Superior orders: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|Criminal defense of following the orders of a superior}} |
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'''Superior orders''' (often known as the '''Nuremberg defense''' or '''lawful orders''') is a [[plea]] in a court of law that a soldier not be held guilty for actions which were ordered by a superior office.<ref>''See'' L.C. Green, ''Superior Orders in National and International Law'', (A.W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co., Netherlands, 1976)</ref> The superior orders plea is similar to the doctrine of [[respondeat superior]] in [[tort]] law where a superior is held liable for the actions of a subordinate, and the subordinate may escape liability.<ref>''See'' Harvard Law Review Editorial Board, ''The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior'', Harvard Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1. pp. 51–2, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 51 (Nov., 1903).</ref> Some legal scholars and war crimes tribunals will correlate the plea to the doctrine of ''respondeat superior''; whereas others will distinguish the plea from the doctrine of ''respondeat superior''. |
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[[File:Nuremberg Trials retouched.jpg|thumb|right|Defendants in the dock at the [[Nuremberg trials]]]] |
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'''Superior orders''', also known as '''just following orders''' or '''the Nuremberg defense''', is a [[plea]] in a court of law that a person, whether civilian, military or police, should not be considered guilty of committing crimes ordered by a [[Officer (armed forces)|superior officer]] or [[official]].<ref>''See'' L.C. Green, ''Superior Orders in National and International Law'', (A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co., Netherlands, 1976)</ref><ref>Mark J. Osiel, ''Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War'', (Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 1999).</ref> It is regarded as a complement to [[command responsibility]].<ref>''See'' James B. Insco, ''Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions'', Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 13 DUKEJCIL 389 (Spring, 2003). Asserting in the author's view that a ''[[respondeat superior]]'' approach to superior orders is an "underinclusive extreme".</ref> |
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One noted use of this plea or [[defense (legal)|defense]] was by the accused in the 1945–1946 [[Nuremberg trials]]. These were a series of [[Military justice|military tribunals]] held by the main victorious [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] of [[World War II]] to prosecute, among others, prominent members of the political, military and economic leadership of the defeated [[Nazi Germany]]. Under the [[London Charter of the International Military Tribunal]] that established them, the trials determined that the defense of superior orders was no longer enough to ''escape'' punishment but merely enough to ''lessen'' it.<ref>H. T. King Jr., ''The Legacy of Nuremberg'', Case Western Journal of International Law, Vol. 34. (Fall 2002) at p. 335.e</ref> |
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The superior orders plea is often regarded as the complement to [[command responsibility]].<ref>''See'' James B. Insco, ''Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions'', Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 13 DUKEJCIL 389 (Spring, 2003). Asserting in the author's view that a ''respondeat superior'' approach to superior orders is an "underinclusive extreme."</ref> |
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Apart from the specific plea of superior orders, discussions about how the general concept of superior orders ought to be used, or ought not to be used, have taken place in various arguments, rulings and statutes that have not necessarily been part of "after the fact" [[war crimes trials]], strictly speaking. Nevertheless, these discussions and related events help to explain the evolution of the specific plea of superior orders and the history of its usage. |
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One of the most noted uses of this plea, or "[[defense (legal)|defense]]," was by the accused in the 1945–46 [[Nuremberg Trials]], such that it is also called the "Nuremberg defense". The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military [[tribunal]]s, held by the main victorious [[Allies of World War II|Allied forces]] of [[World War II]], most notable for the prosecution of prominent members of the political, military, and economic leadership of the defeated [[Nazi Germany]]. It was during these trials, under the [[London Charter of the International Military Tribunal]] which set them up, that the defense of superior orders was no longer considered enough to escape punishment; but merely enough to lessen punishment.<ref>H.T. King, Jr., ''The Legacy of Nuremberg'', Case Western Journal of International Law, Vol. 34. (Fall 2002) at pg. 335.e</ref> |
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Historically, the plea of superior orders has been used both before and after the Nuremberg Trials, with [[#Summary|inconsistent rulings]], up to the final ruling of [[International Criminal Court]] in the ''Prosecutor v [[Bosco Ntaganda|Ntaganda]]'' case.<ref>{{cite web |title=Situation In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo In The Case Of The Prosecutor V. Bosco Ntaganda |url=https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2021_03027.PDF |website=icc-cpi.int |publisher=International Criminal Court |access-date=18 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220715105508/https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2021_03027.PDF |archive-date=15 July 2022 |language=en |date=30 March 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> |
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Historically, the plea of superior orders has been used both before and after the Nuremberg Trials, with a [[#Historical overview summary table|notable lack of consistency in various rulings]]. |
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==History== |
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Apart from the specific plea of Superior Orders, discussions about how the general concept of superior orders ought to be used, or ought not to be used, have taken place in various arguments, rulings and Statutes that have not necessarily been part of “after the fact” war crimes trials, strictly speaking. Nevertheless these discussions and related events help us understand the evolution of the specific plea of superior orders and the history of its usage. |
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===Before 1500<span class="anchor" id="The trial of Peter von Hagenbach"></span>=== |
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==History before 1900== |
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===The trial of Peter von Hagenbach=== |
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{{See also|Command responsibility}} |
{{See also|Command responsibility}} |
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[[Image:Deutsche Geschichte5-310.jpg|thumb |
[[Image:Deutsche Geschichte5-310.jpg|thumb|Hagenbach on trial, from [[Bern]]er Chronik des Diebold Schilling dem Älteren]] |
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In 1474, in the trial of [[Peter von Hagenbach]] by an ad hoc tribunal of the [[Holy Roman Empire]], |
In 1474, in the trial of [[Peter von Hagenbach]] by an ad hoc tribunal of the [[Holy Roman Empire]], the first known "international" recognition of commanders' obligations to act lawfully occurred.<ref name="Greppi">[http://www.icrc.ch/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQ2X The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under international law] By Edoardo Greppi, Associate Professor of International Law at the [[University of Turin]], [[Italy]], [[International Committee of the Red Cross]] No. 835, p. 531–553, October 30, 1999.</ref><ref name="Grant">[http://www.law.harvard.edu/alumni/bulletin/2006/spring/gallery.php Exhibit highlights the first international war crimes tribunal] by Linda Grant, Harvard Law Bulletin.</ref> |
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Specifically, Hagenbach was put on trial for atrocities committed under his command but not by him directly, during the occupation of [[Breisach]]. This was the earliest modern European example of the doctrine of [[command responsibility]].<ref name="Schabas"/><ref name="Mens_Rea">[http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2005/command.htm Command Responsibility] The Mens Rea Requirement, By Eugenia Levine, [[Global Policy Forum]], February 2005</ref> Since he was convicted for crimes "he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent |
Specifically, Hagenbach was put on trial for atrocities committed under his command but not by him directly, during the occupation of [[Breisach]]. This was the earliest modern European example of the doctrine of [[command responsibility]].<ref name="Schabas"/><ref name="Mens_Rea">[http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2005/command.htm Command Responsibility] The Mens Rea Requirement, By Eugenia Levine, [[Global Policy Forum]], February 2005</ref> Since he was convicted for crimes that "he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent", Hagenbach defended himself by arguing that he was only following orders<ref name="Greppi"/><ref name="Murray">[http://www.cbc.ca/news/reportsfromabroad/murray/20020718.html Judge and master] By Don Murray, [[CBC News]], July 18, 2002.</ref> from the [[Duke of Burgundy]], [[Charles the Bold]], to whom the Holy Roman Empire had given Breisach,<ref>[http://law.gsu.edu/Miller_Lecture/2006/MillerLecture-S06-BassiouniDraft.pdf The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080910183610/http://law.gsu.edu/Miller_Lecture/2006/MillerLecture-S06-BassiouniDraft.pdf|date=2008-09-10}} February 10, 2006 Draft by M. Cherif Bassiouni -Distinguished Research Professor of Law and President, [[International Human Rights Law Institute]], [[DePaul University College of Law]], Presented March 14, 2006 as the 38th [[Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture]], [[Georgia State University College of Law]], and to appear in the [[Georgia State University Law Review]]</ref> but this defense was rejected and he was convicted of [[war crimes]] and beheaded.<ref name="Schabas">[http://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/81258/excerpt/9780521881258_excerpt.pdf An Introduction to the International Criminal Court] William A. Schabas, [[Cambridge University Press]], Third Edition</ref> |
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==History from 1900 to |
===1900–1947<span class="anchor" id="History from 1900 to 1947"></span>=== |
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===German military trials after World War I=== |
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====Court-martial of Breaker Morant==== |
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On June 4, 1921, the legal doctrine of superior prders was used during the German Military Trials that took place after [[World War I]]: One of the most famous of these trials was the matter of Lieutenant Karl Neumann, who was a [[U-Boat]] Captain responsible for the sinking of the hospital ship the ''Dover Castle''.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C04EEDA1739E133A25756C0A9609C946095D6CF |title=Free Man Who Sank a Hospital Ship; Leipsic Judges Acquit Neumann on the Ground That He Acted Under Orders. He Admitted Torpedoing. Prosecutor Demanded Acquittal, Calling Dover Castle Culpable in Carrying Wounded Soldiers. |author=[[New York Times]] |date=June 5, 1921 |work= |publisher=[[New York Times]] |accessdate=10 April 2010}}</ref> Even though he frankly admitted to having sunk the ship, he stated that he had done so on the basis of orders supplied to him by the German Admiralty; and as such, he could not be held liable for his actions. The [[Leipzig|Leipsic]] Supreme Court (Germany's supreme court) acquitted him, accepting the defense of superior orders as a grounds to escape criminal liability.<ref>Anon., “German War Trials: Judgement in Case of Commander Karl Neumann”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Oct., 1922) at pg. 704–708.</ref> Further, that very court had this to say in the matter of superior orders: |
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{{main|Court-martial of Breaker Morant}} |
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<blockquote> |
