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Burden of proof is not related to the duty to retreat. Only in Ohio is the burden of proof on the defendant.
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{{Short description|Legal requirement}}
{{Primary sources|article|date=July 2013}}
{{Redirect|No retreat|the film|No Retreat, No Surrender}}
{{Primary sources|article|date=January 2022}}
[[File:Stand-your-ground law by US jurisdiction.svg|thumb|275x275px|Stand your ground law and duty to retreat by US jurisdiction
{{legend|#008000|Stand-your-ground by statute}}
{{legend|#00cd00|Stand-your-ground by judicial decision or jury instruction}}
{{legend|#0000A0|Duty to retreat except in one's home}}
{{legend|#ADD8E6|Duty to retreat except in one's home or workplace}}
{{legend|#00FFFF|Duty to retreat except in one's home or vehicle or workplace}}
{{legend|#FFFF00|Middle-ground approach (DC, WI)}}
{{legend|#000000|No settled rule (AS, VI)}}
]]
{{Criminal defenses}}
{{Criminal defenses}}
In [[criminal law]], the '''duty to retreat''', or '''requirement of safe retreat''',<ref name=CL>''Criminal Law - Cases and Materials'', 7th ed. 2012, [[Wolters Kluwer Law & Business]]; [[John Kaplan (law professor)|John Kaplan]], [[Robert Weisberg]], [[Guyora Binder]], {{ISBN|978-1-4548-0698-1}}, [https://law.stanford.edu/publications/criminal-law-cases-and-materials-7th-edition/]</ref>{{rp|550}} is a legal requirement in some jurisdictions that a threatened person cannot [[stand one's ground]] and apply lethal force in [[self-defense]], but must instead retreat to a place of safety.<ref name="CL"/>{{rp|549–554}}
In [[law]], the '''duty to retreat''', or '''requirement of safe retreat''',<ref name=CL>''Criminal Law - Cases and Materials'', 7th ed. 2012, [[Wolters Kluwer Law & Business]]; [[John Kaplan (law professor)|John Kaplan]], [[Robert Weisberg]], [[Guyora Binder]], {{ISBN|978-1-4548-0698-1}}, [https://law.stanford.edu/publications/criminal-law-cases-and-materials-7th-edition/]</ref>{{rp|550}} is a legal requirement in some jurisdictions that a threatened person cannot harm another in [[self-defense]] (especially lethal force) when it is possible instead to retreat to a place of safety.<ref name=CL />{{rp|549–554}} This requirement contrasts with the right in some other jurisdictions to ''[[stand one's ground]]'', meaning being allowed to defend one's self instead of retreating.


It is a specific component which sometimes appears in the defense of [[self-defense (theory)|self-defense]], and which must be addressed if [[defendants]] are to prove that their conduct was [[excuse|justified]].
It is a specific component which sometimes appears in the criminal defense of self-defense, and which must be addressed if criminal defendants are to prove that their conduct was [[excuse|justified]]. Depending on the state the criminal defendants have to prove a minimal time period of safe retreat.


==U.S. law==
==United States law==
Some U.S. jurisdictions <!-- rm which tag because the list is changing --> require that a person retreat from an attack, and allow the use of [[deadly force]] in self-defense only when retreat is not possible or when retreat poses a danger to the person under attack. The duty to retreat is not universal, however. For example, police officers are not required to retreat when acting in the line of duty.


Other states apply what is known as the [[castle doctrine]], whereby a threatened person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling or place of work. Sometimes this has been the result of court rulings that one need not retreat in a place where one has an especial right to be.<ref>''State of Washington v. Allery'', 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984)</ref>. In other states, this has been accomplished by statute, such as that suggested by the [[Model Penal Code]]<ref>§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii)</ref>.
Most U.S. jurisdictions have a [[stand-your-ground law]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/states-that-have-stand-your-ground-laws.html|title=States That Have Stand Your Ground Laws - FindLaw|publisher=|accessdate=14 August 2018}}</ref> or apply what is known as the [[castle doctrine]], whereby a threatened person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling or place of work. Sometimes this has been the result of court rulings that one need not retreat in a place where one has a special right to be.<ref>''State v. Allery'', 101 Wash. 2d 591, [https://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/1984/49674-9-1.html 682 P.2d 312] (1984).</ref> In other states, this has been accomplished by statute, such as that suggested by the [[Model Penal Code]].<ref>§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii)</ref>


