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=== 08FEB07 ===
=== 08FEB07 ===


[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Bpz1234/ Home]
Metaphysics Book VII
[[Metaphysics]] Book VII


"A Preliminary Sketch of Z (zeta)"
"A Preliminary Sketch of Z (zeta)"


Ontology - comes from the Greek word (on): the account of Being; Aristotle rejects certain questions (chapter 1); The notion of Being is 'floppy'--people & chairs in this room, with colors & shapes... Where does 'is' fit into Aristotle's ontology; A does not use "is", as there isn't a clear criteria for it in Greek.
Ontology - comes from the [[Greek]] word (on): the account of Being; [[Aristotle]] rejects certain questions (chapter 1); The notion of Being is 'floppy'--people & chairs in this room, with colors & shapes... Where does 'is' fit into Aristotle's ontology; A does not use "is", as there isn't a clear criteria for it in Greek.


A speaks on a 'science of being'. ("Knowledge of Being"; Book IV) No axiomatic view of ontology; but he approaches it dialectically, of views that are not his own. (Greek Academy for 20 years, combatting ideas of other members) 'Rough and Ready'
A speaks on a 'science of being'. ("[[Knowledge]] of Being"; Book IV) No axiomatic view of ontology; but he approaches it dialectically, of views that are not his own. (Greek Academy for 20 years, combatting ideas of other members) 'Rough and Ready'


Although we can talk about all sorts of different things, they do not form into a single '''kind''' of being; there is no single kind; some new principle/organization is needed (Book IV & VII); ''Owen'': classical philosopher that greatly influenced Dr. Dancy during his dissertation;--''focal meaning'' - (bears mostly on Book IV, ch. 1-3) (Aristotle denies that there is a single notion of being; but not a notion of sheer ambiguity... such as 'pitcher'... an athlete and also a drinking utility)
Although we can talk about all sorts of different things, they do not form into a single '''kind''' of being; there is no single kind; some new principle/organization is needed (Book IV & VII); ''Owen'': classical philosopher that greatly influenced Dr. Dancy during his dissertation;--''focal meaning'' - (bears mostly on Book IV, ch. 1-3) (Aristotle denies that there is a single notion of being; but not a notion of sheer ambiguity... such as 'pitcher'... an athlete and also a drinking utility)


healthy diet ----------diet that conduces to---\
healthy diet ----------diet that conduces to---\
Healty: healthy complexion---complexion that indicates---------------'''Health'''
Healty: healthy complexion------------complexion that indicates---------------'''[[Health]]'''
healthy body-----------a body that has--------/
healthy body-----------a body that has--------/
These things all point to a single thing;
These things all point to a single thing;
Line 29: Line 30:
(The what it is for something to be, to exist)
(The what it is for something to be, to exist)


(1) Socrates is a man.
(1) [[Socrates]] is a man. <br>
(2) Socrates is pale/5'6"/... .
(2) [[Socrates]] is pale/5'6"/Greek/... . <br>
(3^) Socrates is. (this is still elliptical for the context-free question), provokes the question, ''"What is Socrates"?''
(3^) [[Socrates]] is. (this is still elliptical for the context-free question), provokes the question, ''"What is Socrates"?'' Socrates is a man. (Aristotle thinks like an authority on [[biology]]--a biologist.) If he were not a human being, then he could not/would not exist.

^^X is essentially f =df if X were not f, then x would not be (exist).
The essence of X =df {F: x is essentially f}

[[Othello]] reference. Notion of essentialism: X is essentially a,b,c; Y is essentially d,e,f. (Cannot draw contrarieties beyond the species level, according to Aristotle.) A woman cannot be separated from man in essence.


