British entry into World War I: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added

Inline

Latest revision as of 17:53, 4 November 2024

The United Kingdom entered World War I on 4 August 1914, when King George V declared war after the expiry of an ultimatum to the German Empire. The official explanation focused on protecting Belgium as a neutral country; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control of Western Europe. The Liberal Party was in power with prime minister H. H. Asquith and foreign minister Edward Grey leading the way. The Liberal cabinet made the decision, although the party had been strongly anti-war until the last minute. The Conservative Party was pro-war. The Liberals knew that if they split on the war issue, they would lose control of the government to the Conservatives.

Background

For much of the 19th century, Britain pursued a foreign policy later known as splendid isolation, which sought to maintain the balance of power in Europe without formal alliances. As Europe divided into two power blocs during the 1890s, the 1895–1905 Conservative government realised this left Britain dangerously exposed.^[1] This resulted in the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, followed by King Edward VII's 1903 visit to Paris. By reducing anti-British feeling in France, it led to the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the first tangible effect of which was British support for France against Germany in the 1905 Moroccan Crisis.

In 1907, the new Liberal government agreed to the Anglo-Russian Convention. Like the Entente, the Convention focused on resolving colonial disputes; but by doing so, it paved the way for wider co-operation and allowed Britain to refocus its naval resources in response to German naval expansion.^[2]

The 1911 Agadir Crisis encouraged secret military negotiations between France and Britain in the case of war with the German Empire. A British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men would be landed in France within two weeks of war, while naval arrangements allocated responsibility for the Mediterranean Sea to the French Navy, with the Royal Navy looking after the North Sea and the English Channel, including Northern France.^[3]

Antagonism with Germany

In explaining why Britain went to war with Germany, British historian Paul Kennedy (1980) argued that a critical factor was the British realisation that Germany was rapidly becoming economically more powerful than Britain. It was in essence not a consequence of the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the Baghdad Railway, the confrontations in Eastern Europe, highly-charged political rhetoric, or domestic pressure groups. Germany's reliance time and again on military aggression, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, also played a role, especially in portraying the invasion of neutral Belgium as (in the German view) a necessary military tactic or (in the British view) a profound moral crime. The German invasion of Belgium was not the real cause of war with Britain, because the British decision had already been made as the British were more concerned with the fate of France (pp. 457–62).^{[clarification needed]} Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of the war of 1870, when Prussia and the German states smashed France, would mean that a rapidly industrialising Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the English Channel and northwest France. British policy-makers insisted that that would be a catastrophe for British security.^[4]

Christopher Clark points out that the British cabinet decided on 29 July 1914, that being a signatory to the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgium's frontiers did not oblige it to oppose a German invasion of Belgium with military force.^[5]

Decision for war

In the immediate aftermath of the assassination on 28 June of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the heir to the Habsburg throne) in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, the British newspapers denounced the Serbian nationalist assassin, Gavrilo Princip, and were generally sympathetic to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The newspapers blamed the Kingdom of Serbia for the crime, with rhetoric against "fanatics", "dangerous forces" and "reckless agitators". These responses were broadly shared across the political spectrum, with Liberal and Conservative papers expressing their shock and dismay. But by 27 July, press opinion had turned against Austria-Hungary. The national press divided along party lines, with Conservative papers stressing the obligation to support France, while Liberal papers insisted Britain had no such commitment and should remain neutral.^[6]^[7]

As Germany and Russia became the central players in the crisis (respectively backing Austria-Hungary and Serbia), British leaders increasingly had a sense of commitment to defending France. First, if Germany again conquered France, as had happened in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, it would become a major threat to British economic, political and cultural interests. Second, partisanship was involved. The Liberal Party was identified with internationalism and free trade, and with opposition to jingoism and warfare. By contrast, the Conservative Party was identified as the party of nationalism and patriotism; Britons expected it "to show capacity in running a war."^[8] Liberal voters initially demanded peace, but were outraged when the Germans treated Belgian neutrality as a worthless "scrap of paper" (the words of German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in ridiculing the Treaty of London). Germany, as part of a massive attack on France, invaded northern France through Belgium early on the morning of 4 August. The Belgians called upon Britain for military assistance under the 1839 treaty, and in response London gave Berlin an ultimatum which expired at 11 pm London time, which was ignored. King George V then declared war on Germany that evening.^[9]^[10]

Before war was declared, the British newspapers gave the crisis extensive coverage but varied wildly in recommended policy options, basically covering the entire spectrum from peace to war.^[11]^[12] C. P. Scott and the Manchester Guardian maintained an intense campaign against war. It denounced a "conspiracy to drag us into a war against England’s interests", arguing that it would amount to a "crime against Europe", and warning that it would "throw away the accumulated progress of half a century".^[13] The politician David Lloyd George told Scott on Tuesday 4 August 1914, "Up until last Sunday only two members of the Cabinet had been in favour of our intervention in the war, but the violation of Belgian territory had completely altered the situation".^[13] According to Isabel V. Hull:

Annika Mombauer correctly sums up the current historiography: "Few historians would still maintain that the 'rape of Belgium' was the real motive for Britain's declaration of war on Germany." Instead, the role of Belgian neutrality is variously interpreted as an excuse used to mobilise public opinion, to provide embarrassed radicals in the cabinet with the justification for abandoning the principal of pacifism and thus staying in office, or - in the more conspiratorial versions - as cover for naked imperial interests.^[14]

Once war was declared, defence of Belgium rather than France was the public reason given for the war. Propaganda posters emphasised that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London.^[15]^[16]

As late as 1 August 1914, the great majority of Liberals—both voters and cabinet members—strongly opposed going to war.^[17] The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that the Liberal Party agreed for war on 4 August. Historian Zara Steiner says:

The public mood did change. Belgium proved to be a catalyst which unleashed the many emotions, rationalizations, and glorifications of war which had long been part of the British climate of opinion. Having a moral cause, all the latent anti-German feelings, fueled by years of naval rivalry and assumed enmity, rose to the surface. The 'scrap of paper' proved decisive both in maintaining the unity of the government and then in providing a focal point for public feeling.^[18]

The Liberals succeeded in mending their deep divisions over military action. Unless the Liberal government acted decisively against the German invasion of France, its top leaders including Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, Foreign Minister Edward Grey, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and others would resign, leading to a risk that the much more pro-war Conservative Party might form a government. Mistreatment of Belgium was not itself a fundamental cause of British entry into the war, but it was used extensively as a justification in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people.^[19]

The German high command was aware that entering Belgium could trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war, and their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.^[20]

