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Center of gravity (COG) is a military concept referring to the primary source of strength, balance, or stability necessary for a force to maintain combat operations. Centers of gravity can be physical, moral, or both, and exist for all belligerents at all tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war simultaneously.^[1] COGs play a central role in military planning, though exact definition has been elusive, with interpretations varying substantially over time, across forces, and between theorists. Generally, a COG can be thought of as an essential part of a combatant's warfighting system, interference with which would result in disproportionate impact on their combat effectiveness.^[2]^: 60–64^[3]^: 1041

The concept was first developed by Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his work On War.^[4]^{: 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444} After the end of the Vietnam War, interest in the idea was revitalized, resulting in several competing conceptualizations.^[2]^[5]^[3] Although the framework is used by armed forces around the world, there is widespread controversy regarding its definition and utility. Present academic literature on the subject generally agrees the term needs further clarification and careful application, while some theorists call for its complete removal from military doctrine.^[5]

United States

The United States Department of Defense defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act",^[6]^: 33 although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase.^[7]^{: 45–49, 77, 82, 92}^[8]^: 2, 43 There are twelve qualities of COGs the Joint Chiefs of Staff have doctrinally recognized:^[1]^: IV-23^[9]^: III-39

Exists at each level of warfare
Mostly physical at operational and tactical levels
Is a source of leverage
Allows or enhances freedom of action
May be where the enemy's force is most densely concentrated
Can endanger one's own COGs
May be transitory in nature
Linked to objective(s)
Dependent upon adversarial relationship
Can shift over time or between phases
Often depends on factors of time and space
Contains many intangible elements at strategic level

Because the COG is one or multiple root enablers of a combatant's ability to interfere with the objectives of an opponent, friendly force composition plays just as significant a role in how this concept is interpreted as that of the opponent. As such, each of the various United States Armed Forces Service branches understand the concept through a unique lens specific to that branch's structure and operational priorities and capabilities.^[10]^: 20–27^[11]^: 1^[12] Due to the size and scale of the United States Army, it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's strongest characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, due to the lower personnel count of the United States Marine Corps, they tend to view a COG as the weakness of a combatant. On the other hand, the United States Air Force takes a "targeting" approach to warfare, meaning they often treat COGs as a series of bombable strategic and operational-critical targets.

This means, in the case of an insurgency, the U.S. military may define their opponent's COG as the entire host population, a core group of leaders/believers, or an external nation's material, financial, or political support.^[13]^: 7-6^[14]^{: 93, 102, 120–121}

Center of gravity analysis

COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.^[15]^: 106 Most modern systems of COG analysis rely on Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.^[8]^{: ix–xvi, 2, 43} Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of a combatant's mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Defense University and Joint Forces Quarterly discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:^[16]^{: 129–135}

Critical Factors Analysis (CFA)^[1]^{: IV-24–IV-27}
Eikmeier method^[17]^: 62–66^[18]^{: 156–158}^[19]^{: 109–115}^[20]^: 7
Godzilla method^[21]^: 26–30

Both the Eikmeier and Godzilla methods provide testable criteria for measuring and assessing various factors in the analysis. Meanwhile, CFA uses a subjective system of "means, ways, and ends" to assess critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. CFA is the only system officially recognized by Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publications.

Critical Factors Analysis

When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only COG analysis system officially recognized in Joint Publications.^[1]^: IV-24

Eikmeier method

There are six steps involved in Eikmeier's method of COG analysis:

Identify the organization's desired ends or objectives.
Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
List the organization's means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.

Godzilla method

In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of Godzilla "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.

