Talk:Russian Armed Forces

New Table of Ranks

I created a table of ranks for Comparative military ranks, but as things turned out, it wasn't needed there, so I tried moving it here. Only there already is a table here. But this table is different (and somewhat messier)) than mine. I haven't replaced the table here yet because it contains information which my table does not. I hope the two can be reconsiled soon and then moved here. I will do this if nobody else is up to the task. --Oceanhahn 09:09, 12 Sep 2004 (UTC)

July 13, 2007 AVN new articles

Army

North Caucasian military district group holds anti-terrorist drill

MOSCOW. July 12 (Interfax-AVN) - A tactical battalion group of the 503rd motorized infantry regiment of the 58th army is in an exercise aimed at the destruction of a 500-man strong terrorist group at the Tarskoye training range in North Ossetia, assistant to the Russian Army commander Col. Igor Konashenkov told Interfax-AVN.

"Assault planes, helicopters, self-propelled artillery systems and Grad missile systems are taking part in the anti-terrorist drill at the Tarskoye training range on Thursday. The drill is part of the Caucasian Boundary 2007 exercises," Konashenkov said.

The exercises began last Saturday and will conclude on July 13. They involve over 6,000 servicemen, over 250 pieces of armor and artillery systems and more than 30 planes and helicopters.

Army

NATO planes monitoring Russian exercises

MOSCOW. July 12 (Interfax-AVN) - NATO reconnaissance aircraft have been shadowing military exercises being conducted by Russia's Northern Fleet, as well as exercises in the Far East and the North Caucasus.

"Flights by two or three NATO reconnaissance planes have been registered near Russia's borders since the exercises began," Col. Alexander Drobyshevsky, an aide to the Russian Air Force commander, told Interfax-AVN on Thursday.

"NATO is monitoring the exercises without violating Russia's airspace, that is why our Air Forces are not taking any retaliatory measures. We are only tracking these flights," Drobyshevsky said.

"Two or three NATO aircraft, including Orion, Atlantic and RS-135, have been flying near the scene of the exercises and shadowing them. Usually we register one NATO scout plane per day near these Russian districts," he said.

This week Russia is conducting Caucasian Frontier-2007 antiterrorist exercise, the Wing-2007 logistics maneuvers and the command post exercise of the Northern Fleet.

Army

Over 80 military units to shift to all-volunteer manning before 2008 - general staff

MOSCOW. July 12 (Interfax-AVN) - Deputy Chief of General Staff Col. Gen. Vasily Smirnov has claimed that 81 military units, with the total strength of 124,000 people, will shift to all-volunteer manning by January 1, 2008.

"I have no doubts that this transformation will proceed as planned. Presently, we have 93,000 professional servicemen in the Armed Forces," he said, noting though that there are problems enlisting volunteers, mostly related to the low wages and their bad qualifications.

He added that 174 volunteers from CIS member-states undergo service in the Russian Armed Forces now, emphasizing that they are enlisted under special order of the defense minister, which specifies the units and positions in which such professional servicemen can serve.

Infobox

I think an infobox like in so many other military articles, with statistical numbers about total armed forces, active troops and so on, would be good for this page.

Commanders appointed for new OSKs

New Russian Strategic Level Commanders: Makarov’s Successor in the Making? Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 149 August 3, 2010 11:23 AM Age: 5 days Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Featured, Military/Security, Russia By: Roger McDermott

Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov (L) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov (R)

On July 22, Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, signed an order appointing acting commanders in the new operational-strategic commands (OSK’s). Serdyukov’s Press Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Irina Kovalchuk, told Interfax that Colonel-General Arkadiy Bakhin (Commander of the Volga-Urals Military District –MD) has become the acting Commander of the West OSK; Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Galkin (Commander of the North Caucasus MD) will command the South OSK; Admiral Konstantin Sidenko (Commander of the Pacific Fleet) now commands the East OSK and Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirkin (Commander of the Siberian MD) commands the Central OSK (Interfax, July 22).

These appointments are highly significant for a number of reasons linked to the future course of Serdyukov’s reform program, and not least in strengthening the authority of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Army-General Nikolai Makarov. Each of these commanders are committed supporters of the “new look” and share common features in their career progression, especially Bakhin, Galkin and Chirkin, and these are arguably now possible candidates to replace Makarov in the future.

