Succession of power in China: Difference between revisions
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{{Politics of China |expanded = Leadership }} |
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The '''succession of power in |
The '''succession of power in China''' since 1949 takes place in the context of a [[one-party state]] under the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP).<ref>{{cite book|last=Folsom|first=Ralph|title=Law and Politics in the People's Republic of China|year=1992|publisher=West Group|isbn=0-314-00999-X|pages=76–77}}</ref> Despite the guarantee of universal franchise in the constitution, the appointment of the [[Paramount leader]] lies largely in the hands of his predecessor and the powerful [[Political faction|factions]] that control the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]. |
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The appointment of the leader occurred after two five year terms in accordance with the [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China]] from 1982 to 2018.<ref>{{cite web |title=Constitution of the People's Republic of China |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=0 |publisher=National People's Congress |access-date=26 March 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609133734/http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=0 |archive-date=June 9, 2007 }}</ref> This was changed to unlimited terms during the first plenary session of the [[13th National People's Congress]] in March 2018. |
The appointment of the leader occurred after two five year terms in accordance with the [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China]] from 1982 to 2018.<ref>{{cite web |title=Constitution of the People's Republic of China |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=0 |publisher=National People's Congress |access-date=26 March 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070609133734/http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=0 |archive-date=June 9, 2007 }}</ref> This was changed to unlimited terms during the first plenary session of the [[13th National People's Congress]] in March 2018. |
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Absent a transparent electoral process, the appointment to key positions is the only way to predict future leadership in China. Note in the table below, the path that Xi Jinping followed from a low-level party official at the age of 30 to his current position of the leader of the most populous country in the world. |
Absent a transparent electoral process, the appointment to key positions is the only way to predict future leadership in China. Note in the table below, the path that Xi Jinping followed from a low-level party official at the age of 30 to his current position of the leader of the most populous country in the world. |
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Xi Jinping's Corresponding Political and Military Postings, |
Xi Jinping's Corresponding Political and Military Postings, 1983–2007 |
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===Xi Jinping era=== |
===Xi Jinping era=== |
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{{Excerpt|Generations of Chinese leadership|fragment= |
{{Excerpt|Generations of Chinese leadership|fragment=Possible sixth generation}} |
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Xi Jinping has not named his successor as paramount leader of the CCP which broke from the precedent previously established of naming the successor at the start of the second term of the paramount leader.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |date=2017-10-24 |title=Xi Jinping Unveils China's New Leaders but No Clear Successor |work=New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html?_r=0 |access-date=2023-09-11}}</ref> This is seen as an attempt by Xi to further consolidate power as the leader of China and maintain a strong hold on his position of power.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Johnson |first1=Christopher |date=2017-08-09 |title=Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them |work=Center for Strategic & International Studies |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-politics-has-no-rules-it-may-be-good-if-xi-jinping-breaks-them |access-date=2023-09-11}}</ref> |
Xi Jinping has not named his successor as paramount leader of the CCP which broke from the precedent previously established of naming the successor at the start of the second term of the paramount leader.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |date=2017-10-24 |title=Xi Jinping Unveils China's New Leaders but No Clear Successor |work=New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html?_r=0 |access-date=2023-09-11}}</ref> This is seen as an attempt by Xi to further consolidate power as the leader of China and maintain a strong hold on his position of power.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Johnson |first1=Christopher |date=2017-08-09 |title=Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them |work=Center for Strategic & International Studies |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-politics-has-no-rules-it-may-be-good-if-xi-jinping-breaks-them |access-date=2023-09-11}}</ref> Xi's lack of a named successor reversed the previously perceived notion of intraparty democracy in the naming system of leadership succession in the CCP.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Wang |first1=Xiangwei |date=2017-10-05 |title=Analysis: how Xi Jinping revived old methods by abandoning intraparty democracy |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2118352/analysis-how-xi-jinping-revived-old-methods-abandoning-intraparty |access-date=2023-09-11}}</ref> |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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Latest revision as of 19:37, 19 November 2024
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The succession of power in China since 1949 takes place in the context of a one-party state under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[1] Despite the guarantee of universal franchise in the constitution, the appointment of the Paramount leader lies largely in the hands of his predecessor and the powerful factions that control the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The appointment of the leader occurred after two five year terms in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China from 1982 to 2018.[2] This was changed to unlimited terms during the first plenary session of the 13th National People's Congress in March 2018.
