Casablanca Conference: Difference between revisions

Casablanca Conference
Casablanca Conference
	United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and their advisors in Casablanca, 1943
Date	January 14, 1943 – January 24, 1943
Venue(s)	Anfa Hotel
Cities	Casablanca, French Morocco
Participants	United Kingdom; United States; Free France;

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The Casablanca Conference (codenamed SYMBOL) or Anfa Conference^[1] was held in Casablanca, French Morocco, from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. The main discussions were between US President Franklin Roosevelt (with his military staff) and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (with his staff). Stalin could not attend. Key decisions included a commitment to demand Axis powers' unconditional surrender; plans for an invasion of Sicily and Italy before the main invasion of France; an intensified strategic bombing campaign against Germany; and approval of a US Navy plan to advance on Japan through the central Pacific and the Philippines. The last item authorized the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, which shortened the war. Of all the decisions made, the most important was the Allied invasion of Sicily, which Churchill pushed for in part to divert American attention from opening a second front in France in 1943, a move that he feared would result in very high Allied casualties and not be possible until 1944.

Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco, Sultan Muhammad V, and representing the Free French forces, Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, but they played minor roles and were not part of the military planning.^[1] Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declined to attend, citing the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad as requiring his presence in Moscow.

Roosevelt and Churchill issued the public Casablanca Declaration, which the promulgation of the policy of “unconditional surrender.” That doctrine came to represent the unified voice of Allied will and the determination that the Axis powers would be fought to their ultimate defeat

Casablanca Declaration of "unconditional surrender"

The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the Casablanca Declaration. It announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers. Roosevelt had borrowed the term from US Army General Ulysses S. Grant (known as "Unconditional Surrender" Grant ^[2]), who had communicated that stance to the Confederate commander during the American Civil War.^[3]^[4] So Roosevelt stated at the concluding press conference on 24 January that the Allies were demanding "unconditional surrender" from the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese.^[2]

In a February 12, 1943 radio address, Roosevelt explained what he meant by unconditional surrender: "we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution upon their guilty, barbaric leaders".^[5]^[6]

Behind the scenes, the United States and the United Kingdom were divided in the commitment to see the war through to Germany's capitulation and "unconditional surrender". But Churchill had agreed in advance about "unconditional surrender"; he had cabled the War Cabinet four days earlier and they had not objected. US General George Marshall also said that he had been consulted; he had stated on 7 January that Allied morale would be "strengthened by the uncompromising demand, and Stalin's suspicions allayed".^[2]

However some source material contradicts the official reported accord between Churchill and Roosevelt, claiming that Churchill did not fully subscribe to the doctrine of "unconditional surrender". The New York Times correspondent Drew Middleton, who was in Casablanca at the conference, later revealed in his book, Retreat From Victory, that Churchill had been "startled by the [public] announcement [of unconditional surrender]. I tried to hide my surprise. But I was his [Roosevelt's] ardent lieutenant".^[7]^[8]

According to historian Charles Bohlen, "Responsibility for this unconditional surrender doctrine rests almost exclusively with President Roosevelt". He guessed that Roosevelt made the announcement "to keep Soviet forces engaged with Germany on the Russian front, thus depleting German munitions and troops" and also "to prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate peace with the Nazi regime".^[7]^[8]

That the war would be fought by the Allies until the total annihilation of enemy forces was not universally welcomed. Diplomatic insiders were critical that such a stance was too unequivocal and inflexible, would prevent any opportunity for political maneuvering and would be morally debilitating to French and German resistance groups.^[9]

The British felt that arriving at some accommodation with Germany would allow the German Army to help fight off a Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. To Churchill and the other Allied leaders, the real obstacle to realising that mutual strategy with Germany was the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Allen Dulles, the chief of OSS intelligence in Bern, Switzerland, maintained that the Casablanca Declaration was "merely a piece of paper to be scrapped without further ado if Germany would sue for peace. Hitler had to go."^[10]

There is evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, MI6, to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such individual was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German intelligence, the Abwehr. His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Roosevelt.^[11]^[12]

Topics of discussion and agreements

European invasion

Roosevelt, with advice from General George Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, lobbied for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe. Churchill, with advice from the British Chiefs of Staff, led by General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS, the professional head of the British Army), felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on the island of Sicily followed by an invasion of mainland Italy. The British argument centred on the need to pull German reserves down into Italy where, due to the relatively poor north–south lines of communication, they could not be easily extracted to defend against a later invasion of northwest Europe. Additionally, by delaying the cross-Channel landing, it would mean that any invasion would be against a German army further weakened by many more months' fighting on the Eastern Front against the Red Army.

Throughout the conference, Roosevelt's attention was prominently focused on the Pacific War front and he faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against Japanese entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to Churchill's approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources to the Pacific and Burma to reinforce positions held by Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese. The United States would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing craft.^[13]

Logistical issues

Next phase of European war
All possible aid would be provided to the Russian offensive
Assessment of U-boat danger in the Atlantic
Disposition of ships, planes, troops in the various theatres of war
Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek would be fully apprised of the conference agenda and resulting accords

Leadership of Free French forces

Leaders of the Free French forces: **General Henri Giraud** (L) and **General Charles de Gaulle** (R) at the Casablanca Conference.