In ''[[Erwin v. State]]'' (1876), the [[Supreme Court of Ohio]] wrote that a "true man", one without fault, would not retreat.<ref name=NDR>No Duty to Retreat:Violence and Values in American History and Society 4030 (1991)</ref> In ''[[Runyan v. State]]'' (1877), the Indiana court rejected a duty to retreat, saying,<ref name="CL"/>{{rp|551–2}}<ref name=NDR/> "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against" a duty to retreat.<ref name=NDR/> The court went further in saying that no statutory law could require a duty to retreat, because the right to stand one's ground is "founded on the [[Natural law|law of nature]]; and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society."
Still other states have passed [[stand your ground law]]s that do not require an individual to retreat and allow one to match force for force, deadly force for deadly force. <ref>http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/states-that-have-stand-your-ground-laws.html</ref>

Most state legal systems began by importing [[English Common Law]] such as Acts of Parliament of 2 Ed. III ([[Statute of Northampton]]), and 5 Rich. II of 1381 ([[Forcible Entry Act 1381]])—which imposed criminal sanctions intending to discourage the resort to self-help.<ref>[http://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/CACourts/ ''Dickinson v. Maguire,'' 9 Cal. 46]</ref><ref>[http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/daluiso-v-boone-27416 Daluiso v. Boone , 71 Cal.2d 484] for English common law history</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=''Dustin v. Cowdry'' (1851) 23 Vt. 631, 639–640 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f65LAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA616&lpg=PA616&dq=dustin+v.+cowdry+(1851)+23+vt.+631+vermont&source=bl&ots=98_6oObfZ-&sig=txFhnVjC0-N-cITDIP3lHgHn3_Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZZj0UfmmILLj4APMh4H4CA&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=dustin%20v.%20cowdry%20(1851)%2023%20vt.%20631%20vermont&f=false
|publisher=Official Vermont Reports, Vol. 23, Pg. 631 (Supreme Court of Vermont reporter)|date=1851|accessdate=July 27, 2013 |quote="[H]ad the present plaintiff elected to have proceeded under the statute, there can be no doubt, he might have subjected the defendants to punishment by way of fine, obtained restitution of the possession, and sustained an action of trespass, and recovered three fold damages for the expulsion and detention. And if such be the undeniable rights of the parties, under the statute, it is difficult to see, why, if the party waive all penalty under the statute, he may not sustain trespass qu. cl. against the defendants, the same as against any other wrong doers. Their [defendants'] right to possession gave them no more right to enter in that manner [by force], than if they had been mere strangers. ..."}}</ref> This required a threatened party to retreat, whenever property was "involved" and resolve the issue by civil means.

Today, the majority of American states have construed their statutes of forcible entry, both penal and civil, in such a manner as to abrogate (i.e. abolish) the common law privilege to use force in the recovery of possession of land.<ref>1 Harper and James, op.cit. supra, at § 3.15, p. 258; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 23, p. 125. See e.g., Mason v. Hawes (1884) 52 Conn. 12, 16 [52 Am.Rep. 552]; McIntyre v. Murphy (1908) 153 Mich. 342, 346–347 [116 N.W. 1003, 1004–1005, 15 Ann.Cas. 802]; Lobdell v. Keene (1901) 85 Minn. 90, 101 [88 N.W. 426, 430]; Strauel v. Lubeley (1915) 186 Mo.App. 638, 643–644 [172 S.W. 434, 435–436]; Mosseller v. Deaver (1890) 106 N.C. 494, 496–498 [11 S.E. 529, 530, 8 L.R.A. 537, 19 Am.St.Rep. 540]; Weatherly v. Manatt (1919) 72 Okla. 138, 139–140 [179 P. 470, 471]; Walgreen Co. v. Walton (1932) 16 Tenn.App. 213, 229 [64 S.W.2d 44, 53]; Ray v. Dyer (Tex.Civ.App. 1929) 20 S.W.2d 328, 330; Buchanan v. Crites (1944) 106 Utah 428, 436 [150 [71 Cal.2d 493] P.2d 100, 103]. See also Whitney v. Brown (1907) 75 Kan. 678, 681–683 [90 P. 277, 278, 11 L.R.A. N.S. 468, 12 Ann.Cas. 768]; Rest.2d Torts, § 185, com. a.) See [http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/daluiso-v-boone-27416 Daluiso v. Boone , 71 Cal.2d 484]</ref>