In October 2022, Xi Jinping was re-elected as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party for a precedent-breaking third term of paramount leader after Mao Zedong's death.[3]
Structure of power
[edit]The paramount leader (supreme leader) of China holds these three official titles:
- General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
- Head of the ruling party
- President of the People's Republic of China
- Nominal head of state
- Chairman of the Central Military Commission
- Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces (People's Liberation Army)
In the past it was possible for the Paramount leader to wield absolute power without holding any of the highest offices. This was the case with Deng Xiaoping who was the undisputed leader from 1978 to 1989 without holding any of the highest offices of party and state. Since his retirement, power has become more structured with the leader holding all three of the previously mentioned offices.
History
[edit]The concept of Paramount leader was instituted during the era of Mao Zedong who was Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party for life. The position was further established under Deng Xiaoping, however the term Paramount leader has not been officially attributed to any other leaders. Since the retirement of Deng Xiaoping by resigning from Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party in 1989, political power in China has been held collectively by the members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The General Secretary may be best described as primus inter pares, first among equals. Because the proceedings of this body are considered a state secret, the inner workings of Politburo are not made public. It is clear, however, that decision making has become consensus driven and that no single figure can any longer act unilaterally as in the days of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.[4]
Constitutional mechanism
[edit]Constitutional power in the People's Republic of China is held by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCPC). Although this group of approximately 300 members does not have power in the same way as a traditional legislative body, the most important and senior officials of the Chinese government are all members.
Within the CCCPC is the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. This body is a group of 25 individuals (currently 24 men and one woman) who govern the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Theoretically, the Politburo is elected by the CCCPC; however, in practice any new member of the Politburo is chosen by the current members. Politburo members hold positions in China's national government and regional positions of power simultaneously thereby consolidating the CCP's power.
In the case of key policy decisions, topics are addressed in the Politburo which then determines actions to be taken by the national and local government. The policy direction for the entire country rests in the hands of these 25 individuals who meet together once a month. Admission into the Politburo is extremely difficult. Tight control over the body is exercised by current members who vet potential members carefully to maintain the balance of power. Good political relationships within the Politburo are essential for admittance into the group. All members of the Politburo are elected for five year terms.[5]
Power within the Politburo is further concentrated in the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This group of seven members meets together weekly and is led by the General Secretary.[5]
Executive leadership in the PRC is elected through a process that can best be described as an indirect election. In this system, only one candidate stands for the election of any given position. Although other candidates cannot run formally, write-in candidates are permitted. In 2013, when the 12th National People's Congress elected CCP general secretary Xi Jinping as president, 2952 members voted in favour and one against, with three abstentions. Similarly, in the 2008 election, Hu Jintao, then-General Secretary, President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, were re-elected by a landslide. Of the 2985 members of the 11th National People's Congress, only 3 voted against Hu Jintao, with another 5 abstaining.
