Jump to content

Chen Quanguo: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
No edit summary
 
(46 intermediate revisions by 30 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{short description|Former CCP Secretary of Xinjiang}}
{{Short description|Chinese politician (born 1955)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2024}}
{{family name hatnote|[[Chen (surname)|Chen]]|lang=Chinese}}
{{family name hatnote|[[Chen (surname)|Chen]]|lang=Chinese}}
{{Infobox officeholder
{{Infobox officeholder
Line 6: Line 7:
| native_name_lang = zh-Hans
| native_name_lang = zh-Hans
| image = Chen Quanguo.jpg
| image = Chen Quanguo.jpg
| caption =
| caption = Chen in 2020
| office = Deputy Head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group
| office = [[Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang]]
| term_start = 2022
| term_start = 29 August 2016
| leader = [[Hu Chunhua]]
| term_end = 25 December 2021
| deputy = {{ubl|[[Shohrat Zakir]]|[[Erkin Tuniyaz]] (chairman)}}
| office1 = [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|Communist Party Secretary]] of [[Xinjiang|Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]]
| term_start1 = August 29, 2016
| 1blankname = {{nowrap|General secretary}}
| term_end1 = December 25, 2021
| 1namedata = [[Xi Jinping]]
| deputy1 = [[Shohrat Zakir]]<br>[[Erkin Tuniyaz]] (chairman)
| predecessor = [[Zhang Chunxian]]
| successor = [[Ma Xingrui]]
| office1 = [[Communist Party Secretary of Tibet]]
| governor1 = {{ubl|[[Padma Choling]]|[[Losang Jamcan]]}}
| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap|General secretary}}
| 1blankname1 = {{nowrap|General secretary}}
| 1namedata1 = [[Xi Jinping]]
| 1namedata1 = {{ubl|[[Hu Jintao]]|Xi Jinping}}
| predecessor1 = [[Zhang Chunxian]]
| term_start1 = 25 August 2011
| successor1 = [[Ma Xingrui]]
| term_end1 = 28 August 2016
| predecessor1 = [[Zhang Qingli]]
| office2 = [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|Communist Party Secretary]] of [[Tibet Autonomous Region]]
| governor2 = [[Padma Choling]]<br/>[[Losang Jamcan]]
| successor1 = [[Wu Yingjie]]
| 1blankname2 = {{nowrap|General secretary}}
| office2 = [[Governor of Hebei]]
| 1namedata2 = [[Hu Jintao]]<br/>[[Xi Jinping]]
| term_start2 = 15 December 2009
| term_start2 = August 25, 2011
| term_end2 = 27 August 2011
| term_end2 = August 28, 2016
| leader2 = Zhang Qingli (party secretary)
| predecessor2 = [[Zhang Qingli]]
| predecessor2 = [[Hu Chunhua]]
| successor2 = [[Wu Yingjie]]
| successor2 = [[Zhang Qingwei]]
| office3 = [[Politics of Hebei|Governor]] of [[Hebei Province]]
| office3 = Deputy Head of the [[Central Rural Work Leading Group]]
| term3 = December 15, 2009 – August 27, 2011
| term_start3 = 14 June 2022
| leader3 = [[Zhang Qingli]] (party secretary)
| termend3 = 22 October 2022
| predecessor3 = [[Hu Chunhua]]
| leader3 = Hu Chunhua
| successor3 = [[Zhang Qingwei]]
| birth_date = {{Birth year and age|1955|11|}}
| birth_date = {{Birth year and age|1955|11|}}
| birth_place = [[Pingyu County]], [[Henan]]
| birth_place = [[Pingyu County]], Henan, China
| death_date =
| death_date =
| death_place =
| death_place =
| nationality = Chinese
| nationality = <!-- use only when necessary per [[WP:INFONAT]] -->
| party = [[Chinese Communist Party]] (1976–present)
| party = [[Chinese Communist Party|CCP]] (since 1976)
| spouse =
| spouse =
| children =
| children =
| alma_mater = [[Zhengzhou University]]<br/>[[Wuhan University of Technology]]
| alma_mater = {{ubl|[[Zhengzhou University]]|[[Wuhan University of Technology]]}}
| serviceyears = 1973–1977
| serviceyears = 1973–1977
| allegiance = {{flagu|China}}
| allegiance = China
| branch = {{Armed forces|China}}
| branch = [[People's Liberation Army]]
}}
}}


'''Chen Quanguo''' ({{zh|c={{linktext|陈|全|国}}|p=Chén Quánguó}}; born November 1955) is a Chinese politician and the current deputy head of the CCP Central Rural Work Leading Group. He is a current member of the [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]] and was previously was the [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary]] of [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] from 2011 to 2016 and of the [[Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]] from 2016 to 2021, making him the only person to serve as the Party Secretary for both autonomous regions. Chen was also [[Political Commissar]] of the [[Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps]] concurrently with his position as Xinjiang Party Secretary.
'''Chen Quanguo''' ({{zh|c={{linktext|陈|全|国}}|p=Chén Quánguó}}; born November 1955) is a Chinese retired politician who was the [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary]] of [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] from 2011 to 2016 and of the [[Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region]] from 2016 to 2021, making him the only person to serve as the Party Secretary for both autonomous regions. Between 2017 and 2022, he was a member of the [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]] and was also [[Political Commissar]] of the [[Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps]] concurrently with his position as Xinjiang Party Secretary.


Originally from [[Henan]], Chen was among the first batch of students to graduate university after the resumption of ''[[Gaokao]]'' examinations in 1978. Chen worked up the ranks in the party bureaucracy in his home province from a minor local official to the deputy provincial party chief. In 2009, he became Governor of [[Hebei]]. In 2011 he became the Communist Party Secretary, the top official, of the Tibet Autonomous Region, developing the region economically and instituting greater policing surveillance.<ref>Ben Blanchard, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSBRE90S0ED20130129 ''China appoints new Tibet governor, hardline policies to remain''], (29 January 2013), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210128093051/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSBRE90S0ED20130129 |date=2021-01-28 }} [Reuters ref dead, replaced with this ref]</ref><ref name="chinavitae" />
Originally from [[Henan]], Chen was among the first batch of students to graduate university after the resumption of ''[[Gaokao]]'' examinations in 1978. Chen worked up the ranks in the party bureaucracy in his home province from a minor local official to the deputy provincial party chief. In 2009, he became [[Governor of Hebei]]. In 2011 he became the Communist Party Secretary, the top official, of the Tibet Autonomous Region, developing the region economically and instituting greater policing surveillance.<ref>Ben Blanchard, [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSBRE90S0ED20130129 ''China appoints new Tibet governor, hardline policies to remain''], (29 January 2013), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210128093051/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSBRE90S0ED20130129 |date=28 January 2021 }} [Reuters ref dead, replaced with this ref]</ref>


In 2016, Chen was promoted to the party secretary of [[Xinjiang]]. He has since then attracted press for overseeing [[Xinjiang internment camps]] targeting Turkic minorities in the region. In both Tibet and Xinjiang, he has earned a reputation for applying draconian measures to [[sinicize]] the traditional cultures.<ref>Michael Dillon, [https://books.google.com/books?id=a35fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT155 ''Lesser Dragons: Minority Peoples of China,''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211013204515/https://books.google.com/books?id=a35fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT155 |date=2021-10-13 }} [[Reaktion Books]], 2018 {{isbn|978-1-780-23952-1}} p.155 :'Chen introduced new, draconian methods of repression, most of which he had rehearsed in Tibet.'</ref><ref>Gulbahar Haitiwaji with Rozenn Morgat [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji ''Our souls are dead': how I survived a Chinese 're-education' camp for Uighurs,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112105925/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji |date=2021-01-12 }}[[The Guardian]] 12 January 2021</ref><ref>[https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1730342020ENGLISH.pdf 'Uyghur jailed for nine years in secret trial,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116150831/https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1730342020ENGLISH.pdf |date=2021-01-16 }} [[Amnesty International]] 10 September 2020</ref><ref>[https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance 'Relentless Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014143942/https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance |date=2020-10-14 }} [[Human Rights Watch]] 22 May 2016</ref> He is considered one of the main architects of the [[Uyghur genocide]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-08-21 |title=The Architect of China's Muslim Camps Is a Rising Star Under Xi |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/tosv2.html?vid=&uuid=e5515e13-1748-11ed-a126-56534f787255&url=L25ld3MvYXJ0aWNsZXMvMjAxOC0wOS0yNy90aGUtYXJjaGl0ZWN0LW9mLWNoaW5hLXMtbXVzbGltLWNhbXBzLWlzLWEtcmlzaW5nLXN0YXItdW5kZXIteGk= |access-date=2022-08-08 |website=Bloomberg News}}</ref> In 2022, he was given a post in the Central Rural Work Leading Group of the CCP, which has been described as likely being his last role.
In 2016, Chen was promoted to the party secretary of [[Xinjiang]]. He has since then attracted press for overseeing [[Xinjiang internment camps]] targeting Turkic minorities in the region, and he is considered as one of the main architects of the [[persecution of Uyghurs in China]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 September 2018 |title=The Architect of China's Muslim Camps Is a Rising Star Under Xi |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-27/the-architect-of-china-s-muslim-camps-is-a-rising-star-under-xi |access-date=8 August 2022}}</ref> In both Tibet and Xinjiang, he has earned a reputation for applying draconian measures to [[sinicize]] the traditional cultures.<ref>Michael Dillon, [https://books.google.com/books?id=a35fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT155 ''Lesser Dragons: Minority Peoples of China,''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211013204515/https://books.google.com/books?id=a35fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT155 |date=13 October 2021 }} [[Reaktion Books]], 2018 {{isbn|978-1-780-23952-1}} p.155 :'Chen introduced new, draconian methods of repression, most of which he had rehearsed in Tibet.'</ref><ref>Gulbahar Haitiwaji with Rozenn Morgat [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji ''Our souls are dead': how I survived a Chinese 're-education' camp for Uighurs,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210112105925/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji |date=12 January 2021 }}[[The Guardian]] 12 January 2021</ref><ref>[https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1730342020ENGLISH.pdf 'Uyghur jailed for nine years in secret trial,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116150831/https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1730342020ENGLISH.pdf |date=16 January 2021 }} [[Amnesty International]] 10 September 2020</ref><ref>[https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance 'Relentless Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign,'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014143942/https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance |date=14 October 2020 }} [[Human Rights Watch]] 22 May 2016</ref> In 2022, he was given a post in the Central Rural Work Leading Group of the CCP, and retired later that year after the [[20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|20th CCP National Congress]], when he was not re-elected to the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Central Committee]].


==Early life and education==
==Early life and education==
Chen Quanguo is a native of [[Pingyu County]], [[Henan]] province.<ref name=":2" /> By dint of when he was born he avoided most of the [[Cultural Revolution]] and only suffered a delayed education.<ref name="Kenderdine 2021" /> In December 1973, at the age of 18, Chen enlisted in the [[People's Liberation Army]] for four years.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3041810/tibet-xinjiang-beijings-man-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-prime|title=From Tibet to Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions|date=2019-12-13|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=2019-12-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216055235/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3041810/tibet-xinjiang-beijings-man-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-prime|archive-date=2019-12-16|url-status=live}}</ref> He served with the First Army, Third Division Artillery Regiment.<ref name="Kenderdine 2021" >{{cite web |last1=Kenderdine |first1=Tristan |title=Chen Quanguo, Architect of Xinjiang Crackdown, Likely to be Rewarded With Central Position in 2022 |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/chen-quanguo-architect-of-xinjiang-crackdown-likely-to-be-rewarded-with-central-position-in-2022/ |website=thediplomat.com |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=14 June 2021 |archive-date=14 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614123451/https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/chen-quanguo-architect-of-xinjiang-crackdown-likely-to-be-rewarded-with-central-position-in-2022/ |url-status=live }}</ref> He joined the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) in February 1976.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo/bio|title=China Vitae : Biography of Chen Quanguo|last=Vitae|first=China|website=www.chinavitae.com|access-date=2017-10-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011182221/http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo/bio|archive-date=2017-10-11|url-status=live}}</ref> After leaving the military in March 1977, he briefly worked at a car parts factory in [[Zhumadian]].<ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>
Chen Quanguo is a native of [[Pingyu County]], [[Henan]] province.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |last=Jun |first=Mai |date=13 December 2019 |title=From Tibet to Xinjiang, Beijing's man for restive regions Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3041810/tibet-xinjiang-beijings-man-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-prime |access-date=16 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216055235/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3041810/tibet-xinjiang-beijings-man-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-prime |archive-date=16 December 2019}}</ref> By dint of when he was born he avoided most of the [[Cultural Revolution]] and only suffered a delayed education.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |last=Kenderdine |first=Tristan |date=7 June 2021 |title=Chen Quanguo, Architect of Xinjiang Crackdown, Likely to be Rewarded With Central Position in 2022 |work=[[The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/chen-quanguo-architect-of-xinjiang-crackdown-likely-to-be-rewarded-with-central-position-in-2022/ |url-status=live |access-date=14 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210614123451/https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/chen-quanguo-architect-of-xinjiang-crackdown-likely-to-be-rewarded-with-central-position-in-2022/ |archive-date=14 June 2021}}</ref> In December 1973, at the age of 18, Chen enlisted in the [[People's Liberation Army]] for four years.<ref name=":2" /> He served with the First Army, Third Division Artillery Regiment.<ref name=":3" /> He joined the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) in February 1976.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo/bio|title=China Vitae : Biography of Chen Quanguo|last=Vitae|first=China|website=www.chinavitae.com|access-date=11 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011182221/http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo/bio|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> After leaving the military in March 1977, he briefly worked at a car parts factory in [[Zhumadian]].<ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>