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“… that all civilized nations recognize the principle that a subordinate is covered by the orders of his superiors.<ref>G.A. Finch, Superior Orders and War Crimes, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Jul., 1921) at pg. 440–445.</ref> |
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</blockquote> |
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During the [[Second Boer War]], four Australian officers ([[Breaker Morant]], [[Peter Handcock]], Henry Picton, and [[George Witton]]) were indicted and tried for a number of murders, including those of prisoners who had surrendered and been disarmed. A significant part of the defense was that they were acting under orders issued by [[Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener|Lord Kitchener]] to "[[take no prisoners]]". However, these alleged orders were only issued verbally, were denied by Kitchener and his staff, and could not be validated in court. Furthermore, the crown prosecutor argued that even if such orders existed, they were "illegal orders" and was sustained by the court, resulting in a guilty verdict against all four men. In a ruling still reviled in modern [[South Africa]] as a [[miscarriage of justice]], the defendants' de facto commanding officer, Captain [[Alfred Taylor (British Army officer)|Alfred Taylor]], whose own actions are widely considered to have been much more brutal and inhumane, was also tried but was acquitted on all charges. |
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Many accused of war crimes were acquitted on a similar defense, creating immense dissatisfaction amongst the [[Allies]]. This has been thought to be one of the main causes for the specific removal of this defense in the August 8, 1945 [[London Charter of the International Military Tribunal]]. This removal has been attributed to the actions of [[Robert H. Jackson]], a Justice of the [[United States Supreme Court]], who was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the [[Nuremberg Trials]]. |
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=== |
====German military trials after World War I==== |
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On June 4, 1921, the legal limits of superior orders were tested during the [[Leipzig War Crimes Trials]] that tried German military veterans for committing alleged [[war crimes in World War I]] in a civilian court after the [[Treaty of Versailles]]. One of the most famous of these trials remains that of ''[[Kapitänleutnant]]'' Karl Neumann of [[SM UC-67]]; the [[U-boat]] [[Officer Commanding]] who torpedoed and sank the British [[hospital ship]] the ''[[HMHS Dover Castle|Dover Castle]]''.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C04EEDA1739E133A25756C0A9609C946095D6CF |title=Free Man Who Sank a Hospital Ship; Leipsic Judges Acquit Neumann on the Ground That He Acted Under Orders. He Admitted Torpedoing. Prosecutor Demanded Acquittal, Calling Dover Castle Culpable in Carrying Wounded Soldiers. |date=June 5, 1921 |work=[[New York Times]] |access-date=10 April 2010}}</ref> Even though Neumann frankly admitted to having sunk the ship, he stated that he had done so on the basis of authorisation supplied by the [[German Imperial Admiralty Staff|German Admiralty]]. The Imperial German Government had accused the [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] of violating Articles X and XI of the [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907|Hague Convention of 1907]] by using hospital ships for military purposes, such as transporting healthy troops,<ref name="gwpda">{{cite web |date=28 February 2000 |url=http://www.gwpda.org/naval/rcnmed00.htm |title=Royal Canadian Naval Medical Service |publisher=Great War Primary Documents Archive|accessdate=2 September 2009 |last=Sir Andrew Macphail}}</ref> and the [[Imperial German Navy]] had accordingly decreed on 19 March 1917 that [[officer commanding|officers commanding]] individual U-boats could choose to fire upon Allied hospital ships under certain conditions. The [[Reichsgericht]], then Germany's supreme court, acquitted Lt.-Capt. Neumann, accepting the defense that he had believed the sinking to be a lawful act.<ref><!--Anonymous-->"German War Trials: Judgement in Case of Commander Karl Neumann", ''The American Journal of International Law'', Vol. 16, No. 4. (October 1922), pp. 704–708.</ref> Further, the court stated "that all civilized nations recognize the principle that a subordinate is covered by the orders of his superiors".<ref>G. A. Finch, "Superior Orders and War Crimes", ''The American Journal of International Law'', Vol. 15, No. 3. (July 1921), pp. 440–445.</ref> |
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Many other German veterans similarly facing prosecution for war crimes at Leipzig were also acquitted by either alleging ignorance of the law or citing the superior orders defense, creating immense dissatisfaction among the [[Allies of World War I|Allied]] news media and public. On the other hand, when the defendants at Leipzig could not reasonably claim that they did not know at the time that they were obeying [[Criminal order (international law)|criminal orders]], this defense proved ineffective. For instance, following the sinking of the Canadian hospital ship [[HMHS Llandovery Castle]], ''Oberleutnants zur See'' Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt of [[SM U-86]] were ordered to open fire with the [[deck gun]] on the unarmed shipwreck survivors and obeyed the order. They were both found guilty and sentenced, despite the very deep stigma and humiliation involved for a military officer in pre-1945 [[German culture]], to serve their terms of incarceration in a civilian prison. However, the verdict was later overturned on appeal, on the grounds that their fugitive former commanding officer, [[Helmut Brümmer-Patzig]], bore the lion's share of the guilt.<ref>"German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt". ''The American Journal of International Law'', vol. 16, no. 4, 1922, pp. 708–724.</ref> |
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{{See also|Nuremberg Trials}} |
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According to American historian [[Alfred-Maurice de Zayas|Alfred de Zayas]], however, "generally speaking, the German population took exception to these trials, especially because the Allies were not similarly bringing their own soldiers to justice."<ref>{{cite book |last1=de Zayas |first1=Alfred-Maurice |title=The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945 |date=1989 |publisher=University of Nebraska Press |isbn=0-8032-9908-7 |page=5}}</ref> (See [[Victor's justice]].) |
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In 1945 and 1946, during the [[Nuremberg Trials]] the issue of superior orders again arose: These trials gained so much attention that the "superior orders defense" has subsequently become interchangeable with the label, "Nuremberg defense". This is a [[legal defense]] that essentially states that the defendant was "'''only following orders'''" ("Befehl ist Befehl", literally "orders are orders") and is therefore not responsible for his or her crimes. |
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Even so, dissatisfaction with the Leipzig trials is thought to be one of the main causes for the specific nullification of the superior orders defense in the August 8, 1945, [[London Charter of the International Military Tribunal]]. The removal has been attributed to the actions of [[Robert H. Jackson]], a Justice of the [[United States Supreme Court]], who was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the [[Nuremberg trials]]. |
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====Dostler case==== |
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Thus, under [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]], "defense of superior orders" is not a defense for war crimes, although it might influence a sentencing authority to lessen the penalty. Nuremberg Principle IV states: |
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[[File:Anton Dostler 1945 a.jpg|thumb|right|Dostler tied to a stake before the execution]] |
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On October 8, 1945, [[Anton Dostler]] was the first [[General (Germany)|German general]] to be tried for war crimes by a US [[military tribunal]] at the [[Royal Palace of Caserta]]. He was accused of ordering the execution of 15 captured US soldiers of [[Operations Ginny I and II|Operation Ginny II]] in Italy in March 1944. He admitted to ordering the execution, but said that he could not be held responsible because he was following orders from his superiors. The execution of the [[prisoners of war]] in Italy, ordered by Dostler, was an implementation of [[Adolf Hitler]]'s [[Commando Order]] of 1942, which required the immediate execution of all [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] [[commandos]], whether they were in proper uniforms or not, without trial if they were apprehended by German forces. The tribunal rejected the defense of Superior Orders and found Dostler guilty of war crimes. He was sentenced to death and [[execution by firing squad|executed by a firing squad]] on December 1, 1945, in [[Aversa]]. |
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The Dostler case became a precedent for the principle that was used in the Nuremberg Trials of German generals, officials, and Nazi leaders beginning in November 1945: using superior orders as a defense does not relieve officers from responsibility of carrying out illegal orders and their liability to be punished in court. The principle was codified in [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Principle IV]] of the [[Nuremberg Principles]], and similar principles are in the 1948 [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]]. |
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<blockquote>"The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."</blockquote> |
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====Nuremberg Trials after World War II==== |
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During the Nuremberg trials, [[Wilhelm Keitel]], [[Alfred Jodl]] and other defendants unsuccessfully used the defense. |
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{{See also|Nuremberg trials}} |
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[[File:Defendants in the dock at nuremberg trials.jpg|thumb|Photo of the trial at Nuremberg, depicting the defendants, guarded by American Military Police]] |
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In 1945–46, during the [[Nuremberg trials]] the issue of superior orders again arose. Before the end of World War II, the Allies suspected such a defense might be employed and issued the [[London Charter of the International Military Tribunal]] (IMT), which explicitly stated that following an unlawful order is not a valid defense against charges of [[war crime]]s. |
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(Before the trials, there was little consensus amongst the Allies as to what was to be done with the [[Nazi]] war prisoners. [[Winston Churchill]] was inclined to have the leaders 'executed as outlaws'.<ref name="Timesarticle784041">{{cite news|title=Churchill: execute Hitler without trial|work=[[The Times]]|publisher=[[Times Newspapers Limited]]|date=2006-01-01|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article784041.ece|accessdate=2008-02-08}}</ref> The Soviets desired trials, but wished there to be a presumption of guilt, as opposed to the procedural presumption of innocence that accompanies most [[western civilization|western]] criminal trials.<ref>K.C. Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, (Greenwood Publishers, 2006), sourced from Google Books.</ref>) |
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Thus, under [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]], "defense of superior orders" is not a defense for war crimes, although it might be a mitigating factor that could influence a sentencing authority to lessen the penalty. Nuremberg Principle IV states: |
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===History from 1947 to 2000=== |
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{{quote|The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.}} |
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The defense of superior orders again arose in the 1961 trial of [[Adolf Eichmann]] in [[Israel]], as well as the trial of [[Alfredo Astiz]] of Argentina, responsible for a large number of disappearances and kidnappings that took place during that nation's transfer to democracy. |
