Jump to content

Military history of Cambodia: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
No edit summary
Citation bot (talk | contribs)
Added date. | Use this bot. Report bugs. | Suggested by Abductive | Category:EngvarB from October 2015 | #UCB_Category 96/519
 
(341 intermediate revisions by 81 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Short description|none}} <!-- This short description is INTENTIONALLY "none" - please see WP:SDNONE before you consider changing it! -->
{{Very long|date=September 2009}}
{{EngvarB|date=October 2015}}
History attests to Cambodia's martial origins. In antiquity [[Cambodia]], having conquered [[Laos]], parts of [[Thailand]], and the [[Malay Peninsula]], held sway over a vast area of Southeast Asia. Khmer martial prowess waned in the early fifteenth century, however, and Cambodia subsequently endured periods of colonization, occupation, and vassalage by its more militarily powerful neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. This long period of decline reached its nadir in the early nineteenth century, when Cambodia nearly ceased to exist as a sovereign state as the result of encroachments by its neighbors. In 1863 the Cambodian king acquiesced in the establishment of a French protectorate over his nation, in order to preserve it from extinction. The protectorate's authority was extended often by force of arms, and ultimately Cambodia became a de facto colony that eventually gave birth to a modern state with its own armed forces and military doctrine.
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2015}}
{{History of Cambodia}}
The earliest traces of armed conflict in the territory that constitutes modern Cambodia date to the [[Iron Age]] settlement of [[Phum Snay]] in north-western Cambodia.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Archaeological-evidence-of-warfare-and-weaponry-at-Phum-Snay-a-adult-male-burial-with-a_269096938 | title= Archaeological evidence of warfare and weaponry at Phum Snay |access-date=13 January 2018}}</ref>


Sources on [[Funan]]'s military structure are rare. Funan represents the oldest known regional political entity, formed by the unification of local principalities. Whether these events must be categorized as conflict remains unclear<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8NJ3BgAAQBAJ&dq=funan+warfare&pg=PA45 | title= Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea|author1-link=John N. Miksic | author= John N. Miksic| date= 30 September 2013| publisher= NUS Press| access-date=13 January 2018| isbn= 9789971695583 }}</ref> More information is available for Funan's successor state - [[Chenla]], which has been characterized as distinctly bellicose as it was established by the military subjugation of Funan.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.academia.edu/2635407 | title= As in Heaven, So on Earth: The Politics of Visnu Siva and Harihara Images in Preangkorian Khmer Civilisation | journal= Journal of Southeast Asian Studies | volume= 34 | issue= 1 | pages= 21–39 | publisher= academia edu |access-date=23 December 2015| last1= Lavy | first1= Paul A. | year= 2003 | doi= 10.1017/S002246340300002X | s2cid= 154819912 }}</ref> Chenla's early aristocrats heralded authority by public display of their noble genealogies carved onto stone stelae all over Indochina. Later, rulers increasingly embraced the concept of divine Hindu kingship.<ref name=Miksic>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zjklDwAAQBAJ&dq=funan+warfare&pg=PA262 | title= Ancient Southeast Asia | author= John Norman Miksic| date= 14 October 2016| publisher= Taylor & Francis | access-date=1 January 2018| isbn= 9781317279044 }}</ref>
Since World War II, Cambodia has enjoyed few strife-free periods. Its people have suffered colonization, prolonged civil war, and occupation by a foreign power almost continuously. During this time, it has been ruled by three authoritarian governments of differing ideological orientations and varying degrees of repression.


The Khmer Empire's territory and integrity was maintained through the ''Royal Army'', personally commanded by the king. Records exist for regular conflict with the kingdom's neighbors, [[Champa]] in particular, as the empire effectively controlled Mainland South-east Asia by the 12th century.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://michaelvickery.org/vickery2003two-rev.pdf |title= Two Historical Records of the Kingdom of Vientiane - That was probably also the reason for the Cambodian conquests in Champa in the reigns of the Angkor kings Suryavarman II and Jayavarman VII. | publisher= Michael Vickery’s Publications |access-date=30 June 2015}}</ref> Nonetheless, the Khmer kingdom suffered a number of serious defeats, such as the Cham invasion and sack of Angkor in 1177. [[Khmer people|Khmer]] military supremacy declined by the early 14th century.<ref name="Google Books">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SHK3AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA892 |title=A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, Volume 2 - Tiounn Chronicle |access-date=19 May 2015|isbn=9781134819980 |last1=Woolf |first1=D. R. |date=3 June 2014 |publisher=Routledge }}</ref> Since the rise of the Siam [[Sukhothai Kingdom]] and later the [[Ayutthaya Kingdom]] the empire experienced a series of military setbacks, unable to repel repeated attacks, that eventually caused its collapse followed by the [[Post-Angkor Period]].
American military aid to Cambodia began indirectly in 1950 in the form of a security assistance program for the French forces in Indochina, that enabled them to expand a recently created indigenous army. In 1955 the United States agreed to continue this aid to the independent kingdom of Cambodia. The program, which included military training and a resident Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), lasted until terminated by the Cambodian government. Security assistance was again extended to the Khmer Republic from 1970 until that government fell in 1975 to the Khmer Rouge. After 1975 the United States extended humanitarian assistance through United Nations (UN) agencies to Cambodian refugees on the Thai border and gave non lethal aid, only, to the two non communist components of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.


The period of decline and stagnation (around 1450 to 1863) nearly ended the Khmer aristocrat's royal dynastic sovereignty and unity of the Khmer people as the result of prolonged encroachments by its neighbours Vietnam and Thailand.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.khmerkrom.org/history |title=March to the South (Nam Tiến) |publisher=Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation |access-date=26 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150626125758/http://www.khmerkrom.org/history |archive-date=26 June 2015 |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 1863 the [[Norodom of Cambodia|Cambodian king]] acquiesced in the establishment of a [[French protectorate of Cambodia|French protectorate]] over his country to prevent its imminent incorporation into Vietnam in the east and the loss of its western provinces to Thailand.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9RorGHF0fGIC&pg=PA48 |title=The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai |last=Chapuis |first=Oscar |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group]] |page=48 |date=1 January 2000 |access-date=3 April 2015|isbn=9780313311703 }}</ref>
In 1987 Cambodia was the reluctant host to a substantial Vietnamese military presence, reinforced by its Cambodian surrogate army. History thus appeared to be repeating itself, and foreign observers and Cambodian nationalists feared that the country eventually might become part of a Hanoi-dominated Indochinese federation. The UN recognized the tripartite CGDK as the legitimate government of Cambodia. The insurgent forces of the coalition were capable only of conducting guerilla raids and sabotage missions within Cambodian territory, against the Vietnamese occupation forces and the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Phnom Penh government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea. A number of foreign observers assessed the military situation as a stalemate and doubted that Hanoi would, or could, fulfil its public commitment to withdraw its forces by 1990 from a Cambodia that was becoming a "strategic appendage" of the "indivisible strategic unit of Indochina" claimed by Vietnamese military doctrine.


No centrally organized military actions took place during the French protectorate, although notable was an 1883/84 nationwide revolt "which saw thousands of French troops do battle with shadowy bands of Cambodian guerrilla insurgents throughout the countryside". Several local uprisings are accounted for, which caused considerable problems for the colonial authorities. However, mainly reactions to French tax rulings and other perceived legislative injustices and without clear political objective, these endeavours had no decisive consequences.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/french-cambodia-years-revolt-1884-1886-0 | title= The French in Cambodia: Years of revolt (1884 - 1886) | date=11 December 1998 | publisher=Phnom Penh Post | access-date=13 January 2018}}</ref> French colonial troops engaged in several conflicts with [[Rattanakosin Kingdom|Thailand]] and suppressed revolts in Vietnam and Laos.<ref name="Stuart-Fox 1997">{{cite book|last1=Stuart-Fox|first1=Martin|title=A History of Laos|date=1997|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=0-521-59746-3|pages=24–25}}</ref>
==Khmer Empire==
Bas-relief friezes in galleries of the vast [[Angkor Wat]] complex in [[Siemreab]] depict Cambodia's land and naval conquests during its "time of greatness," the Angkorian Period, which spanned from A.D. 802 to 1431. During this time, the [[Khmer Empire]], by force of arms, extended its dominions to encompass much of Southeast Asia. The warrior kings, who actually led troops in battle, did not customarily maintain standing armies but raised troops as necessity required. Historian [[David P. Chandler]] has described the relationship between the monarch and the military: Though the king, who led his country into battle, sometimes engaged his chief enemy in single combat, Khmer military strength rested on the junior officers, the captains of militia. These men commanded the loyalty of peasant groups in their particular locality. If the king conquered a region, a new captain of militia would be enrolled and put under an oath of allegiance. The captains were simply headmen of the outlying regions, but their connection with the king enhanced their status. In time of war they were expected to conscript the peasants in their district and to lead them to Angkor to join the Khmer army. If the captains disobeyed the king they were put to death. The vast majority of the Khmer population were of the farmer-builder-soldier class.


The Japanese incursion and 1945 [[Japanese coup d'état in French Indochina|coup d'état]] initiated a decade of political and ethnic re-emancipation of Cambodia, brought about without large-scale military action.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://apjjf.org/2011/9/5/Geoffrey-Gunn/3483/article.html | title= The Great Vietnamese Famine of 1944-45 Revisited | author= Geoffrey Gunn| publisher=The Asia-Pacific Journal | access-date=13 January 2018}}</ref>
Little is known conclusively about warfare in early Cambodia, but much can be assumed from the environment or deduced from epigraphic and sculptural evidence. The army was made up of peasant levies, and because the society relied on rice cultivation, Khmer military campaigns were probably confined to the dry season when peasant-soldiers could be spared from the rice fields. Battles were fought on hard-baked plains from which the padi (or rice) had been harvested. Tactics were uncomplicated. The Khmer engaged their foes in pitched frontal assaults, while trying to keep the sun at their backs. War elephants were widely employed, for both tactical and logistical purposes. Late in the Khmer Empire, the ballista (a kind of catapult, often shaped like a giant crossbow) took its place in regional warfare. It probably was introduced to the Cambodians by Cham mercenaries, who had copied it earlier from Chinese models.
Since Cambodia's independence in 1954 the country was to be the stage for a series of proxy wars of the cold war powers, foreign incursions and civil wars, that only effectively ended with the [[United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia|UN Mandate]] in the early 1990s.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.yale.edu/cgp/CAS34-4_Kiernan_Introduction.pdf |title= Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002 by Ben Kiernan - American aircraft dropped over half a million tons of bombs on Cambodia's countryside, killing over 100.000 peasants... | publisher= Yale University |access-date=7 July 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/14/esau-54.pdf |title= COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA - Cambodia first declared independence from the French while occupied by the Japanese. Sihanouk, then King, made the declaration on 12 March 1945, three days after Hirohito's Imperial Army seized and disarmed wavering French garrisons throughout Indo-China. | publisher= DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE |access-date=7 July 2015}}</ref>


==Early history==
The Khmer Empire's principal adversaries were the Thai, the Vietnamese, and the Cham from the powerful kingdom of Champa in central Vietnam. Warfare, seemingly, was endemic, and military campaigns occurred continuously. The Cham—attacking by land in 1177 and again by water in 1178—sacked Angkor twice. In 1181 a young nobleman who was shortly to become Jayavarman VII, and to emerge as one of the greatest of the ancient Khmer kings, raised an army and defeated the Cham in a naval battle. After his death, ca. 1218, Kampuja entered a long decline, resulting in eventual disintegration.
[[File:FunanMap001.jpg|thumb|300px|Map of Funan at around the 3rd century.]]
The earliest traces of armed and violent conflict have been found at the [[Iron Age]] settlement of [[Phum Snay]] in north-western Cambodia. A 2010 examination of skeletal material from the site's burials revealed an exceptionally high number of injuries, especially to the head, likely to have been caused by interpersonal violence. The graves contained a quantity of swords, other offensive weapons used in conflicts. The presence of shoulder decorations and armour suggests a distinct military and/or clan culture, that has, according to some authors similarities with the Thai Iron Age sites such as Noen U-Loke and [[Ban Non Wat]].<ref name=Miksic/><ref>{{cite journal |title= Bioarchaeological evidence for conflict in Iron Age north-west Cambodia - Examination of skeletal material from graves at Phum Snay |journal= Antiquity |volume= 85 |issue= 328 |pages= 441–458 | publisher= Cambridge University Press |date= 2 January 2015 |doi= 10.1017/S0003598X00067867 |last1= Buckley |first1= H. R. |last2= O'Reilly |first2= D. J. W. |last3= Domett |first3= K. M. |doi-access= free }}</ref>


Funan is only known from Chinese sources, which according to most modern historians are doubtful. The polity was fully established around the 1st century CE and consisted of "walled political centers", which implies a desire to be prepared for some kind of conflict and to be protected from attacks. Some authors also argue that Funan was "expansionist" and might have maintained a sizeable navy that conquered regional coastal settlement centers.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xu_Q0WGdw7YC&dq=funan+warfare&pg=PA190 |title= Encyclopedia of Prehistory: Volume 3: East Asia and Oceania |author=Peter N. Peregrine |date= 31 January 2001|publisher= Springer |access-date= 13 January 2018|isbn= 9780306462573 }}</ref> However, the Champasak territory of Laos was aggressively incorporated, although this might have taken place after the establishment of Funan's successor state - [[Chenla]].
==Dark ages==
Scholars frequently assert that the decline of the Khmer Empire was precipitated by the drain on its economy, and on the morale and energy of its people, caused by the continual and monumental construction program at Angkor. Dynastic rivalries took their toll, and slave rebellions are also thought to have hastened the demise of the empire.


Some modern historians such as M. Vickery have redirected research and focus on archaeology, local genealogy and examined the suspicious size fluctuations and curious shifts of central power that characterized Chenla. Consequently, they argue, that Funan and Chenla, in particular, are terms not to be taken too seriously and accept greater political and military division among the elite.<ref name=Miksic/> As contemporary Chinese sources on Chenla only provide factual reference points, such as the claim that by 616/617 CE the kingdom of Chenla is the region's new souvereign and...the conqueror of Funan. In 802 CE a powerful and contentious ruling dynasty united sizable territories and established the [[Khmer Empire]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Glover|first=Ian|title=Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6kDm5d3cMIYC&pg=PA100|year=2004|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-29777-6}}</ref>
Over the centuries, the Khmer kings never completely pacified the countryside. Khmer martial spirit survived, as was demonstrated by uprisings and rebellions, either spontaneous or contrived, throughout periods of foreign encroachment and domination. Among the significant rebellions was one that occurred beginning in 1840 which resulted in Cambodia's being placed under the joint suzerainty of Thailand and Vietnam.


==Colonial Cambodia==
==Khmer Empire==
[[File:Bayon Angkor Relief1.jpg|thumb|250px|[[Khmer Empire|Khmer]] army going to war against the Chams]]
Following entreaties that had been made a decade earlier by Cambodian King Ang Duong to Napoleon III for protection from the Vietnamese, his "traditional enemies," a delegation of French naval officers in 1863 proceeded to Phnom Penh from Saigon to conclude a treaty with Duong's son, now King Norodom (1859-1904), that created a French protectorate. It is generally accepted by historians that only the intervention of the French prevented the extinction of Cambodia.
[[File:Ref-bayon2.jpg|thumb|250px|[[Ballista elephant|Ballista war elephants]] attacking the Chams]]


Bas-relief in galleries of the [[Angkor]] complex in [[Siem Reap Province|Siem Reap]] elaborately depict the empire's land and naval forces and conquests of the period (802 to 1431), as it extended its dominions to encompass most of Indochina. Hindu warrior kings, who actually led troops in battle, did not customarily maintain standing armies but raised troops as necessity required {{citation needed|date=July 2020}}. Historian [[David P. Chandler]] has described the relationship between the monarch and the military:
Heavy taxation as well as resentment against foreign domination and the puppet rulers who sat on the throne in Phnom Penh were the causes of the intermittent rebellions that marked the colonial period. Revolts erupted in 1866 and in 1870 that attracted considerable support in the countryside. They were quelled by the French, assisted by Norodom's half brother (the future king), Sisowath, who led his troops alongside the French in the suppression of both rebellions.


<blockquote>''Though the king, who led his country into battle, sometimes engaged his chief enemy in single combat, Khmer military strength rested on the junior officers, the captains of militia. These men commanded the loyalty of peasant groups in their particular locality. If the king conquered a region, a new captain of militia would be enrolled and put under an oath of allegiance. The captains were simply headmen of the outlying regions, but their connection with the king enhanced their status. In time of war they were expected to conscript the peasants in their district and to lead them to Angkor to join the Khmer army. If the captains disobeyed the king they were put to death. The vast majority of the Khmer population were of the farmer-builder-soldier class.''</blockquote>
Another serious rebellion occurred in 1884, when the French forced upon King Norodom a new treaty that tightened their control over Cambodia. The reforms stipulated in the new accord, such as the abolition of slavery and the nstitutionalization of land ownership, struck at the very heart of the privileged status enjoyed by the Cambodian elite in the countryside. The result was a widespread insurrection evoking such support that a local French official in Kampong Cham noted in 1886 that "...the entire Cambodian population acquiesces in the revolt." Quelling the rebellion took one and one-half years, and it tied down some 4,000 French and Vietnamese troops that had been brought in from Cochinchina (the southern part of Vietnam).


Little is known conclusively about warfare during imperial Cambodia, but much has been assumed from the environment or deduced from epigraphic and sculptural evidence. The army was made up of peasant levies, and because the society relied on rice cultivation, Khmer military campaigns were probably confined to the dry season when peasant-soldiers could be spared from the rice fields. Battles were fought on hard-baked plains from which the paddy (or rice) had been harvested. Tactics were uncomplicated. The Khmer engaged their foes in pitched frontal assaults, while trying to keep the sun at their backs. War elephants were widely employed, for both tactical and logistical purposes. Late in the Khmer Empire, the ballista (a kind of catapult, often shaped like a giant crossbow) took its place in regional warfare. It probably was introduced to the Cambodians by [[Champa|Cham]] mercenaries, who had copied it earlier from Chinese models.<ref name="Hoadley">{{cite book |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=vBw0DwAAQBAJ&dq=khmer+empire+military&pg=PT126 |title = Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in ... |author = J. Stephen Hoadley |access-date = 29 December 2017 |isbn = 9781351488822 |date = 5 September 2017 |publisher = Routledge }}</ref>
Unrest surfaced periodically before World War II, and various episodes of Cambodians' defying colonial rule were recorded. Reports by French officials also hinted at widespread insecurity in the countryside, where peasants frequently were at the mercy of bandit gangs. The colonial military forces in Cambodia, which were available to quell potential insurrections during this period, consisted of a light infantry battalion (Bataillon Tirailleurs Cambodgiens) and a national or native constabulary (Garde Nationale, also called Garde Indigène).


<blockquote>''Throughout the empire’s history, the court was repeatedly concerned with quelling rebellions initiated by ambitious nobles trying to achieve independence, or fighting conspiracies against the king. This was particularly true each time a king died, as successions were usually contested.''<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.worldhistory.org/Khmer_Empire/ |title = Khmer Empire |author = Rodrigo Quijada Plubins |date = March 12, 2013 |access-date = December 29, 2017 |publisher = [[World History Encyclopedia]] }}</ref></blockquote>
The light infantry battalion, a Khmer unit with French officers, was part of a larger force, the third brigade, which had responsibility for Cambodia and for Cochinchina. In addition to the Cambodian battalion, the brigade was composed of French colonial and Vietnamese light infantry regiments and support elements. The brigade, headquartered in Saigon, was ultimately responsible to a supreme military command for Indochina located in Hanoi.


[[File:Angkor_Thom_Bayon_(9728449694).jpg|thumb|left|Bas-relief at Bayon temple of female soldiers of Khmer Empire]]
Under the French pre-World War II colonial regime, the constabulary consisted of a force of about 2,500 men and a mixed Franco-Khmer headquarters element of about forty to fifty officers, technicians, and support personnel. The force was divided into about fifteen companies deployed in the provinces. Control of the constabulary was vested in the colonial civil administration, but in times of crisis, command could pass quickly to military authorities in Saigon or in Hanoi. Service in the constabulary theoretically was voluntary, and personnel received a cash salary. Enlistments, however, were rarely sufficient to keep pace with personnel requirements, and villages occasionally were tasked to provide recruits.
The Khmer Empire's principal adversaries were the [[Cham people|Cham]] of the powerful kingdom of Champa in modern central Vietnam and to a lesser extent the [[Pagan Kingdom]] to the west. Warfare was endemic and military campaigns occurred continuously. The Chams attacked by land in 1177 and again by water in 1178, sacked Angkor twice. The empire quickly recovered, capable to strike back, as it was the case in 1181 with the invasion of the Cham city-state of [[Vijaya (Champa)|Vijaya]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.phnompenhpost.com/angkor-wat-equated-quintessence-cambodian-culture-more-century |title= Angkor Wat: equated with the quintessence of Cambodian culture for more than a century - The Cham fleet sailed up the Mekong River...The reaction was very quick... |date= 14 June 2013 | publisher= The Phnom Penh Post |access-date=21 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://michaelvickery.org/vickery2006bayon.pdf |title= Bayon: New Perspectives Reconsidered Michael Vickery | publisher= Michael Vickery’s Publications |access-date=26 June 2015}}</ref> In 1181 a young nobleman who was shortly to become [[Jayavarman VII]], emerged as one of the great Khmer kings, raised an army and defeated the Chams in a naval battle. After Champa's decline began the rise of Cambodia's new enemies, the [[Thai people|Siamese]] and the [[Vietnamese people|Vietnamese]].


==Post-Angkor Period==
===Japanese occupation (1941-1945)===
As some scholars assert that the decline of the Khmer Empire was, among other causes, mainly precipitated by the drain on its economy. Dynastic rivalries and slave rebellions are also considered to have affected the demise of the empire.
{{Main|Japanese occupation of Cambodia}}
In 1940 the Japanese government, after negotiating a treaty of friendship with Thailand, sought special concessions in Indochina from the French colonial authorities. The Vichy administration in Hanoi, under pressure from the German government, signed an agreement with Tokyo that permitted the movement of Japanese troops through the transportation hubs of Indochina.


