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Stoic passions are various forms of emotional suffering in Stoicism, a school of Hellenistic philosophy.

Definition

The passions are transliterated pathê from Greek.^[1] The Greek word pathos was a wide-ranging term indicating an infliction one suffers.^[2] The Stoics used the word to discuss many common emotions such as anger, fear and excessive joy.^[3] A passion is a disturbing and misleading force in the mind which occurs because of a failure to reason correctly.^[2] For the Stoic Chrysippus the passions are evaluative judgements.^[4] A person experiencing such an emotion has incorrectly valued an indifferent thing.^[5] A fault of judgement, some false notion of good or evil, lies at the root of each passion.^[6] Incorrect judgement as to a present good gives rise to delight, while lust is a wrong estimate about the future.^[6] Unreal imaginings of evil cause distress about the present, or fear for the future.^[6]

These states of feeling are disturbances of mental health which upset the natural balance of the soul, and destroy its self-control.^[6] They are harmful because they conflict with right reason.^[7] The ideal Stoic would instead measure things at their real value,^[6] and see that the passions are not natural.^[8] To be free of the passions is to have a happiness which is self-contained.^[8] There would be nothing to fear—for unreason is the only evil; no cause for anger—for others cannot harm you.^[8]

Primary passions

The Stoics beginning with Zeno arranged the passions under four headings: distress, pleasure, fear and lust.^[9] One report of the Stoic definitions of these passions appears in the treatise On Passions by Pseudo-Andronicus (trans. Long & Sedley, pg. 411, modified):

Distress (lupē): Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be depressed.
Fear (phobos): Fear is an irrational aversion, or avoidance of an expected danger.
Lust (epithumia): Lust is an irrational desire, or pursuit of an expected good but in reality bad.
Delight (hēdonē): Delight is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be elated.

Two of these passions (distress and delight) refer to emotions currently present, and two of these (fear and lust) refer to emotions directed at the future.^[9] Thus there are just two states directed at the prospect of good and evil, but subdivided as to whether they are present or future:^[10]

	Present	Future
Good	Delight	Lust
Evil	Distress	Fear

Subdivisions

Numerous subdivisions of the same class are brought under the head of the separate passions. The definitions are those of the translation of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations by J. E. King.

Distress

Envy: Envy is distress incurred by reason of a neighbor's prosperity.
Rivalry: Rivalry is distress, should another be in possession of the object desired and one has to go without it oneself.
Jealousy: Jealousy is distress arising from the fact that the thing one has coveted oneself is in the possession of the other man as well as one's own.
Compassion: Compassion is distress arising from the wretchedness of a neighbor in undeserved suffering.
Anxiety: Anxiety is oppressive distress.
Mourning: Mourning is distress arising from the untimely death of a beloved object.
Sadness: Sadness is tearful distress.
Troubling: Troubling is burdensome distress.
Grief: Grief is torturing distress.
Lamenting: Distress accompanied by wailing.
Depression: Depression is distress accompanied by brooding.
Vexation: Vexation is lasting distress.
Despondency: Despondency is distress without any prospect of amelioration.

Fear

Sluggishness: Sluggishness is fear of ensuing toil.
Shame: Shame is fear of disgrace.
Fright: Fright is paralyzing fear which causes paleness, trembling and chattering of teeth.
Timidity: Timidity is fear of approaching evil.
Consternation: Consternation is fear upsetting the mental balance.
Pusillanimity: Pusillanimity is fear following on the heels of fright like an attendant.
Bewilderment: Bewilderment is fear paralyzing thought.
Faintheartedness: Faintheartedness is lasting fear.

Lust

Anger: Anger is lust of punishing the man who is thought to have inflicted an undeserved injury.
Rage: Rage is anger springing up and suddenly showing itself.
Hatred: Hatred is inveterate anger.
Enmity: Enmity is anger watching as opportunity for revenge.
Wrath: Wrath is anger of greater bitterness conceived in the innermost heart and soul.
Greed: Greed is insatiable lust.
Longing: Longing is lust of beholding someone who is not present.

