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{{short description|American ships make a last stand against many more Japanese ships; part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=May 2019}}
{{more citations needed|date=September 2017}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict    = Battle off Samar
| partof      = [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]], [[Philippines Campaign (1944–45)]], [[Pacific War]] (World War II)
| image       = LeyteGambierBayStraddle.jpg
| caption     = The [[escort carrier]] {{USS|Gambier Bay|CVE-73|2}}, burning from earlier gunfire damage, is bracketed by a salvo from a Japanese [[cruiser]] (faintly visible in the background, center-right) shortly before sinking during the Battle off Samar.
| date        = October 25, 1944
| place       = East of [[Samar Island]]
| result      = American victory
| combatant1  = {{flag|United States|1912}}
| combatant2  = {{flagcountry|Empire of Japan}}
| commander1  = {{flagicon|USA|1912}} [[Clifton Sprague]]
| commander2  = {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|naval}} [[Takeo Kurita]]
| units1      = {{Flagicon|USA|naval}} [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]]
*[[Task Force 77 (United States Navy)|Task Force 77]]
**Task Group 77.4
***Taffy 1
***Taffy 2
***Taffy 3
| units2      = {{flagicon|Empire of Japan|naval}} [[Combined Fleet]]
*[[2nd Fleet (Imperial Japanese Navy)|2nd Fleet]]
**Force A
| strength1   = "Taffy 3"<br>6 [[escort carrier]]s,<br>3 [[destroyer]]s,<br>4 [[destroyer escort]]s,<br>400 aircraft from Taffy 1, 2, and 3
| strength2   = Center Force "A"<br>4 [[battleship]]s,<br>6 [[heavy cruiser]]s,<br>2 [[light cruiser]]s,<br>11 destroyers,<br> 30 aircraft (in ''[[kamikaze]]'' attack)
| casualties1 = 2 escort carriers sunk<br>2 destroyers sunk<br>1 destroyer escort sunk<br> 23 aircraft lost<br>4 escort carriers damaged <br> 1 destroyer damaged <br> 2 destroyer escorts damaged <br> 1,583 killed and missing<br>913 wounded
| casualties2 = 3 heavy cruisers sunk<br>3 heavy cruisers damaged<br>1 destroyer damaged<br>52 aircraft<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/ctu7741_action_report |title=Action Report – Leyte Operation from 12 October to 29 October 1944, p.31|publisher= United States Pacific Fleet Carrier Division 22 via bosamar.com|date=n.d.|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref>
}}
{{Campaignbox Philippines}}

The '''Battle off Samar''' ([[Filipino language|Filipino]]: ''Labanan sa may Samar'') was the centermost action of the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf]], one of the [[largest naval battle in history|largest naval battles in history]], which took place in the [[Philippine Sea]] off [[Samar (island)|Samar]] Island, in the Philippines on October 25, 1944. It was the only major action in the larger battle where the Americans were largely unprepared against the opposing forces. The Battle off Samar has been cited by historians as one of the greatest [[last stand]]s in naval history.<ref>{{Cite book | last=Hornfischer | first=James D. |authorlink=James D. Hornfischer | title=[[The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors]]: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour | publisher=Bantam | location= | isbn= 978-0-553-38148-1 | pages=}}</ref>

Adm. [[William Halsey, Jr.]] was lured into taking his powerful [[United States Third Fleet|3rd Fleet]] after a decoy fleet, taking with him every ship in the area that he had the power to command. After subtracting Halsey's entire force the only remaining American forces in the area were three [[escort carrier]] groups of the [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]]. The escort carriers and destroyer escorts which had been designed to protect slow convoys from submarine attack had been repurposed to attack ground targets, and had few torpedoes as they could normally rely on Halsey's fleet to protect them from any threats from armored warships. A Japanese surface force of [[battleship]]s and [[cruiser]]s, battered earlier in the larger battle and thought to have been in retreat, instead turned around unobserved and encountered the northernmost of the three groups, Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), commanded by Rear Admiral [[Clifton Sprague]]. Taffy 3's three destroyers and four [[destroyer escort]]s possessed neither the firepower nor the armor to effectively oppose the 23 ships of the Japanese force, but nevertheless desperately attacked with [[5"/38 caliber gun]]s and [[Mark 15 torpedo|torpedo]]es to cover the retreat of their slow "jeep" carriers. Aircraft from the carriers of Taffy 1, 2, and 3, including FM-2 Wildcats, F6F Hellcats and TBM Avengers, strafed, bombed, torpedoed, rocketed, depth-charged, fired at least one .38 caliber handgun and made numerous "dry" runs at the Japanese force when the American planes ultimately ran out of ammunition.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/ctu7742_action_report|title=Reoccupation of Leyte Island...25 October 1944,p.13,14|publisher= United States Pacific Fleet Carrier Division 24 via bosamar.com|date=n.d.|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/ctu7742_action_report|title=Reoccupation of Leyte Island...25 October 1944,p.20|publisher= United States Pacific Fleet Carrier Division 24 via bosamar.com|date=n.d.|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref>

Sprague's task unit lost two escort carriers, two destroyers, a destroyer escort and several aircraft. Over a thousand Americans died, comparable to the combined losses of American men and ships at the better-known [[Battle of Coral Sea|Battles of the Coral Sea]] and [[Battle of Midway|Midway]]. But in exchange for the heavy losses for such a small force, they sank three Japanese cruisers, disabled another three, and caused enough confusion to persuade the Japanese commander, Vice Admiral [[Takeo Kurita]], to regroup and ultimately withdraw, rather than advancing to sink troop and supply ships at [[Leyte Gulf]]. In the combined Battle of Leyte Gulf, 10,000 Japanese sailors and 3,000 Americans died. Although the battleship ''Yamato'' and the remaining force returned to Japan, the battles marked the final defeat of the Imperial Japanese Navy, as the ships remained in port for most of the rest of the war and ceased to be an effective naval force.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=573562&p=3|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120527054333/http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=573562&p=3|dead-url=yes|archive-date=May 27, 2012|title=Navy Cmdr. Ernest Evans' Courage Helped Sink Japan's Hopes In World War II|publisher=Investors Business Daily|date=May 27, 2011|accessdate=June 9, 2011}}</ref>

==Background==
The overall [[Empire of Japan|Japanese]] strategy at Leyte Gulf—a plan known as ''Shō-Go'' 1—called for Vice-Admiral [[Jisaburō Ozawa|Jisaburō Ozawa's]] fleet—known as Northern Force—to lure the American 3rd Fleet away from the Allied [[Battle of Leyte|landings on Leyte]], using an apparently vulnerable force of Japanese carriers as bait. The [[Amphibious warfare|landing forces]]—stripped of air cover by the 3rd Fleet—would then be attacked from the west and south by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force, which would sortie from [[Brunei]], and Vice Admiral [[Shoji Nishimura|Shoji Nishimura's]] Southern Force. Kurita's force consisted of five battleships—including {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Yamato||2}} and {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Musashi||2}}, the largest battleships ever built—escorted by cruisers and destroyers. Nishimura's flotilla included two battleships and would be followed by Vice Admiral [[Kiyohide Shima]] with three cruisers.

On the night of October 23, two American submarines, {{USS|Dace|SS-247|2}} and {{USS|Darter|SS-227|2}}, detected Center Force entering the [[Palawan Passage]]. After alerting Halsey, the submarines torpedoed and sank two cruisers, while crippling a third and forcing it to withdraw. One of the cruisers lost was Admiral Kurita's flagship, but he was rescued and transferred his flag to ''Yamato''.

Subsequently, the carriers of the 3rd Fleet launched a series of air strikes against Kurita's forces in the Sibuyan Sea, damaging several vessels and sinking ''Musashi'', initially forcing Kurita to retreat. One wave of aircraft from the 3rd Fleet also struck Nishimura's Southern Force, causing minor damage. At the same time, Vice-Admiral [[Takijirō Ōnishi]] launched strikes from airfields on [[Luzon]] against Halsey's forces, with one bomber scoring a hit on the U.S. light carrier {{USS|Princeton|CVL-23|2}} that ignited explosions, causing her to be scuttled.

That same night, Nishimura's Southern Force of two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and four destroyers was to approach from the south and coordinate with Kurita's force. The second element of the Southern Force, commanded by Vice Admiral [[Kiyohide Shima]] and consisting of three cruisers and seven destroyers, lagged behind Nishimura by {{convert|40|nmi|mi km|lk=in|abbr=on}}. In the [[Battle of Leyte Gulf#Battle of Surigao Strait (25 October 1944)|Battle of Surigao Strait]], Nishimura's ships entered a deadly trap. Outmatched by the U.S. Seventh Fleet Support Force, they were devastated, running a gauntlet of torpedoes from 28 [[PT boat]]s and 28 destroyers before coming under accurate radar-directed gunfire from six battleships (five of them survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack) and eight cruisers. Afterward, as Shima's force encountered what was left of Nishimura's ships, it too came under attack, but managed to withdraw. Of Nishimura's force, only one destroyer survived.

At the [[Battle of Leyte#The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea (October 24)|Battle of the Sibuyan Sea]] Halsey's Third Fleet savaged the Center Force which had been detected on its way to landing forces from the north. It lacked any air cover to defend against the 259 sorties from the five fleet carriers ''Intrepid'', ''Essex'', ''Lexington'', ''Enterprise'' and ''Franklin'' and light carrier ''Cabot'' which sank the massive super-battleship ''Mushashi'' (sister to ''Yamato'') with 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes. It had seemingly beaten into a retreat but even this overwhelming force failed to stop Kurita, as most the attacks were directed at sinking just one battleship. Besides a cruiser crippled by a torpedo, every other ship including ''Yamato'' remained battleworthy.

Halsey's Third Fleet would miss the battle and head off to the [[Battle off Cape Engaño]] where Ozawa's Northern Force consisted of one fleet carrier and three light carriers fielding a total of 108 airplanes (slightly more than the normal complement of a single large fleet carrier), two battleships, three light cruisers and nine destroyers. Admiral Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, just as the Japanese had planned their sacrificial diversion.  Halsey took three groups of [[Task Force 38]] (TF&nbsp;38), overwhelmingly stronger than Ozawa's Northern Force, with five aircraft carriers and five light fleet carriers with more than 600 aircraft between them, six fast battleships, eight cruisers, and over 40 destroyers. Halsey easily dispatched what was later revealed to be a decoy of no serious threat.

As a result of Halsey's decision, the door was left open to Kurita. When Kurita initially withdrew, the Americans assumed that the Japanese force was retreating from the battle. Kurita eventually turned around and made his way through the [[San Bernardino Strait]] under cover of darkness, intent on destroying the American landing forces. Only the light Taffy forces attached to support the landing forces of Seventh Fleet stood in his way. They were equipped to attack ground troops and submarines under the protection of Halsey's fleet carriers, not face off against Kurita's battleships and cruisers which had already largely shrugged off combined attacks from six fleet and light carriers. It would be up to them to improvise a last ditch defense as they were thrust by Halsey's mistake into the role of a sacrificial diversion to protect their landing forces.

==Battle summary==
[[File:kurita.jpg|left|thumbnail|150px|Admiral Takeo Kurita]]

A force of 23 Japanese warships (four battleships, eight cruisers, and eleven destroyers) commanded by Admiral Kurita engaged a U.S. [[task unit]] of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts of 7th Fleet. The Americans were taken entirely by surprise because the 7th Fleet had firmly believed that its northern flank was being protected by Admiral Halsey's immensely powerful 3rd Fleet, which consisted of ten fleet carriers and six fast battleships.

The brunt of the Japanese attack fell on the northernmost of the escort carrier units, Task Unit 77.4.3 (usually referred to by its radio call-sign "Taffy 3", a subcomponent of [[Task Force 77 (United States Navy)|Task Force 77]]), under the command of Rear Admiral [[Clifton Sprague]]. Ill-equipped to fight large-gunned warships, Taffy 3's escort carriers attempted to escape from the Japanese force, while its destroyers, destroyer escorts, and aircraft made sustained attacks on Kurita's ships. The destroyers and destroyer escorts only had torpedoes and guns of up to {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} caliber; nonetheless, the destroyers (but not the destroyer escorts) had [[Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System|radar-assisted gun directors]]; the Japanese had heavy caliber weapons up to {{convert|18.1|in|mm|abbr=on}}, but they had less accurate optical rangefinders and [[List of Japanese World War II radars|fire-assisting radar]]. The Americans also had large numbers of aircraft available, which the Japanese lacked. The ordnance for the escort carriers' aircraft consisted mostly of high-explosive {{convert|500|lb|kg|abbr=on}} bombs used in ground support missions, and depth charges for [[antisubmarine warfare]], rather than the armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes which would have been more effective against heavily armored warships. Nevertheless, even when they were out of ammunition, American aircraft continued to harass the enemy ships, making repeated mock attacks, which distracted their gunners and disrupted their formations.<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 241, 353.</ref>

In all, two U.S. destroyers, a destroyer escort, and an escort carrier were sunk by Japanese gunfire, and another U.S. escort carrier was hit and sunk by a ''[[kamikaze]]'' aircraft during the battle. Kurita's battleships were driven away from the engagement by torpedo attacks from American destroyers; they were unable to regroup in the chaos, while three cruisers were lost after attacks from U.S. destroyers and aircraft, with several other cruisers damaged. Due to the ferocity of the defense, Kurita was convinced that he was facing a far superior force and withdrew from the battle, ending the threat to the troop transports and supply ships.

