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| is_missile = yes |
| is_missile = yes |
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| name = KN-25 |
| name = KN-25 |
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| image = |
| image = [[File:KN 25.jpg|frameless]] |
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| image_size = |
| image_size = |
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| type = [[Short-range ballistic missile]]/[[Multiple rocket launcher]] |
| type = [[Short-range ballistic missile]]/[[Multiple rocket launcher]] |
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| yield = |
| yield = |
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| engine = |
| engine = |
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| guidance = |
| guidance = Possibly inertial with satellite |
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| accuracy = 80-90 m<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf</ref> |
| accuracy = 80-90 m<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref> |
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| launch_platform = Wheeled or tracked vehicle |
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| speed = |
| speed = |
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| length = {{cvt|8.2|m|abbr=on}} |
| length = {{cvt|8.2|m|abbr=on}} |
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| diameter = 600 mm |
| diameter = 600 mm KN24 450 mm KN25 MRL |
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| weight = {{cvt|3000|kg|abbr=on}} |
| weight = {{cvt|3000|kg|abbr=on}} |
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| payload_capacity = {{cvt|300|kg|abbr=on}} |
| payload_capacity = {{cvt|300|kg|abbr=on}} |
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<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf</ref> |
<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref> |
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| design_date = 2019 |
| design_date = 2019 |
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| manufacturer = |
| manufacturer = |
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| unit_cost = |
| unit_cost = |
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| service = |
| service = |
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| used_by = |
| used_by = [[North Korea]] |
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| wars = |
| wars = |
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}} |
}} |
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==Design== |
==Design== |
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The KN-25 is officially described |
The KN-25 is officially described as a "super-large calibre" multiple launch rocket system. The larger size and greater range of the missile compared to traditional [[rocket artillery]] led the [[United States Forces Korea]] (USFK) to categorize it as an SRBM. It flies on a controlled ballistic trajectory. Missiles are estimated to be 600 mm in diameter, 8.2 meters long, and weigh 3,000 kg. They have an unspecified guidance system and have six rotating rear fins, with four moving forward fins, which likely provide the attitude control of the rocket. They are mounted on either a four-tube [[Tatra 813]] 8×8 wheeled [[transporter-erector-launcher]] (TEL),<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|date=March 23, 2020|title=Analysis of the KN-25 Multiple Rocket Launcher System after the 9 March 2020 DPRK Test|url=https://datayo.org/p/stories/8aILhAlEbecspf95/analysis-of-the-kn-25-multiple-rocket-launcher-system-after-the-9-march-2020-dprk-test|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211012112931/https://datayo.org/p/stories/8aILhAlEbecspf95/analysis-of-the-kn-25-multiple-rocket-launcher-system-after-the-9-march-2020-dprk-test|archive-date=2021-10-12|access-date=2021-10-26}}</ref> or a tracked chassis with 10 road wheels on each side, carrying six tubes.<ref name="onn13feb23">[https://opennuclear.org/publication/update-dprks-600-mm-multiple-launch-rocket-system Update on the DPRK's 600 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System]. ''Open Nuclear Network''. 13 February 2023.</ref> |
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It is a battlefield weapon, suitable for deployment at [[battalion]]-level, to attack enemy rear-echelon targets out to 380 km, with a conventional blast-fragmentation warhead.<ref name="missilethreat">[https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-25/ KN-25]. ''Missile Threat'', [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]].</ref><ref>[https://www.38north.org/2020/03/melleman030620/ North Korea's Recent KN-25 Launches]. ''[[38 North]]''. 6 March 2020.</ref> In October 2022, the KN-25 was included in a statement among other missiles that North Korea claimed were part of its capability to deliver [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s.<ref>[https://www.38north.org/2022/10/a-strong-military-warning-four-key-implications-of-north-koreas-october-10-missile-statement/#_ftn1 “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement]. ''[[38 North]]''. 14 October 2022.</ref> At a parade in February 2023, the KN-25 was included among other missiles which the North Korean press collectively referred to these as "tactical nuclear weapons operation units."<ref>[https://www.38north.org/2023/02/north-koreas-feb-8-parade-highlights-icbms-and-tactical-nukes/ North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes]. ''[[38 North]]''. 15 February 2023.</ref> |