===Military setbacks===
Thailand subsequently sought to take advantage of both its friendship with Tokyo and French military weakness in the region by launching an invasion of Cambodia's western provinces. Although the French suffered a series of land defeats in the skirmishes that followed, a unique twist in the confrontation came from a naval battle that ensued near the Thai island of Ko Chang. A small French naval force intercepted a Thai battle fleet, en route to attack Saigon, and sank two battleships and other light craft. The Japanese then intervened and arranged a treaty, signed in Tokyo in March 1941, compelling the French to concede to Thailand the provinces of Batdambang, Siemreab, and parts of Kampong Thum and Stoeng Treng. Cambodia thus lost one-third of its territory and nearly half a million citizens.
Although a number of sources, such as the [[Cambodian Royal Chronicles]] and the Royal chronicles of [[Ayutthaya Kingdom|Ayutthaya]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.siam-society.org/pub_books/books.html |title=Siam Society Books - The Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya - A Synoptic Translation by Richard D. Cushman | publisher= Siam Society |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref> contain recordings of military expeditions and raids with associated dates and the names of sovereigns and warlords, several influential scholars, such as [[David P. Chandler|David Chandler]] and [[Michael Vickery (historian)|Michael Vickery]] doubt the accuracy and reliability of these texts.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=search&rurl=translate.google.com.kh&sl=ja&u=http://angkorvat.jp/doc/studyonCambodia.pdf&usg=ALkJrhjsmYxvoyWrqJpbRPm7cyDT76gECg|title=Cambodia's cultural heritage considerations in Area Studies by Aratoi Hisao|work=googleusercontent.com|access-date=12 March 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://angkorvat.jp/doc/tch/ang-tch1420.pdf |title=Essay on Cambodian History from the middle of the 14 th to the beginning of the 16 th Centuries According to the Cambodian Royal Chronicles by NHIM Sotheavin - So far, the reconstruction of history from the middle of the 14 th to the beginning of the 16 th centuries is locked in a sort of unsolved state, since local sources prove inadequate and references from foreign sources are of little use |publisher=Sophia Asia Center |access-date=1 July 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402202705/http://angkorvat.jp/doc/tch/ang-tch1420.pdf |archive-date=2 April 2015 |df=dmy }}</ref> Other authors criticise this rigid "overall assessment", though.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://moussons.revues.org/2469?lang=en |title= Culturalism and historiography of ancient Cambodia: about prioritizing sources of Khmer history - Ranking Historical Sources and the Culturalist Approach in the Historiography of Ancient Cambodia by Eric Bourdonneau - 29 Also this material is sparse...|journal= Moussons. Recherche en Sciences Humaines Sur l'Asie du Sud-Est|date= September 2004|issue= 7|pages= 39–70| publisher= Presses Universitaires de Provence |doi= 10.4000/moussons.2469|access-date=3 July 2015|last1= Bourdonneau|first1= Eric|doi-access= free}}</ref>


David Chandler states in ''A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, Volume 2'': "Michael Vickery has argued that Cambodian chronicles, including this one, that treat events earlier than 1550 cannot be verified, and were often copied from Thai chronicles about Thailand..."<ref name="Google Books"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.meruheritage.com/Ayudhya.html |title=The historical Records of Ayudhya...Blamed on the invasion of Pagan in 1767, all Ayudhya's past records were assumed perished during its fall to the Burmese attack | publisher= Khmer heritage |date= 31 May 2015 |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref>
The Japanese, while leaving the Vichy colonial government nominally in charge throughout Indochina, established in Cambodia a garrison that numbered 8,000 troops by August 1941. Preservation of order on a day-to-day basis, however, continued to be the responsibility of the colonial authorities, who were permitted to retain the constabulary and the light infantry battalion. These forces were sufficient to quell the first stirrings of nationalistic unrest in 1941 and in 1942.
Linguist Jean-Michel Filippi concludes: "The chronology of Cambodian history itself is more a chrono-ideology with a pivotal role offered to Angkor."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.phnompenhpost.com/angkor-wat-equated-quintessence-cambodian-culture-more-century |title=Angkor Wat: equated with the quintessence of Cambodian culture for more than a century - Behind the mythical towers: Cambodian history | publisher= Phnom Penh Post |date= 14 June 2013 |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref> Similarities apply to Thai chronological records, with the notable example of the ''[[Ram Khamhaeng|Ramkhamhaeng]] controversy''.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2014/November/opinion_November52.xml&section=opinion |title=A king and a stone - Nineteenth century or twelfth? When the Thai script was first inscribed has much to do with how history is used politically by Rahul Goswami| publisher= Khaleej Times |date= 29 November 2014 |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://kampotmuseum.wordpress.com/tag/the-ramkhamhaeng-controversy/ |title=Recreations epigraphic (2 2). Epigraphic western: the case of Ramkhamhaeng by Jean-Michel Filippi| publisher= Kampotmuseum |date= 28 June 2012 |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref>


According to the Siamese Royal chronicles of [[Paramanuchitchinorot]], clashes occurred in 1350, around 1380, 1418 and 1431.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.siamese-heritage.org/jsspdf/1971/JSS_061_1c_Wyatt_AbridgedChronicleOfAyudhyaOfPrinceParamanuchitchinorot.pdf |title= THE ABRIDGED ROYAL CHRONICLE OF AYUDHYA - In 712 of the Era, Year of the Tiger... | publisher= The Siam Society |access-date=12 June 2015}}</ref><ref name="History of Ayutthaya">{{cite web |url=http://www.ayutthaya-history.com/Dynasties_Ramesuan.html |title=History of Ayutthaya - Dynasties - King Ramesuan | publisher= History of Ayutthaya |access-date=20 June 2015}}</ref>
Anti-French agitation assumed a more overt form, in July 1942, when early nationalist leaders [[Pach Chhoeun]] and [[Son Ngoc Thanh]] organized a demonstration in Phnom Penh over an obscure incident involving Cambodian military personnel. In this occurrence, a monk named Hem Chieu attempted to subvert some Khmer military personnel by involving them in vague coup plotting against the colonial administration. The plot was discovered, and the monk was arrested; Chhoeun and Thanh, believing they had tacit Japanese support, staged a march on the French residency by some 2,000 people, many of them monks. The repressive reaction by the colonial authorities resulted in many injuries and in mass arrests. Although the Japanese failed to support Thanh as he had expected, they spirited him away to Japan, where he was trained for the next three years and was commissioned a captain in the Japanese army. Chhoeun was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment.
[[File:Flag of Cambodia under Japanese occupation.svg|thumb|Flag of the short-lived Cambodian Pro-Japanese puppet state (March - October 1945)]]
On March 9, 1945, Japanese forces in Indochina, including those in Cambodia, overthrew the French colonial administration; and, in a bid to revive the flagging support of local populations for Tokyo's war effort, they encouraged indigenous rulers to proclaim independence. During this period of Japanese-sponsored independence, the fate of the constabulary and of the light infantry battalion remained uncertain. The battalion apparently was demobilized for the most part, while the constabulary remained in place but was reduced to ineffectuality. Presumably both forces were leaderless because their French officers were interned by the Japanese for the remainder of the war.


"In 1350/51; probably April 1350 King [[Uthong|Ramadhipati]] had his son Ramesvara attack the capital of the King of the Kambujas (Angkor) and had Paramaraja (Pha-ngua) of Suphanburi advance to support him. The Kambuja capital was taken and many families were removed to the capital Ayudhya. At that time, [around 1380] the ruler of Kambuja came to attack Chonburi, to carry away families from the provinces eastwards to Chanthaburi, amounting to about six or seven thousand persons who returned [with the Cambodian armies] to Kambuja. So the King attacked Kambuja and, having captured it, returned to the capitol."[sic]
Tokyo, however, did not plan to leave the Indochinese countries without a military force following the March 9 coup. Plans had been prepared for the creation of 5 volunteer units of 1,000 troops each. There was no thought that such a native force would fight alongside Japanese troops, but rather that it would be used to preserve public order and internal security. It was intended that recruitment of indigenous personnel for the volunteer units would be through physical and written exams. Before the plan could be implemented in Cambodia, however, the war ended, and the concept died without further action.


==Colonial Cambodia==
The conclusion of World War II caused considerable turmoil in Cambodia: a defeated Japanese military contingent waited to be disarmed and repatriated; French nationals newly released from internment sought to resume their prewar existence; diverse Allied military units returned to Phnom Penh to reimpose a colonial administration. In the countryside there were two sources of unrest. On the western fringes of the country, the Khmer Issarak, nationalist insurgents with Thai backing, declared their opposition to a French return to power in Cambodia, proclaimed a government-in-exile, and established a base in Batdambang Province. On the eastern frontier, the Vietnamese communist forces, or Viet Minh infiltrated the Cambodian border provinces, organized a "Khmer People's Liberation Army" (not to be confused with the later Cambodian force, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces, which is sometimes called the Khmer People's National Liberation Army), and began seeking a united front with the Khmer Issarak.
[[File:Prince Sisawat.jpg|thumb|300px|[[Sisowath of Cambodia]]]]


===Insurrections===
==First Indochina War (1945-54)==
It was under such exigencies that a Cambodian army was created, primarily by Prince Monireth, the heir to the throne, who earlier had been passed over by the French in favor of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was considered more pliable. In the fall of 1945, Monireth gained the concurrence of returning French authorities in his plan to raise an indigenous military force to fill the vacuum left by the defeated Japanese and to counter mounting internal disorder. On November 23, in his capacity as defense minister, he made public two decisions concerning this issue. The first was to form the first battalion of a nascent Cambodian army, and he invited former noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the demobilized colonial light infantry battalion to join the new unit. The second was to open an officer-candidate school, and he extended an invitation to young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty five with a junior high-school education to apply for admission. The school duly opened on January 1, 1946, and part of it was reserved for NCO training.


Following negotiations by Cambodian King [[Ang Duong]] and [[Napoleon III]] for protection from Vietnam conquest and land loss by Thailand, a delegation of French naval officers concluded the French protectorate with [[Norodom of Cambodia|King Norodom]] (1859–1904).The intervention of colonial France prevented further erosion of national and cultural integrity of Cambodia and ended territory loss.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.siamese-heritage.org/jsspdf/1991/JSS_081_2b_Sternstein_LondonCompanysEnvoysPlotSiam.pdf |title=London Company's Envoys Plot Siam |website=Siamese Heritage |access-date=January 24, 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.grsmu.by/files/file/university/cafedry/gymanitarnuh-nayk/files/fiu/gpw/encyclopedia.pdf |title= Volume IV - Age of Revolution and Empire 1750 to 1900 - French Indochina by Justin Corfield | publisher= Grodno State Medical University |access-date=January 24, 2017}}</ref>
Two important agreements between Phnom Penh and Paris gave the Cambodian military forces a firmer official footing in 1946. The first, the Franco-Cambodian Modus Vivendi of January 7, 1946, for the most part concerned political matters. In military affairs, however, it gave official recognition to the existence of a Cambodian army, although it placed French advisers in the Cambodian Ministry of Defense and declared that French authorities had responsibility for maintaining order in Cambodia.


Heavy taxation, institutionalisation of land ownership, reforms, that weakened the privileged status of the Cambodian elite, as well as resentment against foreign domination, were the causes of intermittent rebellions that marked the colonial period. Revolts erupted in 1866, in 1870 and 1883/84 that attracted considerable support in the countryside, easily quelled by the French, who created discord among the Khmer forces. [[Sisowath of Cambodia|Sisowath]], Norodom's half brother led his troops into combat alongside the French who nourished his ambitions for the royal crown.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Tai-and-Vietnamese-hegemony#ref509239 |title=Cambodia - Tai and Vietnamese hegemony |publisher=britannica.com |access-date= January 13, 2018}}</ref> Quelling the rebellion took one and one-half years, and it tied down some 4,000 French and Vietnamese troops that had been brought in from [[Cochinchina]].
The second agreement, the Franco-Khmer Military Convention of November 20, 1946, was more significant in Cambodian military history because it established the organization and the mission of the nation's armed forces. The pact affirmed that Cambodia, as an autonomous state within the French Union, would have at its disposal indigenous forces, the missions of which were to uphold the sovereignty of the king, to preserve internal security, and to defend the frontiers of the country. The accord also noted that Cambodia participated in the defense of the French Union by placing its military units at the disposal of the French High Commissioner for Indochina, and that, reciprocally, other French Union forces helped to defend Cambodia. The Cambodian forces were to be composed of units with a territorial responsibility and a mobile reserve. The supreme commander would be the king, who would exercise his powers through a Ministry of Defense assisted by a Franco-Khmer general staff. The Cambodians also were granted the responsibilities of recruiting, of determining obligatory military service, of designating unit tables of organization and equipment, and of deploying troops internally. The stationing of Cambodian units outside the country, however, was to be based on mutual understanding between the king and the French High Commissioner for Indochina (see The Struggle for Independence , ch. 1).


===Ethnic Khmer colonial forces===
In 1947 the Cambodian government faced a mounting threat from several thousand Khmer Issarak combatants, whose numbers would swell to around 10,000 by 1949. In an effort to keep pace with their domestic adversaries, the Cambodian military forces slowly but inexorably grew in numbers as the months and years passed. In January 1947, the effective strength of the Cambodian military stood at about 4,000 personnel, of which 3,000 served in the constabulary. The remainder were in a mobile reserve of two battalion-sized units (one of them newly formed) named, respectively, the First Cambodian Rifle Battalion and the Second Cambodian Rifle Battalion (Bataillon de Chasseurs Cambodgiens). These first Cambodian military units went into action in 1947 against the Khmer Issarak. During the next two years, two more rifle battalions were added, bringing total strength up to 6,000 personnel, with about half serving in the Garde Nationale and half in the mobile reserve. The latter at this time comprised three rifle battalions (one battalion had been allocated to French Union forces elsewhere in Indochina).


The colonial military forces in Cambodia, tasked to quell potential insurrections, consisted of a light infantry battalion (Bataillon tirailleurs cambodgiens) and a national constabulary (Garde nationale, also called Garde indigène).<ref>{{cite web |title=Archive & 1re Guerre mondiale : Quand les Cambodgiens se battaient pour la France |url=https://www.cambodgemag.com/post/premi%C3%A8re-guerre-mondiale-quand-les-cambodgiens-se-battaient-pour-le-pouvoir-colonial |access-date=January 13, 2018 |publisher= |language=fr}}</ref>
In July 1949, in another military agreement with France, Cambodian forces were granted autonomy within operational sectors in the provinces of Siemreab and Kampong Thum, which had been part of the territory returned to Cambodia by Thailand in early 1947. Under an additional protocol signed in June 1950, provincial governors were assigned the responsibility for the pacification of the territories under their jurisdictions; to accomplish this mission they were each given a counterinsurgency force consisting of one independent infantry company.


The light infantry battalion, a Khmer unit with French officers, was part of a larger force, the third brigade, which had responsibility for Cambodia and for Cochinchina. In addition to the Cambodian battalion, the brigade was composed of French colonial and Vietnamese light infantry regiments and support elements. The brigade, headquartered in Saigon, was ultimately responsible to a supreme military command for Indochina located in Hanoi.
The early 1950s were marked by further milestones in the development of the Cambodian military forces. In the fall of 1950, a military assistance agreement between the United States and France provided for an expansion of indigenous forces in Indochina, and by 1952 Cambodian troop strength had reached 13,000 personnel, greater than that of French forces in the country. In the meantime, more rifle battalions were formed, combat-support units were established, and a framework for logistical support was set up. Cambodian units were given wider responsibility: protection of the rubber plantations in the area of the middle Mekong, and, to prevent infiltration by the Viet Minh, surveillance of the coastal areas of the southern provinces and of the eastern frontier with Cochinchina.


Under the French pre-World War II colonial regime, the constabulary consisted of a force of about 2,500 men and a mixed Franco–Khmer headquarters element of about forty to fifty officers, technicians, and support personnel. The force was divided into about fifteen companies deployed in the provinces. Control of the constabulary was vested in the colonial civil administration, but in times of crisis, command could pass quickly to military authorities in Saigon or in Hanoi. Service in the constabulary theoretically was voluntary, and personnel received a cash salary. Enlistments, however, were rarely sufficient to keep pace with personnel requirements, and villages occasionally were tasked to provide recruits.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://photius.com/countries/cambodia/national_security/cambodia_national_security_the_french_protector~43.html |title=Cambodia The French Protectorate, 1863-1954 |publisher=photius |access-date= January 13, 2018}}</ref>
In June 1952, Prince Sihanouk—determined to transcend his figurehead role—seized power, staging what was termed a "royal coup d'état." He suspended the constitution "to restore...order and security throughout the country." Taking command of army operations, he led his troops against Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Issarak forces in Siemreab Province, where he announced that he had driven "700 red guerrillas" across the border into Thailand. As the year wore on, the French returned to Cambodian control the battalion that had been assigned to the French Union forces since the late 1940s. The unit returned ceremoniously to Phnom Penh in October. In December the Cambodian operational sector of Siemreab was enlarged by the addition of Batdambang Province, and the subsector of Batdambang City came under the command of a previously obscure lieutenant colonel, Lon Nol. The operational sector of Kampong Thum was given its own combat element, the Third Cambodian Rifle Battalion, an elite unit that was subject to the direct orders of the monarch.


==Japanese occupation (1941–1945)==
In early 1953, Sihanouk embarked on a world tour to publicize his campaign for independence, contending that he could "checkmate communism by opposing it with the force of nationalism." Following his tour, he "retired" to Batdambang Province, which was declared a "free zone of independence" and where he was joined by 30,000 Cambodian troops and police in a show of support and strength. Elsewhere, Cambodian troops under French officers staged slowdowns or refused the commands of their superiors, as a demonstration of solidarity with Sihanouk. Full independence was granted by France in November 1953, and Sihanouk, returning to Phnom Penh, took command of the army of 17,000 troops, which had been renamed the Royal Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales Khmères—FARK—see Appendix B).
{{Main|Japanese occupation of Cambodia}}


[[File:Flag of Cambodia under Japanese occupation.svg|thumb|300px|Alleged flag of Cambodia 1942-1945, while under Japanese occupation]]
In March 1954, combined Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak forces launched attacks from Vietnam into northeastern Cambodia. Sihanouk personally directed a sustained counterattack. Conscription was instituted for men between fifteen and thirty-five years of age, and national mobilization was declared. Following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Indochina in July, Viet Minh representatives agreed to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. After a brief rebellion by the Khmer Issarak in late 1954, one of its principal leaders, Son Ngoc Thanh, surrendered in response to an amnesty decree, but, upon denial of an audience with Sihanouk, he departed for Thailand. FARK force levels were 47,000, but, with demobilization after Geneva, this dropped to 36,000, the approximate level at which it was to be maintained for the next fifteen years except during periods of emergency.
[[File:Norodom Sihanouk 1941.jpg|thumb|left|250px|Norodom Sihanouk in 1941)]]
During [[World War II]] Japan which effectively controlled [[South-east Asia]] by 1942 tolerated the [[French Indochina in World War II|Vichy administration in Hanoi]] as a vassal of [[Nazi Germany]] that included permission of unhindered movement of Japanese troops through [[Indochina]]. The Japanese, while leaving the Vichy colonial government nominally in charge throughout Indochina, established an 8,000 troops strong garrison in Cambodia by August 1941.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MauWlUjuWNsC&dq=Decoux+Indochina+Catroux&pg=PA48 |title= The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and ... |author=Arthur J. Dommen |access-date=January 13, 2018|isbn= 0253109256 |date= 20 February 2002 |publisher= Indiana University Press }}</ref>


Thailand sought to take advantage of its alliance with Tokyo and colonial French weakness by launching an invasion of Cambodia's western provinces. As the French suffered a series of land defeats in the skirmishes that followed, a small French naval force intercepted a Thai battle fleet, en route to attack Saigon, and sank two battleships and other light craft. However, the Japanese then intervened and arranged a treaty, compelling the French to concede to Thailand the provinces of [[Battambang Province|Battambang]], [[Siem Reap Province|Siem Reap]] and parts of [[Kampong Thom Province]] and [[Stung Treng Province]]. Cambodia lost one-third of its territory including half a million citizens.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://ww2f.com/threads/vichy-versus-asia-the-franco-siamese-war-of-1941.12606/ |title= Vichy versus Asia: The Franco-Siamese War of 1941 |publisher= WWII Forum |author=Dr. Andrew McGregor |access-date=January 13, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Egjy-FPZ0-UC&dq=Bataillon+tirailleurs+cambodgiens&pg=PA80 |title= Le conflit franco-thaïlandais de 1940-41: la victoire de Koh-Chang |author=Pierre Gosa |access-date=January 13, 2018|isbn= 9782723320726 |year= 2008 |publisher= Nouvelles Editions Latines }}</ref>
==The Second Indochina War (1954-75)==
In May 1955, the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement providing for security assistance and for the establishment of a thirty-person MAAG. During the next eight years, until the assistance program was discontinued at Cambodian request in November 1963, FARK received from the United States supplies and equipment worth approximately US$83.7 million, in addition to military budget support. In the meantime, the French also retained a military training mission in Cambodia that was to remain until 1971. FARK traditions and doctrine remained French, and there was some incompatibility with United States military doctrine and outlook.


Cambodian nationalism assumed a more overt form in July 1942, when early leaders Pach Chhoeun, a monk named Hem Chieu and [[Son Ngoc Thanh]] organised resistance involving Cambodian military personnel. The plot was discovered by the colonial authorities that resulted in many injuries and in mass arrests.
Although the United States undertook a substantial security- assistance program in Cambodia, and the kingdom was included as a "protocol state" in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), failure to obtain more concrete assurances of defense assistance motivated Cambodia to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. Subsequently adopted as law, this policy declared that Cambodia would "abstain from military or ideological alliances" but would retain the right to self-defense. Cambodia continued to be aware of the serious threat to its independence posed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).


On 9 March 1945, Japanese forces in Cambodia deposed the French colonial administration; and in an attempt get Khmer support for Tokyo's war, they encouraged Cambodia to proclaim independence. During this period the fate of the constabulary and of the light infantry battalion remained uncertain. The battalion apparently was demobilised, while the constabulary remained in place but was rendered ineffective, their French officers were interned by the Japanese. Japan had initially prepared for the creation of 5 Khmer volunteer units of 1,000 troops each to preserve public order and internal security. Recruitment of personnel for the volunteer units would include physical and written exams. Before the plan could be implemented the war ended and the concept died without further action.
FARK's mission thus became a defensive one, that is, to insure Cambodia's territorial integrity within the framework of neutrality. The FARK high command remained fairly stable, staffed by a limited number of well-trained personnel, many of whom had been educated abroad. Ranking officers, however, became highly politicized, if not subservient, because they were more or less compelled by Sihanouk at his whim to perform active roles in national political life. Throughout the years that followed the Geneva Conference, Sihanouk, supreme commander of FARK, controlled national policies affecting the military establishment, and FARK's operational parameters were circumscribed by his frequent policy vacillations. Because of this, FARK never developed as an effective or viable military organization.


