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{{Short description|Internal commission convened by NASA}}
{{Short description|NASA Internal commission re 2003 Shuttle Columbia loss }}
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{{Use American English|date=January 2014}}
{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board}}
{{DISPLAYTITLE:''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board}}
{{Main|Space Shuttle Columbia disaster}}
{{Main|Space Shuttle Columbia disaster}}
⚫
{{More footnotes|date=September 2009}}
⚫
{{Use American English|date=January 2014}}
[[File:Columbia Memorial.JPG|thumb|300px|right|''Columbia'' memorial in [[Arlington National Cemetery]]]]
[[File:Columbia Memorial.JPG|thumb|300px|right|''Columbia'' memorial in [[Arlington National Cemetery]]]]
The '''''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board''' ('''CAIB''') was an internal commission convened by [[NASA]] to investigate the [[Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|destruction]] of the [[Space Shuttle Columbia|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'']] during [[STS-107]] upon atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003. The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank, forming debris which damaged the orbiter's wing, and that the problem of "debris shedding" was well known but considered "acceptable" by management. The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights. The CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.
The '''''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board''' ('''CAIB''') was an internal commission convened by [[NASA]] to investigate the [[Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|destruction]] of the [[Space Shuttle Columbia|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'']] during [[STS-107]] upon atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003.<ref>{{Cite web |title=NASA Columbia disaster: The investigation into one of history's worst space tragedies - and its lasting legacy |url=https://news.sky.com/story/nasa-columbia-disaster-the-investigation-into-one-of-historys-worst-space-tragedies-and-its-lasting-legacy-12796499 |access-date=2023-02-01 |website=Sky News}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author1=Howell |first=Elizabeth |date=2023-02-01 |title=20 years after Columbia shuttle tragedy, NASA pledges 'acute awareness' of astronaut safety |url=https://www.space.com/columbia-space-shuttle-tragedy-20-year-anniversary |access-date=2023-02-01 |website=Space.com}}</ref> The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank, forming debris which damaged the orbiter's wing, and that the problem of "debris shedding" was well known but considered "acceptable" by management.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Deignan |first=Owen |date=2022-11-13 |title=What caused the space shuttle Columbia explosion? |url=https://www.rebellionresearch.com/what-caused-the-space-shuttle-columbia-explosion |access-date=2023-02-01 |website=Rebellion Research |language=en-US}}</ref> The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights. The CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2003-08-24 |title=The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) |url=https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/CAIB.html |access-date=2023-04-05 |website=NASA |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-09-30 |title=Space Shuttle Columbia Fast Facts |url=https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/us/space-shuttle-columbia-fast-facts/index.html |access-date=2023-02-01 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Langewiesche |first=William |date=2003-11-01 |title=Columbia's Last Flight |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbias-last-flight/304204/ |access-date=2023-02-01 |website=The Atlantic |language=en}}</ref>


==Major findings==
==Major findings==
Line 13: Line 14:
82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material, the "left bipod foam ramp", broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels.
82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material, the "left bipod foam ramp", broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels.


During re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this damage allowed super-heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction of ''Columbia''. It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam, from this particular area of the external tank, breaking free during launch, and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage.<ref name="caib_report">{{cite web
During re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this damage allowed super-heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction of ''Columbia''. It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam, from this particular area of the external tank, breaking free during launch, and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage.<ref name="caib_report">{{cite web |last1=Gehman |first1=Harold |last2=Barry |first2=John |last3=Deal |first3=Duane |last4=Hallock |first4=James |last5=Hess |first5=Kenneth |last6=Hubbard |first6=G. Scott |last7=Logsdon |first7=John |last8=Logsdon |first8=John |last9=Ride |first9=Sally |date=August 26, 2003 |title=Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board |url=https://ntrs.nasa.gov/enwiki/api/citations/20030066167/downloads/20030066167.pdf |accessdate=July 19, 2021 |publisher=NASA |authorlink1=Harold W. Gehman Jr. |authorlink4=James N. Hallock |authorlink6=G. Scott Hubbard |authorlink7=John Logsdon |authorlink8=Douglas D. Osheroff |authorlink9=Sally Ride |last10=Tetrault |first10=Roger |last11=Turcotte |first11=Stephen |authorlink11=Stephen A. Turcotte |last12=Wallace |first12=Steven |last13=Widnall |first13=Sheila |authorlink13=Sheila Widnall |volume=1}}</ref>
| last1 = Gehman
| first1 = Harold
| authorlink1 = Harold W. Gehman Jr.
| last2 = Barry
| first2 = John
| last3 = Deal
| first3 = Duane
| last4 = Hallock
| first4 = James
| authorlink4 = James N. Hallock
| last5 = Hess
| first5 = Kenneth
| last6 = Hubbard
| first6 = G. Scott
| authorlink6 = G. Scott Hubbard
| last7 = Logsdon
| first7 = John
| authorlink7 = John Logsdon
| last8 = Logsdon
| first8 = John
| authorlink8 = Douglas D. Osheroff
| last9 = Ride
| first9 = Sally
| authorlink9 = Sally Ride
| last10 = Tetrault
| first10 = Roger
| last11 = Turcotte
| first11 = Stephen
| authorlink11 = Stephen A. Turcotte
| last12 = Wallace
| first12 = Steven
| last13 = Widnall
| first13 = Sheila
| authorlink13 = Sheila E. Widnall
| title = Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board
| volume = 1
| publisher = NASA
| date = August 26, 2003
| url = http://s3.amazonaws.com/akamai.netstorage/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_full.pdf
| accessdate = July 19, 2021 }}</ref>