Delight

Malice: Malice is pleasure derived from a neighbor's evil which brings no advantage to oneself.
Rapture: Rapture is pleasure soothing the soul by charm of the sense of hearing.
Ostentation: Ostentation is pleasure shown in outward demeanor and puffing oneself out extravagantly.

Good feelings

The wise person (sophos) is someone who is free from the passions (apatheia). Instead of passion, the sage experiences good-feelings (eupatheia) which are clear-headed.^[11] These emotional impulses are not excessive, but nor are they diminished emotions.^[12]^[13] Instead they are the correct rational emotions.^[13] The Stoics listed the good-feelings under the headings of joy (chara), wish (boulesis), and caution (eulabeia).^[5] Thus if something is present which is a genuine good, then the wise person experiences an uplift in the soul—joy (chara).^[14] The Stoics also subdivided the good-feelings:^[15]

Joy:
- Enjoyment
- Cheerfulness
- Good spirits

Wish:
- Good intent
- Goodwill
- Welcoming
- Cherishing
- Love

Caution:
- Moral shame
- Reverence

Citations

^ Blank, David. "Philodemus" – 2.2.4.4.2 On individual ethical topics (c.f. - 5th paragraph) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)(published Wed Apr 10, 2013; substantive revision Mon Aug 4, 2014) [Retrieved 2015-3-15]
^ ^a ^b Annas 1994, p. 103
^ Annas 1994, pp. 103–104
^ Groenendijk, Leendert F. and de Ruyter, Doret J.(2009) 'Learning from Seneca: a Stoic perspective on the art of living and education', Ethics and Education, 4: 1, 81–92 doi:10.1080/17449640902816277
^ ^a ^b Annas 1994, p. 114
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Capes 1880, p. 47
^ Annas 1994, p. 113
^ ^a ^b ^c Capes 1880, p. 48
^ ^a ^b Sorabji 2000, p. 29
^ Graver 2007, p. 54
^ Inwood 1999, p. 705
^ Annas 1994, p. 115
^ ^a ^b Graver 2007, p. 52
^ Inwood 1999, p. 701
^ Graver 2007, p. 58

References

Annas, Julia (1994), Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-07659-4
Capes, William Wolfe (1880), Stoicism, Pott, Young, & Co.
Graver, Margaret (2007), Stoicism and Emotion, University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-30557-8
Inwood, Brad (1999), "Stoic Ethics", in Algra, Keimpe; Barnes, Johnathan; Mansfield, Jaap; Schofield, Malcolm (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-25028-3
Sorabji, Richard (2000), Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-198-25005-0
Andronicus, "On Passions I," Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3.391. ed. Hans von Arnim. 1903–1905.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1945 c. 1927). Cicero : Tusculan Disputations (Loeb Classical Library, No. 141) 2nd Ed. trans. by J. E. King. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP.
Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

External links

[1] Blank, David. "Philodemus" – 2.2.4.4.2 On individual ethical topics (c.f. - 5th paragraph) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)(published Wed Apr 10, 2013; substantive revision Mon Aug 4, 2014) [Retrieved 2015-3-15]

[annas103-2] Annas 1994, p. 103

[3] Annas 1994, pp. 103–104

[4] Groenendijk, Leendert F. and de Ruyter, Doret J.(2009) 'Learning from Seneca: a Stoic perspective on the art of living and education', Ethics and Education, 4: 1, 81–92 doi:10.1080/17449640902816277

