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[[File:MG EAE 824 - Paul Julius Möbius - Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie - 01.jpg|thumb|Book cover]] |
[[File:MG EAE 824 - Paul Julius Möbius - Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie - 01.jpg|thumb|Book cover]] |
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'''''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie''''' (translated: Hopelessness of all |
'''''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie''''' (translated: ''Hopelessness of all Psychology'') is a book written by [[Paul Julius Möbius]] published in 1907. In the book, Möbius challenges [[Psychology|psychology's]] ability to establish itself as a legitimate [[science]], questioning its reliance on [[empirical methods]] and raising concerns about its future as a scientific discipline.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Möbius |first=P.J. |title=Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie |publisher=Halle a.d.S. : Marhold, |year=1907 |language=German |trans-title=The hopelessness of all psychology}}</ref> |
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== Context == |
== Context == |
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| ⚫ | The scepticism of psychology as a science was part of a larger intellectual debate in late 19th-century Germany. These debates revolved around the nature of [[Mental disorder|mental illness]] and the role of psychology in [[medicine]] and science.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Brysbaert & Rastle |first= |title=Historical and conceptual issues in psychology |date=2013 |publisher=Pearson, Harlow, England, 2013 |year=2013 |edition=2nd |language=en}}</ref> Although discussions about the mind date back much earlier, critiques of psychology as a scientific discipline grew more pronounced as it sought to establish itself as a true science with the rise of empirical psychology during this period. This rise was led by figures like [[Wilhelm Wundt]] or [[Hermann Ebbinghaus|Hermann Ebbinghau]]<nowiki/>s, who sought to establish psychology as a scientific discipline through [[Experiment|experimental methods]] and systematic self-observation.<ref name=":2" /> However, these approaches were questioned by other schools of thought, such as [[psychoanalysis]] led by [[Sigmund Freud]].<ref name=":2" /> |
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The writing of ''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie'' is an extension of Möbius's critical perspective on the field of psychology. His work reflects scepticism about the empirical foundations of psychology during his time, as he observed the field's struggle to establish itself as a rigorous scientific discipline.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=Cadogan |first=Mike |date=2018-09-03 |title=Paul Julius Moebius |url=https://litfl.com/paul-julius-mobius/ |access-date=2024-08-12 |website=Life in the Fast Lane • LITFL |language=en-US}}</ref> |
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Paul Julius Möbius began his studies in theology and philosophy at Leipzig, Jena, and Marburg. After earning his first doctorate in philosophy, he shifted to medicine, studying at Jena and Marburg, and completed his medical doctorate in 1876.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |title=Paul Julius Möbius |url=http://www.whonamedit.com/doctor.cfm/33.html |access-date=2024-10-13 |website=www.whonamedit.com}}</ref> Möbius contributed significantly to the foundations of [[neurophysiology]] and [[psychiatry]] through his work on classifying nervous disorders. Specifically, he became known for differentiating between [[Exogeny|exogenous]] and [[Endogeny (biology)|endogenous]] nerve conditions. This classification and the characterisation of other diseases, such as the [[Moebius syndrome|Möbius syndrome]], had a significant and lasting influence on the development of neurological and psychiatric theories.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Steinberg |first=H. |date=2005-05-01 |title=Paul Julius Möbius (1853–1907) |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2 |journal=Journal of Neurology |language=en |volume=252 |issue=5 |pages=624–625 |doi=10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2 |issn=1432-1459}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=Cadogan |first=Mike |date=2018-09-03 |title=Paul Julius Moebius |url=https://litfl.com/paul-julius-mobius/ |access-date=2024-08-12 |website=Life in the Fast Lane • LITFL |language=en-US}}</ref> Later in his academic career, his work shifted more to topics in philosophy and psychology. This shift is exemplified in works like ''Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes'' (translated: The Idiocy of Women) or ''Über das pathologische bei Nietzsche'' (translated: On the pathological in Nietzsche), where Möbius applied critiques aspects of human psychology and pathology.<ref name=":4" /> This body of Möbius's earlier works created the background for his critique of psychology from a scientific and medical point of view. His writing of ''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie'' reflects the scepticism about the empirical foundations of psychology during his time.<ref name=":0" /> |
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Möbius initially studied philosophy and theology before pursuing a career in medicine.<ref name=":3" /> By the time he wrote the book Möbius was already an established figure in the field of [[neurophysiology]] and [[psychiatry]]''.''<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Steinberg |first=H. |date=2005-05-01 |title=Paul Julius Möbius (1853–1907) |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2 |journal=Journal of Neurology |language=en |volume=252 |issue=5 |pages=624–625 |doi=10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2 |issn=1432-1459}}</ref> Möbius Prior to the publication, Möbius's work had focused on nervous disorders and neurology. He became known for differentiating between [[Exogeny|exogenous]] and [[Endogeny (biology)|endogenous]] nerve conditions. This classification had a significant and lasting influence on the development of neurological and psychiatric theories.<ref name=":0" /> |