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During the Nuremberg Trials, [[Wilhelm Keitel]], [[Alfred Jodl]], and other defendants unsuccessfully used the defense. They contended that while they knew Hitler's orders were unlawful, or at least had reason to believe they were unlawful, their place was not to question, but to obey. They claimed they were compelled to do so by the {{lang|de|[[Führerprinzip]]}} (leader principle) that governed the Nazi regime, as well as their own [[Hitler oath|oath of allegiance to Hitler]]. In most cases, the tribunal found that the defendants' offenses were so egregious that obedience to superior orders could not be considered a mitigating factor. |
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Following the [[My Lai Massacre]] in 1968, the defense was employed during the court martial of [[William Calley]]. Some have argued that the outcome of the [[My Lai Massacre]] courts martial was a reversal of the laws of war that were set forth in the [[Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal|Nuremberg]] and [[Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal]]s.<ref>{{cite news|last=Marshall|first=Burke|coauthors=Goldstein, Joseph|title=Learning From My Lai: A Proposal on War Crimes|publisher=The New York Times|date=2 April 1976|page=26}}</ref> [[Secretary of the Army]] [[Howard Callaway]] was quoted in the ''New York Times'' as stating that Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley honestly believed that what he did was a part of his orders—a rationale that stands in direct contradiction of the standards set at Nuremberg and Tokyo, where German and Japanese soldiers were executed for similar acts. |
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Before the trials, there was little Allied consensus about prosecuting Nazi war prisoners. [[Winston Churchill]] was inclined to have the leaders "executed as outlaws".<ref name="Timesarticle784041">{{cite news|first=John|last=Crossland|title=Churchill: execute Hitler without trial|newspaper=[[The Times]]|date=2006-01-01|url=https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/churchill-execute-hitler-without-trial-7875nptrm3r|url-access=subscription|access-date=2024-05-26}}</ref> The Soviets desired trials but wished there to be a [[Reverse onus|presumption of guilt]].<ref>{{cite book |first=K. C. |last=Moghalu |title=Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials |publisher=Greenwood |year=2006}}</ref> |
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''[[United States v. Keenan]]'' was a court case in the United States where the accused (Keenan) was found guilty of murder after he obeyed an order to shoot and kill an elderly [[Vietnam]]ese citizen. The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces|Court of Military Appeals]] held that "the justification for acts done pursuant to orders does not exist if the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know it to be illegal." The soldier who gave Keenan the order, Corporal Luczko, was acquitted by reason of insanity.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/militarylaw1/a/obeyingorders.htm |title= Military Orders To Obey or Not to Obey?|author=Rod Powers |date= |work= About.com: US Military|publisher= |accessdate=16 June 2010}}</ref> |
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The German military law since 1872 said<ref>{{lang|la|Militär-Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich}}, § 47. The difference to the present regulation, as found in the {{lang|de|Wehrstrafgesetz}} § 5, is only marginal, at least as far as the letter of the law is concerned.</ref> that while the superior is ("solely") responsible for his order, the subordinate <em>is</em> to be punished for his participation in it if he either transgressed the order on his own account, or if he knew the order to be criminal.<ref>{{lang|de|"... wenn ihm bekannt gewesen, daß der Befehl des Vorgesetzten eine Handlung betraf, welche ein bürgerliches oder militärisches Verbrechen oder Vergehen bezweckte"}}, i.e., "... if it was known to him that the superior's order concerned an action that aimed at a civil or military felony or misdemeanor". According to general legal interpretation,{{cn|date=May 2024}} "if he knew" means "unless he did not know ''and'' had a valid excuse for not knowing".</ref> The Nazis did not bother (or were too reluctant) to formalize many of their offenses (e.g., killing a non-combatant without trial), so the prosecutors at Nuremberg could have argued that the defendants broke German law to begin with. However, this line of argument was infrequently used. |
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In 1996, the superior orders defense was successfully used by [[Erich Priebke]], although the verdict was appealed and he was later convicted.{{Citation needed|date=October 2008}} It was used with varying degrees of success by those involved in the [[Hostages Trial]].{{Citation needed|date=October 2008}} |
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===="Nuremberg defense"==== |
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====The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court==== |
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The trials gained so much attention that the "superior orders defense" has subsequently become interchangeable with the label "Nuremberg defense", a [[legal defense]] that essentially states that defendants were "only following orders" ({{lang|de|"Befehl ist Befehl"}}, literally "an order is an order") and so are not responsible for their crimes. |
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It could be argued{{who|date=November 2010}} that a version of the superior orders defense can be found as a defense to international crimes in the [[Rome Statute]] of the [[International Criminal Court]]. (The Rome Statute was agreed upon in 1998 as the foundational document of the International Criminal Court, established to try those individuals accused of serious international crimes.) Article 33, titled "Superior orders and prescription of law,"<ref>{{cite web |url= http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm|title=Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Part 3: General Principles of Criminal Law; Article 33: Superior orders and prescription of law|author= Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court|date=10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999 |work= |publisher=Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court |accessdate=21 March 2010}}</ref> |
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states: |
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However, US General [[Telford Taylor]], who had served as Chief Counsel for the United States during the Nuremberg trials, employed the term "Nuremberg defense" in a different sense. He applied it not to the defense offered by the Nuremberg defendants but to a justification put forward by those who refused to take part in military action (specifically America's involvement in the Vietnam War) that they believed to be criminal.<ref>{{cite book |last=Taylor |first=Telford |title=Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy |year=1970 |publisher=The New York Times Group |location=New York |pages=15 |quote=The claim that American intervention in Vietnam is itself an aggressive war and therefore criminal - the so-called 'Nuremberg defense' - has been put forward by draft card burners, draftees facing induction and soldiers about to be shipped to Vietnam.}}</ref> |
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<blockquote>1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: |
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===1947–2000<span class="anchor" id="History from 1947 to 2000"></span>=== |
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*(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; |
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[[File:Adolf Eichmann at Trial1961.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Eichmann on trial in 1961]] |
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*(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and |
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The defense of superior orders again arose in the [[Eichmann trial|1961 trial]] of Nazi war criminal [[Adolf Eichmann]] in [[Israel]], as well as the trial of [[Alfredo Astiz]] of [[Argentina]], who was responsible for many disappearances and kidnappings that took place during its [[National Reorganization Process|last civil-military dictatorship]] (1976–1983). The dictators forced [[state-sponsored terrorism]] upon the population,<ref name="cineaste.com">[http://www.cineaste.com/articles/emthe-secret-in-their-eyesem-historical-memory-production-models-and-the-foreign-film-oscar The Secret in Their Eyes: Historical Memory, Production Models, and the Foreign Film Oscar (WEB EXCLUSIVE)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120127110647/http://www.cineaste.com/articles/emthe-secret-in-their-eyesem-historical-memory-production-models-and-the-foreign-film-oscar |date=2012-01-27 }} Matt Losada, ''[[Cineaste Magazine]]'', 2010</ref> resulting in what (to several sources) amounted to [[genocide]].<ref>Conadep, Nunca Más Report, Chapter II, Section One:''Advertencia'', [http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/conadep/nuncamas/] {{in lang|es}}</ref><ref>[https://www.hmh.org/la_Genocide_Argentina.shtml Atrocities in Argentina (1976–1983)] [[Holocaust Museum Houston]]</ref> |
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*(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.</blockquote/> |
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The 1950s and 1960s saw the defense of {{lang|de|[[Befehlsnotstand]]}} ({{langx|en|compulsion to obey orders}}), a concept in which a certain action is ordered which violates law but where the refusal to carry it out would lead to drastic consequences for the person refusing. This was quite successful in war crimes trials in <!-- West? -->Germany.{{clarify|date=September 2021}} With the formation of the [[Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes]] this changed, as its research revealed that refusing an unlawful order did not result in punishment.<ref name="Welt 2015" >{{cite news |last=Kellerhoff |first=Sven Felix |author-link=Sven Felix Kellerhoff |date=15 July 2015|title=Hatten SS-Mitglieder damals wirklich 'keine Wahl'?|trans-title=Did SS members really have "no choice"?|url=https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zweiter-weltkrieg/article144067359/Hatten-SS-Mitglieder-damals-wirklich-keine-Wahl.html|language=de |work=[[Die Welt]] |access-date=17 October 2018 }}</ref> |
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<blockquote>2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful. |
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</blockquote> |
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====Israeli law since 1956==== |
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There are two interpretations{{who|date=November 2010}} of this Article: |
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In 1957, the Israeli legal system established the concept of a "blatantly illegal order" to explain when a military (or security-related) order should be followed, and when it ''must not'' be followed. The concept was explained in 1957 in the [[Kafr Qasim massacre]] ruling. The trial considered for the first time the issue of when Israeli security personnel are required to disobey illegal orders. The judges decided that soldiers do not have the obligation to examine each and every order in detail as to its legality, nor were they entitled to disobey orders merely on a subjective feeling that they might be illegal. On the other hand, some orders were manifestly illegal, and these must be disobeyed. Judge [[Benjamin Halevy]]'s words, still much-quoted today, were that "The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order is that above such an order should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: 'Prohibited!' Illegality that pierces the eye and revolts the heart, if the eye is not blind and the heart is not impenetrable or corrupt."<ref>M. R. Lippman, "Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior Orders Defense", ''Penn State International Law Review'', Fall 2001.</ref><ref>Leora Y. Bilsky, ''Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial (Law, Meaning, and Violence)'', University of Michigan Press, 2004, {{ISBN|0-472-03037-X}}, pp. 169–197, 310–324.</ref> |
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Captain (res.) Itai Haviv, a signatory of the 'courage to refuse' letter of 2002, told of his unhappiness about his service for the [[Israeli Defense Forces]] (IDF) and said "For 35 years a black flag was proudly hanging over our heads, but we have refused to see it". A translation note explains the "Black Flag" principle but adds "In the 45 years that passed since [the ruling], not even a single soldier was protected by a military court for refusing to obey a command because it was a 'black flag' command."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Haviv |first1=Itai |title=Black Flag |url=http://seruv.org.il/Signers/ItaiHavivEng.asp |website=seruv.org.il |access-date=18 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004020856/http://www.seruv.org.il/Signers/ItaiHavivEng.asp |archive-date=4 October 2018 |language=en |url-status=dead}}</ref> |
