Justice: Difference between revisions
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{{short description|Concept of moral fairness and administration of the law}} |
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{{otheruses1|the concept of justice}} |
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{{About|the concept of moral fairness and administration of the law}} |
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{{Ethics}} |
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{{Multiple issues| |
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[[Image:Justice_statue.jpg|right|thumb|250px|J.L. Urban, statue of [[Lady Justice]] at court building in [[Olomouc]], [[Czech Republic]]]] |
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{{Copy edit|for=possible repetition|date=September 2023}} |
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{{Globalize|1=article|2=United States and the Western world|date=September 2023}} |
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{{More citations needed section|1=significant lack of citations of theological researchers alongside direct citations of religious texts without necessary context or interpretation by educated scholars|date=December 2024}} |
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{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2020}} |
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[[File:HK Central Statue Square Legislative Council Building n Themis s.jpg|thumb|[[Lady Justice]], a common [[personification]] of justice.]] |
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{{politics}} |
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'''Justice''' in its broadest sense is the concept that individuals are to be treated in a manner that is equitable and fair.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Moore |first=Margaret |date=November 2021 |title=Justice Principles, Empirical Beliefs, and Cognitive Biases: Reply to Buchanan's 'When Knowing What Is Just and Being Committed to Achieving it Is Not Enough' |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12547 |journal=Journal of Applied Philosophy |language=en |volume=38 |issue=5 |pages=736–741 |doi=10.1111/japp.12547 |s2cid=245448304 |issn=0264-3758}}</ref> |
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'''Justice''' concerns the proper ordering of [[Object (philosophy)|things]] and [[persons]] within a [[society]]. As a concept it has been subject to [[philosophy|philosophical]], [[law|legal]], and [[theology|theological]] reflection and debate throughout [[history]]. |
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A society in which justice has been achieved would be one in which individuals receive what they "deserve". The interpretation of what "deserve" means draws on a variety of fields and philosophical branches including [[ethics]], [[rationality]], [[law]], [[religion]], [[Equity theory|equity]] and fairness. The state may be said to pursue justice by operating [[court]]s and enforcing their rulings. |
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"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."<ref>{{ cite book | last=Rawls | first = John | title = A Theory of Justice | edition = revised | location = Oxford | publisher = Oxford University Press | year = 1999 | pages = 3 }}</ref> Few theorists, however, believe that the current world comprises a fully just system: "We do not live in a just world."<ref>{{ cite journal | last = Nagel | first = Thomas | title = The Problem of Global Justice | journal = Philosophy and Public Affairs | volume = 33 | year = 2005 | pages = 113-147 }}</ref> |
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Justice is what needs to be done |
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== History == |
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Justice can be divided into two broad types. ''[[Distributive justice]]'' is concerned with the proper distribution of good things - wealth, power, reward, respect - between different people. So, for instance, [[egalitarianism]] is a theory of distributive justice which says that the proper distribution of wealth (and perhaps other goods) is an equal distribution: no-one in the relevant group should have more or less than anyone else in that group. ''[[Retributive justice]]'' is concerned with the proper response to wrongdoing. So, for instance, the ''[[lex talionis]]'' (law of retaliation) is a theory of retributive justice which says that the proper punishment is equal to the wrong suffered: "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."<ref>[[Exodus]] 21.xxiii-xxv.</ref> |
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Early western theories of justice were developed in part by Ancient Greek philosophers such as [[Plato]] in his work ''[[Republic (Plato)|The Republic]]'', and [[Aristotle]], in his ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'' and ''[[Politics (Aristotle)|Politics]]''. Modern-day western notions of justice also have their roots in Christian theology, which largely follows the [[divine command theory]], according to which God dictates morality and determines whether or not an action is seen as morally "good". This, in turn, determines justice. <ref>{{cite book |last1=Hare |first1=John E. |title=God's Command |date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-960201-8 |pages=32–49}}</ref> |
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Western thinkers later advanced different theories about where the foundations of justice lie. In the 17th century, philosophers such as [[John Locke]] said justice derives from [[natural law]]. [[Jean-Jacques Rosseau]] was one of the advocates for [[social contract theory]] which states that justice derives from the mutual agreement of members of society to be governed in a political order. In the 19th century, [[utilitarian]] philosophers such as [[John Stuart Mill]] proposed that justice is served by what creates the best outcomes for the greatest number of people. |
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A number of important questions surrounding justice have been fiercely debated over the course of western [[history]]: What is justice? What does it demand of individuals and societies? What is the proper distribution of wealth and resources in society: [[egalitarianism|equal]], [[meritocracy|meritocratic]], [[plutocracy|according to status]], or some other arrangement?<ref>{{ cite book | last = Barry | first = Brian | title = Theories of Justice | location = Berkeley | publisher = University of California Press | year = 1989 | pages = xiii }}</ref> There is a myriad of possible answers to these questions from divergent perspectives on the political and philosophical spectrum. |
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Modern frameworks include concepts such as [[distributive justice]], [[egalitarianism]], [[retributive justice]] and [[restorative justice]]. Distributive justice considers what is fair based on what goods are to be distributed, between whom they are to be distributed, and what is the ''proper'' distribution. Egalitarians suggest justice can only exist within the coordinates of equality. Theories of retributive justice say justice is served by punishing wrongdoers, whereas restorative justice (also sometimes called "reparative justice") is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of victims and offenders.{{cn|reason=not enough citations of the different branches of philosophy here|date=December 2024}} |
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Some theorists, such as the classical Greeks, conceive of justice as a [[virtue]]—a property of people, and only derivatively of their actions and the institutions they create. Others emphasize actions or institutions, and only derivatively of the people who bring them about. The source of justice has variously been attributed to [[harmony]], [[divine command theory|divine command]], [[natural law]], or [[human]] creation. It may be considered subordinate to a different ethical value. |
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==Harmony and the early Greeks== |
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==Virtue or results?== |
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{{Main|The Republic (Plato)}} |
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Justice, according to [[Plato]], is about balance and harmony. It represents the right relationship between conflicting aspects within an individual or a community. He defines justice as everyone having and doing what they are responsible for or what belongs to them. In other words, a just person is someone who contributes to society according to their unique abilities and receives what is proportionate to their contribution. They are in the right place, always striving to do their best, and reciprocating what they receive in a fair and equitable manner. This applies both at the individual level and at the organizational and societal levels.<ref name=":1">Plato, ''Republic'' trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).</ref> |
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To illustrate these ideas, Plato describes a person as having three parts: reason, spirit and desire. These parallel the three parts of a city in his philosophy, which he describes through the metaphor of a chariot: it functions effectively when the charioteer, representative of reason, successfully controls the two horses, symbolizing spirit and desire. Continuing on these themes, Plato theorizes that those who love wisdom, or [[Philosopher king|philosophers]], are the most ideal to govern because only they truly comprehend the nature of the good. Just like one would seek a doctor's expertise in matters of health rather than a farmer's, so should the city entrust its governance to someone knowledgeable about the good, rather than to politicians who might prioritize power over people's genuine needs. [[Socrates]] later used the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain (the common people), a group of untrustworthy advisors who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship's course (the politicians), and a [[navigator]] (the philosopher), the latter of whom being the only one who knows how to get the ship to port.<ref name=":1" /><!-- lead suggests information about Aristotle should be in this section --> |
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Between a just (or unjust) punishment and the just (or unjust) judge who imposes it, which of these senses is more fundamental? Justice has been thought, primarily, the morally right assignment of good and bad things (including wealth, power, reward, respect and punishment); alternatively, it has been thought the virtue of a person who expresses or acts for that right assignment. Either actions are just because a just person does them, or a person is just because they do just things. The twentieth-century moral philosopher [[Elizabeth Anscombe]] influentially argued that modern philosophy had gone wrong in focusing on actions and their results over the character of actors, and so inspired modern [[virtue ethics]], which follows [[Aristotle]] in considering justice as [[Justice (virtue)|one of the virtues]] of a good ''person'', and only indirectly as a property of a state of affairs.<ref>Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, ''Philosophy'' 33(1958): 1-19. See further Alasdair MacIntyre, ''After Virtue'' (2nd edition, London: Duckworth, 1985); Onora O'Neill, ''Towards Justice and Virtue'' (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), chapter 1.</ref> |
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{{further|[[Aretaic turn]]}} |
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==Divine command and Religious Theories of Justice== |
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==Understandings of justice== |
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{{Main|Divine command theory}}{{See also|Divine command}} |
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[[Image:Luca Giordano 013.jpg|thumb|right|250px|''Justice'' by [[Luca Giordano]]]] |
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Advocates of divine command theory say justice, and indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of God. Murder is wrong and must be punished, for instance, because God says it so. Some versions of the theory assert that God must be obeyed because of the nature of God's relationship with humanity, others assert that God must be obeyed because God is goodness itself, and thus doing God's command would be best for everyone.{{cn|reason=having further theological citations and interpretations would assist this alongside it being far too of a conversational tone rather than discussion of theology|date=December 2024}} |
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An early meditation on the divine command theory by [[Plato]] can be found in his dialogue, [[Euthyphro]]. Called the [[Euthyphro dilemma]], it goes as follows: "Is what is morally good commanded by the gods because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by the gods?" The implication is that if the latter is true, then justice is beyond mortal understanding; if the former is true, then morality exists independently from the gods, and is therefore subject to the judgment of mortals. A [[Argument from morality|response]], popularized in two contexts by [[Immanuel Kant]] and [[C. S. Lewis]], is that it is deductively valid to say that the existence of an objective morality implies the existence of God and vice versa. |
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It has already been noted that justice is distinguished from other ethical standards as ''required'' and as ''overwhelmingly important'': Justice can be thought of as distinct from, and more important than, [[benevolence]], [[Charity (virtue)|charity]], [[mercy]], [[generosity]] or [[compassion]]. All of these things may be valuable, but they are supererogatory rather than required. We need to know more than this: we need to know what justice is, not merely what it is not, and several answers to that problem have been proposed. |
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[[Judaism|Judaistic]], [[Christianity|Christian]] and [[Islam|Muslim]] theology traditionally follow that justice is a present, real, right, and, specifically, governing concept along with [[mercy]] and that justice is ultimately derived from and held by God. According to the [[Bible]], such [[institutions]] like the [[Law of Moses|Mosaic Law]] were created by God to require the [[Israelites]] to live by and apply God's standards of justice. |
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Justice is linked, both etymologically and conceptually, to the idea of [[justification]]: having and giving decisive reasons for one’s beliefs and actions. So, attempts to understand justice are typically attempts to discover the justification – the source or basis – of justice, and therefore to account for (or disprove) its overwhelming importance. |
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The Hebrew Bible describes God as saying about the [[Judeo-Christian-Islamic]] [[patriarch]] [[Abraham]]: "No, for I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice;...." ([[Book of Genesis|Genesis]] 18:19, [[New Revised Standard Version|NRSV)]]. The [[Psalms|Psalmist]] describes God as having "Righteousness and justice [as] the foundation of [His] throne;...." (Psalms 89:14, NRSV). |
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===Justice as harmony=== |
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{{main|Republic (dialogue)}} |
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In his dialogue ''Republic'', [[Plato]] uses the character of [[Socrates]] to argue for a single account of justice which covers both the just person and the just [[city-state]]. Justice is a proper, harmonious relationship between the warring parts of the person or city. A person’s soul has three parts – reason, spirit and desire – and the just person is the one in whom reason commands the other two and each keeps to its task. Similarly, a city has three parts – lovers of wisdom, soldiers and workers – and the just city is the one in which the lovers of wisdom rule the other two, and in which everyone sticks to his or her own, appropriate tasks. Socrates uses the parable of the chariot to illustrate his point: a chariot works as a whole because the two horses’ power is directed by the charioteer. Lovers of wisdom – ''philosophers'', in one sense of the term – should rule because only they understand what is [[Goodness and evil|good]]. If one is ill, one goes to a doctor rather than a quack, because the doctor is expert in the subject of health. Similarly, one should trust one’s city to an expert in the subject of the good, not to a mere [[politician]] who tries to gain power by giving people what they want, rather than what’s good for them. Socrates uses the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain (the common people), a group of untrustworthy advisors who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship’s course (the politicians), and a [[navigator]] (the philosopher) who is the only one who knows how to get the ship to port. For Socrates, the only way the ship will reach its destination – the good – is if the navigator takes charge.<ref>Plato, ''Republic'' trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: OUP, 1984).</ref> |
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The [[New Testament]] also describes God and [[Jesus|Jesus Christ]] as having and displaying justice, often in comparison with God displaying and supporting [[mercy]] ([[Gospel of Matthew|Matthew]] 5:7). |
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===Justice as divine command=== |