In ''[[Erwin v. State]]'' (1876), the [[Supreme Court of Ohio]] wrote that a "[[true man]]", one without fault, would not retreat.<ref name=NDR>No Duty to Retreat:Violence and Values in American History and Society 4030 (1991)</ref> In ''[[Runyan v. State]]'' (1877), the Indiana court rejected a duty to retreat, implying it was un-American,<ref name="CL"/>{{rp|551–2}} writing of a referring to the distinct [[American mind]],<ref name=NDR/> "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against" a duty to retreat.<ref name=NDR/> The court went further in saying that no statutory law could require a duty to retreat, because the right to stand one's ground is "founded on the law of nature; and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society."


==English law==
==English law==
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==See also==
==See also==
*[[Castle Doctrine in the United States]]
*[[Castle_doctrine#State-by-state_positions_in_the_United_States|Castle doctrine in the United States]]
*[[Stand-your-ground law]]
*[[Stand-your-ground law]]
*[[Trespasser]]
*[[Trespasser]]
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*{{cite journal |first1=Melissa |last1=Wheatcroft |date=Winter 1999 |title=Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants – In New Jersey a Battered Spouse's Home Is Not Her Castle |journal=Rutgers Law Journal |volume=30 |pages=539}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Melissa |last1=Wheatcroft |date=Winter 1999 |title=Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants – In New Jersey a Battered Spouse's Home Is Not Her Castle |journal=Rutgers Law Journal |volume=30 |pages=539}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Joseph H. |last1=Beale |date=June 1903 |title=Retreat from a Murderous Assault |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=16 |issue=8 |pages=567–82 |jstor=1323119 |doi=10.2307/1323119}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Joseph H. |last1=Beale |date=June 1903 |title=Retreat from a Murderous Assault |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=16 |issue=8 |pages=567–82 |jstor=1323119 |doi=10.2307/1323119}}
*{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0008197300086128 |title=Self-Defence and the Right to Life |year=2009 |last1=Ashworth |first1=A. J. |journal=The Cambridge Law Journal |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=282}}
*{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0008197300086128 |title=Self-Defence and the Right to Life |year=2009 |last1=Ashworth |first1=A. J. |journal=The Cambridge Law Journal |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=282–307|s2cid=146561102 }}
*{{cite journal |first1=Garrett |last1=Epps |date=Winter 1992 |title=Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American 'Retreat Rule' |journal=Law and Contemporary Problems |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=303–31 |url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol55/iss1/16 |jstor=1191769 |doi=10.2307/1191769}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Garrett |last1=Epps |date=Winter 1992 |title=Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American 'Retreat Rule' |journal=Law and Contemporary Problems |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=303–31 |url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol55/iss1/16 |jstor=1191769 |doi=10.2307/1191769}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Richard Maxwell |last1=Brown |year=1979 |title=Southern Violence — Regional Problem or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective |journal=Vanderbilt Law Review |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=225–50}}
*{{cite journal |first1=Richard Maxwell |last1=Brown |year=1979 |title=Southern Violence — Regional Problem or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective |journal=Vanderbilt Law Review |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=225–50}}

Latest revision as of 08:15, 14 January 2024

Stand your ground law and duty to retreat by US jurisdiction
  Stand-your-ground by statute
  Stand-your-ground by judicial decision or jury instruction
  Duty to retreat except in one's home
  Duty to retreat except in one's home or workplace
  Duty to retreat except in one's home or vehicle or workplace
  Middle-ground approach (DC, WI)
  No settled rule (AS, VI)

In law, the duty to retreat, or requirement of safe retreat,[1]: 550  is a legal requirement in some jurisdictions that a threatened person cannot harm another in self-defense (especially lethal force) when it is possible instead to retreat to a place of safety.[1]: 549–554  This requirement contrasts with the right in some other jurisdictions to stand one's ground, meaning being allowed to defend one's self instead of retreating.