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*This formulation, especially (1)(a), whilst effectively prohibiting the use of the Nuremberg defense in relation to charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, does however, appear to allow the Nuremberg defense to be used as a protection against charges of war crimes, provided the relevant criteria are met. |
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==== 1968 Mỹ Lai massacre ==== |
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*Nevertheless, this interpretation of ICC Article 33 is open to debate: For example Article 33 (1)(c) protects the defendant only if "the order was not manifestly unlawful." The "order" could be considered "unlawful" if we consider [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]] to be the applicable "law" in this case. If so, then the defendant is not protected. Discussion as to whether or not Nuremberg Prinicple IV is the applicable law in this case is found in [[Nuremberg Principles#The Principles.27 power or lack of power|a discussion of the Nuremberg Principles' power or lack of power]]. |
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Following the [[Mỹ Lai massacre]] in 1968, the defense was employed during the court martial of [[William Calley]]. Some have argued that the outcome of the Mỹ Lai trial was a reversal of the [[laws of war]] that were set forth in the [[Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal|Nuremberg]] and [[Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal]]s.<ref>{{cite news|last=Marshall|first=Burke|author2=Goldstein, Joseph |title=Learning From My Lai: A Proposal on War Crimes|work=The New York Times|date=2 April 1976|page=26}}</ref> [[Secretary of the Army]] [[Howard Callaway]] was quoted in the ''New York Times'' as stating that Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley believed that what he did was a part of his orders. Calley used the exact phrase "just following orders" when another American soldier, [[Hugh Thompson Jr.|Hugh Thompson]], confronted him about the ongoing massacre. |
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In ''[[United States v. Keenan]]'', the accused was found guilty of murder after he obeyed an order to shoot and kill an elderly [[Vietnam]]ese citizen. The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces|Court of Military Appeals]] held that "the justification for acts done pursuant to orders does not exist if the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know it to be illegal". The soldier who gave the order, Corporal Luczko, was acquitted by reason of insanity.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/militarylaw1/a/obeyingorders.htm |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101205130846/http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/militarylaw1/a/obeyingorders.htm |archive-date=5 December 2010 |title= Military Orders To Obey or Not to Obey?|first=Rod |last=Powers |work= About.com: US Military|access-date=16 June 2010}} </ref> |
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{{See also|States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court}} |
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==== 1987 Canadian prosecution of Imre Finta==== |
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==History 2000 to present== |
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The Canadian government prosecuted Hungarian Nazi collaborator [[Imre Finta]] under its war crimes legislation in 1987. He was accused of organizing the deportation of over 8,000 Jews to Nazi death camps. He was acquitted on the defence that he was following the orders of a superior. The Canadian courts that accepted that verdict are the only ones in the world that recognize that legal defence.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/hunka-parliament-rota-trudeau-nazi-1.6980562|title=After Parliament's humiliation, Canada has to reckon with its past treatment of Nazis, experts say|first=Murray |last=Brewster |date=28 September 2023|work=CBC News}}</ref> |
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===Legal proceedings of Jeremy Hinzman in Canada=== |
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==== 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court==== |
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{{See also|Jeremy Hinzman|Anne L. Mactavish|Canada and Iraq War resisters}} |
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{{Further|States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court}} |
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The [[Rome Statute]] was agreed in 1998 as the foundation document of the [[International Criminal Court]], established to try those accused of serious international crimes. Article 33, titled "Superior orders and prescription of law",<ref>{{cite web |url= http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm|title=Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Part 3: General Principles of Criminal Law; Article 33: Superior orders and prescription of law |date=12 July 1999 |publisher=United Nations |access-date=21 March 2010}}</ref> states: |
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{{blockquote|text= |
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[[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]], and its reference to an individual’s responsibility, was at issue in [[Canada]] in the case of ''Hinzman v. Canada.'' [[Jeremy Hinzman]] was a [[U.S. Army]] [[deserter]] who claimed [[refugee]] status in Canada as a [[conscientious objector]], one of [[List of Iraq War Resisters#Objectors who have fled to Canada|many Iraq War resisters]]. Hinzman's lawyer, (at that time [[Jeffry House]]), had previously raised the issue of the [[legality of the Iraq War]] as having a bearing on their case. The [[Federal Court (Canada)|Federal Court]] ruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.<ref name="Mernagh, M">{{cite web|url=http://www.nowtoronto.com/news/story.cfm?content=153504&archive=25,38,2006|title= AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow|date=2006-05-18|author= Mernagh, M.|publisher= Toronto’s Now Magazine|accessdate=2008-06-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url= http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html|title=Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 420|pages=(see ''Held,'' Para. (1))|publisher= Office of the Commisioner for Federal Judicial Affairs |accessdate=2008-06-16}}</ref> In the decision, Justice [[Anne Mactavish|Anne L. Mactavish]] addressed the issue of personal responsibility: |
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{{ordered list |
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<blockquote> “An individual must be involved at the policy-making level to be culpable for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not expected to make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a conflict. Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal war-time conduct is otherwise proper.”<ref name="Mernagh, M"/><ref>[http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html ''Hinzman v. Canada''] Federal Court decision. Paras (157) and (158). Accessed 2008-06-18</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/6949/sanctuary_denied/ |title=Sanctuary Denied |author= Roman Goergen|date= Feb 23, 2011|work= |publisher=[[In These Times]] |accessdate=6 March 2011}}</ref> |
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|The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: |
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</blockquote> |
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{{ordered list|type=lower-alpha |
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|The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; |
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|The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and |
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|The order was not manifestly unlawful.}} |
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|For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.}}}} |
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===2000–present<span class="anchor" id="History from 2000 to present"></span>=== |
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On Nov 15, 2007, a quorum of the [[Supreme Court of Canada]] made of Justices [[Michel Bastarache]], [[Rosalie Abella]], and [[Louise Charron]] refused an application to have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/11/15/hinzman-decision.html|title= Top court refuses to hear cases of U.S. deserters|date=2007-11-15|author=CBC News|publisher=CBC News|accessdate=2008-06-02}}</ref> |
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<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/bulletin/2007/07-11-16.bul/07-11-16.bul.html|title=Supreme Court of Canada - Decisions - Bulletin of November 16, 2007, (See Sections 32111 and 32112)}}</ref> |
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====Legal proceedings of Jeremy Hinzman in Canada==== |
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“... in written arguments to the [[Supreme Court of Canada]], [[Jeffry House|Mr. House]] pointed out that although our courts have so far refused to grant refugee status to American soldiers who are deserting military duty out of moral objection to the [[Iraq war|war in Iraq]], in 1995 the [[Federal Court of Canada|Federal Court of Appeal]] granted refugee status to a deserter from [[Invasion of Kuwait|Saddam Hussein's armed incursion into Kuwait]], on the basis that he should not be compelled to take part in an illegal war. |
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{{See also|Jeremy Hinzman|Anne L. Mactavish|Canada and Iraq War resisters}} |
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"The courts are taking one stance for [[Saddam Hussein]]'s soldiers and another one entirely for American soldiers," Mr. House said.<ref>{{cite news |first= Lawrence |last= Hill|authorlink= |coauthors= |title= Just desertions|url= http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=16d90480-ccf6-4e3d-9848-ae35143e7685&p=1|work= |publisher= [[Ottawa Citizen]]|date= November 24, 2007|accessdate=30 January 2009 }}</ref> |
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[[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]], and its reference to an individual's responsibility, was at issue in [[Canada]] in the case of ''Hinzman v. Canada.'' [[Jeremy Hinzman]] was a [[U.S. Army]] [[deserter]] who claimed [[refugee]] status in Canada as a [[conscientious objector]], one of [[Iraq War resisters in Canada|many Iraq War resisters]]. Hinzman's lawyer, (at that time [[Jeffry House]]), had previously raised the issue of the [[legality of the Iraq War]] as having a bearing on their case. The [[Federal Court (Canada)|Federal Court]] ruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.<ref name="Mernagh, M">{{cite web|url=http://www.nowtoronto.com/news/story.cfm?content=153504&archive=25,38,2006|title=AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow|date=2006-05-18|last=Mernagh |first=M.|publisher=Toronto's Now Magazine|access-date=2008-06-02|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605061945/http://www.nowtoronto.com/news/story.cfm?content=153504&archive=25%2C38%2C2006|archive-date=2011-06-05}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html|title=Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 420|pages=(see ''Held,'' Para. (1))|publisher=Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs|access-date=2008-06-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090216100429/http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html|archive-date=2009-02-16|url-status=dead}}</ref> In the decision, Justice [[Anne Mactavish|Anne L. Mactavish]] addressed the issue of personal responsibility: |
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{{quote|An individual must be involved at the policy-making level to be culpable for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not expected to make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a conflict. Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal war-time conduct is otherwise proper.<ref name="Mernagh, M"/><ref>[http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2006/2006fc420/2006fc420.html ''Hinzman v. Canada''] Federal Court decision. Paras (157) and (158). Accessed 2008-06-18</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/6949/sanctuary_denied/ |title=Sanctuary Denied |first=Roman |last=Goergen |date=February 23, 2011 |publisher=[[In These Times (publication)|In These Times]] |access-date=6 March 2011}}</ref>}} |