The battle was one of the last major naval engagements between U.S. and Japanese surface forces in World War II. After this, the Philippines were liberated by the U.S., which cut the Japanese off from their oil-producing colonies in Southeast Asia, while her major shipyards and repair facilities were in Japan. The Imperial Japanese Navy never again sailed into battle in such force; most ships returned to bases in Japan and remained largely inactive for the rest of the war.

This battle is often depicted as one of the major "what-ifs" in World War II. If Kurita had continued the attack instead of withdrawing, it is possible that the U.S. could have suffered heavy losses in troops and supplies, which would have delayed the liberation of the Philippines. If Kurita's and Halsey's forces met, that would have been the long-awaited "decisive battle" where both sides would have finally been able to pit their largest battleships against each other. However, Halsey's 3rd Fleet outnumbered Kurita's in ships of all types, particularly with six American battleships versus four for the Japanese. Only ''Yamato'' had heavier armor and larger guns than the American battleships; the other three Japanese battleships were of World War I design and were generally inferior in firepower and protection, whereas their 3rd Fleet counterparts were all recently built battleships, mounting {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} main guns and equipped with radar-guided fire control systems.

==The forces==
The Japanese Center Force now consisted of the battleships {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Yamato||2}}, {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Nagato||2}}, {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Kongō||2}}, and {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Haruna||2}}; heavy cruisers {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chōkai||2}}, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Haguro||2}}, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Kumano||2}}, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Suzuya|1934|2}}, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}}, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Tone|1937|2}}; light cruisers {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Yahagi|1942|2}}, and {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Noshiro||2}}; and 11 {{sclass-|Kagerō|destroyer|5}}-, {{sclass-|Yūgumo|destroyer|5}}- and [[Japanese destroyer Shimakaze (1942)|''Shimakaze''-class]] destroyers. The battleships and cruisers were fully armored against Taffy 3's {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} projectiles. They together had dozens of larger caliber guns, including the ''Yamato''{{'}}s {{convert|18.1|in|mm|abbr=on}} guns, which could reach out to {{convert|25|mi|nmi km|abbr=on}}. Surface gunnery was controlled by optical sighting which fed [[Ship Gun Fire Control Systems|computer-assisted fire control systems]], though they were less sophisticated than the radar-controlled systems on U.S. destroyers.<ref>''Tincan Sailors'' p. 153</ref>

Each of the three task units of the 7th Fleet's Task Group 77.4 had six small {{sclass-|Casablanca|escort carrier|0}} or larger {{sclass-|Sangamon|escort carrier|2}}s (CVEs) defended by destroyers and destroyer escorts. The destroyers had five {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns, the destroyer escorts had two, and the carriers only a single {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun "stinger" at the stern. Most of the pilots and sailors were reservists with scant combat experience, and because of their tasking against ground troops and submarines, the carriers had been given only a few armour-piercing bombs or torpedoes against the unlikely possibility that they might encounter attack by other ships.<ref>[http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=USS-Samuel-B-Roberts-DE413  USS ''Samuel B Roberts'' became known as The Destroyer Escort That Fought Like a Battleship]</ref> Lacking any ships with any larger guns that could reach beyond {{convert|10|mi|nmi km|abbr=on}}, Taffy 3 appeared hopelessly mismatched against Japanese gunnery which emphasized long range and large guns. This battle did reveal that Japanese Navy's partly automated fire control was largely ineffective against maneuvering ships at long range (though some ships such as ''Kongō'' did hit their targets when they got closer). Although the Japanese [[warship]]s opened fire with their heavier-caliber offensive armament at maximum range and scored some hits and damaging near misses{{clarify|date=July 2019|reason=To do damage, a bullet must hit something. The term "damaging near-misses" should be expanded to explain}}, their fire was not effective until they had closed within range of the carriers' own {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} protective armament. By contrast, the American destroyers (but not destroyer escorts) had the [[Ship gun fire-control system#MK 37 GFCS|Mark 37 gun fire-control system]] that aimed automatic, accurate fire against multiple surface and air targets while maneuvering. The lack of a comparable system in Japanese ships also contributed to reports from American pilots on the ineffectiveness of the Japanese [[antiaircraft]] fire.

[[File:USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) and escorts making smoke off Samar 1944.jpeg|thumb|{{USS|Gambier Bay|CVE-73|2}} and her escorts laying a smoke screen early in the battle.]]

Rear Admiral [[Thomas L. Sprague|Thomas L. Sprague's]] Task Unit 77.4.1 ("Taffy 1") consisted of the Carrier Division 22 escort carriers {{USS|Sangamon|CVE-26|2}}, {{USS|Suwannee|CVE-27|2}}, {{USS|Santee|CVE-29|2}}, and {{USS|Petrof Bay|CVE-80|2}}. (The remaining two escort carriers from Taffy 1, Rear Admiral [[George R. Henderson|George R. Henderson's]] Carrier Division 28 {{USS|Chenango|CVE-28|2}} and {{USS|Saginaw Bay|CVE-82|2}}, had departed for [[Morotai]], [[Dutch East Indies]] on October 24, carrying "dud" aircraft from other carriers for transfer ashore for repair. They returned with replacement aircraft after the battle.)

Rear Admiral [[Felix Stump|Felix Stump's]] Task Unit 77.4.2 ("Taffy 2") Carrier Division 24 consisted of {{USS|Natoma Bay|CVE-62|2}} and {{USS|Manila Bay|CVE-61|2}}, and Rear Admiral [[William Sample|William D. Sample's]] Carrier Division 27 {{USS|Marcus Island|CVE-77|2}}, {{USS|Kadashan Bay|CVE-76|2}}, {{USS|Savo Island|CVE-78|2}}, and {{USS|Ommaney Bay|CVE-79|2}}.

Rear Admiral [[Clifton Sprague|Clifton Sprague's]] Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of Carrier Division 25 {{USS|Fanshaw Bay|CVE-70|2}}, {{USS|St. Lo|CVE-63|2}}, {{USS|White Plains|CVE-66|2}}, {{USS|Kalinin Bay|CVE-68|2}}, and Rear Admiral [[Ralph A. Ofstie|Ralph A. Ofstie's]] Carrier Division 26 {{USS|Kitkun Bay|CVE-71|2}} and {{USS|Gambier Bay|CVE-73|2}}. Screening for Taffy 3 were the destroyers {{USS|Hoel|DD-533|2}}, {{USS|Heermann|DD-532|2}} and {{USS|Johnston|DD-557|2}}, and destroyer escorts {{USS|Dennis|DE-405|2}}, {{USS|John C. Butler|DE-339|2}}, {{USS|Raymond|DE-341|2}}, and {{USS|Samuel B. Roberts|DE-413|2}}.

Though each escort carrier was small, and carried an average of about 28 planes, this gave the 16 CVEs of the three "Taffies" a combined total of approximately 450 aircraft, equivalent to four large fleet carriers. While their top speed of {{convert|17.5|kn|mph km/h|lk=in|abbr=on}} was adequate to escort cargo convoys or to provide ground support, they were too slow to engage or to escape a fast task force in combat. Since their aircraft were intended for [[ground-attack aircraft|ground attack]], [[Combat air patrol|defense against aircraft]], and [[antisubmarine warfare]], the first flights from Taffy 3 were armed only with [[machine gun]]s, [[depth charge]]s, and [[high-explosive]] and antipersonnel [[aerial bomb]]s, that were effective against enemy troops, aircraft, submarines, and destroyers, but not very effective against I.J.N. [[battleship]]s and [[cruiser]]s. In later sorties from the carriers of Taffy 2, the aircraft had enough time to be rearmed with [[torpedo]]es and armor-piercing bombs that could be expected to be more effective against [[warship]]s.

==Battle==
[[File:Samar.jpg|right|thumbnail|300px|Movements during the battle]]

Kurita's force passed through [[San Bernardino Strait]] at 03:00 on October 25, 1944 and steamed southwards along the coast of [[Samar (island)|Samar]], hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and moved most of his fleet away as he had in fact done. Kurita had been advised that Nishimura's Southern Force had been destroyed at Surigao Strait and would not be joining his force at Leyte Gulf. However, Kurita did not receive the transmission from the Northern Force that they had successfully lured away Halsey's Third Fleet of battleships and fleet carriers. Through most of the battle Kurita would be haunted by doubts about Halsey's actual location. The wind was from the North-Northeast and visibility was approximately {{convert|40000|yd|mi nmi km|order=out}} with a low overcast and occasional heavy rain squalls which the US forces would exploit for concealment in the battle to come.<ref name="Lundgren15">{{Cite book | last=Lundgren| first=Robert | title=[[The World Wonder'd]]: What really happened off Samar, p. 15. | publisher=Nimble Books LLC| isbn= 978-1-608-88046-1 }}</ref>

===Taffy 3 comes under attack===
Steaming about {{convert|60|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} east of Samar before dawn on October 25, ''St. Lo'' launched a four-plane antisubmarine patrol while the remaining carriers of Taffy 3 prepared for the day's air strikes against the landing beaches. At 06:37, [[Ensign (rank)|Ensign]] William C. Brooks, flying a [[Grumman TBF Avenger]] from ''St. Lo'', sighted a number of ships expected to be from Halsey's 3rd Fleet, but they appeared to be Japanese. When he was notified, Admiral Sprague was incredulous, and he demanded positive identification. Flying in for an even closer look, Brooks reported, "I can see [[pagoda mast]]s. I see the biggest [[Rising Sun Flag|meatball flag]] on the biggest battleship I ever saw!" ''Yamato'' alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined. Brooks had spotted the largest of the three attacking Japanese forces, consisting of four battleships, six [[heavy cruiser]]s, two [[light cruiser]]s, and about ten destroyers. They were approaching from the west-northwest only {{convert|17|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} away, and they were already well within [[naval artillery|gun]] and visual range of the closest task group, Taffy 3. Armed only with depth charges in case of an encounter with enemy submarines, the aviators nevertheless were determined to carry out the first attack of the battle, aggressively setting the tone of the battle by leaving a calling card of several depth charges which bounced off the bow of a cruiser.

The lookouts of Taffy 3 spotted the antiaircraft fire to the north. The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, achieving complete tactical surprise. At about the same time, others in Taffy 3 had picked up targets from surface radar and Japanese radio traffic. At about 07:00, ''Yamato'' opened fire at a range of {{convert|17|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}. The Americans were soon astonished by the spectacle of colorful geysers as the first volleys of shellfire found their range. Each Japanese battleship used a different color of dye marker so they could spot their own shells. Lacking the American's gunnery radars and Ford [[Mark I Fire Control Computer]], which provided coordinated automatic firing solutions as long as the [[director (military)|gun director]] was pointed at the target, Japanese fire control relied on two mechanical calculators (one for ballistics and one for own and target course and speed) fed by optical range finders aided by color-coded dye loads in each shell. Only the Type 1 AP projectiles of the battleships carried dye loads: ''Nagato'' used a brilliant pink, ''Haruna'' used a greenish yellow variously described as green or yellow by the Americans, and ''Kongo'' used a blood red dye which could appear red, purple, or even blue in some circumstances.  Only ''Yamato'' which had relatively primitive fire control radar, used no dye loads, so her shell splashes appeared white.{{#tag:ref|US Navy Battleships also used dye loads in their main battery shells; not being battleship sailors the men of Taffy 3 would have no reason to know this.|group=N}}<ref>Lundgren, pp.21–22</ref>

Not finding the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, Kurita mistook them for larger fleet carriers and assumed that he had a task group of the 3rd Fleet under his guns. His first priority was to eliminate the carrier threat, ordering a "General Attack". Rather than a carefully orchestrated effort, each division in his task force was to attack separately. The Japanese had just changed to a circular antiaircraft formation, and the order caused some confusion, allowing Sprague to lead the Japanese into a stern chase, which restricted the Japanese to using only their forward guns, and restricted their anti-aircraft gunnery. Sprague's ships would not lose as much of their firepower in a stern chase as their stern chase weapons were more numerous than their forward guns, and his carriers would still be able to operate aircraft.