Notes

References

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020-12-01). "Chapter IV: Operational Design". Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (2020 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. IV-23, IV-24 – IV-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ ^a ^b Angstrom, Jan; Widen, J. J. (2014-07-17). Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war. Routledge. pp. 60–64. ISBN 978-1-136-16920-5.
^ ^a ^b Šlebir, Miha (2022-10-01). "Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept". Revista Científica General José María Córdova. 20 (40): 1025–1044. doi:10.21830/19006586.979. ISSN 2500-7645.
^ Clausewitz, Carl Von (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444. ISBN 978-1-4344-0496-1.
^ ^a ^b Meyer, Eystein L. (2022-07-03). "The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications". Defence Studies. 22 (3): 327–353. doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715. ISSN 1470-2436.
^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017-03-01). Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 33. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ United States Marine Corps (1997-06-20). MCDP 1 Warfighting (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps. pp. 45–49, 77, 82, 92. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ ^a ^b Strange, Joseph L. (1996). Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (PDF). 4 (2nd ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. pp. ix–xvi, 2, 43. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018-10-22) [2017-01-17]. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ Strange, Joseph L.; Iron, Richard (October 2004). "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (35). Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies: 20–27. Retrieved 2023-09-01 – via National Defense University.
^ Echevarria, Antulio J. (2003). "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought". Naval War College Review. 56. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Archived from the original on 2023-09-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^ Echevarria, Antulio J. II (2002-09-01). Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!. United States Army War College Press. Retrieved 2023-09-27. Clausewitz's military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together.
^ United States Department of the Army (2014-05-13). "Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations". FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Army. p. 7-6. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Army University (2011). Cox, Dan; Bruscino, Thomas (eds.). Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center. pp. 93, 102, 120–121. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ NATO (2022-12-19). AJP-01 (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (F ed.). NATO Standardization Office. p. 106. STANAG 2437. Retrieved 2023-09-26.
^ Smith, Daniel J.; Jeter, Kelley; Westgaard, Odin (July 2015). "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (78). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 129–135. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (September 2007). "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 62–66. Retrieved 2023-09-27 – via Army University.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2010). "Redefining the Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (59). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 156–158. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2016). "Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly (83). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 109–115. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (May 2017). "The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University: 7. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Butler, James P. (January 2014). "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (72). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 26–30. Retrieved 2023-11-09.

External links

Echevarria, Antulio J. II (Summer 2003). "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept". Air and Space Power Journal. 17 (2). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-04-23. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Sidoti, Anthony F. "The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom". Air and Space Power Journal. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-02-26. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Kornatz, Steven D. (2016-07-01). "The Primacy of COG in Planning: Getting Back to Basics" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 91–96. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Eikmeier, Dale C. (2015-10-13). Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity (Video). United States Army Command and General Staff College – via YouTube.
Heerwagen, Belinda (2007-03-30). "Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist" (PDF). Strategy Research Project. United States Army War College.

[JP_5-0-1] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020-12-01). "Chapter IV: Operational Design". Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (2020 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. IV-23, IV-24 – IV-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[Contemporary_Military_Theory-2] Angstrom, Jan; Widen, J. J. (2014-07-17). Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war. Routledge. pp. 60–64. ISBN 978-1-136-16920-5.

[Re-examining_Miha-3] Šlebir, Miha (2022-10-01). "Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept". Revista Científica General José María Córdova. 20 (40): 1025–1044. doi:10.21830/19006586.979. ISSN 2500-7645.

[On_War-4] Clausewitz, Carl Von (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444. ISBN 978-1-4344-0496-1.

[Contemporary_Meyer-5] Meyer, Eystein L. (2022-07-03). "The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications". Defence Studies. 22 (3): 327–353. doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715. ISSN 1470-2436.

[DoD_Dictionary-6] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017-03-01). Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 33. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Warfighting-7] United States Marine Corps (1997-06-20). MCDP 1 Warfighting (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps. pp. 45–49, 77, 82, 92. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[Strange_Framework-8] Strange, Joseph L. (1996). Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (PDF). 4 (2nd ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. pp. ix–xvi, 2, 43. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[JP_3-0-9] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018-10-22) [2017-01-17]. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[What_Clausewitz_Really_Meant-10] Strange, Joseph L.; Iron, Richard (October 2004). "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (35). Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies: 20–27. Retrieved 2023-09-01 – via National Defense University.

