United Nations Security Council Resolution 39: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|United Nations Security Council resolution}} |
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{{Infobox UN resolution |
{{Infobox UN resolution |
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|number = 39 |
|number = 39 |
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|abstention = 2 |
|abstention = 2 |
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|against = 0 |
|against = 0 |
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|subject = The |
|subject = The India–Pakistan question |
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|result = Adopted |
|result = Adopted |
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|image = India Jammu and Kashmir relief map.png |
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|image = |
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|caption = |
|caption = Map of Jammu and Kashmir |
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'''[[United Nations]] [[United Nations Security Council Resolution|Security Council Resolution]] 39''', adopted on January 20, 1948, offered to assist in the peaceful resolution of the [[Kashmir Conflict]] by setting up a commission of three members; one to be chosen by |
'''[[United Nations]] [[United Nations Security Council Resolution|Security Council Resolution]] 39''', adopted on January 20, 1948, offered to assist in the peaceful resolution of the [[Kashmir Conflict]] by setting up a commission of three members; one to be chosen by [[Dominion of India|India]], one to be chosen by [[Dominion of Pakistan|Pakistan]] and the third to be chosen by the other two members of the commission. The commission was to write a joint letter advising the Security Council on what course of action would be best to help further peace in the region. |
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==Functions of the commission== |
==Functions of the commission== |
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The commission was to "investigate the facts" and to "carry out directions" given by the Security Council. The investigations were to address the allegations made by India in its letter of 1 January 1948, regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly they were to address, when the "Security Council so directs", other issues raised by Pakistan in its submission on the 15 January 1948. The Pakistani allegations were wide-ranging: that India was attempting to undo the [[partition of India]], that it was carrying out a campaign of 'genocide' against Muslims in East Punjab, Delhi and other areas, that it forcefully and unlawfully occupied [[Junagadh State|Junagadh]], that it obtained the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by 'fraud and violence', that it threatened Pakistan with direct military attack.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|p=111}} |
The commission was to "investigate the facts" and to "carry out directions" given by the Security Council. The investigations were to address the allegations made by India in its letter of 1 January 1948, regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly they were to address, when the "Security Council so directs", other issues raised by Pakistan in its submission on the 15 January 1948. The Pakistani allegations were wide-ranging: that India was attempting to undo the [[partition of India]], that it was carrying out a campaign of 'genocide' against Muslims in East Punjab, Delhi and other areas, that it forcefully and unlawfully occupied [[Junagadh State|Junagadh]], that it obtained the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by 'fraud and violence', and that it threatened Pakistan with direct military attack.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|p=111}} |
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==Negotiations and aftermath== |
==Negotiations and aftermath== |
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The resolution was moved by [[Belgium]], as the Chair of the Council. It was largely influenced by the special British delegation headed by [[Philip Noel-Baker]], the British Cabinet minister for [[Commonwealth Relations Office|Commonwealth Relations]], sent to the United Nations for handling the Kashmir dispute.{{sfn|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=278}}{{efn|{{harvtxt|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=278}} quotes Noel-Baker stating "The fact that Van Langenhove is largely guided by us is not known... and we take every precaution to ensure that it is not known."}} |
The resolution was moved by [[Belgium]], as the Chair of the Council. It was largely influenced by the special British delegation headed by [[Philip Noel-Baker]], the British Cabinet minister for [[Commonwealth Relations Office|Commonwealth Relations]], sent to the United Nations for handling the Kashmir dispute.{{sfn|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=278}}{{efn|{{harvtxt|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=278}} quotes Noel-Baker stating "The fact that Van Langenhove is largely guided by us is not known... and we take every precaution to ensure that it is not known."}} |
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The resolution passed by nine votes, with [[ |
The resolution passed by nine votes, with [[Ukrainian SSR]] and the [[Soviet Union]] abstaining. |
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The British delegation also sought to persuade India to accept an impartial administration in Kashmir under the auspices of the UN. The administration was to be headed a "neutral" Chairman and Kashmir was to be under a joint military occupation under a neutral Commander-in-Chief appointed by the UN. The United States did not support these far-reaching proposals.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|pp=115–116}}{{sfn|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=277}}{{sfn|Schaffer, Limits of Influence|2009|pp=15–16}} |
The British delegation also sought to persuade India to accept an impartial administration in Kashmir under the auspices of the UN. The administration was to be headed by a "neutral" Chairman and Kashmir was to be under a joint military occupation under a neutral Commander-in-Chief appointed by the UN. The United States did not support these far-reaching proposals.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|pp=115–116}}{{sfn|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013|p=277}}{{sfn|Schaffer, Limits of Influence|2009|pp=15–16}} |
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The British delegation intended that the UN commission would be subordinate to the Security Council, whereas the real work of formulating a settlement would be carried out in New York. Hence, despite the urgency of the situation, no moves were actually made to create the commission until after the [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 47|Resolution 47]] was passed by the Council in April 1948.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|pp=117–118}} A further |