General Makarov was appointed as the CGS in June 2008, prior to the Russia-Georgia war in August of that year. At the time of his appointment he was 58 years old. Upon reaching the retirement age for an officer of his rank, 60, in October 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev, signed a ukaz extending his service by up to three years, partly in recognition of his crucial role in promoting and overseeing the implementation of military reform (Interfax, October 13, 2009). Consequently, by 2012, Makarov must be replaced; however, since the defense “tandem” that formed between Serdyukov and Makarov has worked so well and proved critical in advancing the military reform, the selection of the latter’s successor must also be handled very carefully.

In December 1997, Makarov was appointed as commander of the ground and coastal troops and deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet. By September 1999 Makarov was the chief of staff in the Moscow MD before becoming the commander of the Siberian MD in December 2002. Following a period as chief of armaments (April 2007) Makarov became the CGS on June 3, 2008. As a candidate of political sciences, his dissertation topic was: “Political Extremism as a Radical Model of the Political Process, and the Organization of State Opposition to Extremism” (Kommersant-Vlast, March 5, 6). Makarov will be 61 in October 2010, allowing a maximum of two years to select his successor.

Makarov’s only obvious similarity to Admiral Sidenko is the latter’s experience commanding troops and forces in Northeastern Russia in the late 1990’s. However, in the case of the other senior appointments, there are more clear indications of shared background and preference for those with service in the Siberian MD. General Bahkin, 54, in the 1990’s served as a commander of the 59th Motorized Rifle Regiment in the 85th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) in the Siberian MD. Following a period as commander of the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia, in 2000 he commanded the 42nd MRD in Chechnya. In 2002, Bakhin was appointed as deputy commander of the North Caucasus MD. In October 2004, he returned to the Siberian MD, commanding the 41st Combined-Arms Army in Novosibirsk, before becoming deputy commander of the Siberian MD in January 2006 (serving as Makarov’s deputy) and later its chief of staff. On December 3, 2008 he was appointed to command the Volga-Urals MD (Kommersant-Vlast, March 5, 6).

In 2003, General Galkin, 52, served as deputy commander of the 41st Combined-Arms Army (Novosibirsk), then as the chief of staff of the 36th Combined-Arms Army (Borzya, Chita Oblast) in the Siberian MD, before he became commander of the 41st Army in January 2006. In April 2008, Galkin was appointed as deputy commander of the Siberian MD, and following Makarov being promoted to the post of CGS in December 2008, Galkin was made its chief of staff. On January 11, 2010, Galkin was appointed as the new commander of the North Caucasus MD (Kommersant-Vlast, March 5, 6).

General Chirkin, 54, was chief of staff in the 19th MRD in the North Caucasus MD before commanding the 42nd MRD in Chechnya in 2000. By 2002, Chirkin was the chief of staff in the 58th Army within the same MD, before his appointment the following year to command the 36th Combined-Arms Army in the Siberian MD. He served from February 2007 as deputy commander of the Moscow MD, and in December 2008 became chief of staff in the Volga-Urals MD. On January 11, 2010, he was promoted to command the Siberian MD (Kommersant-Vlast, March 5, 6).

However, Bakhin, Chirkin and Galkin all benefitted during Makarov’s period commanding the Siberian MD. They are all outspoken supporters of Serdyukov’s reform, and the preference for those with experience in the Siberian MD was demonstrated in January 2010, in the largest reshuffling of generals since Serdyukov’s reform began (Argumenty Nedeli, January 22). These appointments confirm the high level of influence that Makarov has secured over the defense minister, favoring only those senior officers committed to the progress of the reform, and given the expansion of command responsibilities involved in forming the new OSK’s by December 1, 2010, it is likely that these generals will now compete to replace Makarov in 2012. Those confirmed in their posts in December will remain in the running, while given the intensification of Chirkin’s pro-reform interviews this year, as well as having commanded the Siberian MD, the others may have already identified a front runner.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=OSK&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36705&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=3105c60244, Aug 3, 2010

Also http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36496&cHash=582e631d45, June 15, 2010 Also http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=56306 (BU)

Update military budget and share of GDP

Please update military budget and share of GDP to 2024. Military budget: $140 billion Share of GDP: 7.1% Source: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/russias-new-budget-law-signals-determination-see-war-ukraine-through-according-new-sipri-analysis Slim Nesbit (talk) 22:47, 10 June 2024 (UTC)

Lead

Why did my edit get reverted? How is that NPOV? I updated more recent information and added balance to all negative information from 2022 (all of which is inaccurate or over-exaggerated, by the way, but for the sake of argument let's just assume that it's not). Are we supposed to pretend that nothing has changed since 2022? Romanov loyalist (talk) 14:24, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