Historians looking at the July Crisis typically conclude that Grey:

was not a great Foreign Secretary but an honest, reticent, punctilious English gentleman... He exhibited a judicious understanding of European affairs, a firm control of his staff, and a suppleness and tact in diplomacy, but he had no boldness, no imagination, no ability to command men and events. [Regarding the war] He pursued a cautious, moderate policy, one that not only fitted his temperament, but also reflected the deep split in the Cabinet, in the Liberal party, and in public opinion.^[21]

The majority of the Labour Party, which as a member of the Second International had opposed the war, also shifted to support after the German invasion of Belgium with the exception of some members such as its secretary Ramsay MacDonald. The rest of the Labour Party leadership under Arthur Henderson calculated that the war would be brief and that opposing it would cost the party at the next general election.^[22]

Irish crisis on hold

Until late July, British politics was totally focused on the threat of a possible civil war in Ireland. In 1912 the government had presented an Irish Home Rule bill that Irish nationalists demanded; under the terms of the Parliament Act 1911, by which the House of Lords retained the right to delay legislation by up to two years, it was due to become law in 1914. The Ulster Protestants demanded separate treatment; by mid-1914 the government was offering a six-year opt-out to the six counties which would eventually become Northern Ireland, but not the permanent exemption which they demanded. Both sides in Ireland had smuggled in weapons, set up militias with tens of thousands of volunteers, were drilling, and were ready to fight a civil war. The British Army itself was paralyzed: during the Curragh Incident officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to deploy into Ulster. Elements of the Conservative and Unionist Party supported them.

On 25 July the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, and the cabinet realized that war with Germany was increasingly likely. The Government of Ireland Act 1914 was enacted into law, but was suspended for the duration of hostilities, with the issue of Ulster still unresolved.^[23] Grey told the British Parliament on 3 August, "The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. [Prolonged cheers.] The general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad, does not make that a consideration that we feel we have to take into account. [Cheers.]"^[24]

Empire at war

The king's declaration of war automatically involved all dominions, colonies, and protectorates of the British Empire, many of whom made significant contributions to the Allied war effort, both in the provision of troops and civilian labourers.

Notes

^ Avner Cohen, "Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British foreign policy 1901–1903: From collaboration to confrontation." Australian Journal of Politics & History 43#2 (1997): 122-134.
^ Massie, Robert (2007). Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (2013 ed.). Vintage. pp. 466–468. ISBN 978-0099524021.
^ Jenkins, Roy (1964). Asquith (1988 Revised and Updated ed.). Harpers Collins. pp. 242–245. ISBN 978-0002173582.
^ Kennedy, Paul M (1980). The rise of the anglo-german antagonism: 1860-1914. London: Allen & Unwin. pp. 464–70. ISBN 9780049400641.
^ Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers (2012) p. 539.
^ Meilyr Powel, "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914." First World War Studies 8.2-3 (2017): 133-152.online^{[dead link‍]}
^ Adam James Bones, "British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914." International History Review 35.5 (2013): 975-992.
^ Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935 (1966) p 51.
^ Nilesh, Preeta (2014). "Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights". Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 75: 1014. JSTOR 44158486.
^ Adrian Gregory, "A Clash of Cultures: The British Press and the Opening of the Great War," in A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War, edited by Troy R. E. Paddock, (Praeger, 2004) pp 15–49.
^ Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914 (1940) pp 446-70.
^ Scott, Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War (1927) pp 99–153
^ ^a ^b Travis, Alan (2 August 2014). "First world war: how the Manchester Guardian fought to keep Britain out of conflict". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 April 2020.
^ Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell UP, 2014) p, 33
^ Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?." Historical Journal 28.4 (1985): 863-885.
^ Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) pp 235-237.
^ Catriona Pennell (2012). A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland. OUP Oxford. p. 27. ISBN 9780199590582.
^ Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (1977) p 233.
^ Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. Routledge. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.
^ Asquith, Margot (2014). Brock, Michael; Brock, Elinor (eds.). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. pp. 852–864. ISBN 978-0198737728.
^ Clayton Roberts and David F. Roberts, A History of England, Volume 2: 1688 to the present. Vol. 2 (3rd edition, 1991) p. 722.
^ Thorpe, Andrew (1997), "The Surge to Second-Party Status, 1914–22", A History of the British Labour Party, London: Macmillan Education UK, pp. 32–33, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3, ISBN 978-0-333-56081-5, retrieved 16 June 2022
^ J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith. Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (1932 ) vol 2 p 55.
^ "Statement by Sir Edward Grey 03 August 1914". Hansard. Retrieved 2 April 2020.

Historiography

Cornelissen, Christoph, and Arndt Weinrich, eds. Writing the Great War - The Historiography of World War I from 1918 to the Present (2020) free download; full coverage for major countries.
Herwig, Holger H. ed., The Outbreak of World War I: Causes and Responsibilities (1990) excerpts from primary and secondary sources
Horne, John, ed. A Companion to World War I (2012) 38 topics essays by scholars
Kramer, Alan. "Recent Historiography of the First World War – Part I", Journal of Modern European History (Feb. 2014) 12#1 pp 5–27; "Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II)", (May 2014) 12#2 pp 155–174.
Langdon, John W. "Emerging from Fischer's shadow: recent examinations of the crisis of July 1914." History Teacher 20.1 (1986): 63-86, historiography in JSTOR
Mombauer, Annika. "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I." Central European History 48.4 (2015): 541-564.
Mulligan, William. "The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War." English Historical Review (2014) 129#538 pp: 639–666.
Winter, Jay. and Antoine Prost eds. The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (2005)

Primary sources

Barker. Ernest, et al. eds. Why we are at war; Great Britain's case (3rd ed. 1914), the official British case against Germany. online
Gooch, G.P. Recent revelations of European diplomacy (1928) pp 3-101. online
Major 1914 documents from BYU
Gooch, G.P. and Harold Temperley, eds. British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914 (11 vol.) online
- v. i The end of British isolation -- v.2. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente -- v.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12 -- v.7. The Agadir crisis -- v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security -- v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace -- v.11. The outbreak of war V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12 -- v.7. The Agadir crisis -- v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security -- v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace -- v.11. The outbreak of war.
Joll, James, ed. Britain and Europe 1793-1940 (1967); 390pp of documents; online
Jones, Edgar Rees, ed. Selected speeches on British foreign policy, 1738-1914 (1914). online free
Lowe, C.J. and Michael L. Dockrill, eds. Mirage of Power: The Documents v. 3: British Foreign Policy (1972); vol 3 = primary sources 1902-1922
Scott, James Brown, ed., Diplomatic Documents Relating To The Outbreak Of The European War (1916) online
United States. War Dept. General Staff. Strength and organization of the armies of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, England, Italy, Mexico and Japan (showing conditions in July, 1914) (1916) online
Wilson, K.M. "The British Cabinet's Decision for War, 2 August 1914" British Journal of International Studies 1#3 (1975), pp. 148–159 online
Young, John W. "Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis." International History Review 40.2 (2018): 436-455. Diary of UK cabinet discussions 26 July to 4 August 1914.