[annas114-5] Annas 1994, p. 114

[capes47-6] Capes 1880, p. 47

[annas113-7] Annas 1994, p. 113

[capes48-8] Capes 1880, p. 48

[sorabji29-9] Sorabji 2000, p. 29

[graver54-10] Graver 2007, p. 54

[inwood705-11] Inwood 1999, p. 705

[annas115-12] Annas 1994, p. 115

[graver52-13] Graver 2007, p. 52

[inwood701-14] Inwood 1999, p. 701

[graver58-15] Graver 2007, p. 58

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
+{{Short description|Various forms of emotional suffering in Stoicism}}
 '''Stoic passions''' are various forms of [[emotional]] suffering in [[Stoicism]], a school of [[Hellenistic philosophy]].
-==Relevance==
+==Definition==
-''The passions'' are transliterated ''pathê'' from Greek.<ref>Blank, David - [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/philodemus/ "Philodemus"-2.2.4.4.2 On individual ethical topics (c.f. - 5th paragraph)] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)(published Wed Apr 10, 2013; substantive revision Mon Aug 4, 2014) [Retrieved 2015-3-15]</ref><ref>[http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/transliterate Oxford Dictionary] - (Oxford University Press)[Retrieved 2015-3-15]</ref>
+''The passions'' are transliterated ''pathê'' from Greek.<ref>Blank, David. [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/philodemus/ "Philodemus" – 2.2.4.4.2 On individual ethical topics (c.f. - 5th paragraph)] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)(published Wed Apr 10, 2013; substantive revision Mon Aug 4, 2014) [Retrieved 2015-3-15]</ref> The Greek word ''[[pathos]]'' was a wide-ranging term indicating an infliction one suffers.<ref name="annas103">{{Harvnb|Annas|1994|p=103}}</ref> The Stoics used the word to discuss many common emotions such as anger, fear and excessive joy.<ref>{{Harvnb|Annas|1994|pp=103–104}}</ref> A passion is a disturbing and misleading force in the mind which occurs because of a failure to reason correctly.<ref name="annas103"/> For the Stoic [[Chrysippus]] the passions are evaluative judgements.<ref>[http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/34006/222931.pdf?sequen Groenendijk, Leendert F. and de Ruyter, Doret J.(2009) 'Learning from Seneca: a Stoic perspective on the art of living and education', Ethics and Education, 4: 1, 81–92 ] {{doi|10.1080/17449640902816277}}</ref> A person experiencing such an emotion has incorrectly valued an indifferent thing.<ref name="annas114">{{Harvnb|Annas|1994|p=114}}</ref> A fault of judgement, some false notion of good or evil, lies at the root of each passion.<ref name="capes47">{{Harvnb|Capes|1880|p=47}}</ref> Incorrect judgement as to a present good gives rise to delight, while lust is a wrong estimate about the future.<ref name="capes47"/> Unreal imaginings of evil cause distress about the present, or fear for the future.<ref name="capes47"/>
+These states of feeling are disturbances of mental health which upset the natural balance of the soul, and destroy its self-control.<ref name="capes47"/> They are harmful because they conflict with right reason.<ref name="annas113">{{Harvnb|Annas|1994|p=113}}</ref> The ideal Stoic would instead measure things at their real value,<ref name="capes47"/> and see that the passions are not natural.<ref name="capes48">{{Harvnb|Capes|1880|p=48}}</ref> To be free of the passions is to have a happiness which is self-contained.<ref name="capes48"/> There would be nothing to fear—for unreason is the only evil; no cause for anger—for others cannot harm you.<ref name="capes48"/>
-[[Chrysippus]] thought particularly grief, pleasure, fear and desire were evaluative judgements (according to Groenendijk & de Ruyter - p.&nbsp;83).<ref>[http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/34006/222931.pdf?sequen Groenendijk, Leendert F. and de Ruyter, Doret J.(2009) 'Learning from Seneca: a Stoic perspective on the art of living and education', Ethics and Education, 4: 1, 81 — 92 ] To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/17449640902816277 (alternative URL: [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449640902816277 ''here''])
-[Retrieved 2015-3-18]</ref>
 ==Primary passions==
+The Stoics beginning with [[Zeno of Citium|Zeno]] arranged the passions under four headings: distress, pleasure, fear and lust.<ref name="sorabji29">{{Harvnb|Sorabji|2000|p=29}}</ref> One report of the Stoic definitions of these passions appears in the treatise ''On Passions'' by [[Andronicus of Rhodes|Pseudo-Andronicus]] (trans. Long & Sedley, pg. 411, modified):
+; '''Distress''' ('''lupē'''): [[Stress (medicine)|Distress]] is an [[Irrationality|irrational]] contraction, or a fresh [[opinion]] that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be [[Depression (mood)|depressed]].
-The [[Stoicism|Stoics]] named four primary passions. In ''On Passions'', [[Andronicus of Rhodes|Andronicus]] reported the Stoic definitions of these passions (trans. Long & Sedley, pg. 411, modified):
+; '''Fear''' ('''phobos'''): [[Fear]] is an irrational [[Risk aversion|aversion]], or avoidance of an expected [[Risk|danger]].
+; '''Lust''' ('''epithumia'''): [[Lust]] is an irrational desire, or pursuit of an expected [[Goodness and value theory|good]] but in reality bad.