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===Legal proceedings of Ehren Watada in the United States=== |
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On November 15, 2007, a quorum of the [[Supreme Court of Canada]] made of Justices [[Michel Bastarache]], [[Rosalie Abella]], and [[Louise Charron]] refused an application to have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/top-court-refuses-to-hear-cases-of-u-s-deserters-1.672123 |title=Top court refuses to hear cases of U.S. deserters |date=2007-11-15 |work=CBC News |access-date=2008-06-02}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/bulletin/2007/07-11-16.bul/07-11-16.bul.html |author=Supreme Court of Canada |title=Decisions – Bulletin of November 16, 2007 |at=Sections 32111 and 32112|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090216071445/http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/bulletin/2007/07-11-16.bul/07-11-16.bul.html|archive-date=February 16, 2009}}</ref> |
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In June 2006, during the [[Iraq War]], [[Ehren Watada]] refused to go to Iraq on account of his belief that the Iraq war was a [[crime against peace]] (waging a [[war of aggression]] for territorial aggrandizement), which he believed could make him liable for prosecution under the [[command responsibility doctrine]]. In this case, the judge ruled that soldiers, in general, are not responsible for determining whether the order to go to war itself is a lawful order - but are only responsible for those orders resulting in a specific application of military force, such as an order to shoot civilians, or to treat POWs inconsistently with the Geneva Conventions. This is consistent with the Nuremberg Defense, as only the civilian and military principals of the Axis were charged with [[crimes against peace]], while subordinate military officials were not so charged.<ref name=SeattlePI060620>[http://www.seattlepi.com/local/274585_watada20.html Soldier's Iraq war stance backed: Watada has right to refuse to go, retired officer says], ''[[Seattle Post-Intelligencer]]'', June 20, 2006.</ref> |
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====Legal proceedings of Ehren Watada in the United States==== |
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Based on this principle [[international law]] developed the concept of individual criminal liability for war crimes which resulted in the current doctrine of [[command responsibility]].<ref name="Danner-Martinez">[http://www.law.berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/workshop/fall04_Martinez.pdf Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law] [http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:K1mCZsV-egMJ:www.law.berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/workshop/fall04_Martinez.pdf+%22command+responsibility%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=47&client=opera HTML version] by Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, September 15, 2004</ref><ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/world_issues_com.html Command Responsibility - An International Focus] by Anne E. Mahle, [[Public Broadcasting Service|PBS]]</ref><ref name="Robin Rowland">[http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/abughraib_commandresponsibility.html Command, superior and ministerial responsibility] by Robin Rowland, [[CBC News Online]], May 6, 2004</ref> |
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In June 2006, during the [[Iraq War]], [[Ehren Watada]] refused to go to Iraq on account of his belief that the war was a [[crime against peace]] (waging a [[war of aggression]] for territorial aggrandizement), which he believed could make him liable for prosecution under the command responsibility doctrine. In this case, the judge ruled that soldiers, in general, are not responsible for determining whether the order to go to war is itself a lawful order – but are only responsible for those orders resulting in a specific application of military force, such as shooting civilians or treating POWs inconsistently with the Geneva Conventions. This is consistent with the Nuremberg defense, as only the civilian and military principals of the Axis were charged with crimes against peace, while subordinate military officials were not.<ref name=SeattlePI060620>[http://www.seattlepi.com/local/274585_watada20.html "Soldier's Iraq war stance backed: Watada has right to refuse to go, retired officer says"], ''[[Seattle Post-Intelligencer]]'', June 20, 2006.</ref> It is often the case in modern warfare that while subordinate military officials are not held liable for their actions, neither are their superiors, as was the case with Calley's immediate superior Captain Ernest Medina. |
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==Historical overview summary table== |
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Based on this principle, [[international law]] developed the concept of individual criminal liability for war crimes, which resulted in the current doctrine of command responsibility.<ref name="Danner-Martinez">[http://www.law.berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/workshop/fall04_Martinez.pdf "Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law"] [https://web.archive.org/web/20060910213027/http://www.law.berkeley.edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/workshop/fall04_Martinez.pdf HTML version] by Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, September 15, 2004</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Anne E |first1=Mahle |title=Command Responsibility – An International Focus |url=https://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/world_issues_com.html |website=pbs.org |publisher=Public Broadcasting Service |access-date=18 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108011441/https://www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/world_issues_com.html |archive-date=8 November 2012 |language=en-US |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Robin Rowland">[http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/abughraib_commandresponsibility.html "Command, superior and ministerial responsibility"] by Robin Rowland, [[CBC News Online]], May 6, 2004</ref> |
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The below overview of history shows a notable lack of consistency in rulings on the issue of superior orders. This lack of consistency raises questions pertaining to [[international legal theory]], [[sources of international law]], [[laws of war]], etc. (See also [[Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project]]) |
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====Legal proceedings of Vadim Shishimarin in Ukraine==== |
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(For overview purposes, the below table attempts to capsulize much of the history in the above article. It is based on references above. To navigate to those supporting references and further information for each case, click on "see details" for each case.) |
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On February 28, 2022, during the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Russian Sergeant [[Vadim Shishimarin]] shot and killed unarmed civilian Oleksandr Shelipov, a 62 year old Ukrainian man. His trial started on 13 May 2022, and on Wednesday 18 May, Shishimarin pleaded guilty to the killing. On Friday 20 May, Shishimarin's defense lawyer asked for his client to be acquitted of war crimes.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Lawyer asks Kyiv war crimes trial to acquit Russian soldier |url=https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/lawyer-asks-kyiv-war-crimes-trial-to-acquit-russian-soldier.956290 |access-date=2022-05-23 |website=Times of Malta |date=20 May 2022 |language=en-gb}}</ref> He argued that Shishimarin had intended not to kill but only to carry out the order formally, which Shishimarin had refused twice before succumbing to pressure from other soldiers. He further argued that the shots were unaimed, fired from a moving vehicle with a faulty tire, and only one bullet out of the burst hit.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-05-20 |title=Russian soldier in Ukraine war crimes trial says he did not want to kill |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-court-idUKKCN2N60QR |access-date=2022-05-23}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-05-23 |title=Ukraine war: Russian soldier Vadim Shishimarin jailed for life over war crime |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61549569 |access-date=2022-05-23}}</ref> |
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===Summary<span class="anchor" id="Historical overview summary table"></span>=== |
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{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center; width: 800px; height: 200px;" |
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center; width: 800px; height: 200px;" |
||
! Date |
! Date |
||
Line 137: | Line 149: | ||
|[[Rome Statute]] of the [[International Criminal Court]] |
|[[Rome Statute]] of the [[International Criminal Court]] |
||
|future cases under Article 33 of the [[Rome Statute]] of the [[International Criminal Court]] |
|future cases under Article 33 of the [[Rome Statute]] of the [[International Criminal Court]] |
||
| |
|in cases of [[genocide]] and possibly other cases [[#1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court|(see details)]] |
||
|possibly in cases other than genocide [[# |
|possibly in cases other than [[genocide]] [[#1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court|(see details)]] |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|2006 |
|2006 |
||
|[[Iraq War]] |
|[[Iraq War]] |
||
|[[Anne Mactavish|Justice Anne L. Mactavish]] |
|[[Anne Mactavish|Justice Anne L. Mactavish]] – [[Federal Court (Canada)]] |
||
|[[Jeremy Hinzman]] (refugee applicant) |
|[[Jeremy Hinzman]] (refugee applicant) |
||
| |
| |
||
|equivalent to yes |
|equivalent to yes [[#Legal proceedings of Jeremy Hinzman in Canada|(see details)]] |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|2022 |
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|[[Russian invasion of Ukraine]] |
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|Serhiy Agafonov |
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|[[Vadim Shishimarin]] |
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|yes |
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| |
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|} |
|} |
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'''Note |
'''Note''': Yellow rows indicate the use of the ''precise'' plea of superior orders in a war crimes trial, as opposed to events regarding the ''general'' concept of superior orders. |
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==Arguments<span class="anchor" id="Arguments for and against"></span>== |
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'''Note 2''': "*" Hinzman was not on trial for something he did in battle. However, if the ''principle'' of this particular judge's ruling had ''applied'' to such a trial, then Hinzman ''would have been'' found "not responsible" because of Superior Orders. [[#Legal proceedings of Jeremy Hinzman in Canada|(see details)]] |
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{{See also|International legal theories|Sources of international law|Law of war|Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project}} |
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{{dynamic list}} |
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The superior orders defense is still used with the following rationale in the following scenario: An "order" may come from one's superior at the level of ''national'' law. But according to Nuremberg Principle IV, such an order is sometimes "unlawful" according to ''international'' law. Such an "unlawful order" presents a legal dilemma from which there is no legal escape: On one hand, a person who ''refuses'' such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment ''at the national level''. On the other hand, a person who ''accepts'' such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment ''at the international level''. |
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[[Nuremberg Principles#Principle II|Nuremberg Principle II]] responds to that dilemma by stating: "The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law."<ref>[[International Committee of the Red Cross]] (ICRC) [[#References|References]] [http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/390?OpenDocument Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950: Introduction]</ref> |