[1] Avner Cohen, "Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British foreign policy 1901–1903: From collaboration to confrontation." Australian Journal of Politics & History 43#2 (1997): 122-134.

[2] Massie, Robert (2007). Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (2013 ed.). Vintage. pp. 466–468. ISBN 978-0099524021.

[3] Jenkins, Roy (1964). Asquith (1988 Revised and Updated ed.). Harpers Collins. pp. 242–245. ISBN 978-0002173582.

[4] Kennedy, Paul M (1980). The rise of the anglo-german antagonism: 1860-1914. London: Allen & Unwin. pp. 464–70. ISBN 9780049400641.

[5] Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers (2012) p. 539.

[6] Meilyr Powel, "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914." First World War Studies 8.2-3 (2017): 133-152.online^{[dead link‍]}

[7] Adam James Bones, "British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914." International History Review 35.5 (2013): 975-992.

[8] Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935 (1966) p 51.

[9] Nilesh, Preeta (2014). "Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights". Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 75: 1014. JSTOR 44158486.

[10] Adrian Gregory, "A Clash of Cultures: The British Press and the Opening of the Great War," in A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War, edited by Troy R. E. Paddock, (Praeger, 2004) pp 15–49.

[11] Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914 (1940) pp 446-70.

[12] Scott, Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War (1927) pp 99–153

[TravisGuardian-13] Travis, Alan (2 August 2014). "First world war: how the Manchester Guardian fought to keep Britain out of conflict". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 April 2020.

[14] Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (Cornell UP, 2014) p, 33

[15] Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?." Historical Journal 28.4 (1985): 863-885.

[16] Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the origins of the First World War (1977) pp 235-237.

[17] Catriona Pennell (2012). A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland. OUP Oxford. p. 27. ISBN 9780199590582.

[18] Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (1977) p 233.

[19] Stephen J. Lee (2005). Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995. Routledge. pp. 21–22. ISBN 9781134790401.

[20] Asquith, Margot (2014). Brock, Michael; Brock, Elinor (eds.). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street (Kindle ed.). OUP Oxford; Reprint edition. pp. 852–864. ISBN 978-0198737728.

[21] Clayton Roberts and David F. Roberts, A History of England, Volume 2: 1688 to the present. Vol. 2 (3rd edition, 1991) p. 722.

[22] Thorpe, Andrew (1997), "The Surge to Second-Party Status, 1914–22", A History of the British Labour Party, London: Macmillan Education UK, pp. 32–33, doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3, ISBN 978-0-333-56081-5, retrieved 16 June 2022

[23] J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith. Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (1932 ) vol 2 p 55.