Your addition does not in fact contradict the idea the Rusisan still have logistical problems, as they were on the defensive. In fact quite the opposite seems to be true, as the article stated. That was my objection. Slatersteven (talk) 14:28, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

Them being on the defensive when Ukraine went on its summer and fall offensive in 2023 is not an indication of logistical problems. Letting an opponent wear themselves down by going on the attack is also a strategy. The large amount of defensive layers that were prepared along the front also shows a lot of logistical capability. Romanov loyalist (talk) 14:33, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

No but altering us saying they did (and the source for it) is removing the claim they still had a problem. Slatersteven (talk) 14:34, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

I summarized the earlier points to shorten the paragraph. All of the sources in the paragraph about that are from 2022. In 2024, there is the NATO supreme commander saying that Russia can replenish its forces very fast, faster than Ukraine, so that indicates whatever logistical issues there might still be are not that significant by now, compared to 2022. Romanov loyalist (talk) 14:40, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

It looked to me you removed this "Researchers from the U.S.-funded RAND Corporation have observed that Russia continues to struggle with military professionalization" and replaced it with this " However, in 2023 the Russian military defeated a major Ukrainian offensive", that is not "I summarized the earlier points to shorten the paragraph" that is altering it. I will now not be responding again to let otherd chip in.Slatersteven (talk) 14:51, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

Alright. Just to clarify, that RAND source is from 2022, and the sentences before it already say from other 2022 sources that Russia had problems with logistics, casualties, operations, etc. So I shortened the paragraph by rewording the other sentences and removing the sentence with the RAND source because it just restates the same thing from the other 2022 sources. In retrospect, the RAND source can simply be added to the end of the earlier sentences. Then I added more recent information. I think the point was already made by the several sentences before the RAND sentence that the Russian military had significant problems in 2022. So there is no particular reason for yet another sentence restating the same thing but with different words. Romanov loyalist (talk) 15:47, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

I don't think there is anything wrong with updating the article, but the selectiveness you used in doing so made the article read "Russia struggled during the first year during its invasion of Ukraine, however it then defeated (the word "defeat" is nowhere in either cited reference, in fact, it makes references to different small and symbolic Ukrainian victories, so this wording was pure WP:SYNTH) the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and recovered its losses.

If you think this is WP:NPOV according to the WP:DUE weight policy you're very mistaken.

Stating in Wikipedia's voice that Russia has recovered its military losses from early in the war, which included some of its best personnel, by largely mobilizing inmates and other recruits that are almost immediately deployed to the frontline is questionable at best. If things were as rosy for the Russian military as you'd like to imply, they should be a lot further into Ukraine than they are.

If we ignore fringe views and selective use of sources, the mainstream view in WP:RS is that the Russian military is still struggling, albeit managing to replenish enough losses to keep pressure up. Aspects such as equipment losses (Russia have resorted to using Soviet tanks such as the T-62 and T-55 as supplement to other tanks due to high losses of modern equipment) and stockpiles drying up seems to be something you ignored in your update, despite that this is something that military analysts often note.

There are also the leadership issues, Putin just sacked his Defense Minister in favor of a civilian economist with no military experience.

Here are a few sources describing some of it: 1 2 3 4

Russian production and replenishment has allowed it to maintain momentum despite suffering large losses, and it's also worth noting Russia's adaptation throughout the war, that doesn't make the examples (and they are just a few examples) go away. So if you'd like to update the article, follow WP:DUE and avoid WP:SYNTH, otherwise you'll be reverted. TylerBurden (talk) 18:59, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

I'm really not sure what the issue is here. The NATO Supreme Commander said that Russia has rebuilt from its losses. That includes recruiting new troops and gaining more equipment, both from stockpiles and new manufacturing. None of those details change what I wrote. It's objectively true that Russia is making its military bigger than it was before. Is the NATO Supreme Commander a "fringe source"? He also said that the Russian military is also learning from the battlefield situation and becoming more experienced, and so much that it "little resembles the chaotic force that invaded Ukraine two years ago." He said that because of this military experience and expansion, the Russian military poses a long term threat to other countries in Europe, not just Ukraine. If the NATO Supreme Commander is also saying that the Russian military is a threat to Europe and not only to Ukraine, than obviously its military capability has recovered. Is that not significant enough to add to the lead?