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| ⚫ | The six rotating rear fins are an unusual feature for rocket artillery, a considerable innovation of North Korea. Their purpose is to provide stabilisation of the rocket while in flight, compared to other rocket artillery rounds, which are usually spin stabilised by rotating the entire body. This method of stabilisation creates a more favourable environment for the guidance systems, as the rest of the missile does not rotate.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea|url=https://oneearthfuture.org/research-analysis/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea|access-date=2021-10-26|website=oneearthfuture.org|language=en|archive-date=2022-03-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220329044241/https://oneearthfuture.org/research-analysis/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea|url-status=dead}}</ref> It is possible that the missile will be stabilised through rolling the missile when it enters the upper atmosphere, where the smaller control fins are unable to function optimally, and then stopping the spin as it re-enters into denser air.<ref name=":0" /> |
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| ⚫ | The six rotating rear fins are an unusual feature for rocket artillery, a considerable innovation of North Korea. Their purpose is to provide stabilisation of the rocket while in flight, compared to other rocket artillery rounds, which are usually spin stabilised by rotating the entire body. This method of stabilisation creates a more favourable environment for the guidance systems, as the rest of the missile does not rotate.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea|url=https://oneearthfuture.org/research-analysis/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea|access-date=2021-10-26|website=oneearthfuture.org|language=en|archive-date=2022-03-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220329044241/https://oneearthfuture.org/research-analysis/brief-defence-development-exhibition-democratic-peoples-republic-korea|url-status=dead}}</ref> It is possible that the missile will be stabilised through rolling the missile when it enters the upper atmosphere, where the smaller control fins are unable to function optimally, and then stopping the spin as it re-enters into denser air.<ref name=":0" /> |
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| ⚫ | The missile possibly derives from the [[OTR-21 Tochka]]/[[KN-02 Toksa]], which has a similarly sized motor, at 62 cm diameter. Connecting three such motor segments would result in a length similar to |
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| ⚫ | The missile possibly derives from the [[OTR-21 Tochka]]/[[KN-02 Toksa]], which has a similarly sized motor, at 62 cm diameter. Connecting three such motor segments would result in a length similar to the KN-25 rocket.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Pukguksong MLRS|url=http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_MLRS/index.htm|access-date=2021-10-26|website=www.b14643.de}}</ref> It has a 300 kg heavy warhead and [[circular error probable]] accuracy of 80 to 90 meters.<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref> The KN-25 is likely an indigenous project, as media coverage of this missile emphasises its research, using words such as 'Juche projectiles' to describe it, unlike the KN-23.<ref>{{Cite web|title=a tale of two missiles: analysis of kcna reports on north koreas kn-23 and kn-24 short range ballistic missiles|url=https://datayo.org/p/stories/8jzzpJxnZhMCzDA6/a-tale-of-two-missiles-analysis-of-kcna-reports-on-north-koreas-kn-23-and-kn-24-short-range-ballistic-missiles|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210115110740/https://datayo.org/p/stories/8jzzpJxnZhMCzDA6/a-tale-of-two-missiles-analysis-of-kcna-reports-on-north-koreas-kn-23-and-kn-24-short-range-ballistic-missiles|archive-date=2021-01-15}}</ref> |
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KN-25 has 300 kilogram heavy warhead and circular error probable accuracy of 80 to 90 meters.<ref>https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf</ref> |
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30 TELs were presented as a gift to the plenary meeting of the Worker's Party of Korea |
On January 1, 2023, 30 TELs were presented as a gift to the plenary meeting of the Worker's Party of Korea, with Kim Jong-un attending and making a speech.<ref>{{Cite web |title=KCNA {{!}} Article {{!}} Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Reply Speech at Ceremony of Donating 600mm Super-large Multiple Launch Rocket System |url=http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/50ef67e21e186c3c6c68b1dad2067290.kcmsf |access-date=2023-01-03 |website=kcna.kp}}</ref> The system was described as 'unprecedented', in both the munitions industry as having no equal and its presentation, being on the lawn of the party central committee.<ref>{{Cite web |title=KCNA {{!}} Article {{!}} Gift of Loyalty to Plenary Meeting of Great WPK from Munitions Industrial Workers |url=http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/62e6b8bc2246e848838a1467933d43fc.kcmsf |access-date=2023-01-03 |website=kcna.kp}}</ref> 30 6-tube tracked launchers plus at least nine 4-tube wheeled launchers publicly showcased in North Korea's possession, would give them the ability to fire up to 216 projectiles, requiring many fewer launch vehicles than would be needed to fire a similar number of traditional ballistic missiles, to saturate South Korean [[ballistic missile defense]]s.<ref name="onn13feb23"/> |