[24] "Statement by Sir Edward Grey 03 August 1914". Hansard. Retrieved 2 April 2020.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
+{{Short description|none}}
-[[File:Britain declares war--Daily Mail Aug 5, 1914.jpg|thumb|''Daily Mail'' on Aug 5. 1914]]
+{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2024}}
-[[File:WWIchartX.svg|350px|thumb|European diplomatic alignments shortly before the war.]]
-'''[[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]] entered World War I''' on 4 August 1914 when the [[George V|King]] declared war after the expiration of an [[ultimatum]] to the [[German Empire]]. The official explanation focused on protecting Belgium as a [[neutral country]]; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control of [[Western Europe]]. The [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberal Party]] was in power with prime minister [[H. H. Asquith]] and foreign minister [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]] leading the way. The Liberal cabinet made the decision, although the party had been strongly anti-war until the last minute. The Conservative Party was pro-war. The Liberals knew that if they split on the war issue, they would lose control of the government to the Conservatives.
+[[File:Britain declares war--Daily Mail Aug 5, 1914.jpg|thumb|''Daily Mail'' on 5 August 1914]]The [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] entered [[World War I]] on 4 August 1914, when King [[George&nbsp;V]] declared war after the expiry of an [[ultimatum]] to the [[German Empire]]. The official explanation focused on protecting Belgium as a [[neutral country]]; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control of [[Western Europe]]. The [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberal Party]] was in power with prime minister [[H. H. Asquith]] and foreign minister [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]] leading the way. The Liberal cabinet made the decision, although the party had been strongly anti-war until the last minute. The Conservative Party was pro-war. The Liberals knew that if they split on the war issue, they would lose control of the government to the Conservatives.
 ==Background==
@@ Line 8: / Line 8: @@
 {{main|Splendid isolation}}
 [[File:British Empire in 1914.png|thumb|left|350px|The British Empire in 1914]]
-For much of the 19th century, Britain pursued a [[History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom|foreign policy]] later known as [[splendid isolation]], which sought to maintain the [[European balance of power|balance of power]] in Europe without formal alliances. As Europe divided into two power blocs during the 1890s, the [[Unionist government, 1895–1905|1895-1905 Conservative government]] realised this left Britain dangerously exposed.<ref>[[Avner Cohen]], "Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British foreign policy 1901–1903: From collaboration to confrontation." ''Australian Journal of Politics & History'' 43#2 (1997): 122-134.</ref> This resulted in the 1902 [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]], followed by [[Edward VII of Britain|King Edward VII]]'s 1903 visit to Paris. By reducing [[Anti-British sentiment|anti-British feeling]] in France, it led to the 1904 [[Entente Cordiale]], the first tangible impact of which was British support for France against Germany in the [[First Moroccan Crisis|1905 Moroccan Crisis]].
+For much of the 19th century, Britain pursued a [[History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom|foreign policy]] later known as [[splendid isolation]], which sought to maintain the [[European balance of power|balance of power]] in Europe without formal alliances. As Europe divided into two power blocs during the 1890s, the [[Unionist government, 1895–1905|1895–1905 Conservative government]] realised this left Britain dangerously exposed.<ref>[[Avner Cohen]], "Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and British foreign policy 1901–1903: From collaboration to confrontation." ''Australian Journal of Politics & History'' 43#2 (1997): 122-134.</ref> This resulted in the 1902 [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]], followed by King [[Edward VII]]'s 1903 visit to Paris. By reducing [[Anti-British sentiment|anti-British feeling]] in France, it led to the 1904 [[Entente Cordiale]], the first tangible effect of which was British support for France against Germany in the [[First Moroccan Crisis|1905 Moroccan Crisis]].
 In 1907, the new [[Liberal government, 1905–1915|Liberal government]] agreed to the [[Anglo-Russian Convention]]. Like the Entente, the Convention focused on resolving colonial disputes; but by doing so, it paved the way for wider co-operation and allowed Britain to refocus its naval resources in response to [[Anglo-German naval arms race|German naval expansion]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Massie |first1=Robert |author-link = Robert Massie|title=[[Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War]] |date=2007 |publisher=Vintage |isbn=978-0099524021 |pages=466–468 |edition=2013}}</ref>
-[[File:HMS Dreadnought 1906 H61017.jpg|thumb|right|250px|[[HMS Dreadnought (1906)|HMS Dreadnought]]. The 1902, 1904 and 1907 agreements with Japan, France and Russia allowed Britain to refocus resources during the [[Anglo-German naval arms race]]]]
-The 1911 [[Agadir Crisis]] encouraged secret military negotiations between France and Britain in the case of war with the [[German Empire]]. A [[British Expeditionary Force (World War I)|British Expeditionary Force]] of 100,000 men would be landed in France within two weeks of war, while naval arrangements allocated responsibility for the [[Mediterranean Sea]] to the [[French Navy]], with the [[Royal Navy]] looking after the [[North Sea]] and the [[English Channel]], including Northern France.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jenkins |first1=Roy |author-link = Roy Jenkins |title=Asquith |date=1964 |publisher=Harpers Collins |isbn=978-0002173582 |pages=242–245 |edition=1988 Revised and Updated}}</ref> Britain was effectively bound to support France in a war against Germany regardless, but this was not widely understood outside government and the military.{{Citation needed|reason=How was it not widely understood outside the government and the military?  What are the reasons to say that Britain was "effectively bound"?|date=December 2022}}
+The 1911 [[Agadir Crisis]] encouraged secret military negotiations between France and Britain in the case of war with the [[German Empire]]. A [[British Expeditionary Force (World War I)|British Expeditionary Force]] of 100,000 men would be landed in France within two weeks of war, while naval arrangements allocated responsibility for the [[Mediterranean Sea]] to the [[French Navy]], with the [[Royal Navy]] looking after the [[North Sea]] and the [[English Channel]], including Northern France.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jenkins |first1=Roy |author-link = Roy Jenkins |title=Asquith |date=1964 |publisher=Harpers Collins |isbn=978-0002173582 |pages=242–245 |edition=1988 Revised and Updated}}</ref>
 ==Antagonism with Germany==
-In explaining why Britain went to war with Germany, British historian [[Paul Kennedy]] (1980) argued that a critical factor was the British realisation that Germany was rapidly becoming economically more powerful than Britain. It was in essence not a consequence of the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the [[Baghdad Railway]], the confrontations in Eastern Europe, highly-charged political rhetoric, or domestic pressure groups. Germany's reliance time and again on military aggression, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, also played a role, especially in portraying the invasion of neutral Belgium as (in the German view) a necessary military tactic or (in the British view) a profound moral crime. The [[German invasion of Belgium (1914)|German invasion of Belgium]] was not the real cause of war with Britain, because the British decision had already been made as the British were more concerned with the fate of France (pp.&nbsp;457–62){{clarify|date=February 2021}}. Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of the war of 1870, when Prussia and the German states smashed France, would mean that a rapidly industrialising Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the [[English Channel]] and northwest France. British policy-makers insisted that that would be a catastrophe for British security.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kennedy|first1=Paul M|title=The rise of the anglo-german antagonism: 1860-1914|url=https://archive.org/details/riseofanglogerma0000kenn|url-access=registration|date=1980|publisher=Allen & Unwin|location=London|isbn=9780049400641|pages=[https://archive.org/details/riseofanglogerma0000kenn/page/464 464–70]}}</ref>
+[[File:HMS Dreadnought 1906 H61017.jpg|thumb|right|250px|[[HMS Dreadnought (1906)|HMS Dreadnought]]. The 1902, 1904 and 1907 agreements with Japan, France and Russia allowed Britain to refocus resources during the [[Anglo-German naval arms race]]]]In explaining why Britain went to war with Germany, British historian [[Paul Kennedy]] (1980) argued that a critical factor was the British realisation that Germany was rapidly becoming economically more powerful than Britain. It was in essence not a consequence of the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the [[Baghdad Railway]], the confrontations in Eastern Europe, highly-charged political rhetoric, or domestic pressure groups. Germany's reliance time and again on military aggression, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, also played a role, especially in portraying the invasion of neutral Belgium as (in the German view) a necessary military tactic or (in the British view) a profound moral crime. The [[German invasion of Belgium (1914)|German invasion of Belgium]] was not the real cause of war with Britain, because the British decision had already been made as the British were more concerned with the fate of France (pp.&nbsp;457–62).{{clarify|date=February 2021}} Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of the war of 1870, when Prussia and the German states smashed France, would mean that a rapidly industrialising Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the [[English Channel]] and northwest France. British policy-makers insisted that that would be a catastrophe for British security.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kennedy|first1=Paul M|title=The rise of the anglo-german antagonism: 1860-1914|url=https://archive.org/details/riseofanglogerma0000kenn|url-access=registration|date=1980|publisher=Allen & Unwin|location=London|isbn=9780049400641|pages=[https://archive.org/details/riseofanglogerma0000kenn/page/464 464–70]}}</ref>