===The Run to the East===
At 06:50 Admiral Sprague ordered a formation course change to 090, directed his carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and then withdraw towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire. He ordered his escorts to the rear of the formation to [[smoke screen|generate smoke]] to mask the retreating carriers and ordered the carriers to take evasive action, "chasing salvos" to throw off their enemy's aim, and then launched all available [[FM-2 Wildcat]] [[fighter plane]]s and [[TBM Avenger]] [[torpedo bomber]]s with whatever armament they were already loaded with. Some had rockets, machine guns, depth charges, or nothing at all. Very few carried anti-ship bombs or [[aerial torpedo]]es which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships. The Wildcats were deemed a better fit on such small aircraft carriers instead of the faster and heavier [[Grumman F6F Hellcat]]s that were flown from the larger U.S. Navy carriers. Their pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to [[Daniel Z. Romualdez Airport|Tacloban airstrip]], Leyte, to rearm and refuel". Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy.  At about 07:20 the formation entered the squall and the Japanese fire slackened markedly as they lacked gunnery radar that could penetrate the rain and smoke.<ref>Lundgren p. 86</ref>

Admiral Kurita meanwhile was already experiencing the consequences of ordering a General Attack, as his Fifth Cruiser Division and Tenth Destroyer division cut across the course of the Third Battleship Division in their haste to close with the American carriers, forcing the battleship ''Kongo'' to turn North out of formation. ''Kongo'' would act independently for the remainder of the battle.<ref>Lundgren p. 20</ref>  Concerned that his destroyers would burn too much fuel in stern chase of what he presumed were fast carriers while obstructing his battleships' line of fire, Kurita ordered his destroyers to the rear of his formation at 07:10, a decision which had immediate consequences as the Tenth Destroyer Squadron was forced to turn away just as they were gaining the right flank of the American formation. For the Second Destroyer Squadron the consequences were more significant if less immediate: ordered to fall in behind Third Battleship Division ''Yahagi'' and her accompanying destroyers steamed North from their position on the South side of Kurita's formation seeking division flagship ''Kongo'', leaving no Japanese units in position to intercept the American carriers when they turned back South at 07:30.  Despite his General Attack order Kurita would continue to dictate fleet course changes throughout the battle.<ref>Lundgren p. 59</ref>

===American destroyer and destroyer escort counterattack===
[[File:Destroyers laying smoke screen during Battle of Samar 1944.jpeg|thumb|Destroyers of Taffy 3 making smoke under fire.]]
Three destroyers and four smaller destroyer escorts had been tasked to protect the escort carriers from aircraft and submarines. The three {{sclass-|Fletcher|destroyer|2}}s—affectionately nicknamed "tin cans" because they lacked armor—were fast enough to keep up with a fast carrier task force. Each had five single {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns and light [[antiaircraft gun]]s which were not designed to take on armored warships. Only their ten {{convert|21|in|mm|abbr=on}} Mark-15 torpedoes—housed in two swiveling five-tube launchers amidships—posed a serious threat to battleships and cruisers. One advantage the American destroyers had was the radar-controlled Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System which provided coordinated automatic firing solutions for their {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns as long as the [[director (military)|gun director]] was pointing at the target.  A dual-purpose system, the Mark 37's gunfire radar and antiaircraft capabilities allowed the destroyers' guns to remain on target despite poor visibility and their own radical evasive maneuvering. The Japanese reliance on optical range finders aided by color-coded dye loads in each shell and mechanical calculators made it difficult for them to identify their targets through the rain and smoke and limited their ability to maneuver while firing.

The four {{sclass-|John C. Butler|destroyer escort|2}}s were smaller and slower, since they had been designed to protect slow freighter convoys against submarines. Armed with two {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns without automatic fire control they also carried only three torpedoes, though their crews rarely trained for torpedo attacks. Since the torpedoes only had a range of about {{convert|5.5|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}, they were best used at night. During daylight, an attacker would have to pass through a gauntlet of shellfire that could reach out to {{convert|25|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}. In this battle they would be launched against a fleet led by the largest battleship in history, though it was their ability to generate dense, heavy smoke from their funnels and chemical smoke generators which would most influence the course of the battle.

After laying down smoke to hide the carriers from Japanese gunners, they were soon making desperate torpedo runs, using their own smoke for concealment. The ship profiles and aggressiveness caused the Japanese to think they were cruisers and full-sized destroyers. Their lack of armor tended to aid clean penetration of armor-piercing rounds before Japanese gunners switched to high-explosive (HE) shells, which caused much more extensive damage. Their speed and agility enabled some ships to dodge shellfire completely before launching torpedoes. Effective damage control and redundancy in propulsion and power systems kept them running and fighting even after absorbing dozens of hits before sinking, although the decks would be littered with the dead and seriously wounded. Destroyers from Taffy 2 to the south also found themselves under shellfire, but as they were spotted by ''Gambier Bay'', which had signaled for their assistance, they were ordered back to protect their own carriers.<ref name=laststand/>

====USS ''Johnston''====
At 07:00, Commander [[Ernest E. Evans]] of the destroyer {{USS|Johnston|DD-557|2}}, in response to incoming shell fire bracketing carriers of the group he was escorting, began laying down a protective smokescreen and zigzagging. At about 07:10, Gunnery Officer Robert Hagen began firing at the closest attackers, then at a range of {{convert|18000|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}} and registered several hits on the leading heavy cruisers. The Japanese targeted ''Johnston'' and soon shell splashes were bracketing the ship. In response and without consulting with his commanders, Evans ordered ''Johnston'' to "flank speed, full left rudder", beginning an action that would earn him the [[Medal of Honor]].<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_loss_report |title=Loss of Ship – Report Of , p. 1.|publisher= U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com|date=November 10, 1944|accessdate=June 14, 2012}}</ref> ''Johnston'', still making smoke and zigzagging, accelerated to flank speed towards the Japanese.

At 07:15, Hagen concentrated his fire on the leading cruiser squadron's flagship, the heavy cruiser ''Kumano''.<ref name="bosamar">{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/hagen_story |title=We Asked For the Jap Fleet – and Got It|publisher= The Saturday Evening Post via bosamar.com|date=May 26, 1945|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref> Firing at the {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun's maximum range of {{convert|10|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} ''Johnston'' scored several hits on ''Kumano''{{'}}s superstructure, which erupted into flame and smoke.<ref name="bosmar2">{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |title=Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944 |publisher=U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com |date=November 14, 1944 |accessdate=June 10, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016 }}</ref>

At 07:16, Sprague ordered Commander William Dow Thomas aboard ''Hoel'', in charge of the small destroyer screen, to attack. Struggling to form an attack formation, the three small ships (''Hoel'', ''Heermann'', ''Samuel B. Roberts'') began their long sprint to get into firing position for their torpedoes.

''Johnston'' pressed its attack, firing more than two hundred shells as it followed an evasive course through moderate swells, making it a difficult target.<ref name="bosamar"/> ''Johnston'' closed to within maximum torpedo range, and at {{convert|9000|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}} she fired a full salvo of ten torpedoes.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_loss_report |title=Loss of Ship – Report Of|publisher= U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com|date=November 10, 1944|accessdate=June 10, 2012}}</ref> At 07:24, two or three struck, blowing the bow off ''Kumano''.<ref name="bosmar2"/> Minutes later, at 07:33,  ''Kongo'' was narrowly missed by four torpedoes.  (Morrison asserts ''Kongo'' was forced to turn away north to avoid these torpedoes but this is not reflected in ''Kongo's'' own action report.  It is not clear if these torpedoes were fired by ''Johnston'' or ''Hoel''.) <ref>Morison, p. 258.</ref><ref>Lundgren, p.81</ref> The heavy cruiser ''Suzuya'', suffering damage from air attacks, was also taken out of the fight, as she stopped to assist ''Kumano''. The effect of ''Johnston''{{'}}s attack was to generate confusion in the minds of the Japanese commanders, who thought they were being engaged by American cruisers. Evans then reversed course and, under cover of his smoke screen, opened the range between his ship and the enemy.

At 07:30, three battleship main battery shells passed through the deck of ''Johnston'' and into her portside engine room, cutting the destroyer's speed in half to {{convert|17|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}} and disrupting electric power to her aft gun mounts. Hagen reports these as {{convert|14|in|mm|abbr=on}} shells from the battleship ''Kongō'', at a range of {{convert|7|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}, but this is unlikely as ''Kongo'' was on the far side of the Japanese formation and ''Kongo's'' action report states she was not engaging any targets at this time as she was blinded by a rain squall.  Based on the bearing and angle of fall it's far more likely these were {{convert|18.1|in|mm|abbr=on}} shells fired by ''Yamato'' from a range of {{convert|20,313|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}}, as moments later, three {{convert|6.1|in|mm|abbr=on}} shells from ''Yamato'' struck ''Johnston''{{'}}s bridge, causing numerous casualties and severing the fingers of Commander Evans's left hand. The ship was mangled badly, with dead and dying sailors strewn across her bloody decks.  ''Yamato'' reported sinking a "cruiser" (the Japanese consistently overestimated the size of the US ships engaged) with a main battery salvo at 07:27.<ref>Lundgren, p.70</ref> Destroyer ''Kishinami'', which was also firing at ''Johnston'' at the time, reported "The ''Yamato'' sank one enemy cruiser" at 07:28.<ref>Lundgren, p.78</ref>

But ''Johnston'' was not sunk. Her stores of fuel had been seriously depleted before the battle, saving her from a catastrophic explosion.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |title=Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944, p.8 |publisher=U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com |date=November 14, 1944 |accessdate=June 10, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref> The ship found sanctuary in rain squalls, where the crew had time to repair damage, restoring power to two of the three aft gun mounts. ''Johnston''{{'}}s search radar was destroyed, toppled to the deck in a tangled mess. The fire control radar was damaged, but was quickly returned to service. Only a few minutes were required to bring ''Johnston''{{'}}s main battery and radar online, and from its hidden position in the rain, ''Johnston'' fired several dozen rounds at the lead Japanese destroyer at {{convert|10000|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}} beginning at approximately 07:35. Fire was then shifted to the cruisers approaching from the east. Several dozen more rounds were fired at the closest target at {{convert|11000|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}}.<ref name="bosamar"/><ref name="bosmar2"/><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.combinedfleet.com/noshiro_t.htm |title=HIJMS NOSHIRO: Tabular Record of Movement, Rev. 2|publisher= Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp|orig-year=Copyright 1997–2007|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref> Since neither of these targets could be observed visually they could not be positively identified but ''Johnston's'' presumed "cruiser" was most likely the battleship ''Haruna''.<ref>Lundgren p.74</ref>

At 07:37, Commodore Thomas ordered a torpedo attack via voice radio. ''Johnston'' and ''Heermann'' acknowledged.<ref name="bosamar3">{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |title=Combined Action Report ... Report of loss of U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE 413) |publisher=U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE413) via bosamar.com |date=November 20, 1944 |accessdate=June 11, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016 }}</ref> As ''Johnston'' continued its course away from the Japanese, it came upon the charging screening force, led by the damaged ''Hoel''. Evans then had ''Johnston'' rejoin the attack to provide gun support to Commander Thomas' small squadron on their torpedo run. Attacking ''Tone'', the leading heavy cruiser to the east of the formation, ''Johnston'' closed to {{convert|6000|yd|nmi km}}, now firing with reduced efficiency due to her lost SC radar, yet still registering many hits.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |title=Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944, p. 3. |publisher=U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com |date=November 14, 1944 |accessdate=June 10, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/files/0750_2nd_screen_web.jpg |title=Second Screening Action at 07:50|publisher= Robert Jon Cox via bosamar.com|year=2009|accessdate=June 11, 2012}}</ref>

All available fighters and bombers from the Taffys converged on the Japanese fleet. At 08:40, moving erratically through the smoke and rain, ''Johnston'' avoided ''Heermann'' by the narrowest of margins.<ref name="bosamar4">{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |title=Combined Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar ... 25 October 1944, p. 5. |publisher=EX- U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) via bosamar.com |date=November 20, 1944 |accessdate=June 13, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |title=Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944 |publisher=U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com |date=November 14, 1944 |accessdate=June 10, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref> ''Heermann'' was "within potato range" at one point (between 08:08 and 08:25) of a Japanese destroyer for several minutes, before being separated by the smoke.<ref>Hornfischer, p. 256.</ref>

During the battle, Evans engaged in several duels with much larger Japanese opponents. At 08:20, emerging through smoke and rain squalls, ''Johnston'' was confronted by a 36,600-ton ''Kongō''-class battleship. (probably ''Haruna'', which reported engaging a US destroyer with her secondary battery around this time)<ref>Lundgren, p.124</ref> ''Johnston'' fired at least 40 rounds, and more than 15 hits on the battleship's superstructure were observed. ''Johnston'' reversed course and disappeared in the smoke, avoiding ''Kongō''{{'}}s {{convert|14|in|cm|abbr=on|0}} return fire. At 08:26 and again at 08:34, Commander Thomas requested an attack on the heavy cruisers to the east of the carriers.<ref name="bosamar3"/> Responding at 08:30, ''Johnston'' bore down on a huge cruiser firing at the helpless ''Gambier Bay'', then closed to {{convert|6000|yd|nmi km}} and fired for ten minutes at a heavier and better-armed opponent, possibly ''Haguro'', scoring numerous hits.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |title=Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar, P.I., 25 October 1944, p. 4. |publisher=U.S.S. Johnston (DD557) via bosamar.com |date=November 14, 1944 |accessdate=June 11, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd557_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref>

At 08:40, a much more pressing target appeared astern. A formation of seven Japanese destroyers in two columns was closing in to attack the carriers.<ref name="bosamar"/><ref name="bosmar2"/><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/bosc11 |title=My Online Book, The Battle Off Samar, Chapter 11|publisher= Robert Jon Cox via bosamar.com|year=2012|accessdate=June 11, 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/longbeach |title=Long Beach Navy Officer Commander's Ship Named in Thrilling Magazine Story |publisher= Newspaper article from unnamed newspaper from the personal collection of Joan Bayless Brandt via bosamar.com|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/survivor_tells |title=Johnston Survivor Tells of Ship's Defiant Stand|publisher= Newspaper article by Lilian E. Haislip from unnamed newspaper from the personal collection of Joan Bayless Brandt via bosamar.com|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref> Reversing course to intercept, Evans attempted to pass in front of the formation, [[Crossing the T|crossing the "T"]], a classical naval maneuver which would have put the force being "crossed" at a great disadvantage.  Evans ordered ''Johnston''{{'}}s guns to fire on this new threat. The Japanese destroyers returned fire, striking ''Johnston'' several times. Perhaps seeing his disadvantage, the commander of the lead destroyer turned away to the west. From as close as {{convert|7000|yd|nmi km}}, Hagen fired and scored a dozen hits on the destroyer leader before it veered off. He shifted fire to the next destroyer in line, scoring five hits before it too turned away. Amazingly, the entire squadron turned west to avoid ''Johnston''{{'}}s fire. At 09:20, these destroyers finally managed to fire their torpedoes from extreme range, {{convert|10500|yd|nmi mi km|order=out}}.<ref name="bosamar"/>  Several torpedoes were detonated by strafing aircraft or defensive fire from the carriers, and the rest failed to strike a target.