After China resumed the [[National Higher Education Entrance Examination]] which was interrupted during the Cultural Revolution, in March 1978 Chen was admitted to the Economics Department of [[Zhengzhou University]] in the provincial capital [[Zhengzhou]].<ref name="xinhua">{{cite web |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2009-12/01/content_12570049.htm |script-title=zh:陈全国简历 |trans-title=Biography of Chen Quanguo |language=zh |publisher=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |access-date=2013-02-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130209142856/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2009-12/01/content_12570049.htm |archive-date=2013-02-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="people">{{cite web |url=http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/10487050.html |script-title=zh:陈全国简历 |trans-title=Biography of Chen Quanguo |language=zh |publisher=[[People's Daily]] |access-date=2013-02-10 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130116182348/http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/10487050.html |archive-date=2013-01-16 }}</ref> At Zhengzhou University he studied [[political economy]].<ref name="Kenderdine 2021" />
After China resumed the [[National Higher Education Entrance Examination]] which was interrupted during the Cultural Revolution, in March 1978 Chen was admitted to the Economics Department of [[Zhengzhou University]] in the provincial capital [[Zhengzhou]].<ref name="xinhua">{{cite web |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2009-12/01/content_12570049.htm |script-title=zh:陈全国简历 |trans-title=Biography of Chen Quanguo |language=zh |publisher=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |access-date=10 February 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130209142856/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2009-12/01/content_12570049.htm |archive-date=9 February 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="people">{{cite web |url=http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/10487050.html |script-title=zh:陈全国简历 |trans-title=Biography of Chen Quanguo |language=zh |publisher=[[People's Daily]] |access-date=10 February 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130116182348/http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/10487050.html |archive-date=16 January 2013 }}</ref> At Zhengzhou University he studied [[political economy]].<ref name=":3" />


== Career ==
== Career ==


=== Henan ===
=== Henan ===
Chen Quanguo graduated from Zhengzhou University in December 1981 and returned to work in his hometown of Pingyu, Henan. Starting in 1983 he worked for the prefectural government of Zhumadian, and in 1988 became the Communist Party Secretary of [[Suiping County|Suiping]], a county under the administration of Zhumadian. In 1994, he was appointed the head of the Organization Department of the nearby [[prefecture-level city]] of [[Pingdingshan]].<ref name="chinavitae">{{cite web|url=http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo|title=Chen Quanguo|publisher=China Vitae|access-date=2013-02-15|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191215052450/http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo|archive-date=2019-12-15|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>
Chen Quanguo graduated from Zhengzhou University in December 1981 and returned to work in his hometown of Pingyu, Henan. Starting in 1983 he worked for the prefectural government of Zhumadian, and in 1988 became the Communist Party Secretary of [[Suiping County|Suiping]], a county under the administration of Zhumadian. In 1994, he was appointed the head of the Organization Department of the nearby [[prefecture-level city]] of [[Pingdingshan]].<ref name="chinavitae">{{cite web|url=http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo|title=Chen Quanguo|publisher=China Vitae|access-date=15 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191215052450/http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Quanguo|archive-date=15 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>


From 1995 to 1997 Chen enrolled as a part-time student at the School of Business Administration of [[Wuhan University of Technology]], obtaining a master's degree in economics. However, a [[Financial Times|''Financial Times'']] analysis has found that Chen plagiarized his thesis from other sources.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-02-27 |title=Top Chinese officials plagiarised doctoral dissertations |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2eb02fa4-3429-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 |access-date=2022-08-08}}</ref> From 1996 to 1998 he served as the Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of [[Luohe]], another prefecture-level city in Henan.<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>
From 1995 to 1997 Chen enrolled as a part-time student at the School of Business Administration of [[Wuhan University of Technology]], obtaining a master's degree in economics. However, a ''[[Financial Times]]'' analysis has found that Chen plagiarized his thesis from other sources.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 February 2019 |title=Top Chinese officials plagiarised doctoral dissertations |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2eb02fa4-3429-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 |access-date=8 August 2022}}</ref> From 1996 to 1998 he served as the Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of [[Luohe]], another prefecture-level city in Henan.<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>


Chen Quanguo was promoted to Vice-Governor of Henan Province in January 1998, and worked in the administration of then Henan Governor [[Li Keqiang]]. Chen was regarded as a close confidante of Li. In November 2000 Chen was appointed by the CCP head of the Standing committee of the Henan Provincial committee in the provincial Organization Department. In April 2003 he became the [[Chinese Communist Party Deputy Committee Secretary|Deputy Communist Party Secretary]], President of the Party School of the CCP, and the President of the [[Henan Institute of Administration]].<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>
Chen Quanguo was promoted to Vice-Governor of Henan Province in January 1998, and worked in the administration of then Henan Governor [[Li Keqiang]]. Chen was regarded as a close confidante of Li. In November 2000 Chen was appointed by the CCP head of the Standing committee of the Henan Provincial committee in the provincial Organization Department. In April 2003 he became the [[Chinese Communist Party Deputy Committee Secretary|Deputy Communist Party Secretary]], President of the Party School of the CCP, and the President of the [[Henan Institute of Administration]].<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/>


=== Hebei ===
=== Hebei (2009–2011) ===
In November 2009, Chen Quanguo was transferred to neighboring [[Hebei]] and promoted to Acting Governor and Deputy Party Secretary of the province. He replaced [[Hu Chunhua]], who became the Party Secretary of [[Inner Mongolia]]. In January 2010 he was officially elected by the provincial congress as Governor of Hebei at the third session of the [[2008 National People's Congress|11th National People's Congress]].<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2009-12/01/content_12567745.htm |script-title=zh:陈全国同志任河北省委副书记 |trans-title=Comrade Chen Quanguo was appointed Deputy Secretary of Hebei Provincial Party Committee |publisher=[[Xinhua News]] |language=zh-cn |date=2009-12-01 }}{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>
In November 2009, Chen Quanguo was transferred to neighboring [[Hebei]] and promoted to Acting Governor and Deputy Party Secretary of the province. He replaced [[Hu Chunhua]], who became the Party Secretary of [[Inner Mongolia]]. In January 2010 he was officially elected by the provincial congress as Governor of Hebei at the third session of the [[2008 National People's Congress|11th National People's Congress]].<ref name="chinavitae"/><ref name="xinhua"/><ref name="people"/><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2009-12/01/content_12567745.htm |script-title=zh:陈全国同志任河北省委副书记 |trans-title=Comrade Chen Quanguo was appointed Deputy Secretary of Hebei Provincial Party Committee |publisher=[[Xinhua News]] |language=zh-cn |date=1 December 2009 }}{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>


=== Tibet ===
=== Tibet (2011–2016) ===
On August 25, 2011, the CCP Central Committee announced the appointment of Chen to the remote [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] as Party Secretary, the top official of the region. On May 8, 2012, Chen Quanguo was elected the first secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Military Region.
On 25 August 2011, the CCP Central Committee announced the appointment of Chen to the remote [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] as Party Secretary, the top official of the region. On 8 May 2012, Chen Quanguo was elected the first secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Military Region.


Shortly after Chen took up his position in August 2011, the region advertised positions for 2,500 additional police,<ref>[https://tibet.net/from-tibet-to-xinjiang-beijings-man-for-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-is-the-prime-target-of-us-sanctions/ ''From Tibet to Xinjiang Beijing's Man for restive regions Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions''], (13 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200208054814/https://tibet.net/from-tibet-to-xinjiang-beijings-man-for-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-is-the-prime-target-of-us-sanctions/ |date=2020-02-08 }}</ref> and Chen implemented a new security policy for Tibet in the form of "convenience police stations" ({{zh|labels=no|s=便民警务站}}).<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/|title=Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang|last1=Zenz|first1=Adrian|date=September 21, 2017|work=[[Jamestown Foundation]]|access-date=October 17, 2019|last2=Leibold|first2=James|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191018235634/https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/|archive-date=October 18, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This [[Grid-style social management in China|divided urban centers into grids]], allowing the authorities to systematically observe all activities within the area.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/|title=Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview|date=2013-08-08|work=China Change|access-date=2017-10-11|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011181609/https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/|archive-date=2017-10-11|url-status=live}}</ref> As of early 2016, at least 156 of the concrete one- and two-story stations - stocked with wheelchairs, first aid kits, repair tools, umbrellas and even phone chargers for public use - were built in Lhasa, with guards on 24 hour "seamless" surveillance patrols, while two stations are only 15 meters apart.<ref name=TR>[https://www.tibetanreview.net/party-boss-chen-quanguo-replicating-his-tibet-policy-in-xinjiang/ ''Party boss Chen Quanguo replicating his Tibet policy in Xinjiang''], (13 December 2016), Tibetan Review, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014072713/https://www.tibetanreview.net/party-boss-chen-quanguo-replicating-his-tibet-policy-in-xinjiang/ |date=2020-10-14 }}</ref> At least 544 more of these police stations exist throughout urban centers across Tibet.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.163.com/16/0304/17/BHB2970J00014AED.html |language=zh-cn |script-title=zh:七百便民警务站不仅代表西藏法治建设,更是百姓零距离的守护_网易新闻 |trans-title= |website=news.163.com|access-date=2017-10-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011182309/http://news.163.com/16/0304/17/BHB2970J00014AED.html|archive-date=2017-10-11|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Shortly after Chen took up his position in August 2011, the region advertised positions for 2,500 additional police,<ref>[https://tibet.net/from-tibet-to-xinjiang-beijings-man-for-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-is-the-prime-target-of-us-sanctions/ ''From Tibet to Xinjiang Beijing's Man for restive regions Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions''], (13 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200208054814/https://tibet.net/from-tibet-to-xinjiang-beijings-man-for-restive-regions-chen-quanguo-is-the-prime-target-of-us-sanctions/ |date=8 February 2020 }}</ref> and Chen implemented a new security policy for Tibet in the form of "convenience police stations" ({{zh|labels=no|s=便民警务站}}).<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/|title=Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang|last1=Zenz|first1=Adrian|date=21 September 2017|work=[[Jamestown Foundation]]|access-date=17 October 2019|last2=Leibold|first2=James|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191018235634/https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/|archive-date=18 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This [[Grid-style social management in China|divided urban centers into grids]], allowing the authorities to systematically observe all activities within the area.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/|title=Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview|date=8 August 2013|work=China Change|access-date=11 October 2017|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011181609/https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> As of early 2016, at least 156 of the concrete one- and two-story stations - stocked with wheelchairs, first aid kits, repair tools, umbrellas and even phone chargers for public use - were built in Lhasa, with guards on 24 hour "seamless" surveillance patrols, while two stations are only 15 meters apart.<ref name=TR>[https://www.tibetanreview.net/party-boss-chen-quanguo-replicating-his-tibet-policy-in-xinjiang/ ''Party boss Chen Quanguo replicating his Tibet policy in Xinjiang''], (13 December 2016), Tibetan Review, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014072713/https://www.tibetanreview.net/party-boss-chen-quanguo-replicating-his-tibet-policy-in-xinjiang/ |date=14 October 2020 }}</ref> At least 544 more of these police stations exist throughout urban centers across Tibet.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.163.com/16/0304/17/BHB2970J00014AED.html |language=zh-cn |script-title=zh:七百便民警务站不仅代表西藏法治建设,更是百姓零距离的守护_网易新闻 |trans-title= |website=news.163.com|access-date=11 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011182309/http://news.163.com/16/0304/17/BHB2970J00014AED.html|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref>


Chen instituted a policy called the "double-linked household management system" to surveil 81,140 households in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, comprising more than three million people mobilized for security and social issues.<ref name=TR/> The system is described as a method where neighbors spy on each other,<ref name=TE/> while Kelsang Dolma - a Juris Doctor candidate at the [[University of Pennsylvania Law School]], graduated with a B.A. from [[Yale University|Yale]] - in Foreign Policy writes the policy is an "Orwellian social system" where family members are encouraged to report on each other to authorities.<ref>[[Kelsang Dolma]], [https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/ ''Tibet Was China’s First Laboratory of Repression''], (31 August 2020), Foreign Policy, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200926152635/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/ |date=2020-09-26 }}</ref>
Chen instituted a policy called the "double-linked household management system" to surveil 81,140 households in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, comprising more than three million people mobilized for security and social issues.<ref name=TR/> The system is described as a method where neighbors spy on each other,<ref name=TE/> while Kelsang Dolma in Foreign Policy writes the policy is an "Orwellian social system" where family members are encouraged to report on each other to authorities.<ref>[[Kelsang Dolma]], [https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/ ''Tibet Was China’s First Laboratory of Repression''], (31 August 2020), Foreign Policy, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200926152635/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/|date=26 September 2020}}</ref>