-[[Christopher Clark]] points out that the British cabinet decided on July 29, 1914, that being a signatory to the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgium's frontiers did not obligate it to oppose a German invasion of Belgium with military force.<ref>Christopher  Clark, ''The Sleepwalkers'' (2012) p. 539.</ref>
+[[Christopher Clark]] points out that the British cabinet decided on 29 July 1914, that being a signatory to the [[Treaty of London (1839)|1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgium's frontiers]] did not oblige it to oppose a German invasion of Belgium with military force.<ref>Christopher  Clark, ''The Sleepwalkers'' (2012) p. 539.</ref>
 ==Decision for war==
-In the immediate aftermath of the [[Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand|assassination]] on June 28 of Austrian [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand]] (the heir to the [[Habsburg monarchy|Habsburg throne]]) in the [[Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian]] capital, [[Sarajevo]], the British newspapers denounced the [[Serbian nationalism|Serbian nationalist]] assassin, [[Gavrilo Princip]], and were generally sympathetic to the [[Austria-Hungary|Austro-Hungarian monarchy]]. The newspapers blamed the [[Kingdom of Serbia]] for the crime, with rhetoric against "fanatics", "dangerous forces" and "reckless agitators". These responses were broadly shared across the political spectrum, with Liberal and Conservative papers expressing their shock and dismay. But by July 27, press opinion had turned against Austria-Hungary. The national press divided along party lines, with Conservative papers stressing the obligation to support France, while Liberal papers insisted Britain had no such commitment and should remain neutral. <ref> Meilyr Powel, "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914." ''First World War Studies'' 8.2-3 (2017): 133-152.[http://www.academia.edu/download/55210429/The_Welsh_press_and_the_July_Crisis_of_1914.pdf online]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref><ref>Adam James Bones, "British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914." ''International History Review'' 35.5 (2013): 975-992.</ref>
+In the immediate aftermath of the [[Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand|assassination]] on 28 June of Austrian [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand]] (the heir to the [[Habsburg monarchy|Habsburg throne]]) in the [[Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian]] capital, [[Sarajevo]], the British newspapers denounced the [[Serbian nationalism|Serbian nationalist]] assassin, [[Gavrilo Princip]], and were generally sympathetic to the [[Austria-Hungary|Austro-Hungarian monarchy]]. The newspapers blamed the [[Kingdom of Serbia]] for the crime, with rhetoric against "fanatics", "dangerous forces" and "reckless agitators". These responses were broadly shared across the political spectrum, with Liberal and Conservative papers expressing their shock and dismay. But by 27 July, press opinion had turned against Austria-Hungary. The national press divided along party lines, with Conservative papers stressing the obligation to support France, while Liberal papers insisted Britain had no such commitment and should remain neutral.<ref> Meilyr Powel, "The Welsh press and the July Crisis of 1914." ''First World War Studies'' 8.2-3 (2017): 133-152.[http://www.academia.edu/download/55210429/The_Welsh_press_and_the_July_Crisis_of_1914.pdf online]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref><ref>Adam James Bones, "British National Dailies and the Outbreak of War in 1914." ''International History Review'' 35.5 (2013): 975-992.</ref>
 As Germany and Russia became the central players in the crisis (respectively backing Austria-Hungary and Serbia), British leaders increasingly had a sense of commitment to defending France. First, if Germany again conquered France, as had happened in the [[Franco-Prussian War]] of 1870, it would become a major threat to British economic, political and cultural interests. Second, [[Partisan (politics)|partisanship]] was involved. The Liberal Party was identified with [[Internationalism (politics)|internationalism]] and [[free trade]], and with opposition to [[jingoism]] and warfare. By contrast, the Conservative Party was identified as the party of [[British nationalism|nationalism]] and [[patriotism]]; Britons expected it "to show capacity in running a war."<ref>Trevor Wilson, ''The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-1935'' (1966) p 51.</ref> Liberal voters initially demanded peace, but were outraged when the Germans treated Belgian neutrality as a worthless "scrap of paper" (the words of German Chancellor [[Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg]] in ridiculing the [[Treaty of London (1839)|Treaty of London]]). Germany, as part of a massive attack on France, invaded northern France through Belgium early on the morning of 4 August. The Belgians called upon Britain for military assistance under the 1839 treaty, and in response London gave Berlin an ultimatum which expired at 11 pm London time, which was ignored. King [[George V]] then [[United Kingdom declaration of war upon Germany (1914)|declared war on Germany]] that evening.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Nilesh |first1=Preeta |title=Belgian Neutrality and the First world War; Some Insights |journal=Proceedings of the Indian History Congress |date=2014 |volume=75 |page=1014 |jstor=44158486 }}</ref><ref>Adrian Gregory, "A Clash of Cultures: The British Press and the Opening of the Great War,"  in ''A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War'', edited by Troy R. E. Paddock, (Praeger, 2004) pp 15–49.</ref>
-Before war was declared, the British newspapers gave the crisis extensive coverage but varied wildly in recommended policy options, basically covering the entire spectrum from peace to war.<ref>Hale, ''Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914'' (1940) pp 446-70.</ref><ref>Scott, ''Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War'' (1927) pp 99–153</ref> [[C. P. Scott]] and the ''[[The Guardian|Manchester Guardian]]'' maintained an intense campaign against war. It denounced a "conspiracy to drag us into a war against England’s interests", arguing that it would amount to a "crime against Europe", and warning that it would "throw away the accumulated progress of half a century".<ref name="TravisGuardian">{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/sp-first-world-war-manchester-guardian-uk-neutrality|title=First world war: how the Manchester Guardian fought to keep Britain out of conflict|last=Travis|first=Alan|date=2 August 2014|work=The Guardian|access-date=2 April 2020}}</ref> The politician [[David Lloyd George]] told Scott on Tuesday 4th August 1914, "Up until last Sunday only two members of the Cabinet had been in favour of our intervention in the war, but the violation of Belgian territory had completely altered the situation".<ref name="TravisGuardian" /> According to Isabel V. Hull:
+Before war was declared, the British newspapers gave the crisis extensive coverage but varied wildly in recommended policy options, basically covering the entire spectrum from peace to war.<ref>Hale, ''Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914'' (1940) pp 446-70.</ref><ref>Scott, ''Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War'' (1927) pp 99–153</ref> [[C. P. Scott]] and the ''[[The Guardian|Manchester Guardian]]'' maintained an intense campaign against war. It denounced a "conspiracy to drag us into a war against England’s interests", arguing that it would amount to a "crime against Europe", and warning that it would "throw away the accumulated progress of half a century".<ref name="TravisGuardian">{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/sp-first-world-war-manchester-guardian-uk-neutrality|title=First world war: how the Manchester Guardian fought to keep Britain out of conflict|last=Travis|first=Alan|date=2 August 2014|work=The Guardian|access-date=2 April 2020}}</ref> The politician [[David Lloyd George]] told Scott on Tuesday 4 August 1914, "Up until last Sunday only two members of the Cabinet had been in favour of our intervention in the war, but the violation of Belgian territory had completely altered the situation".<ref name="TravisGuardian" /> According to Isabel V. Hull:
-:[[Annika Mombauer]] correctly sums up the current historiography: "Few historians would still maintain that the '[[rape of Belgium]]' was the real motive for Britain's declaration of war on Germany." Instead, the role of Belgian neutrality is variously interpreted as an excuse used to mobilise public opinion, to provide embarrassed radicals in the cabinet with the justification for abandoning the principal of pacifism and thus staying in office, or - in the more conspiratorial versions - as cover for naked imperial interests. <ref> Isabel V. Hull,  ''A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War'' (Cornell UP, 2014)  p, 33</ref>
+:[[Annika Mombauer]] correctly sums up the current historiography: "Few historians would still maintain that the '[[rape of Belgium]]' was the real motive for Britain's declaration of war on Germany." Instead, the role of Belgian neutrality is variously interpreted as an excuse used to mobilise public opinion, to provide embarrassed radicals in the cabinet with the justification for abandoning the principal of pacifism and thus staying in office, or - in the more conspiratorial versions - as cover for naked imperial interests.<ref> Isabel V. Hull,  ''A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War'' (Cornell UP, 2014)  p, 33</ref>
 Once war was declared, defence of Belgium rather than France was the public reason given for the war. [[British propaganda during World War I|Propaganda]] posters emphasised that Britain was required to safeguard Belgium's neutrality under the 1839 Treaty of London.<ref>Bentley B. Gilbert, "Pacifist to interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue?." ''Historical Journal'' 28.4 (1985): 863-885.</ref><ref>Zara S. Steiner, ''Britain and the origins of the First World War'' (1977) pp 235-237.</ref>
 [[File:The Scrap of Paper - Enlist Today.jpg|thumb|right|240px|"The Scrap of Paper - Enlist Today", 1914 British propaganda poster emphasizes German contempt for the 1839 treaty (the signature of British Foreign Secretary [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]] visible at the top), which guaranteed Belgian neutrality, as merely a "scrap of paper" that Germany would ignore.]]