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During the course of his academic career he circled back to his roots in philosophy. Möbius increasingly added psychological topics to the focus of his work, as seen in his highly debated work ''Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes'' (translated: The Idiocy of Women). This and other works created the background for his critique of psychology and from a scientific and medical point of view. <ref name=":0" /> |
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== Contents == |
== Contents == |
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| ⚫ | The book is structured as an extended essay rather than being divided into formal chapters. It begins with a preliminary remark where Möbius introduces the topic and suggests that psychology might need to incorporate [[metaphysics]] into its methods. The first part of the book defines key concepts such as physicality and [[Psychology|psyche]], highlighting their distinctiveness. The main body of the work uses various topics, including [[Comparative psychology|animal psychology]], [[Unconscious mind|unconsciousness]], [[instinct]], feelings, and [[legal psychology]], to illustrate the limitations of empirical psychology. Möbius concludes with a closing statement that critiques the prevailing methods of empirical psychology.<ref name=":1" /> |
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In ''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie'', Möbius offers a detailed critique of psychology as a scientific discipline, arguing that it is fundamentally flawed and cannot evolve into a true science.<ref name=":1" /> |
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| ⚫ | The book is structured as an extended essay rather than being divided into formal chapters. It begins with a preliminary remark where Möbius introduces the topic and suggests that psychology might need to incorporate [[metaphysics]] into its methods. The first part of the book defines key concepts such as physicality and [[Psychology|psyche]], highlighting their distinctiveness. The main body of the work uses various topics, including [[Comparative psychology|animal psychology]], [[Unconscious mind|unconsciousness]], [[instinct]], feelings, and [[legal psychology]], to illustrate the limitations of empirical psychology. Möbius concludes with a closing statement that critiques the prevailing methods of empirical psychology.<ref name=":1" /> |
||
In ''Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie'', Möbius offers a detailed critique of psychology as a scientific discipline, arguing that it is fundamentally flawed and cannot evolve into a true science.<ref name=":1" /> Möbius asserts that psychology relies heavily on self-observation and subjective reports, limiting its scope and accuracy. He argues that any psychology claiming universal [[Validity (logic)|validity]] must cross into the realm of metaphysics, as it deals with phenomena that cannot be fully captured by empirical methods alone. Möbius criticises contemporary psychologists for failing to acknowledge this limitation.<ref name=":1" /> |
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He also challenges the discipline's ability to adequately study the full range of [[mental life]], particularly the unconscious. He observes that there are significant gaps in our understanding of mental processes that empirical psychology is unable to fill. These gaps, he argues, expose the limitations of psychology as a science and call into question its ability to fully explain the complexities of the mind.<ref name=":1" /> |
He also challenges the discipline's ability to adequately study the full range of [[mental life]], particularly the unconscious. He observes that there are significant gaps in our understanding of mental processes that empirical psychology is unable to fill. These gaps, he argues, expose the limitations of psychology as a science and call into question its ability to fully explain the complexities of the mind.<ref name=":1" /> |
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== Reception == |
== Reception == |
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The book elicited a range of responses from his contemporaries and later scholars. [[Kurt Goldstein]], a prominent neurologist and psychiatrist, agreed with some of Möbius’s views on the limitations of [[introspection]] as a methodological tool in psychology. However, Goldstein regarded Möbius's scepticism as overly radical, suggesting that while introspection had clear limitations, the discipline of psychology could not be dismissed as fundamentally flawed or without scientific value.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldstein |first=Kurt |date=1908-07-01 |title=Zur Theorie der Hallucinationen |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01821565 |journal=Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten |language=de |volume=44 |issue=2 |pages=584–655 |doi=10.1007/BF01821565 |issn=1433-8491}}</ref> Other scholars also critiqued Möbius’s conclusions, arguing that his dismissal of psychology placed unrealistic expectations on the field. These critics contended that Möbius’s assertions regarding the "hopelessness" of psychology were overstated, as they held the discipline to standards beyond its scope, failing to acknowledge the evolving methodologies and potential for future scientific development.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Giehm |first=Gerhardt |date=1933-12-01 |title=Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen der Assoziationsgeschwindigkeit bei Geisteskranken |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01814750 |journal=Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten |language=de |volume=100 |issue=1 |pages=432–438 |doi=10.1007/BF01814750 |issn=1433-8491}}</ref> In |