==== Self-immolations ====
==== Self-immolations ====
There was a sharp rise in the number of [[Self-immolation protests by Tibetans in China|self-immolations by Tibetan monks and nuns]] after Chen took office,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tibet.net/important-issues/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/|title=Fact Sheet on Tibetan Self-Immolation Protests in Tibet Since February 2009|work=www.tibet.net|date=28 November 2019|access-date=30 August 2020|archive-date=1 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200901191124/https://tibet.net/important-issues/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/|url-status=live}}</ref> which began and continued at [[Kirti Gompa#Recent events|Kirti Monastery]]. Within Tibet, 156 monks, nuns, and laypeople self-immolated as of December 2019.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Fadiman|first=Anne|date=2020-07-28|title=The Chinese Town That Became the Self-Immolation Capital of the World|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/books/review/eat-the-buddha-barbara-demick.html|access-date=2020-10-21|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=2020-10-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020082552/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/books/review/eat-the-buddha-barbara-demick.html|url-status=live}}</ref> According to the [[International Campaign for Tibet]]'s (ICT) Fact Sheet information,<ref name=ICT>International Campaign for Tibet, [https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/ ''Self-immolation fact sheet''], (02 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201015144959/https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/ |date=2020-10-15 }}</ref> reviewed by Outside, "Chinese police have beaten, shot, isolated, and disappeared self-immolators who survived."<ref name=OS>Tracy Ross, [https://www.outsideonline.com/2402414/self-immolation-tibet#close ''Tibet is still burning''], (24 September 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020111312/https://www.outsideonline.com/2402414/self-immolation-tibet#close |date=2020-10-20 }}</ref> The families are often arrested or detained, which led in 2014 to a rise in walking or solo protests.
There was a sharp rise in the number of [[Self-immolation protests by Tibetans in China|self-immolations by Tibetan monks and nuns]] after Chen took office,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tibet.net/important-issues/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/|title=Fact Sheet on Tibetan Self-Immolation Protests in Tibet Since February 2009|work=www.tibet.net|date=28 November 2019|access-date=30 August 2020|archive-date=1 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200901191124/https://tibet.net/important-issues/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/|url-status=live}}</ref> which began and continued at [[Kirti Gompa#Recent events|Kirti Monastery]]. Within Tibet, 156 monks, nuns, and laypeople self-immolated as of December 2019.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Fadiman|first=Anne|date=28 July 2020|title=The Chinese Town That Became the Self-Immolation Capital of the World|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/books/review/eat-the-buddha-barbara-demick.html|access-date=21 October 2020|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=20 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020082552/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/books/review/eat-the-buddha-barbara-demick.html|url-status=live}}</ref> According to the [[International Campaign for Tibet]]'s (ICT) Fact Sheet information,<ref name=ICT>International Campaign for Tibet, [https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/ ''Self-immolation fact sheet''], (2 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201015144959/https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/ |date=15 October 2020 }}</ref> reviewed by Outside, "Chinese police have beaten, shot, isolated, and disappeared self-immolators who survived."<ref name=OS>Tracy Ross, [https://www.outsideonline.com/2402414/self-immolation-tibet#close ''Tibet is still burning''], (24 September 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020111312/https://www.outsideonline.com/2402414/self-immolation-tibet#close |date=20 October 2020 }}</ref> The families are often arrested or detained, which led in 2014 to a rise in walking or solo protests.


Often, the self-immolators, and solo protestors, carry illegal pictures of the [[14th Dalai Lama]],<ref>{{Cite news|date=2011-10-04|title=Self-immolation 'trend' at restive Tibetan monastery|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15169007|access-date=2020-10-21|archive-date=2020-10-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014151645/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15169007|url-status=live}}</ref> and/or make long life prayers for the Dalai Lama,<ref name=OS/><ref name=ICT/> as well as shout for independence from China. The immolations were seen to be a form of extreme protest against the Chinese government's crackdown on Buddhists from the region,<ref>''Resistance in Tibet: Self-immolation and Protest''. International Tibet Network, 03 May 2013.</ref> and described in Outside as offerings by the self-immolators of their bodies to show the world how badly Tibet is suffering.<ref name=OS/> The Dalai Lama blames the self-immolations on Chinese policies, and said, "Some kind of policy, some kind of cultural genocide is taking place".<ref>{{Cite news|date=2012-02-20|title=Teenage Tibetan monk self-immolates, dies: rights group|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSTRE81J06B20120220|access-date=2020-10-21|archive-date=2020-10-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020035901/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSTRE81J06B20120220|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=2011-11-07|title=Dalai Lama: 'Cultural genocide' behind self-immolations|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15617026|access-date=2020-10-21|archive-date=2019-11-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191103141911/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15617026|url-status=live}}</ref> In March 2011, before Chen began his tenure, the Dalai Lama resigned from his political role to continue in his role as Tibet's spiritual leader.
Often, the self-immolators, and solo protestors, carry illegal pictures of the [[14th Dalai Lama]],<ref>{{Cite news|date=4 October 2011|title=Self-immolation 'trend' at restive Tibetan monastery|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15169007|access-date=21 October 2020|archive-date=14 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014151645/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15169007|url-status=live}}</ref> and/or make long life prayers for the Dalai Lama,<ref name=OS/><ref name=ICT/> as well as shout for independence from China. The immolations were seen to be a form of extreme protest against the Chinese government's crackdown on Buddhists from the region,<ref>''Resistance in Tibet: Self-immolation and Protest''. International Tibet Network, 3 May 2013.</ref> and described in Outside as offerings by the self-immolators of their bodies to show the world how badly Tibet is suffering.<ref name=OS/> The Dalai Lama blames the self-immolations on Chinese policies, and said, "Some kind of policy, some kind of cultural genocide is taking place".<ref>{{Cite news|date=20 February 2012|title=Teenage Tibetan monk self-immolates, dies: rights group|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSTRE81J06B20120220|access-date=21 October 2020|archive-date=20 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020035901/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet-idUSTRE81J06B20120220|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=7 November 2011|title=Dalai Lama: 'Cultural genocide' behind self-immolations|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15617026|access-date=21 October 2020|archive-date=3 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191103141911/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15617026|url-status=live}}</ref> In March 2011, before Chen began his tenure, the Dalai Lama resigned from his political role to continue in his role as Tibet's spiritual leader.


==== Arrests and disappearances ====
==== Arrests and disappearances ====
{{See also|Human rights in Tibet}}
{{See also|Human rights in Tibet}}
Tibet government-in-exile's [[Central Tibetan Administration]] leader Lobsang Sangay states, "If you protest in Tibet, more often than not you get arrested, or beaten up, sometimes tortured, sometimes you disappear, sometimes you die".<ref>{{Cite news|date=2011-11-03|title=Tibetan leader Lobsang Sangay presses US on immolations|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568181|access-date=2020-10-21|archive-date=2020-10-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016012551/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568181|url-status=live}}</ref> Mysterious deaths were reported during Chen's tenure.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2015-07-13|title=Tibetan monk Tenzin Delek Rinpoche dies in China prison|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33505834|access-date=2020-10-21|archive-date=2020-11-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108124737/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33505834|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=report>[https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance ''Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign''], (''www.hrw.org'' 22 May 2016), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014143942/https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance |date=2020-10-14 }}</ref> The earlier mass arbitrary arrests of monks and nuns at Kirti Monastery in March&ndash;April 2011 were followed by reports of disappearances into custody, which continued through Chen's tenure.
Tibet government-in-exile's [[Central Tibetan Administration]] leader Lobsang Sangay states, "If you protest in Tibet, more often than not you get arrested, or beaten up, sometimes tortured, sometimes you disappear, sometimes you die".<ref>{{Cite news|date=3 November 2011|title=Tibetan leader Lobsang Sangay presses US on immolations|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568181|access-date=21 October 2020|archive-date=16 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016012551/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568181|url-status=live}}</ref> Mysterious deaths were reported during Chen's tenure.<ref>{{Cite news|date=13 July 2015|title=Tibetan monk Tenzin Delek Rinpoche dies in China prison|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33505834|access-date=21 October 2020|archive-date=8 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201108124737/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33505834|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=report>[https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance ''Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign''], (''www.hrw.org'' 22 May 2016), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201014143942/https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance |date=14 October 2020 }}</ref> The earlier mass arbitrary arrests of monks and nuns at Kirti Monastery in March&ndash;April 2011 were followed by reports of disappearances into custody, which continued through Chen's tenure.


In December 2013, Chen described his policy as a "Stability Maintenance Campaign" in a statement, included in a [[Human Rights Watch]] report:<ref name=report/>
In December 2013, Chen described his policy as a "Stability Maintenance Campaign" in a statement, included in a [[Human Rights Watch]] report:<ref name=report/>
Line 93: Line 96:
During Chen's tenure, forced evictions of at least 5,000 nuns and monks studying at [[Larung Gar Buddhist Academy]] and residing in [[Larung Gar]], began in 2013 and continued past August 2016, with a major demolitions order for 4,600 residences dated from June 2016.
During Chen's tenure, forced evictions of at least 5,000 nuns and monks studying at [[Larung Gar Buddhist Academy]] and residing in [[Larung Gar]], began in 2013 and continued past August 2016, with a major demolitions order for 4,600 residences dated from June 2016.


After residences were demolished, the nuns and monks were bussed away and reports by [[Tibetan Review]],<ref name=TR1>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tibetanreview.net/political-re-education-awaits-monks-and-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|title=Political re-education awaits monks and nuns expelled from Larung Gar|date=November 6, 2016|website=Tibetan Review|access-date=October 30, 2020|archive-date=October 25, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201025220035/https://www.tibetanreview.net/political-re-education-awaits-monks-and-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Radio France International]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20180106-tibet-chine-acculturation-repression-religion-dolma-tsering-teykhang|title=Chronique des droits de l'homme - Tibet: l'acculturation passe par la répression des activités religieuses|date=January 6, 2018|website=Radio France Internationale|access-date=October 30, 2020|archive-date=October 15, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201015155651/https://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20180106-tibet-chine-acculturation-repression-religion-dolma-tsering-teykhang|url-status=live}}</ref> and Human Rights Watch (HRW)<ref name=HRW>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions|title=Halt 'Re-education,' Humiliation of Monks, Nuns|date=March 29, 2017|website=Human Rights Watch|access-date=October 30, 2020|archive-date=May 24, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200524235510/https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions|url-status=live}} quotation ''A second video, circulated a few days after the first, shows 12 Tibetan nuns dancing on the stage of a theater in front of what appears to be an audience of officials. The nuns, dressed in religious robes, perform a choreographed dance routine to the song, “The Song of the Emancipated Serfs.” The song is associated with official Communist Party celebrations and was originally performed in front of Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1959.''</ref> state 600 people were sent directly to re-education camps and centers located in [[Nyingtri]], while a detention center in [[Sertar]] was being prepared for an additional 800 nuns.<ref name=TR2>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tibetanreview.net/prefecture-sets-up-detention-camp-for-tibetan-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|title=Prefecture sets up detention camp for Tibetan nuns expelled from Larung Gar|date=December 13, 2016|website=Tibetan Review|access-date=October 30, 2020|archive-date=October 25, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201025230203/https://www.tibetanreview.net/prefecture-sets-up-detention-camp-for-tibetan-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|url-status=live}}</ref> Other reported re-education centers and camps for the monastic community of [[Yarchen Gar#Demolitions and re-education|Yarchen Gar]] are reported as located in and around [[Chamdo]] City and [[Jomda]] County.
After residences were demolished, the nuns and monks were bussed away and reports by [[Tibetan Review]],<ref name=TR1>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tibetanreview.net/political-re-education-awaits-monks-and-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|title=Political re-education awaits monks and nuns expelled from Larung Gar|date=6 November 2016|website=Tibetan Review|access-date=30 October 2020|archive-date=25 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201025220035/https://www.tibetanreview.net/political-re-education-awaits-monks-and-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Radio France International]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20180106-tibet-chine-acculturation-repression-religion-dolma-tsering-teykhang|title=Chronique des droits de l'homme - Tibet: l'acculturation passe par la répression des activités religieuses|date=6 January 2018|website=Radio France Internationale|access-date=30 October 2020|archive-date=15 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201015155651/https://www.rfi.fr/fr/emission/20180106-tibet-chine-acculturation-repression-religion-dolma-tsering-teykhang|url-status=live}}</ref> and Human Rights Watch (HRW)<ref name=HRW>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions|title=Halt 'Re-education,' Humiliation of Monks, Nuns|date=29 March 2017|website=Human Rights Watch|access-date=30 October 2020|archive-date=24 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200524235510/https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions|url-status=live}} quotation ''A second video, circulated a few days after the first, shows 12 Tibetan nuns dancing on the stage of a theater in front of what appears to be an audience of officials. The nuns, dressed in religious robes, perform a choreographed dance routine to the song, “The Song of the Emancipated Serfs.” The song is associated with official Communist Party celebrations and was originally performed in front of Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1959.''</ref> state 600 people were sent directly to re-education camps and centers located in [[Nyingtri]], while a detention center in [[Sertar]] was being prepared for an additional 800 nuns.<ref name=TR2>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tibetanreview.net/prefecture-sets-up-detention-camp-for-tibetan-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|title=Prefecture sets up detention camp for Tibetan nuns expelled from Larung Gar|date=13 December 2016|website=Tibetan Review|access-date=30 October 2020|archive-date=25 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201025230203/https://www.tibetanreview.net/prefecture-sets-up-detention-camp-for-tibetan-nuns-expelled-from-larung-gar/|url-status=live}}</ref> Other reported re-education centers and camps for the monastic community of [[Yarchen Gar#Demolitions and re-education|Yarchen Gar]] are reported as located in and around [[Chamdo]] City and [[Jomda]] County.