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{{main|Divine command theory}} |
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Advocates of divine command theory argue that justice, and indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of a deity or deities, for instance, the Christian [[God]]. [[Murder]] is wrong and must be punished, for instance, because, and ''only'' because, God commands that it be so. A common response to Divine Command Theory is the [[Euthyphro dilemma]], which asks: is what is right right because it is commanded by God, or does God command what is in fact morally right? If the former, then justice is arbitrary; if the latter, then morality exists on a higher order than God, who becomes little more than a passer-on of moral knowledge. Divine command advocates have the option of responding by pointing out that the dilemma is false: goodness is the very nature of God and is necessarily expressed in his commands. |
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== |
==Natural law== |
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{{main|Natural law}} |
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For advocates of the theory that justice is part of natural law, it involves the system of consequences which naturally derives from any action or choice. In this, it is similar to the [[Laws of nature|laws of physics]]: in the same way as the Third of [[Isaac Newton|Newton]]'s [[Newton's laws of motion|laws of Motion]] requires that for every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction, justice requires according individuals or groups what they actually deserve, merit, or are entitled to. Justice, on this account, is a universal and absolute concept: laws, principles, [[religion]]s, etc., are merely attempts to codify that concept, sometimes with results that entirely contradict the true nature of justice. |
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{{Main|Natural law}}{{Expand section|date=October 2020}} |
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===Justice as human creation=== |
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[[File:Iustitia van Heemskerck.png|thumb|''[[Justitia]]'' by [[Maarten van Heemskerk]], 1556. Justitia carries symbolic items such as: a sword, [[Weighing scale#Balance|scales]] and a blindfold.<ref>Cuban ''Law's Blindfold'', 23.</ref>]] |
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In contrast to the understandings canvassed so far, justice may be understood as a human ''creation'', rather than a ''discovery'' of harmony, divine command, or natural law. This claim can be understood in a number of ways, with the fundamental division being between those who argue that justice is the creation of ''some'' humans, and those who argue that it is the creation of ''all'' humans. |
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Many have advocated that justice is a part of natural law (e.g., John Locke) which states that "justie inheres in the nature of man."<ref>See {{Cite book |year=1698 |title=Two Treatises of Government: In The Former the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government |edition=3 |publisher=Awnsham and John Churchill |publication-date=1698 |location=London |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7kwUAAAAQAAJ&q=editions%3Aq2cKQ3eYrMIC&pg=PP7 |access-date=20 November 2014}} via Google Books</ref> |
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===Despotism and skepticism=== |
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====Justice as authoritative command==== |
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[[Image:Giotto - Scrovegni - -50- - Injustice.jpg|thumb|150px|''Injustice'' by [[Giotto di Bondone]]]] |
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According to thinkers including [[Thomas Hobbes]], justice is created by public, enforceable, authoritative [[Norm (philosophy)|rules]], and injustice is whatever those rules forbid, regardless of their relation to morality. Justice is ''created'', not merely described or approximated, by the command of an absolute [[sovereign]] power. This position has some similarities with divine command theory (see above), with the difference that the [[state]] (or other authority) replaces God. |
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In ''Republic'' by Plato, the character [[Thrasymachus]] argues that justice is the interest of the strong – merely a name for what the powerful or cunning ruler has imposed on the people. |
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====Justice as mutual agreement==== |
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{{further|The Republic (Plato)}} |
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{{main|Social contract}} |
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According to thinkers in the social contract tradition, justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone concerned; or, in many versions, from what they would agree to under ''hypothetical'' conditions including equality and absence of bias. This account is considered further below, under ‘Justice as fairness’. |
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===Mutual agreement=== |
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===Justice as less important than we think=== |
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According to utilitarian thinkers including [[John Stuart Mill]], justice is not as fundamental as we often think. Rather, it is derived from the more basic standard of rightness, [[consequentialism]]: what is right is what has the best consequences (usually measured by the total or average [[Quality of life|welfare]] caused). So, the proper principles of justice are those which tend to have the best consequences. These rules may turn out to be familiar ones such as keeping [[contract]]s; but equally, they may not, depending on the facts about real consequences. Either way, what is important is those consequences, and justice is important, if at all, only as derived from that fundamental standard. Mill tries to explain our mistaken belief that justice is overwhelmingly important by arguing that it derives from two natural human tendencies: our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, and our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in another’s place. So, when we see someone harmed, we project ourselves into her situation and feel a desire to retaliate on her behalf. If this process is the source of our feelings about justice, that ought to undermine our confidence in them.<ref>John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism'' in ''On Liberty and Other Essays'' ed. John Gray (Oxford: OUP, 1991), Chapter 5.</ref> |
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{{further|[[Utilitarianism]], [[Utilitarianism (book)]], [[John Stuart Mill]]}} |
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{{Main|Social contract}} |
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===Eternal Justice=== |
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Advocates of the social contract say that justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone; or, in many versions, from what they would agree to under ''hypothetical'' conditions including equality and absence of bias. This account is considered further below, under '[[Justice as Fairness]]'. The absence of bias refers to an equal ground for all people involved in a disagreement (or trial in some cases).{{citation needed|date=February 2018}} |
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===Subordinate value=== |
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In [[Human, All Too Human]], philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche dismantles the notion that 'the world' treats everyone fairly: |
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According to utilitarian thinkers including [[John Stuart Mill]], justice is not as fundamental as we often think. Rather, it is derived from the more basic standard of rightness, [[consequentialism]]: what is right is what has the best consequences (usually measured by the total or average [[Quality of life|welfare]] caused). So, the proper principles of justice are those that tend to have the best consequences. These rules may turn out to be familiar ones such as keeping [[contract]]s; but equally, they may not, depending on the facts about real consequences. Either way, what is important is those consequences, and justice is important, if at all, only as derived from that fundamental standard. Mill tries to explain our mistaken belief that justice is overwhelmingly important by arguing that it derives from two natural human tendencies: our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, or the feeling of self-defense and our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in another's place, sympathy. So, when we see someone harmed, we project ourselves into their situation and feel a desire to retaliate on their behalf. If this process is the source of our feelings about justice, that ought to undermine our confidence in them.<ref>John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism'' in ''On Liberty and Other Essays'' ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 5.</ref> |
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==Theories== |
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:''One common false conclusion is that because someone is truthful and upright toward us he is speaking the truth. Thus the child believes his parents` judgments, the Christian believes the claims of the church's founders. Likewise, people do not want to admit that all those things which men have defended with the sacrifice of their lives and happiness in earlier centuries were nothing but errors. Perhaps one calls them levels of truth. Basically, however, one thinks that if someone honestly believed in something and fought for his belief and died it would be too unfair if he had actually been inspired by a mere error. Such an occurrence seems to contradict eternal justice. Therefore the hearts of sensitive men always decree in opposition to their heads that there must be a necessary connection between moral actions and intellectual insights. Unfortunately, it is otherwise, for there is no eternal justice.'' |
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{{further|Justice (virtue)|Cardinal virtues}} |
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[[File:Bonino da Campione, Justice, c. 1357, NGA 46013.jpg|thumb|Bonino da Campione, ''Justice'', {{circa|1357}}, [[National Gallery of Art]]]]It has been said<ref>See, e.g., Eric Heinze, ''The Concept of Injustice'' (Routledge, 2013), pp. 4–10, 50–60.</ref> that 'systematic' or 'programmatic' political and moral philosophy in the West begins, in [[Plato]]'s [[Plato Republic|Republic]], with the question, 'What is Justice?'<ref>Plato, ''The Republic'', Book I, 331b–c.</ref> According to most contemporary theories of justice, justice is overwhelmingly important: [[John Rawls]] claims that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."<ref>John Rawls, ''A Theory of Justice'' (revised edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3</ref> In classical approaches, evident from [[Plato]] through to [[John Rawls|Rawls]], the concept of 'justice' is always construed in logical or 'etymological' opposition to the concept of injustice. Such approaches cite various examples of injustice, as problems which a theory of justice must overcome. A number of post-World War II approaches do, however, challenge that seemingly obvious dualism between those two concepts.<ref>*See, e.g., Eric Heinze, ''The Concept of Injustice'' (Routledge, 2013). |
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* Clive Barnett ''The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory''</ref> Justice can be thought of as distinct from [[wikt:benevolence|benevolence]], [[Charity (virtue)|charity]], [[prudence (virtue)|prudence]], [[mercy]], [[generosity]], or [[compassion]], although these dimensions are regularly understood to also be interlinked. Justice is the concept of [[cardinal virtue]]s, of which it is one.<ref>{{Citation|last=Wenar|first=Leif|title=John Rawls|date=2021|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/rawls/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2021|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-05-20}}</ref> Metaphysical justice has often been associated with concepts of [[destiny|fate]], [[reincarnation]] or [[Divine Providence]], i.e., with a life in accordance with a cosmic plan. |
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The equivalence of justice and fairness has been historically and culturally established.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Daston|first=Lorraine|author-link=Lorraine Daston|year=2008|journal=Daedalus|pages=5–14|title=Life, Chance and Life Chances|doi=10.1162/daed.2008.137.1.5|volume=137|s2cid=57563698|doi-access=free}}</ref> |
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===Justice as Economics=== |
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===Fairness=== |
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Justice as a concept has little, even no, meaning for those who do not have clean water, education, housing etc and are never to know the justice which comes from having some form of secure income. Thus the appeal of a cry for justice − essentially meaning a cry for economic justice − which has lain behind movements such as socialism. |
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{{More citations needed|date=February 2018}} |
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[[File:Justice statue.jpg|thumb|J. L. Urban, statue of [[Lady Justice]] at court building in [[Olomouc]], Czech Republic]] |
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{{Main|Right to a fair trial}} |
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In his ''[[A Theory of Justice]]'', [[John Rawls]] used a [[social contract]] argument to show that justice, and especially distributive justice, is a form of fairness: an impartial distribution of goods. Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves behind a [[veil of ignorance]] that denies us all knowledge of our personalities, social statuses, moral characters, wealth, talents and life plans, and then asks what theory of justice we would choose to govern our society when the veil is lifted, if we wanted to do the best that we could for ourselves. We do not know who in particular we are, and therefore can not bias the decision in our own favor. So, the decision-in-ignorance models fairness, because it excludes selfish [[bias]]. Rawls said that each of us would reject the [[utilitarianism|utilitarian]] theory of justice that we should maximize welfare (see below) because of the risk that we might turn out to be someone whose own good is sacrificed for greater benefits for others. Instead, we would endorse Rawls's ''two principles of justice'': |
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* Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. |
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* Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both |
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** to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and |
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** attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.<ref>John Rawls, ''A Theory of Justice'' (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 266.</ref> |
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This imagined choice justifies these principles as the principles of justice for us, because we would agree to them in a fair decision procedure. Rawls's theory distinguishes two kinds of goods – (1) [[Freedom (political)|the good of liberty rights]] and (2) social and economic goods, i.e. wealth, income and power – and applies different distributions to them – equality between citizens for (1), equality unless inequality improves the position of the worst off for (2). |
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However, the redistribution of wealth or income is not a justice in itself because it does not address the question of efficiently creating the wealth and income in the first place. It is the claim of [[binary economics]] that it does address both the efficient creation and the justice issues by being a market economics whose markets work for everybody rather than just a few; and which upholds private property but private property, again, for everybody rather than just a few. A summary might be – a justice which creates efficiency and an efficiency which creates justice. |
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In one sense, theories of distributive justice may assert that everyone should get what they deserve. Theories vary on the meaning of what is "deserved". The main distinction is between theories that say the basis of just deserts ought to be held equally by everyone, and therefore derive egalitarian accounts of distributive justice – and theories that say the basis of just deserts is unequally distributed on the basis of, for instance, hard work, and therefore derive accounts of distributive justice by which some should have more than others. |
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==Theories of distributive justice== |