Now the Japanese and American ships were intertwined in a confused jumble. The heavy smoke had made the visibility so poor by 08:40 ''Johnston'' nearly collided with ''Heerman'' while crossing the formation to engage the Japanese Destroyers, forcing ''Samuel B Roberts'' to evade them both.<ref>Lundgren, p.142</ref> ''Gambier Bay'' and ''Hoel'' were sinking. Finding targets was not difficult. After 09:00, with ''Hoel'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts'' out of the fight, the crippled ''Johnston'' was an easy target. Fighting with all she had, she exchanged fire with four cruisers and numerous destroyers.

''Johnston'' continued to take hits from the Japanese, which knocked out the number one gun mount, killing many men. By 09:20, forced from the bridge by exploding ammunition, Evans was commanding the ship from the stern by shouting orders down to men manually operating the rudder. Shell fire knocked out the remaining engine, leaving ''Johnston'' dead in the water at 09:40. As her attackers gathered around the vulnerable ship, they concentrated fire on her rather than the fleeing carriers. ''Johnston'' was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat."

At 09:45, Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. ''Johnston'' sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Evans abandoned ship with his crew, but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the [[Medal of Honor]]. However, it was the Japanese themselves who first recognized ''Johnston''{{'}}s incredible actions that day: As the Japanese destroyer {{ship|Japanese destroyer|Yukikaze|1939|2}} cruised slowly by, Robert Billie and several other crewmen watched as her captain saluted the sinking ''Johnston''.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/harms#|title= In Harm's Way|publisher=bosamar.com|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref>

====USS ''Samuel B. Roberts''====
[[File:USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413).jpg|left|200px|thumb|{{USS|Samuel B. Roberts|DE-413|2}} at sea.]]

Although destroyer escorts were conceived as the most inexpensive small ships that could protect slow cargo convoys against submarines, they had retained a basic anti-ship capability with torpedoes and {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns. In this battle, {{USS|Samuel B. Roberts|DE-413}} would distinguish itself as the "destroyer escort that fought like a battleship" when thrown into the fray against armored cruisers which were designed to withstand {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun fire. Sometime around 07:40, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland maneuvered his small ship to evade the charging ''Heermann'' and, as he watched the destroyer receding towards the enemy, sized up the situation,<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 198-201.</ref> which he passed to his crew over the 1MC public-address circuit: "This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can." He realized that at his current heading and location his small ship would be in a textbook position to launch a torpedo attack at the leading heavy cruiser. Without orders, and indeed against orders, he proceeded at full speed and set course to follow ''Heermann'' in to attack the cruisers. Under the cover of the smoke screen from the destroyers, ''Roberts'' escaped detection. Not wanting to draw attention to his small ship, he repeatedly denied his gun captain permission to open fire with the {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns; even though targets were clearly visible and in range, he intended to launch torpedoes at {{convert|5000|yd|km}}. A stray shell, probably intended for one of the nearby destroyers, hit ''Roberts''{{'}} mast which fell and jammed the torpedo mount at 08:00. Finally recovering, at {{convert|4000|yd|km}}, ''Roberts'' launched her torpedoes at ''Chōkai'' without being fired upon. Quickly reversing course, ''Roberts'' disappeared into the smoke. A lookout reported at least one torpedo hit, and the crippled ''Chōkai'' started losing speed and fell to the rear of the column at 08:23.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.bosamar.com/pages/cve68_action_report|title=Action Report of 25 October 1944|publisher=U.S.S. Kalinin Bay (CVE-68), Enclosure "A" via bosamar.com|date=n.d.|accessdate=June 9, 2012}}</ref><ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 253-255.</ref>

By 08:10, ''Roberts'' was nearing the carrier formation. Through the smoke and rain, the heavy cruiser ''Chikuma'' appeared, firing broadsides at the carriers. Copeland changed course to attack and informed his gun captain, "Mr Burton, you may open fire."<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 286.</ref> ''Roberts'' and ''Chikuma'' began to trade broadsides. ''Chikuma'' now divided her fire between the carriers and ''Roberts''. Hampered by the closing range and slow rate of fire, ''Chikuma'' fired with difficulty at her small, fast opponent. (Early in the battle, when it had become apparent that ''Roberts'' would have to defend the escort carriers against a surface attack, chief engineer Lt. "Lucky" Trowbridge bypassed all the engine's safety mechanisms, enabling ''Roberts'' to go as fast as {{convert|28|kn}}.)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |title=Combined Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar ... 25 October 1944, p. 12. |publisher=EX- U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) via bosamar.com |date=November 20, 1944 |accessdate=June 13, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref> ''Roberts'' did not share ''Chikuma''{{'}}s problem of slow rate of fire. For the next 35 minutes, from as close as {{convert|5300|yd|km}}, her guns would fire almost the entire supply of {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} ammunition on board—over 600 rounds.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |title=Combined Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar ... 25 October 1944 |publisher=EX- U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) via bosamar.com |date=November 20, 1944 |accessdate=June 13, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref> In this seemingly unequal contest, ''Chikuma'' was raked along its entire length. However, unknown to the crew of ''Roberts'', shortly after ''Roberts'' engaged ''Chikuma'', ''Heermann'' also aimed her guns at the cruiser, putting her in a deadly crossfire. ''Chikuma''{{'}}s superstructure was ripped by salvo after salvo of armor-piercing shells, high-explosive shells, anti-aircraft shells, and even [[star shell]]s that created chemical fires even in metal plates. The bridge of ''Chikuma'' was devastated, fires could be seen along her superstructure, and her number three gun mount was no longer in action.<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 285-289.</ref>

However, ''Chikuma'' was not alone, and soon the Japanese fleet's multi-colored salvos were bracketing ''Roberts'', indicating that she was under fire from ''Yamato'', ''Nagato'', and ''Haruna''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |title=Combined Action Report – Surface Engagement off Samar ... 25 October 1944, p. 9. |publisher=EX- U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) via bosamar.com |date=November 20, 1944 |accessdate=June 13, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160209122801/http://www.bosamar.com/pages/de413_action_report |archivedate=February 9, 2016  }}</ref> In a desperate bid to avoid approaching shells, Copeland ordered full back, causing the salvo to miss. Now, however, his small ship was an easy target, and at 08:51, cruiser shells found their mark, damaging one of her boilers. At {{convert|17|kn}},  ''Roberts'' began to suffer hits regularly. Credit is given to ''Kongō'' for striking the final decisive blows at 09:00, which knocked out her remaining engine.<ref name="bosamar4"/> Dead in the water and sinking, ''Roberts''{{'}}s part in the battle was over.<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 325-332.</ref>

Gunner's Mate [[Paul H. Carr]] was in charge of the aft {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun mount, which had fired nearly all of its 325 stored rounds in 35 minutes before a breech explosion caused by the gun's barrel overheating. Carr was found dying at his station, begging for help loading the last round he was holding into the breech. He was awarded a [[Silver Star]], and a [[USS Carr (FFG-52)|guided missile frigate]] was later named for him.<ref>''Tincan Sailors'' p. 332.</ref> The [[guided missile frigate]]s ''Samuel B. Roberts'' (FFG-58) and ''Copeland'' (FFG-25)  were named for the ship and its captain.

Companion destroyer escorts {{USS|Raymond|DE-341}}, {{USS|Dennis|DE-405}}, and {{USS|John C. Butler|DE-339}} also launched torpedoes. While they missed, this helped slow the Japanese chase. ''Dennis'' was struck by a pair of cruiser shells, while ''John C. Butler'' ceased fire after expending her ammunition an hour into the engagement.

====USS ''Hoel''====
The fast destroyer {{USS|Hoel|DD-533|2}}—captained by Commander Leon S. Kintberger— was the flagship of the small destroyer and destroyer escort screen of Taffy 3.  As towering splashes from Japanese shells began bracketing the ships of the task group, ''Hoel'' started zig-zagging and laying smoke to help defend the now fleeing CVEs. When the Japanese had closed to {{convert|18000|yd|km}} Kintberger opened fire, and was in turn targeted by the Japanese. ''Yamato''{{'}}s {{convert|6.1|in|cm}} guns scored a hit on ''Hoel''{{'}}s bridge at {{convert|14000|yd|km}}, knocking out all voice radio communication, killing four men and wounding Kintberger and Screen Flag Officer Commander William Dow Thomas.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd533_action_report |title= Combined Action Report and Report of Loss of U.S.S. Hoel (DD533),p. 3,7.|publisher= U.S.S. Hoel (DD533) via bosamar.com|date=November 15, 1944|accessdate=June 14, 2012}}</ref>

Admiral Sprague then ordered Thomas to attack the Japanese with torpedoes. From his position on the damaged ''Hoel'', he formed up the three destroyers of his command as best he could and at 07:40 ordered "Line up and let's go."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd532_action_report |title=Action Report – Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island, Enclosure (F), p. 8.|publisher= U.S.S. Heermann (DD532) via bosamar.com|date=November 1, 1944|accessdate=June 11, 2012}}</ref> Through rain showers and smoke, ''Hoel'' zig-zagged toward the Japanese fleet, followed by ''Heermann'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts''. Lurking in the rain, ''Johnston'' was targeting unsuspecting Japanese cruisers with her radar.

Kintberger now had to quickly choose a target as the distance closed rapidly. In the [[Operations room|Combat Information Center]], Executive Officer Fred Green quickly suggested a course that would put ''Hoel'' in position to attack the leading "battleship", either ''Kongo'' or possibly the heavy cruiser ''Haguro''. Without hesitation, Kintberger ordered ''Hoel'' in. No consideration was given to the fact that the course would put the small ship in the middle of the charging Center Force.<ref>Hornfischer, p. 222-224.</ref>

Gunnery Officer Lt. Bill Sanders directed ''Hoel''{{'}}s main battery of five 5"/38 caliber guns in a rapid-fire barrage and scored several hits, drawing the attention of a substantial portion of the Japanese fleet. Soon shells of all calibers were straddling the attacking destroyer.

Sometime near 07:27, at a range of {{convert|9000|yd|km}}, ''Hoel'' fired a half salvo of torpedoes and reversed course.<ref name="bosamar5">{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd533_action_report |title= Combined Action Report and Report of Loss of U.S.S. Hoel (DD533),p. 3.|publisher= U.S.S. Hoel (DD533) via bosamar.com|date=November 15, 1944|accessdate=June 14, 2012}}</ref> The results of this salvo were not observed, but several histories report that ''Haguro'' was forced to turn sharply away from the torpedo attack and dropped out of the lead to behind ''Tone'',<ref>Morison, p. 259.</ref> an assertion that is contradicted by ''Haguro's'' detailed action report, which records turning to engaging an "enemy cruiser" (''Hoel'') at {{convert|10300|yd|km}}, but not a torpedo attack.<ref name="Lundgren">{{cite book|last1=Lundgren|first1=Robert|title=The World Wonder'd: What Really Happened Off Samar|date=2014|publisher=Nimble Books LLC|location=Ann Arbor|isbn=9781608880461|page=80}}</ref>

Moments after ''Hoel'' loosed her first half salvo, a devastating series of multi-caliber shells struck ''Hoel'' in rapid succession, disabling all the primary and secondary battery weapons aft of the second stack, stopping her port engine, and depriving her of her Mark-37 fire control director, FD radar, and bridge steering control. His ship slowing to 17 knots under hand steering, Kintberger realized he would have to fire his remaining torpedoes quickly before his ship was shot out from under him.<ref>Hornfischer, p. 229.</ref>

Heading southwest after his initial torpedo attack, Commander Kintberger turned west and launched his second torpedo salvo at a "Heavy Cruiser" (probably ''Yamato'' or ''Haruna'', both sides having difficulty with target identification in the poor visibility) at approximately 07:50. This time, ''Hoel's'' crew were rewarded by what appeared to be the sight of large columns of water alongside their target. The torpedo hits could not be confirmed, however. The water spouts were probably near misses by bombs. Japanese action reports reveal that ''Hoel''{{'}}s target was probably ''Yamato'', which turned hard to port to evade a torpedo salvo at 07:54 and was forced to run north until the torpedoes ran out of fuel, taking Kurita out of the battle and causing him to lose track of his forces.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lundgren|first1=Robert|title=The World Wonder'd: What Really Happened Off Samar|date=2014|publisher=Nimble Books LLC|location=Ann Arbor|isbn=9781608880461|page=109}}</ref>

''Hoel'' was now crippled and surrounded by the enemy, with her speed reduced to 17 knots. Within a few minutes, steerage had been restored from the aft steering room. Kintberger ordered a course south towards Taffy 3. In the process of fishtailing and zig-zagging, she peppered the closest enemy ships with her two remaining guns. Finally at roughly 08:30,<ref name="bosamar5"/> after withstanding over 40 hits from {{convert|5|–|16|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns, an {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on}} shell disabled her remaining engine. With her engine room underwater and No. 1 magazine ablaze, the ship began listing to port, settling by the stern. The order to abandon ship was given at 08:40, and many of her surviving crew swam away from the ship.