At the conclusion of [[World War II]] a defeated Japanese military contingent waited to be disarmed and repatriated; French nationals sought to resume their pre-war rule with the support of Allied military units. The [[Khmer Issarak]] (nationalist insurgents with Thai backing), declared opposition to a French return to power, proclaimed a government-in-exile, and established a base in [[Battambang Province]]. On the eastern frontier Vietnamese communist forces ([[Việt Minh]]) infiltrated the Cambodian border provinces, organised a "Khmer People's Liberation Army" (not to be confused with the later Cambodian force, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces) and tried to forge a united front with the Khmer Issarak.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Murashima|first1=Eiji|title=Opposing French colonialism Thailand and the independence movements in Indo-China in the early 1940s|journal=South East Asia Research|date=1 November 2005|volume=13|issue=3|pages=333–383|doi=10.5367/000000005775179702|s2cid=147391206}}</ref>
In addition to the Vietnamese threat, the Cambodian government perceived a menace to internal stability from [[Son Ngoc Thanh]]'s resurgent antimonarchist Khmer Serei (see Appendix B). Although contemporary observers suggested that the Khmer Serei seemed "to be more of a nuisance . . . than a genuine threat," the group's insurgent activities and subversive efforts were viewed with increasing alarm by Phnom Penh. In March 1959, for example, the provincial governor of [[Siem Reap]], General Dap Chhuon, a former [[Khmer Issarak]] leader who once had fought alongside Sihanouk, was implicated in an attempted Khmer Serei uprising (known at the time as the [[Bangkok Plot]]) and was executed. Sihanouk believed the United States had been behind the plot, and his proclivity for assuming complicity between Washington and the Khmer Serei became a particularly significant factor a few years later. In approximately 1965 to 1966, the United States Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV) began recruitment for the Studies and Operations Group and civilian irregular defense groups of Khmer Krom (see Appendix B) living in the Mekong Delta, many of whom were Khmer Serei members. In his public pronouncements regarding Khmer Serei activity, Sihanouk charged that the group had originated in South Vietnam and Thailand, and had the backing of both governments. Over the years, there were countless Khmer Serei incidents, followed by amnesties, surrenders, executions, and acrimonious Cambodian charges against South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States. After Sihanouk was deposed in 1970, the Lon Nol government pardoned some 500 political prisoners, the majority of whom were Khmer Serei. Charges surfaced in 1987 that during his rule Sihanouk had executed as many as 1,000 Khmer Serei suspects.


==First Indochina War (1945–54)==
In the uneasy peace between the First Indochina War and the Second Indochina War, a number of incidents occurred on Cambodia's border with South Vietnam. In June 1958, two South Vietnamese battalions briefly occupied a village in Stoeng Treng Province, and Sihanouk appealed for United States intervention. Receiving no response that satisfied him, Sihanouk established diplomatic relations with China and announced that this action was a direct consequence of South Vietnam's violation of Cambodian territory. Cambodia was also not silent during the early stages of border violations by North Vietnam. In 1959 Phnom Penh complained that North Vietnamese regulars were using northeastern Cambodia to infiltrate South Vietnam. Cambodia made concerted efforts to demonstrate that it was policing its eastern borders, but, although the incursions were publicly admitted, the existence of base areas was not. By the mid-1960s, sites along Cambodia's eastern borders were serving as bases for North Vietnamese and for South Vietnamese communist, or Viet Cong (see Appendix B) forces fighting the South Vietnamese government. FARK, restrained by Sihanouk's policies, which, in effect, constituted a modus vivendi with the intruders, could do little more than monitor these activities. The continuation of border incidents, and Sihanouk's repeated charges of United States complicity with the Khmer Serei, led to a steady deterioration in Cambodian-American relations.
[[File:Gen-commons.jpg|thumb|300px|Geneva Conference in 1954)]]
[[File:French indochina 1952 05 2.png|thumb|300px|French Indochina in 1952)]]
In the fall of 1945 [[Sisowath Monireth|Prince Monireth]] proposed to raise an indigenous military force to the returning French authorities. Appointed defense minister, he announced the formation of the first native Cambodian battalion on 23 November and the establishment of an officer-candidate school on 1 January 1946. The Franco–Cambodian ''Modus Vivendi'' of 1946, mainly concerned political matters included recognition of the Cambodian army by French advisers in the Cambodian Ministry of Defense and the French authorities' responsibility for maintaining order.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/tragedyofcambodi00chan |url-access=registration |page=[https://archive.org/details/tragedyofcambodi00chan/page/22 22] |quote=Prince Monireth. |title=The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 |publisher=GoogleBooks |author=David P. Chandler |access-date= 14 January 2018|isbn=0300057520 |year=1991 }}</ref>


Facing increasing threats from thousands of Khmer Issarak combatants, regular troops quickly grew in numbers. In January 1947, the effective strength of the Cambodian military stood at about 4,000 personnel, of which 3,000 served in the constabulary who saw combat the same year. The remainder belonged to a mobile reserve of two battalion-sized units (one of the newly formed) named, respectively, the First Cambodian Rifle Battalion and the Second Cambodian Rifle Battalion (Bataillon de Chasseurs Cambodgiens). During the next two years, two more rifle battalions were added, bringing total strength up to 6,000 personnel, with about half serving in the Garde Nationale and half in the mobile reserve.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/tragedyofcambodi00chan |url-access=registration |page=[https://archive.org/details/tragedyofcambodi00chan/page/43 43] |quote=Franco–Khmer headquarters. |title= The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945 |publisher=Yale University Press |author=David P. Chandler |access-date=13 January 2018|isbn= 0300057520 |year= 1991 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Grant|first1=Edited by Jonathan S.|last2=Moss|first2=Laurence A. G.|last3=Unger|first3=Jonathan|title=Cambodia: the widening war in Indochina.|date=1971|publisher=Washington Square Press|location=New York|isbn=0671481142|page=314}}</ref>
In November 1963, after the clandestine Khmer Serei radio resumed anti-Sihanouk broadcasts that the Cambodian government alleged were beamed from Thailand and from South Vietnam with transmitters supplied by the United States, Sihanouk terminated the economic and security assistance agreements with Washington. He also demanded the departure from Cambodia of all non-diplomatic United States government personnel. The final rupture in diplomatic relations came two years later, after Cambodia filed a complaint in the UN Security Council against the United States and South Vietnam for their "repeated acts of aggression against Cambodia." Relations were formally terminated May 3, 1965.


By July 1949 Cambodian forces were granted autonomy within operational sectors beginning in the provinces of Siem Reap and Kampong Thom and in 1950 provincial governors received the assignment to oversee the pacification of their jurisdiction, supported by an independent infantry company. A military assistance agreement between the United States and France followed in the fall of 1950 determined the expansion of indigenous forces in Indochina, and by 1952 Cambodian troop strength had reached 13,000. Additional rifle battalions were formed, combat-support units were established, and a framework for logistical support was set up. Cambodian units were given wider responsibilities, such as border and coastal protection.
Although still receiving French military assistance and training (a program that was to continue until 1972), Cambodia began soliciting and accepting military assistance from communist countries as well, after the termination of United States aid. In 1963 FARK received four Soviet MiG aircraft at the beginning of a program in which China also joined. The inevitable results of a variety of suppliers were mixed equipment inventories.


Prince Sihanouk seized power in June 1952, staging a "royal coup d'état" in 1953.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cambodia/history-sihanouk.htm |title=Cambodia Under Sihanouk - 1949-1970 |publisher=Globalsecurity |access-date= 14 January 2018}}</ref>
In 1966 Sihanouk secretly granted access to the deep-water port of [[Sihanoukville]] (later called Kampong Saom), in western [[Kampot Province]], to the North Vietnamese. With the complicity of ranking FARK officers, Sihanoukville became a main entrepôt for North Vietnamese military supplies from China and from the Soviet Union. Armaments were then transported to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sanctuaries on the border with South Vietnam, ironically over the "Friendship Highway" built with United States aid and sometimes in FARK trucks supplied as part of the United States security- assistance program. This effective supply route enabled the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to stockpile substantial amounts of armaments and equipment for the 1968 Tet Offensive against the Saigon government. FARK profited from armaments pilfered from the Vietnamese shipments, and suborned FARK officers derived personal advantage from the Sihanoukville traffic through fees, bribes, and other special arrangements.
He suspended the constitution "to restore...order..." and took command of the army and operations. He attacked Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Issarak forces in Siem Reap Province and announced that he had driven "700 red guerrillas" across the border into Thailand.


In early 1953, Sihanouk embarked on a world tour to publicise his campaign for independence, contending that he could "checkmate communism by opposing it with the force of nationalism." Following his tour, he took control of entire Cambodia, joined by 30,000 Cambodian troops and police in a show of support and strength. Elsewhere, Cambodian troops under French officers staged slowdowns or refused the commands of their superiors, as a demonstration of solidarity with Sihanouk. Full independence was obtained in November 1953, and Sihanouk took command of the army of 17,000 troops, which had been renamed the [[Royal Cambodian Armed Forces]] (Forces armées royales khmères – FARK).
In 1967 a peasant uprising broke out in the [[Samlot district]] of [[Batdambang Province]]. Its significance was not appreciated immediately. At the time, Sihanouk attributed the attacks, which first occurred in about January, to the [[Viet Minh#The 'Khmer Viet Minh'|'Khmer Viet Minh']], whom he also labeled "[[Khmer Rouge]]" to distinguish them from the "Khmer Bleu" (see Appendix B). Sihanouk vacillated in placing the blame for the unrest, however, and later charged the "Thai patriotic front" with being its instigators. Acting on his orders, FARK harshly suppressed the Batdambang insurgents, who had acted spontaneously, and not at Khmer Rouge direction. Although Sihanouk announced two months later that the Batdambang rebellion was "completely at an end," there were subsequent references to continuing Khmer Rouge activity in the countryside.


In March 1954, combined Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak forces launched attacks from Vietnam into northeastern Cambodia. Conscription was introduced for men between fifteen and thirty-five years of age and national mobilisation was declared. Following the conclusion of the [[1954 Geneva Conference|Geneva Conference on Indochina]] in July, Viet Minh representatives agreed to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. FARK troop numbers of 47,000 dropped to 36,000, with demobilisation after Geneva at which it was to be maintained for the next fifteen years except during periods of emergency.<ref>{{cite web| url=https://www.britannica.com/place/Cambodia/Independence#ref509245 | title= First Indochina War - Cambodia | publisher=Britannica| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
The uprising convinced the Khmer communists (including a former school teacher named Saloth Sar, later to emerge under the alias [[Pol Pot]]) who earlier had gone underground, that the time was at hand to escalate the armed struggle against the Phnom Penh government. Shortly thereafter, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK—see Appendix B) came into being. The Khmer Rouge dated its own founding from January 17, 1968. RAK leaders, including Pol Pot, who had just returned from a prolonged visit to China, retreated to the jungle and mountains of Rotanokiri Province (Ratanakiri) in northeastern Cambodia. There they hoped to exploit the disaffection of the Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B) over the policies of the Phnom Penh government concerning taxation, corvée labor, and the resettlement of lowland Khmers in the Khmer Loeu areas. For the next two and one-half years, the newly formed RAK remained small (estimates varied from 400 to 2,000 personnel), and poorly equipped with captured weapons. The Khmer Rouge found that, in spite of the Samlot rebellion, discontent against the government in Phnom Penh was then insufficient to attract large numbers of people to the rigors of an armed insurgency. As for external support, there was no move on the part of Hanoi to provide military assistance to the Khmer Rouge because such action would have alienated Sihanouk's government and would have imperiled continued North Vietnamese and Viet Cong access to Cambodian territory as well as their use of the port of Sihanoukville.


==Second Indochina War (1954–75)==
In 1969 the United States undertook the first of two bombing campaigns against enemy targets in Cambodian territory. Code-named the Menu series, these air operations consisted of tactical strikes against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas on the Cambodian- Vietnamese border. They partially dislodged the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong and drove them more deeply into Cambodia in quest of safer havens. This brought FARK elements into more frequent hostile contact with the communists, and there were reports of FARK forces' being involved in joint operations with South Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Sihanouk became increasingly distressed with these developments; his attitude toward the communist Vietnamese changed, and authorization for continued use of Sihanoukville was terminated. In April, speaking in Rotanokiri Province, Sihanouk stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh," he had ordered General Lon Nol "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt an offensive spirit." Sihanouk announced during a press conference on June 11, 1969 that " . . . at present there is war in Rotanokiri [province] between Cambodia and Vietnam."
[[File:Eisenhower and Sihanouk 1959.jpg|thumb|300px|Eisenhower and Sihanouk 1959)]]
In 1955, the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement providing for security assistance. In addition to a [[Military Assistance Advisory Group]] (MAAG) and military budget support, [[Royal Cambodian Armed Forces|FARK]] received US supplies and equipment worth approximately US$83.7 million for eight years until the assistance program was discontinued at Sihanouk's request in 1963. France also retained a military training mission in Cambodia until 1971 from which FARK military traditions and doctrines were adopted.<ref name=codata>{{cite web|url=http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-2223.html |title=Cambodian The Second Indochina War, 1954-75 |publisher=Country-data |access-date=14 January 2018}}</ref>


As the United States failed to guarantee a reliable military support program Sihanouk increasingly pursued a neutralist foreign policy during the 1960s and eventually declared that Cambodia would "abstain from military or ideological alliances" but would retain the right to self-defense.<ref>{{cite book| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1be-AAAAQBAJ&dq=Second+Indochina+War+cambodia&pg=PA21 | title= The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History |author= William S. Turley | date= 17 October 2008| publisher= Rowman & Littlefield Publishers | access-date=10 February 2018| isbn= 9780742557451 }}</ref>
Sihanouk left Cambodia for medical treatment in France in January 1970. Citing disagreement over economic and administrative matters, after week-long anticommunist rioting in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian National Assembly on March 18 passed a unanimous vote of nonconfidence in Sihanouk and replaced him as chief of state (see The March 1970 Coup d'État , ch. 1). Although Sihanouk's deposition was nominally a parliamentary action, the leaders of the participants consisted primarily of FARK officers, headed by Lon Nol, who had been the prime minister since the previous August (and who, Sihanouk had once suggested, would be his likeliest successor). The coup was bloodless, although FARK contingents were on the alert in Phnom Penh and took control of key installations, such as the airport and the radio station.


From 1958 on Northern and Southern Vietnamese combat troops began to violate Cambodian territory on a regular basis. Neither [[Federal government of the United States|Washington]] nor [[Government of Vietnam|Hanoi]] responded to Sihanouk's protests, which lead him to establish diplomatic relations with China. By the mid-1960s, large areas within Cambodia served as supply routes and strategic staging sites for North - and South Vietnamese communists and [[Viet Cong]] forces. FARK could do little more than monitor these developments and maintained a [[modus vivendi]] with the intruders as Sihanouk charged the United States of complicity with the [[Khmer Serei]], which further strained Cambodian–American relations.<ref name=codata/>
At the time Sihanouk was deposed, FARK, soon to be renamed the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères—FANK—see Appendix B), had 35,000 to 40,000 personnel, organized for the most part as ground forces. The Lon Nol government repeatedly sought negotiations for a peaceful withdrawal of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces from its territory. These overtures were rejected, and in April the Vietnamese communists began moving out of their sanctuaries and deeper into Cambodia, in efforts to preserve their lines of communication and to maintain the corridor to the port of Sihanoukville. President Richard M. Nixon spoke on April 30, 1970 to the American nation, and said that "thousands of their [North Vietnamese and Viet Cong] soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries and they are encircling the capital." Lon Nol, in the meantime, had called up military reserves, had requested UN intervention, and, while reiterating Cambodia's position of neutrality, had issued a call for international assistance.


Economic and military cooperation with the United States was formally terminated on 3 May 1965. Although French military assistance and training continued until 1972, Sihanouk began to accept military assistance from the [[Soviet Union]]. He also accused Thailand and South Vietnam of subversive cooperation with the USA whom he suspected to actively destabilize his government and promote the Khmer Serei.<ref>{{cite book| jstor=j.ctt1bqzmsw | title= 9 "Stupid Moves" (1959–1960) Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War |author= William J. Rust | year= 2016 | isbn= 9780813167459 | publisher= University Press of Kentucky }}</ref><ref name=codata/><ref>{{cite web| url=https://kentuckypress.wordpress.com/2016/06/24/the-failure-of-covert-actions-in-cambodia-and-the-origins-of-the-second-indochina-war/ | title= Covert Action in Cambodia |author= William J. Rust | date= 24 June 2016| publisher=University Press of Kentucky | access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
Between April 29 and May 1, 1970, South Vietnamese and United States ground forces drove into Cambodia's border areas in a determined bid to overrun and to destroy North Vietnamese and Viet Cong logistical depots and sanctuaries. There also was hope at United States MACV headquarters that the offensive would result in the capture of the Central Office for South Vietnam, the Viet Cong headquarters for directing the war against the Saigon government. The operation resulted in the capture of vast quantities of enemy matériel and it bought time for Washington and Saigon to proceed with "Vietnamization," the process of turning over the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese government. For the shaky Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, however, the results of the incursion were destabilizing and far-reaching. In retreating before United States and South Vietnamese troops, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces penetrated farther west into Cambodian territory, overrunning government outposts as they went. Soon all of northeastern Cambodia had fallen to the North Vietnamese or to the Viet Cong, who then proceeded to turn the captured areas over to the Khmer insurgents and to forge them into a full-fledged revolutionary army.


By the mid-1960s Cambodia's armed forces had failed to incorporate into a comprehensive program of one of the opposing sides of the cold war. Mixed military equipment of several suppliers with varying doctrines and structure worsened FARK's strategic position.<ref name=codata/>
To help hard-pressed FANK, Nixon laid down guidelines for United States assistance to Cambodia, promising, among other things, to turn over to the government in Phnom Penh equipment captured during the incursion, and to "provide military assistance...in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army." Thus began a structured military assistance program, supplementing the ad hoc support begun shortly before the incursion, that was to total US$1.18 billion by the fall of the Lon Nol government in April 1975. Although all United States troops were withdrawn from Cambodian territory, South Vietnamese forces were accorded "automatic authority" to operate in Cambodia in a sixteen- kilometer corridor along the frontier.


Unable to effectively combat Vietnamese presence in Eastern Cambodia Sihanouk, in a gesture of appeasement secretly offered the [[Sihanoukville Autonomous Port|deep-water port]] of [[Sihanoukville (city)|Sihanoukville]], situated at the [[Gulf of Thailand]] as a supply terminal for the [[People's Army of Vietnam|NVA]]. FARK's role as a centrally lead operative force eroded further and increasingly functioned as a highly corrupt arbiter of uncontrolled weapon deals and as shipment agency.<ref name=codata/><ref>{{cite web| url=http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1888.html | title= America's Vietnam War in Indochina War in Cambodia | publisher=US History | access-date= 10 February 2018}}</ref>
The Lon Nol government very shortly afterwards declared martial law and total mobilization, and it began expansion of its army. United States government studies conducted shortly before Sihanouk's deposition had expressed serious reservations about the capabilities of the government forces, noting the "lack of combat experience, equipment deficiencies, . . . . lack of mobility," and citing "incompetent and corrupt officers" as the "greatest shortcoming."


In 1967 FARK brutally suppressed the [[Samlaut Uprising]] of frustrated peasants in [[Battambang Province]] who, among other things, protested against government price dumping for rice, treatment by local military, land displacement and poor socio-economic conditions. Sihanouk attributed the insurrection to the [[Khmer Rouge]] and blamed the "Thai patriotic front" to have been the instigating force in the background. Sihanouk's incorrect political analysis and the inappropriate actions of FARK against civilians caused a serious alienation process between Cambodia's population and the official armed forces. Many people fled FARK's repressions and joined rebel groups of whom the [[Kampuchean Revolutionary Army|Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea]] became the most prolific. As long as Sihanouk remained in power these forces received very limited military assistance from Hanoi because this might have alienated Sihanouk's government and affected North Vietnamese and Viet Cong access to Cambodian territory and the Sihanoukville supply route.<ref name=codata/>
The same officers were, however, retained by FANK and their inadequacy rapidly became apparent as military rosters were padded with non-existent "phantom troops." United States advisers attempting to keep track of FANK's development were constantly hampered by the difficulty of accurately estimating the number of Cambodian troops. (Accurate numbers were important because the United States was then providing assistance for FANK's military pay and allowances.) United States Senate staff investigators reported that United States officials acknowledged in January 1972 that the Khmer Republic's military strength figures were "grossly exaggerated" by at least 10 percent. The Senate report concluded there was "no greater mystery in Cambodia than the size of the Cambodian Government's armed forces." In December 1972, the information minister of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic announced that 100,000 troops were found to be "nonexistent." According to the United States secretary of state's report to the Congress for the years 1969 and 1970, FANK grew "from under 40,000 in March 1970 to some 200,000 in January 1971." In reality, FANK levels probably never reached such a high number, and many of its new soldiers were youthful and inexperienced.


The [[Operation Menu|1969 U.S. bombing campaigns inside Cambodian territory]] caused the Vietnamese to penetrate deeper into the country where they came into more frequent hostile contact with FARK, who reportedly conducted joint operations with [[South Vietnam]]ese forces against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Sihanouk disapproved of these latest communist incursions, terminated access to Sihanoukville's port and stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh", he is going "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt an offensive spirit." On 11 June 1969 he announced that "...at present there is war in [[Ratanakiri Province]] between Cambodia and Vietnam."<ref name=codata/>
Limited basic training of the inductees, some of it in Thailand and in South Vietnam, began almost immediately after the introduction of martial law. Such training, however, could not satisfy FANK's pressing need to teach peasant farmers to man the equipment provided by the United States, to fight effectively in sizable units, and to comprehend modern military doctrine.


In January 1970 a group of FARK officers under general [[Lon Nol]] exploited Sihanouk's absence to carry out a [[Cambodian coup of 1970|coup d'État]] that was confirmed by the [[National Assembly of Cambodia]] two months later. The coup passed without any violent incidents and all FARK contingents, around 35,000 to 40,000 troops, organised mainly as ground forces remained alert, manned and secured key strategic positions.<ref name=codata/>
In spite of a steady infusion of United States security assistance and the influx of new FANK personnel, the government forces were unable to hold their own against their adversaries. Because much of the country remained under North Vietnamese control after the withdrawal of United States and South Vietnamese troops, initial FANK strategy focused on holding the heartland of Cambodia south of a line of demarcation dubbed the "Lon Nol Line." This strategy conceded about half the country to the enemy, but it was the heavily forested, sparsely populated, northern half. If the Lon Nol Line could be held, the government would control the southern half with most of the population and all of the rich, rice-growing areas.


The [[Royal Khmer Armed Forces|FARK]] were renamed to [[Khmer National Armed Forces]] (Forces armées nationales khmères - FANK) under Lon Nol's command. His government reiterated a neutral political stance. However, attempts to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Cambodian territory were rejected. As a consequence, Lon Nol called for UN intervention and international assistance.<ref name=codata/>
To defend this territory, FANK unleashed its two most ambitious offensives: Chenla I, in August 1970, and Chenla II, in August 1971. Both had as their objectives the reopening of Route 6 to Kampong Thum and the reassertion of government control over this fertile agricultural area. Both operations failed. Chenla I stalled short of its objective in the face of fierce resistance from the North Vietnamese Ninth Division. FANK units were then withdrawn to protect the capital from enemy commando teams. Chenla II was successful in securing its initial goals, and FANK columns from north and south met jubilantly on Route 6 along the way to [[Kampong Thom]]. As the government forces celebrated, however, their old nemesis, the North Vietnamese Ninth Division, tore into the extended FANK lines with ferocity, slaughtering many of them and leaving the rest cut off and compelled to fight their way back to their own lines as best they could. Former FANK commander General [[Sak Sutsakhan]] noted ruefully about Chenla II after the war that, "In this operation FANK lost some of its best units of infantry as well as a good part of its armor and a great deal of transport, both military and civil."