More nuns than monks were forcibly evicted and detained. The HRW report also details persecution and abuses to which the nuns are subjected in Nyingtri, and refers to a video<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://freetibet.org/news-media/na/video-dancing-nuns|title=Controversial footage shows nuns in choreographed performance &#124; Free Tibet|website=Free Tibet|access-date=2020-10-30|archive-date=2020-11-02|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201102003210/https://freetibet.org/news-media/na/video-dancing-nuns|url-status=live}}</ref> in which nuns are forced to sing and dance on a stage. Another 300 of Larung Gar's monastic Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, which were not directly detained in re-education camps, were to register for forced re-education programs with prefectures in their home towns. Reports also state the nuns and monks are banned from re-entering other monastic institutions.
More nuns than monks were forcibly evicted and detained. The HRW report also details persecution and abuses to which the nuns are subjected in Nyingtri, and refers to a video<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://freetibet.org/news-media/na/video-dancing-nuns|title=Controversial footage shows nuns in choreographed performance &#124; Free Tibet|website=Free Tibet|access-date=30 October 2020|archive-date=2 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201102003210/https://freetibet.org/news-media/na/video-dancing-nuns|url-status=live}}</ref> in which nuns are forced to sing and dance on a stage. Another 300 of Larung Gar's monastic Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, which were not directly detained in re-education camps, were to register for forced re-education programs with prefectures in their home towns. Reports also state the nuns and monks are banned from re-entering other monastic institutions.


==== Economic development ====
==== Economic development ====
In 2015 during Chen's tenure, a transfer of 280,000 Han Chinese settlers to Tibet's capital Lhasa was authorized, as part of China's urbanization plans. The Central Tibetan Administration states 7.5 million Han Chinese and 6 million Tibetans live in the region, as of 2015, and adds, "Under the guise of the economic and social development, Beijing encourages its population to migrate to Tibet with the clear aim to marginalize Tibetans from the economic, educational, political and social life of the region".<ref name=Han/> During Chen's tenure, Tibet's ethnic majority has been "swamped" by promoting economic development that encourages migration from elsewhere in China.<ref name=TE>[https://www.economist.com/china/2019/12/12/in-xinjiang-china-applies-repressive-lessons-learned-in-tibet ''In Xinjiang, China applies repressive lessons learned in Tibet''], (''www.economist.com'', 12 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016182659/https://www.economist.com/china/2019/12/12/in-xinjiang-china-applies-repressive-lessons-learned-in-tibet |date=2020-10-16 }}</ref> In September 2011, at least 226 "key projects" for the development of Tibet were awarded to Han Chinese owned companies.<ref name=Han>[http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-sends-a-new-flood-of-Han-migrants-to-Lhasa:-Tibetans-risk-disappearing-33294.html ''Beijing sends a new flood of Han migrants to Lhasa: Tibetans risk disappearing''], (''www.asianews.it'', 27 January 2015), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200920213202/http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-sends-a-new-flood-of-Han-migrants-to-Lhasa:-Tibetans-risk-disappearing-33294.html |date=2020-09-20 }}</ref> Only Han Chinese college graduates in Tibet or Tibetans that speak fluent Mandarin secure well-paid private sector jobs.<ref>Adrian Zenz, [https://jamestown.org/program/full-employment-tibet-beginning-end-chen-quanguos-neo-socialist-experiment/ ''"Full Employment" in Tibet: The Beginning and End of Chen Quanguo’s Neo-Socialist Experiment''], (''jamestown.org'', 26 February 2018), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109021429/https://jamestown.org/program/full-employment-tibet-beginning-end-chen-quanguos-neo-socialist-experiment/ |date=2020-11-09 }}</ref> Chinese data shows that Tibet's GDP grew by 11.8% in 2012. The growth rate in 2013 was 12.1%. The growth rate in 2014 was 12%, ranking first in the country. The growth rate in 2015 was 11%, and the region's GDP exceeded 100 billion [[Renminbi|CNY]] for the first time. In the first half of 2016, Tibet led other provinces and cities in China at a growth rate of 10.6%.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-02-19/60119033.html|script-title=zh:【治疆策】“特殊”陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派|website=news.dwnews.com|access-date=2019-05-12|title=【治疆策】特殊陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派 |trans-title=(Strategies for Governing Borders) "Special" Chen Quanguo: Frontier factions who work silently|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228090755/http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-02-19/60119033.html|archive-date=2019-02-28|url-status=live}}</ref>
In 2015 during Chen's tenure, a transfer of 280,000 Han Chinese settlers to Tibet's capital Lhasa was authorized, as part of China's urbanization plans. The Central Tibetan Administration states 7.5 million Han Chinese and 6 million Tibetans live in the region, as of 2015, and adds, "Under the guise of the economic and social development, Beijing encourages its population to migrate to Tibet with the clear aim to marginalize Tibetans from the economic, educational, political and social life of the region".<ref name=Han/> During Chen's tenure, Tibet's ethnic majority has been "swamped" by promoting economic development that encourages migration from elsewhere in China.<ref name=TE>[https://www.economist.com/china/2019/12/12/in-xinjiang-china-applies-repressive-lessons-learned-in-tibet ''In Xinjiang, China applies repressive lessons learned in Tibet''], (''www.economist.com'', 12 December 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016182659/https://www.economist.com/china/2019/12/12/in-xinjiang-china-applies-repressive-lessons-learned-in-tibet |date=16 October 2020 }}</ref> In September 2011, at least 226 "key projects" for the development of Tibet were awarded to Han Chinese owned companies.<ref name=Han>[http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-sends-a-new-flood-of-Han-migrants-to-Lhasa:-Tibetans-risk-disappearing-33294.html ''Beijing sends a new flood of Han migrants to Lhasa: Tibetans risk disappearing''], (''www.asianews.it'', 27 January 2015), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200920213202/http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Beijing-sends-a-new-flood-of-Han-migrants-to-Lhasa:-Tibetans-risk-disappearing-33294.html |date=20 September 2020 }}</ref> Only Han Chinese college graduates in Tibet or Tibetans that speak fluent Mandarin secure well-paid private sector jobs.<ref>Adrian Zenz, [https://jamestown.org/program/full-employment-tibet-beginning-end-chen-quanguos-neo-socialist-experiment/ ''"Full Employment" in Tibet: The Beginning and End of Chen Quanguo’s Neo-Socialist Experiment''], (''jamestown.org'', 26 February 2018), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109021429/https://jamestown.org/program/full-employment-tibet-beginning-end-chen-quanguos-neo-socialist-experiment/ |date=9 November 2020 }}</ref> Chinese data shows that Tibet's GDP grew by 11.8% in 2012. The growth rate in 2013 was 12.1%. The growth rate in 2014 was 12%, ranking first in the country. The growth rate in 2015 was 11%, and the region's GDP exceeded 100 billion [[Renminbi|CNY]] for the first time. In the first half of 2016, Tibet led other provinces and cities in China at a growth rate of 10.6%.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-02-19/60119033.html|script-title=zh:【治疆策】“特殊”陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派|website=news.dwnews.com|access-date=12 May 2019|title=【治疆策】"特殊"陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派 |trans-title=(Strategies for Governing Borders) "Special" Chen Quanguo: Frontier factions who work silently|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228090755/http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2019-02-19/60119033.html|archive-date=28 February 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>


=== Xinjiang ===
=== Xinjiang (2016–2021) ===
On 29 August 2016, Chen became the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang, replacing [[Zhang Chunxian]]. He was considered as the best fit for this as he has been successful in controlling Tibet in the past.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Chen Quanguo: The Man Who Silenced Tibet Is Perfecting a Police State in Xinjiang, China|url=https://www.albawaba.com/news/chen-quanguo-man-who-silenced-tibet-perfecting-police-state-xinjiang-china-1181388|access-date=2020-10-22|website=Al Bawaba|language=en|archive-date=2020-10-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201027091440/https://www.albawaba.com/news/chen-quanguo-man-who-silenced-tibet-perfecting-police-state-xinjiang-china-1181388|url-status=live}}</ref>
On 29 August 2016, Chen became the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang, replacing [[Zhang Chunxian]]. He was considered as the best fit for this as he has been successful in controlling Tibet in the past.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Chen Quanguo: The Man Who Silenced Tibet Is Perfecting a Police State in Xinjiang, China|url=https://www.albawaba.com/news/chen-quanguo-man-who-silenced-tibet-perfecting-police-state-xinjiang-china-1181388|access-date=22 October 2020|website=Al Bawaba|language=en|archive-date=27 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201027091440/https://www.albawaba.com/news/chen-quanguo-man-who-silenced-tibet-perfecting-police-state-xinjiang-china-1181388|url-status=live}}</ref>


His measures of disciplining them include: mass-engineering of the Muslim population through detainment camps, specialized boarding schools for Uyghur children, arbitrary arrests. His regime has apparently “destroyed 1,588 terrorist groups” and “arrested 12,995 terrorists” since 2014.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2019-03-18|title=China says it has arrested 13,000 'terrorists' in Xinjiang amid backlash|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3002136/china-says-13000-terrorists-held-xinjiang-2014-defence-its|access-date=2020-10-22|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|archive-date=2020-10-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021032226/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3002136/china-says-13000-terrorists-held-xinjiang-2014-defence-its|url-status=live}}</ref>
His measures of disciplining them include: mass-engineering of the Muslim population through detainment camps, specialized boarding schools for Uyghur children, arbitrary arrests. His regime has apparently “destroyed 1,588 terrorist groups” and “arrested 12,995 terrorists” since 2014.<ref>{{Cite web|date=18 March 2019|title=China says it has arrested 13,000 'terrorists' in Xinjiang amid backlash|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3002136/china-says-13000-terrorists-held-xinjiang-2014-defence-its|access-date=22 October 2020|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|archive-date=21 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021032226/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3002136/china-says-13000-terrorists-held-xinjiang-2014-defence-its|url-status=live}}</ref>


Upon taking office in Xinjiang, Chen became the first senior official in the history of the People's Republic to have occupied the top posts of both Xinjiang and Tibet. It signaled that Chen was a candidate for the [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]], to be installed in the autumn of 2017, as the party chief position in Xinjiang ordinarily held a seat on the Politburo.<ref name="Dahe">{{cite news|script-title=zh:陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记|url=http://news.dahe.cn/2016/08-29/107406757.html|work=Dahewang|date=29 August 2016|title=陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记 |trans-title=Chen Quanguo: From the youngest county party secretary in Henan to Xinjiang party secretary|access-date=31 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160830161200/http://news.dahe.cn/2016/08-29/107406757.html|archive-date=30 August 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>
Upon taking office in Xinjiang, Chen became the first senior official in the history of the People's Republic to have occupied the top posts of both Xinjiang and Tibet. It signaled that Chen was a candidate for the [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]], to be installed in the autumn of 2017, as the party chief position in Xinjiang ordinarily held a seat on the Politburo.<ref name="Dahe">{{cite news|script-title=zh:陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记|url=http://news.dahe.cn/2016/08-29/107406757.html|work=Dahewang|date=29 August 2016|title=陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记 |trans-title=Chen Quanguo: From the youngest county party secretary in Henan to Xinjiang party secretary|access-date=31 August 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160830161200/http://news.dahe.cn/2016/08-29/107406757.html|archive-date=30 August 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>
Line 109: Line 112:
He concurrently served as the first secretary and political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee. Chen is a member of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, elected in 2017. He was previously an alternate member of the [[17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]], and a full member of the [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Central Committee]].<ref name="chinavitae" /><ref name="xinhua" /><ref name="people" />
He concurrently served as the first secretary and political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee. Chen is a member of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, elected in 2017. He was previously an alternate member of the [[17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]], and a full member of the [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Central Committee]].<ref name="chinavitae" /><ref name="xinhua" /><ref name="people" />


On 26 December 2021, Chinese state media announced that Chen would step down from his role as Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang. He was succeeded by [[Ma Xingrui]] with immediate effect.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/china-beijing-replaces-communist-party-head-in-xinjiang/a-60258623|title=China: Beijing replaces Communist Party head in Xinjiang|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|date=26 December 2021|access-date=25 June 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/who-will-make-it-onto-chinas-top-leadership-body/|title=Who will make it into China's top leadership body?|first=Jonathan|last=Brookfield|work=[[The Diplomat]]|date=25 February 2022|access-date=25 June 2022}}</ref>
On 26 December 2021, Chinese state media announced that Chen would step down from his role as Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang. He was succeeded by Governor of Guangdong [[Ma Xingrui]] with immediate effect.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/china-beijing-replaces-communist-party-head-in-xinjiang/a-60258623|title=China: Beijing replaces Communist Party head in Xinjiang|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|date=26 December 2021|access-date=25 June 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/who-will-make-it-onto-chinas-top-leadership-body/|title=Who will make it into China's top leadership body?|first=Jonathan|last=Brookfield|work=[[The Diplomat]]|date=25 February 2022|access-date=25 June 2022}}</ref>


==== Counter-terrorism and detention camps ====
==== Counter-terrorism and detention camps ====
{{Main|Uyghur genocide|Xinjiang internment camps}}
{{Main|Persecution of Uyghurs in China|Xinjiang internment camps}}


