View source for Soviet submarine B-59

{{Short description|Submarine whose onboard situation could have started World War III}}
{{use dmy dates|date=December 2024}}

{|{{Infobox ship begin}}
{{Infobox ship image
| Ship image = Soviet b-59 submarine.jpg
| Ship caption = ''B-59'' near Cuba with a US Navy helicopter circling above, circa 28-29 October 1962
}}{{Infobox ship career
| Ship country = Soviet Union
| Ship flag = {{shipboxflag|Soviet Union|naval}}
| Ship name = ''B-59''
| Ship builder = [[Admiralty Shipyard]]
| Ship laid down = 21 February 1960{{sfn|Project 641}}
| Ship launched = 11 June 1960
| Ship commissioned = 6 October 1961
| Ship decommissioned = 19 April 1990{{sfn|Project 641}}
}}{{Infobox ship characteristics
| Ship class = {{sclass2|Foxtrot|submarine}}
| Ship displacement = {{ubl|style=text-indent:-1em; margin-left:1em; white-space:nowrap;
                            |Surfaced: {{convert|1957|LT|t|0|abbr=on}}
                            |Submerged: {{convert|2475|LT|t|0|abbr=on}}}}
| Ship length = {{convert|91.3|m|ftin|abbr=on}}
| Ship beam = {{convert|7.5|m|ftin|abbr=on}}
| Ship propulsion = {{ubl|style=text-indent:-1em; margin-left:1em;
                            |3 × {{convert|2000|hp|abbr=on}} (diesel)
                            |3 × {{convert|2700|hp|abbr=on}} (electric)|3 shafts}}
| Ship speed = {{ubl|style=text-indent:-1em; margin-left:1em; white-space:nowrap
                            |Surfaced: {{convert|16.8|kn|km/h|lk=in}}
                            |Submerged: {{convert|16|kn|km/h|lk=in}}}}
| Ship range = {{ubl|style=text-indent:-1em; margin-left:1em;
                            |Surfaced: {{convert|17900|nmi|km|lk=in|abbr=on}},
                            |at {{convert|8|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}}
                            |Submerged: {{convert|400|nmi|km|abbr=on}},
                            |at {{convert|2|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}}}}
| Ship complement = 70
| Ship armament = {{ubl|style=text-indent:-1em; margin-left:1em;
                            |10 torpedo tubes|22 torpedoes, including one nuclear torpedo with a 10&nbsp;kt warhead}}
}}
|}

'''Soviet submarine ''B-59''''' (''{{langx|ru|Б-59}}'') was a Project 641 or [[Foxtrot-class submarine|Foxtrot-class]] [[diesel-electric submarine]] of the [[Soviet Navy]]. ''B-59'' was stationed near [[Cuba]] during the 13-day [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of October 1962 and was pursued and harassed by US Navy vessels. Senior officers in the submarine, out of contact with [[Moscow]] and the rest of the world and believing they were under attack and possibly at war, came close to firing a [[T-5 torpedo|T-5 nuclear torpedo]] at the US ships.<ref>Savranskaya, Svetlana V. [https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/CMC50/SavranskayaJSSNewsourcesonroleofSovietsubmarinesinCMC.pdf New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis]. ''[[Journal of Strategic Studies]]'' 28.2 (2005): 233-259.{{doi|10.1080/01402390500088312}}</ref>

==Background==
On the night of 1 October 1962, ''B-59'', the [[flagship]] of a detachment of sister ships ''B-4'', ''B-36'' and ''B-130'', departed secretly from its base on the [[Kola Peninsula]] for the Cuban port of Mariel, close to [[Havana]],<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> where it was intended to establish a Soviet naval base.<ref>The Submarines of October: US and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Editors  William Burr & Thomas S.Blanton. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no.75. Published 31 October 2002</ref> The submarines, built in [[Leningrad]]<ref name="nsarchives.gwu.edu_Dubivko">{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/Dubivko.pdf |first1=Aleksei F. |last1=Dubivko |title=In the depths of the Sargasso Sea |access-date=7 December 2024 }}</ref> in 1959-1961 and said to be "the best in the world", had a range of up to 26,000 miles and were each armed with 22 torpedoes, one of which had a [[nuclear warhead]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> They were sent to the [[Caribbean Sea]] in support of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba in an operation known to the Soviets as ''[[Operation Anadyr|Anadyr]]'', which had been in preparation since March/April.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> The arms deliveries consisted of [[nuclear missiles]], for which launch facilities had been prepared on Cuba. The discovery of this precipitated a major confrontation between the US and Russia after the submarine group had put to sea.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> 