Charles de Gaulle had to be forced to attend, and he met a chilly reception from Roosevelt and Churchill. No French representatives were allowed to attend the military planning sessions.^[14]^[15]

The conference called for the official recognition of a joint leadership of the Free French forces by de Gaulle and Henri Giraud. There was notable tension between the two men, who limited their interactions to formalities like pledging their mutual support.^[16] Roosevelt encouraged them to shake hands for the photographers eager for a photo opportunity, but the ritual handshake was with reluctance and done so quickly that they reportedly had to pose for a second shot. Roosevelt would later describe this meeting between the French leaders as a "shotgun wedding".^[17]

Elliott Roosevelt's book, As He Saw It (1946) describes how Franklin Roosevelt wanted the French provisional government to be set up with Giraud and de Gaulle, who would be "equally responsible for its composition and welfare."^[18] (89) That is because Franklin Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as Churchill's puppet and thought that Giraud would be more compliant with US interests. Complications arose because most people in the French Resistance considered de Gaulle the undisputed leader of the Resistance and so Giraud was progressively dispossessed of his political and military roles. Roosevelt eventually recognized de Gaulle as the head of the Free French in October 1944.^[19]

Plans for postwar northern Africa

The day before, Roosevelt became the first US president to visit Africa when he stayed at the city of Bathurst, Gambia. The poor situation of Gambians under the British Empire further increased his anti-colonialism, leading him to further discuss and impress upon Churchill the need for an international trusteeship system that would advance colonies like Gambia towards independence.^[20]

During the Conference, Roosevelt met privately with Churchill and Sultan Muhammad V of Morocco, who was accompanied by his 14-year-old son, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan (the future Hassan II).^[1]

Roosevelt also spoke with the French resident general at Rabat, Morocco, about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in North Africa. Roosevelt proposed that:

"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."^[21]^[22]

This disposition of the Jewish population harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, William Dodd (1933–37). Dodd had appraised Germany's repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt, he said: "The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to."^[23]

Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.^{[citation needed]}

During the return trip to the United States, President Roosevelt met with the President of Brazil, Getúlio Vargas, at the Potenji River Conference, where they discussed Brazil's participation in the war effort and defined the agreements that led to the creation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. The conference took place aboard the USS Humboldt in the Potenji River harbor in Natal, on January 28 and 29, 1943.^[24]^[1]

References

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Miller, Susan Gilson. (2013). A history of modern Morocco. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-62469-5. OCLC 855022840.
^ ^a ^b ^c Roberts 2009, p. 343.
^ Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
^ Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved November 19, 2013
^ [1] Archived 2018-06-15 at the Wayback Machine, Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012
^ "Casablanca Conference," Radio address, February 12, 1943, (The Public Papers of F.D. Roosevelt, Vol. 12, p. 71), retrieved November 19, 2013
^ ^a ^b [2] Archived 2009-04-16 at the Wayback Machine, Chen, Peter C., "Casablanca Conference, 14 Jan. 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012
^ ^a ^b Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
^ This Day In History, "Roosevelt And Churchill Begin Casablanca Conference," retrieved November 19, 2013
^ Vaughan, Hal, "Sleeping with the Enemy, Coco Chanel's Secret War," Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 178
^ "Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887–1945," Canaris worked with Roosevelt's Balkan representative in Instanbal, former Pennsylvania Governor George H. Earle, who communicated with Roosevelt through the diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012
^ retrieved November 19, 2013
^ nytimes.com. Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
^ Jonathan Fenby, The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France he saved (2010) pp 195–201
^ Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, August 1942 – September 1943 (1972) pp 279–81.
^ Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn
^ Pratt, Julius W. "De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began". The History Teacher, vol. 1, no. 4, 1968, pp. 5–15, p. 11.
^ Roosevelt, Elliott (1946). As he saw it. With a foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt. [On F.D. Roosevelt.] New York. OCLC 504739143.
^ The Governments of the Major Foreign Powers. U.S. Military Academy. West Point, NY. 1945. 71.
^ Wright, Donald (October 1995). "That Hell-hole of Yours". American Heritage. Retrieved December 1, 2024.
^ Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.
^ "The American Experience.America and the Holocaust.Teacher's Guide – PBS". PBS. Archived from the original on 2017-03-19. Retrieved 2017-08-25.
^ Larson, Erik (2011). In the Garden of Beasts. Crown. p. 39.
^ Smith, Joseph (2010). Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence. Athens - London: University of Georgia Press. p. 126. ISBN 978-0-8203-3733-3.

External links

Casablanca Conference of 1943
United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States. Archived 2008-12-02 at the Wayback Machine The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Preceded by Cherchell Conference October 21–22, 1942	World War II Conferences Casablanca Conference January 14–24, 1943	Succeeded by Washington Conference (1943) May 12–17, 1943

[:0-1] Miller, Susan Gilson. (2013). A history of modern Morocco. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-62469-5. OCLC 855022840.

[FOOTNOTERoberts2009343-2] Roberts 2009, p. 343.

[3] Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012

[4] Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved November 19, 2013

[5] [1] Archived 2018-06-15 at the Wayback Machine, Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012

[6] "Casablanca Conference," Radio address, February 12, 1943, (The Public Papers of F.D. Roosevelt, Vol. 12, p. 71), retrieved November 19, 2013

[auto-7] [2] Archived 2009-04-16 at the Wayback Machine, Chen, Peter C., "Casablanca Conference, 14 Jan. 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012

[auto1-8] Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012

[9] This Day In History, "Roosevelt And Churchill Begin Casablanca Conference," retrieved November 19, 2013

[10] Vaughan, Hal, "Sleeping with the Enemy, Coco Chanel's Secret War," Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 178

[11] "Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887–1945," Canaris worked with Roosevelt's Balkan representative in Instanbal, former Pennsylvania Governor George H. Earle, who communicated with Roosevelt through the diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012

[12] retrieved November 19, 2013

[13] ytimes.com. Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012

[14] Jonathan Fenby, The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France he saved (2010) pp 195–201

[15] Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, IV, August 1942 – September 1943 (1972) pp 279–81.

[16] Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn

[17] Pratt, Julius W. "De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began". The History Teacher, vol. 1, no. 4, 1968, pp. 5–15, p. 11.

[18] Roosevelt, Elliott (1946). As he saw it. With a foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt. [On F.D. Roosevelt.] New York. OCLC 504739143.

[19] The Governments of the Major Foreign Powers. U.S. Military Academy. West Point, NY. 1945. 71.

[20] Wright, Donald (October 1995). "That Hell-hole of Yours". American Heritage. Retrieved December 1, 2024.

[21] Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.

