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The '''use–mention distinction''' is a foundational concept of [[analytic philosophy]],<ref>Wheeler (2005) p. 568</ref> according to which it is necessary to make a [[Dichotomy|distinction]] between {{em|using}} a word (or phrase) and {{em|mentioning}} it.<ref name="Devitt99">Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1</ref><ref name="Suine40p24">[[W.V. Quine]] (1940) p. 24</ref> Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".<ref name="Devitt99"/> The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.<ref name="Devitt99" /><ref name="Derrida77p79"/>
In [[analytic philosophy]],<ref>Wheeler (2005) p. 568</ref> a fundamental distinction is made between the use of a term and the mere mention of it.<ref name="Devitt99">Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1</ref><ref name="Suine40p24">[[W.V. Quine]] (1940) p. 24</ref> Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".<ref name="Devitt99"/> The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.<ref name="Devitt99" /><ref name="Derrida77p79"/>


The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":<ref name="Devitt99"/><ref name="Suine40p24"/>
The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":<ref name="Devitt99"/><ref name="Suine40p24"/>
* ''Use'': Cheese is derived from milk.
# Cheese is derived from milk.
* ''Mention'': "Cheese" is derived from the [[Old English language|Old English]] word ''ċēse''.
# "Cheese" is derived from the [[Old English]] word {{lang|ang|ċēse}}.


The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it ''uses'' the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as a [[Sign (linguistics)|signifier]]: it ''mentions'' the word without ''using'' it to refer to anything other than itself. Note the quotation marks.
The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it {{em|uses}} the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as a [[Sign (linguistics)|signifier]]: it {{em|mentions}} the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.


== Grammar ==
== Overview ==
{{More citations needed|date=November 2010}}


In written language, ''mentioned'' words or phrases often appear between single or double [[quotation mark]]s (as in "The name 'Chicago' contains three vowels") or in [[italics]] (as in "When I say ''honey'', I mean the sweet stuff that bees make"). In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are much more common. Style authorities such as ''[[Strunk and White]]'' insist that mentioned words or phrases must always be made visually distinct in this manner. On the other hand, ''used'' words or phrases (much more common than mentioned ones) do not bear any typographic markings. In spoken language, or in absence of the use of stylistic cues such as quotation marks or italics in written language, the audience must identify mentioned words or phrases through semantic, pragmatic, and prosodic cues.<ref>{{cite web|last=Wilson|first=Shomir|title=A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language|url=http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/11694|publisher=PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland|access-date=16 February 2013|year=2011}}</ref>
In written language, ''mentioned'' words or phrases often appear between single or double [[quotation marks]] or in [[italics]]. In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common.<ref>For example, ''Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders,'' 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake, and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. ''Butcher's'' recommends against the practice, but ''The Chicago Manual of Style,'' section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that philosophers use single quotes for a similar distinction, though it is not explained in these terms.</ref> Some style authorities, such as [[Strunk and White]], emphasize that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand, ''used'' words or phrases do not carry typographic markings.<ref>{{cite web |last=Wilson |first=Shomir |year=2011 |title=A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language |url=http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/11694 |access-date=16 February 2013 |publisher=PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland}}</ref>


⚫
The phenomenon of a term having different [[references]] in various contexts was referred to as ''[[Supposition Theory|suppositio]]'' (substitution) by medieval logicians.<ref>See Read, Stephen (2006). [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms]. In [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]].</ref> A substitution describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways:
If quotation marks are used, it is sometimes customary to distinguish between the quotation marks used for speech and those used for mentioned words, with double quotes in one place and single in the other:
* With a ''concrete and real referent'':{{efn|This use of the word ''concrete'' is explained at [[Abstract and concrete]].}} "That is my ''pig''." (personal supposition)
* When Larry said, "That has three letters", he was referring to the word 'bee'.
⚫
* With a ''concrete but unreal referent'': "Santa Claus's ''pig'' is very big." (personal supposition)
* With reference to 'bumbershoot', Peter explained that "The term refers to an umbrella".
⚫
* With a ''generic referent'': "Any ''pig'' breathes air." (simple supposition)
⚫
* Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is a ''pig''." (improper supposition)
⚫
* As a ''pure term'': "''Pig'' has only three letters." (material supposition)


⚫
The use–mention distinction is particularly significant in [[analytic philosophy]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Quotation |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quotation/#2.2 |access-date=5 October 2009 |date=16 July 2005}}</ref> Confusing use with mention can lead to misleading or incorrect statements, such as [[category error]]s.
A few authorities recommend against using different types of quotation marks for speech and mentioned words and recommend one style of quotation mark to be used for both purposes.<ref>For example, ''Butcher's Copy-Editing: the Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders.'' 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. ''Butcher's'' recommends against the practice, but ''The Chicago Manual of Style'', section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that "philosophers" use single quotes for a practice akin to the use/mention distinction, though it is not explained in this way.</ref>