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===Cruise missile launcher=== |
===Cruise missile launcher=== |
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On 13 September 2021, North Korea announced they had conducted successful flight tests of a [[Land-attack missile|land attack]] [[cruise missile]] (LACM) over the past two days. The mobile launcher appears to be the same vehicle used to carry KN-25 "oversized" rockets, both weapons likely being similar in diameter. The cruise missile could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead |
On 13 September 2021, North Korea announced they had conducted successful flight tests of a [[Land-attack missile|land attack]] [[cruise missile]] (LACM) over the past two days. The mobile launcher appears to be the same vehicle used to carry KN-25 "oversized" rockets, both weapons likely being similar in diameter. The cruise missile could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead. It is claimed to have a range from {{cvt|1500|km|abbr=on}}<ref>[https://www.38north.org/2021/09/initial-analysis-of-north-koreas-new-type-long-range-cruise-missile/ Initial Analysis of North Korea's “New Type Long-Range Cruise Missile”]. ''[[38 North]]''. 15 September 2021.</ref> to {{cvt|2000|km|abbr=on}}. It was later revealed to be named the [[Hwasal-2|Hwasal-1/2]].<ref>[https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-launches-four-hwasal-2-lacms-to-show-strong-deterrence-and-rapid-response/ North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response]. ''[[38 North]]''. 1 March 2023.</ref> |
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==Tests== |
==Tests== |
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|18 March 2024 |
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|Six<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-03-18 |title=North Korea: Kim Jong Un Supervised Tests of Artillery Systems Targeting Seoul |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-kim-jong-un-supervised-tests-of-artillery-systems-targeting-seoul/7533375.html |access-date=2024-03-19 |website=Voice of America |language=en}}</ref> |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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*[http://www.military-today.com/artillery/kn_25.htm KN-25]. Military-Today |
*[http://www.military-today.com/artillery/kn_25.htm KN-25]{{dead link|date=December 2024|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}. Military-Today |
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{{DPRK missiles}} |
{{DPRK missiles}} |
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Latest revision as of 19:51, 22 December 2024
| KN-25 | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Type | Short-range ballistic missile/Multiple rocket launcher |
| Service history | |
| Used by | North Korea |
| Production history | |
| Designed | 2019 |
| Specifications | |
| Mass | 3,000 kg (6,600 lb) |
| Length | 8.2 m (27 ft) |
| Diameter | 600 mm KN24 450 mm KN25 MRL |
Operational range | 380 km (240 mi) |
Guidance system | Possibly inertial with satellite |
| Accuracy | 80-90 m[2] |
Launch platform | Wheeled or tracked vehicle |
KN-25 is a designation given to a North Korean tactical ballistic missile.
Design
[edit]The KN-25 is officially described as a "super-large calibre" multiple launch rocket system. The larger size and greater range of the missile compared to traditional rocket artillery led the United States Forces Korea (USFK) to categorize it as an SRBM. It flies on a controlled ballistic trajectory. Missiles are estimated to be 600 mm in diameter, 8.2 meters long, and weigh 3,000 kg. They have an unspecified guidance system and have six rotating rear fins, with four moving forward fins, which likely provide the attitude control of the rocket. They are mounted on either a four-tube Tatra 813 8×8 wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL),[3] or a tracked chassis with 10 road wheels on each side, carrying six tubes.[4]
It is a battlefield weapon, suitable for deployment at battalion-level, to attack enemy rear-echelon targets out to 380 km, with a conventional blast-fragmentation warhead.[5][6] In October 2022, the KN-25 was included in a statement among other missiles that North Korea claimed were part of its capability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons.[7] At a parade in February 2023, the KN-25 was included among other missiles which the North Korean press collectively referred to these as "tactical nuclear weapons operation units."[8]
The six rotating rear fins are an unusual feature for rocket artillery, a considerable innovation of North Korea. Their purpose is to provide stabilisation of the rocket while in flight, compared to other rocket artillery rounds, which are usually spin stabilised by rotating the entire body. This method of stabilisation creates a more favourable environment for the guidance systems, as the rest of the missile does not rotate.[9] It is possible that the missile will be stabilised through rolling the missile when it enters the upper atmosphere, where the smaller control fins are unable to function optimally, and then stopping the spin as it re-enters into denser air.[3]