Does Socrates wear a hat? He does... . (... = wear a hat)
Does Socrates wear a hat? He does... . (... = wear a hat)
Is Socrates really pale? He is... . (... = pale)
Is Socrates really pale? He is... . (... = pale)


Don't forget '''EWAF''' (primary substances); an exposition on the subject-criterion; which things are the substances: the ultimate subjects; founds the original views of the Categories--immediate attack in Book VII (metaphysics); ch 2: A gives his ''inventories of substances'' (possible answers as to which things are the substances, various answers, A's original view also); [[Platonism]]: individuals are not the primary substances, rather they are the [[Forms]];
=== 14FEB07 ===

=== 16FEB07 ===
subject:
matter
form (prior to matter; priority: X is prior to Y (x<y) =df X can exist without Y, but not Y without X)
compound (prior to the form; otherwise, the general aspect shared by all people becomes [[Platonism]]... something like that)

Aristotle gives up stuff... : )


=== 13FEB07 ===

Book VII (of Metaphysics Z)

When A & P are arguing about ontology questions, they're essentially arguing about which things are the substances (substances used in different contexts; Wrong: to say they weren't arguing about the same thing). Which things are the real ''beings''.

Real Difference: chapter 2: which things are the substances (Platonists: Forms; Aristotelian: Substances); chapter 3: Criteria for settling the question, more than 1;--main 2 of interest:

* "a substance is what isn't said of a '''subject'''" and
* Universality

Chapter 3: arguments against A's own view(s); led to a position in which the real substance is going to be ''matter'' (Tan/pale Socrates). Problem: Death of Socrates; he does not survive the change (or does he). EWAF (substance)? Not to the exclusion of Socrates. WTF?

To the end of ch3, I&F pg 277: matter is substance (Impossible!) - not just subjecthood (for substantiality); when we get all the way to the bottom, it is not just inseparable, but independent. What we need: (subject criteria) supplementation - last things that are independent don't go any further; subjects that can stand on their own.

Aristotle wrote his books piecemeal (for lectures). Never any final, direct answer to his search for final being(s).

What is it that can stand on its own? (See [[Kripke]]) All the things that were primary substances--compounds (I&F) of matter and Form.

lines 29-30: Form and Matter: Substance composed of both (Socrates) should be set aside since it is ''posterior'' to the other two and ''clear''. (Clear: ; Posterior: y is posterior to x, then x can exist without y & y cannot exist without x) The form of Socrates is his essence; his Form is something that is shared with all other humans--universal. If Form is independent: Platonism. Booyakasha!

Difficulty: Absolute cleavage between matter and form. A: book VII & VIII: softening that distinction.

End of Book VIII: 1045b, 17... pg 323 (I&F): "some one thing..." Not easy to make sense of it; situation is getting worse [[FUBAR]]! Seems to be saying: suggesting that the distinction between matter and form have been drawn too sharply (4-6, 10-12)--it does look like this, but it's controversial. (Helps to soften it: Matter with potentiality, & Form with actuality)

Back to Ch3: Puzzle: some variety of Platonism? Transition from ch 3-4: (i&f 277) End of ch3: substance, matter, form, compound... nothing is definite... 3rd type of substance: puzzling... Matter, Form, Compound!

Ch4: study form by studying essence (not said by A); (Form and essence are the same thing, implicit) Extremely difficult transition between chapters 3 & 4. Notion of essence: what it is for a thing to be/to exist. 1049b 14: logical remarks - defining what the essence of a thing is: what it is said to be in its own right, all by itself. What kinds of things are these things said to be independent? (Unclear) "pale man" - composite of human being & pale, a non-unity. (End of ch3: Matter... something that cannot stand on its own; needed: a thing with its own essence, independence)

Ch5: Snub (snubbed nose) - funny notion - not independently definable; snubbed nose is defined as a concave nose, not just concave (softening the distinction between Form & Matter). Some things that cannot be defined without their correllation to form/matter...

Ch6: priority & how it bears on his attempts (to find answers); ontology in general, talking about ontologies that are similar to his own--not against Plato, but about the abstract structure about ontology itself, such as Plato's. Main Argument: (brief) Are things the same as their essences? What it is for that thing to be--to be ''it''. 1031a (I&F 281) - ERRONEOUS.

