Operational manoeuvre group: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|Soviet tank corps}} |
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{{refimprove|date=January 2013}}{{Use British English|date=April 2021}} |
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⚫ | The '''operational manoeuvre group''' ('''OMG''') was a [[Soviet Army]] organisational [[maneuver warfare|manoeuvre warfare]] concept created during the early 1950s to replace the [[cavalry mechanized group]] which performed the [[deep operations]] on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] during the [[Second World War]]. |
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The deep operations theory developed in cooperation between the Red Army and Wehrmacht theorists in the 1930s later influenced the [[Blitzkrieg]] operations and echelon-based doctrine. |
The deep operations theory developed in cooperation between the [[Red Army]] and [[Wehrmacht]] theorists in the 1930s later influenced the [[Blitzkrieg]] operations and echelon-based doctrine. |
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In the Soviet Army doctrine the Operational Manoeuvre Groups would be inserted to exploit a breakthrough by a [[Front (Soviet Army)|Front]] during a potential war against [[NATO]] in Europe. In the Soviet doctrine, after the motor-rifle units, heavily supported by artillery, helicopters and [[ |
In the Soviet Army doctrine the Operational Manoeuvre Groups would be inserted to exploit a breakthrough by a [[Front (Soviet Army)|Front]] during a potential war against [[NATO]] in Europe. In the Soviet doctrine, after the [[Motorized infantry|motor-rifle units]], heavily supported by artillery, helicopters and [[close air support]] aircraft would have broken NATO front, the operational manoeuvre groups would be inserted to exploit the breakthrough using elements of, or whole [[Field army|tank armies]].<ref>Simpkin pp.139–186</ref> |
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At the Front level an Operational Manoeuvre Group could include two [[tank division]]s and three to five |
At the Front level an Operational Manoeuvre Group could include two [[tank division]]s and three to five motor-rifle divisions. |
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==Notes== |
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To counter the OMG's threat, NATO deployed a large number of [[special forces]] units with the task of sabotaging and attacking the [[tyl]] logistical depots (in particular fuel) to slow the OMG advance, permitting NATO units to counter-attack the base of the insertion sector as was the practice of German commanders during the Second World War. |
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==References== |
==References== |
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==Sources== |
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* [[Richard Simpkin|Simpkin, Richard E]]. <cite>Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare</cite>. Brassey's, 2000. |
* [[Richard Simpkin|Simpkin, Richard E]]. <cite>Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare</cite>. Brassey's, 2000. |
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{{Russia-mil-stub}} |
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[[Category:Military |
[[Category:Military doctrines]] |
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[[Category:Soviet Army]] |
[[Category:Soviet Army]] |
Latest revision as of 19:24, 20 September 2022
This article needs additional citations for verification. (January 2013) |
The operational manoeuvre group (OMG) was a Soviet Army organisational manoeuvre warfare concept created during the early 1950s to replace the cavalry mechanized group which performed the deep operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War.
The deep operations theory developed in cooperation between the Red Army and Wehrmacht theorists in the 1930s later influenced the Blitzkrieg operations and echelon-based doctrine.
In the Soviet Army doctrine the Operational Manoeuvre Groups would be inserted to exploit a breakthrough by a Front during a potential war against NATO in Europe. In the Soviet doctrine, after the motor-rifle units, heavily supported by artillery, helicopters and close air support aircraft would have broken NATO front, the operational manoeuvre groups would be inserted to exploit the breakthrough using elements of, or whole tank armies.[1]
At the Front level an Operational Manoeuvre Group could include two tank divisions and three to five motor-rifle divisions.
Notes
[edit]- ^ Simpkin pp.139–186
References
[edit]- Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000.