National Reconciliation (Sudan): Difference between revisions
FuzzyMagma (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
|||
| (34 intermediate revisions by 6 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Short description|Reconciliation in Sudan in 1977}} |
{{Short description|Reconciliation in Sudan in 1977}} |
||
[[File:Gaafar_Nimeiry_and_Sadiq_al-Mahdi_in_1976.png|thumb|[[Sadiq al-Mahdi]] sworn into |
[[File:Gaafar_Nimeiry_and_Sadiq_al-Mahdi_in_1976.png|thumb|[[Sadiq al-Mahdi]] (far right) being sworn into [[Gaafar Nimeiry|Nimeiri]]'s (far-left) government after the 1977 National Reconciliation.|300x300px]]{{Other uses|National Reconciliation (disambiguation){{!}}National Reconciliation}} |
||
Following the [[1976 Sudanese coup attempt|1976 coup attempt]], |
Following the [[1976 Sudanese coup attempt|1976 coup attempt]], a '''national reconciliation''' ({{Langx|ar|المصالحة الوطنية}}) was reached in [[Sudan]] on 7 July 1977, where Nimeiri and al-Mahdi signed an agreement that readmitted the opposition in exchange for the dissolution of the National Front. Civil liberties were restored, and political prisoners were released. The reconciliation also involved shifts in Sudanese politics, with the adoption of Islamic law, known as ''[[September 1983 Laws|September Laws]]'', in 1983. Nimeiri faced opposition from various groups, including secularised Muslims and non-Muslim southerners. This move contributed to the resumption of the [[Second Sudanese Civil War|civil war]] in the south, leading to conflicts and political shifts. |
||
The years that followed saw further political discontent against Nimeiri, primarily due to the imposition of sharia and economic austerity. This discontent culminated in the [[1985 Sudanese Revolution|1985 revolution]], where mass protests and a general strike led to a bloodless [[1985 Sudanese coup d'état|military coup]], ousting Nimeiri from power. |
|||
| ⚫ | As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi, who was sentenced to death in absentia. The [[Sudanese Socialist Union]] (SSU) also admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's one-party system.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Darnton |first=John |date=1978-06-02 |title=Sudan's Ruler Is Bringing Back Many Exiled Political Enemies |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1978/06/02/archives/sudans-ruler-is-bringing-back-many-exiled-political-enemies.html |access-date=2023-08-30 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> [[Hassan al-Turabi]], the leader of the [[Muslim Brotherhood (Sudan)|Muslim Brotherhood]] party an dean of law at the [[University of Khartoum]] who had been imprisoned and then exiled after the [[1969 Sudanese coup d'état|May Revolution]],<ref name=":1" /> was also released and became [[Justice Minister of Sudan|Justice Minister]] and [[Attorney General of Sudan|Attorney General]] in 1979.<ref name=":0" /> [[Sharif Hussein al-Hindi]], a previous Finance Minister who led the [[National Unionist Party]], stood against the President's peace proposal. However, he ultimately endorsed a reconciliation accord in London.<ref name=":1" /> While the leaders have made their way back, the 5,000 insurgence located in Libya and Ethiopia remain absent. The Government intends to dispatch delegates to visit the camps with the aim of convincing them to return. Additionally, efforts have been initiated to improve the previously tense relations with [[Addis Ababa]] and [[Tripoli, Libya|Tripoli]].<ref name=":1" /> |
||
== Background == |
|||
| ⚫ | The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the [[1978 Sudanese parliamentary election|February 1978 People's Assembly elections]]. Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old [[National Umma Party|Umma Party]], the National Unionist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratise Sudan's political system.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":0" /> However, the People's Assembly elections marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance personal rather than national interests.<ref name=":0" /> |
||
{{Main article|1976 Sudanese coup attempt}} |
|||
In early 1972, [[Jaafar Nimeiry|Gaafar Nimeiri]] visited Saudi Arabia and engaged in dialogue with [[Sharif Hussein al-Hindi]], the opposition leader, at the request of King [[Faisal of Saudi Arabia]]. The dialogue revolved around addressing past grievances and the political landscape. Nimeiri attributed past massacres to [[Sudanese Communist Party|communists]] while Sharif criticized Nimeiri's regime. Offers and suggestions were exchanged, including Nimeiri proposing the [[Vice President of Sudan|Vice Presidency]] to Sharif, but no agreement was reached. Disappointed with the outcome, Sharif planned an attack on [[Khartoum]] with Libyan support.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Al-Shaqlini |first=Abdullah |date=2018-07-27 |title=نظرة جهاز الأمن لحركة 2 يوليو 1976 .. بقلم: عبدالله الشقليني |trans-title=The Security Apparatus' View of the July 2, 1976 Movement |url=https://sudanile.com/%d9%86%d8%b8%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%ac%d9%87%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%84%d8%ad%d8%b1%d9%83%d8%a9-2-%d9%8a%d9%88%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%88-1976-%d8%a8%d9%82%d9%84%d9%85-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af%d8%a7/ |access-date=2023-07-25 |website=سودانايل |language=ar}}</ref> |