From 29 April and 1 May 1970, South Vietnamese and United States ground forces entered eastern Cambodia and captured vast quantities of enemy matériel, destroyed NVA and Viet Cong infrastructure and depots. Retreating Vietnamese troops pushed further west into Cambodia, destroyed FANK troops and positions, seriously destabilizing the Lon Nol government. After South Vietnamese and United States army withdrawal all of north-eastern Cambodia was controlled by the Vietnamese, who extensively supported, equipped local communist Khmer Rouge insurgents that had replaced FANK in these territories.<ref name=rand/>
The North Vietnamese, however, were neither the only, nor the most determined adversary with whom FANK had to deal. A far more lethal threat was soon posed by a revitalized Khmer Rouge-dominated force that had evolved considerably since its days as the ragtag, poorly armed band of irregulars known then as the RAK. The development of the RAK had owed much to the opportunism of the Khmer Rouge leaders, who had been able to transform a forlorn communist insurgency with no chance of succeeding in the late 1960s, into a war of national liberation headed by the country's most eminent nationalist, Sihanouk.


A comprehensive assessment of the [[Khmer Republic]]'s armed forces revealed serious shortcomings, such as the "lack of combat experience, equipment deficiencies,...lack of mobility" and "incompetent and corrupt officers". Although [[martial law]] was declared and total [[mobilization]] introduced, reliable and transparent administration, replacement of incompetent and corrupt officers, important personnel and educational reforms based on a modern military doctrine did not take place.
From Beijing, where he had been stranded by the coup that deposed him, Sihanouk in 1970 announced the formation of a Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchéa—GRUNK—see Appendix B). This government, he said, would be under the leadership of a broad umbrella organization, the [[National United Front of Kampuchea]] (''Front Uni National du Kampuchéa''--FUNK). The prestige of Sihanouk's name thus helped the Khmer Rouge in their recruitment effort. Rural peasant volunteers believed they were joining a broad-based national resistance movement, headed by the prince, against an ineffectual puppet regime in Phnom Penh. Several groups also rallied to the broad appeal of the GRUNK/FUNK. Such groups included the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdo (see Appendix B), the Khmer Viet Minh, and the Khmer Loeu.


FANK strategy focused on securing the central territory. The majority of the population occupied these rich, rice-growing areas as Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge control constituted the forested and mountainous lands north and east of the "Lon Nol Line." Two military offensives (Chenla I, in August 1970, and Chenla II, in August 1971) were undertaken in order to regain control of the fertile agricultural area of [[Kampong Thom Province|Kompong Thom]] north of [[Phnom Penh]]. Some initial success was not exploited and FANK was eventually defeated by the opposing North Vietnamese Ninth Division and increasingly numerous and effective Khmer Rouge divisions. These troops had acquired considerable political momentum since the dethroned Sihanouk served as their new figurehead proclaiming war of national liberation.
To accommodate the disparate elements that were rallying to the resistance cause, the RAK was renamed the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF—see Appendix B). As this force grew in size and in proficiency, it was able to relieve North Vietnamese units of their combat burden in Cambodia. By 1973 there were reportedly no more than 5,000 North Vietnamese combat troops in Cambodia, and of this number only 2,000 to 3,000 were deployed against FANK units.


In 1970 Sihanouk announced the establishment of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement royal d'union nationale du Kampuchéa – [[GRUNK]]), which he claimed was legitimized by the [[National United Front of Kampuchea]] (''Front uni national du Kampuchéa'' – FUNK). This rhetoric was particularly popular among the rural population and ethnic minorities.<ref>{{cite web| url=http://migs.concordia.ca/documents/MIGS_Karkaria%20_4%20April.pdf | title= Failure Through Neglect: The Women's Policies of the Khmer Rouge in Comparative Perspective |author=Zal Karkaria | publisher=Concordia University Department of History| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref> The RAK (Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea) was renamed the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF).<ref>{{cite book| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=24FWc5grhRMC&dq=CPNLAF&pg=PA267 | title= Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia |author= Arnold R. Isaacs | date= 27 January 1999| publisher= JHU Press | access-date=10 February 2018| isbn= 9780801861079 }}</ref>
After the Chenla campaigns, FANK was unable to regain the offensive, and its operations became a series of hard-fought defensive actions against an enemy whose momentum could not be stayed. Individual unit valor and fleeting tactical successes did little to relieve the unbroken string of FANK setbacks—overrun outposts, annihilated battalions, cut-off columns, plummeting morale, exhausted supplies, steadily shrinking government territory, and enemy units that were drawing ever closer around Phnom Penh. A harbinger of future trends was discernible as early as November 1972, two-and-one-half years before the final defeat. FANK strategists at that time acknowledged the waning capability of their armed forces and redrew the Lon Nol Line. The new line of demarcation signified a profound strategic realignment because it conceded most of the country, including the rich rice-growing areas around the Tonle Sap, to the enemy. In accordance with the redrawn Lon Nol line, FANK was committed to defend no more than the triangular corner of southeastern Cambodia, which held a majority of the population and was bounded generally by Route 4 from Phnom Penh to Kampong Saom on the west, and by Route 1 from Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese border on the east. The apex of the triangle passed just north of Odongk, the former royal capital that was to be the scene of heavy fighting later in the war. Even this retrenchment, however, turned out to be impractical, as successive engagements failed to dislodge the enemy troops south of the new defense line, and FANK increasingly found itself hard pressed from that direction as well.


By 1972 FANK actions were mainly defensive operations for steadily shrinking government territory which by November 1972 had reached a point that required a new strategic realignment of the Lon Nol line. Lost were the rich rice-growing areas around the [[Tonlé Sap]] lake. The remaining territory still held the majority of the population. It consisted of south-eastern Cambodia - roughly a triangle from Phnom Penh in the north via Sihanoukville in the south to the Vietnamese border in the east. By 1973 the CPNLAF controlled about 60 percent of the country's territory and 25 percent of the population.<ref name=tribunal>{{cite web| url=http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/history/cambodian-history/khmer-rouge-history/ | title= Khmer Rouge History | publisher=Cambodia Tribunal| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
By 1973 United States Department of State sources, possibly underestimating, noted that the Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF controlled about 60 percent of Cambodia's territory and 25 percent of the population. Despite a sustained United States bombing campaign that year to blunt the steady advance of the CPNLAF and to relieve pressure on FANK, the Khmer Rouge insurgent forces were able to absorb their losses, to maintain the initiative, and to subject an increasingly demoralized and cornered FANK to unremitting pressure.


CPNLAF began its offensive on Phnom Penh at New Year 1975 - by then the last remnant of [[Khmer Republic]] territory. Khmer Rouge forces slowly encircled the city as all roads and riverine routes were cut. By early April most defensive positions had been overrun with FANK units annihilated and supplies exhausted. On 17 April the Khmer Republic fell and FANK was totally crushed, beaten by a disciplined enemy army in a conventional war of movement and manoeuvre.<ref name=rand>{{cite web| url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P4605.pdf | title= Indochina in North Vietnamese Strategy|author= Melvin Gurtov | publisher=RAND Corporation | access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
The denouement for FANK and for the Khmer Republic began on New Year's Day 1975 when the CPNLAF unleashed its final offensive. As winter turned into spring, the enemy battered the defenses of Phnom Penh from every direction. Routes into the city were cut, reopened, and cut again; river convoys were forced to run a gauntlet of hostile fire to reach the beleaguered capital and finally could no longer break through; United States aircraft, in a forlorn attempt to maintain a lifeline into the city, set up an airlift from bases in Thailand. The effort worked briefly, until the airport itself was interdicted by hostile rocket fire. By early April, Phnom Penh was surrounded on all sides, and its defenses were crumbling. FANK attempts to break out of the encircled city stalled in the face of intense Khmer Rouge firepower. Government units were decimated, exhausted, and out of supplies; finally, they were unable to hold out any longer. The fall of the capital on April 17, marked the demise of the Khmer Republic and the total defeat of FANK, which in the end had been totally outclassed and outfought, not by an army of guerrillas—that phenomenon so intensively studied during the period, but by a tough, disciplined, regular force in a conventional war of movement, by fire and by maneuver.


==Cambodian Civil War==
==Cambodian Civil War==

===Military developments under the Khmer Rouge===
===Military developments under the Khmer Rouge===
[[File:Roundel of Cambodia (1976–1979).svg|thumb|Aircraft roundel of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK), 1975 to 1979.]]
===Khmer Rouge Armed Forces===
The 68,000 troops of [[Democratic Kampuchea]] were led by a small group of intellectuals, inspired by [[Mao Zedong]]’s Cultural Revolution in China who aimed to convert Cambodia into an agrarian [[Utopia]]. With help from the Vietnamese, indoctrinated and highly dedicated to [[Maoism|Maoist]] communist ideology, a handful of loose companies, recruited from peasantry developed into disciplined forces, trained in guerrilla warfare as well as in modern manoeuvre warfare. When North Vietnamese combat divisions had withdrawn from Cambodia by the end of 1972 these forces defeated [[Khmer National Armed Forces|FANK]] - the regular army of Cambodia on their own within 2 years.<ref>{{cite web| url=http://endgenocide.org/learn/past-genocides/the-cambodian-genocide/ | title= Precursors to Genocide: Rise of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot | date= 6 April 2016 | publisher=United to End Genocide| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref><ref name=rand/>
[[File:Roundel of Cambodia 1975.svg|thumb|Aircraft roundel of the RAK (Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea),1975 to 1979.]]
The 68,000-member Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF force that completed its conquest of Cambodia in April 1975 was a highly dedicated and disciplined peasant army, trained in the rigors of guerrilla warfare as well as in full-scale combat. Its shadowy intellectual leaders, adhering to the Maoist principles of guerrilla warfare, had taken their core "fish" from only three scattered companies, when optimum conditions had been presented to them in 1970, and had propelled them through the "water" of the people in the countryside, while collecting thousands of proselytes on the way. These leaders were fiercely independent, at first grudgingly accepting training and arms from the Vietnamese—the hated traditional enemy—while on occasion violently turning on these nominal allies, behavior that presaged the fatal conflict that was to come. When most North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat divisions had withdrawn from the field in Cambodia at the end of 1972, the RAK had experienced phenomenal growth, reaching an estimated 50,000. Its personnel continued to arm themselves by capturing or purchasing weaponry from FANK. The insurgents marched under the banners of nationalism, of legitimacy, and of national preservation—the escutcheon of Sihanouk. In the end, they defeated an army which had a strength on paper of 230,000, but which possibly numbered as few as 150,000. FANK had been armed by the United States with military weaponry and equipment worth $US1.18 billion, an abundance of matériel that now fell into the hands of the CPNLAF.


At the beginning of the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, the CPNLAF—now renamed the RAK once again, under its long-time commander and then Minister of Defense Son Sen, had 230 battalions in 35 to 40 regiments and in 12 to 14 brigades. The command structure in units was based on three-person committees in which the political commissar ranked higher than the military commander and his deputy. The country was divided into zones and special sectors, the boundaries of which changed slightly over the years. Within these areas, the RAK's first task upon "liberation," as a calculated policy, was the peremptory execution of former FANK officers and of their families, without trial or fanfare.
In 1975 that marked the beginning of [[Democratic Kampuchea]], the CPNLAF (Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces) were renamed RAK (Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea) once again. Led by long-time commander and then Minister of Defense [[Son Sen]], RAK consisted of 230 [[battalion]]s in 35 to 40 [[regiment]]s in 12 to 14 [[brigade]]s. The command structure in units was firmly based on an extreme form of peasant communist ideology with three-person committees where the political commissar ranked highest. The country was divided into military zones and special sectors, the boundaries of which changed slightly over the years. One of RAK's first tasks upon military and political consolidation, was the wholesale and [[summary execution]] of former FANK officers and governments officials and their families.<ref>{{cite web| url=https://www.mtholyoke.edu/~amamendo/KhmerRouge.html | title= The Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot's Regime | publisher=Mount Holyoke College| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>


The next priority was to consolidate into a national army the separate forces that were operating more or less autonomously in the various zones. The Khmer Rouge units were commanded by zonal secretaries who were simultaneously party and military officers, some of whom were said to have manifested "warlord characteristics." Troops from one zone frequently were sent to another zone to enforce discipline. It was such efforts to discipline zonal secretaries and their dissident or ideologically impure cadres that gave rise to the purges that were to decimate RAK ranks, to undermine the morale of the victorious army, and to generate the seeds of rebellion. As journalist Elizabeth Becker noted, "in the end paranoia, not enemies, was responsible for bringing down the regime."
The Khmers Rouge units were led by secretaries of the various military zones who exerted supreme political and military power. A national army was established in order to enforce discipline and to separate formerly autonomously operating forces as troops from one zone frequently were sent to another. These efforts were considered to be essential by the central governing group as to control regional secretaries and their dissident or ideologically impure cadres. A practice that eventually culminated in widespread bloody purges decimating the ranks, undermined the morale and considerably contributed to the rapid collapse of the regime. As author Elizabeth Becker noted, "in the end paranoia, not enemies, was responsible for bringing down the regime."<ref>{{cite web| url=https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/551442/Vietnam_Cambodia.pdf?sequence | title= VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND THE US| publisher=Repository Library Georgetown | access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>


===Cambodian–Vietnamese border tensions===
===Khmer-Vietnamese Border Tensions===
[[File:Hài cốt.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Skulls of victims of the [[Ba Chúc massacre]]]]
Border tensions between [[Cambodia]] and [[Vietnam]] (aside from traditional Khmer fear and hatred of the Vietnamese) goes back to the controversy over the [[Brévié Line]], drawn in 1939 by [[France|French]] colonial administrators and considered by Vietnam to be the official international boundary between the two countries. For years after the French departure, various Cambodian governments attempted to negotiate the return of [[Cochinchina]]--known in Cambodia as [[Kampuchea Krom]], which they maintained was a French [[colony]], not a protectorate, that had been promised to Cambodia by early French colonial authorities. Negotiations to solve the border dispute were held between 1975 and 1977, but they made no progress and were suspended. The [[Khmer Rouge]] also felt an abiding distrust of the [[Vietnamese people|Vietnamese]], who, they believed, had never renounced their determination to incorporate Cambodia into a larger, [[Hanoi]]-dominated [[Indochina]] federation.
Tensions between [[Cambodia]] and [[Vietnam]] have been going on for hundreds of years.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/89821/bria?sequence=1 |title= Reconceptualizing Southern Vietnamese History from the 15th to 18th Centuries Competition along the Coasts from Guangdong to Cambodia by Brian A. Zottoli | publisher= University of Michigan |access-date=26 June 2015}}</ref> They first peaked during the 19th century when only the establishment of the [[French Protectorate of Cambodia]] prevented the inevitable incorporation into a Vietnamese empire. French colonial administrators established numerous administrative zones and borders such as the ''Brévié Line'', with little regard to historic and ethnic considerations. Virtually all of these re-drawings resulted in territorial gains for Vietnam, who since independence after 1945 refuse to re-negotiate with Cambodia referring to the authority of the colonial calibrations.<ref name=tribunal/>


Clashes between the [[RAK]] and Vietnamese [[communist]] forces began in Cambodia as early as 1970, when there were reported incidents of Khmer Rouge units firing on North Vietnamese. Reports continued of engagements of growing intensity, particularly after 1973. The [[North Vietnam]]ese, because they urgently needed sanctuaries in Cambodia in order to pursue their war in [[South Vietnam]], chose to ignore the incidents and were still prepared, at the end of [[Cambodian Civil War|Cambodia's long civil war]], to send sapper and artillery groups to help the [[CPNLAF]] (Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces) take [[Phnom Penh]]. After the communist victories of April and May 1975, clashes between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge units centered on the border. Skirmishing began about a month after the fall of Phnom Penh, when Hanoi accused the Khmer Rouge of trying to seize [[Phu Quoc]] Island and of making forays into several Vietnamese border provinces.
First clashes between the RAK and Vietnam's NVA date back to 1970, as Khmer Rouge units fired on North Vietnamese troops. Reports of engagements of growing intensity continued, particularly after 1973. The [[North Vietnam]]ese initially chose to ignore the incidents because they regarded the sanctuaries in Cambodia as vital for their domestic war. After the communist victories of April and May 1975, Khmer Rouge border raids increased, that included massacres of villagers. Democratic Kampuchea attempts to capture several disputed insular territories in the [[Gulf of Thailand]] (e.g. [[Thổ Chu Islands|Thổ Chu]] and [[Phú Quốc]]<ref>{{cite web| url=http://kohrong-sanloem.com/geography/island-map | title= Island map of Cambodia | publisher=Island Wild Life Cambodia| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>) ended, apart from high civilian losses, in failure.


Deteriorating [[Cambodia–Vietnam relations]] reached a low on 31 December 1977 as ''Radio Phnom Penh'' reports a "ferocious and barbarous aggression launched by the 90,000 [troops of the] Vietnamese aggressor forces against [[Democratic Kampuchea]]", denounced the ''"so-called Socialist Republic of Vietnam"'' and announced a "temporary severance" of diplomatic relations. Escalating rhetoric border skirmishes erupted into pitched battles in the summer and the fall of 1978. Major engagements were reported from [[Svay Rieng Province]], [[Kampong Cham Province]] and [[Ratanakiri Province]].
Ironically, some analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge would have made more noise about their offshore claims had it not been for the destruction by the United States of their air force and much of their navy during the [[Mayaguez incident]]. On May 12, 1975, a Khmer Rouge sector commander, zealously asserting Cambodia's territorial rights in the [[Gulf of Thailand]], boarded and captured the American container ship [[S.S. Mayaguez]], which carried a crew of forty, near the island of [[Wai]] (which later fell under Vietnamese jurisdiction). Failing to receive a timely response to demands for return of the ship, [[Washington DC|Washington]] notified the [[UN]] and invoked the right to self-defense under [[Article 51 of the UN Charter]]. The ensuing four-day engagement involved U.S. bombing raids on the airfield at [[Ream]] and on the port of [[Kompong Saom]], as well as naval barrages and a Marine assault on the nearby island of [[Kaoh Tang]]. On orders from the Khmer Rouge leadership, the Mayaguez crew was released unharmed and was returned to [[United States]] custody.


In November 1978 Vietnamese forces launched a sustained operation on Cambodian soil in the area of the town of [[Snuol]] and [[Memot]] in [[Kratié Province]]. This action cleared a liberated zone where anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodians could launch a broad-based political movement that opposed the inhumane [[Pol Pot]] regime. On 2 December 1978 the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation - [[KNUFNS]] was proclaimed in a rubber tree plantation amid rigid security provided by heavily armed Vietnamese units reinforced with anti-aircraft guns.
Deteriorating [[Cambodia–Vietnam relations|relations between Cambodia and Vietnam]] reached a crescendo of recrimination when, on December 31, 1977, Radio Phnom Penh, citing "ferocious and barbarous aggression launched by the 90,000 Vietnamese aggressor forces against [[Democratic Kampuchea]]," denounced the "so-called Socialist Republic of Vietnam" and announced the "temporary severance" of diplomatic relations. Rhetorical exchanges between the two sides became more acrimonious, and border skirmishes involving Cambodian and Vietnamese units erupted into pitched battles in the summer and the fall of 1978. Major engagements were reported in the Parrot's Beak (part of [[Svay Rieng Province]]), in the [[Fishhook]] (part of [[Kampong Cham Province]]), and in [[Rotanokiri Province]]. In an effort to court world public opinion, in September 1978 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea published its so-called "Black Book," the Black Paper: Facts and Evidence of Aggression and Annexation Against Kampuchea. The tract denounced Vietnam's "true nature" as that of "aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' territories."


===Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia===
In November 1978, rhetoric was succeeded by full-scale action: Vietnamese forces launched a sustained operation on Cambodian soil in the area of [[Snuol]] and [[Memot]] (both in [[Kracheh Province]]). This action cleared a liberated zone where anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodians could launch a broad-based political movement that would offer an alternative to the odious Pol Pot regime. Proclamation of this movement, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation ([[KNUFNS]]), took place in a rubber-plantation clearing on December 2, 1978, amid rigid security provided by heavily armed Vietnamese units reinforced with airdefense weapons.
{{Main|Cambodian–Vietnamese War}}
[[File:Soviet ship brings humanitarian help to Cambodia 1979.jpg|thumb|250px|A Soviet ship with humanitarian help in [[Sihanoukville (city)|Sihanoukville]], November 1979]]
The establishment of KNUFNS made a forceful removal of Democratic Kampuchea inevitable. However, KNUFNS was by no means an effective force. Only Vietnam's NVA, which had already had deployed a task force beyond the border, was capable of successfully completing such an operation.<ref name=global/>


Twelve to fourteen divisions and three Khmer regiments - the future nucleus of [[Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces|KPRAF]] - launched an offensive on 25 December 1978, with a total invasion force comprising some 100,000 troops. NVA forces first headed towards [[Kratié (town)|Kratié City]] and [[Stung Treng]] City; however, this initial move was conducted to conceal their final strategic objectives: to secure a far-reaching Vietnamese base in the large but sparsely occupied North-Eastern territories, and to prevent any Khmer Rouge units from retreating into this area.
===Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia===
The public unveiling of the KNUFNS dashed any remaining expectations that Cambodian-Vietnamese disagreements could be solved without further armed conflict, because the Hanoi-backed front openly called for the ouster of the "reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique." Because the KNUFNS was far too weak to topple the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, virtually the entire combat burden would fall on Vietnamese forces, which, for this purpose, had been steadily building up troop strength on the border during the preceding months.


The Khmer Rouge concentrated defensive units only in the plains regions of eastern and south-eastern Cambodia, where they correctly anticipated the main focus of NVA attacks. Strong Vietnamese forces rushed in three columns towards the [[Kampong Cham (city)|Kampong Cham]] river port, the [[Mekong]] river crossing at [[Neak Loeung]], and along the [[Gulf of Thailand|gulf coast]] in order to capture the sea ports of [[Sihanoukville (city)|Sihanoukville]] and [[Kampot (city)|Kampot]].
Nervous Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh did not have long to wait after the KNUFNS announcement, for, on December 25, 1978, Hanoi launched its offensive with twelve to fourteen divisions and three Khmer regiments (that later would form the nucleus of the KPRAF), a total invasion force comprising some 100,000 people. Vietnamese units struck across the Cambodian frontier in five spearheads that thrust initially into northeastern Cambodia. One task force drove west from Buon Me Thuot (in Dac Lac Province, Vietnam) along Route 13 and Route 14 to capture Kracheh City (the capital of Kracheh Province). A second column attacked west from Pleiku (in Gia Lai-Cong Tum Province, Vietnam), and followed the circuitous Route 19 to capture Stoeng Treng City (the capital of Stoeng Treng Province). In thus concentrating its initial thrusts in the northeast, Hanoi may have had several objectives. One of these may have been to capture quickly substantial expanses of the Cambodian territory that had been an early spawning ground for the Khmer Rouge and its fledgling RAK in the late 1960s. The remoteness of this region would have rendered it difficult to dislodge Vietnamese forces, no matter what the outcome of the war. An early occupation also would have preempted Khmer Rouge units, if they were pressed harder elsewhere, from falling back to this area where they might have enjoyed a measure of public support. The attacks in the northeast also may have been intended to confuse the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea about where the full brunt of the Vietnamese offensive would fall.