===Organizational cause of the accident===
===Organizational cause of the accident===
The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always, minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA for visual inspection, feeling that it would be like a car going down a highway and hitting a Styrofoam cooler.{{citation needed|date=April 2021}}
The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always, minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA (extravehicular activity) for visual inspection, feeling that it would be like a car going down a highway and hitting a Styrofoam cooler.{{citation needed|date=April 2021}}


== Board recommendations ==<!-- This section is linked from [[Space Shuttle Endeavour]] -->
== Board recommendations ==<!-- This section is linked from [[Space Shuttle Endeavour]] -->
Line 67: Line 28:
*Recertify all shuttle components by the year 2010
*Recertify all shuttle components by the year 2010
*Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.
*Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.
*Retire the space shuttle.<ref name="caib_report" />


Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations.
Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations.
Line 73: Line 35:
After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew its [[STS-114|first post-''Columbia'' mission]] in 2005. As part of the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm, which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage. As all but one of the post-''Columbia'' missions were concentrated on the [[International Space Station]], primarily to provide a "safe haven" in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods, NASA implemented a [[STS-3xx]] contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice, similar to the [[Skylab Rescue]] that was planned during the [[Skylab]] program.
After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew its [[STS-114|first post-''Columbia'' mission]] in 2005. As part of the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm, which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage. As all but one of the post-''Columbia'' missions were concentrated on the [[International Space Station]], primarily to provide a "safe haven" in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods, NASA implemented a [[STS-3xx]] contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice, similar to the [[Skylab Rescue]] that was planned during the [[Skylab]] program.


NASA retired the [[Space Shuttle]] fleet on July 21, 2011 after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing of ''Atlantis''. The Shuttle's replacement, [[Orion (Constellation program)|Orion]], was to have consisted of an [[Apollo Command/Service Module|Apollo-derived]] spacecraft launched on the [[Ares I]] rocket, which would use a [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster]] as its first stage. Orion would not face the dangers of either an O-ring failure (due to the presence of a [[launch escape system]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |title=Orion &#124; Lockheed Martin |access-date=2011-05-01 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110505180822/http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |archive-date=2011-05-05 }}</ref>) or shedding foam (as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration). In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft was (as part of [[Project Constellation]]) to allow NASA to return to the Moon.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |title=Orion &#124; Lockheed Martin |access-date=2011-05-01 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110505180822/http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |archive-date=2011-05-05 }}</ref> President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with the [[Space Launch System]] (SLS) and [[Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle]] (MPCV) programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit.<ref>[http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html NASA.gov]</ref>
NASA retired the [[Space Shuttle]] fleet on July 21, 2011, after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing of ''Atlantis''. The Shuttle's replacement, [[Orion (Constellation program)|Orion]], was to have consisted of an [[Apollo Command/Service Module|Apollo-derived]] spacecraft launched on the [[Ares I]] rocket, which would use a [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster]] as its first stage. Orion would not face the dangers of either an O-ring failure (due to the presence of a [[launch escape system]]<ref name="lockheedmartin">{{cite web |title=Orion |url=http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110505180822/http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/Orion/index.html |archive-date=2011-05-05 |access-date=2011-05-01 |website=Lockheed Martin}}</ref>) or shedding foam (as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration). In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft was (as part of [[Project Constellation]]) to allow NASA to return to the Moon.<ref name="lockheedmartin" /> President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with the [[Space Launch System]] (SLS) and [[Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle]] (MPCV) programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit.<ref>{{Cite web |title=About the Space Launch System & Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle |url=http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110427020225/http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html |archive-date=2011-04-27 |access-date=2011-05-01}}</ref>