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Studies at [[University of California, Los Angeles|UCLA]] in 2008 have indicated that reactions to fairness are "wired" into the brain and that, "Fairness is activating the same part of the brain that responds to food in rats... This is consistent with the notion that being treated fairly satisfies a basic need".<ref>{{cite news |url=http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/brain-reacts-to-fairness-as-it-49042.aspx?link_page_rss=49042 |title=Brain reacts to fairness as it does to money and chocolate, study shows |work=UCLA Newsroom |publisher=UCLA |date=21 April 2008 |access-date=15 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100226000010/http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/brain-reacts-to-fairness-as-it-49042.aspx?link_page_rss=49042 |archive-date=26 February 2010 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Research conducted in 2003 at [[Emory University]] involving capuchin monkeys demonstrated that other cooperative animals also possess such a sense and that "[[inequity aversion]] may [[inequity aversion in animals|not be]] uniquely human".<ref>Nature 425, 297–299 (18 September 2003)</ref> |
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[[Image:Aachen Allegory.jpg|right|thumb|250px|''Allegory'' or ''The Triumph of Justice'' by [[Hans von Aachen]]]] |
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===Instrumental theories of justice=== |
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Theories of distributive justice need to answer three questions: |
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[[File:Justicia Ottawa.jpg|thumb|right|[[Walter Seymour Allward]]'s ''Justitia'' (Justice), outside [[Supreme Court of Canada]], [[Ottawa, Ontario]], Canada]] |
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# ''What goods'' are to be distributed? Is it to be [[wealth]], [[Political power|power]], [[respect]], some combination of these things? |
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Instrumental theories of justice look at the consequences of [[punishment]] for wrongdoing, looking at questions such as: |
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# ''Between what entities'' are they to be distributed? Humans, [[sentient]] beings, the members of a single society, [[nation]]s? |
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# ''why'' punish? |
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# What is the ''proper'' distribution? Equal, [[Meritocracy|meritocratic]], according to [[social status]], according to [[need]]? |
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# ''who'' should be punished? |
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# ''what'' punishment should they receive? |
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In broad terms, ''utilitarian'' theories look forward to the future consequences of punishment, ''retributive'' theories look back to particular acts of wrongdoing and attempt to match them with appropriate punishment, and ''restorative'' theories look at the needs of victims and society and seek to repair the harms from wrongdoing. |
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===Utilitarian justice=== |
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Distributive justice theorists generally do not answer questions of ''who has the right'' to enforce a particular favored distribution. |
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{{Main|Utilitarianism}} |
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According to the utilitarian, justice is the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals. Utilitarianism fights crime in three ways:<ref>{{Cite web |title=Punishment {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/punishme/ |access-date=2023-10-05 |language=en-US}}</ref> |
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# ''[[Deterrence (legal)|Deterrence]]''. The credible [[coercion|threat]] of punishment might lead people to make different choices; well-designed threats might lead people to make choices that maximize welfare. This matches some strong [[intuition]]s about just punishment: that it should generally be proportional to the crime. Successful deterrence would reduce [[crime statistics]].<ref>[https://doi.org/10.1177/002242787401100204 Bailey, William C., J. David Martin, and Louis N. Gray. "Crime and deterrence: A correlation analysis." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 11.2 (1974): 124-143.]</ref> |
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# ''[[Rehabilitation (penology)|Rehabilitation]]''. Punishment might make "bad people" into "better" ones. For the utilitarian, all that "bad person" can mean is "person who's likely to cause unwanted things (like suffering)". So, utilitarianism could recommend punishment that changes someone such that they are less likely to cause bad things. Successful rehabilitation would reduce [[recidivism]].<ref>Monahan, John. "Preface: Recidivism Risk Assessment in the 21st Century." Handbook of Recidivism Risk/Needs Assessment Tools (2017).</ref> |
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# ''[[Incapacitation (penology)|Security/Incapacitation]]''. Perhaps there are people who are irredeemable causers of bad things. If so, [[Prison|imprisoning]] them might maximize welfare by limiting their opportunities to cause harm and therefore the benefit lies within protecting society. |
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So, the reason for punishment is the maximization of welfare, and punishment should be of whomever, and of whatever form and severity, are needed to meet that goal. This may sometimes justify punishing the innocent, or inflicting disproportionately severe punishments, when that will have the best consequences overall (perhaps executing a few suspected [[Shoplifting|shoplifters]] live on television would be an effective deterrent to shoplifting, for instance). It also suggests that punishment might turn out ''never'' to be right, depending on the facts about what actual consequences it has.<ref>C.L. Ten, 'Crime and Punishment' in Peter Singer ed., ''A Companion to Ethics'' (Oxford: [[Wiley-Blackwell|Blackwell Publishing]], 1993): 366–372.</ref> |
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====Welfare-maximization==== |
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This section describes some widely-held theories of distributive justice, and their attempts to answer these questions. |
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According to the utilitarian, justice requires the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Project Gutenberg eBook of on Liberty, by John Stuart Mill. |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm |access-date=2019-05-03 |work=gutenberg.org}}</ref> This may require sacrifice of some for the good of others, so long as everyone's good is taken impartially into account. Utilitarianism, in general, says that the standard of justification for actions, institutions, or the whole world, is ''impartial welfare consequentialism'', and only indirectly, if at all, to do with [[Human rights|rights]], [[property]], [[need]], or any other non-utilitarian criterion. These other criteria might be indirectly important, to the extent that human welfare involves them. But even then, such demands as human rights would only be elements in the calculation of overall welfare, not uncrossable barriers to action. |
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=== |
===Retributive justice=== |
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{{Main|Retributive justice}} |
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{{main|Egalitarianism}} |
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Retributive justice argues that consequentialism is wrong, as it argues that all guilty individuals deserve appropriate punishment, based on the conviction that punishment should be proportional to the crime and for all the guilty.<ref>{{cite web |title=Punishment |url=https://www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/punishment.htm |website=California State University |access-date=12 August 2020 |archive-date=13 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413204529/https://www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/punishment.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> However, it is sometimes said that retributivism is merely [[revenge]] in disguise.<ref>Ted Honderich, ''Punishment: The supposed justifications'' (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), Chapter 1.</ref> However, there are differences between retribution and revenge: the former is impartial and has a scale of appropriateness, whereas the latter is personal and potentially unlimited in scale.<ref>{{cite web |title=Retribution vs Revenge - What's the difference? |date=9 October 2015|url=https://wikidiff.com/retribution/revenge}}</ref> |
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According to the egalitarian, goods should be distributed equally. This basic view can be elaborated in many different ways, according to what goods are to be distributed – wealth, respect, opportunity – and what they are to be distributed equally between – individuals, families, nations, races, species. Commonly-held egalitarian positions include demands for [[equality of opportunity]] and for [[equality of outcome]]. |
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===Restorative justice=== |
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===Giving people what they deserve=== |
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{{Main|Restorative justice}} |
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In one sense, all theories of distributive justice claim that everyone should get what he or she deserves. Where they diverge is in disagreeing about the basis of desert. The main distinction is between, on one hand, theories which argue that the basis of just desert is something held equally by everyone and therefore derive egalitarian accounts of distributive justice; and, on the other hand, theories which argue that the basis of just desert is unequally distributed on the basis of, for instance, hard work, and therefore derive accounts of distributive justice according to which some should have more than others. This section deals with some popular theories of the second type. |
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Restorative justice attempts to repair the harm that was done to the victims.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wilson |first=Jon |title=Victim-Centered Restorative Justice: An Essential Distinction |url=https://justalternatives.org/VCRJ.pdf}}</ref> It encourages active participation from victims and encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions. Restorative justice fosters dialogue between victim and offender and shows the highest rates of victim satisfaction and offender accountability.<ref>Michael Braswell, and John Fuller, ''Corrections, Peacemaking and Restorative Justice: Transforming Individuals and Institutions'' (Routledge, 2014).</ref> [[Meta-analysis|Meta-analyses]] of the effectivity of restorative justice show no improvement in [[recidivism]].<ref name="Schultheis">[https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895823121522 Fulham, L., Blais, J., Rugge, T., & Schultheis, E. A. (2023). The effectiveness of restorative justice programs: A meta-analysis of recidivism and other relevant outcomes. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0(0). 8]</ref><ref name="Cochrane">{{cite journal|title=Restorative justice conferencing for reducing recidivism in young offenders (aged 7 to 21) | doi=10.1002/14651858.CD008898.pub2 |pmid = 23450592| journal=Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews| issue=2 | pages=CD008898 |year=2013 |last1=Livingstone |first1=Nuala |last2=MacDonald |first2=Geraldine |last3=Carr |first3=Nicola | volume=2020 |pmc=7388302 }}</ref> |
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===Mixed theories=== |
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According to ''meritocratic'' theories, goods, especially wealth and social status, should be distributed to match individual ''merit'', which is usually understood as some combination of talent and hard work. According to ''needs''-based theories, goods, especially such basic goods as food, shelter and medical care, should be distributed to meet individuals’ [[basic needs]] for them. [[Marxism]] can be regarded as a needs-based theory on some readings of [[Karl Marx|Marx]]’s slogan, ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’.<ref>Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’ in ''Karl Marx: Selected writings'' ed. David McLellan (Oxford: OUP, 1977): 564-70, p. 569.</ref> According to ''contribution''-based theories, goods should be distributed to match an individual's contribution to the overall social good. |
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Some modern philosophers have said that Utilitarian and Retributive theories are not mutually exclusive. For example, [[Andrew von Hirsch]], in his 1976 book ''Doing Justice'', suggested that we have a moral obligation to punish greater crimes more than lesser ones.<ref>Andrew Von Hirsch, ''Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments'' (Lebanon NH: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1976). {{ISBN|9780930350833}}</ref> However, so long as we adhere to that constraint then utilitarian ideals would play a significant secondary role. |
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{{further|[[Meritocracy]], [[Need]], [[From each according to his ability, to each according to his need]]}} |
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=== |
===Distributive justice=== |
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{{Main|Distributive justice}} |
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{{main|A Theory of Justice}} |
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[[File:VD-04-3.jpg|thumb|{{Lang|la|Lex, justitia, pax}} ([[Latin]] for "Law, justice, peace") on the pediment of the [[Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland|Supreme Court of Switzerland]]]]Theories of distributive justice need to answer three questions: |
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In his ''A Theory of Justice'', [[John Rawls]] used a [[social contract]] argument to show that justice, and especially distributive justice, is a form of fairness: an ''impartial'' distribution of goods. Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves behind a ''veil of ignorance'' which denies us all knowledge of our personalities, social statuses, moral characters, wealth, talents and lifeplans, and then asks what theory of justice we would choose to govern our society when the veil is lifted, if we wanted to do the best that we could for ourselves. We don’t know who in particular we are, and therefore can’t bias the decision in our own favour. So, the decision-in-ignorance models fairness, because it excludes selfish [[bias]]. Rawls argues that each of us would reject the [[utilitarianism|utilitarian]] theory of justice that we should maximise welfare (see below) because of the risk that we might turn out to be someone whose own good is sacrificed for greater benefits for others. Instead, we would endorse Rawls’s ''two principles of justice'': |
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# ''What goods'' are to be distributed? Is it to be [[wealth]], [[Political power|power]], [[respect]], opportunities or some combination of these things? |
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# ''Between what entities'' are they to be distributed? Humans (dead, living, future), [[Sentience|sentient]] beings, the members of a single society, [[nation]]s? |
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# What is the ''proper'' distribution? Equal, [[Meritocracy|meritocratic]], according to [[social status]], according to [[need]], based on property rights and non-aggression? |
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Distributive justice theorists generally do not answer questions of ''who has the right'' to enforce a particular favored distribution, while property rights theorists say that there is no "favored distribution". Rather, distribution should be based simply on whatever distribution results from lawful interactions or transactions (that is, transactions which are not illicit). |
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:1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. |
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:2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both |
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::a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and |
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::b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.<ref>John Rawls, ''A Theory of Justice'' (revised edition, Oxford: OUP, 1999), p. 266.</ref> |
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===Property rights=== |
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This imagined choice justifies these principles as the principles of justice for us, because we would agree to them in a fair decision procedure. Rawls’s theory distinguishes two kinds of goods – (1) [[Freedom (political)|liberties]] and (2) social and economic goods, i.e. wealth, income and power – and applies different distributions to them – equality between citizens for (1), equality unless inequality improves the position of the worst off for (2). |
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{{further|Libertarianism|Entitlement theory|Constitutional economics}} |
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{{Unreferenced section|date=February 2018}} |
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In ''[[Anarchy, State, and Utopia]]'', [[Robert Nozick]] said that distributive justice is not a matter of the whole distribution matching an ideal ''pattern'', but of each [[Entitlement theory|individual entitlement]] having the right kind of ''history''. It is just that a person has some good (especially, some [[Property rights|property right]]) if and only if they came to have it by a history made up entirely of events of two kinds: |