|||
Sadiq al-Mahdi joined the opposition and orchestrated a [[1976 Sudanese coup attempt|coup attempt in 1976]], storming Khartoum with dissident forces led by [[Muhammad Nour Saad]] on 2 July. Their attempt to arrest Nimeiri was met with resistance, and the ensuing battle caused significant civilian casualties. Despite taking control initially, the rebel forces faced supply shortages and eventually succumbed to loyalist troops, ending the coup after a week. The aftermath involved searches, arrests, and executions of suspected plotters.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mansour |first=Ahmed |date=2015-10-04 |title=مقتطفات من حلقة الصادق المهدي |trans-title=Excerpts from the episode of Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi |url=https://ahmedmansour.com/2015/10/04/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%AC11/}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |last=Bakri |first=Alsaayig |date=2020-06-02 |title=في ذكراها ال(٤٤): السنوسي "الصادق المهدي سبب فشل حركة ٢ يوليو ١٩٧٦" |trans-title=Sadiq al-Mahdi is the cause of the failure of the July 2, 1976 movement |url=https://www.alrakoba.net/31413648/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%A4%D9%A4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A/ |website=Alrakoba}}</ref> |
|||
| ⚫ | The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the [[General Intelligence Service (Sudan)|State Security Organisation]] to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing their own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.<ref name=":0" /> |
||
== |
== The reconciliation == |
||
Following the 1976 coup attempt, Gaafar Nimeiri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the [[National Front (Sudan)|National Front]] in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and [[Sadiq al-Mahdi|Sadiq al Mahdi]] in [[Port Sudan]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date=1978-01-01 |title=1977-78 Attempts at National Reconciliation - Mohamed Beshir Hamid |url=https://mbhamid.com/707/ |access-date=2023-08-30 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Voll |first=John O. |date=1981 |title=Reconciliation in the Sudan |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45315054 |journal=Current History |volume=80 |issue=470 |pages=422–448 |jstor=45315054 |issn=0011-3530}}</ref> In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two leaders signed, on 7 July 1977,<ref>{{Cite web |last=الحسين |first=ياسر محجوب |title=الترابي.. سيناريو تطويق العسكر |url=https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2015/11/26/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a%d9%88-%d8%aa%d8%b7%d9%88%d9%8a%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1 |access-date=2023-10-24 |website=www.aljazeera.net |language=ar}}</ref> an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=Sudan - National Reconciliation |url=https://countrystudies.us/sudan/26.htm |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=countrystudies.us}}{{PD-notice}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Bashier |first=Zakaria |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fI4FAQAAIAAJ&q=%22National+Reconciliation%22+Sudan+-wikipedia |title=The National Reconciliation in the Sudan and Its Aftermath |date=1981 |publisher=Islamic Foundation |isbn=978-0-86037-092-5 |language=en}}</ref> |
|||
On 5 June 1983, Nimeiri sought to counter the south's growing political power by re-dividing the [[Southern Sudan Autonomous Region (1972–1983)|Southern Region]] into the three old provinces of [[Bahr el Ghazal (region of South Sudan)|Bahr al Ghazal]], [[Equatoria|Al Istiwai]], and [[Upper Nile (state)|Aali an Nil]]; he had suspended the [[Southern Sudan Regional Assembly|Southern Regional Assembly]] almost two years earlier. The southern-based [[Sudanese People's Liberation Movement]] (SPLM) and its military wing, the [[Sudanese People’s Liberation Army|Sudanese People's Liberation Army]] (SPLA), which emerged in mid-1983, unsuccessfully opposed this re-division and called for the creation of a new united Sudan.<ref name=":0" /> |
|||
== Aftermath == |
|||
Within a few months, in September 1983 Nimeiri proclaimed the [[sharia]] as the basis of the [[Sudanese legal system]]. Nimeiri's decrees, which became known as the September Laws, were bitterly resented both by secularized Muslims and by the predominantly non-Muslim southerners. The SPLM denounced the sharia and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts. Meanwhile, the security situation in the south had deteriorated so much that by the end of 1983 it amounted to a resumption of the [[Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)|civil war]].<ref name=":0" /> |
|||