[22] "The American Experience.America and the Holocaust.Teacher's Guide – PBS". PBS. Archived from the original on 2017-03-19. Retrieved 2017-08-25.

[23] Larson, Erik (2011). In the Garden of Beasts. Crown. p. 39.

[24] Smith, Joseph (2010). Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence. Athens - London: University of Georgia Press. p. 126. ISBN 978-0-8203-3733-3.

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+{{Short description|1943 conference between Allied leaders for WWII military planning}}
 {{About|the 1943 conference of Allied forces in World War II|the 1961 conference of left-wing Pan-African leaders|Casablanca Group|the secret 1965 conference of leaders of the Arab League|1965 Arab League summit}}
-{{Infobox summit meeting|caption=United States President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], British prime minister [[Winston Churchill]], and their advisors in [[Casablanca]], 1943|image=Casablanca-Conference.jpg|cities=[[Casablanca]], [[French Morocco]]|date=January 14, 1943 – January 24, 1943|participants={{Plainlist|
+{{Infobox summit meeting
+|caption=United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and their advisors in Casablanca, 1943
+|image=File:80-G-38559 (25601980716).jpg
+|cities=Casablanca, [[French Morocco]]
+|date=January 14, 1943 – January 24, 1943
+|participants={{Plainlist|
 * {{Flag|United Kingdom}}
 * {{Flag|United States|1912}}
 * {{Flag|Free France}}
+}}
-}}|venues=Anfa Hotel}}
+|venues=Anfa Hotel}}
-The '''Casablanca Conference''' (codenamed '''SYMBOL''') or '''Anfa Conference<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Miller, Susan Gilson.|title=A history of modern Morocco|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-62469-5|location=New York|oclc=855022840}}</ref>''' was held at the Anfa Hotel in [[Casablanca]], [[French Morocco]], from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] European strategy for the next phase of [[World War II]]. In attendance were United States President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] and British prime minister [[Winston Churchill]]. Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco Sultan [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Muhammad V]] and representing the [[Free French forces]] Generals [[Charles de Gaulle]] and [[Henri Giraud]], but they played minor roles and were not part of the military planning.'''<ref name=":0" />''' USSR General Secretary [[Joseph Stalin]] declined to attend, citing the ongoing [[Battle of Stalingrad]] as requiring his presence in the [[Soviet Union]].
+The '''Casablanca Conference''' (codenamed '''SYMBOL''') or '''Anfa Conference<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Miller, Susan Gilson.|title=A history of modern Morocco|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-62469-5|location=New York|oclc=855022840}}</ref>''' was held in [[Casablanca]], [[French Morocco]], from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] European strategy for the next phase of [[World War II]].  The main discussions were between US President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] (with his military staff)  and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] (with his staff). Stalin could not attend. Key decisions included a commitment to demand Axis powers' unconditional surrender; plans for an invasion of Sicily and Italy before the main invasion of France; an intensified strategic bombing campaign against Germany; and approval of a US Navy plan to advance on Japan through the central Pacific and the Philippines. The last item authorized the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, which shortened the war. Of all the decisions made, the most important was the [[Allied invasion of Sicily]], which Churchill pushed for in part to divert American attention from opening a second front in France in 1943, a move that he feared would result in very high Allied casualties and not be possible until 1944.
+Also attending were the sovereign of Morocco, Sultan [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Muhammad V]], and representing the [[Free French forces]], Generals [[Charles de Gaulle]] and [[Henri Giraud]], but they played minor roles and were not part of the military planning.'''<ref name=":0" />'''  [[Joseph Stalin]], General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declined to attend, citing the ongoing [[Battle of Stalingrad]] as requiring his presence in Moscow.
-The conference's agenda addressed the specifics of tactical procedure, allocation of resources, and the broader issues of diplomatic policy. The debate and negotiations produced what was known as the Casablanca Declaration, and perhaps its most historically provocative statement of purpose, "[[unconditional surrender]]". That doctrine came to represent the unified voice of implacable Allied will and the determination that the [[Axis powers]] would be fought to their ultimate defeat.
+Roosevelt and Churchill issued the public '''Casablanca Declaration''', which the promulgation of the policy of “[[unconditional surrender]].” That doctrine came to represent the unified voice of Allied will and the determination that the [[Axis powers]] would be fought to their ultimate defeat
 ==Casablanca Declaration of "unconditional surrender"==
 [[File:The villa in Casablanca where President Roosevelt stayed during his conferences with Prime Minister Churchill of... - NARA - 196001.jpg|thumb|[[Marius Boyer]]'s [[Hotel Anfa|Anfa Hotel]] in Casablanca, venue of the conference.]]
-The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the Casablanca Declaration. It announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the "unconditional surrender" of the [[Axis powers]]. Roosevelt had borrowed the term from [[US Army]] General [[Ulysses S. Grant]] (known as "Unconditional Surrender" Grant {{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}), who had communicated that stance to the [[Confederate States Army]] commander during the [[American Civil War]].<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0114.html, Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012]</ref><ref>[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp, Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved November 19, 2013]{{Dead link|date=July 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> So Roosevelt stated at the concluding press conference on 24 January that the Allies were demanding "unconditional surrender" from the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese.{{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}
+The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the Casablanca Declaration. It announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the "unconditional surrender" of the [[Axis powers]]. Roosevelt had borrowed the term from US Army General [[Ulysses S. Grant]] (known as "Unconditional Surrender" Grant {{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}), who had communicated that stance to the Confederate commander during the American Civil War.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0114.html, Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012]</ref><ref>[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved November 19, 2013]</ref> So Roosevelt stated at the concluding press conference on 24 January that the Allies were demanding "unconditional surrender" from the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese.{{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}
 In a February 12, 1943 radio address, Roosevelt explained what he meant by unconditional surrender: "we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution upon their guilty, barbaric leaders".<ref>[http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180615065132/http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ |date=2018-06-15 }}, Yale Law School, "The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012</ref><ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/430212a.html, "Casablanca Conference,"  Radio address, February 12, 1943, (The Public Papers of F.D. Roosevelt, Vol. 12, p. 71), retrieved November 19, 2013]</ref>
-It has been claimed that behind the scenes, the United States and the United Kingdom were divided in the commitment to see the war through to Germany's capitulation and "unconditional surrender". But Churchill was consulted and had agreed in advance about "unconditional surrender"; he had cabled the [[War cabinet#Churchill war ministry|War Cabinet]] four days earlier and they had not objected.  US General [[George Marshall]] also said that he had been consulted; he had stated on 7 January that Allied morale would be accepted by the uncompromising demand, and Stalin's suspicions allayed".{{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}
+Behind the scenes, the United States and the United Kingdom were divided in the commitment to see the war through to Germany's capitulation and "unconditional surrender". But Churchill had agreed in advance about "unconditional surrender"; he had cabled the [[War cabinet#Churchill war ministry|War Cabinet]] four days earlier and they had not objected.  US General [[George Marshall]] also said that he had been consulted; he had stated on 7 January that Allied morale would be "strengthened by the uncompromising demand, and Stalin's suspicions allayed".{{sfn|Roberts|2009|p=343}}
 However some source material contradicts the official reported accord between Churchill and Roosevelt, claiming that Churchill did not fully subscribe to the doctrine of "unconditional surrender". ''[[The New York Times]]'' correspondent Drew Middleton, who was in Casablanca at the conference, later revealed in his book, ''Retreat From Victory'', that Churchill had been "startled by the [public] announcement [of unconditional surrender]. I tried to hide my surprise. But I was his [Roosevelt's] ardent lieutenant".<ref name="auto">[http://www.ww2db.com] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090416083151/http://www.ww2db.com/ |date=2009-04-16 }}, Chen, Peter C., "Casablanca Conference, 14 Jan. 1943," retrieved August 27, 2012</ref><ref name="auto1">[https://www.nytimes.com/ Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012]</ref>
-According to former U.S. ambassador to the [[Soviet Union]] [[Charles Bohlen]], "Responsibility for this unconditional surrender doctrine rests almost exclusively with President Roosevelt". He guessed that Roosevelt made the announcement "to keep Soviet forces engaged with Germany on the Russian front, thus depleting German munitions and troops" and also "to prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate peace with the Nazi regime".<ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/>
+According to historian [[Charles Bohlen]], "Responsibility for this unconditional surrender doctrine rests almost exclusively with President Roosevelt". He guessed that Roosevelt made the announcement "to keep Soviet forces engaged with Germany on the Russian front, thus depleting German munitions and troops" and also "to prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate peace with the Nazi regime".<ref name="auto"/><ref name="auto1"/>