It is a specific component which sometimes appears in the criminal defense of self-defense, and which must be addressed if criminal defendants are to prove that their conduct was justified. Depending on the state the criminal defendants have to prove a minimal time period of safe retreat.

United States law

[edit]

Most U.S. jurisdictions have a stand-your-ground law[2] or apply what is known as the castle doctrine, whereby a threatened person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling or place of work. Sometimes this has been the result of court rulings that one need not retreat in a place where one has a special right to be.[3] In other states, this has been accomplished by statute, such as that suggested by the Model Penal Code.[4]

In Erwin v. State (1876), the Supreme Court of Ohio wrote that a "true man", one without fault, would not retreat.[5] In Runyan v. State (1877), the Indiana court rejected a duty to retreat, saying,[1]: 551–2 [5] "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against" a duty to retreat.[5] The court went further in saying that no statutory law could require a duty to retreat, because the right to stand one's ground is "founded on the law of nature; and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society."

English law

[edit]

In English law the focus of the test is whether the defendant is acting reasonably in the particular situation. There is no specific requirement that a person must retreat in anticipation of an attack. Although some withdrawal would be useful evidence to prove that the defendant did not want to fight, not every defendant is able to escape. In R v Bird the defendant was physically attacked, and reacted instinctively and immediately without having the opportunity to retreat. Had there been a delay in the response, the reaction might have appeared more revenge than self-defense.[6]

Carrying weapons

[edit]

As to carrying weapons in anticipation of an attack, Evans v Hughes held that for a defendant to justify his possession of a metal bar on a public highway, he had to show that there was an imminent particular threat affecting the particular circumstances in which the weapon was carried.[7] Similarly, in Taylor v Mucklow a building owner was held to be using an unreasonable degree of force in carrying a loaded airgun against a builder who was demolishing a new extension because his bills were unpaid.[8] More dramatically, in AG's Reference (No 2 of 1983) Lord Lane held that a defendant who manufactured ten petrol bombs to defend his shop during the Toxteth riots could set up the defense of showing that he possessed an explosive substance "for a lawful purpose" if he could establish that he was acting in self-defense to protect himself or his family or property against an imminent and apprehended attack by means which he believed to be no more than reasonably necessary to meet the attack.[9]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Criminal Law - Cases and Materials, 7th ed. 2012, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, Guyora Binder, ISBN 978-1-4548-0698-1, [1]
  2. ^ "States That Have Stand Your Ground Laws - FindLaw". Retrieved 14 August 2018.
  3. ^ State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
  4. ^ § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)
  5. ^ a b c No Duty to Retreat:Violence and Values in American History and Society 4030 (1991)
  6. ^ R v Bird (1985) 1 WLR 816
  7. ^ Evans v Hughes (1972) 3 A ER 412
  8. ^ Taylor v Mucklow (1973) CLR 750
  9. ^ Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1983) (1984) 1 AER 988

Further reading

[edit]
  • Wheatcroft, Melissa (Winter 1999). "Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants – In New Jersey a Battered Spouse's Home Is Not Her Castle". Rutgers Law Journal. 30: 539.
  • Beale, Joseph H. (June 1903). "Retreat from a Murderous Assault". Harvard Law Review. 16 (8): 567–82. doi:10.2307/1323119. JSTOR 1323119.
  • Ashworth, A. J. (2009). "Self-Defence and the Right to Life". The Cambridge Law Journal. 34 (2): 282–307. doi:10.1017/S0008197300086128. S2CID 146561102.
  • Epps, Garrett (Winter 1992). "Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American 'Retreat Rule'". Law and Contemporary Problems. 55 (1): 303–31. doi:10.2307/1191769. JSTOR 1191769.
  • Brown, Richard Maxwell (1979). "Southern Violence — Regional Problem or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective". Vanderbilt Law Review. 32 (1): 225–50.
  • Brown, Richard Maxwell (1991). No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society. (New York: Oxford University Press).
  • Ross, Luevonda P. (Fall 2007). "Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground". Southern University Law Review. 35: 1.
  • Suk, Jeannie. (2009). At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is Transforming Privacy. (New Haven: Yale University Press).