| ⚫ | As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi, who was sentenced to death in absentia. The [[Sudanese Socialist Union]] (SSU) also admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's one-party system.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Darnton |first=John |date=1978-06-02 |title=Sudan's Ruler Is Bringing Back Many Exiled Political Enemies |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1978/06/02/archives/sudans-ruler-is-bringing-back-many-exiled-political-enemies.html |access-date=2023-08-30 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> [[Hassan al-Turabi]], the leader of the [[Muslim Brotherhood (Sudan)|Muslim Brotherhood]] party an dean of law at the [[University of Khartoum]] who had been imprisoned and then exiled after the [[1969 Sudanese coup d'état|May Revolution]],<ref name=":1" /> was also released and became [[Justice Minister of Sudan|Justice Minister]] and [[Attorney General of Sudan|Attorney General]] in 1979.<ref name=":0" /> [[Sharif Hussein al-Hindi]], a previous Finance Minister who led the [[National Unionist Party]], stood against the President's peace proposal. However, he ultimately endorsed a reconciliation accord in London.<ref name=":1" /> While the leaders have made their way back, the 5,000 insurgence located in Libya and Ethiopia remain absent. The Government intends to dispatch delegates to visit the camps with the aim of convincing them to return. Additionally, efforts have been initiated to improve the previously tense relations with [[Addis Ababa]] and [[Tripoli, Libya|Tripoli]].<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> |
||
| ⚫ | However, relations between [[Khartoum]] and the [[Southern Sudan Autonomous Region (1972–1983)|South Sudan]] leadership worsened after the National Reconciliation due to the shift to [[Sharia law]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Warburg |first=Gabriel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BiGPWGvlnpIC&dq=%22Bona+Malwal%22+-wikipedia&pg=PA167 |title=Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya |date=2003 |publisher=Hurst & Company |isbn=978-1-85065-588-6 |language=en}}</ref> and adopting Arabic as the country official language.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Warburg |first=Gabriel R. |date=1990 |title=The Sharia in Sudan: Implementation and Repercussions, 1983-1989 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328194 |url-status=live |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=624–637 |issn=0026-3141 |jstor=4328194 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221213030201/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328194 |archive-date=2022-12-13 |access-date=2023-07-21}}</ref> |
||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | |||
{{Main articles|1983 September laws}} |
|||
| ⚫ | Nimeiri's attempt at implementing an "Islamic path" in Sudan from 1977 to 1985, including aligning with religious factions, ultimately failed. His transition from nationalist leftist ideologies to strict Islam was detailed in his books "Al-Nahj al-Islami limadha?" and "Al-Nahj al-Islami kayfa?" The connection between Islamic revival and reconciling with opponents of the 1969 revolution coincided with the rise of militant Islam in other parts of the world. Nimeiri's association with the [[Abu Qurun]] Sufi order influenced his shift towards Islam, leading him to appoint followers of the order into significant roles. The process of legislating the "Islamic path" began in 1983, culminating in the enactment of various orders and acts to implement sharia law and other Islamic principles.<ref name=":5" /> |
||
In September 1983, President Jaafar |
In September 1983, President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced sharia law in Sudan, known as ''September laws'', symbolically disposing of alcohol and implementing [[hudud punishments]] like public amputations. Al-Turabi supported this move, differing from Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's dissenting view. Al-Turabi and his allies within the regime also opposed self-rule in the south, a secular constitution, and non-Islamic cultural acceptance. The [[Islamic economics|Islamic economy]] followed in early 1984, eliminating interest and instituting [[zakat]]. Nimeiri declared himself the imam of the Sudanese Umma in 1984.<ref name=":5" /> Opposition to Nimeiri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Fluehr-Lobban |first=Carolyn |date=1990 |title=Islamization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328193 |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=610–623 |issn=0026-3141 |jstor=4328193}}</ref> |
||
=== Transition to democracy === |
|||
| ⚫ | The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the [[1978 Sudanese parliamentary election|February 1978 People's Assembly elections]]. Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old [[National Umma Party|Umma Party]], the National Unionist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratise Sudan's political system.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":0" /> However, the People's Assembly elections marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance personal rather than national interests.<ref name=":0" /> |
||
| ⚫ | The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the [[General Intelligence Service (Sudan)|State Security Organisation]] to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing their own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.<ref name=":0" /> |
||
| ⚫ | Nimeiri's attempt at implementing an "Islamic path" in Sudan from 1977 to 1985 |
||
