Talk:Security dilemma

Intro Re-Write

To honor the refinement of this stub I propose the following overview. I'm also working on a sourced history including Thucydides, Hume, Waltz, Jervis and others. The spiral concept can be included in the body. It may confuse a reader who is not introduced to the basic concept of the dilemma as such:

The Security Dilemma asserts that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to other nations. If a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since “most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others” (Jervis, p 63). On the other hand, if a nation is too weak, “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve" (Jervis, p 58). Thus, directly and indirectly, both strength and weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations.

--pjm (talk) 16:15, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

The Essence of the Dilemma Using Jervis

A response to IP 46.208.68.242

Good point in the notes of the edit page. Yet, by deleting the intro paragraph from February 2011 (see note above), we are losing an important insight by Jervis into the essence of the dilemma. While the security dilemma may be used today to discuss miscommunications, a dilemma by definition is “a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two or more alternatives, especially equally undesirable ones.” Jervis does indeed indicate—as a seminal author of the original meaning—that being too strong or being too weak both present problems—thus the dilemma. Authors could evolve the meaning of the dilemma to be choices between “too strong” and “just right” but that is not how Jervis lays out the dilemma. I recommend returning his concept to the introduction as spiral theory only captures one (popular and important) aspect of the dilemma as described by Jervis in his own words. I’ll wait for comment before reverting back to the quotes from Jervis.--pjm (talk) 04:43, 27 May 2014 (UTC)

other applications

Thomas Hobbes argued that conditions similar to the security dilemma prevails between individuals in a "state of nature" i.e. where there is no sovereign rule to enforce binding rules, and anthropologists e.g. Azar Gat have shown using empirical evidence that a security dilemma is a dominant feature of tribal societies.

Is this article solely about the security dilemma as it applies to IR, or can we discuss non-state applications?