A Japanese cruiser and several destroyers closed to within {{convert|2000|yd|km}}, giving the two forward gun crews, under Gun Captain Chester Fay, a large, close target. For about ten minutes, they traded salvos with the ''Tone''-class cruiser. When the destroyers slowed and approached to about {{convert|1000|yd}}, they were also fired upon. The Japanese fire only stopped at 08:55 when ''Hoel'' rolled over and sank in {{convert|8000|yd|km}} of water, after enduring 90 minutes of punishment.<ref>''U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History'', by Norman Friedman. Naval Institute Press, 2004. {{ISBN|1-55750-442-3}}, {{ISBN|978-1-55750-442-5}} (excerpt on [[Google Books]]).</ref>

''Hoel'' was the first of Taffy 3's ships to sink, and suffered the heaviest proportional losses: only 86 of her complement survived; 253 officers and men died with their ship. Commander Kintberger, who would live to retire a rear admiral, described the courageous devotion to duty of the men of ''Hoel'' in a seaman's epitaph: "Fully cognizant of the inevitable result of engaging such vastly superior forces, these men performed their assigned duties coolly and efficiently until their ship was shot from under them."

====USS ''Heermann''====
{{USS|Heermann|DD-532|2}}—captained by Commander Amos T. Hathaway—was on the disengaged side of the carriers at the start of the fight when at 07:37 he received an order from Commodore Thomas to take the lead position in a column of "small boys" to attack the approaching enemy fleet. ''Heermann'' steamed into the action at flank speed through the formation of "baby flattops" through smoke and intermittent rain squalls that had reduced visibility at times to less than {{convert|100|yd|m|abbr=on}}, twice having to back emergency full to avoid collisions with friendly ships, first with ''Samuel B. Roberts'', and then at 07:49 with ''Hoel'', as she tried to take her assigned position at the head of the column in preparation for a torpedo attack.<ref name="bosamar6">{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/dd532_action_report |title=Action Report – Philippine Operation; Battle East of Samar Island|publisher= U.S.S. Heermann (DD532) via bosamar.com|date=November 1, 1944|accessdate=June 11, 2012}} {{subscription required}}</ref>

At 07:50, ''Heermann'' engaged the heavy cruiser ''Haguro'' with her {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} guns, while hurriedly preparing a half-salvo torpedo attack. In the confusion of battle, the torpedoman on the second torpedo mount mistakenly fired two extra torpedoes at the same time as the number one mount before he was stopped by the mount captain. After firing seven torpedoes, ''Heermann'' changed course to engage a column of three battleships that had commenced firing upon her.<ref name="bosamar6"/>

Hathaway may now have been responsible for causing a series of events that may have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle. He directed {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gunfire on the battleship ''Haruna'', the column's leader. Then he quickly closed to a mere {{convert|4400|yd|km|abbr=on}} and fired his last three torpedoes.<ref name="bosamar6"/> ''Haruna'' evaded all of them, but historian [[Samuel Eliot Morison]], with his usual disregard for Japanese sources, asserts that ''Yamato'' was bracketed between two of ''Heermann''{{'}}s torpedoes on parallel courses, and for 10 minutes was forced to head north away from the action, while Lundgren, based on a comparison of both Japanese and American sources, asserts that these torpedoes came from ''Hoel''{{'}}s second salvo fired at 07:53.<ref>Lundgren, p. 111</ref> In either case Admiral Kurita and his most powerful ship were temporarily out of the action. The Japanese had now lost the initiative. The stubborn American defense had completely taken the wind out of the Japanese attack.

At 08:03, believing that one of the torpedoes had hit the battleship, Hathaway set course for the carrier formation, zigzagging and under the cover of smoke. Still undamaged, ''Heermann'' was able to fire through the smoke and rain at nearby targets. Now under continuous fire, ''Heermann'' began an unequal duel with ''Nagato'', whose salvos were beginning to land uncomfortably close.<ref name="bosamar6"/>

At 08:26, Commander Thomas requested covering fire on the cruisers firing on the CVEs from the east. Hathaway responded, but first had to pass through the formation of carriers and escorts. This task proved hazardous. Traveling at flank speed, ''Heermann'' again had two near misses, this time with ''Fanshaw Bay'' and ''Johnston''.

Finally on course for the enemy cruisers, ''Heermann'' came upon the heavily damaged ''Gambier Bay'' which was being pummeled at point-blank range.  At {{convert|12000|yd|km}}, ''Heermann'' engaged ''Chikuma'' as her guns cleared ''Gambier Bay''. Now ''Chikuma'' was caught in a crossfire between ''Heermann'' and ''Samuel B. Roberts'' and taking considerable punishment. During this phase of the battle, ''Heermann'' came under fire from the bulk of the Japanese fleet. Colored splashes of red, yellow, and green indicated that she was being targeted by ''Kongō'' and ''Haruna''. Many uncolored splashes were also observed, likely from the line of heavy cruisers being led by ''Chikuma''. At 08:45, a hit on ''Heermann''{{'}}s wheelhouse killed three men outright and fatally wounded another.<ref name="bosamar6"/>  A series of {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on}} shell hits flooded the forward part of the destroyer, pulling her bow down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water, while one of her guns was knocked out.

At 08:50, aircraft from [[VC-10 Challengers|VC-10]] approached the scene and were vectored via VHF by Taffy 3 to the cruisers to the east. By 08:53, ''Chikuma'' and the rest of the four heavy cruisers were under heavy air attack. At 0902, under the combined effort of ''Heermann'', ''Roberts'', and the bombs, torpedoes, and strafing from the carrier-based planes, ''Chikuma'' finally disengaged, but sank during her withdrawal.<ref name="bosamar6"/>

At 09:07, the heavy cruiser ''Tone'' exchanged fire with ''Heermann'' until she too turned away at 09:10. By 09:17, Sprague ordered Hathaway to lay smoke on the port quarter of the CVEs, and by 09:30 the group had reformed in its normal formation and was headed southward.<ref name="bosamar6"/>

Convinced he was facing a much larger force due to the ferocity of the American resistance, Admiral Kurita gave a "cease action" order at 09:00, with instructions to rendezvous north.  Thus, unexpectedly, the Japanese began to disengage and turned away.

Though extensively damaged, ''Heermann'' was the only destroyer from the screen to survive.

===The Run to the South===
[[File:TBM-1 VT-26 in flight 1944.jpeg|thumb|right|A [[Grumman TBF Avenger]] from USS ''Santee''.]]
Temporarily safe within the rain squall, Admiral Sprague had a hard decision to make.  Their easterly course was drawing the enemy too close to San Bernardino Strait and away from any help that might come from Admiral Oldendorf's forces to the south, and Kurita was about to gain the windward side of his formation, which would render his smoke less effective.  So at 07:30 Sprague ordered a course change, first to the southeast and then to the south, and ordered his escorts to make their torpedo attack to cover the carrier's emergence from the storm.  This was a very risky decision for Sprague, because it gave Kurita a chance to cut across the diameter of Sprague's arc and cut him off. However, Kurita missed the chance and his forces followed Taffy 3 around the circle, his earlier decision to send his destroyers to the rear having removed them from a position where they could have intercepted or prevented the American formation's turn.<ref>Lundgren, pp. 86–87</ref>  The [[aircraft carrier]]s of Taffy 3 turned south and withdrew through shellfire at their top speed of {{convert|17.5|kn|mph kph}}. The six carriers dodged in and out of rain squalls, occasionally turning into the wind to launch the few planes they had left.

After one hour the Japanese had closed the chase to within {{convert|10|mi|km}} of the carriers. That the carriers had managed to evade destruction reinforced the Japanese belief that they were attacking fast fleet carriers. The heavy clouds of black and white smoke generated by the Americans were now making target observation extremely difficult. At 08:00, Sprague ordered the carriers to "open fire with pea-shooters when the range is clear". The stern chase was also advantageous for the sole anti-ship armament of small carriers was a single manually controlled stern-mounted {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun as a stinger, though they were loaded with anti-aircraft shells.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://battleshipyamato.info/battles.html |title=Battleship Yamato Battles|publisher= Battleshipyamato.info|accessdate=March 18, 2010}}</ref> Fire from the CVEs' stingers would be credited with hitting Japanese warships that ventured within {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun range and contributing to the sinking of heavy cruiser {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chōkai||2}}.<ref name="Hornfischer 2004, p. 309">Hornfischer 2004, p. 309.</ref> As anti-aircraft gunners observed helplessly, an officer cheered them by exclaiming, "just wait a little longer, boys, we're suckering them into 40-mm range."

===Carriers under attack===
During the run to the east the ships had been battered by near-misses; at 08:05 ''Kalinin Bay'' was struck by an {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on}} shell and the carriers started taking direct hits. However, the Japanese ships were firing armor-piercing (AP) shells, which often carried right through the unarmored escort carriers without detonating. Though CVEs were popularly known as "Combustible Vulnerable Expendable", they would ultimately prove durable in first dodging and then absorbing heavy shell fire, and in downing attacking ''kamikaze'' planes.

====USS ''White Plains''====
When ''Yamato'' opened fire at 06:59 at an estimated range of {{convert|34,544|yd|nmi km|0|order=out}}, she targeted ''White Plains'' with her first four salvos.''Yamato's'' third salvo was a close straddle landing at 07:04. One shell from this salvo exploded beneath the turn of ''White Plains'' port bilge near frame 142, close to her aft (starboard) engine room. While the ship was not struck directly the mining effect of the under-keel explosion severely damaged her hull, deranged her starboard machinery and tripped all of the circuit breakers in her electrical network. Prompt and effective damage control restored power and communications within three minutes and she was able to remain in formation by overspeeding her port engine to compensate. The gout of black smoke resulting from the shock of the explosion convinced ''Yamato'' (and ''Nagato'', which was also firing her main battery at ''White Plains'' at the time) that they had scored a direct hit and they shifted fire to other targets.<ref>{{Cite book | last=Lundgren| first=Robert | title=[[The World Wonder'd]]: What really happened off Samar, pp.29–36. | publisher=Nimble Books LLC| isbn= 978-1-608-88046-1 }}</ref> The turn to the south put ''White Plains'' in the lead of the formation and she escaped any further hits from Japanese fire.

During the surface phase of the action, ''White Plains'''s {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun crew claimed six hits on [[heavy cruiser]] {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chōkai||2}},<ref name=laststand>{{Cite book | last=Hornfischer | first=James D. |authorlink=James D. Hornfischer | title=[[The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors]]: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy's Finest Hour|pages=308–310 | publisher=Bantam | isbn= 978-0-553-38148-1 }}</ref> causing its eight deck-mounted [[Type 93 torpedo|Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo]]es to explode. The explosion crippled ''Chokai'', making it vulnerable to air attack. ''Chokai'' was later sunk by planes from {{USS|Ommaney Bay|CVE-79|3}}, an escort carrier of Taffy 2. However, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Haguro||2}}'s detailed action report states that ''Chokai's'' immobilizing damage resulted from a bomb hit at 08:51,<ref name="Lundgren | p. 184">Lundgren | p. 184</ref> so while this claim is plausible it is not verified by Japanese sources.

====USS ''Gambier Bay''====
As Japanese gunners concentrated on the closest target, ''Gambier Bay'' effectively was a sacrifice that diverted attention from the other fleeing carriers. It was 08:10 when ''Chikuma'' closed to within {{convert|5|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} to finally land hits on the flight deck of ''Gambier Bay'', which was the most exposed. Subsequent hits and near misses, as the Japanese switched to high-explosive shells, first caused ''Gambier Bay'' to lose speed, and she was soon dead in the water. Three cruisers closed to point-blank range, as destroyers such as ''Johnston'' were unsuccessful in drawing fire away from the doomed carrier. Fires raged through the riddled escort carrier. She capsized at 09:07 and disappeared beneath the waves at 09:11. The majority of her nearly 800 survivors were rescued two days later by landing and patrol craft dispatched from Leyte Gulf. ''Gambier Bay'' would be the only U.S. carrier sunk by naval gunfire in World War II.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/cve73|title=CVE73|publisher= Bosamar.com |accessdate=March 18, 2010}}</ref>

====USS ''St. Lo''====
[[File:USS St Lo (CVE-63) 2.jpg|thumb|224px|''St. Lo'' explodes after ''kamikaze'' strike.]]

Straddled several times during the run to the east, ''St. Lo'' escaped serious damage during the surface phase of the action. By 07:38 the Japanese cruisers approaching from ''St. Lo''{{'s}} port quarter had closed to within {{convert|14000|yd|km}}. ''St. Lo'' responded to their salvos with rapid fire from her single {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun, claiming three hits on a [[Tone class cruiser|''Tone''-class]] cruiser. At 10:00 she launched an Avenger armed with a torpedo to join the attack launched by ''Kitkun Bay'' at 10:13.  At 10:51 [[Yukio Seki|Lt. Yukio Seki]], leader of the ''Shikishima'' squadron, crashed his A6M ''Zero'' into her flight deck from astern and the resulting explosions and fires within her hangar forced Captain McKenna to order abandon ship at 11:00. USS ''St Lo'' capsized and sank at 11:25 with the loss of 114 men.<ref>Lundgren pp. 222–223</ref>

====USS ''Kalinin Bay''====
As the trailing ship in the escort carrier van after the turn to the south, {{USS|Kalinin Bay|CVE-68|2}} came under intense enemy fire. Though partially protected by smoke, a timely rain squall, and counterattacks by the screening destroyers and destroyer escorts, she took the first of fifteen direct hits at 07:50. Fired from an enemy battleship, the large-caliber shell ({{convert|14|in|mm|abbr=on}} or {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on}}) struck the starboard side of the hangar deck just aft of the forward elevator.