==Board members==
==Board members==
Line 83: Line 45:
*[[Maj. General John Barry]], Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters [[Air Force Materiel Command]]
*[[Maj. General John Barry]], Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters [[Air Force Materiel Command]]
*[[Kenneth W. Hess|Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess]], Commander, [[Air Force Safety Center]]
*[[Kenneth W. Hess|Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess]], Commander, [[Air Force Safety Center]]
*[[James N. Hallock|Dr. James N. Hallock]], Chief, Aviation Safety Division, [[U.S. Department of Transportation]], Volpe Center
*[[James N. Hallock|Dr. James N. Hallock]], Chief, Aviation Safety Division, [[U.S. Department of Transportation]], [[John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center|Volpe Center]]
*[[Steven B. Wallace|Mr. Steven B. Wallace]], Director of Accident Investigation, [[Federal Aviation Administration]]
*[[Steven B. Wallace|Mr. Steven B. Wallace]], Director of Accident Investigation, [[Federal Aviation Administration]]
*[[Duane Deal|Brig. General Duane Deal]], Commander, 21st Space Wing, [[USAF|United States Air Force]]
*[[Duane Deal|Brig. General Duane Deal]], Commander, 21st Space Wing, [[USAF|United States Air Force]]
Line 90: Line 52:
*[[Sheila E. Widnall|Dr. Sheila E. Widnall]], Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems, [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]]
*[[Sheila E. Widnall|Dr. Sheila E. Widnall]], Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems, [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]]
*[[Douglas D. Osheroff|Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff]], Professor of Physics and Applied Physics, [[Stanford University]]
*[[Douglas D. Osheroff|Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff]], Professor of Physics and Applied Physics, [[Stanford University]]
*[[Sally Ride|Dr. Sally Ride]], Former astronaut and professor of Space Science, [[University of California, San Diego]]
*[[Sally Ride|Dr. Sally Ride]], Former astronaut and professor of Space Science, [[University of California, San Diego]]. Only board member to serve on both the Challenger and Columbia accident boards.
*[[John Logsdon|Dr. John Logsdon]], Director of the Space Policy Institute, [[George Washington University]]
*[[John Logsdon|Dr. John Logsdon]], Director of the Space Policy Institute, [[George Washington University]]


Line 140: Line 102:
*Michael J. Aftosmis
*Michael J. Aftosmis
{{div col end}}
{{div col end}}

<ref>{{cite web |url=http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |title=CAIB |access-date=2012-05-28 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120522072615/http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |archive-date=2012-05-22 }}</ref>
Source:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |title=CAIB |access-date=2012-05-28 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120522072615/http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |archive-date=2012-05-22 }}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==
* [[Apollo 204 Review Board]] ([[Apollo 1]] fire)
* [[Apollo 204 Review Board]] ([[Apollo 1]] fire)
* [[Rogers Commission]]
* {{annotated link|Rogers Commission Report}}


==References==
==References==
⚫
{{More footnotes|date=September 2009}}
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist}}


Line 154: Line 116:
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20041109135216/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/CAIB_medres_full.pdf CAIB Final Report, Volume 1 (August 26, 2003)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20041109135216/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/CAIB_medres_full.pdf CAIB Final Report, Volume 1 (August 26, 2003)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20041030155825/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/index.html STS-107 Investigation Reference Page]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20041030155825/http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/investigation/index.html STS-107 Investigation Reference Page]
* [http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html NASA SLS MPCV] Retrieved April 30, 2011
* [http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html NASA SLS MPCV] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110427020225/http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/new_space_enterprise/sls_mpcv/index.html |date=2011-04-27 }} Retrieved April 30, 2011


==External links==
==External links==

Latest revision as of 20:05, 3 August 2024

Main article: Space Shuttle Columbia disaster

Columbia memorial in Arlington National Cemetery

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was an internal commission convened by NASA to investigate the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia during STS-107 upon atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003.[1][2] The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank, forming debris which damaged the orbiter's wing, and that the problem of "debris shedding" was well known but considered "acceptable" by management.[3] The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights. The CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.[4][5][6]

Major findings

[edit]

The board found both the immediate physical cause of the accident and also what it called organizational causes.

Immediate cause of the accident

[edit]
Close-up photo of left Bipod Foam Ramp

82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material, the "left bipod foam ramp", broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels.