The missile possibly derives from the OTR-21 Tochka/KN-02 Toksa, which has a similarly sized motor, at 62 cm diameter. Connecting three such motor segments would result in a length similar to the KN-25 rocket.[10] It has a 300 kg heavy warhead and circular error probable accuracy of 80 to 90 meters.[11] The KN-25 is likely an indigenous project, as media coverage of this missile emphasises its research, using words such as 'Juche projectiles' to describe it, unlike the KN-23.[12]
On January 1, 2023, 30 TELs were presented as a gift to the plenary meeting of the Worker's Party of Korea, with Kim Jong-un attending and making a speech.[13] The system was described as 'unprecedented', in both the munitions industry as having no equal and its presentation, being on the lawn of the party central committee.[14] 30 6-tube tracked launchers plus at least nine 4-tube wheeled launchers publicly showcased in North Korea's possession, would give them the ability to fire up to 216 projectiles, requiring many fewer launch vehicles than would be needed to fire a similar number of traditional ballistic missiles, to saturate South Korean ballistic missile defenses.[4]
Cruise missile launcher
[edit]On 13 September 2021, North Korea announced they had conducted successful flight tests of a land attack cruise missile (LACM) over the past two days. The mobile launcher appears to be the same vehicle used to carry KN-25 "oversized" rockets, both weapons likely being similar in diameter. The cruise missile could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead. It is claimed to have a range from 1,500 km (930 mi)[15] to 2,000 km (1,200 mi). It was later revealed to be named the Hwasal-1/2.[16]
Tests
[edit]| Date[5][3] | Number fired | Range | Apogee | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 July 2019 | Two | 21 minute firing interval, dubious projectile; thin warhead, but different shape to the smaller KN-09 (MRL) | ||
| 2 August 2019 | Two | 24 minute firing interval, tracked chassis | ||
| 24 August 2019 | Two | 380 km | 97 km | 17 minute firing interval |
| 10 September 2019 | Two | 330 km (210 mi) | 50-60 km | 19 minute firing interval, another rocket possibly failed to properly launch. |
| 31 October 2019 | Two | 370 km (230 mi) | 90 km | 3 minute firing interval |
| 28 November 2019 | Two | 380 km | 97 km | 30 second firing interval |
| 2 March 2020 | Two | 240 km (150 mi) | 35 km | 20 second firing interval, first time seen operated by artillery soldiers, potentially reached initial operating capacity. |
| 29 March 2020[17] | Two or three | 230 kilometres (140 mi) | 30 km | unknown firing interval, possibly around 1 minute, another rocket possibly failed to properly launch. |
| 31 December 2022 | Three[18] | |||
| 1 January 2023 | One[18] | |||
| 18 March 2024 | Six[19] |
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
- ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
- ^ a b c "Analysis of the KN-25 Multiple Rocket Launcher System after the 9 March 2020 DPRK Test". March 23, 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-10-12. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
- ^ a b Update on the DPRK's 600 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System. Open Nuclear Network. 13 February 2023.
- ^ a b KN-25. Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- ^ North Korea's Recent KN-25 Launches. 38 North. 6 March 2020.
- ^ “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement. 38 North. 14 October 2022.
- ^ North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes. 38 North. 15 February 2023.
- ^ "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". oneearthfuture.org. Archived from the original on 2022-03-29. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
- ^ "Pukguksong MLRS". www.b14643.de. Retrieved 2021-10-26.
- ^ https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf [bare URL PDF]
- ^ "a tale of two missiles: analysis of kcna reports on north koreas kn-23 and kn-24 short range ballistic missiles". Archived from the original on 2021-01-15.
- ^ "KCNA | Article | Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Reply Speech at Ceremony of Donating 600mm Super-large Multiple Launch Rocket System". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
- ^ "KCNA | Article | Gift of Loyalty to Plenary Meeting of Great WPK from Munitions Industrial Workers". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
- ^ Initial Analysis of North Korea's “New Type Long-Range Cruise Missile”. 38 North. 15 September 2021.
- ^ North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response. 38 North. 1 March 2023.
- ^ "North Korea Fine Tunes its Precision Strike Capabilities Amidst Pandemic". Beyond Parallel. 2020-03-30. Retrieved 2021-03-12.
- ^ a b "KCNA | Article | Latest News | Test-fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Held". kcna.kp. Retrieved 2023-01-03.
- ^ "North Korea: Kim Jong Un Supervised Tests of Artillery Systems Targeting Seoul". Voice of America. 2024-03-18. Retrieved 2024-03-19.