By 08:00 the Japanese cruisers off her port quarter (''Tone'' and ''Haguro'') had closed to within {{convert|18000|yd|km}}. ''Kalinin Bay'' responded to their straddling salvos with her {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun. Three {{convert|8|in|mm|abbr=on}} armor-piercing projectiles struck her within minutes. At 08:25, the carrier scored a direct hit from {{convert|16000|yd|km}} on the No. 2 turret of a ''Nachi''-class heavy cruiser, and a second hit shortly thereafter forced the Japanese ship to withdraw temporarily from formation.

At 08:30, five Japanese destroyers steamed over the horizon off her starboard quarter. They opened fire from about {{convert|14500|yd|km}}. As screening ships engaged the cruisers and laid down concealing smoke, ''Kalinin Bay'' shifted her fire, and for the next hour traded shots with Destroyer Squadron 10. No destroyer hit ''Kalinin Bay'', but she took ten more {{convert|20|cm|in|0}} hits from the now obscured cruisers. One shell passed through the flight deck and into the communications area, where it destroyed all the radar and radio equipment. Most of these hits occurred after 08:45 when ''Tone'' and ''Haguro'' had closed to within {{convert|10,100|yd|km}}.<ref>Lundgren, p. 175</ref>

At 09:15, an Avenger from ''St. Lo''—piloted by Lieutenant (j.g.) Waldrop—strafed and exploded two torpedoes in ''Kalinin Bay''{{'}}s wake about {{convert|100|yd|m}} astern of her. A shell from the latter's {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun deflected a third from a collision course with her stern. At about 09:30, as the Japanese ships fired parting salvos and reversed course northward, ''Kalinin Bay'' scored a direct hit amidships on a retreating destroyer. Five minutes later, she ceased fire and retired southward with the other survivors of Taffy 3.

Around 10:50, the task unit came under a concentrated air attack. During the 40-minute battle, the first attack from a ''kamikaze'' unit in World War II, all escort carriers but ''Fanshaw Bay'' were damaged. Four diving planes attacked ''Kalinin Bay'' from astern and the starboard quarter. Two were shot down close aboard, but the third crashed into the port side of the flight deck, damaging it severely, and the fourth destroyed the aft port stack. ''Kalinin Bay'' suffered extensive structural damage during the morning's intense action, as well as five dead among her sixty casualties. Twelve direct hits were later confirmed by damage plus two large-caliber near misses. Ironically, it was the two near misses that exploded under her [[stern|counter]] that threatened the ship's survival.

====USS ''Kitkun Bay''====
Straddled several times early in the surface action during the run to the east as she was at the rear of the formation alongside ''White Plains'', ''Kitkun Bay'' was towards the front of the formation after the turn to the south and escaped serious damage. At 10:13 she launched five Avengers (four armed with torpedoes, one with bombs) to attack the retreating Japanese. These five (along with one from ''St. Lo'') attacked ''Yamato'' at 10:35 without result. Attacked by a ''kamikaze'' at 11:08, she was successfully defended by her own and ''Fanshaw Bay''{{'s}} AA batteries. She was the only one of Sprague's carriers to escape undamaged.
[[File:CVE-71 launching FM-2s Samar 25Oct1944.jpg|thumb|202px|''Kitkun Bay'' prepares to launch her Wildcat fighters, while ''White Plains'' is straddled by {{convert|18|in|mm|abbr=on}} shells.]]

====USS ''Fanshaw Bay''====
Targeted by ''Kongo'' and ''Haruna'' early in the action (red, yellow and blue shell splashes) Spragues's flagship ''Fanshaw Bay'' escaped serious damage during the run to the east and was on the far side of the formation across from ''Gambier Bay'' during the run to the south. During the later ''kamikaze'' attacks, the ''Fanshaw Bay'' took a near miss ''kamikaze'' close aboard, helped down a plane just about to crash into ''Kitkun Bay'' and landed planes from her sunk or damaged sisters. ''Fanshaw Bay'' suffered four dead and four wounded.

====Battleship ''Yamato''====
''Yamato'' engaged enemy surface forces for the first and only time at Samar, entering the battle two meters down by the bow and limited to 26 knots due to 3000 tons of flooding caused by three armor-piercing bombs during the [[Battle of the Sibuyan Sea]]. ''Yamato'' opened the battle at 06:59, firing on USS ''White Plains'' at an estimated range of {{convert|34,524|yd|mi nmi km|order=out}}, severely damaging ''White Plains'' with a near miss from her third salvo. The resulting gout of smoke from the stricken carrier obscured the target and convinced ''Yamato'' she was destroyed so they checked fire at 07:09. At 07:27, ''Yamato'' reported main and secondary battery hits on an "enemy cruiser" at {{convert|20,313|yd|mi nmi km|order=out}}, the time, range and bearing of which all correspond with the hits on the  destroyer ''Johnston''.<ref>Lundgren p. 70</ref> At 07:51 she turned her secondary battery on USS ''Raymond'' at a range of {{convert|10,096|yd|mi nmi km|order=out}} before steering hard to port to avoid a torpedo salvo from the charging USS ''Hoel'' at 07:54. At 07:55 ''Yamato'' opened fire on ''Hoel'' with her {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} anti-aircraft guns and was struck by an American {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} shell in return.  Hemmed in by ''Haruna'' to starboard and her destroyers to port ''Yamato'' was forced to run due North away from the battle until the torpedoes ran out of fuel, finally turning back at 08:12.<ref>Lundgren p. 110</ref>

At 08:23 ''Yamato''{{'}}s [[Mitsubishi F1M|F1M2 "Pete" floatplane]] reported a primary battery hit on ''Gambier Bay'' though this hit was also claimed by ''Kongo''. ''Gambier Bay''{{'}}s own records report a damaging near miss from a battleship caliber shell around this time.<ref>Lundgren  p. 131</ref> At 08:34 ''Yamato'' trained her secondary batteries on another "light cruiser", probably USS ''Hoel'', which was observed sinking at 08:40.<ref>Lundgren p. 153</ref>  At 08:45 ''Yamato'' sighted three of the American carriers, US smoke screens preventing her from seeing the entire US formation. Between 09:06 and 09:17 ''Yamato'' received multiple strafing and torpedo attacks from US aircraft, claiming one US aircraft shot down at 09:15. Fighter pilot [[Lieutenant]] Richard W. Roby reportedly attacked destroyers before raking the decks and then bridge of ''Yamato'' with his {{convert|.50|in|mm|1|abbr=on}} machine guns, further discouraging her.<ref>Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy</ref> However, US reports that ''Yamato'' closed to within {{convert|2400|yd|km}} of the American ships before she was attacked by American aircraft are not supported by ''Yamato'''s own action report.<ref>Lundgren p.159</ref>  At 09:11 Kurita ordered his ships to regroup to the North and at 09:22 ''Yamato'' slowed to 20 knots and came round to course 040, finally setting course 000 (due north) at 09:25.  Kurita reported that his force had sunk two carriers, two cruisers, and some destroyers, apparently assuming that ''Yamato'' had indeed sunk ''White Plains'' with her first four salvoes.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://battleshipyamato.info/ |title=Battleship Yamato Battles |publisher=Battleshipyamato.info |accessdate=March 18, 2010| archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20100324110152/http://www.battleshipyamato.info/| archivedate= March 24, 2010 | deadurl= no}}</ref><ref>Reynolds, Clark G (1982). ''The Carrier War''. Time-Life Books. {{ISBN|0-8094-3304-4}}</ref><ref name="NHC">{{cite web|url=http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-xz/yamato-k.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20001102224649/http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-xz/yamato-k.htm|dead-url=yes|archive-date=November 2, 2000|title=''Yamato'' (Battleship, 1941–1945) — in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, 22–26 October 1944|date=May 13, 2000|work=Japanese Navy Ships|publisher=[[Naval Historical Center]], [[United States Department of the Navy|Department of the Navy]]|accessdate=March 7, 2009}}</ref>  Kurita's forces had actually sunk one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort, and ''Yamato''{{'}}s guns likely contributed to the sinking of three out of four, with claimed hits (some unconfirmed or disputed) on all except ''Samuel B. Roberts''.
[[File:Yamato off Samar.jpg|thumb|left|''Yamato'' and a Japanese heavy cruiser, possibly {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Tone|1937|2}} or {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}} off Samar]]

==== Japanese cruiser ''Chōkai'' hit by ''White Plains'' ====
Targeted by {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gunfire from the destroyers and destroyer escorts, the Japanese cruiser {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Chōkai||2}} was hit amidships, starboard side, most likely by the sole {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} gun of the carrier ''White Plains''.<ref name="Hornfischer 2004, p. 309"/> While the shell could not pierce the hull armor, the {{convert|7|lb}} bursting charge it contained may have set off the eight deck-mounted Japanese [[Type 93 torpedo|Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo]]es, which were especially volatile because they contained pure oxygen, in addition to their {{convert|1080|lb|kg|abbr=on}} warheads. The explosion resulted in such severe damage that it knocked out the rudder and engines, causing ''Chōkai'' to drop out of formation. Within minutes, an American aircraft dropped a {{convert|500|lb|kg|abbr=on}} bomb on her forward machinery room. Fires began to rage and she went dead in the water. Later that day, she was scuttled by torpedoes from the destroyer {{Ship|Japanese destroyer|Fujinami||2}}.

However, {{Ship|Japanese cruiser|Haguro||2}}'s detailed action report states that ''Chokai's'' immobilizing damage resulted from a bomb hit at 08:51,<ref name="Lundgren | p. 184"/> so while this claim is plausible it is not verified by Japanese sources.

{{clear}}

===Japanese take further hits===

After ''Johnston'' blew off the bow of ''Kumano'' with a [[Mark 15 torpedo]], the Japanese ship retired towards the San Bernardino Strait, where she suffered minor damage from an aerial attack.
[[File:ChikumaLeyte.jpg|thumb|The Japanese cruiser {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}} maneuvering after sustaining torpedo damage.]]

{{ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}} engaged the U.S. escort carriers, helping to sink ''Gambier Bay'', but came under fire from ''Heermann'' and under a heavy air attack. It is generally thought that destroyer {{ship|Japanese destroyer|Nowaki|1940|2}} took off survivors from ''Chikuma'', and then scuttled her at {{coord|11|25|N|126|36|E|display=inline, title}} in the late morning of on October 25, 1944, but a more recent study suggests ''Chikuma'' sank from the effect of the air attack, and ''Nowaki'' arrived only in time to pick up survivors from the water.<ref>Anthony P. Tully, 'Solving some Mysteries of Leyte Gulf: Fate of the ''Chikuma'' and ''Chokai'' ', ''Warship International'' No. 3, 2000, pp. 248–258, especially p. 251.</ref> 
While withdrawing from the battle area, ''Nowaki'' was herself sunk, with the loss of all but one of ''Chikuma''{{'}}s surviving crewmen.

The heavy cruiser {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Suzuya|1934|2}}, which had also engaged the carriers, received fatal damage from the air, ironically without suffering any direct hits. Early in the battle, she was attacked by ten Avengers from Taffy 3. A near miss close astern to port by an HE bomb from one of the TBMs carried away one of ''Suzuya'''s propellers, reducing her maximum speed to 20 knots. At 10:50, she was attacked by 30 more carrier aircraft.<!--couldn't determine which ships, task group or plane types--> Another near miss by a bomb, this time starboard amidships, set off the Long Lance torpedoes loaded in one of her starboard tube mounts. The fires started by this explosion soon propagated to other torpedoes nearby and beyond, the subsequent explosions damaging one of the boilers and the starboard engine rooms. Abandon ship was ordered at 11:50, none too soon, as the fires set off the remaining torpedoes and her main magazines just ten minutes later. ''Suzuya'' rolled over and sank at 13:22, with 401 officers and crew rescued by destroyer {{Ship|Japanese destroyer|Okinami||2}}, followed by further rescues by American ships later.

===Kurita withdraws===
Though Kurita's battleships had not been seriously damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. His flagship ''Yamato'' had been forced to turn north in order to avoid torpedoes, causing him to lose contact with much of his task force. The ferocity of the determined, concentrated sea and air attack from Taffy 3 had already sunk or crippled the heavy cruisers ''Chōkai'', ''Kumano'', and ''Chikuma'', seemingly confirming to the Japanese that they were engaging major fleet units rather than escort carriers and destroyers. Kurita was at first not aware that Halsey had already taken the bait and that his battleships and carriers were far out of range. The ferocity of the air attacks<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bookscrounger.com/thomas-j-lupo/ |title=Thomas J. Lupo & Taffy 3 |publisher=Bookscrounger.com |date=December 11, 2015 |accessdate=October 21, 2017}}</ref> further contributed to his confusion, for he assumed that such devastating strikes could come only from major fleet units rather than escort carriers. Signals from Ozawa eventually convinced Kurita that he was not engaging the entirety of 3rd fleet, and that remaining elements of Halsey's forces might close in and destroy him if he lingered too long in the area.<ref>{{cite web|first = Klemen | last = L |url= http://www.dutcheastindies.webs.com/kurita.html |title= Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita  |date=1999–2000 |work=Forgotten Campaign: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941–1942}}</ref>

Finally, Kurita received word that the Southern Force that he was to meet had been destroyed the previous night. Calculating that the fight was not worth further losses, and believing he had already sunk or damaged several American carriers, Kurita broke off the engagement at 09:20 with the order: "all ships, my course north, speed 20". He set a course for Leyte Gulf, but became distracted by reports of another American carrier group to the north. Preferring to expend his ships against capital ships rather than transports, he turned north after the non-existent enemy fleet, and ultimately withdrew back through the San Bernardino Strait.