The submarines arrived at their assigned positions in the [[Sargasso Sea]], east of Cuba, in the week beginning 20 October.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> US [[President Kennedy]] announced a blockade of Cuba on the evening of 22 October.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> The US was preparing a major airborne assault on the island.<ref name="nsarchives.gwu.edu_Dubivko"/> A radio interception group on ''B-59'' heard Kennedy warn America that there was a possibility of [[thermonuclear]] conflict with the Soviet Union.<ref name="nsarchives.gwu.edu_Dubivko"/>

The need for the utmost secrecy had been emphasised, but ''B-130'' was forced to surface in the Sargasso Sea after all three of its engines broke down,<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> which revealed the  presence of the other submarines.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchives.gwu.edu./document7/28941-32-aleksei-f-dubivko-depths-sargasso-sea |title=Aleksei F. Dubivko: "In the depths of the Sargasso Sea" |access-date=18 November 2024 }}</ref> The US Navy sent more than 200 combat surface ships, almost 200 shore-based aircraft and four aircraft carrier search and assault groups with 50-60 planes on each - 85 per cent of its anti-submarine forces in the Atlantic<ref>{{cite web |title=Aleksei F. Dubivko: "In the depths of the Sargasso Sea" |url=https://nsarchives.gwu.edu./document7/28941-32-aleksei-f-dubivko-depths-sargasso-sea |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> - to search for them. [[Destroyers]] ''Berry, Lowry, Beale, Beich, Bill, Eaton, Cony, Conway'' and ''Murray''<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> were charged with finding and destroying the submarines if military action became necessary.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref> 

The US Navy had an existing tactical protocol against diesel submarines called "hunt to exhaustion" which was similar to tactics used by the British in World War II.<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> The Soviet submarines were pursued for several days and US Naval Command ordered that any submarine discovered in the area should be made to surface and be identified.<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> Commanders of US ships were instructed to be ready to attack if a submarine refused to surface.<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> 

On 27 October, after three days of searching,<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> blockading units of the [[United States Navy]], an aircraft carrier-based search and attack group consisting of the aircraft carrier [[USS Randolph (CV-15)|USS ''Randolph'']] and [[destroyer]]s using multi-frequency [[sonars]], Julie sonobouys, towed sono-locators, radio hydroacoustic buoys and "all means available",<ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> located ''B-59'' off the coast of Cuba and used grenade explosions as a signal that it should surface. [[USS Cony|USS ''Cony'']], which first detected the sub, [[USS Beale (DD-471)|USS ''Beale'']] and other destroyers began dropping signalling [[Depth charge|depth charges]] of the type used for naval training, which contained very little charge and were not intended to cause damage.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28910-01-excerpt-meeting-executive-committee-excom-national-security-council-1000-am |title=Excerpt from meeting of the Executive Committee (Excom) of the National Security Council, 10:00 A.M.--11:15 A.M.,relating to use of warning depth charges|date= 24 October 1962 |access-date=22 November 2024}}</ref> Messages from the US Navy stating the type of depth charges being used did not reach ''B-59'' or, it seems, Soviet naval HQ.{{cn|date=November 2024}}