Practical mechanism
[edit]In practical terms, the National Congress provides a rubber stamp on a decision that is made by the Politburo and the Standing Committee.[citation needed] The transition of leadership can take several months. For instance, when Hu Jintao took over power from Jiang Zemin, the transition of power stretched out almost two years. Listed below are the dates on which Hu was appointed to each office:
- General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (November 2002)[citation needed]
- President of the People's Republic of China (March 2003)[citation needed]
- Chairman of the Central Military Commission (September 2004)[citation needed]
Usually the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission is the last office handed over by the previous leader, in order to secure political influence and ensure political continuity.[citation needed]
Most recent transition
[edit]Appointments to key offices are the best predictor of whom the next leader will be. The office of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) is seen by many as the last stop before becoming the top leader of China. Appointment to Vice Chairman position is so crucial that when Xi Jinping, the current CCP General Secretary, failed to achieve that office at the 4th Plenum in 2009, many analysts suggested that he had fallen from favor and would not be the next Chinese leader. His ultimate appointment to Vice Chairman of the CMC was seen as evidence that he had begun to consolidate his power and would ultimately succeed Hu Jintao when his term expired in 2012 at the 18th Party Congress.[32]
Absent a transparent electoral process, the appointment to key positions is the only way to predict future leadership in China. Note in the table below, the path that Xi Jinping followed from a low-level party official at the age of 30 to his current position of the leader of the most populous country in the world.
Xi Jinping's Corresponding Political and Military Postings, 1983–2007
| Years | Political Position | Military Position |
|---|---|---|
| 1983-85 | First secretary, Zhengding County, Hebei Province party committee | First political commissar and first secretary of the Party committee of People's Armed Forces Department of Zhengding County, Hebei Province |
| 1988-90 | Secretary of the CCP Ningde Prefectural Committee, Fujian Province | First secretary of the Party committee of Ningde Sub-Military Area Command |
| 1990-93 | Secretary of the CCP Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command |
| 1995-96 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CCP Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command |
| 1996-99 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee | First political commissar of the anti-aircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
| 1999-2000 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee and acting governor of Fujian Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
| 2000-02 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Fujian Provincial Committee and governor of Fujian Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command |
| 2002 | Deputy secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province | Vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang provincial commission for national defense mobilization |
| 2002-03 | Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province | First secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang provincial commission for national defense mobilization |
| 2003-07 | Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress | First secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command |
| 2007 | Secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee | First secretary of the Party committee of Shanghai Garrison |
As long as the Chinese government remains secretive about the inner workings of the CCP Politburo, past behavior will continue to be the most effective tool for predicting future appointments. In this context, the appointment of a candidate to key offices is still the best indicator of their future role. For example, the appointment of Xi Jinping as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party signposted with a reasonable amount of confidence that he would be the next top leader of the People's Republic of China.
Xi Jinping era
[edit]The sixth generation of leaders had been expected to come to power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. However, following Xi Jinping's consolidation of power at the 19th Party Congress, the future of the "sixth generation" was cast into doubt as clear successor figures failed to be named to senior leadership posts, particularly the Politburo Standing Committee.[citation needed] Xi Jinping was re-elected as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022.
In preceding years, Hu Chunhua (a Vice-Premier from 2018 to 2023) was seen[by whom?] as a possible core figure.[citation needed] Hu and Sun Zhengcai were the only Politburo members named at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 who were born after 1960, making their further advancement seem like a certainty, but Sun was purged before the 19th Party Congress and Hu was dropped from the Politburo at the 20th.[citation needed] U.S.-based newspaper Duo Wei Times also listed four figures who have since fallen from grace, former Fujian Governor Su Shulin, former President of the Supreme People's Court Zhou Qiang, former Heilongjiang Party Secretary Zhang Qingwei, and former Minister of Natural Resources Lu Hao, as other potential figures in this generation of leadership. Others in this rough age group ascending in the ranks include Zhang Guoqing (now a Vice-Premier) and Chen Min'er (party secretary of Chongqing and then Tianjin).[34]
Ding Xuexiang is the only person from this age bracket to have reached the Standing Committee, but the 20th Politburo includes eight other members born between 1960 and 1964.[citation needed]Xi Jinping has not named his successor as paramount leader of the CCP which broke from the precedent previously established of naming the successor at the start of the second term of the paramount leader.[35] This is seen as an attempt by Xi to further consolidate power as the leader of China and maintain a strong hold on his position of power.[36] Xi's lack of a named successor reversed the previously perceived notion of intraparty democracy in the naming system of leadership succession in the CCP.[37]
See also
[edit]- List of Chinese leaders
- Paramount leader
- Orders of precedence in China
- Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
- General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
- President of the People's Republic of China
- Premier of the People's Republic of China
References
[edit]- ^ Folsom, Ralph (1992). Law and Politics in the People's Republic of China. West Group. pp. 76–77. ISBN 0-314-00999-X.