Nimeiri's establishment of the Islamic state in Sudan was outlined in his speech at a 1984 Islamic conference. He justified the implementation of the sharia due to a rising crime rate. He claimed a reduction of crime by over 40% within a year due to the new punishments. Nimeiri attributed Sudan's economic success to the zakat and taxation act, outlining its benefits for the poor and non-Muslims. His association with the Abu Qurun Sufi order and his self-proclaimed position as imam led to his belief that he alone could interpret laws in line with the sharia. However, his economic policies, including Islamic banking, led to severe economic issues. Nimeiri's collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ansar aimed to end sectarian divisions and implement the sharia. The Ansar, despite initial collaboration, criticized Nimeiri's implementation as un-Islamic and corrupt.<ref name=":2" /> |
|||
Nimeiri's Islamic phase resulted in renewed conflict in Southern Sudan in 1983, marking the end of the [[Addis Ababa Agreement (1972)|Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972]], which had granted regional autonomy and recognized the diverse nature of Sudanese society. The agreement ensured equality regardless of race or religion and allowed for separate personal laws for non-Muslims. However, hostilities escalated due to oil discovery, dissolution of the Southern Regional Assembly, and decentralization efforts. Despite this, the Islamic laws implemented by Nimeiri exacerbated the situation. The political landscape shifted with Nimeiri's removal in 1985, leading to the emergence of numerous political parties. The National Islamic Front (NIF), Ansar, and Khatmiyya Sufi order (DUP) played crucial roles in Sudan's politics. Hasan al-Turabi and the NIF consistently supported the Islamic laws and resisted changes. Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani of the Khatmiyya Sufi order initiated negotiations with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) for a cease-fire and compromise. Meanwhile, Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar and prime minister during Sudan's third democratic episode, initially opposed the Islamic laws he later supported. He proposed a vision of a fully Arabized and Islamized southern Sudan, aiming for unity but differing from his earlier, more liberal views. The failure to address Sudan's issues led to the military coup by Umar al-Bashir in 1989, further entrenching Islamic principles.<ref name=":2" /> |
|||
The events of 1983 marked a pivotal moment in Sudanese history, showcasing the interconnectedness of Islamization and concerns over Islamic dominance in the country. This relationship led to significant political implications, exemplified by key incidents. The year saw the eruption of a second civil war in May 1983, following southern troops' mutiny, and Numayri's declaration of the sharia as state law in September 1983. These events were driven by various factors, including southerners' disappointment over unfulfilled agreements, particularly in terms of economic development and oil discoveries in the south. Numayri's growing reliance on the Islamic right-wing political agenda exacerbated tensions and ultimately culminated in the transformational events of 1983. Numayri's Islamization efforts were not sudden; they had roots dating back to the post-1976 coup attempt, which marked his personal reconnection with Islam. By 1977, a committee was working to align Sudanese law with the sharia, and the Muslim Brotherhood was gaining influence in university student political groups. While legislative attempts to Islamize the law through the People's Assembly were met with resistance, the mutiny of southern forces in 1983 changed the political landscape. This led to the founding of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1984, both seeking the removal of the sharia.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Fluehr-Lobban |first=Carolyn |date=1990 |title=Islamization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328193 |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=610–623 |issn=0026-3141}}</ref> |
|||
Opposition to Numayri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition, later became prime minister, but his efforts to reform the sharia were limited by pressure from the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by his brother-in-law Hasan al-Turabi. The NIF's formation in 1985 aimed to assert Islam as the general source of law due to the Muslim majority, and it advocated a federal power-sharing system. The events culminated in a transition government, freezing the September Laws, and eventually in the elected coalition government led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. However, dissatisfaction with his handling of the issue, his failure to engage with SPLM/SPLA, and moves to abrogate the September Laws led to his government's resignation in 1989. The subsequent coup, supported by the NIF, marked a turning point, further entrenching the Islamic agenda. This complex relationship between Islamization, power dynamics, and political manoeuvring underscored Sudan's trajectory and deep divisions between north and south, Arab and non-Arab communities, and Islamic and secular ideologies. The events of 1983 and their aftermath intensified fear and mistrust among various groups, shaping the course of Sudanese history.<ref name=":3" /> |
|||
== 1985 protest and coup d'état == |
|||