The British delegation intended that the UN commission would be subordinate to the Security Council, whereas the real work of formulating a settlement would be carried out in New York. Hence, despite the urgency of the situation, no moves were actually made to create the commission until after the [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 47|Resolution 47]] was passed by the Council in April 1948.{{sfn|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014|pp=117–118}} A further eleven weeks passed before the commission could be formed and able to arrive in the Indian subcontinent. The UN diplomat [[Josef Korbel]] later had words of criticism for the delay in forming the UN commission. During the winter months, the fighting had reduced to small skirmishes. Korbel opined that the arrival of the commission before the fighting renewed in the summer months could have had a dampening effect. When the commission eventually got down to work, the political and military situation was quite different from what it had been in January–April 1948.{{sfn|Korbel, Danger in Kashmir|1966|p=117}} |
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It was later discovered that a contributory factor for the delay was Pakistan's failure to nominate its representative on the UN commission until 30 April 1948.<ref>{{citation|last=Blinkenberg|first=Lars|title=India-Pakistan: The history of unsolved conflicts|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CCVuAAAAMAAJ|year=1972|publisher=Munksgaard|isbn=978-87-16-01110-7|ref={{sfnref|Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan: The history of unsolved conflicts|1972}}}}, p. 121, note 30: "Pakistan had not yet appointed her nominee to the Commission, which took place only on April 30, 1948. This was one of the reasons for the delay in sending out UNCIP, which was severely criticized by Korbel."</ref> |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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*[[List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1 to 100]] ( |
*[[List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1 to 100]] (1946–1953) |
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*[[United Nations Security Council Resolution 47]] |
*[[United Nations Security Council Resolution 47]] |
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*[[United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan]] |
*[[United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan]] |
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==Bibliography== |
==Bibliography== |
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* {{citation |last=Ankit |first=Rakesh |title=Britain and Kashmir, 1948: 'The Arena of the UN' |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |volume=24 |number=2 | |
* {{citation |last=Ankit |first=Rakesh |title=Britain and Kashmir, 1948: 'The Arena of the UN' |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |volume=24 |number=2 |pages=273–290 |year=2013 |doi=10.1080/09592296.2013.789771 |s2cid=154021048 |ref={{sfnref|Ankit, Britain and Kashmir|2013}}}} |
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* {{citation |last=Dasgupta |first=C. | |
* {{citation |last=Dasgupta |first=C. |author-link=Chandrashekhar Dasgupta |title=War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jEtuAAAAMAAJ |date=2014 |orig-year=first published 2002 |publisher=SAGE Publications |isbn=978-81-321-1795-7 |ref={{sfnref|Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir|2014}}}} |
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* {{citation |last=Korbel |first=Josef | |
* {{citation |last=Korbel |first=Josef |author-link=Josef Korbel |title=Danger in Kashmir |publisher=Princeton University Press |edition=second |year=1966 |isbn=9781400875238 |orig-year=first published 1954 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7Q7WCgAAQBAJ |ref={{sfnref|Korbel, Danger in Kashmir|1966}}}} |
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* {{citation |last=Schaffer |first=Howard B. |title=The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kyYOWdA5PNkC |date=2009 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=978-0-8157-0370-9 |ref={{sfnref|Schaffer, Limits of Influence|2009}}}} |
* {{citation |last=Schaffer |first=Howard B. |title=The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kyYOWdA5PNkC |date=2009 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=978-0-8157-0370-9 |ref={{sfnref|Schaffer, Limits of Influence|2009}}}} |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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{{wikisource}} |
* {{wikisource-inline}} |
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*[https://undocs.org/S/RES/39(1948) Text of the Resolution at undocs.org] |
*[https://undocs.org/S/RES/39(1948) Text of the Resolution at undocs.org] |
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*[https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/047/64/img/NR004764.pdf?OpenElement Text of Resolution at the UN Official Document System] |
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{{UNSCR 1948}} |
{{UNSCR 1948}} |
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[[Category:1948 United Nations Security Council resolutions|0039]] |
[[Category:1948 United Nations Security Council resolutions| 0039]] |
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[[Category:United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the Kashmir conflict]] |
[[Category:United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning the Kashmir conflict| 0039]] |
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[[Category:January 1948 events]] |
[[Category:January 1948 events]] |
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Latest revision as of 20:39, 2 October 2024
| UN Security Council Resolution 39 | ||
|---|---|---|
 Map of Jammu and Kashmir | ||
| Date | January 20 1948 | |
| Meeting no. | 230 | |
| Code | S/654 (Document) | |
| Subject | The India–Pakistan question | |
Voting summary |
| |
| Result | Adopted | |
| Security Council composition | ||
Permanent members | ||
Non-permanent members | ||
| ||
United Nations Security Council Resolution 39, adopted on January 20, 1948, offered to assist in the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Conflict by setting up a commission of three members; one to be chosen by India, one to be chosen by Pakistan and the third to be chosen by the other two members of the commission. The commission was to write a joint letter advising the Security Council on what course of action would be best to help further peace in the region.