έίδοζ<br>
ίδέα

Start with something that's primary, and there is no separate essence. Truth Preservation Crisis.

Remainder of the book: ontology abstractly characterized; 10-12 - Separating matter/form; definability; how to form the unity. When defining ''human being'', there is an implicit connection with matter.

(genus)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Animal
/\
/ \
(differentiae)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>footed>>>>...
/ | \
/ | \
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>biped quadraped ...
(men)
man: of 2-footed animal
(form) (matter)
By Book VII, ch3, A sounds like a Platonist... No form without matter...
ch11: 1036a 32: form... circularity... matter...


=== 15FEB07 ===


== Book Notes ==
== Book Notes ==

Latest revision as of 19:59, 13 February 2007

Class Notes

[edit]

08FEB07

[edit]

Home Metaphysics Book VII

"A Preliminary Sketch of Z (zeta)"

Ontology - comes from the Greek word (on): the account of Being; Aristotle rejects certain questions (chapter 1); The notion of Being is 'floppy'--people & chairs in this room, with colors & shapes... Where does 'is' fit into Aristotle's ontology; A does not use "is", as there isn't a clear criteria for it in Greek.

A speaks on a 'science of being'. ("Knowledge of Being"; Book IV) No axiomatic view of ontology; but he approaches it dialectically, of views that are not his own. (Greek Academy for 20 years, combatting ideas of other members) 'Rough and Ready'

Although we can talk about all sorts of different things, they do not form into a single kind of being; there is no single kind; some new principle/organization is needed (Book IV & VII); Owen: classical philosopher that greatly influenced Dr. Dancy during his dissertation;--focal meaning - (bears mostly on Book IV, ch. 1-3) (Aristotle denies that there is a single notion of being; but not a notion of sheer ambiguity... such as 'pitcher'... an athlete and also a drinking utility)

           healthy diet ----------diet that conduces to---\

Healty: healthy complexion------------complexion that indicates---------------Health

           healthy body-----------a body that has--------/

These things all point to a single thing; a color is (exists)...a quality of a height is... a quantity of All these things point to ... Substance

A substance is # .(full stop). The focus of being (ousia).

chapter 4: Sometimes the expression of "ousia" is translated as "essence"; it occurs in 2 different syntactic environments: a rutebaga is a subtance #; the substance of a rutebaga is to be a vegetable.

The essence of Socrates: (in Greek) the what it is for Socrates to be... (The what it is for something to be, to exist)

(1) Socrates is a man.
(2) Socrates is pale/5'6"/Greek/... .
(3^) Socrates is. (this is still elliptical for the context-free question), provokes the question, "What is Socrates"? Socrates is a man. (Aristotle thinks like an authority on biology--a biologist.) If he were not a human being, then he could not/would not exist.

^^X is essentially f =df if X were not f, then x would not be (exist). The essence of X =df {F: x is essentially f}

Othello reference. Notion of essentialism: X is essentially a,b,c; Y is essentially d,e,f. (Cannot draw contrarieties beyond the species level, according to Aristotle.) A woman cannot be separated from man in essence.

Does Socrates wear a hat? He does... . (... = wear a hat) Is Socrates really pale? He is... . (... = pale)

Don't forget EWAF (primary substances); an exposition on the subject-criterion; which things are the substances: the ultimate subjects; founds the original views of the Categories--immediate attack in Book VII (metaphysics); ch 2: A gives his inventories of substances (possible answers as to which things are the substances, various answers, A's original view also); Platonism: individuals are not the primary substances, rather they are the Forms;

subject:

        matter
        form (prior to matter; priority: X is prior to Y (x<y) =df X can exist without Y, but not Y without X)
        compound (prior to the form; otherwise, the general aspect shared by all people becomes Platonism... something like that)

Aristotle gives up stuff... : )


13FEB07

[edit]

Book VII (of Metaphysics Z)

When A & P are arguing about ontology questions, they're essentially arguing about which things are the substances (substances used in different contexts; Wrong: to say they weren't arguing about the same thing). Which things are the real beings.