 That the war would be fought by the Allies until the total annihilation of enemy forces was not universally welcomed. Diplomatic insiders were critical that such a stance was too unequivocal and inflexible, would prevent any opportunity for political maneuvering and would be morally debilitating to French and German resistance groups.<ref>[http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/roosevelt-and-churchill-begin-casablanca-conference, ''This Day In History'', "Roosevelt And Churchill Begin Casablanca Conference," retrieved November 19, 2013]</ref>
-The British felt that arriving at some accommodation with Germany would allow the [[German Army (1935–1945)|German Army]] to help fight off a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] takeover of [[Eastern Europe]]. To Churchill and the other Allied leaders, the real obstacle to realising that mutual strategy with Germany was the leadership of [[Adolf Hitler]]. [[Allen Dulles]], the chief of OSS intelligence in [[Bern]], [[Switzerland]], maintained that the Casablanca Declaration was "merely a piece of paper to be scrapped without further ado if Germany would sue for peace. Hitler had to go".<ref>Vaughan, Hal, "Sleeping With The Enemy, Coco Chanel's Secret War," Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 178</ref>
+The British felt that arriving at some accommodation with Germany would allow the [[German Army (1935–1945)|German Army]] to help fight off a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] takeover of [[Eastern Europe]]. To Churchill and the other Allied leaders, the real obstacle to realising that mutual strategy with Germany was the leadership of [[Adolf Hitler]]. [[Allen Dulles]], the chief of OSS intelligence in [[Bern]], [[Switzerland]], maintained that the Casablanca Declaration was "merely a piece of paper to be scrapped without further ado if Germany would sue for peace. Hitler had to go."<ref>Vaughan, Hal, "Sleeping with the Enemy, Coco Chanel's Secret War," Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 178</ref>
-There is evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, [[MI6]], to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such man was Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]], head of German intelligence, the [[Abwehr]]. His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Roosevelt.<ref>[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org, "''Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887–1945''," Canaris worked with Roosevelt's Balkan representative in Instanbal]{{Dead link|date=July 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, former Pennsylvania Governor [[George H. Earle]], who communicated with Roosevelt through the diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012</ref><ref>[http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/casablanca_war_conference.htm, retrieved November 19, 2013]</ref>
+There is evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, [[MI6]], to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such individual was Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]], head of German intelligence, the [[Abwehr]]. His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Roosevelt.<ref>[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ "''Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887–1945''," Canaris worked with Roosevelt's Balkan representative in Instanbal], former Pennsylvania Governor [[George H. Earle]], who communicated with Roosevelt through the diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012</ref><ref>[http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/casablanca_war_conference.htm, retrieved November 19, 2013]</ref>
 ==Topics of discussion and agreements==
 ===European invasion===
+[[File:Allies Grand-strategy Conference in N Africa- President Roosevelt Meets Mr Churchill. One of the Most Momentous Conferences of This War Began on January 14 1943, Near Casablanca, When President Roosevelt and Mr A14134.jpg|thumb|left|George Marshall (left), Sir Alan Brooke (right)]]
-Roosevelt, with advice from [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall|George C. Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], lobbied for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe. Churchill, with advice from the British Chiefs of Staff, led by [[General (United Kingdom)|General]] [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Sir Alan Brooke]], the [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]] (CIGS, the professional head of the British Army), felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on the island of [[Sicily]] followed by an invasion of mainland [[Italy]]. The British argument centred on the need to pull German reserves down into Italy where, due to the relatively poor north–south lines of communication, they could not be easily extracted to defend against a later invasion of northwest Europe. Additionally, by delaying the cross-Channel landing, it would mean that any invasion would be against a German army further weakened by many more months fighting on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] against the Red Army.
+Roosevelt, with advice from General [[George Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], lobbied for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe. Churchill, with advice from the British Chiefs of Staff, led by General [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Sir Alan Brooke]], the [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]] (CIGS, the professional head of the British Army), felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on the island of [[Sicily]] followed by an invasion of mainland Italy. The British argument centred on the need to pull German reserves down into Italy where, due to the relatively poor north–south lines of communication, they could not be easily extracted to defend against a later invasion of northwest Europe. Additionally, by delaying the cross-Channel landing, it would mean that any invasion would be against a German army further weakened by many more months' fighting on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] against the Red Army.
-Throughout the conference, Roosevelt's attention was prominently focused on the [[Pacific War]] front and he faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against [[Empire of Japan|Japanese]] entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to Churchill's approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources to the Pacific and [[Burma Campaign|Burma]] to reinforce positions held by [[Chiang Kai-shek]] against the Japanese. The United States would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing craft.<ref>nytimes.com.  Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012</ref>
+Throughout the conference, Roosevelt's attention was prominently focused on the [[Pacific War]] front and he faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against Japanese entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to Churchill's approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources to the Pacific and [[Burma Campaign|Burma]] to reinforce positions held by [[Chiang Kai-shek]] against the Japanese. The United States would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing craft.<ref>nytimes.com.  Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy," January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012</ref>
 ===Logistical issues===
@@ Line 40: / Line 51: @@
 * Assessment of [[U-boat]] danger in the Atlantic
 * Disposition of ships, planes, troops in the various theatres of war
-* [[Joseph Stalin]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] would be fully apprised of the conference agenda and resulting accords
+* Stalin and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] would be fully apprised of the conference agenda and resulting accords
 ===Leadership of Free French forces===
 [[File:Degaulle-freefrench.png|thumb|Leaders of the [[Free French forces]]: '''General Henri Giraud''' (L) and '''General Charles de Gaulle''' (R) at the Casablanca Conference.]]
-[[Charles de Gaulle]] had to be forced to attend, and he met a chilly reception from Roosevelt and Churchill. No French representatives were allowed to attend the military planning sessions.<ref>Jonathan Fenby, ''The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France he saved'' (2010) pp 195–201</ref><ref>Michael Howard, ''Grand Strategy, IV, August 1942 – September 1943'' (1972) pp 279–81.</ref>
+Charles de Gaulle had to be forced to attend, and he met a chilly reception from Roosevelt and Churchill. No French representatives were allowed to attend the military planning sessions.<ref>Jonathan Fenby, ''The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France he saved'' (2010) pp 195–201</ref><ref>Michael Howard, ''Grand Strategy, IV, August 1942 – September 1943'' (1972) pp 279–81.</ref>
-The conference called for the official recognition of a joint leadership of the [[Free French forces]] by de Gaulle and [[Henri Giraud]]. There was notable tension between the two men, who limited their interactions to formalities like pledging their mutual support.<ref>Rick Atkinson, ''An Army at Dawn''</ref> Roosevelt encouraged them to shake hands for the photographers eager for a photo opportunity, but the ritual handshake was with reluctance and done so quickly that they reportedly had to pose for a second shot. Roosevelt would later describe this meeting between the French leaders as a "shotgun wedding".<ref>Pratt, Julius W. “De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began.” The History Teacher, vol. 1, no. 4, 1968, pp. 5–15, p. 11.</ref>
+The conference called for the official recognition of a joint leadership of the [[Free French forces]] by de Gaulle and [[Henri Giraud]]. There was notable tension between the two men, who limited their interactions to formalities like pledging their mutual support.<ref>Rick Atkinson, ''An Army at Dawn''</ref> Roosevelt encouraged them to shake hands for the photographers eager for a photo opportunity, but the ritual handshake was with reluctance and done so quickly that they reportedly had to pose for a second shot. Roosevelt would later describe this meeting between the French leaders as a "shotgun wedding".<ref>Pratt, Julius W. "De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began". The History Teacher, vol. 1, no. 4, 1968, pp. 5–15, p. 11.</ref>
-[[Elliott Roosevelt]]’s book, ''As He Saw It'' (1946) describes how Franklin Roosevelt wanted the French provisional government to be set up with Giraud and de Gaulle, who would be “equally responsible for its composition and welfare.”<ref>{{Cite book|title=As he saw it. With a foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt. [On F.D. Roosevelt.].|author=Roosevelt, Elliott|date=1946|publisher=New York|oclc=504739143}}</ref> (89) That is because Franklin Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as Churchill's puppet and thought that Giraud would be more compliant with US interests. Complications arose because most people in the French Resistance considered de Gaulle the undisputed leader of the Resistance and so Giraud was progressively dispossessed of his political and military roles. Roosevelt eventually recognized de Gaulle as the head of the Free French in mid-1944.{{cn|date=January 2021}}