[[Self-reference|Self-referential]] statements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such as [[Quine's paradox]]. In mathematics, this concept appears in [[Gödel's incompleteness theorem]], where the [[diagonal lemma]] plays a crucial role.
== In philosophy ==
⚫
The general phenomenon of a term's having different [[references]] in different contexts was called ''[[Supposition Theory|suppositio]]'' (substitution) by medieval logicians.<ref>See Read, Stephen (2006). [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms]. In [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]].</ref> It describes how one has to substitute a term in a sentence based on its meaning—that is, based on the term's referent. In general, a term can be used in several ways. For nouns, they are the following:
* Properly with a ''[[Abstract and concrete|concrete]] and real referent'': "That is my ''pig''" (assuming it exists). (personal supposition)
⚫
* Properly with a ''concrete but unreal referent'': "Santa Claus's pig is very big." (also personal supposition)
⚫
* Properly with a ''generic referent'': "Any ''pig'' breathes air." (simple supposition)
⚫
* Improperly by way of ''metaphor'': "Your grandfather is a ''pig''". (improper supposition)
⚫
* As a ''pure term'': "''<nowiki/>'Pig''' has only three letters". (material supposition)


== Commentary ==
The last sentence contains a mention example.
⚫
[[Stanisław Leśniewski]] extensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it in [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead|Whitehead]]'s ''[[Principia Mathematica]]''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Simons |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Simons (academic) |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition |title-link=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Thomson Gale |year=2006 |isbn=0-02-866072-2 |editor=Borchert, Donald M |edition=e-book |page=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaphil04borc/page/n295 292] |chapter=Leśniewski, Stanisław}}</ref>


[[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] argued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Davidson |first=Donald |date=March 1979 |title=Quotation |journal=Theory and Decision |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=27–40 |doi=10.1007/BF00126690 |issn=0040-5833 |s2cid=261211103}}</ref>
⚫
The use–mention distinction is especially important in [[analytic philosophy]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Quotation|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quotation/#2.2|date=16 July 2005|access-date=5 October 2009}}</ref> Failure to properly distinguish use from mention can produce false, misleading, or meaningless statements or [[category error]]s. For example, the following sentences correctly distinguish between use and mention:
* "Copper" contains six letters, and is not a metal.
* Copper is a metal, and contains no letters.


[[Douglas Hofstadter]] explains the distinction between use and mention as follows:<ref>{{cite book |last=Hofstadter |first=Douglas R. |url=https://archive.org/details/metamagicalthema0000hofs |title=Metamagical Themas |year=1985 |page=[https://archive.org/details/metamagicalthema0000hofs/page/9 9]}}</ref>
The first sentence, a mention example, is a statement about the word "copper" and not the chemical element. The word is composed of six letters, but does not contain any kind of metal or other tangible thing. The second sentence, a use example, is a statement about the chemical element copper and not the word itself. The element is composed of 29 electrons and protons and a number of neutrons, but not any letters.
{{blockquote|When a word is used to ''refer'' to something, it is being ''used''. When a word is ''quoted'', the focus is on its surface aspects, such as typography or phonetics, and it is being ''mentioned''.}}
Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.<ref>{{cite book |last=Boolos |first=George |author-link=George Boolos |title=Logic, Logic, and Logic |year=1999 |page=398 |quote=In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of a [[formal language]], and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks.}}</ref>


⚫
[[Stanisław Leśniewski]] was perhaps the first to make widespread use of this distinction and the [[fallacy]] that arises from overlooking it, seeing it all around in analytic philosophy of the time, for example in Russell and Whitehead's ''[[Principia Mathematica]]''.<ref>{{cite book|last=Simons|first=Peter|title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition|year=2006|publisher=Thomson Gale|isbn=0-02-866072-2|edition=e-book|author-link=Peter Simons (academic)|editor=Borchert, Donald M|page=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaphil04borc/page/n295 292]|chapter=Leśniewski, Stanisław|title-link=Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> At the logical level, a use–mention mistake occurs when two heterogeneous levels of meaning or context are confused inadvertently.{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}}

{{anchor|both use and mention}}
[[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] told that in his student years, "quotation was usually introduced as a somewhat shady device, and the introduction was accompanied by a stern sermon on the sin of confusing the use and mention of expressions." He presented a class of sentences like
{{blockquote|Quine said that "quotation has a certain anomalous feature."}}
which both use the meaning of the quoted words to complete the sentence, and mention them as they are attributed to [[W. V. Quine]], to argue against his teachers' hard distinction. He said that quotations could not be analyzed as simple expressions that mention their content by means of [[Proper name (philosophy)|naming]] it or [[definite description|describing]] its parts, as sentences like the above would lose their exact, twofold meaning.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1007/BF00126690| issn = 0040-5833| volume = 11| issue = 1| pages = 27–40| last = Davidson| first = Donald| title = Quotation| journal = Theory and Decision| date = March 1979}}</ref>