During re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this damage allowed super-heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction of Columbia. It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam, from this particular area of the external tank, breaking free during launch, and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage.[7]

Organizational cause of the accident

[edit]

The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always, minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA (extravehicular activity) for visual inspection, feeling that it would be like a car going down a highway and hitting a Styrofoam cooler.[citation needed]

Board recommendations

[edit]

The board made 29 specific recommendations to NASA to improve the safety of future shuttle flights. These recommendations include:

  • Foam from external tank should not break free
  • Better pre-flight inspection routines
  • Increase quality of images available of shuttle during ascent and on-flight
  • Recertify all shuttle components by the year 2010
  • Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.
  • Retire the space shuttle.[7]

Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations.

Shuttle program after the CAIB report

[edit]

After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew its first post-Columbia mission in 2005. As part of the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm, which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage. As all but one of the post-Columbia missions were concentrated on the International Space Station, primarily to provide a "safe haven" in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods, NASA implemented a STS-3xx contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice, similar to the Skylab Rescue that was planned during the Skylab program.

NASA retired the Space Shuttle fleet on July 21, 2011, after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing of Atlantis. The Shuttle's replacement, Orion, was to have consisted of an Apollo-derived spacecraft launched on the Ares I rocket, which would use a Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster as its first stage. Orion would not face the dangers of either an O-ring failure (due to the presence of a launch escape system[8]) or shedding foam (as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration). In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft was (as part of Project Constellation) to allow NASA to return to the Moon.[8] President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit.[9]

Board members

[edit]

Chairman of the board

Board members

Board support

[edit]
  • Ex Officio Member: Lt. Col. Michael J. Bloomfield, NASA Astronaut
  • Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron M. Bradley Jr., NASA Chief Engineer

Partial list of additional investigators and CAIB support staff

[edit]
  • Col Timothy Bair
  • Col. Jack Anthony
  • Dr. James P. Bagian
  • Lt. Col. Richard J. Burgess
  • Thomas L. Carter
  • Dr. Dwayne A. Day
  • Major Tracy Dillinger
  • Thomas L. Foster
  • CDR Mike Francis
  • Howard E. Goldstein
  • Lt. Col Patrick A. Goodman
  • Lt. Matthew E. Granger
  • Ronald K. Gress
  • Thomas Haueter
  • Dr. Daniel Heimerdinger
  • Dennis R. Jenkins
  • Dr. Christopher Kirchhoff
  • Dr. Gregory T. A. Kovacs
  • John F. Lehman
  • Jim Mosquera
  • Gary Olson
  • Gregory Phillips
  • David B. Pye
  • Lester A. Reingold
  • Donald J. Rigali
  • Dr. James. W. Smiley
  • G. Mark Tanner
  • Lt. Col. Wade J. Thompson
  • Dr. Edward Tufte[10]
  • Bob Vallaster
  • Dr. Diane Vaughan, sociologist
  • Lt. Col. Donald J. White
  • Dr. Paul D. Wilde
  • LCDR Johnny R. Wolfe Jr.
  • Richard W. Russell
  • Mr. Daniel W. Haros
  • Dr. Robert E. Green Jr.
  • Dr. Stuart E. Rogers
  • Dr. Reynaldo J. Gomez
  • Michael J. Aftosmis

Source:[11]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ "NASA Columbia disaster: The investigation into one of history's worst space tragedies - and its lasting legacy". Sky News. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  2. ^ Howell, Elizabeth (2023-02-01). "20 years after Columbia shuttle tragedy, NASA pledges 'acute awareness' of astronaut safety". Space.com. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  3. ^ Deignan, Owen (2022-11-13). "What caused the space shuttle Columbia explosion?". Rebellion Research. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  4. ^ "The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)". NASA. 2003-08-24. Retrieved 2023-04-05.
  5. ^ "Space Shuttle Columbia Fast Facts". CNN. 2013-09-30. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  6. ^ Langewiesche, William (2003-11-01). "Columbia's Last Flight". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  7. ^ a b Gehman, Harold; Barry, John; Deal, Duane; Hallock, James; Hess, Kenneth; Hubbard, G. Scott; Logsdon, John; Logsdon, John; Ride, Sally; Tetrault, Roger; Turcotte, Stephen; Wallace, Steven; Widnall, Sheila (August 26, 2003). "Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board" (PDF). NASA. Retrieved July 19, 2021.
  8. ^ a b "Orion". Lockheed Martin. Archived from the original on 2011-05-05. Retrieved 2011-05-01.
  9. ^ "About the Space Launch System & Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle". Archived from the original on 2011-04-27. Retrieved 2011-05-01.
  10. ^ NASA.gov
  11. ^ "CAIB". Archived from the original on 2012-05-22. Retrieved 2012-05-28.

Sources

[edit]
[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/enwiki/w/index.php?title=Columbia_Accident_Investigation_Board&oldid=1238420874"