The book elicited a range of responses from his contemporaries and later scholars. [[Kurt Goldstein]], a prominent neurologist and psychiatrist, agreed with some of Möbius’s views on the limitations of [[introspection]] as a methodological tool in psychology. However, Goldstein regarded Möbius's scepticism as overly radical, suggesting that while introspection had clear limitations, the discipline of psychology could not be dismissed as fundamentally flawed or without scientific value.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Goldstein |first=Kurt |date=1908-07-01 |title=Zur Theorie der Hallucinationen |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01821565 |journal=Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten |language=de |volume=44 |issue=2 |pages=584–655 |doi=10.1007/BF01821565 |issn=1433-8491}}</ref> Other scholars also critiqued Möbius’s conclusions, arguing that his dismissal of psychology placed unrealistic expectations on the field. These critics contended that Möbius’s assertions regarding the "hopelessness" of psychology were overstated, as they held the discipline to standards beyond its scope, failing to acknowledge the evolving methodologies and potential for future scientific development.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Giehm |first=Gerhardt |date=1933-12-01 |title=Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen der Assoziationsgeschwindigkeit bei Geisteskranken |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01814750 |journal=Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten |language=de |volume=100 |issue=1 |pages=432–438 |doi=10.1007/BF01814750 |issn=1433-8491}}</ref> In 2004, [[Wolfgang Prinz]], a cognitive psychologist, referred to Möbius as a harsh critic of introspection but he also acknowledges that Möbius's arguments were not entirely novel.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Prinz |first=Wolfgang |date=2004-10 |title=Kritik des freien Willens: |url=https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1026/0033-3042.55.4.198 |journal=Psychologische Rundschau |language=de |volume=55 |issue=4 |pages=198–206 |doi=10.1026/0033-3042.55.4.198 |issn=0033-3042}}</ref> |
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Over time, the specific topic of psychology’s scientific validity continued to evolve, with the field gradually moving away from introspection as a primary method. While Möbius’s arguments about the limitations of introspection were acknowledged, the field of psychology continued to advance without incorporating the metaphysical elements he recommended, instead pursuing a path focused on empirical methodologies. The rise of [[cognitive psychology]], and eventually [[neuropsychology]] reflects a shift towards more empirically grounded approaches.<ref name=":2" /> |
Over time, the specific topic of psychology’s scientific validity continued to evolve, with the field gradually moving away from introspection as a primary method. While Möbius’s arguments about the limitations of introspection were acknowledged, the field of psychology continued to advance without incorporating the metaphysical elements he recommended, instead pursuing a path focused on empirical methodologies. The rise of [[cognitive psychology]], and eventually [[neuropsychology]] reflects a shift towards more empirically grounded approaches.<ref name=":2" /> |
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The book was published in 1907, the same year Möbius passed away |
The book was published in 1907, the same year Möbius passed away. There is no record of him responding to critiques of the work, and it appears he did not publish any further material after its release.<ref name=":0" /> |
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== References == |
== References == |
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Latest revision as of 02:01, 13 October 2024
Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie (translated: Hopelessness of all Psychology) is a book written by Paul Julius Möbius published in 1907. In the book, Möbius challenges psychology's ability to establish itself as a legitimate science, questioning its reliance on empirical methods and raising concerns about its future as a scientific discipline.[1]
Context
[edit]The scepticism of psychology as a science was part of a larger intellectual debate in late 19th-century Germany. These debates revolved around the nature of mental illness and the role of psychology in medicine and science.[2] Although discussions about the mind date back much earlier, critiques of psychology as a scientific discipline grew more pronounced as it sought to establish itself as a true science with the rise of empirical psychology during this period. This rise was led by figures like Wilhelm Wundt or Hermann Ebbinghaus, who sought to establish psychology as a scientific discipline through experimental methods and systematic self-observation.[2] However, these approaches were questioned by other schools of thought, such as psychoanalysis led by Sigmund Freud.[2]
Paul Julius Möbius began his studies in theology and philosophy at Leipzig, Jena, and Marburg. After earning his first doctorate in philosophy, he shifted to medicine, studying at Jena and Marburg, and completed his medical doctorate in 1876.[3] Möbius contributed significantly to the foundations of neurophysiology and psychiatry through his work on classifying nervous disorders. Specifically, he became known for differentiating between exogenous and endogenous nerve conditions. This classification and the characterisation of other diseases, such as the Möbius syndrome, had a significant and lasting influence on the development of neurological and psychiatric theories.[4][5] Later in his academic career, his work shifted more to topics in philosophy and psychology. This shift is exemplified in works like Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes (translated: The Idiocy of Women) or Über das pathologische bei Nietzsche (translated: On the pathological in Nietzsche), where Möbius applied critiques aspects of human psychology and pathology.[3] This body of Möbius's earlier works created the background for his critique of psychology from a scientific and medical point of view. His writing of Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie reflects the scepticism about the empirical foundations of psychology during his time.[4]