As he retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait, the smaller and heavily damaged American force continued to press the battle. While watching the Japanese retreat, Admiral Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Damn it, boys, they're getting away!"

===The kamikaze attack===
Around 10:47 Taffy 3 came under a concentrated air attack. During the 40-minute battle, the first attack from a ''kamikaze'' unit in World War II, all of the escort carriers except ''Fanshaw Bay'' were damaged. One plane crashed alongside ''Fanshaw Bay'' without damaging her, shot down by her anti-aircraft battery. Another struck the water near ''White Plains'' alongside her flight deck, wounding 11 sailors and causing minor damage. Four diving planes attacked ''Kalinin Bay'' from astern and the starboard quarter. Two were shot down close aboard, but the third crashed into the port side of the flight deck, damaging it severely, and the fourth destroyed the aft port stack and catwalk.<ref>Lundgren p.225</ref>

===Seventh Fleet's calls for help===
Shortly after 08:00, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from 7th Fleet. One from Vice Admiral [[Thomas C. Kinkaid]], sent in plain language, read, "My situation is critical. Fast battleships and support by airstrikes may be able to keep enemy from destroying CVEs and entering Leyte."

At 08:22, Kinkaid radioed, "Fast Battleships are Urgently Needed Immediately at Leyte Gulf".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://home.earthlink.net/~gowheeler/page20.html |title=Battleship Musashi |publisher=Home.earthlink.net |date=October 24, 1944 |accessdate=March 18, 2010}}</ref>

At 09:05: "Need Fast Battleships and Air Support".

At 09:07, Kinkaid broadcast what his mismatched fleet was up against: "4 Battleships, 8 Cruisers Attack Our Escort Carriers".

{{convert|3000|nmi|mi km}} away at Pearl Harbor, Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz|Nimitz]] had monitored the desperate calls from Taffy 3, and sent Halsey a terse message: [[The world wonders|"Where is TF 34?"]]. To [[Known-plaintext attack|complicate decryption]], communications officers were to add a nonsense phrase at both ends of a message — in this case, "Turkey trots to water" and suffixed with "[[The world wonders]]". The receiving radioman repeated the "where is" section of this message and his staff failed to remove the trailing phrase "the world wonders". A simple query by a distant supervisor had, through the random actions of three sailors, become a stinging rebuke.

Halsey was infuriated (not recognizing the final phrase as padding, possibly chosen for the anniversary of the [[Charge of the Light Brigade]]). He threw his hat to the deck and began to curse.

Halsey sent Task Group 38.1 (TG&nbsp;38.1)—commanded by Vice Admiral [[John S. McCain, Sr.|John S. McCain]]—to assist.<ref>McCain, ''Faith of My Fathers'', 40–41.</ref> Halsey recalled he did not receive this vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00, and later claimed that he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but had not dreamed of the seriousness of this crisis. McCain, by contrast, had monitored Sprague's messages and turned [[Task Force 58|TG&nbsp;58.1]] to aid Sprague even before Halsey's orders arrived (after prodding from Nimitz), putting Halsey's defense in question.

At 10:05, Kinkaid asked, "Who is guarding the San Bernardino Strait?"

McCain raced towards the battle, briefly turning into the wind to recover returning planes. At 10:30, a force of [[Curtiss SB2C Helldiver|Helldivers]], [[Grumman TBF Avenger|Avengers]], and [[Grumman F6F Hellcat|Hellcats]] was launched from {{USS|Hornet|CV-12|2}}, {{USS|Hancock|CV-19|2}}, and {{USS|Wasp|CV-18|2}} at the extreme range of {{convert|330|nmi|mi km}}. Though the attack did little damage, it strengthened Kurita's decision to retire.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/w3/wasp-ix.htm |title=danfs WASP IX |publisher=History.navy.mil |accessdate=March 18, 2010 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426234455/http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/w3/wasp-ix.htm |archivedate=April 26, 2009  }}</ref>

At 11:15, more than two hours after the first distress messages had been received by his flagship, Halsey ordered TF&nbsp;34 to turn around and head south to pursue Kurita, but the Japanese forces had already escaped.

Just hours after his perceived chastisement by Nimitz, Halsey's forces did destroy all four enemy aircraft carriers he had pursued. But despite the complete absence of 3rd Fleet against the main Japanese force, the desperate efforts of Taffy 3 and assisting task forces had driven back the Japanese. A relieved Halsey sent the following message to Nimitz, Kinkaid and General Douglas MacArthur at 12:26: "It can be announced with assurance that the Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed and broken by the Third and Seventh Fleets."

===The survivors' ordeal===
Partly as a result of disastrous communication errors within 7th Fleet and a reluctance to expose search ships to submarine attack,<ref>''Heavy Metal: Destroyers'' television show</ref> a very large number of survivors from Taffy 3, including those from ''Gambier Bay'', ''Hoel'', ''Johnston'' and ''Roberts'', were not rescued until October 27, after two days adrift.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/ctg7812_war_diary | title = U.S.S. PC 623 War Diary, 25-28 October 1944 via bosamar.com | publisher = bosamar.com | accessdate = June 12, 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/pc1119_war_diary | title = U.S.S. PC 1119 War Diary, October 1944 via bosamar.com | publisher = bosamar.com | accessdate = June 12, 2012}}</ref>  A plane had spotted the survivors, but the location radioed back was incorrect. By that time, many had died as a result of exposure, thirst and [[shark attack]]s. Finally, when a [[Landing Craft Infantry]]<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/bosc13 | title = The Battle Off Samar – Taffy III at Leyte Gulf, Chapter 13 | publisher = bosamar.com | accessdate = May 17, 2012}}</ref> of Task Group 78.12 arrived, its captain used what is almost a standard method of distinguishing friend from foe—asking a topical question about a national sport—as one survivor, Jack Yusen, relates:

<blockquote>
We saw this ship come up, it was circling around us, and a guy was standing up on the bridge with a megaphone. And he called out 'Who are you? Who are you?' and we all yelled out 'Samuel B. Roberts!' He's still circling, so now we're cursing at him. He came back and yelled 'Who won the World Series?' and we all yelled '[[St. Louis Cardinals]]!' And then we could hear the engines stop, and cargo nets were thrown over the side. That's how we were rescued.
</blockquote>

==Aftermath==
The Japanese had succeeded in luring Halsey's 3rd Fleet away from its role of covering the invasion fleet, but seemingly light forces proved to be a very considerable obstacle. What Halsey had unwittingly left behind still packed the air power of 4 carriers, even if they were inexpensive, slow, lightly armed, and equipped with older-type combat aircraft. With an available air force of over 400 aircraft, they were the numeric—though far from qualitative—equivalent of four of Halsey's five large fleet carriers. These naval aircraft, despite not being armed for anti-ship duties, did much to confuse and harass the Center Force, and even contributed to the sinking of three Japanese heavy cruisers. The breakdown in Japanese communications resulted in Kurita being unaware of the opportunity that Ozawa's decoy plan had offered him. Kurita's mishandling of his forces during the surface engagement further compounded his losses. Despite Halsey's failure to protect the northern flank of the 7th Fleet, Taffy 3 and assisting aircraft turned back the most powerful surface fleet Japan had sent to sea since the [[Battle of Midway]].  Domination of the skies, prudent and timely maneuvers by the U.S. ships, tactical errors by the Japanese admiral, and superior American radar technology, gunnery and seamanship, all contributed to this outcome.

In that engagement the Japanese had numerous large-caliber battleship and cruiser main guns with much more range and power than the Americans.  But the Japanese guns lacked a blind fire capability and were thwarted by rain squalls and by smoke laid by screening American destroyers. Japanese  fire control systems manually computing solutions for targets on a constant course were fighting American destroyers that would constantly alter course. Running zig zag, a {{convert|40|ft|m|abbr=on}}-wide destroyer at {{convert|30|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}} can travel up to {{convert|0.41|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} away in the 49 seconds it takes for a {{convert|46|cm|in|abbr=on|1}} [[Armor-piercing shell#Armor-piercing capped|armor piercing capped (APC) shell]] to cover {{convert|15|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}}.<ref>http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_18-45_t94.htm</ref> The Japanese visual-aiming system produced "bracketing" multiple shots, so American ships' crews would see sets of shells fall and notice that subsequent shells would be predictably placed. The American destroyers could predict the fall of Japanese shells and have ample time to maneuver away from a bracket that was closing in. While exploiting the freedom to dodge "bracketing" shots, American destroyers were still able to land accurate hits, thanks to their inclusion of the [[Ship gun fire-control system#MK 37 Gun Fire Control System .28GFCS.29|MK-37 radar-directed fire control system]] and its computer, as well as their main guns' faster reloading; ''Samuel B. Roberts'' and ''Heermann'' devastated the superstructure of cruiser ''Chikuma''. In addition, the excellent U.S. {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} and 40&nbsp;mm anti-aircraft fire directed by radar and computer control downed several ''kamikaze''s, while the lack of comparable systems made the Japanese ships vulnerable to American fliers. Lastly, the attacking Japanese force initially used armor-piercing shells which proved largely ineffective against unarmored ships as they passed through and out without exploding, which was fortuitous as American destroyers and destroyer escorts were engineered with enough redundancy to survive dozens of hits without or before sinking.

The American escort carriers landed hits when the large Japanese ships, which could not maneuver while firing, came within range of guns as small as the {{convert|5|in|mm|abbr=on|0}} carrier-mounted guns. These small guns would prove their value; ''White Plains'' found an [[Achilles' heel]] by setting off the Type 93 torpedoes carried by heavy cruiser ''Chokai''.

In summary, the Japanese had built the largest battleships but the fleet was largely unrefined, and had numerous technical limitations and weaknesses, and the commanding officers made mistakes and failed to take into account their weaknesses nor make best use of their strengths. The American Navy had superior technology, and while the commanding officers would make some mistakes, they were limited in nature, and the Americans had sufficient numbers of all types of ships and weapons to compensate for these mistakes.  After all, neither the important capital ships of the American Navy, nor the invasion units, were damaged by even this surprise attack.

It may be argued that, of all of the battles in the Pacific War, Samar best demonstrates the effectiveness of air attack and destroyer-launched torpedoes against larger surface vessels. Cautious Japanese tactics were hampered by the belief they were fighting a much more powerful force. Conversely, the Americans accurately sensed the gravity of their predicament, and quickly improvised a strategy based on harassment and delay which did not hesitate to throw inadequately armed planes and ships directly against battleships if that was what was available.

{{quote|Well, I think it was really just determination that really meant something. I can't believe that they didn't just go in and wipe us out. We confused the Japanese so much. I think it deterred them. It was a great experience.|source=Interview by Hornfischer of Tom Stevensen, Survivor ''Samuel B. Roberts''<ref>''Tin Can Sailors'' audio book, end track.</ref>}}

Clifton Sprague's task unit lost two escort carriers: ''Gambier Bay'', to surface attack and ''St. Lo'', to ''kamikaze'' attack. Of the seven screening ships, fewer than half, two destroyers (''Hoel'' and ''Johnston'') and a destroyer escort (''Samuel B. Roberts''), were lost, as were several aircraft. The other four U.S. destroyers and escorts were damaged. Though it was such a small task unit, well over a thousand Americans died, comparable to the losses suffered at the Allied defeat of the [[Battle of Savo Island]] off [[Guadalcanal campaign|Guadalcanal]] when four cruisers were sunk. It was also comparable to the combined losses of the 543 men and 3 ships at the [[Battle of the Coral Sea]], and 307 men and 2 ships at the [[Battle of Midway]].

On the other side of the balance sheet, the Japanese were forced to scuttle three heavy cruisers, and a fourth limped back to base seriously damaged, having lost its bow. All of Kurita's battleships except ''Yamato'' suffered considerable damage, and apart from ''Yamato'', all of the heavy ships stayed inactive in their bases, and the Japanese navy as a whole had been rendered ineffective for the remainder of the war. Of the six U.S. ships totaling {{convert|37000|LT|t|abbr=on}} that were lost during Leyte Gulf operations, relatively tiny Taffy 3 bore the brunt of losses, sacrificing five ships. By comparison, the Japanese lost twenty-six ships totaling {{convert|306000|LT|t|abbr=on}}.<ref>{{cite web| url=http://www.bosamar.com/pages/bosc14 |title='&#39;The Battle Off Samar: The Taffy III at Leyte Gulf'&#39; Chapter 14 Robert Jon Cox |publisher=Bosamar.com|accessdate=March 18, 2010}}</ref>

The battle took place above the [[Philippine Trench]], with most of the hull losses occurring in waters of over 7,000 m (23,000&nbsp;ft) deep.  Though none of the wreckage has yet been located and the sinking locations are approximate, the battle produced some of the deepest shipwrecks on record.