The morale and combat effectiveness of the Democratic Kampuchea troops had considerably deteriorated, and many senior commanders had been lost in party purges. Serious battle engagements were confined to small areas as most Khmer Rouge units – under relentless NVA artillery and air force assaults – soon retreated west. The first Vietnamese troops reached the eastern banks of the Mekong near Phnom Penh on 5 January 1979. Whether it was [[Government of Vietnam|Hanoi's]] initial intention to go any further is still not entirely clear. However, after a 48-hour halt to regroup and rout Khmer Rouge troops, the assault on [[Phnom Penh]] was launched, and the undefended and deserted city was captured on 7 January 1979.<ref name=forgot>{{cite web |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29106034 |title= Vietnam's forgotten Cambodian war |date= 14 September 2014|author=Kevin Doyle | publisher= BBC |access-date=10 March 2018}}</ref>
Khmer Rouge commanders were not deceived by the Vietnamese thrusts toward [[Kratié Province|Kracheh]] and [[Stoeng Treng]], however, and made no attempt to reinforce the northeast. Instead, they erected their main defense line in an arc across the flat, rice-growing plains of southeastern Cambodia, astride the most probable Vietnamese axes of advance. Their calculation of Vietnamese intentions proved correct, as Hanoi's forces unleashed the full weight of their offensive in this area. From Vietnam's [[Tay Ninh Province]], heavily armed Vietnamese units drove along the axis of Route 7 toward their objective, the river port of Kampong Cham. Farther south, Vietnamese units with air support attacked along Route 1, in the direction of Prek Khsay (near [[Neak Luong]]), the Mekong River gateway to Phnom Penh. The fifth and final Vietnamese spearhead drove west from Ha Tien, Vietnam, to capture the ports of [[Kampot (city)|Kampot]] and [[Kampong Saom]], and thus to prevent the resupply by sea of retreating Khmer Rouge forces.


With the capital secure, NVA units proceeded towards and captured [[Battambang]] and [[Siem Reap]] in western Cambodia. Prolonged and serious fighting took place west of [[Sisophon]] near the Thai border, lasting until April. The last Khmer Rouge fighters evacuated into the remote forests on both sides of the border. Vietnamese troops did not advance further and kept a distance to Thai territory. As international dissent over the legitimacy of the new government persisted, the Khmer Rouge continued to threaten and attack inner Cambodia for more than another decade, seeking to reclaim political power.
Resistance to the invading Vietnamese units by the RAK could have been suicidal, given the disregard for human life previously displayed by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea. Instead, heavy fighting was localized. Major engagements were fought before Kampong Cham and Prek Khsay and at Tani, inland from the coast of Kampot Province. RAK units, already deprived of experienced commanders by party purges, withered under sustained pounding by Vietnamese artillery and air strikes, and many of them simply scattered before the Vietnamese offensive, some to regroup later in western Cambodia.


Following the Vietnamese intervention, two anti-Vietnamese non-communist political and military fronts emerged from the masses of civilian refugees and dislodged soldiery - namely the [[Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces]] (KPNLAF)<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QKgraWbb7yoC&dq=Khmer+People%27s+National+Liberation+Armed+Forces&pg=PA726 |title= Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East ..., Volume 1 |isbn= 9781576077702 |access-date=9 March 2018|last1= Ooi |first1= Keat Gin |year= 2004 |publisher= Bloomsbury Academic }}</ref> and the Sihanouk National Army (''Armée nationale sihanoukiste'' – ''ANS'', see also: [[FUNCINPEC]]).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000386683.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170122225546/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000386683.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=22 January 2017 |title= The non-communist factions in Cambodia | publisher= CIA |access-date=9 March 2018}}</ref> During the next decade, both factions operated independently from bases inside Thai territory, conducting [[Hit-and-run tactics|hit-and-run]] insurgency operations against Vietnamese troops and [[People's Republic of Kampuchea|the current government]], who failed to neutralize the threat. The Vietnamese and the People's Republic of Kampuchea government's [[K5 Plan]]<ref>[http://vorasith.online.fr/cambodge/livres/mur.htm Esmeralda Luciolli, ''Le mur de bambou, ou le Cambodge après Pol Pot.''] {{in lang|fr}}</ref> (also known as the ''Bamboo Curtain'') established trenches, wired fences, and extensive minefields along the {{convert|700|km|mi|abbr=on}} border with Thailand. The K5 Plan further destabilized the region and increased chaos, as maintenance and effective patrolling became ever more difficult, while rebel forces eventually succeeded in avoiding or crossing it.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://opus.macmillan.yale.edu/workpaper/pdfs/GS24.pdf |title= Second Life, Second Death: The Khmer Rouge After 1978 |author=Kelvin Rowley |publisher= Swinburne University of Technology |access-date=9 March 2018|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160216054030/http://opus.macmillan.yale.edu/workpaper/pdfs/GS24.pdf |archive-date= 16 February 2016 }}</ref><ref name=global>{{cite web| url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/cambodia3-3.htm | title= 1978-1979 - Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia | publisher=GlobalSecurity| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
By January 5, 1979, the main Vietnamese spearheads had driven to the eastern banks of the Mekong River. Incomplete evidence hints that the Vietnamese offensive originally may have intended to go no farther. The way to Phnom Penh lay open, however, because the Khmer Rouge units were falling back. Vietnamese forces paused briefly, perhaps to wait for bridging and ferrying equipment and the latest orders from Hanoi, then proceeded to carry out the final assault on Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge leaders elected not to defend the city, and it fell on January 7.

After the fall of the capital, Vietnamese units continued their advance in two columns into western Cambodia, capturing [[Battambang]] and [[Siemreab]]. The columns met at [[Sisophon]] and drove on to the Thai border, where there was heavy fighting in March and in April. In the meantime, some remaining Khmer Rouge units offered scattered resistance before they melted away into less accessible areas. There the Khmer Rouge leaders soon rekindled an insurgency against the new government in power, just as they had in the late 1960s, and insecurity persisted in the countryside in spite of the continued Vietnamese presence.

On the diplomatic front, Vietnam, maintaining it had no troops in Cambodia and attributing the lightning-like victory to the KNUFNS, at first denied responsibility for the invasion. When called before the UN Security Council, however, Hanoi's representative, tacitly admitting the presence of Vietnam and citing numerous Western press reports of Pol Pot's genocidal actions, implied that his country had overthrown the Pol Pot regime in the name of humanitarian and human rights.

The Vietnamese sweep through Cambodia produced an unprecedented level of turmoil on the Thai border, as disorganized and bypassed Khmer Rouge units and civilian refugees fled before their advancing enemy. Amid this chaos, in 1979, two anti-Vietnamese insurgent movements, besides the Khmer Rouge, came into being. The first of these was the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF—see Appendix B), the armed wing of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF—see Appendix B), which gave allegiance to [[Son Sann]], a noncommunist, perennial cabinet minister in successive Sihanouk administrations. The other was the Sihanouk National Army (Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste—ANS—see Appendix B), the armed wing of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif—FUNCINPEC—see Appendix B), which owed allegiance to Sihanouk. Fighting independently, these noncommunist guerrilla movements and the Khmer Rouge fomented continuous rebellion in the early 1980s that could not be quelled, despite a substantial Vietnamese military commitment to this purpose. Operating from refugee camps on the Thai frontier, the insurgents made forays into the Cambodian border provinces and kept the countryside in a permanent state of insecurity.

In the 1984 to 1985 dry season, the Vietnamese military command in Cambodia, frustrated because of depredations by the guerrillas, undertook a sustained offensive to dislodge them from their sanctuaries in the refugee camps. These installations were pounded by artillery and were overrun by Vietnamese tactical units. The operation, which was intended to cripple the Khmer guerrillas, had the opposite effect, however. It drove them away from the border, and they undertook prolonged forays deeper into the Cambodian interior.

To restrict guerrilla activity, the Vietnamese erected a physical barrier on the Thai-Cambodian border. Code-named Project K-5, the effort consisted of clearing jungle growth; of erecting obstacles, such as ditches, barbed wire, and minefields; and of building a road parallel to the border. Construction of the project, which began in 1985, was performed by corvée labor. All districts in Cambodia were tasked to provide able-bodied males for tours of duty on the project that ranged from three to six months. Living conditions were primitive in the construction camps, and the diet was inadequate; the area was malarial, and unexploded ordnance from past conflicts was a constant threat. The barrier was completed in 1987 at an unrecorded cost in Cambodian lives. Preliminary indications shortly thereafter revealed that it was having little effect on guerrilla movements to and from the Cambodian interior.


==Military developments in postwar Cambodia==
==Military developments in postwar Cambodia==
===Tenuous security===

In the late 1980s, a Vietnamese military contingent of 140,000 troops, and a Khmer force—a surrogate for the Vietnamese—of 30,000 to 35,000 troops, which comprised the KPRAF of the new government in Phnom Penh, maintained tenuous control over the heartland of Cambodia. This territory included the population centers, the fertile rice-growing area around the Tonle Sap, and the main arteries of communication (see Population, ch. 2; Agriculture, and Transportation and Communications, ch. 3). The combined Vietnamese-KPRAF military effort was opposed by disunited and factious but persistent insurgent forces belonging to each of the three components of the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—see Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 4). The insurgents had the capability to conduct long-range combat or reconnaissance patrols with as many as 100 troops. They could engage in small-scale propaganda missions, raids, and ambushes against poorly armed targets, such as militia outposts, and in sabotage against stationary, infrastructural objectives, such as bridges and railroad tracks. They lacked sufficient troop strength, heavy weapons, trained leadership, and dependable logistical support, however, for sustained combat operations. From their jungle havens deep within the country and from their bases near the Thai border, the insurgents were reputed to range widely throughout Cambodia. Verifiable guerrilla actions, however, were confined to the northwestern provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey (the two provinces were combined into one by the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea prior to 1980), which continued to be the centers of insurgent activity. Most foreign observers in the late 1980s assessed the military situation as being at a stalemate. The rebels lacked the capability, actual or potential, to drive out the Vietnamese occupation force, while the combined Vietnamese-KPRAF armies, at foreseeable force and equipment levels, were incapable of destroying the CGDK guerrilla units.

===Coalition government resistance forces===
The tripartite CGDK opposed both the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia and the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea that had been installed in Phnom Penh by Hanoi. Each component of the coalition maintained its own force of armed combatants (see fig. 13). Divided by deep-seated animosities among their leaders, these three distinctive and autonomous military forces were brought into a reluctant and uneasy coalition as a result of diplomatic activity by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The common goal of contesting the Vietnamese occupation, however, could not bridge the noncommunist coalition partners' deep suspicion toward the renascent Khmer Rouge. Throughout the 1980s, the three combatant forces remained unintegrated, and each maintained separate bases, command structures, and operational planning. An effort by ASEAN to unite the three resistance forces on the Thai border resulted, in May 1984, in the creation on paper of the Permanent Military Coordinating Committee, which apparently never functioned.

Limited tactical cooperation, however, occasionally was reported among the various coalition partners. In one rare example, the three forces participated jointly in a major operation in Batdambang Province in early 1986. Usually, Khmer Rouge units, under their shadowy zonal commanders, remained aloof from their coalition partners and, on occasion, even attacked their military forces and inflicted casualties. Such interfactional clashes were the subject of several complaints by Sihanouk, who charged over the years that Khmer Rouge guerrillas had "repeatedly ambushed and killed [his] troops." These allegations were the principal reason why he chose to step down from the presidency of the CGDK on a leave of absence in May 1987.

===National Army of Democratic Kampuchea===
The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK—see Appendix B) was the successor to the RAK of the Khmer Rouge, the name change having gone into effect in December 1979, in an apparent public relations effort that later saw the dissolution of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party (KCP—see Appendix B), (replaced by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, or PDK—see Appendix B) and the purported retirement of Pol Pot to an advisory role in 1985. NADK forces consisted of former RAK troops—large numbers of whom had escaped the 1978 to 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia—as well as conscripts coerced into submission during the Khmer Rouge retreat and new volunteers or recruits either pressed into service during in-country raids or drawn from among refugee groups. The New York Times reported in June 1987 that "the Khmer Rouge army is believed to be having some success in its recruitment, not only among the refugees in its camps but within Vietnamesecontrolled Cambodia." The NADK did not make personnel figures public, but estimates by military observers and by journalists generally ranged between 40,000 and 50,000 combatants.

In 1987 the opinion that the NADK was "the only effective fighting force" opposing the Vietnamese was more often expressed by foreign observers. In an interview published in the United States in May 1987, Sihanouk reportedly said, "without the Khmer Rouge, we have no credibility on the battlefield... [they are]... the only credible military force."

During the 1980s, the Khmer Rouge leadership, composed of party cadres who doubled as military commanders, remained fairly constant. Pol Pot retained an ambiguous but presumably prominent position in the hierarchy, although he was nominally replaced as commander in chief of the NADK by Son Sen, who had also been a student in Paris, and who had gone underground with him in 1963. There were reports of factions in the NADK, such as one loyal to Khieu Samphan, prime minister of the defunct regime of Democratic Kampuchea, and his deputy Ieng Sary, and another identified with Pol Pot and Ta Mok (the Southwestern Zone commander who conducted extensive purges of party ranks in Cambodia in 1977 to 1978). Although led by party and military veterans, the NADK combatants were reportedly "less experienced, less motivated, and younger" than those the Vietnamese had faced in previous encounters. Nevertheless, the new Khmer Rouge recruits still were "hardy and lower class," and tougher than the noncommunist combatants.


===Military stalemate===
During forays into Cambodia, NADK units employed terror tactics against Khmer civilians, including murder and destruction of economic resources. Such success as they achieved in recruiting was apparently owed to traditional Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese invader, although there were reports that some of the peasantry would have preferred to endure a continued Vietnamese occupation rather than to suffer a return to Khmer Rouge rule.


As the 1980s proceeded Vietnam maintained a permanent 140,000 strong force, supplemented by 30,000 to 35,000 [[Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces|KPRAF]] troops. This force managed to continuously control the Cambodian heartlands, including the commercial, agricultural and population centres. The opposing rebel factions had established a government in exile known as the [[Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea]] (CGDK), encouraged by widespread international rejection (in particular by the [[Association of Southeast Asian Nations]] - ASEAN) of Vietnamese authority. However, attempts at political and military co-operation, like the ''Permanent Military Coordinating Committee'' of 1984 and the subsequent ''Joint Military Command,'' failed due to ideological differences and general mistrust.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lp0uDwAAQBAJ&dq=Permanent+Military+Coordinating+Committee+cambodia&pg=PT99 |title= The Chronicle of a People's War: The Military and Strategic History of the ... |date= 28 July 2017|author=Boraden Nhem |publisher= Routledge |isbn= 9781351807654 |access-date=9 March 2018}}</ref> Factional uncoordinated military actions prevented strategic gains and only affected the fringes of Battambang, Siem Reap and [[Oddar Meanchey Province|Oddar Meanchey]] provinces. The two opposing fronts had drifted into a stalemate, unable to defeat or weaken each other and only further obstructing vital political progress.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ31Ae02.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080723212624/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ31Ae02.html |url-status=unfit |archive-date=23 July 2008 |title= Odd couple: The royal and the Red |date=31 October 2007 |author=Bertil Lintner | publisher= Asia Times Online |access-date=9 March 2018}}</ref> Soon after one of the rare CGDK tactical co-operations that involved all three factions in 1986, the Khmer Rouge quickly resumed hostilities towards the two non-communist factions and "repeatedly ambushed and killed troops." Prince Sihanouk, figurehead and chief negotiator among the three CGDK factions, resigned in 1987.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QSIuDwAAQBAJ&dq=Permanent+Military+Coordinating+Committee+cambodia&pg=PT33 |title= Cambodia: Change and Continuity in Contemporary Politics: Change and ... |date= 12 July 2017|author=Sorpong Peou |publisher= Routledge |access-date=9 March 2018|isbn= 9781351756501 }}</ref>
The Khmer Rouge divided the country into four military zones that functioned virtually autonomously under their respective commanders. Within these four zones, three areas—the provinces around the Tonle Sap, the western border of Cambodia, and the remainder of the country—were sites of NADK tactical operations. It was the first area, the heartland of Cambodia, that the NADK viewed as the "Achilles' heel of the Vietnamese enemy," where NADK military efforts were concentrated.


===CGDK factions===
NADK units managed to keep the main routes linking Phnom Penh to western Cambodia "in a permanent state of insecurity," according to a senior Vietnamese military observer; traffic to and from the seaport of Kampong Saom was obliged to move in convoys. Both highways and railroads from the capital were interdicted intermittently because of guerrilla activity. Officials in Phnom Penh told a Western correspondent in 1987 that the Khmer Rouge were then operating in small insurgent groups inside Cambodia in a battle for the villages, rather than fighting from the Thai border area, as had been the case prior to the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive. In carrying the war to the countryside, the NADK demonstrated that it had gone on the strategic defensive, that is, that it would adhere to a doctrine of guerrilla warfare until the balance of forces was about equal. If this parity were to achieved, NADK strategists presumably would then switch to offensive operations.


====National Army of Democratic Kampuchea====
In carrying on its protracted insurgency, the NADK received the bulk of its military equipment and financing from China, which had supported the previous regime of Democratic Kampuchea. One proBeijing source put the level of Chinese aid to the NADK at US$1 million a month. Another source, although it did not give a breakdown, set the total level of Chinese assistance, to all the resistance factions, at somewhere between US$60 million and US$100 million a year.
{{Main|National Army of Democratic Kampuchea}}
In December 1979, the Khmer Rouge renamed their army to the ''National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK),'' followed by political reorganisation and the demotion of Pol Pot to an advisor in 1985. These reforms were adopted as an attempt to diassociate themselves from the terror of the Pol Pot era. NADK forces consisted of former RAK troops, conscripts forcibly recruited during the 1978/79 retreat, and personnel pressed into service during in-country raids or drawn from refugees and new volunteers. Military observers and journalists estimated around 40,000 and 50,000 NADK combatants, which were considered to be "the only effective [anti-Vietnamese] fighting force".


In 1987 the opinion that the NADK was "the only effective fighting force" opposing the Vietnamese was expressed by foreign observers. In an interview published in the United States in May 1987, Sihanouk reportedly said, "without the Khmer Rouge, we have no credibility on the battlefield... [they are]... the only credible military force." Led by senior figures such as [[Son Sen]], [[Khieu Samphan]], Ieng Sary and [[Ta Mok]] with an unclear hierarchy and loyalty structure, the NADK units were "less experienced, less motivated, and younger" than the early to mid 1970s generation of Khmer Rouge fighters. The NADK only gained limited success, despite their use of terror against civilians, murder and destruction of property and economic resources, and invoking traditional Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese as a means to recruit personnel; most Cambodians preferred to live under Vietnamese occupation rather than endure another Khmer Rouge reign.
The Chinese weaponry observed in the possession of NADK combatants included AK-47 (Automatic Kalashnikov) assault rifles, RPD light machine guns, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launchers, recoilless rifles, and antipersonnel mines. NADK guerrillas usually were seen garbed in dark green Chinese fatigues and soft "Mao caps" without insignia. No markings or patches were evident on guerrilla uniforms, although the NADK had promulgated a hierarchy of ranks with distinctive insignias in 1981.


The NADK divided Cambodia into four autonomous military zones. As the bulk of combatants were stationed at the Thai border, countless Khmer Rouge sanctuaries existed countrywide. This kept Cambodia "in a permanent state of insecurity" until the late 1990s. The NADK received most of its military equipment and financing from China. Sources suggest Chinese aid in between US$60 Million and US$100 Million a year, to as high as US$1 million a month, arrived via two infiltration routes. One of them ran south from Thailand through the Dangrek Mountains into northern Cambodia. The second ran north from Trat, a Thai seaport in the Gulf of Thailand.
To keep troops and supplies moving into the combat zone, the NADK, according to Vietnamese sources, followed two infiltration routes. One of them ran south from Thailand through the Dangrek Escarpment into Cambodia. The second ran north from Tra, a minor Thai seaport that may have been an unloading point for Chinese supplies for the Khmer Rouge. In spite of substantial Chinese material assistance, however, the NADK could not maintain the logistical supply line needed to conduct a sustained military campaign.


===Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces===
====Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces====
{{Main|Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces}}
{{Main|Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces}}
[[File:Cambodia anti-PRK border camps.png|thumb|250px|Border camps hostile to the [[People's Republic of Kampuchea|PRK]]; 1979–1984. KPNLF camps shown in black.]]
The [[Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces]] ([[KPNLAF]]), the military component of the [[Khmer People's National Liberation Front]] ([[KPNLF]]), was formed in March 1979 from various anticommunist groups concentrated near the Thai border with Cambodia, which were opposed to Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. Many had become essentially warlord bands, engaging more in trade and in internecine fighting than in combat operations. They were brought together by General [[Dien Del]], a former career officer of the Khmer Republic, who became chief of the KPNLAF General Staff.
The Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) was the military component of the [[Khmer People's National Liberation Front]] (KPNLF). The KPNLAF was formed in March 1979 and loyal to [[Son Sann]]. It was consolidated by General [[Dien Del]] (Chief of Staff) from various anticommunist groups, former [[Khmer Republic]] soldiers, refugees, and retreating military and insurgency combatants at the Thai border. The KPNLAF initially lacked a central command structure, as personal allegiance and loyalty only functioned in various warlord bands. These bands focused on trading all kinds of commodities and fighting rival factions, rather than on conducting combat operations. However, as the KPNLAF opposed all communist factions, it constituted the second largest guerrilla force. By 1981, with about 7,000 men under arms, it was able to protect its border camps and conduct occasional forays further inland.


Beginning in 1986 the KPNLAF declined as a fighting force as it lost its bases at the Thai–Cambodian border, following the Vietnamese dry season offensive of 1984/85. Inflexible and unable to adapt to new conditions, combatants were "virtually immobilized by the loss of their camps." Additionally, senior commanders began to oppose the "dictatorial ways" of president Son Sann, who regularly interfered into "military matters". Units deserted or demobilized in order to await the outcome of leadership clashes; this led to the collapse of the central chain of command, and stagnation and collapse of the entire KPNLAF structure.
The KPNLAF was loyal to Son Sann, a former Sihanouk minister and the founder of the KPNLF political movement. Because of Son Sann's noncommunist credentials, the KPNLAF offered an alternative to those Cambodians who could support neither Hanoi nor the Khmer Rouge, and it quickly became the second largest guerrilla force in the country. By mid-1981, with about 7,000 personnel under arms, it was able to protect its refugee camps and occasionally to conduct forays into Cambodia.