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==Arguments for and against== |
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This might present a ''legal'' dilemma, but Nuremberg Principle IV speaks of "a ''moral'' choice" as being just as important as legal decisions: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a ''moral'' choice was in fact possible to him". |
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The superior orders defense is still used with the following rationale in the following scenario: An "order" may come from one's superior at the level of ''national'' law. But according to [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]], such an order is sometimes "unlawful" according to ''international'' law. Such an "unlawful order" presents a legal dilemma from which there is no legal escape: On one hand, a person who ''refuses'' such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment ''at the national level'' for refusing orders. On the other hand, a person who ''accepts'' such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment ''at the international level'' (e.g. [[Nuremberg Trials]]) for committing unlawful acts. Therefore this is a [[Catch-22 (logic)|Catch-22]] legal dilemma. |
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In moral choices or [[ethical dilemma]]s a decision is often made by appealing to a "higher ethic". One found in many religions and in secular ethics is the ''[[ethic of reciprocity]]'', or ''[[Golden Rule]]''. It states that one has a right to just treatment, and therefore has a reciprocal responsibility to ensure justice for others. |
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[[Nuremberg Principles#Principle II|Nuremberg Principle II]] responds to that dilemma by stating: "The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under [[international law]] does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under [[international law]]."<ref>[[International Committee of the Red Cross]] (ICRC) [[#References|References]] [http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/390?OpenDocument Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950: Introduction]</ref> |
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Although messengers are not usually responsible for the content of messages, the [[Babylonian Talmud]] (3rd to 5th century corpus of [[Jewish law]]) states, "There is no messenger in a case of sin."<ref>''Kiddushin'' 42b. Qtd. in Telushkin, ''The Book of Jewish Values'', 330.</ref> [[Joseph Telushkin]] interprets the precept to mean that "if a person is sent to perform an evil act, he cannot defend his behavior by saying he was only acting as another's messenger. ... [T]he person who carries out the evil act bears responsibility for the evil he or she does."<ref>Telushkin, Joseph. ''The Book of Jewish Values: A Day-By-Day Guide to Ethical Living''. New York: Bell Tower, 2000. p. 330</ref> This is because God's law (i.e. [[morality]]) supersedes human law. |
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The above scenario might present a ''[[law|legal]]'' dilemma, but [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]] speaks of "a ''[[morality|moral]]'' choice" as being just as important as "legal" decisions: It states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a ''moral'' choice was in fact possible to him". |
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Another argument against the use of the superior orders defense is that it does not follow the traditional legal definitions and categories established under [[criminal law]], where a [[principal (criminal law)|principal]] is any actor who is primarily responsible for a criminal offense.<ref>See, e.g., Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 177–78; United States v. Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1013 (lst Cir. 1982).</ref> Such an actor is distinguished from others who may also be subject to criminal liability as [[accomplice]]s, [[accessory (legal term)|accessories]] or [[conspiracy (crime)|conspirator]]s. (See also the various degrees of liability: [[absolute liability]], [[strict liability]], and [[mens rea]].) |
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In "moral choices" or [[ethical dilemma]]s an [[ethical decision]] is often made by appealing to a "higher ethic" such as [[ethics in religion]] or secular [[ethics]]. One such "higher ethic," which is found in many religions and also in secular ethics, is the "[[ethic of reciprocity]]," or the [[Golden Rule]]. It states that one has a right to just treatment, and therefore has a reciprocal responsibility to ensure justice for others. "Higher ethics," such as those, could be used by an individual to solve the ''legal'' dilemma presented by the superior orders defense. |
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The common argument is that every individual under orders should be bound by law to immediately relieve of command an officer who gives an obviously unlawful order to their troops. This represents a rational check against organizational command hierarchies. |
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Another argument against the use of the superior orders defense (i.e. "I was just following orders") is that it does not follow the traditional legal definitions and categories established under [[criminal law]]. Under criminal law, a [[principal (criminal law)|principal]] is any actor who is primarily responsible for a criminal offense.<ref>See, e.g., Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 177–78; United States v. Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1013 (lst Cir. 1982).</ref> Such an actor is distinguished from others who may also be subject to criminal liability as [[accomplice]]s, [[accessory (legal term)|accessories]] or [[conspiracy (crime)|conspirator]]s. (See also the various degrees of liability: [[absolute liability]], [[strict liability]], and [[mens rea]].) |
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Nuremberg Principle IV, the [[international law]] that counters the superior orders defense, is legally supported by the [[jurisprudence]] found in [[Conscientious objector#Universal Declaration of Human Rights|certain articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that deal indirectly with conscientious objection]]. It is also supported by [[Conscientious objector#Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status|the principles found in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status]], which was issued by the Office of the [[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]] (UNHCR). Those principles deal with the conditions under which [[conscientious objector]]s can apply for refugee status in another country if they face persecution in their own for refusing to participate in an illegal war. |
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== Bibliography == |
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Also, the "I was just following order" defense might arise from a situation when the person committing the action that was later deemed to be highly immoral or controversial because accepting responsibility would make the person feel self-guilt so therefore it might be much easier to totally deny any personal responsibility and assign it to the superiors that he/she was actually receiving order from to avoid self-contradiction in some persons. |
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* Yoram Dinstein: ''The Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Law'', Sijthoff-Leyden, 1965. |
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* Paola Gaeta: [http://ejil.org/pdfs/10/1/571.pdf ''The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law''], pdf, European Journal of International Law, 1999. |
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* Matthew Lippman: [http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1398&context=psilr ''Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War''] pdf, Penn State International Law Review, 1996, Volume 15. |
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== |
==See also== |
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* [[Corpse-like obedience]] (''Kadavergehorsam'') |
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* [[Milgram experiment]] |
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In the [[Christopher Buckley (novelist)|Christopher Buckley]] novel ''[[Thank You for Smoking (novel)|Thank You for Smoking]]'' and its [[Thank You For Smoking|film adaptation]], the main character [[Nick Naylor]] justifies his career to a reporter by telling her that "Everybody has a [[mortgage loan|mortgage]] to pay," and referring to his response as the "[[Yuppie]] Nuremberg defense." |
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* [[Radbruch formula]] |
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* [[Tu quoque defense]] |
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The play and film ''[[A Few Good Men (film)|A Few Good Men]]'' revolves around the question of the culpability of officers giving orders which they knew to be illegal, and the culpability of the soldiers under their command for following such orders, when such orders resulted in unintended and unforeseen consequences. |
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In the television series ''[[The A-Team]],'' the personnel of the [[United States Army Special Forces]] who make up the team are described as having robbed the Bank of [[Hanoi]] under orders which they could not actually prove they had been given because their commanding officer had been murdered and his headquarters had been destroyed. |
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== See also == |
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* [[Command responsibility]] |
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* [[International legal theory]] |
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* [[Laws of war]] |
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* [[Milgram Experiment]] - psychology experiments which measured the willingness of study participants to obey an authority figure who instructed them to perform acts that conflicted with their conscience. |
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* [[Nuremberg Principles#Principle IV|Nuremberg Principle IV]] |
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* [[Nuremberg Principles]] |
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* [[Peter von Hagenbach]] |
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* [[Respondeat superior]] |
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* [[Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project]] |
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* [[Sources of international law]] |
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* [[Vicarious liability]] |
* [[Vicarious liability]] |
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==References== |
==References== |
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==External links== |
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[[de:Befehlsnotstand]] |
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[[es:Defensa Núremberg]] |
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[[he:פקודה בלתי חוקית בעליל]] |
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[[ru:Исполнение приказа или распоряжения]] |
Latest revision as of 02:15, 4 December 2024
Superior orders, also known as just following orders or the Nuremberg defense, is a plea in a court of law that a person, whether civilian, military or police, should not be considered guilty of committing crimes ordered by a superior officer or official.[1][2] It is regarded as a complement to command responsibility.[3]
One noted use of this plea or defense was by the accused in the 1945–1946 Nuremberg trials. These were a series of military tribunals held by the main victorious Allies of World War II to prosecute, among others, prominent members of the political, military and economic leadership of the defeated Nazi Germany. Under the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal that established them, the trials determined that the defense of superior orders was no longer enough to escape punishment but merely enough to lessen it.[4]
Apart from the specific plea of superior orders, discussions about how the general concept of superior orders ought to be used, or ought not to be used, have taken place in various arguments, rulings and statutes that have not necessarily been part of "after the fact" war crimes trials, strictly speaking. Nevertheless, these discussions and related events help to explain the evolution of the specific plea of superior orders and the history of its usage.