Contents
[edit]The book is structured as an extended essay rather than being divided into formal chapters. It begins with a preliminary remark where Möbius introduces the topic and suggests that psychology might need to incorporate metaphysics into its methods. The first part of the book defines key concepts such as physicality and psyche, highlighting their distinctiveness. The main body of the work uses various topics, including animal psychology, unconsciousness, instinct, feelings, and legal psychology, to illustrate the limitations of empirical psychology. Möbius concludes with a closing statement that critiques the prevailing methods of empirical psychology.[1]
In Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie, Möbius offers a detailed critique of psychology as a scientific discipline, arguing that it is fundamentally flawed and cannot evolve into a true science.[1] Möbius asserts that psychology relies heavily on self-observation and subjective reports, limiting its scope and accuracy. He argues that any psychology claiming universal validity must cross into the realm of metaphysics, as it deals with phenomena that cannot be fully captured by empirical methods alone. Möbius criticises contemporary psychologists for failing to acknowledge this limitation.[1]
He also challenges the discipline's ability to adequately study the full range of mental life, particularly the unconscious. He observes that there are significant gaps in our understanding of mental processes that empirical psychology is unable to fill. These gaps, he argues, expose the limitations of psychology as a science and call into question its ability to fully explain the complexities of the mind.[1]
Another key point in Möbius's critique is the neglect of physiological explanations within psychology. He emphasizes the interconnectedness of mental processes and the physical aspects of the brain, asserting that any serious study of the mind must account for its physiological underpinnings. Without this integration, he argues, psychology remains incomplete, failing to offer a comprehensive account of human thought and behaviour.[1]
Reception
[edit]The book elicited a range of responses from his contemporaries and later scholars. Kurt Goldstein, a prominent neurologist and psychiatrist, agreed with some of Möbius’s views on the limitations of introspection as a methodological tool in psychology. However, Goldstein regarded Möbius's scepticism as overly radical, suggesting that while introspection had clear limitations, the discipline of psychology could not be dismissed as fundamentally flawed or without scientific value.[6] Other scholars also critiqued Möbius’s conclusions, arguing that his dismissal of psychology placed unrealistic expectations on the field. These critics contended that Möbius’s assertions regarding the "hopelessness" of psychology were overstated, as they held the discipline to standards beyond its scope, failing to acknowledge the evolving methodologies and potential for future scientific development.[7] In 2004, Wolfgang Prinz, a cognitive psychologist, referred to Möbius as a harsh critic of introspection but he also acknowledges that Möbius's arguments were not entirely novel.[8]
Over time, the specific topic of psychology’s scientific validity continued to evolve, with the field gradually moving away from introspection as a primary method. While Möbius’s arguments about the limitations of introspection were acknowledged, the field of psychology continued to advance without incorporating the metaphysical elements he recommended, instead pursuing a path focused on empirical methodologies. The rise of cognitive psychology, and eventually neuropsychology reflects a shift towards more empirically grounded approaches.[2]
The book was published in 1907, the same year Möbius passed away. There is no record of him responding to critiques of the work, and it appears he did not publish any further material after its release.[4]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f Möbius, P.J. (1907). Die Hoffnungslosigkeit aller Psychologie [The hopelessness of all psychology] (in German). Halle a.d.S. : Marhold,.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) - ^ a b c d Brysbaert & Rastle (2013). Historical and conceptual issues in psychology (2nd ed.). Pearson, Harlow, England, 2013.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link) - ^ a b "Paul Julius Möbius". www.whonamedit.com. Retrieved 2024-10-13.
- ^ a b c Steinberg, H. (2005-05-01). "Paul Julius Möbius (1853–1907)". Journal of Neurology. 252 (5): 624–625. doi:10.1007/s00415-005-0872-2. ISSN 1432-1459.
- ^ Cadogan, Mike (2018-09-03). "Paul Julius Moebius". Life in the Fast Lane • LITFL. Retrieved 2024-08-12.
- ^ Goldstein, Kurt (1908-07-01). "Zur Theorie der Hallucinationen". Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (in German). 44 (2): 584–655. doi:10.1007/BF01821565. ISSN 1433-8491.
- ^ Giehm, Gerhardt (1933-12-01). "Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen der Assoziationsgeschwindigkeit bei Geisteskranken". Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten (in German). 100 (1): 432–438. doi:10.1007/BF01814750. ISSN 1433-8491.
- ^ Prinz, Wolfgang (2004-10). "Kritik des freien Willens:". Psychologische Rundschau (in German). 55 (4): 198–206. doi:10.1026/0033-3042.55.4.198. ISSN 0033-3042.
{{cite journal}}: Check date values in:|date=(help)