Mobile Warfare: Difference between revisions
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{{short description|English phrase for Mao Zedong's main military methods}} |
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{{Distinguish|Maneuver warfare}} |
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{{More footnotes|date=October 2020}} |
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'''Mobile warfare''' ({{Zh|s=运动战|p=yùndòngzhàn}}) is a military strategy of the [[China|People’s Republic of China]] employing [[Conventional warfare|conventional forces]] on fluid fronts with units maneuvering to exploit opportunities for tactical surprise, or where a local superiority of forces can be realized. One of early CCP leader [[Mao Zedong]]'s three forms of warfare ({{Zh|s=战争形式|p=zhànzhēng xíngshì}}), mobile warfare was the primary form of warfare used by [[Chinese Communist Forces|Chinese communist forces]] from the early 1930s to the conclusion of the [[Chinese Civil War]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CgV1DwAAQBAJ |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019-04-23 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |language=en}}</ref> The other two forms of warfare that Mao defined in ''[[On Protracted War]]'', [[guerrilla warfare]] ({{zh|c=游击战|p=yóujīzhàn|labels=no}}) and positional warfare ({{zh|c=阵地战|p=zhèndìzhàn|labels=no}}), were less frequently employed.<ref name=":0" /> |
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The achievements of Mao and the Communists in the p*e*n*i*s [[Chinese Civil War]] are normally referred to as [[Guerrilla warfare]]. But he himself made a distinction between Mobile Warfare (''yundong zhan''), Positional Warfare (zhendi zhan) and [[Guerrilla warfare]] (''youji zhan''). |
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| ⚫ | The most notable example of Chinese mobile warfare was the [[Long March]], a massive military retreat in which Mao marched in circles in [[Guizhou]] until he had confused the vastly larger armies pursuing him, and was then able to slip through [[Yunnan]] and [[Sichuan]], although the retreat was completed by only one-tenth of the force that left for the Long March at Jiangxi. |
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Mao had a regular army that was far too big to hide, but made a point of conceding territory and avoiding battle until he was ready to fight. |
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| ⚫ | The Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]]'s first five campaigns in the [[Korean War]] were characterized by a strategy of mobile warfare, in which the PVA encircled the enemy through maneuvers and sought to annihilate the enemy. Then it entered a stage of positional warfare, when both the PVA and [[United Nations|UN]] forces fought to a stalemate along the [[38th parallel north]].{{Cn|date=November 2022}} |
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| ⚫ | The most notable example was the [[Long March]], in which Mao marched in circles in [[Guizhou]] until he had confused the vastly larger armies pursuing him, and was then able to slip through [[Yunnan]] and [[Sichuan]] |
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These military methods were part of the military-political strategy of [[People's war]], which aims to win the support of the local population. |
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| ⚫ | The Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]]'s first five campaigns in the [[Korean War]] were |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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*[[Tunnel war]] |
*[[Tunnel war]] |
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==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
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==Sources== |
==Sources== |
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*''Seeking Truth From Facts'': RAND 1991, page 136. The book is mostly about post-Mao developments within the Chinese military. |
*''Seeking Truth From Facts'': RAND 1991, page 136. The book is mostly about post-Mao developments within the Chinese military. |
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* |
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20010330032758/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/great/mao.htm various English-language sources using the phrase] |
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[[Category:Military strategy]] |
[[Category:Military strategy]] |
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[[Category:Military history of the People's Republic of China]] |
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[[Category:Military history of China]] |
[[Category:Military history of China]] |
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[[Category:Mao Zedong]] |
[[Category:Mao Zedong]] |
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[[zh:運動戰]] |
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Latest revision as of 19:59, 13 September 2024
 | This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. (October 2020) |
Mobile warfare (Chinese: 运动战; pinyin: yùndòngzhàn) is a military strategy of the People’s Republic of China employing conventional forces on fluid fronts with units maneuvering to exploit opportunities for tactical surprise, or where a local superiority of forces can be realized. One of early CCP leader Mao Zedong's three forms of warfare (Chinese: 战争形式; pinyin: zhànzhēng xíngshì), mobile warfare was the primary form of warfare used by Chinese communist forces from the early 1930s to the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War.[1] The other two forms of warfare that Mao defined in On Protracted War, guerrilla warfare (游击战; yóujīzhàn) and positional warfare (阵地战; zhèndìzhàn), were less frequently employed.[1]
The most notable example of Chinese mobile warfare was the Long March, a massive military retreat in which Mao marched in circles in Guizhou until he had confused the vastly larger armies pursuing him, and was then able to slip through Yunnan and Sichuan, although the retreat was completed by only one-tenth of the force that left for the Long March at Jiangxi.
The Chinese People's Volunteer Army's first five campaigns in the Korean War were characterized by a strategy of mobile warfare, in which the PVA encircled the enemy through maneuvers and sought to annihilate the enemy. Then it entered a stage of positional warfare, when both the PVA and UN forces fought to a stalemate along the 38th parallel north.[citation needed]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b Fravel, M. Taylor (2019-04-23). Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-18559-0.
Sources
[edit]- Seeking Truth From Facts: RAND 1991, page 136. The book is mostly about post-Mao developments within the Chinese military.
- various English-language sources using the phrase