After Chen took office, he issued a written military order<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/politic/cnpol/story20190228-935597|script-title=zh:两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范|date=2019-02-28|website=早报|language=zh-sg|access-date=2019-05-12|title=两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范 |trans-title=Two years without violence and terrorism, Chen Quanguo’s model of governing Xinjiang with an iron fist will become a model for all provinces in China |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612023537/https://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/politic/cnpol/story20190228-935597|archive-date=2019-06-12|url-status=live}}</ref> to [[Xi Jinping]], [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], and put forward the slogan: "In Xinjiang, if there is no stability then all our efforts are for nothing." ({{zh|labels=no|s=在新疆,没有稳定一切皆为零}})<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170223/50722521_0.shtml|language=zh-Hans|script-title=zh:西藏到新疆,“维稳”与“暗访”始终与陈全国相伴|website=news.ifeng.com|access-date=2019-05-12|title=西藏到新疆,“维稳暗访始终与陈全国相伴 |trans-title=From Tibet to Xinjiang, "stability maintenance" and "unannounced visits" have always accompanied Chen Quanguo |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190301013342/http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170223/50722521_0.shtml|archive-date=2019-03-01|url-status=live}}</ref> He has expanded counter-terrorism and anti-separatist efforts under orders from Xi.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=2019-11-16|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=2019-11-16|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|archive-date=2019-12-22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000|title=Stop Calling China's Xi Jinping 'President,' U.S. Panel Says|author=Kate O’Keeffe and Katy Stech Ferek|date=14 November 2019|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|access-date=27 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115142227/https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000|archive-date=15 November 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> There have been no reported terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since 2017. According to Ming Pao, Chen's measures to maintain stability in Xinjiang have been affirmed by the top level of the Chinese Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.mingpao.com/pns/中國/article/20190227/s00013/1551205408771/鐵腕治疆-陳全國表現獲中央肯定-反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228065952/https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B/article/20190227/s00013/1551205408771/%E9%90%B5%E8%85%95%E6%B2%BB%E7%96%86-%E9%99%B3%E5%85%A8%E5%9C%8B%E8%A1%A8%E7%8F%BE%E7%8D%B2%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E8%82%AF%E5%AE%9A-%E5%8F%8D%E6%81%90%E6%A8%A1%E5%BC%8F%E6%88%96%E3%80%8C%E8%BC%B8%E5%87%BA%E3%80%8D%E4%BB%96%E7%9C%81%E9%84%B0%E5%9C%8B|url-status=live|archive-date=2019-02-28|language=zh-hk|script-title=zh:鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國|date=2019-02-28|access-date=2019-11-21|title=鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國 |trans-title=Governing Xinjiang with an iron fist, Chen Quanguo's performance has been affirmed by the central government, and the anti-terrorism model may be "exported" to neighboring countries in other provinces}}</ref>
After Chen took office, he issued a written military order<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/politic/cnpol/story20190228-935597|script-title=zh:两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范|date=28 February 2019|website=早报|language=zh-sg|access-date=12 May 2019|title=两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范 |trans-title=Two years without violence and terrorism, Chen Quanguo’s model of governing Xinjiang with an iron fist will become a model for all provinces in China |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612023537/https://www.zaobao.com.sg/special/report/politic/cnpol/story20190228-935597|archive-date=12 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> to [[Xi Jinping]], [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], and put forward the slogan: "In Xinjiang, if there is no stability then all our efforts are for nothing." ({{zh|labels=no|s=在新疆,没有稳定一切皆为零}})<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170223/50722521_0.shtml|language=zh-Hans|script-title=zh:西藏到新疆,“维稳”与“暗访”始终与陈全国相伴|website=news.ifeng.com|access-date=12 May 2019|title=西藏到新疆,"维稳""暗访"始终与陈全国相伴 |trans-title=From Tibet to Xinjiang, "stability maintenance" and "unannounced visits" have always accompanied Chen Quanguo |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190301013342/http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170223/50722521_0.shtml|archive-date=1 March 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> He has expanded counter-terrorism and anti-separatist efforts under orders from Xi.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=16 November 2019|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=16 November 2019|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|archive-date=22 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000|title=Stop Calling China's Xi Jinping 'President,' U.S. Panel Says|author=Kate O’Keeffe and Katy Stech Ferek|date=14 November 2019|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|access-date=27 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115142227/https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-calling-chinas-xi-jinping-president-u-s-panel-says-11573740000|archive-date=15 November 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> There have been no reported terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since 2017. According to Ming Pao, Chen's measures to maintain stability in Xinjiang have been affirmed by the top level of the Chinese Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.mingpao.com/pns/中國/article/20190227/s00013/1551205408771/鐵腕治疆-陳全國表現獲中央肯定-反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228065952/https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B/article/20190227/s00013/1551205408771/%E9%90%B5%E8%85%95%E6%B2%BB%E7%96%86-%E9%99%B3%E5%85%A8%E5%9C%8B%E8%A1%A8%E7%8F%BE%E7%8D%B2%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E8%82%AF%E5%AE%9A-%E5%8F%8D%E6%81%90%E6%A8%A1%E5%BC%8F%E6%88%96%E3%80%8C%E8%BC%B8%E5%87%BA%E3%80%8D%E4%BB%96%E7%9C%81%E9%84%B0%E5%9C%8B|url-status=live|archive-date=28 February 2019|language=zh-hk|script-title=zh:鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國|date=28 February 2019|access-date=21 November 2019|title=鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國 |trans-title=Governing Xinjiang with an iron fist, Chen Quanguo's performance has been affirmed by the central government, and the anti-terrorism model may be "exported" to neighboring countries in other provinces}}</ref>


Chen has supposedly overseen the construction of a network of [[Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3003047/architect-chinas-muslim-camps-chen-quanguo-expected-stay|title=Architect of Muslim camps expected to stay on in Xinjiang for now|date=2019-03-24|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=2019-10-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191209041928/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3003047/architect-chinas-muslim-camps-chen-quanguo-expected-stay|archive-date=2019-12-09|url-status=live}}</ref> Chen expanded the detention camps in Xinjiang holding Muslim ethnic minorities. As a party boss for the region, Chen exhorted local officials to "round up everyone who should be rounded up." When the local officials who feared it would exacerbate ethnic tensions and stifle economic growth pushed back, Chen responded by purging them including one county leader who was jailed after quietly releasing thousands of inmates from the camps.<ref name="ramzy">{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=2019-11-16|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=2019-11-21|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|archive-date=2019-12-22|url-status=live}}</ref>
Chen has supposedly overseen the construction of a network of [[Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3003047/architect-chinas-muslim-camps-chen-quanguo-expected-stay|title=Architect of Muslim camps expected to stay on in Xinjiang for now|date=24 March 2019|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=8 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191209041928/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3003047/architect-chinas-muslim-camps-chen-quanguo-expected-stay|archive-date=9 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Chen expanded the detention camps in Xinjiang holding Muslim ethnic minorities. As a party boss for the region, Chen exhorted local officials to "round up everyone who should be rounded up." When the local officials who feared it would exacerbate ethnic tensions and stifle economic growth pushed back, Chen responded by purging them including one county leader who was jailed after quietly releasing thousands of inmates from the camps.<ref name="ramzy">{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|date=16 November 2019|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=21 November 2019|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191222022035/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|archive-date=22 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>


Aside from camps, Chen has also increased surveillance of residents by using advanced technology as well as increasing police presence.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/07/27/us-urged-sanction-chinese-officials-overseeing-sweeping-crackdown-muslim-region/|title=US urged to sanction Chinese officials overseeing sweeping crackdown in Muslim region|last=Lai|first=Catherine|date=2018-07-27|access-date=2019-10-17|language=en-GB|website=[[Hong Kong Free Press]]|archive-date=2019-08-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190816185822/https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/07/27/us-urged-sanction-chinese-officials-overseeing-sweeping-crackdown-muslim-region/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html|title=U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps|last=Cumming-Bruce|first=Nick|date=2018-08-10|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=2019-10-17|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180811012135/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html|archive-date=2018-08-11|url-status=live}}</ref> Under Chen, a policy of "Pair-up and become family" is used to surveil households, many of which include men detained at the re-education camps. The wives of camp detainees must share a bed with the officials during an average 6-day stay.<ref>Alexandra Ma, [https://www.businessinsider.de/international/china-uighur-monitor-home-shared-bed-report-2019-11/?r=US&IR=T ''China is reportedly sending men to sleep in the same beds as Uighur Muslim women while their husbands are in prison camps''], (04 November 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201026174836/https://www.businessinsider.de/international/china-uighur-monitor-home-shared-bed-report-2019-11/?r=US&IR=T |date=2020-10-26 }}</ref> As Xinjiang Party Secretary, Chen promoted the recruitment of the local population into the police force.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/|title=Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State|last1=Zenz|first1=Adrian|last2=Leibold|first2=James|date=March 14, 2017|website=[[Jamestown Foundation]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905224747/https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/|archive-date=September 5, 2019|access-date=October 17, 2019}}</ref>
Aside from camps, Chen has also increased surveillance of residents by using advanced technology as well as increasing police presence.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/07/27/us-urged-sanction-chinese-officials-overseeing-sweeping-crackdown-muslim-region/|title=US urged to sanction Chinese officials overseeing sweeping crackdown in Muslim region|last=Lai|first=Catherine|date=27 July 2018|access-date=17 October 2019|language=en-GB|website=[[Hong Kong Free Press]]|archive-date=16 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190816185822/https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/07/27/us-urged-sanction-chinese-officials-overseeing-sweeping-crackdown-muslim-region/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html|title=U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps|last=Cumming-Bruce|first=Nick|date=10 August 2018|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=17 October 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180811012135/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html|archive-date=11 August 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Under Chen, a policy of "Pair-up and become family" is used to surveil households, many of which include men detained at the re-education camps. The wives of camp detainees must share a bed with the officials during an average 6-day stay.<ref>Alexandra Ma, [https://www.businessinsider.de/international/china-uighur-monitor-home-shared-bed-report-2019-11/?r=US&IR=T ''China is reportedly sending men to sleep in the same beds as Uighur Muslim women while their husbands are in prison camps''], (4 November 2019), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201026174836/https://www.businessinsider.de/international/china-uighur-monitor-home-shared-bed-report-2019-11/?r=US&IR=T |date=26 October 2020 }}</ref> As Xinjiang Party Secretary, Chen promoted the recruitment of the local population into the police force.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/|title=Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State|last1=Zenz|first1=Adrian|last2=Leibold|first2=James|date=14 March 2017|website=[[Jamestown Foundation]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905224747/https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/|archive-date=5 September 2019|access-date=17 October 2019}}</ref>


The Uyghurs have been put under a surveillance system that is able to detect facial features and clothing and accessories to distinguish them from the other ethnic and religious groups in the region. This information is pooled into a central database and aides the government to crackdown on any escapees from the detainment centres.<ref>{{Cite web|title=China's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang|url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang|access-date=2020-10-22|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en|archive-date=2019-12-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191210100917/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang|url-status=live}}</ref>
The Uyghurs have been put under a surveillance system that is able to detect facial features and clothing and accessories to distinguish them from the other ethnic and religious groups in the region. This information is pooled into a central database and aides the government to crackdown on any escapees from the detainment centres.<ref>{{Cite web|title=China's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang|url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang|access-date=22 October 2020|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en|archive-date=10 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191210100917/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang|url-status=live}}</ref>


According to the [[Xinjiang Police Files]], Chen, in his role as Xinjiang's party leader at the time, issued a shooting order for escaping prisoners in 2018,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/erst-toeten-dann-melden-die-xinjiang-police-files-enthuellen-das-ausmass-der-uighur-persecution/28372464.html |first1=Benedikt|last1=Voigt|first2=Cornelius|last2=Dieckmann |title="Erst töten, dann melden": Die "Xinjiang Police Files" enthüllen das Ausmaß der Uiguren-Verfolgung |trans-title="First kill, then report": The "Xinjiang Police Files" reveal the extent of the Uyghur persecution |work=[[Der Tagesspiegel]] |date=2022-05-24 |access-date=2022-05-25|language=de}}</ref> having spoken along those lines already in a classified 2017 speech.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-police-files-07072022190733.html|title=Uyghurs abroad in shock after finding relatives listed in leaked police files|first=Nuriman|last=Abdureshid|work=[[Radio Free Asia]]|date=2022-07-07|access-date=2022-07-11}}</ref> The internal-party speeches in the files contained one of May 2017, in which Chen advocated for indefinite detention or prison terms for those Uyghurs whose outlooks could not be changed to align with that envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party; and one of June 2018, in which he repeatedly referred to the "Xi Jinping-led Chinese Communist Party's strategy of governing Xinjiang", and said that "social harmony and long-term stability" was the most important task in Xinjiang, ahead of increasing the [[gross domestic product|GDP]] of the province.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/leaked-speeches-06282022171511.html|title=Leaked documents show China’s careful coordination of Uyghur repression|first=Kurban|last=Niyaz|publisher=[[Radio Free Asia]]|date=2022-06-28|access-date=2022-06-30}}</ref>
According to the [[Xinjiang Police Files]], Chen, in his role as Xinjiang's party leader at the time, issued a shooting order for escaping prisoners in 2018,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/erst-toeten-dann-melden-die-xinjiang-police-files-enthuellen-das-ausmass-der-uighur-persecution/28372464.html |first1=Benedikt|last1=Voigt|first2=Cornelius|last2=Dieckmann |title="Erst töten, dann melden": Die "Xinjiang Police Files" enthüllen das Ausmaß der Uiguren-Verfolgung |trans-title="First kill, then report": The "Xinjiang Police Files" reveal the extent of the Uyghur persecution |work=[[Der Tagesspiegel]] |date=24 May 2022 |access-date=25 May 2022|language=de}}</ref> having spoken along those lines already in a classified 2017 speech.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/xinjiang-police-files-07072022190733.html|title=Uyghurs abroad in shock after finding relatives listed in leaked police files|first=Nuriman|last=Abdureshid|work=[[Radio Free Asia]]|date=7 July 2022|access-date=11 July 2022}}</ref> The internal-party speeches in the files contained one of May 2017, in which Chen advocated for indefinite detention or prison terms for those Uyghurs whose outlooks could not be changed to align with that envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party; and one of June 2018, in which he repeatedly referred to the "Xi Jinping-led Chinese Communist Party's strategy of governing Xinjiang", and said that "social harmony and long-term stability" was the most important task in Xinjiang, ahead of increasing the [[gross domestic product|GDP]] of the province.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/leaked-speeches-06282022171511.html|title=Leaked documents show China's careful coordination of Uyghur repression|first=Kurban|last=Niyaz|publisher=[[Radio Free Asia]]|date=28 June 2022|access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref>