+[[Elliott Roosevelt (general)|Elliott Roosevelt]]'s book, ''As He Saw It'' (1946) describes how Franklin Roosevelt wanted the French provisional government to be set up with Giraud and de Gaulle, who would be "equally responsible for its composition and welfare."<ref>{{Cite book|title=As he saw it. With a foreword by Eleanor Roosevelt. [On F.D. Roosevelt.].|author=Roosevelt, Elliott|date=1946|publisher=New York|oclc=504739143}}</ref> (89) That is because Franklin Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as Churchill's puppet and thought that Giraud would be more compliant with US interests. Complications arose because most people in the French Resistance considered de Gaulle the undisputed leader of the Resistance and so Giraud was progressively dispossessed of his political and military roles. Roosevelt eventually recognized de Gaulle as the head of the Free French in October 1944.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=clItAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA71 The Governments of the Major Foreign Powers]. U.S. Military Academy. West Point, NY. 1945. 71.</ref>
 ===Plans for postwar northern Africa===
-The day before, Roosevelt became the first US president to visit Africa when he stayed at the city of [[Bathurst, Gambia]]. The abhorrent situation of Gambians under the [[British Empire]] further increased his [[anti-colonialism]], leading him to further discuss and impress upon Churchill the need for an international trusteeship system that would advance colonies like Gambia towards independence.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.americanheritage.com/content/%E2%80%9C-hell-hole-yours%E2%80%9D|title=That Hell-hole Of Yours {{!}}|website=www.americanheritage.com|language=en|access-date=2018-06-04}}</ref>
+The day before, Roosevelt became the first US president to visit Africa when he stayed at the city of [[Bathurst, Gambia]]. The poor situation of Gambians under the British Empire further increased his [[anti-colonialism]], leading him to further discuss and impress upon Churchill the need for an international trusteeship system that would advance colonies like Gambia towards independence.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.americanheritage.com/hell-hole-yours |title=That Hell-hole of Yours |first=Donald |last=Wright |date=October 1995 |work=[[American Heritage (magazine)|American Heritage]] |access-date=December 1, 2024}}</ref>
+[[File:Editing File-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mohammed V and Hassan II at the Casablanca Conference.jpg|thumb|Sultan [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Muhammad V]] seated with Roosevelt and Churchill. Behind them, [[George S. Patton|General Patton]], [[Robert Daniel Murphy|Robert D. Murphy]], [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Hassan II of Morocco|Hassan II]], [[Charles Noguès|General Nogues]], [[Muhammad al-Muqri]], the Moroccan Chief of Protocol, [[Elliott Roosevelt (general)|Elliott Roosevelt]], and [[John L. McCrea]].]]
-During the Conference, Roosevelt met privately with Churchill and Sultan [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Muhammad V]] of Morocco, who was accompanied by his 14-year-old son, [[Hassan II of Morocco|Hassan II]].'''<ref name=":0" />'''
+During the Conference, Roosevelt met privately with Churchill and Sultan [[Mohammed V of Morocco|Muhammad V]] of Morocco, who was accompanied by his 14-year-old son, Crown Prince [[Hassan II of Morocco|Moulay Hassan]] (the future Hassan II).'''<ref name=":0" />'''
-Roosevelt also spoke with the French resident general at [[Rabat, Morocco|Rabat]], [[Morocco]], about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in [[North Africa]]. Roosevelt proposed that:
+Roosevelt also spoke with the French resident general at [[Rabat, Morocco|Rabat]], [[Morocco]], about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in North Africa. Roosevelt proposed that:
-"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."<ref>Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., ''Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence'', New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html|title=The American Experience.America and the Holocaust.Teacher's Guide – PBS}}</ref>
+"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."<ref>Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., ''Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence'', New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html|title=The American Experience.America and the Holocaust.Teacher's Guide – PBS|publisher=[[PBS]]|access-date=2017-08-25|archive-date=2017-03-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170319005422/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>
-This disposition of the Jewish population harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, [[William Dodd (ambassador)|William Dodd]] (1933–37). Dodd had appraised Germany's repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt, he said: "The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to."<ref>Larson, Erik, "In the Garden of Beasts," Crown, 2011, p. 39</ref>
+This disposition of the Jewish population harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, [[William Dodd (ambassador)|William Dodd]] (1933–37). Dodd had appraised Germany's repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt, he said: "The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to."<ref>{{cite book |last=Larson |first=Erik |title=In the Garden of Beasts |publisher=Crown |year=2011 |page=39}}</ref>
-Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.{{cn|date=January 2021}}
+Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.{{citation needed|date=January 2021}}
-During the return trip to the United States, President Roosevelt met with the President of [[Brazil]], [[Getúlio Vargas]], at the [[Potenji River Conference]], where they discussed Brazil's participation in the war effort and defined the agreements that led to the creation of the [[Brazilian Expeditionary Force]]. The conference took place aboard the [[USS Humboldt|USS ''Humboldt'']] in the Potenji River harbor in [[Natal, Rio Grande do Norte|Natal]], on January 28 and 29, 1943.<ref>{{cite book|title=Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence|last=Smith|first=Joseph|publisher=University of Georgia Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0-8203-3733-3|location=Athens - London|pages=126}}</ref><ref name=":0" />
+During the return trip to the United States, President Roosevelt met with the President of [[Brazil]], [[Getúlio Vargas]], at the [[Potenji River Conference]], where they discussed Brazil's participation in the war effort and defined the agreements that led to the creation of the [[Brazilian Expeditionary Force]]. The conference took place aboard the {{USS|Humboldt}} in the Potenji River harbor in [[Natal, Rio Grande do Norte|Natal]], on January 28 and 29, 1943.<ref>{{cite book|title=Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence|last=Smith|first=Joseph|publisher=University of Georgia Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0-8203-3733-3|location=Athens - London|pages=126}}</ref><ref name=":0" />
 ==See also==
 *[[Atlantic Charter]]
 *[[Casablanca directive]] the Allied strategic bombing directive issued shortly after the Casablanca Conference.
-*[[List of World War II conferences]]
+*[[List of Allied World War II conferences]]
 ==References==
@@ Line 77: / Line 88: @@
 * Appleby, Simon. "SYMBOL: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Casablanca Conference, January 1943." (PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge 1998) [http://www.bookswarm.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/SYMBOL-1364819449-Clarke1.pdf online]. 73pp; with bibliography pp 64–72.
 * Armstrong, Anne. ''Unconditional surrender: the impact of the Casablanca policy upon World War II'' (Rutgers University Press, 1961).
+* Buchanan, Andrew. ''American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II'' (Cambridge University Press, 2014) [https://networks.h-net.org/system/files/contributed-files/roundtable-xvii-15.pdf online reviews]
 * Chase, John L. "Unconditional surrender reconsidered." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 70.2 (1955): 258–279.  [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2145225 JSTOR]
-* Churchill, Winston S. ''Memoirs of the Second World War, An abridgement of the six volumes'' Chapter 20 The Casablanca Conference page 664
+* Churchill, Winston S. ''Memoirs of the Second World War, An abridgement of the six volumes'' Chapter 20 The Casablanca Conference page 664+
+* Conroy, James B.''The Devils Will Get No Rest: FDR, Churchill, and the Plan That Won the War'' (2023) scholarly history of the Conference.
 * Farrell, Brian P. "Symbol of paradox: The Casablanca Conference, 1943," ''Canadian Journal of History,'' (April 1993) 28#1 pp 21–40
-*Feis, Herbert. "Churchill Roosevelt Stalin The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought A Diplomatic History of World War II"  (1957)
+*Feis, Herbert. ''Churchill Roosevelt Stalin The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought A Diplomatic History of World War II''  (1957)
 * Funk, Arthur Layton. "The" Anfa Memorandum": An Incident of the Casablanca Conference." ''Journal of Modern History'' (1954): 246–254. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1875377 JSTOR]
 * Howard, Michael. ''Grand Strategy, IV, August 1942 – September 1943.'' (1972). pp 239–88.
@@ Line 92: / Line 105: @@
 ==External links==
 *[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp Casablanca Conference of 1943]
-*[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941-43 United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States.] The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943
+*[http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941-43 United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081202033147/http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1941-43 |date=2008-12-02 }} The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943
 {{s-start}}
 {{succession box
@@ Line 102: / Line 115: @@
 {{s-end}}
+{{Diplomatic history of World War II|state=expanded}}
 {{Winston Churchill}}
 {{Franklin D. Roosevelt}}
@@ Line 107: / Line 121: @@
 {{Authority control}}
-[[Category:History of Casablanca]]
+[[Category:Casablanca in World War II]]
-[[Category:Morocco in World War II]]
 [[Category:World War II conferences]]
 [[Category:Diplomatic conferences in Morocco]]
@@ Line 114: / Line 127: @@
 [[Category:1943 in international relations]]
 [[Category:1943 in Morocco]]
-[[Category:20th century in Casablanca]]
 [[Category:January 1943 events]]
+[[Category:Free France]]