===Nuclear close call===   
''B-59'' had not been in contact with Moscow for several days. The submarine's crew had been picking up US civilian radio broadcasts, but once they began attempting to hide from pursuers the vessel had to run too deep to monitor radio traffic and those on board did not know whether or not war had broken out. Conditions inside the vessel were becoming extremely difficult. The submarine had nine extra people on board, members of an [[OSNAZ]] radio interception group with all their equipment.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002|access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref> There was now only emergency lighting and the interior was overcrowded, unbearably hot, and short of drinking water and breathable air.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002 |access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref> The crew of 70 were suffering from lack of ventilation, high levels of CO2, diesel fumes and increasingly high temperatures and some were collapsing from heat stroke.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002|access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchives.gwu.edu./document7/28941-32-aleksei-f-dubivko-depths-sargasso-sea |title=Aleksei F. Dubivko: "In the depths of the Sargasso Sea" |access-date=18 November 2024 }}</ref> 

The submarine was under what seemed to be attack for about four hours. Fourteen surface vessels surrounded it and tightened the circle, dropping grenades which exploded close to the hull.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002 |access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref> When ''B-59'' was finally hit with something stronger than depth charges the captain, Valentin Grigoryevich [[Savitsky]], who was by then "totally exhausted",<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002|access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref> became furiously angry and ordered the officer assigned to the nuclear torpedo to assemble it to battle readiness and load it into its tube.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002 |access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref><ref name="crimson">{{cite web|url= https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-history/b-59-submarine-crimson-tide/|title= A Russian submarine had a 'Crimson Tide' moment near Cuba|date=20 May 2022 |access-date=10 June 2024}}</ref> He is reported to have said, "Maybe the war has already started ... We're going to blast them now. We will die, but we will sink them all. We will not disgrace our navy." The situation inside the submarine and Savitsky's words were described later by naval intelligence officer Vadim Pavlovich Orlov, Commander of the Special Assignment [radio interception] Group on the submarine.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002 |access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref> (Orlov's account has been described as "controversial" and it has been stated that other submarine commanders did not believe that Savitsky would have issued this order.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarcgive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/ |title=National Security Archive. The Submarines of October: US and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis |date=31 October 2002}}</ref>)

The three most senior officers on board ''B-59'' were Captain Savitsky; the [[Political commissar|political officer]] Ivan Semyonovich Maslennikov; and Chief of Staff of the deployed submarine detachment [[Vasily Arkhipov]], who was equal in rank to Savitsky but the more senior officer''.'' They were only authorized to launch a nuclear weapon if all three agreed to do it.{{cn|date=November 2024}} ''B-59'' was the only sub in the flotilla that required the authorisation of three officers in order to fire the "special weapon". The other subs would only have required the captain and the political officer to approve the launch, but on ''B-59'' Arkhipov's position as detachment commander meant that he also had to give his consent. Of the three, Arkhipov alone opposed the launch, and he persuaded Savitsky to surface and await orders from Moscow.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://nsarcgive.gwu.edudocuments/29066-7-recollections-vadim-orlov-ussr-submarine-b-59-we-will-sink-them-all |title=Recollections of Vadim P. Orlov: Caribbean Crisis of 1962 |date=2002|access-date=23 November 2024}}</ref>

The submarine's batteries had run very low and its air-conditioning had failed and eventually, late in the evening of 27 October,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28922-13-deck-log-book-excerpts-uss-beale-dd-471-october-1962 |title=Deck Log Book USS Beale |date=27 October 1962 |access-date=23 November 2024 }}</ref> ''B-59'' had to surface. It surfaced amid the US warships that were pursuing it and was immediately subjected to intense harassment with searchlights and what appeared to be mock attacks from planes and helicopters from the Randolph.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29063-3-soviet-northern-fleetheadquarters-report-about-participation-submarines-b-4-b-36 |title=Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters report "About participation of submarines ''B-4'', ''B-36'', ''B-59'',  ''B-130'' of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation 'Anadyr' during the period of October-December 1962. |date=December 1962 |access-date=18 November 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Vice-Admiral Vasili Arkhipov: Presentation at the Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow, 14 October 1997. |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/29078-document-1-vice-admiral-vasili-arkhipov |access-date=16 November 2024}}</ref> The submarine made contact with the [[destroyer]] [[USS Cony]] and after discussions with the ship, ''B-59'' was ordered by the Russian fleet to set course back to the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name="crimson" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://blogs.wnpt.org/mediaupdate/2012/10/17/nashvilles-gary-slaughter-on-50th-anniversary-of-cuban-missile-crisis-and-man-who-saved-the-world/|title=Nashville's Gary Slaughter on 50th Anniversary of Cuban Missile Crisis and 'Man Who Saved the World'|publisher=Nashville Public Television|date=17 October 2012|access-date=1 September 2024}}</ref>