==== Economic development ====
==== Economic development ====
Line 128: Line 131:
Chen Quanguo continued to introduce policies such as economic development, employment protection, housing projects, infrastructure improvement, and ecological protection, increasing the GDP of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 752.9 billion CNY in 2012 to 1.38 trillion CNY in 2020, with an average annual growth of 9%. Infrastructure investment totaled 1.94 trillion CNY, with an average annual growth rate of 27.5%, forest coverage rate increased from 4.24% to 4.87%, and oasis forest coverage rate increased from 23% to 28%.<ref name=":1" /><ref name="data1995-2019">Historical GDP of Provinces {{cite press release| url=https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103| title=Home - Regional - Annual by Province| publisher=China NBS| date=31 January 2020| access-date=31 January 2020| archive-date=9 January 2020| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200109073448/http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103| url-status=live}}</ref>
Chen Quanguo continued to introduce policies such as economic development, employment protection, housing projects, infrastructure improvement, and ecological protection, increasing the GDP of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 752.9 billion CNY in 2012 to 1.38 trillion CNY in 2020, with an average annual growth of 9%. Infrastructure investment totaled 1.94 trillion CNY, with an average annual growth rate of 27.5%, forest coverage rate increased from 4.24% to 4.87%, and oasis forest coverage rate increased from 23% to 28%.<ref name=":1" /><ref name="data1995-2019">Historical GDP of Provinces {{cite press release| url=https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103| title=Home - Regional - Annual by Province| publisher=China NBS| date=31 January 2020| access-date=31 January 2020| archive-date=9 January 2020| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200109073448/http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103| url-status=live}}</ref>


=== Return to Beijing ===
=== Return to Beijing and retirement ===
In 2022, Chen was appointed as the deputy head of CCP Central Rural Work Leading Group.<ref name=":3" /> This was seen by Wu Qiang, a political analyst in Beijing, as his "last role" before retirement, despite previous expectations that he would join the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo Standing Committee]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |date=2022-06-15 |title=US-sanctioned hardline Xinjiang chief moves to rural affairs role |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3181820/sanctioned-hardline-former-xinjiang-chief-chen-quanguo-moves |access-date=2022-08-07 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref>
In 2022, Chen was appointed as the deputy head of CCP [[Central Rural Work Leading Group]].<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |last=Wang |first=Amber |date=15 June 2022 |title=Sanctioned hardline former Xinjiang chief Chen Quanguo moves to rural affairs role for 'last job before retirement' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3181820/sanctioned-hardline-former-xinjiang-chief-chen-quanguo-moves |access-date=7 August 2022}}</ref> This was seen by Wu Qiang, a political analyst in Beijing, as his "last role" before retirement, despite previous expectations that he would join the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo Standing Committee]].<ref name=":4" /> He retired after the [[20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|20th National Congress of the CCP]], due to the fact that he was not re-elected to the Central Committee despite being young enough to do so.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ma |first=Josephine |date=23 October 2022 |title=Former Xinjiang party boss Chen Quanguo among surprise exits from China's top leadership body |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196909/former-xinjiang-party-boss-chen-quanguo-among-surprise-exits-chinas-top-leadership-body |access-date=24 October 2022}}</ref>


== Personal life ==
== Personal life ==


=== Family ===
=== Family ===
Chen has a daughter who attended a school in U.K. while he was the governor of Hebei.<ref name=":2" />
Chen has a daughter who attended a school in the UK while he was the governor of Hebei.<ref name=":2" />


=== Personality ===
=== Personality ===
Line 140: Line 143:


== Sanctions ==
== Sanctions ==
On 9 July 2020, the United States government imposed [[Global Magnitsky Act]] sanctions and visa restrictions against Chen Quanguo, together with [[Zhu Hailun]], [[Wang Mingshan]] and [[Huo Liujun]]. These sanctions were imposed as a result of Chen's involvement in the [[Uyghur genocide]]. With sanctions, he and his immediate relatives are barred from entering the US and will have US-based assets frozen.<ref>{{cite web| url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697| title=US sanctions Chinese officials over Xinjiang 'violations'| work=www.bbc.com| access-date=7 July 2020| archive-date=10 July 2020| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710005130/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697| url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-in-response-to-the-ongoing-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-in-xinjiang/|title=The United States Imposes Sanctions and Visa Restrictions in Response to the Ongoing Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Xinjiang|date=9 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[United States Department of State]]|archive-date=9 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200709230753/https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-in-response-to-the-ongoing-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-in-xinjiang/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/slaps-sanctions-china-officials-abuse-uighurs-200709164014926.html|title=US sanctions top Chinese official over Xinjiang crackdown|date=10 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[Al Jazeera]]|archive-date=10 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710092508/https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/slaps-sanctions-china-officials-abuse-uighurs-200709164014926.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://theindependent.in/us-sanctions-chinas-politburo-figure/|title=US sanctions China's Politburo figure|date=10 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[theindependent.in]]|archive-date=11 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711042835/https://theindependent.in/us-sanctions-chinas-politburo-figure/|url-status=live}}</ref>
On 9 July 2020, the United States government imposed [[Global Magnitsky Act]] sanctions and visa restrictions against Chen Quanguo, together with [[Zhu Hailun]], [[Wang Mingshan]] and [[Huo Liujun]]. These sanctions were imposed as a result of Chen's involvement in the Uyghur genocide. With sanctions, he and his immediate relatives are barred from entering the U.S. and will have U.S.-based [[Asset freezing|assets frozen]].<ref>{{cite web| url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697| title=US sanctions Chinese officials over Xinjiang 'violations'| work=www.bbc.com| access-date=7 July 2020| archive-date=10 July 2020| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710005130/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53355697| url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-in-response-to-the-ongoing-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-in-xinjiang/|title=The United States Imposes Sanctions and Visa Restrictions in Response to the Ongoing Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Xinjiang|date=9 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[United States Department of State]]|archive-date=9 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200709230753/https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-in-response-to-the-ongoing-human-rights-violations-and-abuses-in-xinjiang/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/slaps-sanctions-china-officials-abuse-uighurs-200709164014926.html|title=US sanctions top Chinese official over Xinjiang crackdown|date=10 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]]|archive-date=10 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200710092508/https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/slaps-sanctions-china-officials-abuse-uighurs-200709164014926.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://theindependent.in/us-sanctions-chinas-politburo-figure/|title=US sanctions China's Politburo figure|date=10 July 2020|access-date=10 July 2020|website=[[theindependent.in]]|archive-date=11 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200711042835/https://theindependent.in/us-sanctions-chinas-politburo-figure/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1055 |access-date=9 July 2024}}</ref> Chen, in an interview with [[Xinhua News Agency]], called the sanctions a "naked, unreasonable and unreasonable hegemonic behavior", and said "I have no interest in going to the United States, and I don’t have a penny of assets in the United States".<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 July 2024 |title=新疆书记陈全国遭点名制裁 指在美国没资产不怕 |trans-title=Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was named in sanctions and said he was not afraid as he had no assets in the United States |url=https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20200722-%E6%96%B0%E7%96%86%E4%B9%A6%E8%AE%B0%E9%99%88%E5%85%A8%E5%9B%BD%E9%81%AD%E5%A4%9A%E5%90%8D%E5%88%B6%E8%A3%81-%E5%9C%A8%E7%BE%8E%E5%9B%BD%E6%B2%A1%E8%B5%84%E4%BA%A7%E4%B8%8D%E6%80%95 |access-date=11 October 2024 |work=[[Radio France Internationale]]}}</ref>


== See also ==
== See also ==
Line 146: Line 149:
*[[History of Xinjiang]]
*[[History of Xinjiang]]
*[[Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act]]
*[[Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act]]
*[[Uyghur Genocide]]


==References==
==References==
Line 152: Line 154:


== External links ==
== External links ==
* [https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang], China Brief, Adrian Zenz, James Leibold.
* [https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ "Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang"] by Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, ''China Brief''.


{{Clear}}
{{-}}
{{s-start}}
{{s-start}}
{{s-gov}}
{{s-gov}}
Line 162: Line 162:
{{s-aft|after={{ill|Liu Famin|zh|刘法民}}}}
{{s-aft|after={{ill|Liu Famin|zh|刘法民}}}}
{{s-bef|before=[[Hu Chunhua]]}}
{{s-bef|before=[[Hu Chunhua]]}}
{{s-ttl|title=[[Politics of Hebei|Governor of Hebei]]|years=2009–2011}}
{{s-ttl|title=[[Governor of Hebei]]|years=2009–2011}}
{{s-aft|after=[[Zhang Qingwei]]}}
{{s-aft|after=[[Zhang Qingwei]]}}
{{s-ppo}}
{{s-ppo}}
Line 177: Line 177:
{{s-aft|after=[[Ma Xingrui]]}}
{{s-aft|after=[[Ma Xingrui]]}}
{{s-end}}
{{s-end}}

{{19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party}}
{{19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party}}
{{Xinjiang leaders}}
{{Xinjiang leaders}}
{{Tibet Autonomous Region leaders}}
{{Tibet Autonomous Region leaders}}
{{Hebei leaders}}
{{Hebei leaders}}

{{Authority control}}
{{Authority control}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Chen, Quanguo}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Chen, Quanguo}}
[[Category:Living people]]
[[Category:1955 births]]
[[Category:1955 births]]
[[Category:Alternate members of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Chinese atheists]]
[[Category:Chinese Communist Party politicians from Henan]]
[[Category:Chinese Communist Party politicians from Henan]]
[[Category:Chinese individuals subject to U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions]]
[[Category:Critics of religions]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 11th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 12th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 13th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Genocide perpetrators]]
[[Category:Governors of Hebei]]
[[Category:Living people]]
[[Category:Members of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Members of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:People sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act]]
[[Category:People's Republic of China politicians from Henan]]
[[Category:People's Republic of China politicians from Henan]]
[[Category:Governors of Hebei]]
[[Category:Persecution of Uyghurs]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Henan]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Tibet]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Xinjiang]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Xinjiang]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Tibet]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Henan]]
[[Category:Politicians from Zhumadian]]
[[Category:Politicians from Zhumadian]]
[[Category:Zhengzhou University alumni]]
[[Category:Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List]]
[[Category:Wuhan University of Technology alumni]]
[[Category:Wuhan University of Technology alumni]]
[[Category:Alternate members of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Members of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Members of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 11th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 12th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Delegates to the 13th National People's Congress]]
[[Category:Xinjiang conflict]]
[[Category:Xinjiang conflict]]
[[Category:People sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act]]
[[Category:Zhengzhou University alumni]]
[[Category:Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List]]
[[Category:Secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Committee]]
[[Category:Genocide perpetrators]]

Latest revision as of 00:46, 29 November 2024

Chen Quanguo
陈全国
Chen in 2020
Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang
In office
29 August 2016 – 25 December 2021
Deputy
General secretaryXi Jinping
Preceded byZhang Chunxian
Succeeded byMa Xingrui
Communist Party Secretary of Tibet
In office
25 August 2011 – 28 August 2016
Governor
General secretary
Preceded byZhang Qingli
Succeeded byWu Yingjie
Governor of Hebei
In office
15 December 2009 – 27 August 2011
LeaderZhang Qingli (party secretary)
Preceded byHu Chunhua
Succeeded byZhang Qingwei
Deputy Head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group
In office
14 June 2022 – 22 October 2022
LeaderHu Chunhua
Personal details
BornNovember 1955 (age 69)
Pingyu County, Henan, China
Political partyCCP (since 1976)
Alma mater
Military service
AllegianceChina
Branch/servicePeople's Liberation Army
Years of service1973–1977

Chen Quanguo (Chinese: ; pinyin: Chén Quánguó; born November 1955) is a Chinese retired politician who was the Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region from 2011 to 2016 and of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 2016 to 2021, making him the only person to serve as the Party Secretary for both autonomous regions. Between 2017 and 2022, he was a member of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and was also Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps concurrently with his position as Xinjiang Party Secretary.