v t e Diplomatic history of World War II
Conferences	U.S.–British Staff Conference (1941) First Inter-Allied Conference (1941) Atlantic Conference (1941) Second Inter-Allied Conference (1941) First Moscow Conference (1941) Arcadia Conference (1941– 1942) Third Inter-Allied Conference (1942) Second Washington Conference (1942) Second Moscow Conference (1942) Casablanca Conference (1943) Adana Conference (1943) Third Washington Conference (1943) First Quebec Conference (1943) Third Moscow Conference (1943) Cairo Conference (1943) Greater East Asia Conference (1943) Tehran Conference (1943) Second Cairo Conference (1943) Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (1944) Bretton Woods Conference (1944) Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944) Second Quebec Conference (1944) Fourth Moscow Conference (1944) Malta Conference (1945) Yalta Conference (1945) United Nations Conference on International Organization (1945) Potsdam Conference (1945)
Declarations and treaties	Munich Agreement (1938) Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (1939) Pact of Steel (1939) Anglo-Thai Non-Aggression Pact (1940) Destroyers-for-bases deal (1940) Franco-Italian Armistice (1940) Moscow Peace Treaty (1940) Tripartite Pact (1940) Declaration of St James's Palace (1941) Anglo-Soviet Agreement (1941) Armistice of Saint Jean d'Acre (1941) Atlantic Charter (1941) German–Turkish Treaty of Friendship (1941) Paris Protocols (1941) Declaration by United Nations (1942) Punishment for War Crimes (1942) Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 (1942) Armistice of Cassibile (1943) Cairo Declaration (1943) Moscow Declarations (1943) Declaration of the Four Nations Treaty between the United States and China for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China Sino-British Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China (1943) Moscow Armistice (1944) Nuremberg Charter (1945) Potsdam Agreement (1945) Potsdam Declaration (1945) United Nations Charter (1945) Paris Peace Treaties (1947) Treaty of San Francisco (1951) Austrian State Treaty (1955) Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (1990)
Organizations	Anglo-French Supreme War Council Sino-American Cooperative Organization European Advisory Commission Council of Foreign Ministers
Related	German Instrument of Surrender Japanese Instrument of Surrender