Historically, the plea of superior orders has been used both before and after the Nuremberg Trials, with inconsistent rulings, up to the final ruling of International Criminal Court in the Prosecutor v Ntaganda case.[5]
History
[edit]Before 1500
[edit]In 1474, in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire, the first known "international" recognition of commanders' obligations to act lawfully occurred.[6][7]
Specifically, Hagenbach was put on trial for atrocities committed under his command but not by him directly, during the occupation of Breisach. This was the earliest modern European example of the doctrine of command responsibility.[8][9] Since he was convicted for crimes that "he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent", Hagenbach defended himself by arguing that he was only following orders[6][10] from the Duke of Burgundy, Charles the Bold, to whom the Holy Roman Empire had given Breisach,[11] but this defense was rejected and he was convicted of war crimes and beheaded.[8]
1900–1947
[edit]Court-martial of Breaker Morant
[edit]During the Second Boer War, four Australian officers (Breaker Morant, Peter Handcock, Henry Picton, and George Witton) were indicted and tried for a number of murders, including those of prisoners who had surrendered and been disarmed. A significant part of the defense was that they were acting under orders issued by Lord Kitchener to "take no prisoners". However, these alleged orders were only issued verbally, were denied by Kitchener and his staff, and could not be validated in court. Furthermore, the crown prosecutor argued that even if such orders existed, they were "illegal orders" and was sustained by the court, resulting in a guilty verdict against all four men. In a ruling still reviled in modern South Africa as a miscarriage of justice, the defendants' de facto commanding officer, Captain Alfred Taylor, whose own actions are widely considered to have been much more brutal and inhumane, was also tried but was acquitted on all charges.
German military trials after World War I
[edit]On June 4, 1921, the legal limits of superior orders were tested during the Leipzig War Crimes Trials that tried German military veterans for committing alleged war crimes in World War I in a civilian court after the Treaty of Versailles. One of the most famous of these trials remains that of Kapitänleutnant Karl Neumann of SM UC-67; the U-boat Officer Commanding who torpedoed and sank the British hospital ship the Dover Castle.[12] Even though Neumann frankly admitted to having sunk the ship, he stated that he had done so on the basis of authorisation supplied by the German Admiralty. The Imperial German Government had accused the Allies of violating Articles X and XI of the Hague Convention of 1907 by using hospital ships for military purposes, such as transporting healthy troops,[13] and the Imperial German Navy had accordingly decreed on 19 March 1917 that officers commanding individual U-boats could choose to fire upon Allied hospital ships under certain conditions. The Reichsgericht, then Germany's supreme court, acquitted Lt.-Capt. Neumann, accepting the defense that he had believed the sinking to be a lawful act.[14] Further, the court stated "that all civilized nations recognize the principle that a subordinate is covered by the orders of his superiors".[15]
Many other German veterans similarly facing prosecution for war crimes at Leipzig were also acquitted by either alleging ignorance of the law or citing the superior orders defense, creating immense dissatisfaction among the Allied news media and public. On the other hand, when the defendants at Leipzig could not reasonably claim that they did not know at the time that they were obeying criminal orders, this defense proved ineffective. For instance, following the sinking of the Canadian hospital ship HMHS Llandovery Castle, Oberleutnants zur See Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt of SM U-86 were ordered to open fire with the deck gun on the unarmed shipwreck survivors and obeyed the order. They were both found guilty and sentenced, despite the very deep stigma and humiliation involved for a military officer in pre-1945 German culture, to serve their terms of incarceration in a civilian prison. However, the verdict was later overturned on appeal, on the grounds that their fugitive former commanding officer, Helmut Brümmer-Patzig, bore the lion's share of the guilt.[16]
According to American historian Alfred de Zayas, however, "generally speaking, the German population took exception to these trials, especially because the Allies were not similarly bringing their own soldiers to justice."[17] (See Victor's justice.)
Even so, dissatisfaction with the Leipzig trials is thought to be one of the main causes for the specific nullification of the superior orders defense in the August 8, 1945, London Charter of the International Military Tribunal. The removal has been attributed to the actions of Robert H. Jackson, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials.
Dostler case
[edit]On October 8, 1945, Anton Dostler was the first German general to be tried for war crimes by a US military tribunal at the Royal Palace of Caserta. He was accused of ordering the execution of 15 captured US soldiers of Operation Ginny II in Italy in March 1944. He admitted to ordering the execution, but said that he could not be held responsible because he was following orders from his superiors. The execution of the prisoners of war in Italy, ordered by Dostler, was an implementation of Adolf Hitler's Commando Order of 1942, which required the immediate execution of all Allied commandos, whether they were in proper uniforms or not, without trial if they were apprehended by German forces. The tribunal rejected the defense of Superior Orders and found Dostler guilty of war crimes. He was sentenced to death and executed by a firing squad on December 1, 1945, in Aversa.
The Dostler case became a precedent for the principle that was used in the Nuremberg Trials of German generals, officials, and Nazi leaders beginning in November 1945: using superior orders as a defense does not relieve officers from responsibility of carrying out illegal orders and their liability to be punished in court. The principle was codified in Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles, and similar principles are in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Nuremberg Trials after World War II
[edit]In 1945–46, during the Nuremberg trials the issue of superior orders again arose. Before the end of World War II, the Allies suspected such a defense might be employed and issued the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which explicitly stated that following an unlawful order is not a valid defense against charges of war crimes.
Thus, under Nuremberg Principle IV, "defense of superior orders" is not a defense for war crimes, although it might be a mitigating factor that could influence a sentencing authority to lessen the penalty. Nuremberg Principle IV states:
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
During the Nuremberg Trials, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Jodl, and other defendants unsuccessfully used the defense. They contended that while they knew Hitler's orders were unlawful, or at least had reason to believe they were unlawful, their place was not to question, but to obey. They claimed they were compelled to do so by the Führerprinzip (leader principle) that governed the Nazi regime, as well as their own oath of allegiance to Hitler. In most cases, the tribunal found that the defendants' offenses were so egregious that obedience to superior orders could not be considered a mitigating factor.
Before the trials, there was little Allied consensus about prosecuting Nazi war prisoners. Winston Churchill was inclined to have the leaders "executed as outlaws".[18] The Soviets desired trials but wished there to be a presumption of guilt.[19]
The German military law since 1872 said[20] that while the superior is ("solely") responsible for his order, the subordinate is to be punished for his participation in it if he either transgressed the order on his own account, or if he knew the order to be criminal.[21] The Nazis did not bother (or were too reluctant) to formalize many of their offenses (e.g., killing a non-combatant without trial), so the prosecutors at Nuremberg could have argued that the defendants broke German law to begin with. However, this line of argument was infrequently used.
"Nuremberg defense"
[edit]The trials gained so much attention that the "superior orders defense" has subsequently become interchangeable with the label "Nuremberg defense", a legal defense that essentially states that defendants were "only following orders" ("Befehl ist Befehl", literally "an order is an order") and so are not responsible for their crimes.
However, US General Telford Taylor, who had served as Chief Counsel for the United States during the Nuremberg trials, employed the term "Nuremberg defense" in a different sense. He applied it not to the defense offered by the Nuremberg defendants but to a justification put forward by those who refused to take part in military action (specifically America's involvement in the Vietnam War) that they believed to be criminal.[22]
1947–2000
[edit]The defense of superior orders again arose in the 1961 trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Israel, as well as the trial of Alfredo Astiz of Argentina, who was responsible for many disappearances and kidnappings that took place during its last civil-military dictatorship (1976–1983). The dictators forced state-sponsored terrorism upon the population,[23] resulting in what (to several sources) amounted to genocide.[24][25]
The 1950s and 1960s saw the defense of Befehlsnotstand (English: compulsion to obey orders), a concept in which a certain action is ordered which violates law but where the refusal to carry it out would lead to drastic consequences for the person refusing. This was quite successful in war crimes trials in Germany.[clarification needed] With the formation of the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes this changed, as its research revealed that refusing an unlawful order did not result in punishment.[26]
Israeli law since 1956
[edit]In 1957, the Israeli legal system established the concept of a "blatantly illegal order" to explain when a military (or security-related) order should be followed, and when it must not be followed. The concept was explained in 1957 in the Kafr Qasim massacre ruling. The trial considered for the first time the issue of when Israeli security personnel are required to disobey illegal orders. The judges decided that soldiers do not have the obligation to examine each and every order in detail as to its legality, nor were they entitled to disobey orders merely on a subjective feeling that they might be illegal. On the other hand, some orders were manifestly illegal, and these must be disobeyed. Judge Benjamin Halevy's words, still much-quoted today, were that "The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order is that above such an order should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: 'Prohibited!' Illegality that pierces the eye and revolts the heart, if the eye is not blind and the heart is not impenetrable or corrupt."[27][28]
Captain (res.) Itai Haviv, a signatory of the 'courage to refuse' letter of 2002, told of his unhappiness about his service for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and said "For 35 years a black flag was proudly hanging over our heads, but we have refused to see it". A translation note explains the "Black Flag" principle but adds "In the 45 years that passed since [the ruling], not even a single soldier was protected by a military court for refusing to obey a command because it was a 'black flag' command."[29]
1968 Mỹ Lai massacre
[edit]Following the Mỹ Lai massacre in 1968, the defense was employed during the court martial of William Calley. Some have argued that the outcome of the Mỹ Lai trial was a reversal of the laws of war that were set forth in the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals.[30] Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway was quoted in the New York Times as stating that Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley believed that what he did was a part of his orders. Calley used the exact phrase "just following orders" when another American soldier, Hugh Thompson, confronted him about the ongoing massacre.