+; '''Delight''' ('''hēdonē'''): Delight is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be [[Mania|elated]].
+Two of these passions (distress and delight) refer to emotions currently present, and two of these (fear and lust) refer to emotions directed at the future.<ref name="sorabji29"/> Thus there are just two states directed at the prospect of good and evil, but subdivided as to whether they are present or future:<ref name="graver54">{{Harvnb|Graver|2007|p=54}}</ref>
-; '''Distress''' : [[Stress (medicine)|Distress]] is an [[Irrationality|irrational]] contraction, or a fresh [[opinion]] that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be [[Depression (mood)|depressed]].
-; '''Fear''' : [[Fear]] is an irrational [[Risk aversion|aversion]], or avoidance of an expected [[Risk|danger]].
+{| class="wikitable" style="margin:1.0em auto;border:1px;background:white;"
-; '''Lust''' : [[Lust]] is an irrational desire, or pursuit of an expected [[Goodness and value theory|good]].
+|- style="background:white"
-; '''Delight''' : Delight is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be [[Mania|elated]].
+! &nbsp; !! '''Present''' !! '''Future'''
+|-
+| '''Good'''  || Delight || Lust
+|-
+| '''Evil'''  || Distress || Fear
+|}
 ==Subdivisions==
@@ Line 52: / Line 62: @@
 ; Rage : [[Rage (emotion)|Rage]] is anger springing up and suddenly showing itself.
 ; Hatred : [[Hate|Hatred]] is inveterate anger.
-; Enmity : [[Enmity]] is anger watching as opportunity for [[revenge]].
+; Enmity : Enmity is anger watching as opportunity for [[revenge]].
 ; Wrath : [[Wrath]] is anger of greater bitterness conceived in the innermost heart and [[soul]].
 ; Greed : [[Seven deadly sins#Greed|Greed]] is insatiable lust.
@@ Line 63: / Line 73: @@
 ; Ostentation : [[:wikt:ostentation|Ostentation]] is pleasure shown in outward demeanor and puffing oneself out extravagantly.
-==References==
+==Good feelings==
+The [[sage (philosophy)|wise person]] (''sophos'') is someone who is free from the passions (''[[apatheia]]''). Instead of passion, the sage experiences good-feelings (''eupatheia'') which are clear-headed.<ref name="inwood705">{{Harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=705}}</ref> These emotional impulses are not excessive, but nor are they diminished emotions.<ref name="annas115">{{Harvnb|Annas|1994|p=115}}</ref><ref name="graver52">{{Harvnb|Graver|2007|p=52}}</ref> Instead they are the correct rational emotions.<ref name="graver52"/> The Stoics listed the good-feelings under the headings of joy (''chara''), wish (''boulesis''), and caution (''eulabeia'').<ref name="annas114"/> Thus if something is present which is a genuine good, then the wise person experiences an uplift in the soul&mdash;joy (''chara'').<ref name="inwood701">{{Harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=701}}</ref> The Stoics also subdivided the good-feelings:<ref name="graver58">{{Harvnb|Graver|2007|p=58}}</ref>
+*'''Joy:'''
+**Enjoyment
+**Cheerfulness
+**Good spirits
+*'''Wish:'''
+**Good intent
+**Goodwill
+**Welcoming
+**Cherishing
+**Love
+*'''Caution:'''
+**Moral shame
+**Reverence
+==See also==
+* ''[[On Passions]]''
+*[[Passions (philosophy)|Passions]]
+==Citations==
 {{Reflist}}
+==References==
+*{{Citation|last=Annas|first=Julia|title=Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind|year=1994|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-07659-4}}
+*{{Citation|last=Capes|first=William Wolfe|title=Stoicism|year=1880|publisher=Pott, Young, & Co.}}
+*{{Citation|last=Graver|first=Margaret|title=Stoicism and Emotion|year=2007|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-30557-8}}
+*{{Citation|last=Inwood|first=Brad|contribution=Stoic Ethics|editor1-last=Algra|editor1-first=Keimpe|editor2-last=Barnes|editor2-first=Johnathan|editor3-last=Mansfield|editor3-first=Jaap|editor4-last=Schofield|editor4-first=Malcolm|title=The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy|year=1999|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-25028-3}}
+*{{Citation|last=Sorabji|first=Richard|title=Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation|year=2000|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-198-25005-0|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/emotionpeaceofmi0000sora}}
 *Andronicus, "On Passions I," ''[[Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta]]'', 3.391. ed. [[Hans von Arnim]]. 1903–1905.
 *Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1945 c. 1927). ''Cicero : Tusculan Disputations'' (Loeb Classical Library, No. 141) 2nd Ed. trans. by J. E. King. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP.
@@ Line 72: / Line 111: @@
 ==External links==
 * [http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/stoipass.htm The Passions according to the Classical Stoa]
-* [http://www.ptypes.com/primary_passions The Primary Passions]
+* [http://www.ptypes.com/primary_passions.html The Primary Passions]
 {{Stoicism}}
+{{Emotion-footer}}
 [[Category:Stoicism]]
 [[Category:Emotion]]
+[[Category:Theories in ancient Greek philosophy]]
+[[Category:Ancient Greek ethics]]