Functions of the commission
[edit]The commission was to "investigate the facts" and to "carry out directions" given by the Security Council. The investigations were to address the allegations made by India in its letter of 1 January 1948, regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly they were to address, when the "Security Council so directs", other issues raised by Pakistan in its submission on the 15 January 1948. The Pakistani allegations were wide-ranging: that India was attempting to undo the partition of India, that it was carrying out a campaign of 'genocide' against Muslims in East Punjab, Delhi and other areas, that it forcefully and unlawfully occupied Junagadh, that it obtained the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by 'fraud and violence', and that it threatened Pakistan with direct military attack.[1]
Negotiations and aftermath
[edit]The resolution was moved by Belgium, as the Chair of the Council. It was largely influenced by the special British delegation headed by Philip Noel-Baker, the British Cabinet minister for Commonwealth Relations, sent to the United Nations for handling the Kashmir dispute.[2][a] The resolution passed by nine votes, with Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union abstaining.
The British delegation also sought to persuade India to accept an impartial administration in Kashmir under the auspices of the UN. The administration was to be headed by a "neutral" Chairman and Kashmir was to be under a joint military occupation under a neutral Commander-in-Chief appointed by the UN. The United States did not support these far-reaching proposals.[3][4][5]
The British delegation intended that the UN commission would be subordinate to the Security Council, whereas the real work of formulating a settlement would be carried out in New York. Hence, despite the urgency of the situation, no moves were actually made to create the commission until after the Resolution 47 was passed by the Council in April 1948.[6] A further eleven weeks passed before the commission could be formed and able to arrive in the Indian subcontinent. The UN diplomat Josef Korbel later had words of criticism for the delay in forming the UN commission. During the winter months, the fighting had reduced to small skirmishes. Korbel opined that the arrival of the commission before the fighting renewed in the summer months could have had a dampening effect. When the commission eventually got down to work, the political and military situation was quite different from what it had been in January–April 1948.[7]
It was later discovered that a contributory factor for the delay was Pakistan's failure to nominate its representative on the UN commission until 30 April 1948.[8]
See also
[edit]- List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1 to 100 (1946–1953)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 47
- United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
Notes
[edit]- ^ Ankit, Britain and Kashmir (2013, p. 278) quotes Noel-Baker stating "The fact that Van Langenhove is largely guided by us is not known... and we take every precaution to ensure that it is not known."
References
[edit]- ^ Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 2014, p. 111.
- ^ Ankit, Britain and Kashmir 2013, p. 278.
- ^ Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 2014, pp. 115–116.
- ^ Ankit, Britain and Kashmir 2013, p. 277.
- ^ Schaffer, Limits of Influence 2009, pp. 15–16.
- ^ Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 2014, pp. 117–118.
- ^ Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 1966, p. 117.
- ^ Blinkenberg, Lars (1972), India-Pakistan: The history of unsolved conflicts, Munksgaard, ISBN 978-87-16-01110-7, p. 121, note 30: "Pakistan had not yet appointed her nominee to the Commission, which took place only on April 30, 1948. This was one of the reasons for the delay in sending out UNCIP, which was severely criticized by Korbel."
Bibliography
[edit]- Ankit, Rakesh (2013), "Britain and Kashmir, 1948: 'The Arena of the UN'", Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24 (2): 273–290, doi:10.1080/09592296.2013.789771, S2CID 154021048
- Dasgupta, C. (2014) [first published 2002], War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48, SAGE Publications, ISBN 978-81-321-1795-7
- Korbel, Josef (1966) [first published 1954], Danger in Kashmir (second ed.), Princeton University Press, ISBN 9781400875238
- Schaffer, Howard B. (2009), The Limits of Influence: America's Role in Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, ISBN 978-0-8157-0370-9
