Dillon v. Legg: Difference between revisions
Coolcaesar (talk | contribs) Expanding this |
Javert2113 (talk | contribs) Adding short description: "1968 Supreme Court of California case" |
||
| (16 intermediate revisions by 9 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Short description|1968 Supreme Court of California case}} |
|||
{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2023}} |
|||
{{Infobox California Supreme Court case |
{{Infobox California Supreme Court case |
||
|Litigants= Dillon v. Legg |
|Litigants= Dillon v. Legg |
||
| Line 6: | Line 8: | ||
|DecideYear= 1968 |
|DecideYear= 1968 |
||
|FullName= Margery M. Dillon v. David Luther Legg |
|FullName= Margery M. Dillon v. David Luther Legg |
||
|Citations= |
|Citations= [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1779068908894362158&q=dillon+legg&hl=en&as_sdt=2006 68 Cal.2d 728]<br>441 P.2d 912<br>69 Cal.Rptr. 72<br>29 A.L.R.3d 1316 |
||
|Prior= |
|Prior= |
||
|Subsequent= |
|Subsequent= |
||
|Holding= A bystander that suffers damages by the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. |
|Holding= A bystander that suffers damages by the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. |
||
|ChiefJudge=[[Roger J. Traynor]] |
|ChiefJudge=[[Roger J. Traynor]] |
||
|AssociateJudges=[[Mathew Tobriner]], [[Raymond E. Peters]], [[Stanley Mosk]], [[Raymond L. Sullivan]], [[Louis H. Burke]], [[ |
|AssociateJudges=[[Mathew Tobriner]], [[Raymond E. Peters]], [[Stanley Mosk]], [[Raymond L. Sullivan]], [[Louis H. Burke]], [[Marshall F. McComb]] |
||
|Majority= Tobriner |
|Majority= Tobriner |
||
|JoinMajority= Peters, Mosk, Sullivan |
|JoinMajority= Peters, Mosk, Sullivan |
||
| Line 26: | Line 28: | ||
==Background== |
==Background== |
||
A mother, Margery M. Dillon, and her daughter witnessed the death of her other child in a car accident caused by a [[negligent]] driver, David Luther Legg. Two-year-old Erin Dillon was crossing Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane in |
A mother, Margery M. Dillon, and her daughter Cheryl witnessed the death of her other child in a car accident caused by a [[negligent]] driver, David Luther Legg. Two-year-old Erin Dillon was fatally struck by Legg's vehicle while crossing Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane (near the Dillons' residence in the [[unincorporated area]] of [[Arden-Arcade, California|Arden-Arcade]] in [[Sacramento County, California|Sacramento County]]). The mother and daughter sued for emotional distress as a result of witnessing the accident. The trial court dismissed the claim under the prevailing zone of danger rule: the plaintiff needed to be in physical danger of the accident itself to recover for emotional distress.<ref>Henderson, J.A. et al. ''The Torts Process, Seventh Edition.'' Aspen Publishers, New York, NY: 2007, p. 305</ref><ref name="Meyer">{{cite book|last=Meyer|first=Robert G. |author2=Christopher M. Weaver|title=Law and mental health: a case-based approach |publisher=Guilford Press|date=December 15, 2005|isbn=1-59385-221-5|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_zU4PCsY774C&q=Dillon+v.+Legg&pg=PA182}}</ref> |
||
==Decision== |
==Decision== |
||
===Majority opinion=== |
===Majority opinion=== |
||
The court relied on [[foreseeability]] to establish whether or not a negligent defendant owed a [[duty of care]] to a bystander. The court urged a case |
The court relied on [[foreseeability]] to establish whether or not a negligent defendant owed a [[duty of care]] to a bystander. The court urged a [[Balancing test|case-by-case analysis of several factors]] to determine if foreseeability would create a duty to a bystander: |
||
*Whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident, |
*Whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident, |
||
| Line 43: | Line 45: | ||
===Burke's dissent=== |
===Burke's dissent=== |
||
In dissent, Justice Burke asserted that the majority had adopted arguments that were previously rejected in ''Amaya''. Burke criticized the guidelines offered by the majority as insufficient protection against possibly limitless liability. Burke viewed the limitations on liability inherent in the zone of danger rule as logical and necessary, and thought that such a pronounced change in liability rules should be adopted by the legislature and not the courts.<ref>''Dillon'', 68 Cal.2d at 749-52</ref> |
In dissent, Justice Burke asserted that the majority had adopted arguments that were previously rejected in ''Amaya''. Burke criticized the guidelines offered by the majority as insufficient protection against possibly limitless liability. Burke viewed the limitations on liability inherent in the zone of danger rule as logical and necessary, and thought that such a pronounced change in liability rules should be adopted by the legislature and not the courts.<ref>''Dillon'', 68 Cal.2d at 749-52</ref> |
||
==See also== |
|||