In early 1985, anti-government discontent resulted in a [[1985 Sudanese Revolution|general strike]] in [[Khartoum]]. Demonstrators opposed rising food, gasoline, and transport costs. The general strike paralysed the country. Nimeiri, who was on a visit to the United States, was unable to suppress the rapidly growing demonstrations against his regime which lead to the [[1985 Sudanese coup d'état|1985 coup d’état]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=Sudan - National Reconciliation |url=https://countrystudies.us/sudan/26.htm |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=countrystudies.us}}{{PD-notice}}</ref> |
|||
Political and economic discontent against Nimeiry grew over several years prior to 1985, according to Sudanese interviewed by ''[[The New York Times]]'', who said that Nimeiry had "begun to alienate almost every sector of Sudanese society". Major complaints included the obligatory use of Islamic law throughout Sudan, which upset non-Muslims, especially in the southern part of Sudan, and price increases resulting from an economic austerity program implemented under pressure from the [[United States]] (US) and the [[International Monetary Fund]] (IMF).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Miller |first=Judith |last2=Times |first2=Special To the New York |date=1985-04-07 |title=SUDAN'S PRESIDENT IS OUSTED IN COUP BY MILITARY CHIEF |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/07/world/sudan-s-president-is-ousted-in-coup-by-military-chief.html |access-date=2023-08-30 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Price increases in late March 1985 were considered to be a major trigger factor for protests. Eight doctors', lawyers' and university lecturers' associations called for a protest on 3 April and a "general political strike until the abolition of the current regime". Massive demonstrations took place in Khartoum and around Sudan on 3 April. The general strike took place up to 6 April, when Nimeiry was deposed, with a high effectiveness in shutting down governance of Sudan. The use of massive [[civil disobedience]] that led to the coup d'état deposing Nimeiry from the presidency on 6 April is often referred to as the ''1985 Revolution'' that followed the Sudanese [[History of Sudan (1956–69)#October 1964 Revolution|October 1964 Revolution]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gresh |first=Alain |date=1985-10-01 |title=Le Soudan après la dictature |url=https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1985/10/GRESH/38833 |access-date=2023-08-30 |website=Le Monde diplomatique |language=fr}}</ref> |
|||
On 6 April 1985, while Nimeiry was on an official visit to the [[United States|United States of America]] in the hope of gaining more financial aid from Washington, a [[1985 Sudanese coup d'état|bloodless military coup]] led by his defence minister Gen. [[Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab]] ousted him from power. At the subsequent elections the pro-Islamist leader, [[Sadiq al-Mahdi]] (who had attempted a coup against Nimeiry in 1976) became Prime Minister. |
|||
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:273412/FULLTEXT02.pdf |
|||
=== The Libyan-Sudanese crisis === |
|||
https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-occasional-papers/OP2-Sudan-what-kind-of-state-what-kind-of-crisis.pdf |
|||
In 1980 and 1981, Sudan faced significant challenges due to Libya's involvement in Chad and its complex relationship with Libya's [[Muammar Gaddafi]]. Tensions were further exacerbated by a history of mistrust and the fallout from a failed coup attempt in Khartoum in July 1976, in which Libyan elements played a role. This event strained Sudan-Libya relations, but over time, some of the coup plotters, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and Husayn al-Hindi, returned to Sudan, leading to a temporary improvement in relations.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last=Brewer |first=William D. |date=1982 |title=The Libyan-Sudanese "Crisis" of 1981: Danger for Darfur and Dilemma for the United States |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4326390 |journal=Middle East Journal |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=205–216 |jstor=4326390 |issn=0026-3141}}</ref> |
|||
The situation in Chad, a country divided along religious lines, added further complexity. Sudan's involvement in brokering a ceasefire in February 1978 was short-lived, and Libya's claim to the resource-rich [[Aozou Strip]] only deepened regional tensions. In December 1980, Libyan forces occupied Chad's capital, [[N'Djamena]], leading to concerns about the possibility of a [[Chado-Libyan union]], which raised alarm bells in Khartoum and Cairo.<ref name=":6" /> Sudan found itself supporting Chadian rebels, mainly from its [[Darfur region]], which increased tensions. Libyan airstrikes on Darfur border villages prompted the U.S. to offer more support to Sudan. Although a full-scale Libyan invasion was unlikely, Sudan remained cautious due to past Libyan-backed coup attempts and took measures like detentions and military deployments to protect its stability.<ref name=":6" /> |
|||
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51d3d28c4.pdf<nowiki/>https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/uc67-i/uc67m15.htm |
|||