[Clausewitz's_Center_of_Gravity:_It's_Not_What_We_Thought-11] Echevarria, Antulio J. (2003). "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought". Naval War College Review. 56. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Archived from the original on 2023-09-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)

[12] Echevarria, Antulio J. II (2002-09-01). Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!. United States Army War College Press. Retrieved 2023-09-27. Clausewitz's military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together.

[FM_3-24-13] United States Department of the Army (2014-05-13). "Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations". FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Army. p. 7-6. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Population-Centric_Counterinsurgency-14] Army University (2011). Cox, Dan; Bruscino, Thomas (eds.). Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center. pp. 93, 102, 120–121. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[15] NATO (2022-12-19). AJP-01 (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (F ed.). NATO Standardization Office. p. 106. STANAG 2437. Retrieved 2023-09-26.

[Three_Approaches_to_Center_of_Gravity_Analysis-16] Smith, Daniel J.; Jeter, Kelley; Westgaard, Odin (July 2015). "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (78). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 129–135. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[A_Logical_Method_for_Center-of-Gravity_Analysis-17] Eikmeier, Dale C. (September 2007). "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 62–66. Retrieved 2023-09-27 – via Army University.

[Redefining_the_Center_of_Gravity-18] Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2010). "Redefining the Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (59). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 156–158. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Let’s_Fix_or_Kill_the_Center_of_Gravity_Concept-19] Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2016). "Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly (83). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 109–115. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[The_Center_of_Gravity:_Still_Relevant_After_All_These_Years?-20] Eikmeier, Dale C. (May 2017). "The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University: 7. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Godzilla_Methodology:_Means_for_Determining_Center_of_Gravity-21] Butler, James P. (January 2014). "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (72). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 26–30. Retrieved 2023-11-09.