[[Self-reference|Self-referential]] statements mention themselves or their components, often producing logical [[paradox]]es, such as [[Quine's paradox]]. A mathematical analogy of self-referential statements lies at the core of [[Gödel's incompleteness theorem]] ([[diagonal lemma]]). There are many examples of self-reference and use–mention distinction in the works of [[Douglas Hofstadter]], who makes the distinction thus:

{{blockquote|When a word is used to ''refer'' to something, it is said to be being ''used''. When a word is ''quoted'', though, so that someone is examining it for its surface aspects (typographical, phonetic, etc.), it is said to be being ''mentioned''.<ref>{{cite book |title=Metamagical Themas |url=https://archive.org/details/metamagicalthema0000hofs |url-access=registration |last=Hofstadter |first=Douglas R. |year=1985 |page=[https://archive.org/details/metamagicalthema0000hofs/page/9 9]}}</ref>}}

Although the standard notation for mentioning a term in philosophy and logic is to put the term in quotation marks, issues arise when the mention is itself of a mention. Notating using italics might require a potentially infinite number of typefaces, while putting quotation marks within quotation marks may lead to ambiguity.<ref>{{cite book |title=Logic, Logic, and Logic |last=Boolos |first=George |author-link=George Boolos |year=1999 |page=398 |quote=In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of a [[formal language]], and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks, using "′" to modify the succeeding "°", as in:<br/>According to [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. Quine]],<br/>Whose views on quotation are fine,<br/>°Boston° names Boston,<br/>and ′°°Boston°′° names °Boston°, <!-- sic; for more explanation, you must read the paper --><br/>But 9 doesn't designate 9.}}</ref>

==Criticism==
Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".<ref name="Devitt99" />
Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".<ref name="Devitt99" />


In a [[Limited Inc|1977 response to]] analytic philosopher [[John Searle]], [[Jacques Derrida]] mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".<ref name="Derrida77p79">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-ANhg9zaAtIC&pg=PA79|title=Limited Inc
In a [[Limited Inc|1977 response to]] analytic philosopher [[John Searle]], [[Jacques Derrida]] mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".<ref name="Derrida77p79">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-ANhg9zaAtIC&pg=PA79|title=Limited Inc
|year=1977 |page=79|isbn=9780810107885 |last1=Derrida |first1=Jacques }}</ref>
|year=1977 |page=79|isbn=9780810107885 |last1=Derrida |first1=Jacques |publisher=Northwestern University Press
}}</ref>


== See also ==
== See also ==
Line 68: Line 52:
* {{Annotated link |When a white horse is not a horse}}
* {{Annotated link |When a white horse is not a horse}}


== Notes ==
==Notes==
{{notelist}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist}}


== References ==
== Sources ==
* [[Derrida|Derrida, Jacques]] (1977) ''Limited Inc abc ...'' in ''[[Limited Inc]]''
* [[Derrida|Derrida, Jacques]] (1977) ''Limited Inc abc ...'' in ''[[Limited Inc]]''
* [[Michael Devitt]], [[Kim Sterelny]] (1999) [https://books.google.com/books?id=JwuHtulKe6AC&pg=PA40 ''Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language'']
* [[Michael Devitt]], [[Kim Sterelny]] (1999) [https://books.google.com/books?id=JwuHtulKe6AC&pg=PA40 ''Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language'']
Line 82: Line 69:
== External links ==
== External links ==
* "[https://web.archive.org/web/20050305154415/http://www.unconventional-wisdom.com/WAW/ROBERT.html Robert And The Use-Mention Distinction]", by William A. Wisdom, c. 2002
* "[https://web.archive.org/web/20050305154415/http://www.unconventional-wisdom.com/WAW/ROBERT.html Robert And The Use-Mention Distinction]", by William A. Wisdom, c. 2002
* "[http://www.xenodochy.org/gs/quotes.html On the use of Quotation Marks]", by Ralph E. Kenyon, Jr. PhD, 29 December 1992, Revised 21 October 1993, Published in ''Etc.: A Review of General Semantics'', Vol. 51 No 1, Spring 1994. (accessed: 26 August 2006).
* "[http://www.xenodochy.org/gs/quotes.html On the use of Quotation Marks]", by Ralph E. Kenyon Jr. PhD, 29 December 1992, Revised 21 October 1993, Published in ''ETC: A Review of General Semantics'', Vol. 51 No 1, Spring 1994. (accessed: 26 August 2006).
* "[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_9w8JougLQ The evolution of Confusion]", talk by [[Daniel Dennett]] AAI 2009, 4 October 2009
* "[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_9w8JougLQ The evolution of Confusion]", talk by [[Daniel Dennett]] AAI 2009, 4 October 2009