1987 estimates of KPNLAF unit strength varied within a maximum total of 14,000 troops. The KPNLAF divided Cambodia into nine military regions or operational zones, and was headed by a general officer (in 1987, by General [[Sak Sutsakhan]]) who functioned as commander in chief, a chief of staff, and four deputy chiefs of staff in charge of military operations, general administration, logistical affairs, and planning/psychological operations respectively. Combat units were divided into battalions, regiments, and brigades. The KPNLAF received most of its military equipment from China. However, further aid and training was granted by [[Association of Southeast Asian Nations|ASEAN]] nations such as Singapore and Malaysia.<ref>{{cite web| url=https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa074.pdf | title= U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The "Reagan Doctrine" and Its Pitfalls - Cambodia |author= Ted Galen Carpenter | date=24 June 1986 | publisher=Cato Institute| access-date=10 February 2018}}</ref>
Two developments in the mid-1980s, however, greatly diminished KPNLAF capabilities as a fighting force. The first of these was the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985, which dislodged these guerrillas from their havens on the Thai-Cambodian border. All three insurgent forces were affected by this setback, but the KPNLAF proved less able than the others to sustain the reversal and less flexible in adapting to new conditions. Critical sources noted that the KPNLAF had "made no significant contribution to the [1984-85] dry season fighting against the Vietnamese" and that its combatants had been "virtually immobilized by the loss of their camps." The second development, equally harmful to the KPNLAF cause, was the dispute that broke out among the top leaders. Following the loss of the border camps, contemporary reports noted that "open revolt" had broken out among guerrilla commanders over the "dictatorial ways" of Son Sann, who had continued as president of the KPNLF, and his "interference in military matters." The crisis resulted in the virtual paralysis of the KPNLAF on a temporary basis.


====Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste====
Observers also reported that, as a result of the KPNLAF leadership dispute, members of guerrilla units had returned to the Thai border from the Cambodian interior to await the outcome of the controversy. There were desertions, and discipline became an increasingly serious problem. KPNLAF soldiers became suspect when it was reported that gangs of Khmer bandits had attacked Thai vehicles and buses, and had sometimes abducted or abused passengers. There had long been allegations that Khmer insurgents on the border engaged in black marketing and in other criminal activity.
{{See also|FUNCINPEC}}
The ''Armée National Sihanoukiste (ANS)'' constituted the armed component of FUNCINPEC, royalist supporters of Sihanouk also based at the Thai border, and was smaller than the KPRAF. It was founded in June 1981 as a merger of the ''Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la libération nationale du Kampuchea – MOULINAKA)'' and several minor armed groups. The ANS only began to develop a professional and effective military structure with the formation of the [[Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea]], which introduced international shipments of supplies and armaments (mostly Chinese equipment). By 1986/87, the ANS had replaced the KPNLAF (weakened by leadership dispute) as the primary non-communist rebel force.


Figures of ANS personnel strength during the 1980s are based on the statements of Sihanouk and his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh (since 1987 commander in chief and chief of staff), ranging from 7,000 to a maximum of 11,000 combatants, plus an additional "8,500 fighters permanently inside Cambodia.". Major General Prince Norodom Chakrapong functioned as deputy chief of staff. Combat and manoeuvre elements consisted of battalions grouped under six brigades, four additional independent regiments (at least one composed of Khmer Rouge deserters), and a further five independent commando groups.
In 1987 estimates of KPNLAF strength varied widely. At the upper limit, a widely quoted total was 14,000 personnel. In view of the leadership dispute that debilitated the movement in 1985 and in 1986 and prevented its subsequent growth, this figure probably was a considerable exaggeration. A more realistic total was about 8,000 combatants, and KPNLAF leaders expressed the hope that an earnest recruitment drive then beginning might increase the movement's strength to 18,000 by the end of the year.


===Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces===
In accordance with its recruitment and reorganization plans, the KPNLAF divided Cambodia into nine military regions, or operational zones. The force's chain of command was headed by a general officer (in 1987, by General [[Sak Sutsakhan]]) who functioned as commander in chief. Reporting to him was a chief of staff, who exercised responsibility over four deputy chiefs of staff. Each of these latter officers was in charge of one of four sections dealing respectively with military operations, general administration, logistical affairs, and planning/psychological operations. At the next subordinate echelon were two or three assistant chiefs of staff, whose functions were undefined. Military units of the KPNLAF were described as battalions, regiments, and brigades, operating presumably from semi-permanent camps in inaccessible areas. Combat elements reportedly, were operating in three provinces of western Cambodia: Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and Pouthisat. Actual deployment in the latter province, long a Khmer Rouge stronghold, however, was in question.

The KPNLAF, like the NADK, received most of its military assistance from China. Some aid and training was granted by ASEAN nations, however, especially by Singapore and by Malaysia. In late 1986, the Chinese reportedly delivered a shipment of rocket launchers; this was the first time the KPNLAF was equipped with effective antitank weapons.

KPNLAF combatants sometimes were garbed in camouflage fatigues and combat boots, both probably of noncommunist origin. At other times, they were observed, while on operations, to be wearing merely odds and ends of clothing, gleaned in refugee camps, rather than uniforms. No rank or branch insignia were discernible, but KPNLAF troops frequently wore plastic-laminated chest pocket badges with a photo of Son Sann and the noncommunist Cambodian flag.

===Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste===
The smaller of the two noncommunist resistance groups, the [[Armée National Sihanoukiste]] (ANS) owed allegiance to Sihanouk. It was the armed adjunct of FUNCINPEC, which rallied Sihanouk supporters clustered on the Thai border. The force was formed in June 1981, by consolidating the Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Libération Nationale du Kampuchea—MOULINAKA—see Appendix B) and at least two other armed groups of Sihanouk supporters grouped on the Thai border. These groups existed at first in conditions of near penury, their members poorly armed and equipped as well as half starved. Following the proclamation of the [[Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea]], international support consisting of armaments, supplies, and other nonlethal aid, principally from the ASEAN countries and from China, began to transform the ANS into a more effective movement. In about 1986 to 1987, it became the principal noncommunist insurgent force by default when the KPNLAF slipped from that position because of its internal leadership dispute.

No authoritative figures for the personnel strength of the ANS were available in the late 1980s. The most frequently cited totals ranged from a low of 7,000 to a high of 11,000 combatants. The former figure was quoted by Sihanouk, the latter by Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, some time afterward. In late 1987, Sihanouk also declared that the ANS maintained "8,500 fighters permanently inside Cambodia." (This number would not necessarily include headquarters, staff, and support elements on the Thai border.)

The ANS was organized into a command structure and maneuver elements. The command structure was headed by the commander in chief of the ANS, who was assisted by both a chief and a deputy chief of staff. In 1987 the positions of commander and of chief of staff were held concurrently by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and that of deputy chief of staff by Major General Prince Norodom Chakrapong, both middle-aged sons of Sihanouk. Maneuver elements consisted of battalions, grouped under the first through the sixth brigades. There were, in addition, four independent regiments, at least one reportedly composed of Khmer Rouge deserters who had rallied to Sihanouk's cause, and five independent commando groups, each composed of about seventy personnel.

Following the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985, the ANS made a major effort to deploy its fighters away from the border camps and more deeply into Cambodia. In 1987 according to Sihanouk, ANS combatants were deployed in five Cambodian provinces, including Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey on the western border with Thailand. Limited deployments also were reported as far east as Kampong Thum.

Photographic evidence indicated that the ANS, like the KPNLAF, was equipped principally with Chinese weapons. This included AK assault rifles, light machine guns, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launchers, and recoilless rifles. ANS combatants were dressed in a panoply of uniforms, some of them of ASEAN origin. These included camouflage fatigues and (T -shirts), visored caps, and combat boots. Indications of rank were not evident on uniforms; however, ANS members sometimes wore plastic-laminated chest pocket badges bearing a photograph of Sihanouk and a noncommunist Cambodian flag.

===Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's Revolutionary Armed Forces===
{{Main|Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces}}
{{Main|Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces}}
The Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) constituted the regular forces of the pro-Hanoi People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Soon after the downfall of the Khmer Rouge, two reasons for the necessity of such forces became apparent to the PRK's Vietnamese mentors when they installed the new Cambodian government in early 1979. First, if the new administration in Phnom Penh was to project internationally the image of being a legitimate sovereign state, it would need a national army of its own apart from the Vietnamese forces. Second, if the Vietnamese army was not to have to shoulder indefinitely its internal security mission in Cambodia, it would need to develop a Khmer military force that could be put in place as a surrogate for Vietnamese troops. Raising such an indigenous force presented no insurmountable obstacle for Hanoi at the time because several precedents already had been established. In Laos, the Vietnamese armed forces maintained a close training and coordinating relationship with their Laotian counterparts as a result of Hanoi's military presence in the country. In Cambodia, Vietnam had been a mainstay for Khmer communist factions since 1954. The Vietnamese army also had helped train Pol Pot's RAK and its successor, the CPNLAF, following the coup that deposed Sihanouk in 1970. More recently, Hanoi had helped raise and train a few, probably battalion-sized, regiments of Khmer troops that had fought alongside the Vietnamese during the invasion of Cambodia. With further Vietnamese tutelage, these Khmer units became the nucleus of a national army. From such ad hoc beginnings, the KPRAF grew as a military force and eventually gained its position as an instrument of both the party and the state. This development, however, was carefully shielded from the scrutiny of outsiders, and much that could be concluded about the armed forces of the PRK was based on analysis rather than incontrovertible hard data.
The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) constituted the regular armed forces of the [[People's Republic of Kampuchea]] (PRK) under Vietnamese occupation. It was promoted and supervised by [[Government of Vietnam|Hanoi]] and established immediately after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in order to sanitize the regime's image ruling a legitimate and sovereign state. Furthermore, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) would require an effective Khmer military force that eventually could replace NVA units in future security tasks. The establishment of a sovereign ethnic Khmer army also addressed the problem of traditional fears and widespread hate towards the Vietnamese among the population, and was instrumental for the upkeep of public order. However, it remained a very delicate matter, as several recent precedents had seriously affected Cambodia's fortunes, such as supporting Khmer communist factions and raising regiments of Khmer troops for the Vietnamese invasion. Nonetheless, the KPRAF consolidated as the official military force and served as an instrument of both the party and the state. These measures remained classified, and much that could be concluded about the armed forces of the PRK was based on analysis rather than incontrovertible hard data.


===Foreign troops and advisers===
===Foreign armed forces===
As many as 200,000 troops invaded Cambodia in 1978. Designated by Hanoi as ''"The Vietnamese volunteer army in Kampuchea"'', the PAVN force, comprising some ten to twelve divisions, was made up of conscripts who supported a "regime of military administration." After several years, Vietnam ostensibly began to decrease the size of its military contingent in Cambodia. In June 1981, Vietnam's 137th Division returned home. In July 1982, Hanoi announced it would withdraw an unspecified number of troops as these withdrawals became annual occurrences with elaborate departure ceremonies. However, critical observers contended that these movements were merely troop rotations.<ref name=forgot/>
In the late 1980s, Vietnamese units stationed in Cambodia represented a military force that had broken away from its revolutionary tradition and had become an army of occupation, a dramatic role change in view of the fact that its most formidable adversaries, the Khmer Rouge, were fellow communists and former allies. Consistently designated by Hanoi as "the Vietnamese volunteer army in Kampuchea," the Vietnamese force, comprising some ten to twelve divisions, was made up of conscripts who supported a "regime of military administration."


Hanoi publicly committed itself to withdraw its occupation forces by 1990. It first announced this decision following an August 1985 meeting of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian foreign ministers. The commitment to a pullout engendered continuing discussion, both by foreign observers and by Indochinese participants. What emerged was the clarifying qualification that a total Vietnamese military withdrawal was contingent upon the progress of pacification in Cambodia and upon the ability of the KPRAF to contain the insurgent threat without Vietnamese assistance. Prime Minister Hun Sen declared in a May 1987 interview that "if the situation evolves as is, we are hopeful that by 1990 all Vietnamese troops will be withdrawn ... [but] if the troop withdrawal will be taken advantage of, we will have to negotiate to take appropriate measures...." Shortly thereafter, a KPRAF battalion commander told a Phnom Penh press conference that "Vietnamese forces could remain in Cambodia beyond 1990, if the Khmer Rouge resistance continues to pose a threat." In an interview with a Western correspondent, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach repeated the 1990 withdrawal pledge, insisting that only foreign military intervention could convince Hanoi to change its plans. Some ASEAN and Western observers greeted declarations of a total pullout by 1990 with incredulity. Departing Vietnamese units reportedly left equipment behind in Cambodia, and it was suggested that they easily could return if it looked as though a province might be lost.
Military units totalling as many as 200,000 troops invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978 to eradicate the Khmer Rouge regime of Democratic Kampuchea and to install a more pliant government in Phnom Penh. After several years, Vietnam ostensibly began to decrease the size of its military contingent in Cambodia. The first recorded, but unannounced, withdrawal occurred in June 1981, when Vietnam's 137th Division returned home. In July 1982, Hanoi announced publicly that as an "act of goodwill" it would withdraw an unspecified number of troops from Cambodia. These withdrawals became annual occurrences. In 1986 Vietnamese sources announced a pullout of 12,000 troops. In November 1987, an additional 20,000 Vietnamese military personnel were withdrawn. These retrenchments were conducted with considerable publicity and fanfare, including departure ceremonies in Phnom Penh and featuring medals for commanders and citations for units. Skeptics, however, contended that these movements were merely troop rotations. A 1987 study conducted by Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok reached the same conclusion, after its researchers interviewed groups of Vietnamese defectors.


Vietnam's presence in Cambodia reportedly consumed 40 to 50 percent of Hanoi's military budget. Although substantial portions of the cost had been underwritten by Soviet grant aid, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia apparently were on short rations. Radio Hanoi reportedly commented on troops "dressed in rags, puritanically fed, and mostly disease ridden." The parlous state of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia also was the subject of a report by the director of an Hanoi military medical institute. According to media accounts, the report acknowledged that Vietnamese troops in the country suffered from widespread and serious malnutrition and that beriberi occurred in epidemic proportions.
Hanoi publicly committed itself to withdraw its occupation forces by 1990. It first announced this decision following an August 1985 meeting of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian foreign ministers. The commitment to a pullout engendered continuing discussion, both by foreign observers and by Indochinese participants. What emerged was the clarifying qualification that a total Vietnamese military withdrawal was contingent upon the progress of pacification in Cambodia and upon the ability of the KPRAF to contain the insurgent threat without Vietnamese assistance. Prime Minister Hun Sen declared in a May 1987 interview that "if the situation evolves as is, we are hopeful that by 1990 all Vietnamese troops will be withdrawn ... [but] if the troop withdrawal will be taken advantage of, we will have to negotiate to take appropriate measures... ." Shortly thereafter, a KPRAF battalion commander told a Phnom Penh press conference that "Vietnamese forces could remain in Cambodia beyond 1990, if the Khmer Rouge resistance continues to pose a threat." In an interview with a Western correspondent, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach repeated the 1990 withdrawal pledge, insisting that only foreign military intervention could convince Hanoi to change its plans. Some ASEAN and Western observers greeted declarations of a total pullout by 1990 with incredulity. Departing Vietnamese units reportedly left equipment behind in Cambodia, and it was suggested that they easily could return if it looked as though a province might be lost.


Vietnamese military advisers also were detached to serve with KPRAF main and provincial forces down to the battalion, and perhaps even the company, level. The functions and the chain of command of these advisers remained unknown, except that it could be assumed that they reported to the Vietnamese military region or front headquarters.
As Hanoi's military presence in Cambodia approached its ninth year, it appeared that the Vietnamese troops stationed there were not frontline veterans. Most of Vietnam's main force units and its best troops were deployed in the Red River Delta or on Vietnam's northern border to contain any armed threat from China. Units in Cambodia were composed of conscripts from the southern provinces of Vietnam, or, according to refugee accounts, of military misfits and "troublemakers." Some Vietnamese defectors in Thailand declared that they had volunteered for military service to get out of Vietnam and to have an opportunity for resettlement in third countries.


==21st century military structure==
Vietnam's presence in Cambodia reportedly consumed 40 to 50 percent of Hanoi's military budget. Although substantial portions of the cost had been underwritten by Soviet grant aid, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia apparently were on short rations. Radio Hanoi reportedly commented on troops "dressed in rags, puritanically fed, and mostly disease ridden." The parlous state of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia also was the subject of a report by the director of an Hanoi military medical institute. According to media accounts, the report acknowledged that Vietnamese troops in the country suffered from widespread and serious malnutrition and that beriberi occurred in epidemic proportions.


As a member of ASEAN's defensive program, Cambodia's army has adopted modern military doctrines which call for developing practical co-operation in a regional defense concept.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.asean.org/uploads/archive/documents/18471-i.pdf |title= ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS' MEETING (ADMM) - THREE-YEAR-WORK PROGRAM - 2011-2013 | publisher= ASEAN org |access-date=10 March 2018}}</ref> All common branches of military service are maintained and equipped accordingly. Personnel and recruitment figures are centrally administered and published annually. Active combat forces are supported by reserve troops.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=cambodia |title= 2017 Cambodia Military Strength - Current military capabilities and available firepower for the nation of Cambodia. | publisher= Global Firepower |access-date=10 March 2018}}</ref>
The Vietnamese military headquarters in Cambodia was located at Chamka Morn in Phnom Penh. In the mid-1980s, it was responsible to the Vietnamese Fourth Corps commander, at that time General Le Duc Anh (subsequently promoted to minister of national defense). Vietnamese military authorities divided Cambodia into four military regions. These areas probably coincided with KPRAF regions. Each of these regions, in turn, corresponded to a Vietnamese military front that exercised tactical responsibility over it. The four Vietnamese military fronts were Front 479, headquartered at Barai Toek Thla Airport, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey Province; Front 579, at Stoeng Treng City, Stoeng Treng Province; Front 779, at the Chhupp rubber plantation, Kampong Cham Province; and Front 979, at Somrong Tong, Kampong Spoe Province. Front 479 was considered the most critical because of heavy insurgent activity in the area. A Special Military Administrative Zone was also created, comprising the vital heartland of the country around the Tonle Sap and the alluvial plain to the southeast. The relationship of the zone to the military regions and to the fronts was undetermined. Along the Cambodian coast, the Vietnamese established another type of military jurisdiction. Naval Zone Five comprised the shore lines of Kaoh Kong and Kampot provinces and their contiguous territorial waters. The headquarters of the naval zone was at Kampong Saom.

Vietnamese military advisers also were detached to serve with KPRAF main and provincial forces down to the battalion, and perhaps even the company, level. The functions and the chain of command of these advisers remained unknown, except that it could be assumed that they reported to the Vietnamese military region or front headquarters.


==References==
==References==
{{Reflist}}
* Tatu, Frank. "National security". ''[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/khtoc.html Cambodia: A Country Study]'' (Russell R. Ross, editor). [[Library of Congress]] [[Federal Research Division]] (December 1987). ''This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the [[public domain]].''[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/about.html]
* Tatu, Frank. "National security". ''[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/khtoc.html Cambodia: A Country Study]'' (Russell R. Ross, editor). [[Library of Congress]] [[Federal Research Division]] (December 1987). ''This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the [[public domain]].''[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/about.html]


{{DEFAULTSORT:Military History Of Cambodia}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Military History Of Cambodia}}
[[Category:Military of Cambodia]]
[[Category:Military history of Cambodia| ]]
[[Category:History of Cambodia]]
[[Category:Military history by country|Cambodia]]

Latest revision as of 11:45, 10 August 2024

The earliest traces of armed conflict in the territory that constitutes modern Cambodia date to the Iron Age settlement of Phum Snay in north-western Cambodia.[1]

Sources on Funan's military structure are rare. Funan represents the oldest known regional political entity, formed by the unification of local principalities. Whether these events must be categorized as conflict remains unclear[2] More information is available for Funan's successor state - Chenla, which has been characterized as distinctly bellicose as it was established by the military subjugation of Funan.[3] Chenla's early aristocrats heralded authority by public display of their noble genealogies carved onto stone stelae all over Indochina. Later, rulers increasingly embraced the concept of divine Hindu kingship.[4]

The Khmer Empire's territory and integrity was maintained through the Royal Army, personally commanded by the king. Records exist for regular conflict with the kingdom's neighbors, Champa in particular, as the empire effectively controlled Mainland South-east Asia by the 12th century.[5] Nonetheless, the Khmer kingdom suffered a number of serious defeats, such as the Cham invasion and sack of Angkor in 1177. Khmer military supremacy declined by the early 14th century.[6] Since the rise of the Siam Sukhothai Kingdom and later the Ayutthaya Kingdom the empire experienced a series of military setbacks, unable to repel repeated attacks, that eventually caused its collapse followed by the Post-Angkor Period.

The period of decline and stagnation (around 1450 to 1863) nearly ended the Khmer aristocrat's royal dynastic sovereignty and unity of the Khmer people as the result of prolonged encroachments by its neighbours Vietnam and Thailand.[7] In 1863 the Cambodian king acquiesced in the establishment of a French protectorate over his country to prevent its imminent incorporation into Vietnam in the east and the loss of its western provinces to Thailand.[8]

No centrally organized military actions took place during the French protectorate, although notable was an 1883/84 nationwide revolt "which saw thousands of French troops do battle with shadowy bands of Cambodian guerrilla insurgents throughout the countryside". Several local uprisings are accounted for, which caused considerable problems for the colonial authorities. However, mainly reactions to French tax rulings and other perceived legislative injustices and without clear political objective, these endeavours had no decisive consequences.[9] French colonial troops engaged in several conflicts with Thailand and suppressed revolts in Vietnam and Laos.[10]

The Japanese incursion and 1945 coup d'état initiated a decade of political and ethnic re-emancipation of Cambodia, brought about without large-scale military action.[11] Since Cambodia's independence in 1954 the country was to be the stage for a series of proxy wars of the cold war powers, foreign incursions and civil wars, that only effectively ended with the UN Mandate in the early 1990s.[12][13]

Early history

[edit]
Map of Funan at around the 3rd century.

The earliest traces of armed and violent conflict have been found at the Iron Age settlement of Phum Snay in north-western Cambodia. A 2010 examination of skeletal material from the site's burials revealed an exceptionally high number of injuries, especially to the head, likely to have been caused by interpersonal violence. The graves contained a quantity of swords, other offensive weapons used in conflicts. The presence of shoulder decorations and armour suggests a distinct military and/or clan culture, that has, according to some authors similarities with the Thai Iron Age sites such as Noen U-Loke and Ban Non Wat.[4][14]

Funan is only known from Chinese sources, which according to most modern historians are doubtful. The polity was fully established around the 1st century CE and consisted of "walled political centers", which implies a desire to be prepared for some kind of conflict and to be protected from attacks. Some authors also argue that Funan was "expansionist" and might have maintained a sizeable navy that conquered regional coastal settlement centers.[15] However, the Champasak territory of Laos was aggressively incorporated, although this might have taken place after the establishment of Funan's successor state - Chenla.