Real Difference: chapter 2: which things are the substances (Platonists: Forms; Aristotelian: Substances); chapter 3: Criteria for settling the question, more than 1;--main 2 of interest:

  • "a substance is what isn't said of a subject" and
  • Universality

Chapter 3: arguments against A's own view(s); led to a position in which the real substance is going to be matter (Tan/pale Socrates). Problem: Death of Socrates; he does not survive the change (or does he). EWAF (substance)? Not to the exclusion of Socrates. WTF?

To the end of ch3, I&F pg 277: matter is substance (Impossible!) - not just subjecthood (for substantiality); when we get all the way to the bottom, it is not just inseparable, but independent. What we need: (subject criteria) supplementation - last things that are independent don't go any further; subjects that can stand on their own.

Aristotle wrote his books piecemeal (for lectures). Never any final, direct answer to his search for final being(s).

What is it that can stand on its own? (See Kripke) All the things that were primary substances--compounds (I&F) of matter and Form.

lines 29-30: Form and Matter: Substance composed of both (Socrates) should be set aside since it is posterior to the other two and clear. (Clear: ; Posterior: y is posterior to x, then x can exist without y & y cannot exist without x) The form of Socrates is his essence; his Form is something that is shared with all other humans--universal. If Form is independent: Platonism. Booyakasha!

Difficulty: Absolute cleavage between matter and form. A: book VII & VIII: softening that distinction.

End of Book VIII: 1045b, 17... pg 323 (I&F): "some one thing..." Not easy to make sense of it; situation is getting worse FUBAR! Seems to be saying: suggesting that the distinction between matter and form have been drawn too sharply (4-6, 10-12)--it does look like this, but it's controversial. (Helps to soften it: Matter with potentiality, & Form with actuality)

Back to Ch3: Puzzle: some variety of Platonism? Transition from ch 3-4: (i&f 277) End of ch3: substance, matter, form, compound... nothing is definite... 3rd type of substance: puzzling... Matter, Form, Compound!

Ch4: study form by studying essence (not said by A); (Form and essence are the same thing, implicit) Extremely difficult transition between chapters 3 & 4. Notion of essence: what it is for a thing to be/to exist. 1049b 14: logical remarks - defining what the essence of a thing is: what it is said to be in its own right, all by itself. What kinds of things are these things said to be independent? (Unclear) "pale man" - composite of human being & pale, a non-unity. (End of ch3: Matter... something that cannot stand on its own; needed: a thing with its own essence, independence)

Ch5: Snub (snubbed nose) - funny notion - not independently definable; snubbed nose is defined as a concave nose, not just concave (softening the distinction between Form & Matter). Some things that cannot be defined without their correllation to form/matter...

Ch6: priority & how it bears on his attempts (to find answers); ontology in general, talking about ontologies that are similar to his own--not against Plato, but about the abstract structure about ontology itself, such as Plato's. Main Argument: (brief) Are things the same as their essences? What it is for that thing to be--to be it. 1031a (I&F 281) - ERRONEOUS.

έίδοζ
ίδέα

Start with something that's primary, and there is no separate essence. Truth Preservation Crisis.

Remainder of the book: ontology abstractly characterized; 10-12 - Separating matter/form; definability; how to form the unity. When defining human being, there is an implicit connection with matter.

(genus)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Animal

                                  /\
                                 /  \

(differentiae)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>footed>>>>...

                          / |     \
                         /  |      \

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>biped quadraped ...

                    (men)

man: of 2-footed animal

       (form)    (matter)

By Book VII, ch3, A sounds like a Platonist... No form without matter... ch11: 1036a 32: form... circularity... matter...


15FEB07

[edit]

Book Notes

[edit]