At the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana Conference in 2002, which marked its 40th anniversary, this was recognized for the first time as having been the most dangerous moment of the crisis. The Americans had not been aware that ''B-59'' was armed with a nuclear torpedo, of roughly the power of the bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Evans |first=Michael |title=The Submarines of October |url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161031210839/http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/ |archive-date=31 October 2016 |access-date=24 October 2016 |website=nsarchive.gwu.edu}}</ref><ref name="thankyou">{{Cite news |author=Edward Wilson |author-link=Edward Wilson (novelist) |date=2012-10-27 |title=Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the man who stopped nuclear war |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war |access-date=2012-10-31 |newspaper=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> During the three-day conference, between 11-13 October 2002, which was sponsored by the private [[National Security Archive]], [[Brown University]] and the Cuban government,<ref name="latinamericanstudies">[https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/sovietsbomb.htm SOVIETS CLOSE TO USING A-BOMB IN 1962 CRISIS, FORUM IS TOLD], [[The Boston Globe]], 13 October 2002</ref> Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Defence Secretary, said that nuclear war had come much closer than anyone had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the [[National Security Archive]], said Vasily Arkhipov had "saved the world".<ref name="latinamericanstudies" />

[ ''The Soviet source documents may be seen at <ref>https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2022-10-03/soviet-submarines-nuclear-torpedoes-cuban-missile-crisis<nowiki>: National Security Archive</nowiki></ref>'' ]

== See also ==
* [[Vasily Arkhipov]]

== Notes ==
{{Reflist}}

== References ==
* {{cite web|title=Project 641 Liste des unités|url=http://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post45/641/641_liste.htm|url-status=dead|language=French|date=2014-10-27|archiveurl=https://archive.today/20141027204243/http://www.soumarsov.eu/Sous-marins/Post45/641/641_liste.htm|archivedate=2014-10-27|ref={{sfnref|Project 641}}|access-date=2018-10-02}}
* Polmar, Norman, ''Cold War Submarines, The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines.'' KJ More. Potomac Books, Inc., 2003. {{ISBN|1-57488-530-8}}
* {{cite book|author=Peter A. Huchthausen|author-link=Peter A. Huchthausen|title=October Fury|url=https://archive.org/details/octoberfury00huch|url-access=registration|year=2002|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-0-471-43357-6}}
* [https://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/tag/cuban-missile-crisis/ "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Man Who Saved the World"], ''[[Secrets of the Dead]]'', [[PBS]] TV documentary, 24 October 2012
* William Burr and Thomas S. Blanton, editors (October 31, 2002) "[http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/ The Submarines of October. U.S. and Soviet Naval Encounters During the Cuban Missile Crisis]", [[National Security Archive]] Electronic Briefing Book No. 75
* Ketov, Ryurik A. "The Cuban Missile Crisis as seen through a periscope." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 28.2 (2005): 217-231. {{doi|10.1080/01402390500088304}}

== External links ==
* {{cite web |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2022-10-03/soviet-submarines-nuclear-torpedoes-cuban-missile-crisis |title=The Underwater Cuban Missile Crisis at 60 |publisher=National Security Archive |date=3 October 2022 |access-date=2024-12-07}}</ref>

{{Foxtrot class submarine}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:B-059}}
[[Category:Foxtrot-class submarines]]
[[Category:Cuban Missile Crisis]]
[[Category:Ships built in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:1960 ships]]
[[Category:Cold War submarines of the Soviet Union]]