Some modern historians such as M. Vickery have redirected research and focus on archaeology, local genealogy and examined the suspicious size fluctuations and curious shifts of central power that characterized Chenla. Consequently, they argue, that Funan and Chenla, in particular, are terms not to be taken too seriously and accept greater political and military division among the elite.[4] As contemporary Chinese sources on Chenla only provide factual reference points, such as the claim that by 616/617 CE the kingdom of Chenla is the region's new souvereign and...the conqueror of Funan. In 802 CE a powerful and contentious ruling dynasty united sizable territories and established the Khmer Empire.[16]

Khmer Empire

[edit]
Khmer army going to war against the Chams
Ballista war elephants attacking the Chams

Bas-relief in galleries of the Angkor complex in Siem Reap elaborately depict the empire's land and naval forces and conquests of the period (802 to 1431), as it extended its dominions to encompass most of Indochina. Hindu warrior kings, who actually led troops in battle, did not customarily maintain standing armies but raised troops as necessity required [citation needed]. Historian David P. Chandler has described the relationship between the monarch and the military:

Though the king, who led his country into battle, sometimes engaged his chief enemy in single combat, Khmer military strength rested on the junior officers, the captains of militia. These men commanded the loyalty of peasant groups in their particular locality. If the king conquered a region, a new captain of militia would be enrolled and put under an oath of allegiance. The captains were simply headmen of the outlying regions, but their connection with the king enhanced their status. In time of war they were expected to conscript the peasants in their district and to lead them to Angkor to join the Khmer army. If the captains disobeyed the king they were put to death. The vast majority of the Khmer population were of the farmer-builder-soldier class.

Little is known conclusively about warfare during imperial Cambodia, but much has been assumed from the environment or deduced from epigraphic and sculptural evidence. The army was made up of peasant levies, and because the society relied on rice cultivation, Khmer military campaigns were probably confined to the dry season when peasant-soldiers could be spared from the rice fields. Battles were fought on hard-baked plains from which the paddy (or rice) had been harvested. Tactics were uncomplicated. The Khmer engaged their foes in pitched frontal assaults, while trying to keep the sun at their backs. War elephants were widely employed, for both tactical and logistical purposes. Late in the Khmer Empire, the ballista (a kind of catapult, often shaped like a giant crossbow) took its place in regional warfare. It probably was introduced to the Cambodians by Cham mercenaries, who had copied it earlier from Chinese models.[17]

Throughout the empire’s history, the court was repeatedly concerned with quelling rebellions initiated by ambitious nobles trying to achieve independence, or fighting conspiracies against the king. This was particularly true each time a king died, as successions were usually contested.[18]

Bas-relief at Bayon temple of female soldiers of Khmer Empire

The Khmer Empire's principal adversaries were the Cham of the powerful kingdom of Champa in modern central Vietnam and to a lesser extent the Pagan Kingdom to the west. Warfare was endemic and military campaigns occurred continuously. The Chams attacked by land in 1177 and again by water in 1178, sacked Angkor twice. The empire quickly recovered, capable to strike back, as it was the case in 1181 with the invasion of the Cham city-state of Vijaya.[19][20] In 1181 a young nobleman who was shortly to become Jayavarman VII, emerged as one of the great Khmer kings, raised an army and defeated the Chams in a naval battle. After Champa's decline began the rise of Cambodia's new enemies, the Siamese and the Vietnamese.

Post-Angkor Period

[edit]

As some scholars assert that the decline of the Khmer Empire was, among other causes, mainly precipitated by the drain on its economy. Dynastic rivalries and slave rebellions are also considered to have affected the demise of the empire.

Military setbacks

[edit]

Although a number of sources, such as the Cambodian Royal Chronicles and the Royal chronicles of Ayutthaya[21] contain recordings of military expeditions and raids with associated dates and the names of sovereigns and warlords, several influential scholars, such as David Chandler and Michael Vickery doubt the accuracy and reliability of these texts.[22][23] Other authors criticise this rigid "overall assessment", though.[24]

David Chandler states in A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, Volume 2: "Michael Vickery has argued that Cambodian chronicles, including this one, that treat events earlier than 1550 cannot be verified, and were often copied from Thai chronicles about Thailand..."[6][25] Linguist Jean-Michel Filippi concludes: "The chronology of Cambodian history itself is more a chrono-ideology with a pivotal role offered to Angkor."[26] Similarities apply to Thai chronological records, with the notable example of the Ramkhamhaeng controversy.[27][28]

According to the Siamese Royal chronicles of Paramanuchitchinorot, clashes occurred in 1350, around 1380, 1418 and 1431.[29][30]

"In 1350/51; probably April 1350 King Ramadhipati had his son Ramesvara attack the capital of the King of the Kambujas (Angkor) and had Paramaraja (Pha-ngua) of Suphanburi advance to support him. The Kambuja capital was taken and many families were removed to the capital Ayudhya. At that time, [around 1380] the ruler of Kambuja came to attack Chonburi, to carry away families from the provinces eastwards to Chanthaburi, amounting to about six or seven thousand persons who returned [with the Cambodian armies] to Kambuja. So the King attacked Kambuja and, having captured it, returned to the capitol."[sic]

Colonial Cambodia

[edit]
Sisowath of Cambodia

Insurrections

[edit]

Following negotiations by Cambodian King Ang Duong and Napoleon III for protection from Vietnam conquest and land loss by Thailand, a delegation of French naval officers concluded the French protectorate with King Norodom (1859–1904).The intervention of colonial France prevented further erosion of national and cultural integrity of Cambodia and ended territory loss.[31][32]

Heavy taxation, institutionalisation of land ownership, reforms, that weakened the privileged status of the Cambodian elite, as well as resentment against foreign domination, were the causes of intermittent rebellions that marked the colonial period. Revolts erupted in 1866, in 1870 and 1883/84 that attracted considerable support in the countryside, easily quelled by the French, who created discord among the Khmer forces. Sisowath, Norodom's half brother led his troops into combat alongside the French who nourished his ambitions for the royal crown.[33] Quelling the rebellion took one and one-half years, and it tied down some 4,000 French and Vietnamese troops that had been brought in from Cochinchina.

Ethnic Khmer colonial forces

[edit]

The colonial military forces in Cambodia, tasked to quell potential insurrections, consisted of a light infantry battalion (Bataillon tirailleurs cambodgiens) and a national constabulary (Garde nationale, also called Garde indigène).[34]

The light infantry battalion, a Khmer unit with French officers, was part of a larger force, the third brigade, which had responsibility for Cambodia and for Cochinchina. In addition to the Cambodian battalion, the brigade was composed of French colonial and Vietnamese light infantry regiments and support elements. The brigade, headquartered in Saigon, was ultimately responsible to a supreme military command for Indochina located in Hanoi.

Under the French pre-World War II colonial regime, the constabulary consisted of a force of about 2,500 men and a mixed Franco–Khmer headquarters element of about forty to fifty officers, technicians, and support personnel. The force was divided into about fifteen companies deployed in the provinces. Control of the constabulary was vested in the colonial civil administration, but in times of crisis, command could pass quickly to military authorities in Saigon or in Hanoi. Service in the constabulary theoretically was voluntary, and personnel received a cash salary. Enlistments, however, were rarely sufficient to keep pace with personnel requirements, and villages occasionally were tasked to provide recruits.[35]

Japanese occupation (1941–1945)

[edit]
Alleged flag of Cambodia 1942-1945, while under Japanese occupation
Norodom Sihanouk in 1941)

During World War II Japan which effectively controlled South-east Asia by 1942 tolerated the Vichy administration in Hanoi as a vassal of Nazi Germany that included permission of unhindered movement of Japanese troops through Indochina. The Japanese, while leaving the Vichy colonial government nominally in charge throughout Indochina, established an 8,000 troops strong garrison in Cambodia by August 1941.[36]

Thailand sought to take advantage of its alliance with Tokyo and colonial French weakness by launching an invasion of Cambodia's western provinces. As the French suffered a series of land defeats in the skirmishes that followed, a small French naval force intercepted a Thai battle fleet, en route to attack Saigon, and sank two battleships and other light craft. However, the Japanese then intervened and arranged a treaty, compelling the French to concede to Thailand the provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap and parts of Kampong Thom Province and Stung Treng Province. Cambodia lost one-third of its territory including half a million citizens.[37][38]

Cambodian nationalism assumed a more overt form in July 1942, when early leaders Pach Chhoeun, a monk named Hem Chieu and Son Ngoc Thanh organised resistance involving Cambodian military personnel. The plot was discovered by the colonial authorities that resulted in many injuries and in mass arrests.

On 9 March 1945, Japanese forces in Cambodia deposed the French colonial administration; and in an attempt get Khmer support for Tokyo's war, they encouraged Cambodia to proclaim independence. During this period the fate of the constabulary and of the light infantry battalion remained uncertain. The battalion apparently was demobilised, while the constabulary remained in place but was rendered ineffective, their French officers were interned by the Japanese. Japan had initially prepared for the creation of 5 Khmer volunteer units of 1,000 troops each to preserve public order and internal security. Recruitment of personnel for the volunteer units would include physical and written exams. Before the plan could be implemented the war ended and the concept died without further action.

At the conclusion of World War II a defeated Japanese military contingent waited to be disarmed and repatriated; French nationals sought to resume their pre-war rule with the support of Allied military units. The Khmer Issarak (nationalist insurgents with Thai backing), declared opposition to a French return to power, proclaimed a government-in-exile, and established a base in Battambang Province. On the eastern frontier Vietnamese communist forces (Việt Minh) infiltrated the Cambodian border provinces, organised a "Khmer People's Liberation Army" (not to be confused with the later Cambodian force, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces) and tried to forge a united front with the Khmer Issarak.[39]

First Indochina War (1945–54)

[edit]
Geneva Conference in 1954)
French Indochina in 1952)

In the fall of 1945 Prince Monireth proposed to raise an indigenous military force to the returning French authorities. Appointed defense minister, he announced the formation of the first native Cambodian battalion on 23 November and the establishment of an officer-candidate school on 1 January 1946. The Franco–Cambodian Modus Vivendi of 1946, mainly concerned political matters included recognition of the Cambodian army by French advisers in the Cambodian Ministry of Defense and the French authorities' responsibility for maintaining order.[40]

Facing increasing threats from thousands of Khmer Issarak combatants, regular troops quickly grew in numbers. In January 1947, the effective strength of the Cambodian military stood at about 4,000 personnel, of which 3,000 served in the constabulary who saw combat the same year. The remainder belonged to a mobile reserve of two battalion-sized units (one of the newly formed) named, respectively, the First Cambodian Rifle Battalion and the Second Cambodian Rifle Battalion (Bataillon de Chasseurs Cambodgiens). During the next two years, two more rifle battalions were added, bringing total strength up to 6,000 personnel, with about half serving in the Garde Nationale and half in the mobile reserve.[41][42]

By July 1949 Cambodian forces were granted autonomy within operational sectors beginning in the provinces of Siem Reap and Kampong Thom and in 1950 provincial governors received the assignment to oversee the pacification of their jurisdiction, supported by an independent infantry company. A military assistance agreement between the United States and France followed in the fall of 1950 determined the expansion of indigenous forces in Indochina, and by 1952 Cambodian troop strength had reached 13,000. Additional rifle battalions were formed, combat-support units were established, and a framework for logistical support was set up. Cambodian units were given wider responsibilities, such as border and coastal protection.

Prince Sihanouk seized power in June 1952, staging a "royal coup d'état" in 1953.[43] He suspended the constitution "to restore...order..." and took command of the army and operations. He attacked Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer Issarak forces in Siem Reap Province and announced that he had driven "700 red guerrillas" across the border into Thailand.

In early 1953, Sihanouk embarked on a world tour to publicise his campaign for independence, contending that he could "checkmate communism by opposing it with the force of nationalism." Following his tour, he took control of entire Cambodia, joined by 30,000 Cambodian troops and police in a show of support and strength. Elsewhere, Cambodian troops under French officers staged slowdowns or refused the commands of their superiors, as a demonstration of solidarity with Sihanouk. Full independence was obtained in November 1953, and Sihanouk took command of the army of 17,000 troops, which had been renamed the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (Forces armées royales khmères – FARK).

In March 1954, combined Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak forces launched attacks from Vietnam into northeastern Cambodia. Conscription was introduced for men between fifteen and thirty-five years of age and national mobilisation was declared. Following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Indochina in July, Viet Minh representatives agreed to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. FARK troop numbers of 47,000 dropped to 36,000, with demobilisation after Geneva at which it was to be maintained for the next fifteen years except during periods of emergency.[44]

Second Indochina War (1954–75)

[edit]
Eisenhower and Sihanouk 1959)

In 1955, the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement providing for security assistance. In addition to a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and military budget support, FARK received US supplies and equipment worth approximately US$83.7 million for eight years until the assistance program was discontinued at Sihanouk's request in 1963. France also retained a military training mission in Cambodia until 1971 from which FARK military traditions and doctrines were adopted.[45]

As the United States failed to guarantee a reliable military support program Sihanouk increasingly pursued a neutralist foreign policy during the 1960s and eventually declared that Cambodia would "abstain from military or ideological alliances" but would retain the right to self-defense.[46]

From 1958 on Northern and Southern Vietnamese combat troops began to violate Cambodian territory on a regular basis. Neither Washington nor Hanoi responded to Sihanouk's protests, which lead him to establish diplomatic relations with China. By the mid-1960s, large areas within Cambodia served as supply routes and strategic staging sites for North - and South Vietnamese communists and Viet Cong forces. FARK could do little more than monitor these developments and maintained a modus vivendi with the intruders as Sihanouk charged the United States of complicity with the Khmer Serei, which further strained Cambodian–American relations.[45]

Economic and military cooperation with the United States was formally terminated on 3 May 1965. Although French military assistance and training continued until 1972, Sihanouk began to accept military assistance from the Soviet Union. He also accused Thailand and South Vietnam of subversive cooperation with the USA whom he suspected to actively destabilize his government and promote the Khmer Serei.[47][45][48]

By the mid-1960s Cambodia's armed forces had failed to incorporate into a comprehensive program of one of the opposing sides of the cold war. Mixed military equipment of several suppliers with varying doctrines and structure worsened FARK's strategic position.[45]

Unable to effectively combat Vietnamese presence in Eastern Cambodia Sihanouk, in a gesture of appeasement secretly offered the deep-water port of Sihanoukville, situated at the Gulf of Thailand as a supply terminal for the NVA. FARK's role as a centrally lead operative force eroded further and increasingly functioned as a highly corrupt arbiter of uncontrolled weapon deals and as shipment agency.[45][49]

In 1967 FARK brutally suppressed the Samlaut Uprising of frustrated peasants in Battambang Province who, among other things, protested against government price dumping for rice, treatment by local military, land displacement and poor socio-economic conditions. Sihanouk attributed the insurrection to the Khmer Rouge and blamed the "Thai patriotic front" to have been the instigating force in the background. Sihanouk's incorrect political analysis and the inappropriate actions of FARK against civilians caused a serious alienation process between Cambodia's population and the official armed forces. Many people fled FARK's repressions and joined rebel groups of whom the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea became the most prolific. As long as Sihanouk remained in power these forces received very limited military assistance from Hanoi because this might have alienated Sihanouk's government and affected North Vietnamese and Viet Cong access to Cambodian territory and the Sihanoukville supply route.[45]

The 1969 U.S. bombing campaigns inside Cambodian territory caused the Vietnamese to penetrate deeper into the country where they came into more frequent hostile contact with FARK, who reportedly conducted joint operations with South Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Sihanouk disapproved of these latest communist incursions, terminated access to Sihanoukville's port and stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh", he is going "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt an offensive spirit." On 11 June 1969 he announced that "...at present there is war in Ratanakiri Province between Cambodia and Vietnam."[45]

In January 1970 a group of FARK officers under general Lon Nol exploited Sihanouk's absence to carry out a coup d'État that was confirmed by the National Assembly of Cambodia two months later. The coup passed without any violent incidents and all FARK contingents, around 35,000 to 40,000 troops, organised mainly as ground forces remained alert, manned and secured key strategic positions.[45]

The FARK were renamed to Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces armées nationales khmères - FANK) under Lon Nol's command. His government reiterated a neutral political stance. However, attempts to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Cambodian territory were rejected. As a consequence, Lon Nol called for UN intervention and international assistance.[45]

From 29 April and 1 May 1970, South Vietnamese and United States ground forces entered eastern Cambodia and captured vast quantities of enemy matériel, destroyed NVA and Viet Cong infrastructure and depots. Retreating Vietnamese troops pushed further west into Cambodia, destroyed FANK troops and positions, seriously destabilizing the Lon Nol government. After South Vietnamese and United States army withdrawal all of north-eastern Cambodia was controlled by the Vietnamese, who extensively supported, equipped local communist Khmer Rouge insurgents that had replaced FANK in these territories.[50]

A comprehensive assessment of the Khmer Republic's armed forces revealed serious shortcomings, such as the "lack of combat experience, equipment deficiencies,...lack of mobility" and "incompetent and corrupt officers". Although martial law was declared and total mobilization introduced, reliable and transparent administration, replacement of incompetent and corrupt officers, important personnel and educational reforms based on a modern military doctrine did not take place.

FANK strategy focused on securing the central territory. The majority of the population occupied these rich, rice-growing areas as Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge control constituted the forested and mountainous lands north and east of the "Lon Nol Line." Two military offensives (Chenla I, in August 1970, and Chenla II, in August 1971) were undertaken in order to regain control of the fertile agricultural area of Kompong Thom north of Phnom Penh. Some initial success was not exploited and FANK was eventually defeated by the opposing North Vietnamese Ninth Division and increasingly numerous and effective Khmer Rouge divisions. These troops had acquired considerable political momentum since the dethroned Sihanouk served as their new figurehead proclaiming war of national liberation.

In 1970 Sihanouk announced the establishment of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement royal d'union nationale du Kampuchéa – GRUNK), which he claimed was legitimized by the National United Front of Kampuchea (Front uni national du Kampuchéa – FUNK). This rhetoric was particularly popular among the rural population and ethnic minorities.[51] The RAK (Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea) was renamed the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF).[52]

By 1972 FANK actions were mainly defensive operations for steadily shrinking government territory which by November 1972 had reached a point that required a new strategic realignment of the Lon Nol line. Lost were the rich rice-growing areas around the Tonlé Sap lake. The remaining territory still held the majority of the population. It consisted of south-eastern Cambodia - roughly a triangle from Phnom Penh in the north via Sihanoukville in the south to the Vietnamese border in the east. By 1973 the CPNLAF controlled about 60 percent of the country's territory and 25 percent of the population.[53]

CPNLAF began its offensive on Phnom Penh at New Year 1975 - by then the last remnant of Khmer Republic territory. Khmer Rouge forces slowly encircled the city as all roads and riverine routes were cut. By early April most defensive positions had been overrun with FANK units annihilated and supplies exhausted. On 17 April the Khmer Republic fell and FANK was totally crushed, beaten by a disciplined enemy army in a conventional war of movement and manoeuvre.[50]

Cambodian Civil War

[edit]

Military developments under the Khmer Rouge

[edit]
Aircraft roundel of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK), 1975 to 1979.

The 68,000 troops of Democratic Kampuchea were led by a small group of intellectuals, inspired by Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in China who aimed to convert Cambodia into an agrarian Utopia. With help from the Vietnamese, indoctrinated and highly dedicated to Maoist communist ideology, a handful of loose companies, recruited from peasantry developed into disciplined forces, trained in guerrilla warfare as well as in modern manoeuvre warfare. When North Vietnamese combat divisions had withdrawn from Cambodia by the end of 1972 these forces defeated FANK - the regular army of Cambodia on their own within 2 years.[54][50]

In 1975 that marked the beginning of Democratic Kampuchea, the CPNLAF (Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces) were renamed RAK (Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea) once again. Led by long-time commander and then Minister of Defense Son Sen, RAK consisted of 230 battalions in 35 to 40 regiments in 12 to 14 brigades. The command structure in units was firmly based on an extreme form of peasant communist ideology with three-person committees where the political commissar ranked highest. The country was divided into military zones and special sectors, the boundaries of which changed slightly over the years. One of RAK's first tasks upon military and political consolidation, was the wholesale and summary execution of former FANK officers and governments officials and their families.[55]

The Khmers Rouge units were led by secretaries of the various military zones who exerted supreme political and military power. A national army was established in order to enforce discipline and to separate formerly autonomously operating forces as troops from one zone frequently were sent to another. These efforts were considered to be essential by the central governing group as to control regional secretaries and their dissident or ideologically impure cadres. A practice that eventually culminated in widespread bloody purges decimating the ranks, undermined the morale and considerably contributed to the rapid collapse of the regime. As author Elizabeth Becker noted, "in the end paranoia, not enemies, was responsible for bringing down the regime."[56]

Cambodian–Vietnamese border tensions

[edit]
Skulls of victims of the Ba Chúc massacre

Tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam have been going on for hundreds of years.[57] They first peaked during the 19th century when only the establishment of the French Protectorate of Cambodia prevented the inevitable incorporation into a Vietnamese empire. French colonial administrators established numerous administrative zones and borders such as the Brévié Line, with little regard to historic and ethnic considerations. Virtually all of these re-drawings resulted in territorial gains for Vietnam, who since independence after 1945 refuse to re-negotiate with Cambodia referring to the authority of the colonial calibrations.[53]

First clashes between the RAK and Vietnam's NVA date back to 1970, as Khmer Rouge units fired on North Vietnamese troops. Reports of engagements of growing intensity continued, particularly after 1973. The North Vietnamese initially chose to ignore the incidents because they regarded the sanctuaries in Cambodia as vital for their domestic war. After the communist victories of April and May 1975, Khmer Rouge border raids increased, that included massacres of villagers. Democratic Kampuchea attempts to capture several disputed insular territories in the Gulf of Thailand (e.g. Thổ Chu and Phú Quốc[58]) ended, apart from high civilian losses, in failure.

Deteriorating Cambodia–Vietnam relations reached a low on 31 December 1977 as Radio Phnom Penh reports a "ferocious and barbarous aggression launched by the 90,000 [troops of the] Vietnamese aggressor forces against Democratic Kampuchea", denounced the "so-called Socialist Republic of Vietnam" and announced a "temporary severance" of diplomatic relations. Escalating rhetoric border skirmishes erupted into pitched battles in the summer and the fall of 1978. Major engagements were reported from Svay Rieng Province, Kampong Cham Province and Ratanakiri Province.

In November 1978 Vietnamese forces launched a sustained operation on Cambodian soil in the area of the town of Snuol and Memot in Kratié Province. This action cleared a liberated zone where anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodians could launch a broad-based political movement that opposed the inhumane Pol Pot regime. On 2 December 1978 the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation - KNUFNS was proclaimed in a rubber tree plantation amid rigid security provided by heavily armed Vietnamese units reinforced with anti-aircraft guns.

Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia

[edit]
A Soviet ship with humanitarian help in Sihanoukville, November 1979

The establishment of KNUFNS made a forceful removal of Democratic Kampuchea inevitable. However, KNUFNS was by no means an effective force. Only Vietnam's NVA, which had already had deployed a task force beyond the border, was capable of successfully completing such an operation.[59]

Twelve to fourteen divisions and three Khmer regiments - the future nucleus of KPRAF - launched an offensive on 25 December 1978, with a total invasion force comprising some 100,000 troops. NVA forces first headed towards Kratié City and Stung Treng City; however, this initial move was conducted to conceal their final strategic objectives: to secure a far-reaching Vietnamese base in the large but sparsely occupied North-Eastern territories, and to prevent any Khmer Rouge units from retreating into this area.