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===Having the right history=== |
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* Just ''acquisition'', especially by working on unowned things; and |
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[[Robert Nozick]]’s influential critique of Rawls argues that distributive justice is not a matter of the whole distribution matching an ideal ''pattern'', but of each individual entitlement having the right kind of ''history''. It is just that a person has some good (especially, some [[Property rights|property right]]) if and only if he or she came to have it by a history made up entirely of events of two kinds: |
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* Just ''transfer'', that is free gift, sale or other agreement, but not [[theft]] (i.e. by force or fraud). |
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:1. Just ''acquisition'', especially by working on unowned things; and |
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:2. Just ''transfer'', that is free gift, sale or other agreement, but not [[theft]]. |
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If the chain of events leading up to the person having something meets this criterion, then he or she is entitled to it: it is just that he or she possesses it, and what anyone else has, or does not have, or needs, is irrelevant. |
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If the chain of events leading up to the person having something meets this criterion, they are entitled to it: that they possess it is just, and what anyone else does or does not have or need is irrelevant. |
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On the basis of this theory of distributive justice, Nozick argues that all attempts to redistribute goods according to an ideal pattern, without the consent of their owners, are theft. In particular, [[Redistribution|redistributive taxation]] is theft. |
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{{further|[[Anarchy, State, and Utopia]], [[Economic libertarianism]]}} |
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On the basis of this theory of distributive justice, Nozick said that all attempts to redistribute goods according to an ideal pattern, without the consent of their owners, are theft. In particular, [[redistribution (economics)|redistributive taxation]] is theft. |
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===Welfare-maximisation=== |
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{{main|Utilitarianism}} |
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According to the utilitarian, justice requires the maximisation of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals. This may require sacrifice of some for the good of others, so long as everyone’s good is taken impartially into account. Utilitarianism, in general, argues that the standard of justification for actions, institutions, or the whole world, is ''impartial welfare consequentialism'', and only indirectly, if at all, to do with [[Human rights|rights]], [[property]], [[need]], or any other non-utilitarian criterion. These other criteria might be indirectly important, to the extent that human welfare involves them. But even then, such demands as human rights would only be elements in the calculation of overall welfare, not uncrossable barriers to action. |
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Some property rights theorists (such as Nozick) also take a consequentialist view of distributive justice and say that property rights based justice also has the effect of maximizing the overall wealth of an economic system. They explain that voluntary (non-coerced) transactions always have a property called [[Pareto efficiency]]. The result is that the world is better off in an absolute sense and no one is worse off. They say that respecting property rights maximizes the number of Pareto efficient transactions in the world and minimized the number of non-Pareto efficient transactions in the world (i.e. transactions where someone is made worse off). The result is that the world will have generated the greatest total benefit from the limited, scarce resources available in the world. Further, this will have been accomplished without taking anything away from anyone unlawfully. |
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==Theories of retributive justice== |
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===Classical liberalism=== |
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Theories of retributive justice are concerned with [[punishment]] for wrongdoing, and need to answer three questions: |
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Equality before the law is one of the basic principles of [[classical liberalism]].<ref name="kukathas" /><ref name="evans" /> Classical liberalism calls for equality before the law, not for [[equality of outcome]].<ref name="kukathas">[[Chandran Kukathas]], "Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective", in ''The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World'', ed. Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, Ethikon Series in Comparative Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 61 ({{ISBN|0-691-09993-6}}).</ref> Classical liberalism opposes pursuing [[group rights]] at the expense of [[individual rights]].<ref name="evans">Mark Evans, ed., ''Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism: Evidence and Experience'' (London: Routledge, 2001), 55 ({{ISBN|1-57958-339-3}}).</ref> In addition to equality, individual liberty serves as a core notion of classical liberalism. As to the liberty component, British social and political theorist, philosopher, and historian of ideas [[Isaiah Berlin]] identifies positive and negative liberty in "Two Concepts of Liberty",<ref>Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in ''Four Essays on Liberty'' (Oxford University Press, 1969)</ref> subscribing to a view of negative liberty, in the form of freedom from governmental interference. He further extends the concept of negative liberty in endorsing John Stuart Mills' harm principle: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection",<ref>John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in ''John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Other Essays'', ed. John Gray (Oxford University Press, 1998)</ref> which represents a classical liberal view of liberty.<ref>Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions ([[Rowman & Littlefield|Lexington Books]], 2015), p.79 ({{ISBN|978-1498516518}})</ref> |
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# ''why'' punish? |
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# ''who'' should be punished? |
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# ''what punishment'' should they receive? |
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This section considers the two major accounts of retributive justice, and their answers to these questions. ''Utilitarian'' theories look forward to the future consequences of punishment, while ''retributive'' theories look back to particular acts of wrongdoing, and attempt to balance them with deserved punishment. |
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=== |
===Equality=== |
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{{Main|Equal opportunity}} |
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According to the utilitarian, as already noted, justice requires the maximisation of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals. Punishment is bad treatment of someone, and therefore can’t be good ''in itself'', for the utilitarian. But punishment might be a necessary ''sacrifice'' which maximises the overall good in the long term, in one or more of three ways: |
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In political theory, liberalism includes two traditional elements: liberty and equality. Most contemporary theories of justice emphasize the concept of equality, including Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. For Ronald Dworkin, a complex notion of equality is the sovereign political virtue.<ref>(Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2000)</ref> Dworkin raises the question of whether society is under a duty of justice to help those responsible for the fact that they need help. Complications arise in distinguishing matters of choice and matters of chance, as well as justice for future generations in the redistribution of resources that he advocates.<ref>Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions ([[Rowman & Littlefield|Lexington Books]], 2015), ch.7 ({{ISBN|978-1498516518}})</ref> |
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# ''[[Deterrence (legal)|Deterrence]]''. The credible [[threat]] of punishment might lead people to make different choices; well-designed threats might lead people to make choices which maximise welfare. |
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# ''[[Rehabilitation (penology)|Rehabilitation]]''. Punishment might make bad people into better ones. For the utilitarian, all that ‘bad person’ can mean is ‘person who’s likely to cause bad things (like suffering) ’. So, utilitarianism could recommend punishment which changes someone such that he or she is less likely to cause bad things. |
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# ''[[Security]]''. Perhaps there are people who are irredeemable causers of bad things. If so, [[Prison|imprisoning]] them might maximise welfare by limiting their opportunities to cause harm. |
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So, the reason for punishment is the maximisation of welfare, and punishment should be of whomever, and of whatever form and severity, are needed to meet that goal. Worryingly, this may sometimes justify punishing the innocent, or inflicting disproportionately severe punishments, when that will have the best consequences overall (perhaps executing a few suspected [[Shoplifting|shoplifters]] live on television would be an effective deterrent to shoplifting, for instance). It also suggests that punishment might turn out ''never'' to be right, depending on the facts about what actual consequences it has.<ref>C. L. Ten, ‘Crime and Punishment’ in Peter Singer ed., ''A Companion to Ethics'' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993): 366-72.</ref> |
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=== |
===Equality before the law=== |
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Law raises important and complex issues about equality, fairness, and justice. There is an old saying that '[[All are equal before the law]]'. The belief in equality before the law is called legal egalitarianism. In criticism of this belief, the author [[Anatole France]] said in 1894, "In its majestic equality, the law forbids [[rich and poor alike]] to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets, and steal loaves of bread."<ref>(France, ''The Red Lily'', [http://www.online-literature.com/anatole-france/red-lily/8/ Chapter VII]).</ref> With this saying, France illustrated the fundamental shortcoming of a theory of legal equality that remains blind to social inequality; the same law applied to all may have disproportionately harmful effects on the least powerful. |
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{{main|Retributive justice}} |
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The retributivist will think the utilitarian’s argument disastrously mistaken. If someone does something wrong, we must respond to it, and to him or her, as an [[individual]], not as a part of a calculation of overall welfare. To do otherwise is to disrespect him or her as an individual human being. If the crime had victims, it is to disrespect them, too. Wrongdoing must be balanced or made good in some way, and so the criminal ''deserves'' to be punished. Retributivism emphasises retribution – payback – rather than maximisation of welfare. Like the theory of distributive justice as giving everyone what she deserves (see above), it links justice with desert. It says that all guilty people, and only guilty people, deserve appropriate punishment. This matches some strong [[Intuition (knowledge)|intuitions]] about just punishment: that it should be ''proportional'' to the crime, and that it should be of ''only'' and ''all of'' the guilty. However, it is sometimes argued that retributivism is merely [[revenge]] in disguise.<ref>Ted Honderich, ''Punishment: The supposed justifications'' (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), Chapter 1.</ref> |
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===Meritocracy=== |
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{{further|[[Deontological ethics]]}} |
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According to ''[[Meritocracy|meritocratic]]'' theories, goods, especially wealth and [[social status]], should be distributed to match individual ''merit'', which is usually understood as some combination of talent and hard work. According to ''[[need]]s''-based theories, goods, especially such basic goods as food, shelter and medical care, should be distributed to meet individuals' [[basic needs]] for them. According to ''contribution''-based theories, goods should be distributed to match an individual's contribution to the overall social good. |
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===Social justice=== |
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==Institutions== |
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{{Main|Social justice}} |
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Social justice encompasses the just relationship between individuals and their society, often considering how privileges, opportunities, and wealth ought to be distributed among individuals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=social justice {{!}} Definition of social justice in English by Oxford Dictionaries |url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/social_justice |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170114180223/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/social_justice |archive-date=14 January 2017 |access-date=2018-11-13 |website=Oxford Dictionaries {{!}} English}}</ref> Social justice is also associated with [[social mobility]], especially the ease with which individuals and families may move between [[Social stratification|social strata]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ornstein |first=Allan C. |date=2017-12-01 |title=Social Justice: History, Purpose and Meaning |journal=Society |language=en |volume=54 |issue=6 |pages=541–548 |doi=10.1007/s12115-017-0188-8 |issn=1936-4725 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Social justice is distinct from [[cosmopolitanism]], which is the idea that all people belong to a single global community with a shared morality.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Kleingeld |first1=Pauline |title=Cosmopolitanism |date=2014 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cosmopolitanism/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |edition=Fall 2014 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2018-12-14 |last2=Brown |first2=Eric}}</ref> Social justice is also distinct from [[egalitarianism]], which is the idea that all people are equal in terms of status, value, or rights, as social justice theories do not all require equality.<ref>{{Cite web |title=egalitarianism {{!}} Definition of egalitarianism in English by Oxford Dictionaries |url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/egalitarianism |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181113125343/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/egalitarianism |archive-date=13 November 2018 |access-date=2018-11-13 |website=Oxford Dictionaries {{!}} English}}</ref> For example, sociologist [[George C. Homans]] suggested that the root of the concept of justice is that each person should receive rewards that are proportional to their contributions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rubinstein |first=David |date=1988 |title=The Concept of Justice in Sociology |journal=Theory and Society |volume=17 |issue=4 |pages=527–550 |doi=10.1007/BF00158887 |jstor=657654 |s2cid=143622666}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Homans |first=George Caspar |url=https://archive.org/details/socialbehaviorit0000homa_e3x9/page/246 |title=Social behavior; its elementary forms. |publisher=Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich |year=1974 |isbn=978-0-15-581417-2 |edition=Rev. |location=New York |pages=[https://archive.org/details/socialbehaviorit0000homa_e3x9/page/246 246–249] |oclc=2668194}}</ref> |
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Economist [[Friedrich Hayek]] said that the concept of social justice was meaningless, saying that justice is a result of individual behavior and unpredictable market forces.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hayek |first=F.A. |title=Law, legislation and liberty : a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy |date=1976 |publisher=Routledge & Kegan Paul |isbn=978-0-7100-8403-3 |pages=78 |oclc=769281087}}</ref> Social justice is closely related to the concept of relational justice, which is about the just relationship with individuals who possess features in common such as nationality, or who are engaged in cooperation or negotiation.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Poblet |first1=Marta |title=Concepts and Fields of Relational Justice |date=2008 |url=http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143902 |work=Computable Models of the Law |pages=323–339 |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |publisher=Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_21 |isbn=978-3-540-85568-2 |last2=Casanovas |first2=Pompeu|volume=4884 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Nagel |first=Thomas |date=2005 |title=The Problem of Global Justice |journal=Philosophy & Public Affairs |language=en |volume=33 |issue=2 |pages=113–147 |doi=10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00027.x |issn=1088-4963 |s2cid=144307058}}</ref> |