v t e Emotions (list)
Emotions	Acceptance Admiration Adoration Aesthetic Affection Agitation Agony Amusement Anger Angst Anguish Annoyance Anticipation Anxiety Apathy Arousal Attraction Awe Belongingness Boredom Calmness Compassion Confidence Confusion Contempt Contentment Courage Cruelty Curiosity Defeat Depression Desire Disappointment Disgust Distrust Doubt Ecstasy Embarrassment vicarious Emotion work Empathy Emptiness Enthrallment Enthusiasm Envy Euphoria Excitement Faith Fear Flow Frustration Gratification Gratitude Greed Grief Guilt Happiness Joie de vivre Hatred Hiraeth Homesickness Hope Horror Hostility Humiliation Hygge Hysteria Ikigai (sense of purpose) Indulgence Infatuation Insecurity Inspiration Interest Irritation Isolation Jealousy Joy Kindness Loneliness Love limerence at first sight Lust Mono no aware Neglect Nostalgia Outrage Panic Passion Pity self-pity Pleasure Pride grandiosity hubris insult vanity Rage Regret Rejection Relief Remorse Resentment Revenge Sadness melancholy Saudade Schadenfreude Sehnsucht Sentimentality Shame Shock Shyness Social connection Sorrow Spite Stress chronic Suffering Surprise Sympathy Trust Wonder sense of wonder Worry
Worldviews	Cynicism Defeatism Fatalism Misanthropy Nihilism Optimism Pessimism Reclusion Weltschmerz
Related	Affect consciousness in education measures in psychology Affective computing forecasting neuroscience science spectrum Affectivity positive negative Appeal to emotion Amygdala hijack Emotion and art and memory and music and sex and sleep classification evolution expressed functional accounts group homeostatic in animals perception recognition in conversation regulation interpersonal work Emotional aperture bias blackmail competence conflict contagion detachment dysregulation eating exhaustion expression and gender intelligence and bullying Empathy quotient intimacy isolation lability labor lateralization literacy prosody reasoning responsivity security symbiosis thought method well-being Emotionality bounded Emotions and culture history in decision-making in the workplace in virtual communication moral self-conscious social social sharing sociology Feeling Group affective tone Interactions between the emotional and executive brain systems Jealousy in art Meta-emotion Pathognomy Pathos Social emotional development Stoic passions Theory affect appraisal constructed emotion discrete emotion somatic marker
Italics indicate emotion names in foreign languages