-As late as 1 August 1914, the great majority of Liberals—both voters and cabinet members—strongly opposed going to war.<ref>{{cite book|author=Catriona Pennell|title=A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lVK0SSmvD5wC&pg=PA27|year=2012|page=27|isbn=9780199590582}}</ref> The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that the Liberal Party agreed for war on August 4th. Historian [[Zara Steiner]] says:
+As late as 1 August 1914, the great majority of Liberals—both voters and cabinet members—strongly opposed going to war.<ref>{{cite book|author=Catriona Pennell|title=A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lVK0SSmvD5wC&pg=PA27|year=2012|page=27|publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=9780199590582}}</ref> The German invasion of Belgium was such an outrageous violation of international rights that the Liberal Party agreed for war on 4 August. Historian [[Zara Steiner]] says:
 :The public mood did change. Belgium proved to be a catalyst which unleashed the many emotions, rationalizations, and glorifications of war which had long been part of the British climate of opinion. Having a moral cause, all the latent [[Anti-German sentiment|anti-German feelings]], fueled by years of naval rivalry and assumed enmity, rose to the surface. The 'scrap of paper' proved decisive both in maintaining the unity of the government and then in providing a focal point for public feeling.<ref>Zara S. Steiner, ''Britain and the Origins of the First World War'' (1977) p 233.</ref>
-The Liberals succeeded in mending their deep divisions over military action. Unless the [[Liberal government, 1905–1915|Liberal government]] acted decisively against the German invasion of France, its top leaders including Prime Minister [[H. H. Asquith]], Foreign Minister [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]], First Lord of the Admiralty [[Winston Churchill]] and others would resign, leading to a risk that the much more pro-war Conservative Party might form a government. Mistreatment of Belgium was not itself a fundamental cause of British entry into the war, but it was used extensively as a justification in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people.<ref>{{cite book|author=Stephen J. Lee|title=Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LKGFAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21|year=2005|pages=21–22|isbn=9781134790401}}</ref>
+The Liberals succeeded in mending their deep divisions over military action. Unless the [[Liberal government, 1905–1915|Liberal government]] acted decisively against the German invasion of France, its top leaders including Prime Minister [[H. H. Asquith]], Foreign Minister [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]], First Lord of the Admiralty [[Winston Churchill]] and others would resign, leading to a risk that the much more pro-war Conservative Party might form a government. Mistreatment of Belgium was not itself a fundamental cause of British entry into the war, but it was used extensively as a justification in wartime propaganda to motivate the British people.<ref>{{cite book|author=Stephen J. Lee|title=Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LKGFAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21|year=2005|pages=21–22|publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781134790401}}</ref>
-The German high command was aware that entering Belgium could trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war, and their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.<ref>{{cite book |last = Asquith|first = Margot|author-link = Margot Asquith |editor-last1=Brock|editor-first1 = Michael |editor-link1 = Michael Brock |editor-last2=Brock|editor-first2 =  Elinor |editor-link2 = Eleanor Brock |title=Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street |date=2014 |publisher=OUP Oxford; Reprint edition |location=852-864 |isbn=978-0198737728 |edition=Kindle }}</ref>
+The German high command was aware that entering Belgium could trigger British intervention but decided the risk was acceptable; they expected it to be a short war, and their ambassador in London claimed civil war in Ireland would prevent Britain from assisting France.<ref>{{cite book |last = Asquith|first = Margot|author-link = Margot Asquith |editor-last1=Brock|editor-first1 = Michael |editor-link1 = Michael Brock |editor-last2=Brock|editor-first2 =  Elinor |editor-link2 = Eleanor Brock |title=Margot Asquith's Great War Diary 1914-1916: The View from Downing Street |date=2014 |publisher=OUP Oxford; Reprint edition |pages=852–864 |isbn=978-0198737728 |edition=Kindle }}</ref>
 Historians looking at the [[July Crisis]] typically conclude that Grey:
 :was not a great Foreign Secretary but an honest, reticent, punctilious English gentleman... He exhibited a judicious understanding of European affairs, a firm control of his staff, and a suppleness and tact in diplomacy, but he had no boldness, no imagination, no ability to command men and events. [Regarding the war] He pursued a cautious, moderate policy, one that not only fitted his temperament, but also reflected the deep split in the Cabinet, in the Liberal party, and in public opinion.<ref>Clayton Roberts and David F. Roberts, ''A History of England, Volume 2: 1688 to the present. Vol. 2'' (3rd edition, 1991) p. 722.</ref>
-The majority of the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], which as a member of the [[Second International]] had opposed the war, also shifted to support after the German invasion of Belgium with the exception of some members such as its secretary [[Ramsay MacDonald]]. The rest of the Labour Party leadership under [[Arthur Henderson]] calculated that the war would be brief and that opposing it would cost the party at the next general election.<ref>{{Citation |last=Thorpe |first=Andrew |title=The Surge to Second-Party Status, 1914–22 |date=1997 |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3 |work=A History of the British Labour Party |pages=32–33 |place=London |publisher=Macmillan Education UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3 |isbn=978-0-333-56081-5 |access-date=2022-06-16}}</ref>[[File:New Names Canadian WW1 recruiting poster.jpg|thumb|left|200px|Canada automatically joined the war, and vigorously recruited volunteers.]]
+The majority of the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], which as a member of the [[Second International]] had opposed the war, also shifted to support after the German invasion of Belgium with the exception of some members such as its secretary [[Ramsay MacDonald]]. The rest of the Labour Party leadership under [[Arthur Henderson]] calculated that the war would be brief and that opposing it would cost the party at the next general election.<ref>{{Citation |last=Thorpe |first=Andrew |title=The Surge to Second-Party Status, 1914–22 |date=1997 |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3 |work=A History of the British Labour Party |pages=32–33 |place=London |publisher=Macmillan Education UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-25305-0_3 |isbn=978-0-333-56081-5 |access-date=16 June 2022}}</ref>[[File:New Names Canadian WW1 recruiting poster.jpg|thumb|left|200px|Canada automatically joined the war, and vigorously recruited volunteers.]]
 ==Irish crisis on hold==
+{{main|Home Rule Crisis}}
-Until late July, [[Politics of the United Kingdom|British politics]] was totally focused on the threat of [[civil war]] in [[Ireland]]. In 1912 the government had presented a [[Irish Home Rule movement|Irish Home Rule]] bill that [[Irish nationalism|Irish nationalists]] demanded; under the terms of the [[Parliament Act 1911]], by which the [[House of Lords]] retained the right to delay legislation by up to two years, it was due to become law in 1914. The [[Ulster Protestants]] demanded separate treatment; by 1914 the government was offering a six-year opt-out to the six counties which would eventually become [[Northern Ireland]], but not the permanent exemption which they demanded. Both sides in Ireland had smuggled in weapons, set up militias with tens of thousands of volunteers, were drilling, and were ready to fight a civil war. The [[British Army]] itself was paralyzed: during the [[Curragh Incident]] officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to deploy into Ulster. Elements of the [[Conservative and Unionist Party]] supported them. On  25 July the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, and the cabinet realized that war with Germany was increasingly likely. The [[Government of Ireland Act 1914]] was enacted into law, but was suspended for the duration of hostilities, with the issue of Ulster still unresolved.<ref>[[J. A. Spender]] and [[Cyril Asquith]]. ''Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith '' (1932 ) vol 2 p 55.</ref>  Grey told the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|British Parliament]] on 3 August, "The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. [Prolonged cheers.] The general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad, does not make that a consideration that we feel we have to take into account. [Cheers.]"<ref>{{cite web|url=https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1914-08-03/debates/d0615753-a6a6-4101-b937-2a22b4ce3514/StatementBySirEdwardGrey|title=Statement by Sir Edward Grey 03 August 1914|work=Hansard|access-date=2 April 2020}}</ref>
+Until late July, [[Politics of the United Kingdom|British politics]] was totally focused on the threat of a possible [[civil war]] in [[Ireland]]. In 1912 the government had presented an [[Irish Home Rule movement|Irish Home Rule]] bill that [[Irish nationalism|Irish nationalists]] demanded; under the terms of the [[Parliament Act 1911]], by which the [[House of Lords]] retained the right to delay legislation by up to two years, it was due to become law in 1914. The [[Ulster Protestants]] demanded separate treatment; by mid-1914 the government was offering a six-year opt-out to the six counties which would eventually become [[Northern Ireland]], but not the permanent exemption which they demanded. Both sides in Ireland had smuggled in weapons, set up militias with tens of thousands of volunteers, were drilling, and were ready to fight a civil war. The [[British Army]] itself was paralyzed: during the [[Curragh Incident]] officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal rather than obey orders to deploy into Ulster. Elements of the [[Conservative and Unionist Party]] supported them.