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[[Image:Supreme_Court_October_2005.jpg|thumb|right|250px|The Justices of the [[United States]] [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] with [[President George W. Bush]], October 2005]] |
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===Equity=== |
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{{main|Law}} |
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{{Main|Social equity}} |
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In an imperfect world, institutions are required to instantiate ideals of justice, however imperfectly. These institutions may be justified by their approximate instantiation of justice, or they may be deeply unjust when compared with ideal standards — consider the institution of [[slavery]]. Justice is an ideal which the world fails to live up to, sometimes despite good intentions, sometimes disastrously. The question of institutive justice raises issues of [[Legitimacy (political science)|legitimacy]], [[Legal procedure|procedure]], [[codification]] and [[interpretation]], which are considered by legal theorists and by [[Philosophy of law|philosophers of law]]. |
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In [[legal theory]], equity is seen as the concept connecting law to justice, since law cannot be applied without reference to justice.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Titi |first=Catharine |title=The Function of Equity in International Law |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford university press |isbn=978-0-19-886800-2 |location=Oxford |chapter=4}}</ref> In that context, justice is seen as 'the rationale and the ethical foundation of equity'.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Titi |first=Catharine |date=2023-08-14 |title=International law in quest for justice |url=https://blog.oup.com/2023/08/international-law-in-quest-for-justice/ |access-date=2024-02-18 |website=OUPblog |language=en}}</ref> One approach towards equity in justice is [[community policing]].<ref name="b308">{{cite journal | last=Thacher | first=David | title=Equity and community policing: A new view of community partnerships | journal=Criminal Justice Ethics | volume=20 | issue=1 | date=2001 | issn=0731-129X | doi=10.1080/0731129X.2001.9992093 | pages=3–16}}</ref> [[Marxism]] is a needs-based theory, expressed succinctly in [[Karl Marx|Marx's]] slogan "[[from each according to his ability, to each according to his need]]".<ref>Karl Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program' in ''Karl Marx: Selected writings'' ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 564–70 [569].</ref> |
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===Equality of outcome=== |
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Another definition of justice is an independent investigation of truth. |
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{{Excerpt|Equality of outcome|paragraphs=1|only=paragraphs}} |
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In a court room lawyers, the judge and the jury are supposed to be indepently investigating the truth of an alleged crime. |
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In physics, a group of physicists examine data and theoretical concepts to consult on what might be the truth or reality of a phenomena. |
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===Relational justice=== |
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Relational justice examines individual connections and societal relationships, focusing on normative and political aspects. Rawls' theory of justice aims to distribute social goods to benefit the poor, but does not consider power relations, political structures, or social meanings. Even Rawls' self-respect is not compatible with distribution.<ref>Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions ([[Rowman & Littlefield|Lexington Books]], 2015), ch.10 ({{ISBN|978-1498516518}})</ref> Iris Marion Young charges that distributive accounts of justice fail to provide an adequate way of conceptualizing political justice in that they fail to take into account many of the demands of ordinary life and that a relational view of justice grounded upon understanding the differences among social groups offers a better approach, one which acknowledges unjust power relations among individuals, groups, and institutional structures.<ref>[[Iris Marion Young]], Justice and the Politics of Difference ([[Oxford University Press]], 1990).</ref> Young Kim also takes a relational approach to the question of justice, but departs from Iris Marion Young's political advocacy of group rights and instead, he emphasizes the individual and moral aspects of justice.<ref>Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions ([[Rowman & Littlefield|Lexington Books]], 2015) ({{ISBN|978-1498516518}})</ref> As to its moral aspects, he said that justice includes responsible actions based on rational and autonomous moral agency, with the individual as the proper bearer of rights and responsibilities. Politically, he maintains that the proper context for justice is a form of liberalism with the traditional elements of liberty and equality, together with the concepts of diversity and tolerance. |
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===Speedy justice=== |
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{{Main|Speedy trial}} |
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The phrase "[[Justice delayed is justice denied]]" refers to the problem of slow justice. The right to [[speedy trial]] is in some [[jurisdictions]] enshrined.<ref name="g700">{{cite journal | title=Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or Second-Class Citizen | journal=Sw. U. L. Rev. | date=1992| volume=21 | page=31 | url=https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/swulr21&div=9&id=&page= | access-date=21 July 2024 | last1=Garcia | first1=Alfredo }}</ref> |
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Higher quality justice tends to be speedy.<ref name="g896">{{cite journal | last1=Melcarne | first1=Alessandro | last2=Ramello | first2=Giovanni B. | last3=Spruk | first3=Rok | title=Is justice delayed justice denied? An empirical approach | journal=International Review of Law and Economics | volume=65 | date=2021 | doi=10.1016/j.irle.2020.105953 | page=105953}}</ref> |
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==Sentencing== |
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In [[criminal law]], a [[Sentence (law)|sentence]] forms the final explicit act of a [[judge]]-ruled process, and also the symbolic principal act connected to his function.<ref>{{Cite web|title=laws rules justice|url=https://www.basicknowledge101.com/subjects/laws.html}}</ref> The sentence can generally involve a decree of [[prison|imprisonment]], a [[Fine (penalty)|fine]] and/or other [[punishment]]s against a [[defendant]] [[conviction (law)|convicted]] of a [[crime]]. Laws may specify the range of penalties that can be imposed for various offenses, and sentencing guidelines sometimes regulate what punishment within those ranges can be imposed given a certain set of offense and offender characteristics.<ref>{{Cite web|title=sentencing guidelines|website=[[Library of Congress]]|url=https://www.loc.gov/law/help/sentencing-guidelines/sentencing-guidelines.pdf}}</ref> The most common purposes of sentencing in legal theory are: |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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|- style="background:#b0c4de; text-align:center;" |
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! Theory |
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! Aim of theory |
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! Suitable punishment |
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|- |
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|[[Retributive justice|Retribution]] |
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| Punishment imposed for no reason other than an offense being committed, on the basis that if [[Eye for an eye|proportionate]], punishment is morally acceptable as a response that satisfies the aggrieved party, their intimates and society. |
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| |
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* Tariff sentences |
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* Sentence must be proportionate to the crime |
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|- |
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|[[Deterrence (legal)|Deterrence]] |
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| |
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* To the individual – the individual is deterred through fear of further punishment. |
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* To the general public – Potential offenders warned as to likely punishment |
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| |
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* Prison Sentence |
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* Heavy Fine |
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* Long sentence as an example to others |
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|- |
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|[[Rehabilitation (penology)|Rehabilitation]] |
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|To reform the offender's behavior |
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| |
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* Individualized sentences |
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* Community service orders |
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* moral education |
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* vocational education |
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|- |
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|[[Incapacitation (penology)|Incapacitation]] |
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|Offender is made incapable of committing further crime to protect society at large from crime |
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| |
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* Long prison sentence |
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* Electronic tagging |
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* Banning orders |
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|- |
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|[[Reparation (legal)|Reparation]] |
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|Repayment to victim(s) or to community |
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| |
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* Compensation |
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* Unpaid work |
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* Reparation Schemes |
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|- |
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|[[Denunciation (penology)|Denunciation]] |
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|Society expressing its disapproval reinforcing moral boundaries |
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| |
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* Reflects blameworthiness of offense |
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* punishment in public |
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* punishment reported to public |
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|- |
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|} |
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In [[civil law (common law)|civil cases]] the decision is usually known as a [[verdict]], or judgment, rather than a sentence.<ref>{{Cite web|title=how court works|url=https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/verdict/}}</ref> Civil cases are settled primarily by means of monetary compensation for harm done ("[[damages]]") and orders intended to prevent future harm (for example [[injunction]]s). Under some legal systems an award of damages involves some scope for retribution, denunciation and deterrence, by means of additional categories of damages beyond simple compensation, covering a [[Punitive damages|punitive effect, social disapprobation, and potentially, deterrence]], and occasionally [[Disgorgement (law)|disgorgement]] (forfeit of any gain, even if no loss was caused to the other party). |
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==Evolutionary perspectives== |
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[[Evolutionary ethic]]s and [[evolution of morality]] suggest [[evolutionary]] bases for the concept of justice.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Morality and evolutionary biology|year=2021|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-biology/}}</ref> [[Biosocial criminology]] research says that human perceptions of what is appropriate criminal justice are based on how to respond to crimes in the ancestral small-group environment and that these responses may not always be appropriate for today's societies.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Life History Predicts Perceptions of Procedural Justice and Crime Reporting Intentions|year=2015|doi=10.1007/s40806-015-0021-9|last1=Kruger|first1=Daniel J.|last2=Nedelec|first2=Joseph L.|last3=Reischl|first3=Thomas M.|last4=Zimmerman|first4=Marc A.|journal=Evolutionary Psychological Science|volume=1|issue=3|pages=183–194|s2cid=142324638|doi-access=free}}</ref> |
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== Psychology == |
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{{See also|Victimology}} |
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There has been research into victim's perspective of justice following crimes. Victims find respectful treatment, information and having a voice important for a sense of justice as well as the perception of a [[Procedural justice|fair procedure]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |title=Beyond retribution, restoration and procedural justice: the Big Two of communion and agency in victims' perspectives on justice |journal=Psychology, Crime & Law | year=2017 |language=en |doi=10.1080/1068316X.2017.1298760| last1=Pemberton | first1=A. | last2=Aarten | first2=P. G. M. | last3=Mulder | first3=E. | volume=23 | issue=7 | pages=682–698 | s2cid=151982079 | doi-access=free | hdl=1887/70580 | hdl-access=free }}</ref> |
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Pemberton et al. proposed a "Big 2" model of justice in terms [[Agency (philosophy)|agency]], communion and membership in a society. Victims experience a loss of perception of agency due to a loss of control, as well as a loss of communion if the offender is a member of their social group, but may also lose trust in others or institutions. It can shatter an individual's trust that they live in a [[Just-world hypothesis|just and moral world]]. This suggests that a sense of justice can be restored by increasing a sense of communion and agency, rather than through retribution or restoration.<ref name=":0" /> |
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==Institutions== |
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{{Main|Judiciary}} |
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{{See also|Court}} |
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In a world where people are interconnected but they disagree, institutions are required to instantiate ideals of justice. These institutions may be justified by their approximate instantiation of justice, or they may be deeply unjust when compared with ideal standards – consider the institution of [[slavery]]. Justice is an ideal the world fails to live up to, sometimes due to deliberate opposition to justice despite understanding, which could be disastrous. The question of institutive justice raises issues of [[Legitimacy (political science)|legitimacy]], [[Legal procedure|procedure]], [[Codification (law)|codification]] and [[statutory interpretation|interpretation]], which are considered by legal theorists and by [[Philosophy of law|philosophers of law]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title =Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |author=David Miller |chapter=Justice |chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/ |date=26 June 2017|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> The United Nations [[Sustainable Development Goal 16]] emphasizes the need for strong institutions in order to uphold justice.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Doss|first=Eric|title=Sustainable Development Goal 16|url=https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/sdg-16/|access-date=2020-09-25|website=United Nations and the Rule of Law|language=en-US}}</ref> |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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===Other pages=== |
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{{div col|colwidth=22em}} |
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* [[Law]] |
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* [[Adl]] (Arabic for Justice in [[Islam]]) |
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* [[Criminal justice]] |
* [[Criminal justice]] |
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* [[ |
* [[Crime statistics]] |
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* [[Ethics]] |
* [[Ethics]] |