The Khmer Rouge concentrated defensive units only in the plains regions of eastern and south-eastern Cambodia, where they correctly anticipated the main focus of NVA attacks. Strong Vietnamese forces rushed in three columns towards the Kampong Cham river port, the Mekong river crossing at Neak Loeung, and along the gulf coast in order to capture the sea ports of Sihanoukville and Kampot.

The morale and combat effectiveness of the Democratic Kampuchea troops had considerably deteriorated, and many senior commanders had been lost in party purges. Serious battle engagements were confined to small areas as most Khmer Rouge units – under relentless NVA artillery and air force assaults – soon retreated west. The first Vietnamese troops reached the eastern banks of the Mekong near Phnom Penh on 5 January 1979. Whether it was Hanoi's initial intention to go any further is still not entirely clear. However, after a 48-hour halt to regroup and rout Khmer Rouge troops, the assault on Phnom Penh was launched, and the undefended and deserted city was captured on 7 January 1979.[60]

With the capital secure, NVA units proceeded towards and captured Battambang and Siem Reap in western Cambodia. Prolonged and serious fighting took place west of Sisophon near the Thai border, lasting until April. The last Khmer Rouge fighters evacuated into the remote forests on both sides of the border. Vietnamese troops did not advance further and kept a distance to Thai territory. As international dissent over the legitimacy of the new government persisted, the Khmer Rouge continued to threaten and attack inner Cambodia for more than another decade, seeking to reclaim political power.

Following the Vietnamese intervention, two anti-Vietnamese non-communist political and military fronts emerged from the masses of civilian refugees and dislodged soldiery - namely the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF)[61] and the Sihanouk National Army (Armée nationale sihanoukisteANS, see also: FUNCINPEC).[62] During the next decade, both factions operated independently from bases inside Thai territory, conducting hit-and-run insurgency operations against Vietnamese troops and the current government, who failed to neutralize the threat. The Vietnamese and the People's Republic of Kampuchea government's K5 Plan[63] (also known as the Bamboo Curtain) established trenches, wired fences, and extensive minefields along the 700 km (430 mi) border with Thailand. The K5 Plan further destabilized the region and increased chaos, as maintenance and effective patrolling became ever more difficult, while rebel forces eventually succeeded in avoiding or crossing it.[64][59]

Military developments in postwar Cambodia

[edit]

Military stalemate

[edit]

As the 1980s proceeded Vietnam maintained a permanent 140,000 strong force, supplemented by 30,000 to 35,000 KPRAF troops. This force managed to continuously control the Cambodian heartlands, including the commercial, agricultural and population centres. The opposing rebel factions had established a government in exile known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), encouraged by widespread international rejection (in particular by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN) of Vietnamese authority. However, attempts at political and military co-operation, like the Permanent Military Coordinating Committee of 1984 and the subsequent Joint Military Command, failed due to ideological differences and general mistrust.[65] Factional uncoordinated military actions prevented strategic gains and only affected the fringes of Battambang, Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey provinces. The two opposing fronts had drifted into a stalemate, unable to defeat or weaken each other and only further obstructing vital political progress.[66] Soon after one of the rare CGDK tactical co-operations that involved all three factions in 1986, the Khmer Rouge quickly resumed hostilities towards the two non-communist factions and "repeatedly ambushed and killed troops." Prince Sihanouk, figurehead and chief negotiator among the three CGDK factions, resigned in 1987.[67]

CGDK factions

[edit]

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

[edit]

In December 1979, the Khmer Rouge renamed their army to the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), followed by political reorganisation and the demotion of Pol Pot to an advisor in 1985. These reforms were adopted as an attempt to diassociate themselves from the terror of the Pol Pot era. NADK forces consisted of former RAK troops, conscripts forcibly recruited during the 1978/79 retreat, and personnel pressed into service during in-country raids or drawn from refugees and new volunteers. Military observers and journalists estimated around 40,000 and 50,000 NADK combatants, which were considered to be "the only effective [anti-Vietnamese] fighting force".

In 1987 the opinion that the NADK was "the only effective fighting force" opposing the Vietnamese was expressed by foreign observers. In an interview published in the United States in May 1987, Sihanouk reportedly said, "without the Khmer Rouge, we have no credibility on the battlefield... [they are]... the only credible military force." Led by senior figures such as Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ta Mok with an unclear hierarchy and loyalty structure, the NADK units were "less experienced, less motivated, and younger" than the early to mid 1970s generation of Khmer Rouge fighters. The NADK only gained limited success, despite their use of terror against civilians, murder and destruction of property and economic resources, and invoking traditional Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese as a means to recruit personnel; most Cambodians preferred to live under Vietnamese occupation rather than endure another Khmer Rouge reign.

The NADK divided Cambodia into four autonomous military zones. As the bulk of combatants were stationed at the Thai border, countless Khmer Rouge sanctuaries existed countrywide. This kept Cambodia "in a permanent state of insecurity" until the late 1990s. The NADK received most of its military equipment and financing from China. Sources suggest Chinese aid in between US$60 Million and US$100 Million a year, to as high as US$1 million a month, arrived via two infiltration routes. One of them ran south from Thailand through the Dangrek Mountains into northern Cambodia. The second ran north from Trat, a Thai seaport in the Gulf of Thailand.

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces

[edit]
Border camps hostile to the PRK; 1979–1984. KPNLF camps shown in black.

The Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) was the military component of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The KPNLAF was formed in March 1979 and loyal to Son Sann. It was consolidated by General Dien Del (Chief of Staff) from various anticommunist groups, former Khmer Republic soldiers, refugees, and retreating military and insurgency combatants at the Thai border. The KPNLAF initially lacked a central command structure, as personal allegiance and loyalty only functioned in various warlord bands. These bands focused on trading all kinds of commodities and fighting rival factions, rather than on conducting combat operations. However, as the KPNLAF opposed all communist factions, it constituted the second largest guerrilla force. By 1981, with about 7,000 men under arms, it was able to protect its border camps and conduct occasional forays further inland.

Beginning in 1986 the KPNLAF declined as a fighting force as it lost its bases at the Thai–Cambodian border, following the Vietnamese dry season offensive of 1984/85. Inflexible and unable to adapt to new conditions, combatants were "virtually immobilized by the loss of their camps." Additionally, senior commanders began to oppose the "dictatorial ways" of president Son Sann, who regularly interfered into "military matters". Units deserted or demobilized in order to await the outcome of leadership clashes; this led to the collapse of the central chain of command, and stagnation and collapse of the entire KPNLAF structure.

1987 estimates of KPNLAF unit strength varied within a maximum total of 14,000 troops. The KPNLAF divided Cambodia into nine military regions or operational zones, and was headed by a general officer (in 1987, by General Sak Sutsakhan) who functioned as commander in chief, a chief of staff, and four deputy chiefs of staff in charge of military operations, general administration, logistical affairs, and planning/psychological operations respectively. Combat units were divided into battalions, regiments, and brigades. The KPNLAF received most of its military equipment from China. However, further aid and training was granted by ASEAN nations such as Singapore and Malaysia.[68]

Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste

[edit]

The Armée National Sihanoukiste (ANS) constituted the armed component of FUNCINPEC, royalist supporters of Sihanouk also based at the Thai border, and was smaller than the KPRAF. It was founded in June 1981 as a merger of the Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la libération nationale du Kampuchea – MOULINAKA) and several minor armed groups. The ANS only began to develop a professional and effective military structure with the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which introduced international shipments of supplies and armaments (mostly Chinese equipment). By 1986/87, the ANS had replaced the KPNLAF (weakened by leadership dispute) as the primary non-communist rebel force.

Figures of ANS personnel strength during the 1980s are based on the statements of Sihanouk and his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh (since 1987 commander in chief and chief of staff), ranging from 7,000 to a maximum of 11,000 combatants, plus an additional "8,500 fighters permanently inside Cambodia.". Major General Prince Norodom Chakrapong functioned as deputy chief of staff. Combat and manoeuvre elements consisted of battalions grouped under six brigades, four additional independent regiments (at least one composed of Khmer Rouge deserters), and a further five independent commando groups.

Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces

[edit]

The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) constituted the regular armed forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under Vietnamese occupation. It was promoted and supervised by Hanoi and established immediately after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in order to sanitize the regime's image ruling a legitimate and sovereign state. Furthermore, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) would require an effective Khmer military force that eventually could replace NVA units in future security tasks. The establishment of a sovereign ethnic Khmer army also addressed the problem of traditional fears and widespread hate towards the Vietnamese among the population, and was instrumental for the upkeep of public order. However, it remained a very delicate matter, as several recent precedents had seriously affected Cambodia's fortunes, such as supporting Khmer communist factions and raising regiments of Khmer troops for the Vietnamese invasion. Nonetheless, the KPRAF consolidated as the official military force and served as an instrument of both the party and the state. These measures remained classified, and much that could be concluded about the armed forces of the PRK was based on analysis rather than incontrovertible hard data.

Foreign armed forces

[edit]

As many as 200,000 troops invaded Cambodia in 1978. Designated by Hanoi as "The Vietnamese volunteer army in Kampuchea", the PAVN force, comprising some ten to twelve divisions, was made up of conscripts who supported a "regime of military administration." After several years, Vietnam ostensibly began to decrease the size of its military contingent in Cambodia. In June 1981, Vietnam's 137th Division returned home. In July 1982, Hanoi announced it would withdraw an unspecified number of troops as these withdrawals became annual occurrences with elaborate departure ceremonies. However, critical observers contended that these movements were merely troop rotations.[60]

Hanoi publicly committed itself to withdraw its occupation forces by 1990. It first announced this decision following an August 1985 meeting of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian foreign ministers. The commitment to a pullout engendered continuing discussion, both by foreign observers and by Indochinese participants. What emerged was the clarifying qualification that a total Vietnamese military withdrawal was contingent upon the progress of pacification in Cambodia and upon the ability of the KPRAF to contain the insurgent threat without Vietnamese assistance. Prime Minister Hun Sen declared in a May 1987 interview that "if the situation evolves as is, we are hopeful that by 1990 all Vietnamese troops will be withdrawn ... [but] if the troop withdrawal will be taken advantage of, we will have to negotiate to take appropriate measures...." Shortly thereafter, a KPRAF battalion commander told a Phnom Penh press conference that "Vietnamese forces could remain in Cambodia beyond 1990, if the Khmer Rouge resistance continues to pose a threat." In an interview with a Western correspondent, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach repeated the 1990 withdrawal pledge, insisting that only foreign military intervention could convince Hanoi to change its plans. Some ASEAN and Western observers greeted declarations of a total pullout by 1990 with incredulity. Departing Vietnamese units reportedly left equipment behind in Cambodia, and it was suggested that they easily could return if it looked as though a province might be lost.

Vietnam's presence in Cambodia reportedly consumed 40 to 50 percent of Hanoi's military budget. Although substantial portions of the cost had been underwritten by Soviet grant aid, Vietnamese troops in Cambodia apparently were on short rations. Radio Hanoi reportedly commented on troops "dressed in rags, puritanically fed, and mostly disease ridden." The parlous state of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia also was the subject of a report by the director of an Hanoi military medical institute. According to media accounts, the report acknowledged that Vietnamese troops in the country suffered from widespread and serious malnutrition and that beriberi occurred in epidemic proportions.

Vietnamese military advisers also were detached to serve with KPRAF main and provincial forces down to the battalion, and perhaps even the company, level. The functions and the chain of command of these advisers remained unknown, except that it could be assumed that they reported to the Vietnamese military region or front headquarters.

21st century military structure

[edit]

As a member of ASEAN's defensive program, Cambodia's army has adopted modern military doctrines which call for developing practical co-operation in a regional defense concept.[69] All common branches of military service are maintained and equipped accordingly. Personnel and recruitment figures are centrally administered and published annually. Active combat forces are supported by reserve troops.[70]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ "Archaeological evidence of warfare and weaponry at Phum Snay". Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  2. ^ John N. Miksic (30 September 2013). Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea. NUS Press. ISBN 9789971695583. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  3. ^ Lavy, Paul A. (2003). "As in Heaven, So on Earth: The Politics of Visnu Siva and Harihara Images in Preangkorian Khmer Civilisation". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 34 (1). academia edu: 21–39. doi:10.1017/S002246340300002X. S2CID 154819912. Retrieved 23 December 2015.
  4. ^ a b c John Norman Miksic (14 October 2016). Ancient Southeast Asia. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781317279044. Retrieved 1 January 2018.
  5. ^ "Two Historical Records of the Kingdom of Vientiane - That was probably also the reason for the Cambodian conquests in Champa in the reigns of the Angkor kings Suryavarman II and Jayavarman VII" (PDF). Michael Vickery’s Publications. Retrieved 30 June 2015.
  6. ^ a b Woolf, D. R. (3 June 2014). A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, Volume 2 - Tiounn Chronicle. Routledge. ISBN 9781134819980. Retrieved 19 May 2015.
  7. ^ "March to the South (Nam Tiến)". Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation. Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
  8. ^ Chapuis, Oscar (1 January 2000). The Last Emperors of Vietnam: From Tu Duc to Bao Dai. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 48. ISBN 9780313311703. Retrieved 3 April 2015.
  9. ^ "The French in Cambodia: Years of revolt (1884 - 1886)". Phnom Penh Post. 11 December 1998. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  10. ^ Stuart-Fox, Martin (1997). A History of Laos. Cambridge University Press. pp. 24–25. ISBN 0-521-59746-3.
  11. ^ Geoffrey Gunn. "The Great Vietnamese Famine of 1944-45 Revisited". The Asia-Pacific Journal. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  12. ^ "Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002 by Ben Kiernan - American aircraft dropped over half a million tons of bombs on Cambodia's countryside, killing over 100.000 peasants..." (PDF). Yale University. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  13. ^ "COMMUNISM AND CAMBODIA - Cambodia first declared independence from the French while occupied by the Japanese. Sihanouk, then King, made the declaration on 12 March 1945, three days after Hirohito's Imperial Army seized and disarmed wavering French garrisons throughout Indo-China" (PDF). DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  14. ^ Buckley, H. R.; O'Reilly, D. J. W.; Domett, K. M. (2 January 2015). "Bioarchaeological evidence for conflict in Iron Age north-west Cambodia - Examination of skeletal material from graves at Phum Snay". Antiquity. 85 (328). Cambridge University Press: 441–458. doi:10.1017/S0003598X00067867.
  15. ^ Peter N. Peregrine (31 January 2001). Encyclopedia of Prehistory: Volume 3: East Asia and Oceania. Springer. ISBN 9780306462573. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  16. ^ Glover, Ian (2004). Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-415-29777-6.
  17. ^ J. Stephen Hoadley (5 September 2017). Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in ... Routledge. ISBN 9781351488822. Retrieved 29 December 2017.
  18. ^ Rodrigo Quijada Plubins (12 March 2013). "Khmer Empire". World History Encyclopedia. Retrieved 29 December 2017.
  19. ^ "Angkor Wat: equated with the quintessence of Cambodian culture for more than a century - The Cham fleet sailed up the Mekong River...The reaction was very quick..." The Phnom Penh Post. 14 June 2013. Retrieved 21 June 2015.
  20. ^ "Bayon: New Perspectives Reconsidered Michael Vickery" (PDF). Michael Vickery’s Publications. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
  21. ^ "Siam Society Books - The Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya - A Synoptic Translation by Richard D. Cushman". Siam Society. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  22. ^ "Cambodia's cultural heritage considerations in Area Studies by Aratoi Hisao". googleusercontent.com. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  23. ^ "Essay on Cambodian History from the middle of the 14 th to the beginning of the 16 th Centuries According to the Cambodian Royal Chronicles by NHIM Sotheavin - So far, the reconstruction of history from the middle of the 14 th to the beginning of the 16 th centuries is locked in a sort of unsolved state, since local sources prove inadequate and references from foreign sources are of little use" (PDF). Sophia Asia Center. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 1 July 2015.
  24. ^ Bourdonneau, Eric (September 2004). "Culturalism and historiography of ancient Cambodia: about prioritizing sources of Khmer history - Ranking Historical Sources and the Culturalist Approach in the Historiography of Ancient Cambodia by Eric Bourdonneau - 29 Also this material is sparse..." Moussons. Recherche en Sciences Humaines Sur l'Asie du Sud-Est (7). Presses Universitaires de Provence: 39–70. doi:10.4000/moussons.2469. Retrieved 3 July 2015.
  25. ^ "The historical Records of Ayudhya...Blamed on the invasion of Pagan in 1767, all Ayudhya's past records were assumed perished during its fall to the Burmese attack". Khmer heritage. 31 May 2015. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  26. ^ "Angkor Wat: equated with the quintessence of Cambodian culture for more than a century - Behind the mythical towers: Cambodian history". Phnom Penh Post. 14 June 2013. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  27. ^ "A king and a stone - Nineteenth century or twelfth? When the Thai script was first inscribed has much to do with how history is used politically by Rahul Goswami". Khaleej Times. 29 November 2014. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  28. ^ "Recreations epigraphic (2 2). Epigraphic western: the case of Ramkhamhaeng by Jean-Michel Filippi". Kampotmuseum. 28 June 2012. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  29. ^ "THE ABRIDGED ROYAL CHRONICLE OF AYUDHYA - In 712 of the Era, Year of the Tiger..." (PDF). The Siam Society. Retrieved 12 June 2015.
  30. ^ "History of Ayutthaya - Dynasties - King Ramesuan". History of Ayutthaya. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
  31. ^ "London Company's Envoys Plot Siam" (PDF). Siamese Heritage. Retrieved 24 January 2017.
  32. ^ "Volume IV - Age of Revolution and Empire 1750 to 1900 - French Indochina by Justin Corfield" (PDF). Grodno State Medical University. Retrieved 24 January 2017.
  33. ^ "Cambodia - Tai and Vietnamese hegemony". britannica.com. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  34. ^ "Archive & 1re Guerre mondiale : Quand les Cambodgiens se battaient pour la France" (in French). Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  35. ^ "Cambodia The French Protectorate, 1863-1954". photius. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  36. ^ Arthur J. Dommen (20 February 2002). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and ... Indiana University Press. ISBN 0253109256. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  37. ^ Dr. Andrew McGregor. "Vichy versus Asia: The Franco-Siamese War of 1941". WWII Forum. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  38. ^ Pierre Gosa (2008). Le conflit franco-thaïlandais de 1940-41: la victoire de Koh-Chang. Nouvelles Editions Latines. ISBN 9782723320726. Retrieved 13 January 2018.
  39. ^ Murashima, Eiji (1 November 2005). "Opposing French colonialism Thailand and the independence movements in Indo-China in the early 1940s". South East Asia Research. 13 (3): 333–383. doi:10.5367/000000005775179702. S2CID 147391206.
  40. ^ David P. Chandler (1991). The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. GoogleBooks. p. 22. ISBN 0300057520. Retrieved 14 January 2018. Prince Monireth.
  41. ^ David P. Chandler (1991). The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution Since 1945. Yale University Press. p. 43. ISBN 0300057520. Retrieved 13 January 2018. Franco–Khmer headquarters.
  42. ^ Grant, Edited by Jonathan S.; Moss, Laurence A. G.; Unger, Jonathan (1971). Cambodia: the widening war in Indochina. New York: Washington Square Press. p. 314. ISBN 0671481142. {{cite book}}: |first1= has generic name (help)
  43. ^ "Cambodia Under Sihanouk - 1949-1970". Globalsecurity. Retrieved 14 January 2018.
  44. ^ "First Indochina War - Cambodia". Britannica. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  45. ^ a b c d e f g h i "Cambodian The Second Indochina War, 1954-75". Country-data. Retrieved 14 January 2018.
  46. ^ William S. Turley (17 October 2008). The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 9780742557451. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  47. ^ William J. Rust (2016). 9 "Stupid Moves" (1959–1960) Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813167459. JSTOR j.ctt1bqzmsw.
  48. ^ William J. Rust (24 June 2016). "Covert Action in Cambodia". University Press of Kentucky. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  49. ^ "America's Vietnam War in Indochina War in Cambodia". US History. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  50. ^ a b c Melvin Gurtov. "Indochina in North Vietnamese Strategy" (PDF). RAND Corporation. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  51. ^ Zal Karkaria. "Failure Through Neglect: The Women's Policies of the Khmer Rouge in Comparative Perspective" (PDF). Concordia University Department of History. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  52. ^ Arnold R. Isaacs (27 January 1999). Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia. JHU Press. ISBN 9780801861079. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  53. ^ a b "Khmer Rouge History". Cambodia Tribunal. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  54. ^ "Precursors to Genocide: Rise of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot". United to End Genocide. 6 April 2016. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  55. ^ "The Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot's Regime". Mount Holyoke College. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  56. ^ "VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND THE US" (PDF). Repository Library Georgetown. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  57. ^ "Reconceptualizing Southern Vietnamese History from the 15th to 18th Centuries Competition along the Coasts from Guangdong to Cambodia by Brian A. Zottoli". University of Michigan. Retrieved 26 June 2015.
  58. ^ "Island map of Cambodia". Island Wild Life Cambodia. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  59. ^ a b "1978-1979 - Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia". GlobalSecurity. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  60. ^ a b Kevin Doyle (14 September 2014). "Vietnam's forgotten Cambodian war". BBC. Retrieved 10 March 2018.
  61. ^ Ooi, Keat Gin (2004). Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East ..., Volume 1. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 9781576077702. Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  62. ^ "The non-communist factions in Cambodia" (PDF). CIA. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 January 2017. Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  63. ^ Esmeralda Luciolli, Le mur de bambou, ou le Cambodge après Pol Pot. (in French)
  64. ^ Kelvin Rowley. "Second Life, Second Death: The Khmer Rouge After 1978" (PDF). Swinburne University of Technology. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 February 2016. Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  65. ^ Boraden Nhem (28 July 2017). The Chronicle of a People's War: The Military and Strategic History of the ... Routledge. ISBN 9781351807654. Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  66. ^ Bertil Lintner (31 October 2007). "Odd couple: The royal and the Red". Asia Times Online. Archived from the original on 23 July 2008. Retrieved 9 March 2018.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  67. ^ Sorpong Peou (12 July 2017). Cambodia: Change and Continuity in Contemporary Politics: Change and ... Routledge. ISBN 9781351756501. Retrieved 9 March 2018.
  68. ^ Ted Galen Carpenter (24 June 1986). "U.S. Aid to Anti-Communist Rebels: The "Reagan Doctrine" and Its Pitfalls - Cambodia" (PDF). Cato Institute. Retrieved 10 February 2018.
  69. ^ "ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS' MEETING (ADMM) - THREE-YEAR-WORK PROGRAM - 2011-2013" (PDF). ASEAN org. Retrieved 10 March 2018.
  70. ^ "2017 Cambodia Military Strength - Current military capabilities and available firepower for the nation of Cambodia". Global Firepower. Retrieved 10 March 2018.