+On 25 July the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia became known, and the cabinet realized that war with Germany was increasingly likely. The [[Government of Ireland Act 1914]] was enacted into law, but was suspended for the duration of hostilities, with the issue of Ulster still unresolved.<ref>[[J. A. Spender]] and [[Cyril Asquith]]. ''Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith '' (1932 ) vol 2 p 55.</ref>  Grey told the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|British Parliament]] on 3 August, "The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. [Prolonged cheers.] The general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad, does not make that a consideration that we feel we have to take into account. [Cheers.]"<ref>{{cite web|url=https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1914-08-03/debates/d0615753-a6a6-4101-b937-2a22b4ce3514/StatementBySirEdwardGrey|title=Statement by Sir Edward Grey 03 August 1914|work=Hansard|access-date=2 April 2020}}</ref>
 ==Empire at war==
@@ Line 50: / Line 52: @@
 ==See also==
+* [[Allies of World War I]]
+** [[France–United Kingdom relations]]
+** [[Germany–United Kingdom relations]]
+** [[Triple Entente]]
 * [[Causes of World War I]]
 ** [[Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I]]
@@ Line 57: / Line 62: @@
 ** [[Ottoman entry into World War I]]
 ** [[Russian entry into World War I]]
-* [[Allies of World War I]]
-** [[Triple Entente]]
-** [[France–United Kingdom relations]]
-** [[Germany–United Kingdom relations]]
-* [[British military history]]
-* [[History of the United Kingdom]], since 1707
-* [[International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)]]
-* [[Diplomatic history of World War I]]
 * [[Color book]]
+* [[Diplomatic history of World War I]]
+* [[History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom]]
+* [[History of the United Kingdom]], since 1707
+* [[International relations (1814–1919)]]
 * [[International relations (1919–1939)]]
+* [[Military history of the United Kingdom]]
 * [[Timeline of British diplomatic history]]
-* [[History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom]]
 ==Notes==
@@ Line 82: / Line 83: @@
 * Bartlett, C. J. ''British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century'' (1989).
 * Brandenburg, Erich. (1927) ''From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914'' (1927) [https://web.archive.org/web/20170315175229/http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/12322 online].
-* Bridge, F. R. “The British Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary in 1914.” ''Slavonic and East European Review'' 47#109 (1969), pp. 401–422. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4206101 online]
+* Bridge, F. R. "The British Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary in 1914." ''Slavonic and East European Review'' 47#109 (1969), pp. 401–422. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4206101 online]
 * Charmley, John. ''Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War'' (1999), highly critical of Grey.
 * [[Chris Clark (historian)|Clark, Christopher]]. ''The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914'' (2013) [https://www.amazon.com/dp/006114665X/ excerpt]
@@ Line 91: / Line 92: @@
 * French, David. ''British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-15'' (1982).
 * Goodlad, Graham D. ''British Foreign and Imperial Policy 1865–1919'' (1999).
-* Hale, Oron James. ''Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914'' (1940) [https://www.questia.com/library/1023289/publicity-and-diplomacy-with-special-reference-to online]
+* Hale, Oron James. ''Publicity and Diplomacy: With Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914'' (1940) [https://www.questia.com/library/1023289/publicity-and-diplomacy-with-special-reference-to online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201204172729/https://www.questia.com/library/1023289/publicity-and-diplomacy-with-special-reference-to |date=4 December 2020 }}
 * Hamilton, Richard F. and Holger H. Herwig, eds. ''War Planning 1914'' (2014) pp 48–79
 * Hamilton, Richard F. and Holger H. Herwig, eds. ''The Origins of World War I'' (2003) pp 266–299.
 * Hamilton, Richard F.. and Holger H. Herwig. ''Decisions for War, 1914-1917'' (2004).
-* Hinsley, F. H. ed. ''British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey'' (1977) [https://books.google.com/books?id=VJ08AAAAIAAJ&pg=PR5&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false 31 major scholarly essays]
+* Hinsley, F. H. ed. ''British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey'' (1977) [https://books.google.com/books?id=VJ08AAAAIAAJ&pg=PR5 31 major scholarly essays]
 * Howard, Christopher. "MacDonald, Henderson, and the Outbreak of War, 1914." ''Historical Journal'' 20.4 (1977): 871-891. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638412 online]
 * {{cite book |last1=Joll |first1=James |author-link1=James Joll |last2=Martel |first2=Gordon |author-link2=Gordon Martel |title=The Origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uwAvAgAAQBAJ |edition=3rd |year=2013 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=9781317875352 }}
-* Kennedy, Paul. ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914'' (1980) in-depth Coverage of diplomacy, military planning,  business and cultural relationships, propaganda and public opinion [https://www.amazon.com/dp/157392301X/ excerpt and text search]
 * Kennedy, Paul. ''The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers'' (1987), pp 194–260. [[iarchive:risefallofgreatp00paul|online free to borrow]]
 * Kennedy, Paul. ''The Rise and Fall of British Naval mastery'' (1976) pp 205–38.
@@ Line 111: / Line 111: @@
 * Neilson,  Keith. ''Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894-1917'' (1995) [https://www.questia.com/library/6560054/britain-and-the-last-tsar-british-policy-and-russia online]
 * Otte, T. G. ''July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914'' (Cambridge UP, 2014). [https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/sites/www.alistairlexden.org.uk/files/lord_lexden_-_july_crisis.pdf online review]
-* Paddock, Troy R. E. ''A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War''  (2004) [https://www.questia.com/library/119588639/a-call-to-arms-propaganda-public-opinion-and-newspapers online]
+* Paddock, Troy R. E. ''A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War''  (2004) [https://www.questia.com/library/119588639/a-call-to-arms-propaganda-public-opinion-and-newspapers online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190721133043/https://www.questia.com/library/119588639/a-call-to-arms-propaganda-public-opinion-and-newspapers |date=21 July 2019 }}
 * [[Peter Padfield|Padfield, Peter]]. ''The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German Naval Rivalry 1900-1914'' (2005)
 * Papayoanou, Paul A. "Interdependence, institutions, and the balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I." ''International Security'' 20.4 (1996): 42-76.
@@ Line 118: / Line 118: @@
 * Schmitt, Bernadotte E. "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914." ''American Historical Review'' 29.3 (1924): 449-473. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1836520 in JSTOR]
 * Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly.  ''England and Germany, 1740-1914'' (1916). [[iarchive:englandandgerma02schmgoog|online]]
-* Scott, Jonathan French. ''Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War'' (1927)   pp 99–153 [https://www.questia.com/library/83680/five-weeks-the-surge-of-public-opinion-on-the-eve online].
+* Scott, Jonathan French. ''Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War'' (1927)   pp 99–153 [https://www.questia.com/library/83680/five-weeks-the-surge-of-public-opinion-on-the-eve online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190721133042/https://www.questia.com/library/83680/five-weeks-the-surge-of-public-opinion-on-the-eve |date=21 July 2019 }}.
 * Seligmann, Matthew S. "A Service Ready for Total War? The State of the Royal Navy in July 1914." ''English Historical Review'' 133.560 (2018): 98-122 [https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article-pdf/133/560/98/24421502/cey060.pdf online].
@@ Line 133: / Line 133: @@
 * Wood, Harry. "Sharpening the Mind: The German Menace and Edwardian National Identity." ''Edwardian Culture'' (2017). 115-132. public fears of German invasion.
 * Woodward, E.L. ''Great Britain And The German Navy'' (1935) 535pp; scholarly history [[iarchive:in.ernet.dli.2015.499103|online]]
-* Young, John W. "Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis." ''International History Review'' 40.1 (2018): 206-224. [http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44300/1/BuchananReviseOpAc.pdf online]
+* Young, John W. "Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis." ''International History Review'' 40.1 (2018): 206-224. [http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44300/1/BuchananReviseOpAc.pdf online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190415044554/http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44300/1/BuchananReviseOpAc.pdf |date=15 April 2019 }}
 * Young, John W. "Emotions and the British Government’s Decision for War in 1914." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 29.4 (2018): 543-564. [https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/preview/913473/Emotions1914OA0818.pdf online]
 *  "British Entry into World War I: Did the Germans Have Reason to Doubt that the British Would Declare War in 1914?" in   Paul du Quenoy ed., ''History in Dispute Vol. 16: Twentieth-Century European Social and Political Movements: First Series (St. James Press 2000; Gale E-Books) 10pp summary of debate''
@@ Line 159: / Line 159: @@
 *  United States. War Dept. General Staff. ''Strength and organization of the armies of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, England, Italy, Mexico and Japan (showing conditions in July, 1914)'' (1916) [[iarchive:strengthorganiza00unit|online]]
 * Wilson, K.M. "The British Cabinet's Decision for War, 2 August 1914" ''British Journal of International Studies'' 1#3 (1975), pp.&nbsp;148–159 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/20096738 online]
-* Young, John W. "Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis." ''International History Review'' 40.2 (2018): 436-455. Diary of UK cabinet discussions  26 July to Aug. 4, 1914.
+* Young, John W. "Lewis Harcourt's Journal of the 1914 War Crisis." ''International History Review'' 40.2 (2018): 436-455. Diary of UK cabinet discussions  26 July to 4 August 1914.
+{{World War I}}{{H. H. Asquith|state=collapsed}}
 [[Category:1914 in the United Kingdom]]
@@ Line 170: / Line 171: @@
 [[Category:George V]]
 [[Category:H. H. Asquith]]
+[[Category:July Crisis|*]]