Latest revision as of 17:40, 26 November 2024

In analytic philosophy,[1] a fundamental distinction is made between the use of a term and the mere mention of it.[2][3] Many philosophical works have been "vitiated by a failure to distinguish use and mention".[2] The distinction can sometimes be pedantic, especially in simple cases where it is obvious.[2][4]

The distinction between use and mention can be illustrated with the word "cheese":[2][3]

  1. Cheese is derived from milk.
  2. "Cheese" is derived from the Old English word ċēse.

The first sentence is a statement about the substance called "cheese": it uses the word "cheese" to refer to that substance. The second is a statement about the word "cheese" as a signifier: it mentions the word without using it to refer to anything other than itself.

Overview

[edit]

In written language, mentioned words or phrases often appear between single or double quotation marks or in italics. In philosophy, single quotation marks are typically used, while in other fields (such as linguistics) italics are more common.[5] Some style authorities, such as Strunk and White, emphasize that mentioned words or phrases should be visually distinct. On the other hand, used words or phrases do not carry typographic markings.[6]

The phenomenon of a term having different references in various contexts was referred to as suppositio (substitution) by medieval logicians.[7] A substitution describes how a term is substituted in a sentence based on its referent. For nouns, a term can be used in different ways:

  • With a concrete and real referent:[a] "That is my pig." (personal supposition)
  • With a concrete but unreal referent: "Santa Claus's pig is very big." (personal supposition)
  • With a generic referent: "Any pig breathes air." (simple supposition)
  • Metaphorically: "Your grandfather is a pig." (improper supposition)
  • As a pure term: "Pig has only three letters." (material supposition)

The use–mention distinction is particularly significant in analytic philosophy.[8] Confusing use with mention can lead to misleading or incorrect statements, such as category errors.

Self-referential statements also engage the use–mention distinction and are often central to logical paradoxes, such as Quine's paradox. In mathematics, this concept appears in Gödel's incompleteness theorem, where the diagonal lemma plays a crucial role.

Commentary

[edit]

Stanisław Leśniewski extensively employed this distinction, noting the fallacies that can result from confusing it in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica.[9]

Donald Davidson argued that quotation cannot always be treated as mere mention, giving examples where quotations carry both use and mention functions.[10]

Douglas Hofstadter explains the distinction between use and mention as follows:[11]

When a word is used to refer to something, it is being used. When a word is quoted, the focus is on its surface aspects, such as typography or phonetics, and it is being mentioned.

Issues arise when a mention itself is mentioned. Notating this with italics or repeated quotation marks can lead to ambiguity.[12]

Some analytic philosophers have said the distinction "may seem rather pedantic".[2]

In a 1977 response to analytic philosopher John Searle, Jacques Derrida mentioned the distinction as "rather laborious and problematical".[4]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ This use of the word concrete is explained at Abstract and concrete.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Wheeler (2005) p. 568
  2. ^ a b c d e Devitt and Sterelny (1999) pp. 40–1
  3. ^ a b W.V. Quine (1940) p. 24
  4. ^ a b Derrida, Jacques (1977). Limited Inc. Northwestern University Press. p. 79. ISBN 9780810107885.
  5. ^ For example, Butcher's Copy-Editing: The Cambridge Handbook for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders, 4th edition, by Judith Butcher, Caroline Drake, and Maureen Leach. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Butcher's recommends against the practice, but The Chicago Manual of Style, section 7.58 (15th edition, 2003), indicates that philosophers use single quotes for a similar distinction, though it is not explained in these terms.
  6. ^ Wilson, Shomir (2011). "A Computational Theory of the Use-Mention Distinction in Natural Language". PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland. Retrieved 16 February 2013.
  7. ^ See Read, Stephen (2006). Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^ "Quotation". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 16 July 2005. Retrieved 5 October 2009.
  9. ^ Simons, Peter (2006). "Leśniewski, Stanisław". In Borchert, Donald M (ed.). Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition (e-book ed.). Thomson Gale. p. 292. ISBN 0-02-866072-2.
  10. ^ Davidson, Donald (March 1979). "Quotation". Theory and Decision. 11 (1): 27–40. doi:10.1007/BF00126690. ISSN 0040-5833. S2CID 261211103.
  11. ^ Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1985). Metamagical Themas. p. 9.
  12. ^ Boolos, George (1999). Logic, Logic, and Logic. p. 398. In this 1995 paper, Boolos discussed ambiguities in using quotation marks as part of a formal language, and proposed a way of distinguishing levels of mentioning using a finite number of marks.

Sources

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
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