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 {{Globalize|article|US|date=October 2023}}
 {{War}}
-'''Center of gravity''' ('''COG''') is a warfighting concept used in the planning of military operations. The concept was first developed by [[Carl von Clausewitz]], a [[Prussia]]n [[Military theory|military theorist]], in his work ''[[On War]]''.<ref name="On War">{{cite book |author=Clausewitz |first=Carl Von |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC |title=On War: The Complete Edition |publisher=Wildside Press LLC |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4344-0496-1 |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA144 144], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA151 151], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA253 253], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA331 331–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA413 413–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA430 430–1], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA437 437], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA444 444]}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=144,151,253,331–4,413–4,430–1,437,444}} After the end of the [[Vietnam War]], interest in the Clausewitzian concept was revived, resulting in several competing conceptualisations.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Angstrom |first=Jan |url=https://books.google.si/books?id=0GQKBAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false |title=Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war |last2=Widen |first2=J. J. |date=2014-07-17 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-16920-5 |pages=60–64 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Meyer |first=Eystein L. |date=2022-07-03 |title=The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715 |journal=Defence Studies |language=en |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=327–353 |doi=10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715 |issn=1470-2436|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Šlebir |first=Miha |date=2022-10-01 |title=Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept |url=https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/979/887 |journal=Revista Científica General José María Córdova |language=en |volume=20 |issue=40 |pages=1025–1044 |doi=10.21830/19006586.979 |issn=2500-7645|doi-access=free }}</ref> In modern military thought, the centre of gravity is one of the central concepts of [[Military strategy|strategy]] and [[Operational level of war|operational art]],<ref name=":0" /><sup>:60–4</sup> and can be generally defined as a warfighting concept used in the planning of military operations to achieve disproportionate desired effects by degrading a limited but essential part of the enemy's system.<ref name=":2" /><sup>:1041</sup> Although the concept is used by armed forces around the world, some theorists warn that the concept is controversial and may need to be removed from military doctrine.<ref name=":1" />
+'''Center of gravity''' ('''COG''') is a military concept referring to the primary source of strength, balance, or stability necessary for a [[Military|force]] to maintain [[Military operation|combat operations]]. Centers of gravity can be physical, moral, or both, and exist for all belligerents at all [[Military tactics|tactical]], [[Military strategy|strategic]], and [[Operational level of war|operational levels of war]] simultaneously.<ref name="JP 5-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf#page=179 |title=Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning |date=2020-12-01 |publisher=Joint Chiefs of Staff |edition=2020 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=IV-23, IV-24{{ndash}}IV-27 |chapter=Chapter IV: Operational Design |type={{PD-notice}} |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref> COGs play a central role in [[Military operation plan|military planning]], though exact definition has been elusive, with interpretations varying substantially over time, across forces, and between [[Military_theory|theorists]]. Generally, a COG can be thought of as an essential part of a combatant's warfighting system, interference with which would result in disproportionate impact on their [[combat effectiveness]].<ref name="Contemporary Military Theory">{{Cite book |last1=Angstrom |first1=Jan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0GQKBAAAQBAJ |title=Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war |last2=Widen |first2=J. J. |date=2014-07-17 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-16920-5 |pages=60–64 |language=en}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=60{{ndash}}64|quote={{Request quotation|date=March 2024}}}}<ref name="Re-examining Miha">{{Cite journal |last=Šlebir |first=Miha |date=2022-10-01 |title=Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept |url=https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/979/887 |journal=Revista Científica General José María Córdova |language=en |volume=20 |issue=40 |pages=1025–1044 |doi=10.21830/19006586.979 |issn=2500-7645|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{Rp|page=1041|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}
+The concept was first developed by [[Carl von Clausewitz]], a [[Prussia|Prussian]] [[Military theory|military theorist]], in his work ''[[On War]]''.<ref name="On War">{{cite book |author=Clausewitz |first=Carl Von |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC |title=On War: The Complete Edition |publisher=Wildside Press LLC |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4344-0496-1 |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA144 144], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA151 151], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA253 253], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA331 331–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA413 413–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA430 430–1], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA437 437], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA444 444]}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=144,151,253,331–4,413–4,430–1,437,444}} After the end of the [[Vietnam War]], interest in the idea was revitalized, resulting in several competing conceptualizations.