==Criticism of Halsey==
{{or-section|date=December 2017}}
[[File:Halsey.JPG|thumb|left|Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey—Commander U.S. Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf]]

Halsey was criticized for his decision to take TF&nbsp;34 north in pursuit of Ozawa, and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. A piece of U.S. Navy slang for Halsey's actions is "Bull's Run", a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the U.S. Navy the nickname “Bull” was used primarily by enlisted men; Halsey's friends and fellow officers called him  “Bill”) with an allusion to the [[First Battle of Bull Run|Battle of Bull Run]] in the [[American Civil War]].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7W7UIsIC76oC&pg=PA378|title=Bull Halsey: A Biography |chapter=Last Years |last=Potter |first=E. B. |authorlink=E. B. Potter |publisher=[[Naval Institute Press]] |isbn=978-1-61251-224-2|page=378 |date=May 11, 2013}}</ref>

In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey gave reasons for his decision as follows:

:"Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of October 24, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF&nbsp;38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn.

:"I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet."<ref name="Morison1956">{{cite book|chapter =Leyte, June 1944 – January 1945 |title=[[History of United States Naval Operations in World War II]] |volume=XII |last=Morison |first=Samuel E. |authorlink= |year=1956 |publisher= Little & Brown |location=Boston |isbn= |pages= |url= }}</ref>

Halsey also said that he had feared that leaving TF&nbsp;34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft, while leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of air power going north to strike Ozawa.

Morison writes in a footnote that "Admiral Lee, however, said after the battle that he would have been only too glad to have been ordered to cover San Bernardino Strait without air cover."<ref name="Morison1956"/> If Halsey had been in proper communication with 7th Fleet it would have been possible for the escort carriers of TF 77 to provide adequate air cover for TF 34 — a much easier matter than it would be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.

It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships, and "would have had to remain behind" with TF 34 (while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers) may have contributed to this decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible (and logical) to have taken one or both of 3rd Fleet's two fastest battleships (USS ''Iowa'' and/or ''New Jersey'') with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernardino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of TF 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the 3rd Fleet's battleships). Therefore, to guard San Bernardino Strait with a powerful battleship force would ''not'' have been incompatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the ''New Jersey''.

It does seem likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral [[Robert Carney|Robert "Mick" Carney]], who was also wholeheartedly in favor of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.

Clifton Sprague—commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar—was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision, and of his failure to clearly inform Kinkaid and the 7th Fleet that their northern flank was no longer protected:

{{quote|In the absence of any information that this exit [of the San Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.}}

Regarding Halsey's failure to turn TF 34 southwards when 7th Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes:

{{quote|If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force… Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have [[crossed the T]] of Kurita's fleet and completed the destruction of Center Force.}}

Morison also observes:

{{quote|The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships.|source=Morison (1956), pp. 336–337<ref>Note: Task Group 34.5 — in fact only finished off the straggling destroyer ''Nowaki'', and this was not achieved by the battleships, but rather by their escorting [[light cruiser]]s and [[destroyer]]s (Source: [http://www.history.navy.mil/ U.S. Naval Historical Center]).</ref>}}

Perhaps the most telling comment is made laconically by [[Willis Augustus Lee|Vice Admiral Lee]] in his action report as the Commander of TF 34:

{{quote|No battle damage was incurred ''nor inflicted on the enemy'' by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four.|source=[http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/TF-34-Leyte.html Task Force 34 Action Report: October 6, 1944 – November 3, 1944]}}

==Presidential Unit Citation==
Taffy 3 was awarded a [[Presidential Unit Citation (United States)|Presidential Unit Citation]]:

<blockquote>For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ...the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy ...two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells ... The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.<ref name="PUC Taffy 3">
{{cite web|title=Memorial to Admiral Sprague and Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3)|url= http://www.navsource.org/archives/03/features/taffy3m.htm|publisher=NavSource Online Naval History| accessdate = May 11, 2007 }}</ref></blockquote>

==Legacy==
[[File:Rotation of Resize of DSC08648.JPG|thumb|250px|A memorial to Sprague and Taffy 3 next to {{USS|Midway|CV-41}} in [[San Diego]].]]

A number of ships were named after participants and ships from that battle, including {{USS|Copeland|FFG-25}}, {{USS|Evans|DE-1023}}, {{USS|Clifton Sprague|FFG-16}}, {{USS|Carr|FFG-52}} and {{USS|Hoel|DDG-13}}, and {{USS|Johnston|DD-821}}. When {{USS|Samuel B. Roberts|FFG-58}} struck a mine, her crew would touch a plaque commemorating the original crew as they struggled to save the ship.<ref>Hornfischer 2004, p. 425-427.</ref>

While the battle is frequently included in historical accounts of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the duels between the destroyer and destroyer escorts and ''Yamato'' and the Japanese force were the subject of a ''Dogfights'' television episode, "Death of the Japanese Navy".<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.tv.com/dogfights/death-of-the-japanese-navy/episode/996142/summary.html#|title= Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy|publisher=Tv.com|accessdate=March 18, 2010}}</ref> That episode, as well as a History Channel documentary, was based on ''[[The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors]]'', written by [[James D. Hornfischer]]. There was also an episode of Ultimate Warfare on American Heroes Channel called Courage at Sea.

The survivors formed associations which still meet annually, and raised funds to build memorials in San Diego near the current location of the {{USS|Midway|CV-41}} museum, which contains a model of ''Gambier Bay''.{{citation needed|date=May 2014}}

The 1962 novel ''[[Harm's Way (novel)|Harm's Way]]'' bears many similarities to the battle.  The combined small destroyer/jeep carrier/cruiser group portrayed as facing a battle group centered on the Japanese battleship ''Yamato'' is quite similar, as are the lopsided results of the battle. The author was Halsey's public relations officer, and can be assumed to have drawn on detailed knowledge of the real engagement acquired when it was taking place.{{citation needed|date=May 2014}}

The 2005 Japanese movie ''[[Yamato (film)|Yamato]]'' shows ''Yamato'' firing its main guns against surface targets, and battling against aircraft, but it is not made clear that the ship withdrew in the face of an attack by light escort ships.

==References==

===Notes===
{{reflist|group=N}}

===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Bibliographys===
*{{Cite book|last=Bess|first=Michael|authorlink=|year=2006|chapter=|title=Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|location=New York|isbn= 0-307-26365-7}}
*{{Cite book|last=Copeland|first=Robert W.|authorlink=|year=1950|chapter=|title=The Spirit of the Sammy B|publisher=Self-published Lulu.com|location=Seattle}}
*{{Cite book|last=Cox|first=Robert Jon| authorlink=|year=2010|chapter=|title=The Battle Off Samar: Taffy III at Leyte Gulf (5th Edition)|publisher=Agogeebic Press, LLC|location=|isbn= 0-9822390-4-1}}
*{{Cite book|last=Cutler|first=Thomas|authorlink=|year=2001|chapter=|title=The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944|publisher=Naval Institute Press|location=Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.| isbn=1-55750-243-9}}
*{{Cite book|last=D'Albas|first = Andrieu | authorlink = | year = 1965 | title = Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II | publisher = Devin-Adair Pub | location = | isbn = 0-8159-5302-X }}
*{{Cite book | last = Drea | first = Edward J. | authorlink = | year = 1998 | chapter = Leyte: Unanswered Questions | title = In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army | publisher = University of Nebraska Press | location = Nebraska | isbn = 0-8032-1708-0 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Dull | first = Paul S. | authorlink = | year = 1978 | chapter = | title = A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945 | publisher = Naval Institute Press | location = | isbn = 0-87021-097-1 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Field | first = James A. | authorlink = | year = 1947 | chapter = | title = The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation | publisher = Princeton University Press | location = | id = ASIN B0006AR6LA }}
*{{Cite book | author= Hornfischer, James D. | title=[[The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors]] | publisher=Bantam | year=2004 | isbn=0-553-80257-7 | authorlink= James D. Hornfischer }}
*{{Cite book | last = Hoyt | first = Edwin P. | authorlink = | year = 2003 | chapter = | title = The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf | publisher = The Lyons Press | location = | isbn = 1-58574-643-6 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Lacroix | first = Eric | authorlink = |author2=Linton Wells | year = 1997
| chapter = | title = Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War | publisher = Naval Institute Press | location = | isbn = 0-87021-311-3 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Morison | first = Samuel Eliot | authorlink = Samuel Eliot Morison | year = 2004|edition=reissue | chapter = | title = Leyte, June 1944 – January 1945, ''vol. 5 of ''[[History of United States Naval Operations in World War II]] | publisher = University of Illinois Press; Reprint edition | location = Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A. | isbn = 0-252-07063-1 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Potter | first = E. B. | authorlink = | year = 2005 | chapter = | title = Admiral Arleigh Burke | publisher = Naval Institute Press | location = | isbn = 1-59114-692-5 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Potter | first = E. B. | authorlink = | year = 2003 | chapter = | title = Bull Halsey | publisher = Naval Institute Press | location = | isbn = 1-59114-691-7 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Thomas | first = Evan | authorlink = Evan Thomas | year = 2006 | chapter =  | title = Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941–1945 | publisher = [[Simon & Schuster]] | location =  | isbn = 0-7432-5221-7 | url = https://archive.org/details/seaofthunderfour00thom }}
*{{Cite book | last = Willmott | first = H. P. | authorlink = | year = 2005 | chapter = | title = The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action | publisher = Indiana University Press | location = | isbn = 0-253-34528-6 }}
*{{Cite book | last = Woodward | first = C. Vann | authorlink = | year = 2007 | chapter = | title = The Battle for Leyte Gulf: The Incredible Story of World War II's Largest Naval Battle | publisher = Skyhorse Publishing | location = | isbn = 1-60239-194-7 }}
*{{cite book | last = Wukovits | first = John | authorlink = | year = 2013 | chapter = | title = For Crew and Country: The Inspirational True Story of Bravery and Sacrifice Aboard the USS Samuel B. Roberts | publisher = St. Martin's Press | location = | isbn = 0312681895 }}

===Reports===
*War Damage Report A-3(420), ''Summary of War Damage—December 8, 1943 to December 7, 1944,'' pp28. BuShips, Design Division, Preliminary Design Section, War Damage Assessment Team. June 1, 1945.
*War Damage Report #60, ''Escort Carriers Gunfire, Bomb, Kamikaze Damage and Loss During World War II,'' BuShips, Design Division, Preliminary Design Section, War Damage Assessment Team.
*Reports of General MacArthur, ''JAPANESE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA'' Volume II – Part II, pp394–402. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 66-60007

===Magazine and news articles===
* {{cite magazine |last1=Reynolds |first1=Quentin |last2=Jones |first2=George E. |last3=Teatsorth |first3=Ralph |last4=Morris |first4=Frank D. |date=January 27, 1945 |title=America's Greatest Naval Battle: Report on the Second Battle of the Philippines (Third of three parts) |url=https://www.unz.com/print/Colliers-1945jan27-00018/ |pages=18, 69–72 |magazine=Collier's }}

===Web===
{{commons|Battle of Leyte Gulf}}
*[http://www.historyanimated.com/LeyteGulfPage.html Animated History of The Battle of Leyte Gulf including the Battle off Samar]
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/BatExp/index.html Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf] [Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 22]
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/TF-77-Leyte.html Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20060426230049/http://www.battleship.org/html/Articles/History/Leyte0.htm "Turkey Trots to Water"]—detailed description of the battle from battleship.org
*Order of battle: [http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Samar.htm Samar].
*[http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battles/leyte_gulf.htm "Glorious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf"] by Tim Lanzendörfer
*[http://www.bosamar.com/ The Battle Off Samar – Taffy III at Leyte Gulf website] by Robert Jon Cox
*[http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Philippines/index.html Return to the Philippines]: public domain documents from ibiblio.org
*[http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/leytegulfrevisited.aspx The Battle for Leyte Gulf Revisited]
*[http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-de413.shtml Timeline for USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'' (DE 413)]
*[http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/japanstaoperation.aspx Japan's TA-Operation: A Blueprint for Disaster] by Irwin Kappes
*[http://www.chuckhawks.com/task_force_34.htm Case study if Halsey had formed task force 34]
*[http://ussjohnston-hoel.com/166.html USS Johnston-Hoel Association]
*[http://de413.org/ USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) Survivors Association]
*[http://www.ussgambierbay-vc10.com/special_pages/T_Montague.htm ''The Ship Has Sunk and the Sharks are Hungry''] The account of survivor Earl Bagley

===Audio/visual media===
*''Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf''. History Channel. TV. Based on book by Hornfischer, James D. (2004). ''The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors''.
*''Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy''. History Channel. TV. Based on book, and with interview by Hornfischer, James D. (2004). ''The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors''. [http://shop.history.com/detail.php?p=69944&ecid=SEO-0000046&pa=SEO-SSP History Channel DVD] "Score one for the little guy as Taffy 3 sends Yamamoto's fleet limping home."

{{DEFAULTSORT:Samar}}
[[Category:Pacific Ocean theatre of World War II|Samar]]
[[Category:Military history of the Philippines during World War II|Samar]]
[[Category:Battle of Leyte Gulf|Samar]]
[[Category:World War II aerial operations and battles of the Pacific theatre]]
[[Category:1944 in the Philippines]]
[[Category:Naval battles of World War II involving Japan|Sam]]
[[Category:Naval battles of World War II involving the United States|Sam]]
[[Category:History of Eastern Samar]]
[[Category:Last stand battles|Samar]]