- ^ "Constitution of the People's Republic of China". National People's Congress. Archived from the original on June 9, 2007. Retrieved 26 March 2011.
- ^ "China's leader Xi Jinping secures third term and stacks inner circle with loyalists". The Guardian. 2022-10-23. Retrieved 2022-10-23.
- ^ "In China, democracy is only in the Politburo: WikiLeaks". Hindustan Times. December 19, 2010. Retrieved 5 August 2021.
- ^ a b Miller, Alice (28 June 2010). "The 18th Central Committee Politburo: A Quixotic, Foolhardy, Rashly Speculative, But Nonetheless Ruthlessly Reasoned Projection" (PDF). China Leadership Monitor. 33. Retrieved 26 March 2011.
- ^ "The 20th Politburo". South China Morning Post. 21 November 2022. Archived from the original on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ a b Li, Cheng. "Cai Qi 蔡奇" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ "Chen Jining appointed Shanghai Party chief". China Daily. 28 October 2022. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Chen Jining 陈吉宁". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ Li, Cheng. "Chen Min'er 陈敏尔" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
- ^ "Brief introductions of members of CPC central leading bodies". State Council of the People's Republic of China. 24 October 2022. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Chen Wenqing 陈文清". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ a b Li, Cheng. "Ding Xuexiang 丁薛祥" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ Pei, Minxin (1 June 2023). "Xi Jinping's New Economic Team and Government Re-organization". China Leadership Monitor. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"He Lifeng 何立峰". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ Jiayao, Li (11 March 2023). "He Weidong -- Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission". China Military. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
- ^ Li, Cheng. "Huang Kunming 黄坤明" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
- ^ "China puts scientist in charge of Communist Party's human resources department". South China Morning Post. 27 April 2023. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Li Ganjie 李干杰". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ "Brief introduction of vice chairpersons, secretary-general of 14th NPC Standing Committee". People's Daily. 11 March 2023. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Li Hongzhong 李鸿忠". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ a b Li, Cheng. "Li Qiang 李强" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 July 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ Mai, Jun (13 March 2023). "Politburo newcomer and Xi protégé confirmed as China's new propaganda chief before presenting summary of party congress". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 27 October 2022. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Li Shulei 李书磊". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ a b Li, Cheng. "Li Xi 李希" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 October 2022. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ "Liu Guozhong -- Vice premier". State Council of the People's Republic of China. 13 March 2023. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
"Liu Guozhong 刘国中". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ Li, Cheng. "Ma Xingrui 马兴瑞" (PDF). Brookings Institution. Archived from the original (PDF) on 6 December 2022. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
- ^ "Shi Taifeng". National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 11 March 2023. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
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"Yuan Jiajun 袁家军". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023. - ^ "Zhang Guoqing -- Vice premier". State Council of the People's Republic of China. 13 March 2023. Archived from the original on 22 July 2023. Retrieved 22 July 2023.
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- ^ Johnson, Christopher (2017-08-09). "Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them". Center for Strategic & International Studies. Retrieved 2023-09-11.
- ^ Wang, Xiangwei (2017-10-05). "Analysis: how Xi Jinping revived old methods by abandoning intraparty democracy". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 2023-09-11.
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Xia → Shang → Zhou → Qin → Han → 3 Kingdoms → Jìn / 16 Kingdoms → S. Dynasties / N. Dynasties → Sui → Tang → 5 Dynasties & 10 Kingdoms → Liao / Song / W. Xia / Jīn → Yuan → Ming → Qing → ROC / PRC | ||