Originally from Henan, Chen was among the first batch of students to graduate university after the resumption of Gaokao examinations in 1978. Chen worked up the ranks in the party bureaucracy in his home province from a minor local official to the deputy provincial party chief. In 2009, he became Governor of Hebei. In 2011 he became the Communist Party Secretary, the top official, of the Tibet Autonomous Region, developing the region economically and instituting greater policing surveillance.[1]

In 2016, Chen was promoted to the party secretary of Xinjiang. He has since then attracted press for overseeing Xinjiang internment camps targeting Turkic minorities in the region, and he is considered as one of the main architects of the persecution of Uyghurs in China.[2] In both Tibet and Xinjiang, he has earned a reputation for applying draconian measures to sinicize the traditional cultures.[3][4][5][6] In 2022, he was given a post in the Central Rural Work Leading Group of the CCP, and retired later that year after the 20th CCP National Congress, when he was not re-elected to the CCP Central Committee.

Early life and education

[edit]

Chen Quanguo is a native of Pingyu County, Henan province.[7] By dint of when he was born he avoided most of the Cultural Revolution and only suffered a delayed education.[8] In December 1973, at the age of 18, Chen enlisted in the People's Liberation Army for four years.[7] He served with the First Army, Third Division Artillery Regiment.[8] He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in February 1976.[9] After leaving the military in March 1977, he briefly worked at a car parts factory in Zhumadian.[10][11]

After China resumed the National Higher Education Entrance Examination which was interrupted during the Cultural Revolution, in March 1978 Chen was admitted to the Economics Department of Zhengzhou University in the provincial capital Zhengzhou.[10][11] At Zhengzhou University he studied political economy.[8]

Career

[edit]

Henan

[edit]

Chen Quanguo graduated from Zhengzhou University in December 1981 and returned to work in his hometown of Pingyu, Henan. Starting in 1983 he worked for the prefectural government of Zhumadian, and in 1988 became the Communist Party Secretary of Suiping, a county under the administration of Zhumadian. In 1994, he was appointed the head of the Organization Department of the nearby prefecture-level city of Pingdingshan.[12][10][11]

From 1995 to 1997 Chen enrolled as a part-time student at the School of Business Administration of Wuhan University of Technology, obtaining a master's degree in economics. However, a Financial Times analysis has found that Chen plagiarized his thesis from other sources.[13] From 1996 to 1998 he served as the Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of Luohe, another prefecture-level city in Henan.[12][10][11]

Chen Quanguo was promoted to Vice-Governor of Henan Province in January 1998, and worked in the administration of then Henan Governor Li Keqiang. Chen was regarded as a close confidante of Li. In November 2000 Chen was appointed by the CCP head of the Standing committee of the Henan Provincial committee in the provincial Organization Department. In April 2003 he became the Deputy Communist Party Secretary, President of the Party School of the CCP, and the President of the Henan Institute of Administration.[12][10][11]

Hebei (2009–2011)

[edit]

In November 2009, Chen Quanguo was transferred to neighboring Hebei and promoted to Acting Governor and Deputy Party Secretary of the province. He replaced Hu Chunhua, who became the Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia. In January 2010 he was officially elected by the provincial congress as Governor of Hebei at the third session of the 11th National People's Congress.[12][10][11][14]

Tibet (2011–2016)

[edit]

On 25 August 2011, the CCP Central Committee announced the appointment of Chen to the remote Tibet Autonomous Region as Party Secretary, the top official of the region. On 8 May 2012, Chen Quanguo was elected the first secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Military Region.

Shortly after Chen took up his position in August 2011, the region advertised positions for 2,500 additional police,[15] and Chen implemented a new security policy for Tibet in the form of "convenience police stations" (便民警务站).[16] This divided urban centers into grids, allowing the authorities to systematically observe all activities within the area.[17] As of early 2016, at least 156 of the concrete one- and two-story stations - stocked with wheelchairs, first aid kits, repair tools, umbrellas and even phone chargers for public use - were built in Lhasa, with guards on 24 hour "seamless" surveillance patrols, while two stations are only 15 meters apart.[18] At least 544 more of these police stations exist throughout urban centers across Tibet.[19]

Chen instituted a policy called the "double-linked household management system" to surveil 81,140 households in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, comprising more than three million people mobilized for security and social issues.[18] The system is described as a method where neighbors spy on each other,[20] while Kelsang Dolma in Foreign Policy writes the policy is an "Orwellian social system" where family members are encouraged to report on each other to authorities.[21]

Self-immolations

[edit]

There was a sharp rise in the number of self-immolations by Tibetan monks and nuns after Chen took office,[22] which began and continued at Kirti Monastery. Within Tibet, 156 monks, nuns, and laypeople self-immolated as of December 2019.[23] According to the International Campaign for Tibet's (ICT) Fact Sheet information,[24] reviewed by Outside, "Chinese police have beaten, shot, isolated, and disappeared self-immolators who survived."[25] The families are often arrested or detained, which led in 2014 to a rise in walking or solo protests.

Often, the self-immolators, and solo protestors, carry illegal pictures of the 14th Dalai Lama,[26] and/or make long life prayers for the Dalai Lama,[25][24] as well as shout for independence from China. The immolations were seen to be a form of extreme protest against the Chinese government's crackdown on Buddhists from the region,[27] and described in Outside as offerings by the self-immolators of their bodies to show the world how badly Tibet is suffering.[25] The Dalai Lama blames the self-immolations on Chinese policies, and said, "Some kind of policy, some kind of cultural genocide is taking place".[28][29] In March 2011, before Chen began his tenure, the Dalai Lama resigned from his political role to continue in his role as Tibet's spiritual leader.

Arrests and disappearances

[edit]

Tibet government-in-exile's Central Tibetan Administration leader Lobsang Sangay states, "If you protest in Tibet, more often than not you get arrested, or beaten up, sometimes tortured, sometimes you disappear, sometimes you die".[30] Mysterious deaths were reported during Chen's tenure.[31][32] The earlier mass arbitrary arrests of monks and nuns at Kirti Monastery in March–April 2011 were followed by reports of disappearances into custody, which continued through Chen's tenure.

In December 2013, Chen described his policy as a "Stability Maintenance Campaign" in a statement, included in a Human Rights Watch report:[32]

We have followed the law in striking out and relentlessly pounding at illegal organizations and key figures, and resolutely followed the law in striking at the illegal organizations and key figures who follow the 14th Dalai Lama clique in carrying out separatist, infiltration, and sabotage activities, knocking out the hidden dangers and soil for undermining Tibet’s stability, and effectively safeguarding the state’s utmost interests [and] society’s overall interests.

Re-education camps

[edit]

During Chen's tenure, forced evictions of at least 5,000 nuns and monks studying at Larung Gar Buddhist Academy and residing in Larung Gar, began in 2013 and continued past August 2016, with a major demolitions order for 4,600 residences dated from June 2016.

After residences were demolished, the nuns and monks were bussed away and reports by Tibetan Review,[33] Radio France International,[34] and Human Rights Watch (HRW)[35] state 600 people were sent directly to re-education camps and centers located in Nyingtri, while a detention center in Sertar was being prepared for an additional 800 nuns.[36] Other reported re-education centers and camps for the monastic community of Yarchen Gar are reported as located in and around Chamdo City and Jomda County.

More nuns than monks were forcibly evicted and detained. The HRW report also details persecution and abuses to which the nuns are subjected in Nyingtri, and refers to a video[37] in which nuns are forced to sing and dance on a stage. Another 300 of Larung Gar's monastic Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, which were not directly detained in re-education camps, were to register for forced re-education programs with prefectures in their home towns. Reports also state the nuns and monks are banned from re-entering other monastic institutions.

Economic development

[edit]

In 2015 during Chen's tenure, a transfer of 280,000 Han Chinese settlers to Tibet's capital Lhasa was authorized, as part of China's urbanization plans. The Central Tibetan Administration states 7.5 million Han Chinese and 6 million Tibetans live in the region, as of 2015, and adds, "Under the guise of the economic and social development, Beijing encourages its population to migrate to Tibet with the clear aim to marginalize Tibetans from the economic, educational, political and social life of the region".[38] During Chen's tenure, Tibet's ethnic majority has been "swamped" by promoting economic development that encourages migration from elsewhere in China.[20] In September 2011, at least 226 "key projects" for the development of Tibet were awarded to Han Chinese owned companies.[38] Only Han Chinese college graduates in Tibet or Tibetans that speak fluent Mandarin secure well-paid private sector jobs.[39] Chinese data shows that Tibet's GDP grew by 11.8% in 2012. The growth rate in 2013 was 12.1%. The growth rate in 2014 was 12%, ranking first in the country. The growth rate in 2015 was 11%, and the region's GDP exceeded 100 billion CNY for the first time. In the first half of 2016, Tibet led other provinces and cities in China at a growth rate of 10.6%.[40]

Xinjiang (2016–2021)

[edit]

On 29 August 2016, Chen became the Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang, replacing Zhang Chunxian. He was considered as the best fit for this as he has been successful in controlling Tibet in the past.[41]

His measures of disciplining them include: mass-engineering of the Muslim population through detainment camps, specialized boarding schools for Uyghur children, arbitrary arrests. His regime has apparently “destroyed 1,588 terrorist groups” and “arrested 12,995 terrorists” since 2014.[42]

Upon taking office in Xinjiang, Chen became the first senior official in the history of the People's Republic to have occupied the top posts of both Xinjiang and Tibet. It signaled that Chen was a candidate for the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, to be installed in the autumn of 2017, as the party chief position in Xinjiang ordinarily held a seat on the Politburo.[43]

He concurrently served as the first secretary and political commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Committee. Chen is a member of the 19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, elected in 2017. He was previously an alternate member of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and a full member of the 18th Central Committee.[12][10][11]

On 26 December 2021, Chinese state media announced that Chen would step down from his role as Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang. He was succeeded by Governor of Guangdong Ma Xingrui with immediate effect.[44][45]

Counter-terrorism and detention camps

[edit]

After Chen took office, he issued a written military order[46] to Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and put forward the slogan: "In Xinjiang, if there is no stability then all our efforts are for nothing." (在新疆,没有稳定一切皆为零)[47] He has expanded counter-terrorism and anti-separatist efforts under orders from Xi.[48][49] There have been no reported terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since 2017. According to Ming Pao, Chen's measures to maintain stability in Xinjiang have been affirmed by the top level of the Chinese Communist Party.[50]

Chen has supposedly overseen the construction of a network of internment camps.[51] Chen expanded the detention camps in Xinjiang holding Muslim ethnic minorities. As a party boss for the region, Chen exhorted local officials to "round up everyone who should be rounded up." When the local officials who feared it would exacerbate ethnic tensions and stifle economic growth pushed back, Chen responded by purging them including one county leader who was jailed after quietly releasing thousands of inmates from the camps.[52]

Aside from camps, Chen has also increased surveillance of residents by using advanced technology as well as increasing police presence.[53][54] Under Chen, a policy of "Pair-up and become family" is used to surveil households, many of which include men detained at the re-education camps. The wives of camp detainees must share a bed with the officials during an average 6-day stay.[55] As Xinjiang Party Secretary, Chen promoted the recruitment of the local population into the police force.[56]

The Uyghurs have been put under a surveillance system that is able to detect facial features and clothing and accessories to distinguish them from the other ethnic and religious groups in the region. This information is pooled into a central database and aides the government to crackdown on any escapees from the detainment centres.[57]

According to the Xinjiang Police Files, Chen, in his role as Xinjiang's party leader at the time, issued a shooting order for escaping prisoners in 2018,[58] having spoken along those lines already in a classified 2017 speech.[59] The internal-party speeches in the files contained one of May 2017, in which Chen advocated for indefinite detention or prison terms for those Uyghurs whose outlooks could not be changed to align with that envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party; and one of June 2018, in which he repeatedly referred to the "Xi Jinping-led Chinese Communist Party's strategy of governing Xinjiang", and said that "social harmony and long-term stability" was the most important task in Xinjiang, ahead of increasing the GDP of the province.[60]

Economic development

[edit]

Chen Quanguo continued to introduce policies such as economic development, employment protection, housing projects, infrastructure improvement, and ecological protection, increasing the GDP of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region from 752.9 billion CNY in 2012 to 1.38 trillion CNY in 2020, with an average annual growth of 9%. Infrastructure investment totaled 1.94 trillion CNY, with an average annual growth rate of 27.5%, forest coverage rate increased from 4.24% to 4.87%, and oasis forest coverage rate increased from 23% to 28%.[40][61]

Return to Beijing and retirement

[edit]

In 2022, Chen was appointed as the deputy head of CCP Central Rural Work Leading Group.[62] This was seen by Wu Qiang, a political analyst in Beijing, as his "last role" before retirement, despite previous expectations that he would join the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.[62] He retired after the 20th National Congress of the CCP, due to the fact that he was not re-elected to the Central Committee despite being young enough to do so.[63]

Personal life

[edit]

Family

[edit]

Chen has a daughter who attended a school in the UK while he was the governor of Hebei.[7]

Personality

[edit]

The South China Morning Post has said that Chen is known for not putting jokes, slogans or personal anecdotes in official speeches. It also noted that he preferred to stay in the background during press meetings.[7]

Sanctions

[edit]