v t e H. H. Asquith
Premiership	Liberal government 1908-1915 Coalition government 1915–1916
General elections	January 1910 December 1910 1918 1922 1923 1924
Career	Relugas Compact (1905) People's Budget (1909) Battle of Downing Street (1910) Marconi scandal (1912) Third Home Rule Bill (1914) Curragh incident (1914) Buckingham Palace Conference (1914) July Crisis (1914) British entry into World War I Gallipoli campaign (1915) Shell Crisis (1915) Easter Rising (1916) Maurice Debate (1918)
Parties	Liberal Party Independent Liberal Party (1918)
Constituenies	East Fife (1886-1918) Paisley (1920-1924)
Family	Margot Asquith (second wife) Raymond Asquith (son) Herbert Asquith (son) Arthur Asquith (son) Violet Bonham Carter (daughter) Cyril Asquith (son) Elizabeth Bibesco (daughter) Anthony Asquith (son) Maurice Bonham-Carter (son-in-law) Cynthia Asquith (daughter-in-law) Katharine Asquith (daughter-in-law) Edward Tennant, 1st Baron Glenconner (brother-in-law) Harold Tennant (brother-in-law)
Cultural depictions	Edward the Seventh (TV, 1975) The Life and Times of David Lloyd George (TV, 1981) Number 10 (TV, 1983) The Lost Prince (TV, 2003)
Related articles	Rector of the University of Glasgow Rector of the University of Aberdeen 1916 Prime Minister's Resignation Honours 1920 Paisley by-election 1925 University of Oxford Chancellor election Earl of Oxford and Asquith Venetia Stanley