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* [[Global justice]] |
* [[Global justice]] |
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* [[International Court of Justice]] |
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* [[Just war]] |
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* [[International Criminal Court]] |
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* [[Judicial reform]] |
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* [[Judicial review]] |
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* [[Just war theory]] |
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* [[Just-world hypothesis]] |
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* [[Justice (economics)]] |
* [[Justice (economics)]] |
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* [[Law reform]] |
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* [[Morality]] |
* [[Morality]] |
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* [[Napoleonic Code]] |
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* [[Rationality]] |
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* [[Rule according to higher law]] |
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* [[Sociology of law]] |
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{{div col end}} |
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===Types of justice=== |
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{{div col|colwidth=22em}} |
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* [[Design justice]] |
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* [[Distributive justice]] |
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* [[Environmental justice]] |
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* [[Injustice]] |
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* [[Occupational injustice]] |
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* [[Open justice]] |
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* [[Organizational justice]] |
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* [[Poetic justice]] |
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* [[Retributive justice]] |
* [[Retributive justice]] |
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* [[Social justice]] |
* [[Social justice]] |
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* [[ |
* [[Spatial justice]] |
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* [[Transformative justice]] |
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{{div col end}} |
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==References== |
==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
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<references/> |
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== |
==Further reading== |
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* |
* Clive Barnett, ''The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory'' (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2017), {{ISBN| 978-0-8203-5152-0}} |
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* |
* [[Brian Barry]], ''Theories of Justice'' (Berkeley: [[University of California Press]], 1989) |
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* [[Gad Barzilai]], ''Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities'' (Ann Arbor: [[University of Michigan Press]], 2003) |
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* Anthony Duff & David Garland eds, ''A Reader on Punishment'' (Oxford: OUP, 1994). |
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* Harry Brighouse, ''Justice'' (Cambridge: [[Polity (publisher)|Polity Press]], 2004) |
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* Colin Farrelly, ''An Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory'' (London: Sage, 2004). |
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* David |
* Anthony Duff & David Garland eds, ''A Reader on Punishment'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) |
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* |
* Colin Farrelly, ''An Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory'' (London: Sage, 2004) |
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* [[David Gauthier]], ''Morals By Agreement'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) |
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* Ted Honderich, ''Punishment: The supposed justifications'' (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969). |
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* |
* [[Robert E. Goodin]] & [[Philip Pettit]] eds, ''Contemporary Political Philosophy: An anthology'' (2nd edition, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2006), Part III |
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* [[Serge Guinchard]], ''La justice et ses institutions'' (Judicial institutions), Dalloz editor, 12 edition, 2013 |
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* Nicola Lacey, ''State Punishment'' (London: Routledge, 1988). |
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* [[Eric Heinze]], ''The Concept of Injustice'' (Routledge, 2013) |
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* John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism'' in ''On Liberty and Other Essays'' ed. John Gray (Oxford: OUP, 1991). |
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* [[Ted Honderich]], ''Punishment: The supposed justifications'' (London: [[Hutchinson & Co.]], 1969) |
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* Robert Nozick, ''Anarchy, State, and Utopia'' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). |
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* James Konow (2003) "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories", ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 41(4)[https://www.jstor.org/stable/3217459 pp. 1188–1239] |
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* Plato, ''Republic'' trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: OUP, 1994). |
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* |
* [[Will Kymlicka]], ''Contemporary Political Philosophy: An introduction'' (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) |
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* |
* [[Nicola Lacey]], ''State Punishment'' (London: [[Routledge]], 1988) |
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* John Stuart Mill, ''Utilitarianism'' in ''On Liberty and Other Essays'' ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) |
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* Peter Singer ed., ''A Companion to Ethics'' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Part IV. |
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* |
* Robert Nozick, ''Anarchy, State, and Utopia'' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) |
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* {{cite book |author=Amartya Sen |title=The Idea of Justice |publisher=Belknap Press of Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-674-06047-0 }} |
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* Marek Piechowiak, ''Plato's Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity'' (2nd edition, revised and extended, Berlin: Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2021), ISBN 978-3-631-84524-0. |
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* C.L. Ten, ''Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A philosophical introduction'' (Oxford: [[Clarendon Press]], 1987) |
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* [[Plato]], ''[[Republic (Plato)|Republic]]'' trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) |
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* John Rawls, ''A Theory of Justice'' (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) |
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* David Schmidtz, ''Elements of Justice'' (New York: [[Columbia University Press]], 2006) |
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* Peter Singer ed., ''A Companion to Ethics'' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Part IV |
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* [[Telford Taylor]], [[Constance Baker Motley]], and [[James Feibleman]] (1975) ''Perspectives on Justice'', [[Northwestern University Press]] {{ISBN|0-8101-0453-9}} |
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* [[Catharine Titi]], ''The Function of Equity in International Law'' ([[Oxford University Press]], 2021), {{ISBN|9780198868002}} |
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* [[Reinhold Zippelius]], ''Rechtsphilosophie, §§ 11–22'' (6th edition, Munich: [[C.H. Beck]], 2011), {{ISBN|978-3-406-61191-9}} |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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{{Wikiquote|Justice}} |
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{{commons category}} |
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{{Wikivoyage|Justice history}} |
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{{Library resources box}} |
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* Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries: |
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** [https://iep.utm.edu/distributive-justice/ Distributive Justice], by Michael Allingham |
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** [https://iep.utm.edu/punishme/ Punishment], by Kevin Murtagh |
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** [https://iep.utm.edu/justwest/ Western Theories of Justice], by Wayne P. Pomerleau |
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* Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries: |
* Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries: |
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** [ |
** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/ "Justice"] by David Miller |
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** [ |
** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/ "Distributive Justice"] by Julian Lamont |
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** [ |
** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-virtue/ "Justice as a Virtue"] by Michael Slote |
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** [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ "Legal Punishment"] by Zachary Hoskins and Antony Duff |
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* [https://web.archive.org/web/20091204190016/http://unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=30 United Nations Rule of Law: Informal Justice], on the relationship between informal/community justice, the [[rule of law]] and the [[United Nations]] |
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* [http://www.justiceharvard.org Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140427043908/http://www.justiceharvard.org/ |date=27 April 2014 }}, a series of 12 videos on the subject of justice by Harvard University's Michael Sandel, with reading materials and comments from participants. |
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{{Types of justice|state=expanded}} |
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* [http://www.sterlingharwood.com] www.sterlingharwood.com |
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Latest revision as of 13:44, 21 December 2024
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Justice in its broadest sense is the concept that individuals are to be treated in a manner that is equitable and fair.[1]
A society in which justice has been achieved would be one in which individuals receive what they "deserve". The interpretation of what "deserve" means draws on a variety of fields and philosophical branches including ethics, rationality, law, religion, equity and fairness. The state may be said to pursue justice by operating courts and enforcing their rulings.
History
[edit]Early western theories of justice were developed in part by Ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato in his work The Republic, and Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Modern-day western notions of justice also have their roots in Christian theology, which largely follows the divine command theory, according to which God dictates morality and determines whether or not an action is seen as morally "good". This, in turn, determines justice. [2]
Western thinkers later advanced different theories about where the foundations of justice lie. In the 17th century, philosophers such as John Locke said justice derives from natural law. Jean-Jacques Rosseau was one of the advocates for social contract theory which states that justice derives from the mutual agreement of members of society to be governed in a political order. In the 19th century, utilitarian philosophers such as John Stuart Mill proposed that justice is served by what creates the best outcomes for the greatest number of people.
Modern frameworks include concepts such as distributive justice, egalitarianism, retributive justice and restorative justice. Distributive justice considers what is fair based on what goods are to be distributed, between whom they are to be distributed, and what is the proper distribution. Egalitarians suggest justice can only exist within the coordinates of equality. Theories of retributive justice say justice is served by punishing wrongdoers, whereas restorative justice (also sometimes called "reparative justice") is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of victims and offenders.[citation needed]
Harmony and the early Greeks
[edit]Justice, according to Plato, is about balance and harmony. It represents the right relationship between conflicting aspects within an individual or a community. He defines justice as everyone having and doing what they are responsible for or what belongs to them. In other words, a just person is someone who contributes to society according to their unique abilities and receives what is proportionate to their contribution. They are in the right place, always striving to do their best, and reciprocating what they receive in a fair and equitable manner. This applies both at the individual level and at the organizational and societal levels.[3]
To illustrate these ideas, Plato describes a person as having three parts: reason, spirit and desire. These parallel the three parts of a city in his philosophy, which he describes through the metaphor of a chariot: it functions effectively when the charioteer, representative of reason, successfully controls the two horses, symbolizing spirit and desire. Continuing on these themes, Plato theorizes that those who love wisdom, or philosophers, are the most ideal to govern because only they truly comprehend the nature of the good. Just like one would seek a doctor's expertise in matters of health rather than a farmer's, so should the city entrust its governance to someone knowledgeable about the good, rather than to politicians who might prioritize power over people's genuine needs. Socrates later used the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain (the common people), a group of untrustworthy advisors who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship's course (the politicians), and a navigator (the philosopher), the latter of whom being the only one who knows how to get the ship to port.[3]
Divine command and Religious Theories of Justice
[edit]Advocates of divine command theory say justice, and indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of God. Murder is wrong and must be punished, for instance, because God says it so. Some versions of the theory assert that God must be obeyed because of the nature of God's relationship with humanity, others assert that God must be obeyed because God is goodness itself, and thus doing God's command would be best for everyone.[citation needed]
An early meditation on the divine command theory by Plato can be found in his dialogue, Euthyphro. Called the Euthyphro dilemma, it goes as follows: "Is what is morally good commanded by the gods because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by the gods?" The implication is that if the latter is true, then justice is beyond mortal understanding; if the former is true, then morality exists independently from the gods, and is therefore subject to the judgment of mortals. A response, popularized in two contexts by Immanuel Kant and C. S. Lewis, is that it is deductively valid to say that the existence of an objective morality implies the existence of God and vice versa.
Judaistic, Christian and Muslim theology traditionally follow that justice is a present, real, right, and, specifically, governing concept along with mercy and that justice is ultimately derived from and held by God. According to the Bible, such institutions like the Mosaic Law were created by God to require the Israelites to live by and apply God's standards of justice.
The Hebrew Bible describes God as saying about the Judeo-Christian-Islamic patriarch Abraham: "No, for I have chosen him, that he may charge his children and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord by doing righteousness and justice;...." (Genesis 18:19, NRSV). The Psalmist describes God as having "Righteousness and justice [as] the foundation of [His] throne;...." (Psalms 89:14, NRSV).
The New Testament also describes God and Jesus Christ as having and displaying justice, often in comparison with God displaying and supporting mercy (Matthew 5:7).
Natural law
[edit]This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (October 2020) |
Many have advocated that justice is a part of natural law (e.g., John Locke) which states that "justie inheres in the nature of man."[5]
Despotism and skepticism
[edit]In Republic by Plato, the character Thrasymachus argues that justice is the interest of the strong – merely a name for what the powerful or cunning ruler has imposed on the people.