<ref name="Contemporary Military Theory" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}<ref name="Contemporary Meyer">{{Cite journal |last=Meyer |first=Eystein L. |date=2022-07-03 |title=The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications |journal=Defence Studies |language=en |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=327–353 |doi=10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715 |issn=1470-2436|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}<ref name="Re-examining Miha" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotatio}}n|date=March 2024}} Although the framework is used by armed forces around the world, there is widespread controversy regarding its definition and utility. Present academic literature on the subject generally agrees the term needs further clarification and careful application, while some theorists call for its complete removal from military doctrine.<ref name="Contemporary Meyer" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}
-==United States==
-[[File:JP 5-0- Characteristics of a Center of Gravity.png|alt=Characteristics of a Center of Gravity|thumb|Characteristics of a Center of Gravity]]
+== United States ==
-The [[United States Department of Defense]] defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act",<ref name="DoD Dictionary">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1029823.pdf#page=39 |title=Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms |date=2017-03-01 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |location=Washington, D.C. |publication-date=2017-03-01 |pages=33 |format=PDF |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-01 }}</ref>{{Rp|page=33|quote=The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.}} although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase.<ref name="Warfighting">{{Cite book |last=United States Marine Corps |url=https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf |title=MCDP 1 Warfighting |date=1997-06-20 |publisher=[[United States Marine Corps]] |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92 |format=PDF |author-link=United States Marine Corps |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92|quote=Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will? These are centers of gravity.}}<ref name="Strange Framework">{{Cite book |last=Strange |first=Joseph L. |url=https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf |title=Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language |publisher=[[Marine Corps University]] |year=1996 |edition=2nd |series=4 |location=Quantico, VA |pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi, 2, 43 |type= |quote= |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=We should as a minimum return to the Clausewitzian meaning of centers of gravity as moral and physical sources of strength, while simultaneously retaining the concept of "critical vulnerabilities" as critical weaknesses as explained in USMC FMFM 1 Warfighting, without of course the infamous footnote 28.|pages=2,43|page=}} There are twelve qualities of COGs the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] have doctrinally recognized:<ref name="JP 5-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf#page=179 |title=Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning |date=2020-12-01 |publisher=Joint Chiefs of Staff |edition=2020 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=IV-23, IV-24{{ndash}}IV-27 |chapter=Chapter IV: Operational Design |type={{PD-notice}} |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|page=IV-23|quote=The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help commanders analyze
+[[File:JP 5-0- Characteristics of a Center of Gravity.png|alt=Characteristics of a Center of Gravity|thumb|Characteristics of a Center of Gravity]]{{Expand section|Analysis of a conventional force's COG(s). This should be placed at the end of the section near existing text regarding that of an insurgency.|date=August 2024|period=no}}
+The [[United States Department of Defense]] defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act",<ref name="DoD Dictionary">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1029823.pdf#page=39 |title=Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms |date=2017-03-01 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |location=Washington, D.C. |publication-date=2017-03-01 |pages=33 |format=PDF |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-01 }}</ref>{{Rp|page=33|quote=The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.}} although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase.<ref name="Warfighting">{{Cite book |last=United States Marine Corps |url=https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf |title=MCDP 1 Warfighting |date=1997-06-20 |publisher=[[United States Marine Corps]] |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92 |author-link=United States Marine Corps |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92|quote=Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will? These are centers of gravity.}}<ref name="Strange Framework">{{Cite book |last=Strange |first=Joseph L. |url=https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf |title=Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language |publisher=[[Marine Corps University]] |year=1996 |edition=2nd |series=4 |location=Quantico, VA |pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi, 2, 43 |type= |quote= |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=We should as a minimum return to the Clausewitzian meaning of centers of gravity as moral and physical sources of strength, while simultaneously retaining the concept of "critical vulnerabilities" as critical weaknesses as explained in USMC FMFM 1 Warfighting, without of course the infamous footnote 28.|pages=2,43|page=}} There are twelve qualities of COGs the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] have doctrinally recognized:<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|page=IV-23|quote=The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help commanders analyze
 friendly and adversary or enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and
-vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly.|pages=}}<ref name="JP 3-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf |title=Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations |date=2018-10-22 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |edition=Change 1 |location=Washington, D.C. |format=PDF |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-27 |orig-date=2017-01-17}}</ref>{{Rp|page=III-39|quote=The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.}}
+vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly.|pages=}}<ref name="JP 3-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf |title=Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations |date=2018-10-22 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |edition=Change 1 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-27 |orig-date=2017-01-17}}</ref>{{Rp|page=III-39|quote=The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.}}
 # Exists at each level of warfare
@@ Line 15: / Line 17: @@
 # Is a source of leverage
 # Allows or enhances freedom of action
-# May be where the enemy’s force is most densely concentrated
+# May be where the enemy's force is most densely concentrated
-# Can endanger one’s own COGs
+# Can endanger one's own COGs
 # May be transitory in nature
 # Linked to objective(s)
@@ Line 24: / Line 26: @@
 # Contains many intangible elements at strategic level
-The COG is the root enabler of the enemy's ability to interfere with friendly forces' mission, and vice versa. However, the various [[United States Armed Forces#Service branches|United States Armed Forces Service branches]] interpret this concept in different manners.<ref name="What Clausewitz Really Meant">{{Cite journal |last1=Strange |first1=Joseph L. |last2=Iron |first2=Richard |date=October 2004 |title=Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-35.pdf#page=28 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies |issue=35 |pages=20{{ndash}}27 |access-date=2023-09-01 |quote= |via=[[National Defense University]]}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=The discussion of centers of gravity in book eight [of ''On War'' by Carl von Clausewitz] is much less precise and is the source of misunderstanding for two reasons. First, the Howard and Paret translation of On War, the most commonly used English edition, may have confused some aspects of the original text. Moreover, some interpretations have taken the original out of context. Notwithstanding possible mistranslations, Howard and Paret are usually clear and consistent—provided the text is interpreted within the context of the relevant passages elsewhere.|pages=20{{ndash}}27}}<ref name="Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought">{{Cite journal |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. |date=2003 |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |journal=Naval War College Review |location=Newport, Rhode Island |publisher=[[Naval War College]] |volume=56 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927212312/https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |archive-date=2023-09-27 |access-date=2023-09-27 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual perspectives to Clausewitz's expression and redefined it in its respective image.|page=1}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=monographs |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again! |date=2002-09-01 |publisher=[[United States Army War College]] Press |quote=Clausewitz’s military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together. |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref> Due to this size of the [[United States Army]], it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's strongest characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, the [[United States Marine Corps]] prefers to view a COG as the weakness of a combatant. For example, a counter-insurgency's COG may be defined as the entire host population, an external nation's support, or a core group of leaders/believers.<ref name="FM 3-24">{{Cite book |last=United States Department of the Army |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/NOCASE-FM_3-24-001-WEB-5.pdf#page=92 |title=FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies |date=2014-05-13 |publisher=[[United States Department of the Army]] |location=Washington, D.C. |page=7-6 |chapter=Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations |format=PDF |quote= |author-link=United States Department of the Army |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7-6|quote=In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions.|quote-location=7-21}}<ref name="Population-Centric Counterinsurgency">{{Cite book |last=Army University |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Population-CentricCounterinsurgency.pdf |title=Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? |publisher=[[US Army Combined Arms Center]] |year=2011 |editor-last=Cox |editor-first=Dan |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121 |quote= |author-link=Army University |access-date=2023-09-01 |editor-last2=Bruscino |editor-first2=Thomas}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=In essence, the population is the insurgent's center of gravity. Therefore, the counterinsurgent must drive a wedge between the insurgent and the population by establishing a level of security that is inhospitable to the insurgent's attempts to manipulate the population.|pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121}}