The eventual withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad and the events that followed were not fully disclosed. Chadian President [[Goukouni Oueddei]] appeared to request their withdrawal, which Gaddafi complied with, and they were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force partially funded by France. There were unconfirmed reports of a last-minute coup attempt by Libyan elements in Chad, but this seemed exaggerated.<ref name=":6" /> |
|||
<ref>{{Cite web |date=2020-04-26 |title=الصادق المهدي وسياسة الإمساك بالعصا من النصف |url=https://www.independentarabia.com/node/114996/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%83-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%81 |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=اندبندنت عربية |language=ar}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=هدهود |first=محمود |date=2019-04-15 |title=تاريخ الحركة الإسلامية في السودان |url=https://www.ida2at.com/history-islamic-movement-sudan/ |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=إضاءات |language=ar}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Voll |first=John O. |date=1981 |title=Reconciliation in the Sudan |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45315054 |journal=Current History |volume=80 |issue=470 |pages=422–448 |issn=0011-3530}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Sudan: What kind of state? What kind of crisis? |url=https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/sudan-what-kind-of-state-what-kind-of-crisis |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=GOV.UK |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=SUDAN: THE NUMAYRI REGIME--ORIENTATION AND PROSPECTS {{!}} CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov) |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80t00634a000400010013-8 |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=www.cia.gov}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=1978-01-01 |title=1977-78 Attempts at National Reconciliation - Mohamed Beshir Hamid |url=https://mbhamid.com/707/ |access-date=2023-08-28 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=SudanTribune |date=2013-03-11 |title=Sudan: on nostalgia and wars |url=https://sudantribune.com/article44968/ |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=Sudan Tribune |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=A complex web: Politics and conflict in Sudan {{!}} Conciliation Resources |url=https://www.c-r.org/accord/sudan/complex-web-politics-and-conflict-sudan |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=www.c-r.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Virginia |first=Hashim, Mohamed, Religious Studies - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of |title=Religious Politics and State Power: Religion in Sudan during War and Peace |url=https://libraetd.lib.virginia.edu/public_view/4q77fs06x |access-date=2023-08-28 |website=libraetd.lib.virginia.edu}}</ref> |
|||
The tensions between Sudan and Chad, primarily fuelled by the Libyan presence in Chad, eased after the Libyan withdrawal. Sudan and Chad restored normal diplomatic ties, and President Nimeiri and President Oueddei established a working relationship, including an agreement to establish a "ministerial committee" to prevent Chadian rebels from using Sudan as a base.<ref name=":6" /> However, Gaddafi's hostility toward the Nimeiri regime in Sudan persisted. There were concerns that Libya might continue its efforts to undermine the Khartoum government. Gaddafi maintained connections with anti-Nimeiri Sudanese groups in Libya and Ethiopia, and the tripartite pact between Libya, Southern Yemen, and Ethiopia remained a potential challenge to Nimeiri. This situation continued to pose a threat to Darfur and remained a challenge for U.S. policy in the region.<ref name=":6" /> |
|||
https://www.google.com/search?q=1977+%22National+Reconciliation%22+Sudan+-wikipedia&sca_esv=560734445&sxsrf=AB5stBgDzYAyhkdA126f0EQNBabb6Xitqg%3A1693252065662&ei=4fnsZIaJKKTBhbIPhaGk8Ac&oq=1977+%22National+Reconciliation%22+Sudan+-wikipedia&gs_lp=EhNtb2JpbGUtZ3dzLXdpei1zZXJwIi8xOTc3ICJOYXRpb25hbCBSZWNvbmNpbGlhdGlvbiIgU3VkYW4gLXdpa2lwZWRpYUirJ1DbFFiFIXAAeACQAQCYAWOgAc4DqgEBNrgBA8gBAPgBAeIDBBgBIEGIBgE&sclient=mobile-gws-wiz-serp#ip=1 |
|||
== References == |
== References == |
||
[[Category:1977 in Sudan]] |
|||
[[Category:Cold War treaties]] |
|||
[[Category:Second Sudanese Civil War]] |
|||
[[Category:Peace treaties of Sudan]] |
|||
[[Category:Treaties concluded in 1977]] |
|||
<references />{{Sudan topics}} |
|||
Latest revision as of 14:02, 10 November 2024
Following the 1976 coup attempt, a national reconciliation (Arabic: المصالحة الوطنية) was reached in Sudan on 7 July 1977, where Nimeiri and al-Mahdi signed an agreement that readmitted the opposition in exchange for the dissolution of the National Front. Civil liberties were restored, and political prisoners were released. The reconciliation also involved shifts in Sudanese politics, with the adoption of Islamic law, known as September Laws, in 1983. Nimeiri faced opposition from various groups, including secularised Muslims and non-Muslim southerners. This move contributed to the resumption of the civil war in the south, leading to conflicts and political shifts.
The years that followed saw further political discontent against Nimeiri, primarily due to the imposition of sharia and economic austerity. This discontent culminated in the 1985 revolution, where mass protests and a general strike led to a bloodless military coup, ousting Nimeiri from power.