Mutual agreement
[edit]Advocates of the social contract say that justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone; or, in many versions, from what they would agree to under hypothetical conditions including equality and absence of bias. This account is considered further below, under 'Justice as Fairness'. The absence of bias refers to an equal ground for all people involved in a disagreement (or trial in some cases).[citation needed]
Subordinate value
[edit]According to utilitarian thinkers including John Stuart Mill, justice is not as fundamental as we often think. Rather, it is derived from the more basic standard of rightness, consequentialism: what is right is what has the best consequences (usually measured by the total or average welfare caused). So, the proper principles of justice are those that tend to have the best consequences. These rules may turn out to be familiar ones such as keeping contracts; but equally, they may not, depending on the facts about real consequences. Either way, what is important is those consequences, and justice is important, if at all, only as derived from that fundamental standard. Mill tries to explain our mistaken belief that justice is overwhelmingly important by arguing that it derives from two natural human tendencies: our desire to retaliate against those who hurt us, or the feeling of self-defense and our ability to put ourselves imaginatively in another's place, sympathy. So, when we see someone harmed, we project ourselves into their situation and feel a desire to retaliate on their behalf. If this process is the source of our feelings about justice, that ought to undermine our confidence in them.[6]
Theories
[edit]It has been said[7] that 'systematic' or 'programmatic' political and moral philosophy in the West begins, in Plato's Republic, with the question, 'What is Justice?'[8] According to most contemporary theories of justice, justice is overwhelmingly important: John Rawls claims that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought."[9] In classical approaches, evident from Plato through to Rawls, the concept of 'justice' is always construed in logical or 'etymological' opposition to the concept of injustice. Such approaches cite various examples of injustice, as problems which a theory of justice must overcome. A number of post-World War II approaches do, however, challenge that seemingly obvious dualism between those two concepts.[10] Justice can be thought of as distinct from benevolence, charity, prudence, mercy, generosity, or compassion, although these dimensions are regularly understood to also be interlinked. Justice is the concept of cardinal virtues, of which it is one.[11] Metaphysical justice has often been associated with concepts of fate, reincarnation or Divine Providence, i.e., with a life in accordance with a cosmic plan.
The equivalence of justice and fairness has been historically and culturally established.[12]
Fairness
[edit]This article needs additional citations for verification. (February 2018) |
In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls used a social contract argument to show that justice, and especially distributive justice, is a form of fairness: an impartial distribution of goods. Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves behind a veil of ignorance that denies us all knowledge of our personalities, social statuses, moral characters, wealth, talents and life plans, and then asks what theory of justice we would choose to govern our society when the veil is lifted, if we wanted to do the best that we could for ourselves. We do not know who in particular we are, and therefore can not bias the decision in our own favor. So, the decision-in-ignorance models fairness, because it excludes selfish bias. Rawls said that each of us would reject the utilitarian theory of justice that we should maximize welfare (see below) because of the risk that we might turn out to be someone whose own good is sacrificed for greater benefits for others. Instead, we would endorse Rawls's two principles of justice:
- Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
- Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
- to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
- attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.[13]
This imagined choice justifies these principles as the principles of justice for us, because we would agree to them in a fair decision procedure. Rawls's theory distinguishes two kinds of goods – (1) the good of liberty rights and (2) social and economic goods, i.e. wealth, income and power – and applies different distributions to them – equality between citizens for (1), equality unless inequality improves the position of the worst off for (2).
In one sense, theories of distributive justice may assert that everyone should get what they deserve. Theories vary on the meaning of what is "deserved". The main distinction is between theories that say the basis of just deserts ought to be held equally by everyone, and therefore derive egalitarian accounts of distributive justice – and theories that say the basis of just deserts is unequally distributed on the basis of, for instance, hard work, and therefore derive accounts of distributive justice by which some should have more than others.
Studies at UCLA in 2008 have indicated that reactions to fairness are "wired" into the brain and that, "Fairness is activating the same part of the brain that responds to food in rats... This is consistent with the notion that being treated fairly satisfies a basic need".[14] Research conducted in 2003 at Emory University involving capuchin monkeys demonstrated that other cooperative animals also possess such a sense and that "inequity aversion may not be uniquely human".[15]
Instrumental theories of justice
[edit]Instrumental theories of justice look at the consequences of punishment for wrongdoing, looking at questions such as:
- why punish?
- who should be punished?
- what punishment should they receive?
In broad terms, utilitarian theories look forward to the future consequences of punishment, retributive theories look back to particular acts of wrongdoing and attempt to match them with appropriate punishment, and restorative theories look at the needs of victims and society and seek to repair the harms from wrongdoing.
Utilitarian justice
[edit]According to the utilitarian, justice is the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals. Utilitarianism fights crime in three ways:[16]
- Deterrence. The credible threat of punishment might lead people to make different choices; well-designed threats might lead people to make choices that maximize welfare. This matches some strong intuitions about just punishment: that it should generally be proportional to the crime. Successful deterrence would reduce crime statistics.[17]
- Rehabilitation. Punishment might make "bad people" into "better" ones. For the utilitarian, all that "bad person" can mean is "person who's likely to cause unwanted things (like suffering)". So, utilitarianism could recommend punishment that changes someone such that they are less likely to cause bad things. Successful rehabilitation would reduce recidivism.[18]
- Security/Incapacitation. Perhaps there are people who are irredeemable causers of bad things. If so, imprisoning them might maximize welfare by limiting their opportunities to cause harm and therefore the benefit lies within protecting society.
So, the reason for punishment is the maximization of welfare, and punishment should be of whomever, and of whatever form and severity, are needed to meet that goal. This may sometimes justify punishing the innocent, or inflicting disproportionately severe punishments, when that will have the best consequences overall (perhaps executing a few suspected shoplifters live on television would be an effective deterrent to shoplifting, for instance). It also suggests that punishment might turn out never to be right, depending on the facts about what actual consequences it has.[19]
Welfare-maximization
[edit]According to the utilitarian, justice requires the maximization of the total or average welfare across all relevant individuals.[20] This may require sacrifice of some for the good of others, so long as everyone's good is taken impartially into account. Utilitarianism, in general, says that the standard of justification for actions, institutions, or the whole world, is impartial welfare consequentialism, and only indirectly, if at all, to do with rights, property, need, or any other non-utilitarian criterion. These other criteria might be indirectly important, to the extent that human welfare involves them. But even then, such demands as human rights would only be elements in the calculation of overall welfare, not uncrossable barriers to action.
Retributive justice
[edit]Retributive justice argues that consequentialism is wrong, as it argues that all guilty individuals deserve appropriate punishment, based on the conviction that punishment should be proportional to the crime and for all the guilty.[21] However, it is sometimes said that retributivism is merely revenge in disguise.[22] However, there are differences between retribution and revenge: the former is impartial and has a scale of appropriateness, whereas the latter is personal and potentially unlimited in scale.[23]
Restorative justice
[edit]Restorative justice attempts to repair the harm that was done to the victims.[24] It encourages active participation from victims and encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions. Restorative justice fosters dialogue between victim and offender and shows the highest rates of victim satisfaction and offender accountability.[25] Meta-analyses of the effectivity of restorative justice show no improvement in recidivism.[26][27]
Mixed theories
[edit]Some modern philosophers have said that Utilitarian and Retributive theories are not mutually exclusive. For example, Andrew von Hirsch, in his 1976 book Doing Justice, suggested that we have a moral obligation to punish greater crimes more than lesser ones.[28] However, so long as we adhere to that constraint then utilitarian ideals would play a significant secondary role.
Distributive justice
[edit]Theories of distributive justice need to answer three questions:
- What goods are to be distributed? Is it to be wealth, power, respect, opportunities or some combination of these things?
- Between what entities are they to be distributed? Humans (dead, living, future), sentient beings, the members of a single society, nations?
- What is the proper distribution? Equal, meritocratic, according to social status, according to need, based on property rights and non-aggression?
Distributive justice theorists generally do not answer questions of who has the right to enforce a particular favored distribution, while property rights theorists say that there is no "favored distribution". Rather, distribution should be based simply on whatever distribution results from lawful interactions or transactions (that is, transactions which are not illicit).
Property rights
[edit]In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick said that distributive justice is not a matter of the whole distribution matching an ideal pattern, but of each individual entitlement having the right kind of history. It is just that a person has some good (especially, some property right) if and only if they came to have it by a history made up entirely of events of two kinds:
- Just acquisition, especially by working on unowned things; and
- Just transfer, that is free gift, sale or other agreement, but not theft (i.e. by force or fraud).
If the chain of events leading up to the person having something meets this criterion, they are entitled to it: that they possess it is just, and what anyone else does or does not have or need is irrelevant.
On the basis of this theory of distributive justice, Nozick said that all attempts to redistribute goods according to an ideal pattern, without the consent of their owners, are theft. In particular, redistributive taxation is theft.
Some property rights theorists (such as Nozick) also take a consequentialist view of distributive justice and say that property rights based justice also has the effect of maximizing the overall wealth of an economic system. They explain that voluntary (non-coerced) transactions always have a property called Pareto efficiency. The result is that the world is better off in an absolute sense and no one is worse off. They say that respecting property rights maximizes the number of Pareto efficient transactions in the world and minimized the number of non-Pareto efficient transactions in the world (i.e. transactions where someone is made worse off). The result is that the world will have generated the greatest total benefit from the limited, scarce resources available in the world. Further, this will have been accomplished without taking anything away from anyone unlawfully.
Classical liberalism
[edit]Equality before the law is one of the basic principles of classical liberalism.[29][30] Classical liberalism calls for equality before the law, not for equality of outcome.[29] Classical liberalism opposes pursuing group rights at the expense of individual rights.[30] In addition to equality, individual liberty serves as a core notion of classical liberalism. As to the liberty component, British social and political theorist, philosopher, and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin identifies positive and negative liberty in "Two Concepts of Liberty",[31] subscribing to a view of negative liberty, in the form of freedom from governmental interference. He further extends the concept of negative liberty in endorsing John Stuart Mills' harm principle: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually and collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection",[32] which represents a classical liberal view of liberty.[33]
Equality
[edit]In political theory, liberalism includes two traditional elements: liberty and equality. Most contemporary theories of justice emphasize the concept of equality, including Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. For Ronald Dworkin, a complex notion of equality is the sovereign political virtue.[34] Dworkin raises the question of whether society is under a duty of justice to help those responsible for the fact that they need help. Complications arise in distinguishing matters of choice and matters of chance, as well as justice for future generations in the redistribution of resources that he advocates.[35]
Equality before the law
[edit]Law raises important and complex issues about equality, fairness, and justice. There is an old saying that 'All are equal before the law'. The belief in equality before the law is called legal egalitarianism. In criticism of this belief, the author Anatole France said in 1894, "In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets, and steal loaves of bread."[36] With this saying, France illustrated the fundamental shortcoming of a theory of legal equality that remains blind to social inequality; the same law applied to all may have disproportionately harmful effects on the least powerful.
Meritocracy
[edit]According to meritocratic theories, goods, especially wealth and social status, should be distributed to match individual merit, which is usually understood as some combination of talent and hard work. According to needs-based theories, goods, especially such basic goods as food, shelter and medical care, should be distributed to meet individuals' basic needs for them. According to contribution-based theories, goods should be distributed to match an individual's contribution to the overall social good.
Social justice
[edit]Social justice encompasses the just relationship between individuals and their society, often considering how privileges, opportunities, and wealth ought to be distributed among individuals.[37] Social justice is also associated with social mobility, especially the ease with which individuals and families may move between social strata.[38] Social justice is distinct from cosmopolitanism, which is the idea that all people belong to a single global community with a shared morality.[39] Social justice is also distinct from egalitarianism, which is the idea that all people are equal in terms of status, value, or rights, as social justice theories do not all require equality.[40] For example, sociologist George C. Homans suggested that the root of the concept of justice is that each person should receive rewards that are proportional to their contributions.[41][42]
Economist Friedrich Hayek said that the concept of social justice was meaningless, saying that justice is a result of individual behavior and unpredictable market forces.[43] Social justice is closely related to the concept of relational justice, which is about the just relationship with individuals who possess features in common such as nationality, or who are engaged in cooperation or negotiation.[44][45]
Equity
[edit]In legal theory, equity is seen as the concept connecting law to justice, since law cannot be applied without reference to justice.[46] In that context, justice is seen as 'the rationale and the ethical foundation of equity'.[47] One approach towards equity in justice is community policing.[48] Marxism is a needs-based theory, expressed succinctly in Marx's slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need".[49]
Equality of outcome
[edit]Relational justice
[edit]Relational justice examines individual connections and societal relationships, focusing on normative and political aspects. Rawls' theory of justice aims to distribute social goods to benefit the poor, but does not consider power relations, political structures, or social meanings. Even Rawls' self-respect is not compatible with distribution.[51] Iris Marion Young charges that distributive accounts of justice fail to provide an adequate way of conceptualizing political justice in that they fail to take into account many of the demands of ordinary life and that a relational view of justice grounded upon understanding the differences among social groups offers a better approach, one which acknowledges unjust power relations among individuals, groups, and institutional structures.[52] Young Kim also takes a relational approach to the question of justice, but departs from Iris Marion Young's political advocacy of group rights and instead, he emphasizes the individual and moral aspects of justice.[53] As to its moral aspects, he said that justice includes responsible actions based on rational and autonomous moral agency, with the individual as the proper bearer of rights and responsibilities. Politically, he maintains that the proper context for justice is a form of liberalism with the traditional elements of liberty and equality, together with the concepts of diversity and tolerance.