*''[[Thing v. La Chusa]]'' (1989) - transformed ''Dillon's'' test into a strict [[bright-line rule]] |
|||
==References== |
==References== |
||
| Line 49: | Line 54: | ||
==External links== |
==External links== |
||
*[http://www.audiocasefiles.com/acf_cases/9067-dillon-v-legg Edited text and audio of opinion at Audio Case Files] |
*[http://www.audiocasefiles.com/acf_cases/9067-dillon-v-legg Edited text and audio of opinion at Audio Case Files] |
||
| ⚫ | |||
[[Category: |
[[Category:United States negligence case law]] |
||
| ⚫ | |||
[[Category:1968 in United States case law]] |
[[Category:1968 in United States case law]] |
||
[[Category: |
[[Category:Supreme Court of California case law]] |
||
[[Category:1968 in California]] |
[[Category:1968 in California]] |
||
[[Category:History of Sacramento, California]] |
[[Category:History of Sacramento, California]] |
||
Latest revision as of 22:07, 13 December 2024
| Dillon v. Legg | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Decided June 21, 1968 | |
| Full case name | Margery M. Dillon v. David Luther Legg |
| Citation(s) | 68 Cal.2d 728 441 P.2d 912 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 |
| Holding | |
| A bystander that suffers damages by the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. | |
| Court membership | |
| Chief Justice | Roger J. Traynor |
| Associate Justices | Mathew Tobriner, Raymond E. Peters, Stanley Mosk, Raymond L. Sullivan, Louis H. Burke, Marshall F. McComb |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Tobriner, joined by Peters, Mosk, Sullivan |
| Dissent | Traynor |
| Dissent | Burke, joined by McComb |
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of California that established the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. To date, it is the most persuasive decision of the most persuasive state supreme court in the United States during the latter half of the 20th century: Dillon has been favorably cited and followed by at least twenty reported out-of-state appellate decisions, more than any other California appellate decision in the period from 1940 to 2005.[1] It was also favorably cited by the House of Lords in an important case on nervous shock, McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983].
Background
[edit]A mother, Margery M. Dillon, and her daughter Cheryl witnessed the death of her other child in a car accident caused by a negligent driver, David Luther Legg. Two-year-old Erin Dillon was fatally struck by Legg's vehicle while crossing Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane (near the Dillons' residence in the unincorporated area of Arden-Arcade in Sacramento County). The mother and daughter sued for emotional distress as a result of witnessing the accident. The trial court dismissed the claim under the prevailing zone of danger rule: the plaintiff needed to be in physical danger of the accident itself to recover for emotional distress.[2][3]
Decision
[edit]Majority opinion
[edit]The court relied on foreseeability to establish whether or not a negligent defendant owed a duty of care to a bystander. The court urged a case-by-case analysis of several factors to determine if foreseeability would create a duty to a bystander:
- Whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident,
- Whether the plaintiff suffered an emotional shock from contemporaneously observing the accident, and
- Whether the plaintiff is closely related to the victim
Using these criteria, the court determined that it was foreseeable that the negligent operation of an automobile could cause emotional distress to a mother witnessing the injury of her child in an accident.[4]
Traynor's dissent
[edit]In his dissenting opinion, Justice Traynor asserted that the case should have been decided according to the zone of danger rule enunciated in the case Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.[5]
Burke's dissent
[edit]In dissent, Justice Burke asserted that the majority had adopted arguments that were previously rejected in Amaya. Burke criticized the guidelines offered by the majority as insufficient protection against possibly limitless liability. Burke viewed the limitations on liability inherent in the zone of danger rule as logical and necessary, and thought that such a pronounced change in liability rules should be adopted by the legislature and not the courts.[6]
See also
[edit]- Thing v. La Chusa (1989) - transformed Dillon's test into a strict bright-line rule
References
[edit]- ^ Jake Dear and Edward W. Jessen, " Followed Rates" and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 683, 694(2007).
- ^ Henderson, J.A. et al. The Torts Process, Seventh Edition. Aspen Publishers, New York, NY: 2007, p. 305
- ^ Meyer, Robert G.; Christopher M. Weaver (December 15, 2005). Law and mental health: a case-based approach. Guilford Press. ISBN 1-59385-221-5.
- ^ Henderson, J.A. et al., p. 307
- ^ Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 748 (1968)
- ^ Dillon, 68 Cal.2d at 749-52