Background
[edit]In early 1972, Gaafar Nimeiri visited Saudi Arabia and engaged in dialogue with Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, the opposition leader, at the request of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The dialogue revolved around addressing past grievances and the political landscape. Nimeiri attributed past massacres to communists while Sharif criticized Nimeiri's regime. Offers and suggestions were exchanged, including Nimeiri proposing the Vice Presidency to Sharif, but no agreement was reached. Disappointed with the outcome, Sharif planned an attack on Khartoum with Libyan support.[1]
Sadiq al-Mahdi joined the opposition and orchestrated a coup attempt in 1976, storming Khartoum with dissident forces led by Muhammad Nour Saad on 2 July. Their attempt to arrest Nimeiri was met with resistance, and the ensuing battle caused significant civilian casualties. Despite taking control initially, the rebel forces faced supply shortages and eventually succumbed to loyalist troops, ending the coup after a week. The aftermath involved searches, arrests, and executions of suspected plotters.[2][3]
The reconciliation
[edit]Following the 1976 coup attempt, Gaafar Nimeiri and his opponents adopted more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the National Front in London, and arranged for a conference between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in Port Sudan.[4][5] In what became known as the "national reconciliation," the two leaders signed, on 7 July 1977,[6] an eight-point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front. The agreement also restored civil liberties, freed political prisoners, reaffirmed Sudan's nonaligned foreign policy, and promised to reform local government.[7][8]
Aftermath
[edit]As a result of the reconciliation, the government released about 1,000 detainees and granted an amnesty to Sadiq al Mahdi, who was sentenced to death in absentia. The Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) also admitted former supporters of the National Front to its ranks. Sadiq renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime's one-party system.[7][9] Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood party an dean of law at the University of Khartoum who had been imprisoned and then exiled after the May Revolution,[9] was also released and became Justice Minister and Attorney General in 1979.[7] Sharif Hussein al-Hindi, a previous Finance Minister who led the National Unionist Party, stood against the President's peace proposal. However, he ultimately endorsed a reconciliation accord in London.[9] While the leaders have made their way back, the 5,000 insurgence located in Libya and Ethiopia remain absent. The Government intends to dispatch delegates to visit the camps with the aim of convincing them to return. Additionally, efforts have been initiated to improve the previously tense relations with Addis Ababa and Tripoli.[9][4]
However, relations between Khartoum and the South Sudan leadership worsened after the National Reconciliation due to the shift to Sharia law,[10] and adopting Arabic as the country official language.[11]
Sharia laws
[edit]Nimeiri's attempt at implementing an "Islamic path" in Sudan from 1977 to 1985, including aligning with religious factions, ultimately failed. His transition from nationalist leftist ideologies to strict Islam was detailed in his books "Al-Nahj al-Islami limadha?" and "Al-Nahj al-Islami kayfa?" The connection between Islamic revival and reconciling with opponents of the 1969 revolution coincided with the rise of militant Islam in other parts of the world. Nimeiri's association with the Abu Qurun Sufi order influenced his shift towards Islam, leading him to appoint followers of the order into significant roles. The process of legislating the "Islamic path" began in 1983, culminating in the enactment of various orders and acts to implement sharia law and other Islamic principles.[11]
In September 1983, President Jaafar Nimeiri introduced sharia law in Sudan, known as September laws, symbolically disposing of alcohol and implementing hudud punishments like public amputations. Al-Turabi supported this move, differing from Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's dissenting view. Al-Turabi and his allies within the regime also opposed self-rule in the south, a secular constitution, and non-Islamic cultural acceptance. The Islamic economy followed in early 1984, eliminating interest and instituting zakat. Nimeiri declared himself the imam of the Sudanese Umma in 1984.[11] Opposition to Nimeiri's Islamization came from various quarters. Southerners, northern secular and religious voices, and even the judiciary voiced concerns about the undemocratic implementation and lack of consultation. Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma Party, initially jailed for his opposition.[12]
Transition to democracy
[edit]The first test of national reconciliation occurred during the February 1978 People's Assembly elections. Nimeiri authorised returning exiles who had been associated with the old Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood to stand for election as independent candidates. These independents won 140 of 304 seats, leading many observers to applaud Nimeiri's efforts to democratise Sudan's political system.[9][7] However, the People's Assembly elections marked the beginning of further political decline. The SSU's failure to sponsor official candidates weakened party discipline and prompted many assembly deputies who also were SSU members to claim that the party had betrayed them. As a result, an increasing number of assembly deputies used their offices to advance personal rather than national interests.[7]
