Triggerfish (surveillance): Difference between revisions
Content deleted Content added
cleanup and headings |
|||
| (59 intermediate revisions by 38 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Short description|Cell phone interception technology}} |
|||
'''Triggerfish''' describes a technology of [[cell phone]] interception and surveillance using a mobile [[cellular base station]] ([[microcell]] or [[picocell]]). The devices are also known as cell-site simulators or digital analyzers. |
'''Triggerfish''' describes a technology of [[cell phone]] [[phone tapping|interception]] and [[surveillance]] using a mobile [[cellular base station]] ([[microcell]] or [[picocell]]). The devices are also known as cell-site simulators or digital analyzers. |
||
==Device capability== |
==Device capability== |
||
* Tracking of a cell phone by a mobile FBI van (Wireless Intercept and Tracking Team) |
* Tracking of a cell phone by a mobile [[FBI]] van (Wireless Intercept and Tracking Team) that seeks to locate a cell phone lacking [[GPS tracking unit|GPS tracking]] by scanning for its emissions. This first became known for its use in tracking hacker [[Kevin Mitnick]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/12/fbi_cell?currentPage=1|title=FBI E-Mail Shows Rift Over Warrantless Phone Record Grabs|author=Ryan Singel|date=2007-12-20|publisher=Wired}}</ref> |
||
| ⚫ | |||
* Mimicking a cell phone tower to force cell phones in the area to reveal their phone numbers, serial numbers and locations. A report by Global Research of Canada suggests that this feature was used to identify and round up the [[RNC 8]], organizers seeking to lead protests at the [[2008 Republican National Convention]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11030|title=Preemptive Policing & the National Security State: Repressing Dissent at the Republican National Convention|author=Tom Burghart|date=2008-11-19|publisher=Global Research}}</ref> |
|||
| ⚫ | |||
<!--- considering the similarity of "iNAC managed access" blocking of prison cell phone calls, the use of this system to block cell phone calls e.g. at a political protest should be researched further. ---> |
<!--- considering the similarity of "iNAC managed access" blocking of prison cell phone calls, the use of this system to block cell phone calls e.g. at a political protest should be researched further. ---> |
||
==Controversy and concerns== |
==Controversy and concerns== |
||
Neither the user nor the cell phone provider |
Neither the user nor the cell phone provider need to know about Triggerfish for it to be used successfully.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aclu.org/2008/11/14/with-technology-like-this-who-needs-the-law|title=With Technology Like This, Who Needs the Law?|date=2008-11-14|author=Rachel Myers|publisher=ACLU}}</ref> A [[court order]] is required, but the device circumvents provisions of [[Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act|CALEA]] barring use of [[pen register]] or [[Trap and trace device|trap-and-trace devices]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/11/foia-docs-show-feds-can-lojack-mobiles-without-telco-help.ars|title=FOIA docs show feds can lojack mobiles without telco help|author=Julian Sanchez|date=2008-11-16|publisher=Ars Technica}}</ref> |
||
The device is similar to but distinct from an [[IMSI catcher]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http:// |
The device is similar to but distinct from an [[IMSI catcher]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://thecyberrecce.net/2008/11/19/cyber-espionage-the-triggerfish/|title=Cyber Espionage : The Triggerfish|date=2008-11-18|website=|publisher=Infected Packets|access-date=2016-12-15|author=Jonathan Racicot}}</ref> |
||
On March 28, 2013, the ''Washington Post'' reported that federal investigators "routinely" use the systems to track criminal suspects, but sometimes fail to explain the technology sufficiently to [[Magistrate Judge|magistrate judges]] from whom they seek search warrants.<ref>{{cite news|last=Nakashima|first=Ellen|title=Little-known surveillance tool raises concerns by judges, privacy activists|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/little-known-surveillance-tool-raises-concerns-by-judges-privacy-activists/2013/03/27/8b60e906-9712-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html|newspaper=The Washington Post|accessdate=28 March 2013|date=2013-03-28}}</ref> |
|||
== See also == |
== See also == |
||
[[DCSNet]] |
*[[DCSNet]] |
||
*[[Dirtbox (cell phone)]] |
|||
*[[Harris Corporation]] |
|||
*[[Stingray phone tracker]] |
|||
== References == |
== References == |
||
<references /> |
<references /> |
||
==Further reading== |
|||
* {{cite book |last=Landau |first=S. |year=2010 |title=Surveillance Or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies |place=Cambridge, MA |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0262518741}} |
|||
* {{cite book |last=Petersen |first=J. |year=2000 |title=Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Their Origins & Applications |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1420038811}} |
|||
{{privacy}} |
|||
[[Category:Signals intelligence]] |
|||
[[Category:Surveillance]] |
|||
[[Category:Telephone tapping]] |
|||
{{government-stub}} |
{{government-stub}} |
||
Latest revision as of 10:14, 5 August 2023
Triggerfish describes a technology of cell phone interception and surveillance using a mobile cellular base station (microcell or picocell). The devices are also known as cell-site simulators or digital analyzers.
Device capability
[edit]- Tracking of a cell phone by a mobile FBI van (Wireless Intercept and Tracking Team) that seeks to locate a cell phone lacking GPS tracking by scanning for its emissions. This first became known for its use in tracking hacker Kevin Mitnick.[1]
- Intercepting a cell phone call by a man-in-the-middle attack, if the option is enabled, and the user makes or receives a call.
Controversy and concerns
[edit]Neither the user nor the cell phone provider need to know about Triggerfish for it to be used successfully.[2] A court order is required, but the device circumvents provisions of CALEA barring use of pen register or trap-and-trace devices.[3]
The device is similar to but distinct from an IMSI catcher.[4]
On March 28, 2013, the Washington Post reported that federal investigators "routinely" use the systems to track criminal suspects, but sometimes fail to explain the technology sufficiently to magistrate judges from whom they seek search warrants.[5]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ Ryan Singel (2007-12-20). "FBI E-Mail Shows Rift Over Warrantless Phone Record Grabs". Wired.
- ^ Rachel Myers (2008-11-14). "With Technology Like This, Who Needs the Law?". ACLU.
- ^ Julian Sanchez (2008-11-16). "FOIA docs show feds can lojack mobiles without telco help". Ars Technica.
- ^ Jonathan Racicot (2008-11-18). "Cyber Espionage : The Triggerfish". Infected Packets. Retrieved 2016-12-15.
- ^ Nakashima, Ellen (2013-03-28). "Little-known surveillance tool raises concerns by judges, privacy activists". The Washington Post. Retrieved 28 March 2013.
Further reading
[edit]- Landau, S. (2010). Surveillance Or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0262518741.
- Petersen, J. (2000). Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Their Origins & Applications. CRC Press. ISBN 978-1420038811.
 | This government-related article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. |