Speedy justice
[edit]The phrase "Justice delayed is justice denied" refers to the problem of slow justice. The right to speedy trial is in some jurisdictions enshrined.[54] Higher quality justice tends to be speedy.[55]
Sentencing
[edit]In criminal law, a sentence forms the final explicit act of a judge-ruled process, and also the symbolic principal act connected to his function.[56] The sentence can generally involve a decree of imprisonment, a fine and/or other punishments against a defendant convicted of a crime. Laws may specify the range of penalties that can be imposed for various offenses, and sentencing guidelines sometimes regulate what punishment within those ranges can be imposed given a certain set of offense and offender characteristics.[57] The most common purposes of sentencing in legal theory are:
Theory | Aim of theory | Suitable punishment |
---|---|---|
Retribution | Punishment imposed for no reason other than an offense being committed, on the basis that if proportionate, punishment is morally acceptable as a response that satisfies the aggrieved party, their intimates and society. |
|
Deterrence |
|
|
Rehabilitation | To reform the offender's behavior |
|
Incapacitation | Offender is made incapable of committing further crime to protect society at large from crime |
|
Reparation | Repayment to victim(s) or to community |
|
Denunciation | Society expressing its disapproval reinforcing moral boundaries |
|
In civil cases the decision is usually known as a verdict, or judgment, rather than a sentence.[58] Civil cases are settled primarily by means of monetary compensation for harm done ("damages") and orders intended to prevent future harm (for example injunctions). Under some legal systems an award of damages involves some scope for retribution, denunciation and deterrence, by means of additional categories of damages beyond simple compensation, covering a punitive effect, social disapprobation, and potentially, deterrence, and occasionally disgorgement (forfeit of any gain, even if no loss was caused to the other party).
Evolutionary perspectives
[edit]Evolutionary ethics and evolution of morality suggest evolutionary bases for the concept of justice.[59] Biosocial criminology research says that human perceptions of what is appropriate criminal justice are based on how to respond to crimes in the ancestral small-group environment and that these responses may not always be appropriate for today's societies.[60]
Psychology
[edit]There has been research into victim's perspective of justice following crimes. Victims find respectful treatment, information and having a voice important for a sense of justice as well as the perception of a fair procedure.[61]
Pemberton et al. proposed a "Big 2" model of justice in terms agency, communion and membership in a society. Victims experience a loss of perception of agency due to a loss of control, as well as a loss of communion if the offender is a member of their social group, but may also lose trust in others or institutions. It can shatter an individual's trust that they live in a just and moral world. This suggests that a sense of justice can be restored by increasing a sense of communion and agency, rather than through retribution or restoration.[61]
Institutions
[edit]In a world where people are interconnected but they disagree, institutions are required to instantiate ideals of justice. These institutions may be justified by their approximate instantiation of justice, or they may be deeply unjust when compared with ideal standards – consider the institution of slavery. Justice is an ideal the world fails to live up to, sometimes due to deliberate opposition to justice despite understanding, which could be disastrous. The question of institutive justice raises issues of legitimacy, procedure, codification and interpretation, which are considered by legal theorists and by philosophers of law.[62] The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 emphasizes the need for strong institutions in order to uphold justice.[63]
See also
[edit]Other pages
[edit]- Law
- Adl (Arabic for Justice in Islam)
- Criminal justice
- Crime statistics
- Ethics
- Global justice
- International Court of Justice
- International Criminal Court
- Judicial reform
- Judicial review
- Just war theory
- Just-world hypothesis
- Justice (economics)
- Law reform
- Morality
- Napoleonic Code
- Rationality
- Rule according to higher law
- Sociology of law
Types of justice
[edit]References
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- ^ Hare, John E. (2015). God's Command. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 32–49. ISBN 978-0-19-960201-8.
- ^ a b Plato, Republic trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- ^ Cuban Law's Blindfold, 23.
- ^ See Two Treatises of Government: In The Former the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and His Followers, are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government (3 ed.). London: Awnsham and John Churchill. 1698. Retrieved 20 November 2014. via Google Books
- ^ John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 5.
- ^ See, e.g., Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013), pp. 4–10, 50–60.
- ^ Plato, The Republic, Book I, 331b–c.
- ^ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3
- ^ *See, e.g., Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013).
- Clive Barnett The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory
- ^ Wenar, Leif (2021), "John Rawls", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 20 May 2021
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- ^ "Brain reacts to fairness as it does to money and chocolate, study shows". UCLA Newsroom. UCLA. 21 April 2008. Archived from the original on 26 February 2010. Retrieved 15 January 2015.
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- ^ "Punishment | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 5 October 2023.
- ^ Bailey, William C., J. David Martin, and Louis N. Gray. "Crime and deterrence: A correlation analysis." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 11.2 (1974): 124-143.
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- ^ "The Project Gutenberg eBook of on Liberty, by John Stuart Mill". gutenberg.org. Retrieved 3 May 2019.
- ^ "Punishment". California State University. Archived from the original on 13 April 2021. Retrieved 12 August 2020.
- ^ Ted Honderich, Punishment: The supposed justifications (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969), Chapter 1.
- ^ "Retribution vs Revenge - What's the difference?". 9 October 2015.
- ^ Wilson, Jon. "Victim-Centered Restorative Justice: An Essential Distinction" (PDF).
- ^ Michael Braswell, and John Fuller, Corrections, Peacemaking and Restorative Justice: Transforming Individuals and Institutions (Routledge, 2014).
- ^ Fulham, L., Blais, J., Rugge, T., & Schultheis, E. A. (2023). The effectiveness of restorative justice programs: A meta-analysis of recidivism and other relevant outcomes. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 0(0). 8
- ^ Livingstone, Nuala; MacDonald, Geraldine; Carr, Nicola (2013). "Restorative justice conferencing for reducing recidivism in young offenders (aged 7 to 21)". Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. 2020 (2): CD008898. doi:10.1002/14651858.CD008898.pub2. PMC 7388302. PMID 23450592.
- ^ Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (Lebanon NH: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1976). ISBN 9780930350833
- ^ a b Chandran Kukathas, "Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective", in The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, ed. Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, Ethikon Series in Comparative Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 61 (ISBN 0-691-09993-6).
- ^ a b Mark Evans, ed., Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism: Evidence and Experience (London: Routledge, 2001), 55 (ISBN 1-57958-339-3).
- ^ Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969)
- ^ John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty" in John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford University Press, 1998)
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- ^ (Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Harvard University Press, 2000)
- ^ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015), ch.7 (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ^ (France, The Red Lily, Chapter VII).
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- ^ Hayek, F.A. (1976). Law, legislation and liberty : a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-7100-8403-3. OCLC 769281087.
- ^ Poblet, Marta; Casanovas, Pompeu (2008), "Concepts and Fields of Relational Justice", Computable Models of the Law, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4884, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 323–339, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_21, ISBN 978-3-540-85568-2
- ^ Nagel, Thomas (2005). "The Problem of Global Justice". Philosophy & Public Affairs. 33 (2): 113–147. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00027.x. ISSN 1088-4963. S2CID 144307058.
- ^ Titi, Catharine (2021). "4". The Function of Equity in International Law. Oxford: Oxford university press. ISBN 978-0-19-886800-2.
- ^ Titi, Catharine (14 August 2023). "International law in quest for justice". OUPblog. Retrieved 18 February 2024.
- ^ Thacher, David (2001). "Equity and community policing: A new view of community partnerships". Criminal Justice Ethics. 20 (1): 3–16. doi:10.1080/0731129X.2001.9992093. ISSN 0731-129X.
- ^ Karl Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Program' in Karl Marx: Selected writings ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977): 564–70 [569].
- ^ Mark E. Rushefsky (2008). "Public Policy in the United States: At the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century". M. E. Sharpe Inc. ISBN 9780765628503. Retrieved 15 July 2011.
- ^ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015), ch.10 (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ^ Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Oxford University Press, 1990).
- ^ Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions (Lexington Books, 2015) (ISBN 978-1498516518)
- ^ Garcia, Alfredo (1992). "Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or Second-Class Citizen". Sw. U. L. Rev. 21: 31. Retrieved 21 July 2024.
- ^ Melcarne, Alessandro; Ramello, Giovanni B.; Spruk, Rok (2021). "Is justice delayed justice denied? An empirical approach". International Review of Law and Economics. 65: 105953. doi:10.1016/j.irle.2020.105953.
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- ^ Kruger, Daniel J.; Nedelec, Joseph L.; Reischl, Thomas M.; Zimmerman, Marc A. (2015). "Life History Predicts Perceptions of Procedural Justice and Crime Reporting Intentions". Evolutionary Psychological Science. 1 (3): 183–194. doi:10.1007/s40806-015-0021-9. S2CID 142324638.
- ^ a b Pemberton, A.; Aarten, P. G. M.; Mulder, E. (2017). "Beyond retribution, restoration and procedural justice: the Big Two of communion and agency in victims' perspectives on justice". Psychology, Crime & Law. 23 (7): 682–698. doi:10.1080/1068316X.2017.1298760. hdl:1887/70580. S2CID 151982079.
- ^ David Miller (26 June 2017). "Justice". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- ^ Doss, Eric. "Sustainable Development Goal 16". United Nations and the Rule of Law. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
Further reading
[edit]- Clive Barnett, The Priority of Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2017), ISBN 978-0-8203-5152-0
- Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)
- Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003)
- Harry Brighouse, Justice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004)
- Anthony Duff & David Garland eds, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- Colin Farrelly, An Introduction to Contemporary Political Theory (London: Sage, 2004)
- David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
- Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An anthology (2nd edition, Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2006), Part III
- Serge Guinchard, La justice et ses institutions (Judicial institutions), Dalloz editor, 12 edition, 2013
- Eric Heinze, The Concept of Injustice (Routledge, 2013)
- Ted Honderich, Punishment: The supposed justifications (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1969)
- James Konow (2003) "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories", Journal of Economic Literature, 41(4)pp. 1188–1239
- Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An introduction (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
- Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (London: Routledge, 1988)
- John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
- Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974)
- Amartya Sen (2011). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-06047-0.
- Marek Piechowiak, Plato's Conception of Justice and the Question of Human Dignity (2nd edition, revised and extended, Berlin: Peter Lang Academic Publishers, 2021), ISBN 978-3-631-84524-0.
- C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A philosophical introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)
- Plato, Republic trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
- David Schmidtz, Elements of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)
- Peter Singer ed., A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Part IV
- Telford Taylor, Constance Baker Motley, and James Feibleman (1975) Perspectives on Justice, Northwestern University Press ISBN 0-8101-0453-9
- Catharine Titi, The Function of Equity in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2021), ISBN 9780198868002
- Reinhold Zippelius, Rechtsphilosophie, §§ 11–22 (6th edition, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011), ISBN 978-3-406-61191-9
External links
[edit]- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries:
- Distributive Justice, by Michael Allingham
- Punishment, by Kevin Murtagh
- Western Theories of Justice, by Wayne P. Pomerleau
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries:
- "Justice" by David Miller
- "Distributive Justice" by Julian Lamont
- "Justice as a Virtue" by Michael Slote
- "Legal Punishment" by Zachary Hoskins and Antony Duff
- United Nations Rule of Law: Informal Justice, on the relationship between informal/community justice, the rule of law and the United Nations
- Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Archived 27 April 2014 at the Wayback Machine, a series of 12 videos on the subject of justice by Harvard University's Michael Sandel, with reading materials and comments from participants.