v t e Franklin D. Roosevelt
32nd President of the United States (1933–1945) 44th Governor of New York (1929–1932) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1913–1920) New York State Senator (1911–1913)
Presidency (timeline)	Transition Inaugurations (1st 2nd 3rd 4th) First and second terms Third and fourth terms Foreign policy New Deal overview New Deal coalition First 100 days Second New Deal Federal Emergency Relief Administration Civilian Conservation Corps Agricultural Adjustment Act Emergency Banking Act Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act Tennessee Valley Authority National Labor Relations Act of 1935 National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 Public Works Administration National Recovery Administration Works Progress Administration National Youth Administration Social Security Act Aid to Families with Dependent Children Communications Act of 1934 Federal Communications Commission Securities and Exchange Commission Monetary gold ownership Gold Reserve Act Silver seizure Record on civil rights Defense industry non-discrimination Fair Employment Practice Committee Indian Reorganization Act Executive Orders 9066, 9102 War Relocation Authority Japanese American internment German-American internment Italian-American internment Brownlow Committee Executive Office of the President G.I. Bill of Rights Cullen–Harrison Act Roerich Pact Four Freedoms Four Freedoms Monument Black Cabinet Jefferson's Birthday holiday Jefferson Memorial Judicial Court-Packing Bill Cannabis policy Federal Judicial appointments Supreme Court Harlan F. Stone Supreme Court nomination Wiley Rutledge Supreme Court nomination Cabinet "Brain Trust" March of Dimes Modern Oval Office Official car Criticism Franksgiving Executive Orders Presidential Proclamations
Presidential foreign policy	Banana Wars U.S. occupation of Nicaragua, 1912–1933 U.S. occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 Good Neighbor Policy (1933–1945) Montevideo Convention (1933) Second London Naval Treaty (1936) ABCD line (1940) Export Control Act Four Policemen Destroyers-for-bases deal Lend-Lease 1940 Selective Service Act Hull note Atlantic Charter (1941) Military history of the United States during World War II Home front during World War II Combined Munitions Assignments Board War Production Board Declaration by United Nations (1942) Dumbarton Oaks Conference World War II conferences Quebec Agreement Europe first Morgenthau Plan support
Presidential speeches	1932 Acceptance speech Commonwealth Club Address Madison Square Garden speech "Four Freedoms" Day of Infamy speech Arsenal of Democracy "...is fear itself" Fireside chats "Look to Norway" Quarantine Speech "The More Abundant Life" State of the Union Address (1934 1938 1939 1940 1941 (Four Freedoms) 1944 (Second Bill of Rights) 1945)
Other events	Early life, education, career Warm Springs Institute Governorship of New York Business Plot Assassination attempt
Elections	1928 New York state election 1930 Democratic National Convention, 1920 1924 1932 1936 1940 1944 1920 United States presidential election 1932 theme song 1936 1940 1944
Life and homes	Early life and education Groton School Springwood birthplace, home, and gravesite Adams House FDR Suite Campobello home Paralytic illness Top Cottage Little White House, Warm Springs, Georgia
Legacy	Bibliography Statues Presidential Library and Museum Roosevelt Institute Roosevelt Institute Campus Network Franklin Delano Roosevelt Foundation Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Roosevelt Island Four Freedoms Park White House Roosevelt Room Roosevelt Institute for American Studies USS Franklin D. Roosevelt USS Roosevelt Four Freedoms Award Four Freedoms paintings Unfinished portrait U.S. Postage stamps Roosevelt dime I'd Rather Be Right 1937 musical Films The Roosevelt Story 1947 Sunrise at Campobello 1960 Eleanor and Franklin 1976, The White House Years 1977 Backstairs at the White House 1979 miniseries World War II: When Lions Roared 1997 miniseries Warm Springs 2005 Hyde Park on Hudson 2012 The Roosevelts 2014 documentary The First Lady 2022 miniseries FDR 2023 miniseries The Six Triple Eight 2024 film Other namesakes
Family (Roosevelt • Delano)	Eleanor Roosevelt (wife) Anna Roosevelt Halsted (daughter) James Roosevelt II (son) Elliott Roosevelt (son) Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr. (son) John Aspinwall Roosevelt II (son) James Roosevelt I (father) Sara Ann Delano (mother) James Roosevelt Roosevelt (half-brother) Isaac Roosevelt (grandfather) Warren Delano Jr. (grandfather) Fala (family dog) Major (family dog)
← Herbert Hoover Harry S. Truman → Category