On 9 July 2020, the United States government imposed Global Magnitsky Act sanctions and visa restrictions against Chen Quanguo, together with Zhu Hailun, Wang Mingshan and Huo Liujun. These sanctions were imposed as a result of Chen's involvement in the Uyghur genocide. With sanctions, he and his immediate relatives are barred from entering the U.S. and will have U.S.-based assets frozen.[64][65][66][67][68] Chen, in an interview with Xinhua News Agency, called the sanctions a "naked, unreasonable and unreasonable hegemonic behavior", and said "I have no interest in going to the United States, and I don’t have a penny of assets in the United States".[69]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Ben Blanchard, China appoints new Tibet governor, hardline policies to remain, (29 January 2013), Archived 28 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine [Reuters ref dead, replaced with this ref]
  2. ^ "The Architect of China's Muslim Camps Is a Rising Star Under Xi". Bloomberg News. 27 September 2018. Retrieved 8 August 2022.
  3. ^ Michael Dillon, Lesser Dragons: Minority Peoples of China, Archived 13 October 2021 at the Wayback Machine Reaktion Books, 2018 ISBN 978-1-780-23952-1 p.155 :'Chen introduced new, draconian methods of repression, most of which he had rehearsed in Tibet.'
  4. ^ Gulbahar Haitiwaji with Rozenn Morgat Our souls are dead': how I survived a Chinese 're-education' camp for Uighurs,' Archived 12 January 2021 at the Wayback MachineThe Guardian 12 January 2021
  5. ^ 'Uyghur jailed for nine years in secret trial,' Archived 16 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine Amnesty International 10 September 2020
  6. ^ 'Relentless Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign,' Archived 14 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine Human Rights Watch 22 May 2016
  7. ^ a b c d Jun, Mai (13 December 2019). "From Tibet to Xinjiang, Beijing's man for restive regions Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 16 December 2019. Retrieved 16 December 2019.
  8. ^ a b c Kenderdine, Tristan (7 June 2021). "Chen Quanguo, Architect of Xinjiang Crackdown, Likely to be Rewarded With Central Position in 2022". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 14 June 2021. Retrieved 14 June 2021.
  9. ^ Vitae, China. "China Vitae : Biography of Chen Quanguo". www.chinavitae.com. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 11 October 2017.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g 陈全国简历 [Biography of Chen Quanguo] (in Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. Archived from the original on 9 February 2013. Retrieved 10 February 2013.
  11. ^ a b c d e f g 陈全国简历 [Biography of Chen Quanguo] (in Chinese). People's Daily. Archived from the original on 16 January 2013. Retrieved 10 February 2013.
  12. ^ a b c d e "Chen Quanguo". China Vitae. Archived from the original on 15 December 2019. Retrieved 15 February 2013.
  13. ^ "Top Chinese officials plagiarised doctoral dissertations". Financial Times. 27 February 2019. Retrieved 8 August 2022.
  14. ^ 陈全国同志任河北省委副书记 [Comrade Chen Quanguo was appointed Deputy Secretary of Hebei Provincial Party Committee] (in Chinese (China)). Xinhua News. 1 December 2009.[dead link]
  15. ^ From Tibet to Xinjiang Beijing's Man for restive regions Chen Quanguo is the prime target of US sanctions, (13 December 2019), Archived 8 February 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  16. ^ Zenz, Adrian; Leibold, James (21 September 2017). "Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 18 October 2019. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  17. ^ "Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview". China Change. 8 August 2013. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 11 October 2017.
  18. ^ a b Party boss Chen Quanguo replicating his Tibet policy in Xinjiang, (13 December 2016), Tibetan Review, Archived 14 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  19. ^ 七百便民警务站不仅代表西藏法治建设,更是百姓零距离的守护_网易新闻. news.163.com (in Chinese (China)). Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 11 October 2017.
  20. ^ a b In Xinjiang, China applies repressive lessons learned in Tibet, (www.economist.com, 12 December 2019), Archived 16 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  21. ^ Kelsang Dolma, Tibet Was China’s First Laboratory of Repression, (31 August 2020), Foreign Policy, Archived 26 September 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  22. ^ "Fact Sheet on Tibetan Self-Immolation Protests in Tibet Since February 2009". www.tibet.net. 28 November 2019. Archived from the original on 1 September 2020. Retrieved 30 August 2020.
  23. ^ Fadiman, Anne (28 July 2020). "The Chinese Town That Became the Self-Immolation Capital of the World". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 20 October 2020. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  24. ^ a b International Campaign for Tibet, Self-immolation fact sheet, (2 December 2019), Archived 15 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  25. ^ a b c Tracy Ross, Tibet is still burning, (24 September 2019), Archived 20 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  26. ^ "Self-immolation 'trend' at restive Tibetan monastery". BBC News. 4 October 2011. Archived from the original on 14 October 2020. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  27. ^ Resistance in Tibet: Self-immolation and Protest. International Tibet Network, 3 May 2013.
  28. ^ "Teenage Tibetan monk self-immolates, dies: rights group". Reuters. 20 February 2012. Archived from the original on 20 October 2020. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  29. ^ "Dalai Lama: 'Cultural genocide' behind self-immolations". BBC News. 7 November 2011. Archived from the original on 3 November 2019. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  30. ^ "Tibetan leader Lobsang Sangay presses US on immolations". BBC News. 3 November 2011. Archived from the original on 16 October 2020. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  31. ^ "Tibetan monk Tenzin Delek Rinpoche dies in China prison". BBC News. 13 July 2015. Archived from the original on 8 November 2020. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  32. ^ a b Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans under China’s “Stability Maintenance” Campaign, (www.hrw.org 22 May 2016), Archived 14 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  33. ^ "Political re-education awaits monks and nuns expelled from Larung Gar". Tibetan Review. 6 November 2016. Archived from the original on 25 October 2020. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  34. ^ "Chronique des droits de l'homme - Tibet: l'acculturation passe par la répression des activités religieuses". Radio France Internationale. 6 January 2018. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  35. ^ "Halt 'Re-education,' Humiliation of Monks, Nuns". Human Rights Watch. 29 March 2017. Archived from the original on 24 May 2020. Retrieved 30 October 2020. quotation A second video, circulated a few days after the first, shows 12 Tibetan nuns dancing on the stage of a theater in front of what appears to be an audience of officials. The nuns, dressed in religious robes, perform a choreographed dance routine to the song, “The Song of the Emancipated Serfs.” The song is associated with official Communist Party celebrations and was originally performed in front of Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1959.
  36. ^ "Prefecture sets up detention camp for Tibetan nuns expelled from Larung Gar". Tibetan Review. 13 December 2016. Archived from the original on 25 October 2020. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  37. ^ "Controversial footage shows nuns in choreographed performance | Free Tibet". Free Tibet. Archived from the original on 2 November 2020. Retrieved 30 October 2020.
  38. ^ a b Beijing sends a new flood of Han migrants to Lhasa: Tibetans risk disappearing, (www.asianews.it, 27 January 2015), Archived 20 September 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  39. ^ Adrian Zenz, "Full Employment" in Tibet: The Beginning and End of Chen Quanguo’s Neo-Socialist Experiment, (jamestown.org, 26 February 2018), Archived 9 November 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  40. ^ a b "【治疆策】"特殊"陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派" 【治疆策】“特殊”陈全国:闷声做事的边疆派 [(Strategies for Governing Borders) "Special" Chen Quanguo: Frontier factions who work silently]. news.dwnews.com. Archived from the original on 28 February 2019. Retrieved 12 May 2019.
  41. ^ "Chen Quanguo: The Man Who Silenced Tibet Is Perfecting a Police State in Xinjiang, China". Al Bawaba. Archived from the original on 27 October 2020. Retrieved 22 October 2020.
  42. ^ "China says it has arrested 13,000 'terrorists' in Xinjiang amid backlash". South China Morning Post. 18 March 2019. Archived from the original on 21 October 2020. Retrieved 22 October 2020.
  43. ^ "陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记" 陈全国:从河南曾经最年轻的县委书记到新疆党委书记 [Chen Quanguo: From the youngest county party secretary in Henan to Xinjiang party secretary]. Dahewang. 29 August 2016. Archived from the original on 30 August 2016. Retrieved 31 August 2016.
  44. ^ "China: Beijing replaces Communist Party head in Xinjiang". Deutsche Welle. 26 December 2021. Retrieved 25 June 2022.
  45. ^ Brookfield, Jonathan (25 February 2022). "Who will make it into China's top leadership body?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 25 June 2022.
  46. ^ "两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范" 两年无暴恐事件 陈全国铁腕治疆反恐模式将成中国各省模范 [Two years without violence and terrorism, Chen Quanguo’s model of governing Xinjiang with an iron fist will become a model for all provinces in China]. 早报 (in Chinese (Singapore)). 28 February 2019. Archived from the original on 12 June 2019. Retrieved 12 May 2019.
  47. ^ "西藏到新疆,"维稳"与"暗访"始终与陈全国相伴" 西藏到新疆,“维稳”与“暗访”始终与陈全国相伴 [From Tibet to Xinjiang, "stability maintenance" and "unannounced visits" have always accompanied Chen Quanguo]. news.ifeng.com (in Simplified Chinese). Archived from the original on 1 March 2019. Retrieved 12 May 2019.
  48. ^ Ramzy, Austin; Buckley, Chris (16 November 2019). "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 22 December 2019. Retrieved 16 November 2019.
  49. ^ Kate O’Keeffe and Katy Stech Ferek (14 November 2019). "Stop Calling China's Xi Jinping 'President,' U.S. Panel Says". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 27 November 2019.
  50. ^ "鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國" 鐵腕治疆 陳全國表現獲中央肯定 反恐模式或「輸出」他省鄰國 [Governing Xinjiang with an iron fist, Chen Quanguo's performance has been affirmed by the central government, and the anti-terrorism model may be "exported" to neighboring countries in other provinces] (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). 28 February 2019. Archived from the original on 28 February 2019. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  51. ^ "Architect of Muslim camps expected to stay on in Xinjiang for now". South China Morning Post. 24 March 2019. Archived from the original on 9 December 2019. Retrieved 8 October 2019.
  52. ^ Ramzy, Austin; Buckley, Chris (16 November 2019). "'Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 22 December 2019. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  53. ^ Lai, Catherine (27 July 2018). "US urged to sanction Chinese officials overseeing sweeping crackdown in Muslim region". Hong Kong Free Press. Archived from the original on 16 August 2019. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  54. ^ Cumming-Bruce, Nick (10 August 2018). "U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 11 August 2018. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  55. ^ Alexandra Ma, China is reportedly sending men to sleep in the same beds as Uighur Muslim women while their husbands are in prison camps, (4 November 2019), Archived 26 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine
  56. ^ Zenz, Adrian; Leibold, James (14 March 2017). "Xinjiang's Rapidly Evolving Security State". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 5 September 2019. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
  57. ^ "China's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 10 December 2019. Retrieved 22 October 2020.
  58. ^ Voigt, Benedikt; Dieckmann, Cornelius (24 May 2022). ""Erst töten, dann melden": Die "Xinjiang Police Files" enthüllen das Ausmaß der Uiguren-Verfolgung" ["First kill, then report": The "Xinjiang Police Files" reveal the extent of the Uyghur persecution]. Der Tagesspiegel (in German). Retrieved 25 May 2022.
  59. ^ Abdureshid, Nuriman (7 July 2022). "Uyghurs abroad in shock after finding relatives listed in leaked police files". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
  60. ^ Niyaz, Kurban (28 June 2022). "Leaked documents show China's careful coordination of Uyghur repression". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 30 June 2022.
  61. ^ Historical GDP of Provinces "Home - Regional - Annual by Province" (Press release). China NBS. 31 January 2020. Archived from the original on 9 January 2020. Retrieved 31 January 2020.
  62. ^ a b Wang, Amber (15 June 2022). "Sanctioned hardline former Xinjiang chief Chen Quanguo moves to rural affairs role for 'last job before retirement'". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 7 August 2022.
  63. ^ Ma, Josephine (23 October 2022). "Former Xinjiang party boss Chen Quanguo among surprise exits from China's top leadership body". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 24 October 2022.
  64. ^ "US sanctions Chinese officials over Xinjiang 'violations'". www.bbc.com. Archived from the original on 10 July 2020. Retrieved 7 July 2020.
  65. ^ "The United States Imposes Sanctions and Visa Restrictions in Response to the Ongoing Human Rights Violations and Abuses in Xinjiang". United States Department of State. 9 July 2020. Archived from the original on 9 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
  66. ^ "US sanctions top Chinese official over Xinjiang crackdown". Al Jazeera. 10 July 2020. Archived from the original on 10 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
  67. ^ "US sanctions China's Politburo figure". theindependent.in. 10 July 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
  68. ^ "Treasury Sanctions Chinese Entity and Officials Pursuant to Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act". Retrieved 9 July 2024.
  69. ^ "新疆书记陈全国遭点名制裁 指在美国没资产不怕" [Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was named in sanctions and said he was not afraid as he had no assets in the United States]. Radio France Internationale. 22 July 2024. Retrieved 11 October 2024.
[edit]
Government offices
Preceded by Mayor of Luohe
1996–1998
Succeeded by
Preceded by Governor of Hebei
2009–2011
Succeeded by
Party political offices
Preceded by Head of Organization Department of Henan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
2000–2004
Succeeded by
Preceded by Deputy Communist Party Secretary of Henan
2009–2011
Preceded by Communist Party Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region
2011–2016
Succeeded by
Preceded by Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang
2016–2021
Succeeded by