+Because the COG is one or multiple root enablers of a combatant's ability to interfere with the objectives of an opponent, friendly force composition plays just as significant a role in how this concept is interpreted as that of the opponent. As such, each of the various [[United States Armed Forces#Service branches|United States Armed Forces Service branches]] understand the concept through a unique lens specific to that branch's structure and operational priorities and capabilities.<ref name="What Clausewitz Really Meant">{{Cite journal |last1=Strange |first1=Joseph L. |last2=Iron |first2=Richard |date=October 2004 |title=Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-35.pdf#page=28 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies |issue=35 |pages=20{{ndash}}27 |access-date=2023-09-01 |quote= |via=[[National Defense University]]}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=The discussion of centers of gravity in book eight [of ''On War'' by Carl von Clausewitz] is much less precise and is the source of misunderstanding for two reasons. First, the Howard and Paret translation of On War, the most commonly used English edition, may have confused some aspects of the original text. Moreover, some interpretations have taken the original out of context. Notwithstanding possible mistranslations, Howard and Paret are usually clear and consistent—provided the text is interpreted within the context of the relevant passages elsewhere.|pages=20{{ndash}}27}}<ref name="Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought">{{Cite journal |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. |date=2003 |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |journal=Naval War College Review |location=Newport, Rhode Island |publisher=[[Naval War College]] |volume=56 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927212312/https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |archive-date=2023-09-27 |access-date=2023-09-27 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual perspectives to Clausewitz's expression and redefined it in its respective image.|page=1}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=monographs |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again! |date=2002-09-01 |publisher=[[United States Army War College]] Press |quote=Clausewitz’s military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together. |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref> Due to the size and scale of the [[United States Army]], it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's ''strongest'' characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, due to the lower personnel count of the [[United States Marine Corps]], they tend to view a COG as the ''weakness'' of a combatant. On the other hand, the [[United States Air Force]] takes a "targeting" approach to warfare, meaning they often treat COGs as a series of bombable strategic and operational-critical targets.
+This means, in the case of an insurgency, the U.S. military may define their opponent's COG as the entire host population, a core group of leaders/believers, or an external nation's material, financial, or political support.<ref name="FM 3-24">{{Cite book |last=United States Department of the Army |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/NOCASE-FM_3-24-001-WEB-5.pdf#page=92 |title=FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies |date=2014-05-13 |publisher=[[United States Department of the Army]] |location=Washington, D.C. |page=7-6 |chapter=Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations |format=PDF |quote= |author-link=United States Department of the Army |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7-6|quote=In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions.|quote-location=7-21}}<ref name="Population-Centric Counterinsurgency">{{Cite book |last=Army University |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Population-CentricCounterinsurgency.pdf |title=Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? |publisher=[[US Army Combined Arms Center]] |year=2011 |editor-last=Cox |editor-first=Dan |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121 |quote= |author-link=Army University |access-date=2023-09-01 |editor-last2=Bruscino |editor-first2=Thomas}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=In essence, the population is the insurgent's center of gravity. Therefore, the counterinsurgent must drive a wedge between the insurgent and the population by establishing a level of security that is inhospitable to the insurgent's attempts to manipulate the population.|pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121}}
-==Center of Gravity Analysis==
+== Center of gravity analysis ==
 [[File:JP 5-0- Center of Gravity Analysis.png|alt=Center of Gravity Analysis|thumb|Center of Gravity Analysis]]
-COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=NATO |url=https://archive.org/details/AJP-01-F1/ |title=AJP-01 |date=2022-12-19 |publisher=[[NATO Standardization Office]] |edition=F |page=106 |type={{PD-notice}} |format=PDF |id=STANAG 2437 |author-link=NATO |access-date=2023-09-26}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Centre of gravity analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.|page=106}} Most modern systems of COG of analysis rely on the Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.<ref name="Strange Framework"/>{{Rp|quote=We should also incorporate into Joint/Service doctrine two new conceptual terms - "critical capabilities" (CCs) and "critical requirements" (CRs) - which bridge the gap and explain the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.|pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi,2,43}} Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of the mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the [[National Defense University]] (NDU) and Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ) discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:<ref name="Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis">{{Cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Daniel J. |last2=Jeter |first2=Kelley |last3=Westgaard |first3=Odin |date=July 2015 |title=Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-78/jfq-78.pdf#page=131 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=78 |pages=129{{ndash}}135 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=129{{ndash}}135|quote=Speculation on proper COG determination has given rise to other COG methodologies, which have both questioned and challenged established doctrine for COG determination. Therefore, the objective of this article is to compare and contrast different COG determination methodologies to reveal strengths and weaknesses of each and ultimately to make recommendations for changes to joint doctrine.}}
+COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=NATO |url=https://archive.org/details/AJP-01-F1/ |title=AJP-01 |date=2022-12-19 |publisher=[[NATO Standardization Office]] |edition=F |page=106 |type={{PD-notice}} |format=PDF |id=STANAG 2437 |author-link=NATO |access-date=2023-09-26}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Centre of gravity analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.|page=106}} Most modern systems of COG analysis rely on Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.<ref name="Strange Framework"/>{{Rp|quote=We should also incorporate into Joint/Service doctrine two new conceptual terms - "critical capabilities" (CCs) and "critical requirements" (CRs) - which bridge the gap and explain the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.|pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi,2,43}} Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of a combatant's mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the [[National Defense University]] and Joint Forces Quarterly discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:<ref name="Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis">{{Cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Daniel J. |last2=Jeter |first2=Kelley |last3=Westgaard |first3=Odin |date=July 2015 |title=Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-78/jfq-78.pdf#page=131 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=78 |pages=129{{ndash}}135 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=129{{ndash}}135|quote=Speculation on proper COG determination has given rise to other COG methodologies, which have both questioned and challenged established doctrine for COG determination. Therefore, the objective of this article is to compare and contrast different COG determination methodologies to reveal strengths and weaknesses of each and ultimately to make recommendations for changes to joint doctrine.}}
 *  Critical Factors Analysis (CFA)<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|page=|quote=Critical factors analysis is a framework to assist in analyzing and identifying a COG and to aid operational planning against threat networks within the OE, including insurgent, resistance, terrorist, and criminal organizations that operate in the human dimension of complex OEs. During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment.|pages=IV-24{{ndash}}IV-27}}
@@ Line 37: / Line 41: @@
 === Critical Factors Analysis ===
-When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only officially recognized COG Analysis system in Joint Publications.<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|page=|quote=During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies those characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat.|pages=IV-24}}
+When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only COG analysis system officially recognized in Joint Publications.<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|quote=During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies those characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat.|pages=IV-24}}
-=== Eikmeier Method ===
+=== Eikmeier method ===
 There are six steps involved in Eikmeier's method of COG analysis:
-# Identify the organization’s desired ends or objectives.
+# Identify the organization's desired ends or objectives.
 # Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
-# List the organization’s means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
+# List the organization's means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
 # Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
 # From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
 # Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.
-=== Godzilla Method ===
+=== Godzilla method ===
-In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of Godzilla "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.
+In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of [[Godzilla]] "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.
+==See also==
+* [[Military strategy]]
+* [[United States Army Strategist]]
 ==Notes==
@@ Line 56: / Line 65: @@
 ==References==
 {{Reflist}}
-==See also==
-* [[Military strategy]]
-* [[United States Army Strategist]]
 ==External links==
 *{{Cite journal |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |date=Summer 2003 |title='Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-17_Issue-1-4/sum03.pdf#page=88 |journal=[[Air and Space Power Journal]] |volume=17 |issue=2 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070423201250/http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/echevarria.html |archive-date=2007-04-23 |access-date=2023-11-09}}
-*{{Cite journal |last=Sidoti |first=Anthony F. |title=The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/sidoti.pdf |format=PDF |journal=[[Air and Space Power Journal]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070226214019/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/sidoti.html |archive-date=2007-02-26 |access-date=2023-11-09}}
+*{{Cite journal |last=Sidoti |first=Anthony F. |title=The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/sidoti.pdf |journal=[[Air and Space Power Journal]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070226214019/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/sidoti.html |archive-date=2007-02-26 |access-date=2023-11-09}}
 *{{Cite journal |date=2016-07-01 |title=The Primacy of COG in Planning: Getting Back to Basics |journal=Joint Forces Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |pages=91{{ndash}}96 |access-date=2023-11-09 |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-82/jfq-82.pdf#page=93 |last=Kornatz |first=Steven D.}}
 *{{Cite AV media |url=https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLkGvnfy3IadOrkQ_QkDfDCNHlny03N4PJ |title=Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity |date=2015-10-13 |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |type=Video |publisher=[[United States Army Command and General Staff College]] |via=YouTube}}
-*{{Cite journal |last=Heerwagen |first=Belinda |date=2007-03-30 |title=Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468496.pdf |journal= |publisher=[[United States Army War College]]}}
+*{{Cite journal |last=Heerwagen |first=Belinda |date=2007-03-30 |title=Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468496.pdf |journal=Strategy Research Project |publisher=[[United States Army War College]]}}
 [[Category:Military strategy]]