v t e Casablanca
Subdivisions	Aïn Chock Aïn Chock Aïn Sebaâ Hay Mohammadi Aïn Sebaâ Hay Mohammadi Roches Noires Anfa Anfa Maârif Sidi Belyout Ben M'Sick Ben M'Sick Sbata Sidi Bernoussi Sidi Bernoussi Sidi Moumen Al Fida - Mers Sultan Al Fida Mechouar (municipality) Mers Sultan Hay Hassani Hay Hassani Moulay Rachid Moulay Rachid Sidi Othmane
History and archaeology	Timeline Anfa Ahl al Oughlam Bombardment of Casablanca (1907) Casablanca Conference 2003 Casablanca bombings 2007 Casablanca bombings
Economy	Economy of Casablanca Casablanca Stock Exchange MADEX index MASI index Casablanca Finance City Morocco Mall Casablanca Technopark
Transport	Al Bidaoui (suburban railways) Al-Boraq (high-speed railways) Port of Casablanca Mohammed V International Airport Casablanca Tit Mellil Airport Casablanca-Anfa Airport Nouasseur Air Base Casablanca metro Casablanca Tramway Casa-Port railway station Casa-Voyageurs railway station Oasis railway station
Roads and streets	Casablanca–Agadir expressway Casablanca–Marrakesh expressway Casablanca–Rabat expressway Boulevard Mohamed V Boulevard Mohamed-Zerktouni Boulevard Moulay Youssef
Education	Colleges and universities List of universities, colleges and schools Académie internationale Mohammed VI de l'aviation civile École Hassania des Travaux Publics ISCAE Primary and secondary schools Casablanca American School Collège-Lycée Léon l'Africain École internationale de Casablanca École Normale Hébraïque Groupe Scolaire La Résidence Lycée Maïmonide Lycée Lyautey George Washington Academy Instituto Español Juan Ramón Jiménez Scuola "Enrico Mattei" École Belge de Casablanca Lycée français international Louis-Massignon
Sports	Clubs Raja Club Athletic Wydad Athletic Club Racing de Casablanca Rachad Bernoussi TAS de Casablanca Majd Al Madina Competitions Grand Prix Hassan II Sports venues Stade Mohamed V Salle Mohammed V Stade Père-Jégo Royal Golf Anfa Hassan II Stadium
Landmarks	Places of worship Casablanca Cathedral Hassan II Mosque Temple Beth-El Skyscrapers and hotels Casablanca Twin Center Anfa Hotel Club Val D Anfa Hotel Farah Hotel Kenzi Tower Hyatt Regency Casablanca Novotel Casablanca City Center Royal Mansour Casablanca Sheraton Casablanca Hotel & Towers Museums Museum of Moroccan Judaism Parks and cemeteries Jardin de la Préfécture Ben Msik Parc de Jeux Yasmina Jewish cemetery of Casablanca Ben M'Sik European Cemetery Hospitals Hôpital Mohamed V Hôpital Ben Msik
People	See Category:People from Casablanca