The details and specifics could be in the body of the article, since the lead is meant to be a summary. That Chatham House source you listed makes the same point as the NATO commander, but in more detail than he did, which is that Russia's military has increased in size from before the war. Chatham House also provides other important details, including that Russia has a big advantage in artillery over Ukraine (which WP:RS have said is one of Russia's most important advantages) and that it increased the number of drones it has since the start of the war, and we know that drones have an important role in this conflict. But, like some of the things you mentioned, I thought that details like that were supposed to be further in the article instead of in the lead. My point still stands that it should not be controversial to say that Russia has rebuilt its military from earlier losses if the Commanding General of European Command and the NATO Supreme Commander has said so.

The offensive's goal was to reach the coast of the Sea of Azov, and it did not get anywhere close to that or to its own stated minimum objective because it was stopped by the Russian military. So, another way to say that is it was defeated by the Russian military. It was militarily defeated. The Ukrainian offensive was the big event of 2023 in the war, and noting that it was defeated should not be controversial either. Shoigu got promoted, and is now in charge of overseeing not only the Defense Ministry, but also all of the other agencies that are represented on the Security Council of Russia. But I am not sure how that is relevant to the edit.

So I don't really see how my edit is an issue. I am simply stating developments that happened in 2023 and 2024. If you were to do that, how would you change what I wrote, for example? Romanov loyalist (talk) 20:54, 20 July 2024 (UTC)

I already pointed out the issues with your edit, if all you're looking to add is content that looks favourable for Russia despite the sources that have been presented and the numerous others available still detailing issues Russia is having with its military then that's not in line with Wikipedia policy. One statement by the NATO Supreme Commander is just one of many sources and I'm not saying it's insignificant, though even there you seem to have ignored a rather notable part of what he said: "They’ve got some gaps that have been produced by this war"

So again you focused only on the aspect that makes Russia look good, if you think he is such a great source you should at least quote him in full. The source also explicitly mentions his testimony came as US military aid to Ukraine was being decided, which seems like a pretty notable circumstance.

The lead is meant to be a summary of the most important parts of the article body, so if we are to follow WP:NPOV I still don't think that becomes "Russia recovered from its losses and defeated the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive".

This article is about the Russian Armed Forces, not the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, so arguing about the outcome of it is pointless. In that case it seems much more logical to highlight the adaptations of the Russian military during the war than the failure of the Ukrainian military.

Ok, then according to you Shoigu got a big promotion, that's not how I've seen WP:RS describe it. At the end of the day, he was replaced by an economist. That's not really the point though, the point is the Russian military's leadership issues, like the CRS source described the Russian military has been described to operate with a Soviet style centralized command and prioritizing political loyalty in officers over battlefield effectiveness, particularly after the Wagner incident. On an article about the Russian Armed Forces, that seems like notable information.

What about the very high casualties in the more recent Russian offensives, suffering over 70,000 casualties in 2 months in Kharkiv per the UK Defense Ministry? If you believe the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive should be included and in the lead nonetheless, I don't understand why you ignored more recent information about Russian offensives.

So I'll say it once again, if you want to update the article, look at the bigger WP:DUE picture and make edits in line with neutrality policy. TylerBurden (talk) 21:19, 23 July 2024 (UTC)

@User:XANTHO GENOS 5.5.2024 The same applies to you, no one has said the NATO commander in Europe and sources like Interfax-Ukraine and Politico are politically motivated in supporting Russia, so I have no idea what you are on about in this edit summary. If you want to add stuff to the article lead, establish the content firmly in the article body first, the lead is there to summarize the article for readers, not to function as an express train for content you want to be extra visible. This is an established guideline as described in WP:LEAD, and this is the second time you go against it in this article alone over the last 12 days. TylerBurden (talk) 16:08, 25 July 2024 (UTC)

Again, to act as a counterfact to a statement something must EXPLICTY deny it. So we would need a source saying it's not true, not saying something else is true (read wp:synthesis). Slatersteven (talk) 12:55, 25 July 2024 (UTC)

How big are their losses?

I read that Russia lost 600,000 soldiers since the war in Ukraine began but the active duty personnel size actually increased from just over 1 million in February 2022 (according to this article's history) to 1.3 million now. Is the difference because of increased recruitment/draft to make up for the losses? 2A02:A46A:2C29:1:B04C:9197:82EA:AE93 (talk) 17:20, 1 September 2024 (UTC)