The end of the SSU's political monopoly, coupled with rampant corruption at all levels of government, cast increasing doubt on Nimeiri's ability to govern Sudan. To preserve his regime, Nimeiri adopted a more dictatorial leadership style. He ordered the State Security Organisation to imprison without trial thousands of opponents and dissidents. Nimeiri also dismissed or transferred any minister or senior military officer who appeared to be developing their own power base. Nimeiri selected replacements based on their loyalty to him rather than on their abilities. This strategy caused the president to lose touch with popular feeling and the country's deteriorated political situation.[7]
The Libyan-Sudanese crisis
[edit]In 1980 and 1981, Sudan faced significant challenges due to Libya's involvement in Chad and its complex relationship with Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. Tensions were further exacerbated by a history of mistrust and the fallout from a failed coup attempt in Khartoum in July 1976, in which Libyan elements played a role. This event strained Sudan-Libya relations, but over time, some of the coup plotters, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and Husayn al-Hindi, returned to Sudan, leading to a temporary improvement in relations.[13]
The situation in Chad, a country divided along religious lines, added further complexity. Sudan's involvement in brokering a ceasefire in February 1978 was short-lived, and Libya's claim to the resource-rich Aozou Strip only deepened regional tensions. In December 1980, Libyan forces occupied Chad's capital, N'Djamena, leading to concerns about the possibility of a Chado-Libyan union, which raised alarm bells in Khartoum and Cairo.[13] Sudan found itself supporting Chadian rebels, mainly from its Darfur region, which increased tensions. Libyan airstrikes on Darfur border villages prompted the U.S. to offer more support to Sudan. Although a full-scale Libyan invasion was unlikely, Sudan remained cautious due to past Libyan-backed coup attempts and took measures like detentions and military deployments to protect its stability.[13]
The eventual withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad and the events that followed were not fully disclosed. Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei appeared to request their withdrawal, which Gaddafi complied with, and they were replaced by an OAU peacekeeping force partially funded by France. There were unconfirmed reports of a last-minute coup attempt by Libyan elements in Chad, but this seemed exaggerated.[13]
The tensions between Sudan and Chad, primarily fuelled by the Libyan presence in Chad, eased after the Libyan withdrawal. Sudan and Chad restored normal diplomatic ties, and President Nimeiri and President Oueddei established a working relationship, including an agreement to establish a "ministerial committee" to prevent Chadian rebels from using Sudan as a base.[13] However, Gaddafi's hostility toward the Nimeiri regime in Sudan persisted. There were concerns that Libya might continue its efforts to undermine the Khartoum government. Gaddafi maintained connections with anti-Nimeiri Sudanese groups in Libya and Ethiopia, and the tripartite pact between Libya, Southern Yemen, and Ethiopia remained a potential challenge to Nimeiri. This situation continued to pose a threat to Darfur and remained a challenge for U.S. policy in the region.[13]
References
[edit]- ^ Al-Shaqlini, Abdullah (2018-07-27). "نظرة جهاز الأمن لحركة 2 يوليو 1976 .. بقلم: عبدالله الشقليني" [The Security Apparatus' View of the July 2, 1976 Movement]. سودانايل (in Arabic). Retrieved 2023-07-25.
- ^ Mansour, Ahmed (2015-10-04). "مقتطفات من حلقة الصادق المهدي" [Excerpts from the episode of Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi].
- ^ Bakri, Alsaayig (2020-06-02). "في ذكراها ال(٤٤): السنوسي "الصادق المهدي سبب فشل حركة ٢ يوليو ١٩٧٦"" [Sadiq al-Mahdi is the cause of the failure of the July 2, 1976 movement]. Alrakoba.
- ^ a b "1977-78 Attempts at National Reconciliation - Mohamed Beshir Hamid". 1978-01-01. Retrieved 2023-08-30.
- ^ Voll, John O. (1981). "Reconciliation in the Sudan". Current History. 80 (470): 422–448. ISSN 0011-3530. JSTOR 45315054.
- ^ الحسين, ياسر محجوب. "الترابي.. سيناريو تطويق العسكر". www.aljazeera.net (in Arabic). Retrieved 2023-10-24.
- ^ a b c d e f "Sudan - National Reconciliation". countrystudies.us. Retrieved 2023-08-28.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Bashier, Zakaria (1981). The National Reconciliation in the Sudan and Its Aftermath. Islamic Foundation. ISBN 978-0-86037-092-5.
- ^ a b c d e Darnton, John (1978-06-02). "Sudan's Ruler Is Bringing Back Many Exiled Political Enemies". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2023-08-30.
- ^ Warburg, Gabriel (2003). Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya. Hurst & Company. ISBN 978-1-85065-588-6.
- ^ a b c Warburg, Gabriel R. (1990). "The Sharia in Sudan: Implementation and Repercussions, 1983-1989". Middle East Journal. 44 (4): 624–637. ISSN 0026-3141. JSTOR 4328194. Archived from the original on 2022-12-13. Retrieved 2023-07-21.
- ^ Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn (1990). "Islamization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment". Middle East Journal. 44 (4): 610–623. ISSN 0026-3141. JSTOR 4328193.
- ^ a b c d e f Brewer, William D. (1982). "The Libyan-Sudanese "Crisis" of 1981: Danger for Darfur and Dilemma for the United States". Middle East Journal. 36 (2): 205–216. ISSN 0026-3141. JSTOR 4326390.