In United States v. Keenan, the accused was found guilty of murder after he obeyed an order to shoot and kill an elderly Vietnamese citizen. The Court of Military Appeals held that "the justification for acts done pursuant to orders does not exist if the order was of such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know it to be illegal". The soldier who gave the order, Corporal Luczko, was acquitted by reason of insanity.[31]
1987 Canadian prosecution of Imre Finta
[edit]The Canadian government prosecuted Hungarian Nazi collaborator Imre Finta under its war crimes legislation in 1987. He was accused of organizing the deportation of over 8,000 Jews to Nazi death camps. He was acquitted on the defence that he was following the orders of a superior. The Canadian courts that accepted that verdict are the only ones in the world that recognize that legal defence.[32]
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
[edit]The Rome Statute was agreed in 1998 as the foundation document of the International Criminal Court, established to try those accused of serious international crimes. Article 33, titled "Superior orders and prescription of law",[33] states:
- The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
- The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;
- The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
- The order was not manifestly unlawful.
- For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
2000–present
[edit]Legal proceedings of Jeremy Hinzman in Canada
[edit]Nuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's responsibility, was at issue in Canada in the case of Hinzman v. Canada. Jeremy Hinzman was a U.S. Army deserter who claimed refugee status in Canada as a conscientious objector, one of many Iraq War resisters. Hinzman's lawyer, (at that time Jeffry House), had previously raised the issue of the legality of the Iraq War as having a bearing on their case. The Federal Court ruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim.[34][35] In the decision, Justice Anne L. Mactavish addressed the issue of personal responsibility:
An individual must be involved at the policy-making level to be culpable for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not expected to make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a conflict. Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal war-time conduct is otherwise proper.[34][36][37]
On November 15, 2007, a quorum of the Supreme Court of Canada made of Justices Michel Bastarache, Rosalie Abella, and Louise Charron refused an application to have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.[38][39]
Legal proceedings of Ehren Watada in the United States
[edit]In June 2006, during the Iraq War, Ehren Watada refused to go to Iraq on account of his belief that the war was a crime against peace (waging a war of aggression for territorial aggrandizement), which he believed could make him liable for prosecution under the command responsibility doctrine. In this case, the judge ruled that soldiers, in general, are not responsible for determining whether the order to go to war is itself a lawful order – but are only responsible for those orders resulting in a specific application of military force, such as shooting civilians or treating POWs inconsistently with the Geneva Conventions. This is consistent with the Nuremberg defense, as only the civilian and military principals of the Axis were charged with crimes against peace, while subordinate military officials were not.[40] It is often the case in modern warfare that while subordinate military officials are not held liable for their actions, neither are their superiors, as was the case with Calley's immediate superior Captain Ernest Medina.
Based on this principle, international law developed the concept of individual criminal liability for war crimes, which resulted in the current doctrine of command responsibility.[41][42][43]
Legal proceedings of Vadim Shishimarin in Ukraine
[edit]On February 28, 2022, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian Sergeant Vadim Shishimarin shot and killed unarmed civilian Oleksandr Shelipov, a 62 year old Ukrainian man. His trial started on 13 May 2022, and on Wednesday 18 May, Shishimarin pleaded guilty to the killing. On Friday 20 May, Shishimarin's defense lawyer asked for his client to be acquitted of war crimes.[44] He argued that Shishimarin had intended not to kill but only to carry out the order formally, which Shishimarin had refused twice before succumbing to pressure from other soldiers. He further argued that the shots were unaimed, fired from a moving vehicle with a faulty tire, and only one bullet out of the burst hit.[45][46]
Summary
[edit]Date | Preceding context | Jurisdiction / decisionmaker | Defendant(s) or case(s) | [found] "responsible" despite superior orders | [found] "not responsible" because of superior orders |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1474 | the occupation of Breisach | ad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire | Peter von Hagenbach | yes (see details) | |
1921 | World War I | Germany's Supreme Court (trials after World War I) | Lieutenant Karl Neumann and others | yes (see details) | |
1945 | World War II | Nuremberg trials after World War II | all defendants | yes (see details) | |
1998 | preparation for future cases | Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | future cases under Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | in cases of genocide and possibly other cases (see details) | possibly in cases other than genocide (see details) |
2006 | Iraq War | Justice Anne L. Mactavish – Federal Court (Canada) | Jeremy Hinzman (refugee applicant) | equivalent to yes (see details) | |
2022 | Russian invasion of Ukraine | Serhiy Agafonov | Vadim Shishimarin | yes |
Note: Yellow rows indicate the use of the precise plea of superior orders in a war crimes trial, as opposed to events regarding the general concept of superior orders.
Arguments
[edit]The superior orders defense is still used with the following rationale in the following scenario: An "order" may come from one's superior at the level of national law. But according to Nuremberg Principle IV, such an order is sometimes "unlawful" according to international law. Such an "unlawful order" presents a legal dilemma from which there is no legal escape: On one hand, a person who refuses such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment at the national level. On the other hand, a person who accepts such an unlawful order faces the possibility of legal punishment at the international level.
Nuremberg Principle II responds to that dilemma by stating: "The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law."[47]
This might present a legal dilemma, but Nuremberg Principle IV speaks of "a moral choice" as being just as important as legal decisions: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him".
In moral choices or ethical dilemmas a decision is often made by appealing to a "higher ethic". One found in many religions and in secular ethics is the ethic of reciprocity, or Golden Rule. It states that one has a right to just treatment, and therefore has a reciprocal responsibility to ensure justice for others.
Although messengers are not usually responsible for the content of messages, the Babylonian Talmud (3rd to 5th century corpus of Jewish law) states, "There is no messenger in a case of sin."[48] Joseph Telushkin interprets the precept to mean that "if a person is sent to perform an evil act, he cannot defend his behavior by saying he was only acting as another's messenger. ... [T]he person who carries out the evil act bears responsibility for the evil he or she does."[49] This is because God's law (i.e. morality) supersedes human law.
Another argument against the use of the superior orders defense is that it does not follow the traditional legal definitions and categories established under criminal law, where a principal is any actor who is primarily responsible for a criminal offense.[50] Such an actor is distinguished from others who may also be subject to criminal liability as accomplices, accessories or conspirators. (See also the various degrees of liability: absolute liability, strict liability, and mens rea.)
The common argument is that every individual under orders should be bound by law to immediately relieve of command an officer who gives an obviously unlawful order to their troops. This represents a rational check against organizational command hierarchies.
Nuremberg Principle IV, the international law that counters the superior orders defense, is legally supported by the jurisprudence found in certain articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that deal indirectly with conscientious objection. It is also supported by the principles found in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which was issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Those principles deal with the conditions under which conscientious objectors can apply for refugee status in another country if they face persecution in their own for refusing to participate in an illegal war.
Bibliography
[edit]- Yoram Dinstein: The Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders in International Law, Sijthoff-Leyden, 1965.
- Paola Gaeta: The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law, pdf, European Journal of International Law, 1999.
- Matthew Lippman: Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War pdf, Penn State International Law Review, 1996, Volume 15.
See also
[edit]- Corpse-like obedience (Kadavergehorsam)
- Milgram experiment
- Radbruch formula
- Tu quoque defense
- Vicarious liability
References
[edit]- ^ See L.C. Green, Superior Orders in National and International Law, (A. W. Sijthoff International Publishing Co., Netherlands, 1976)
- ^ Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, (Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 1999).
- ^ See James B. Insco, Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 13 DUKEJCIL 389 (Spring, 2003). Asserting in the author's view that a respondeat superior approach to superior orders is an "underinclusive extreme".
- ^ H. T. King Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, Case Western Journal of International Law, Vol. 34. (Fall 2002) at p. 335.e
- ^ "Situation In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo In The Case Of The Prosecutor V. Bosco Ntaganda" (PDF). icc-cpi.int. International Criminal Court. 30 March 2021. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 July 2022. Retrieved 18 October 2022.
- ^ a b The evolution of individual criminal responsibility under international law By Edoardo Greppi, Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Turin, Italy, International Committee of the Red Cross No. 835, p. 531–553, October 30, 1999.
- ^ Exhibit highlights the first international war crimes tribunal by Linda Grant, Harvard Law Bulletin.
- ^ a b An Introduction to the International Criminal Court William A. Schabas, Cambridge University Press, Third Edition
- ^ Command Responsibility The Mens Rea Requirement, By Eugenia Levine, Global Policy Forum, February 2005
- ^ Judge and master By Don Murray, CBC News, July 18, 2002.
- ^ The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitik Archived 2008-09-10 at the Wayback Machine February 10, 2006 Draft by M. Cherif Bassiouni -Distinguished Research Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law, Presented March 14, 2006 as the 38th Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture, Georgia State University College of Law, and to appear in the Georgia State University Law Review
- ^ "Free Man Who Sank a Hospital Ship; Leipsic Judges Acquit Neumann on the Ground That He Acted Under Orders. He Admitted Torpedoing. Prosecutor Demanded Acquittal, Calling Dover Castle Culpable in Carrying Wounded Soldiers". New York Times. June 5, 1921. Retrieved 10 April 2010.
- ^ Sir Andrew Macphail (28 February 2000). "Royal Canadian Naval Medical Service". Great War Primary Documents Archive. Retrieved 2 September 2009.
- ^ "German War Trials: Judgement in Case of Commander Karl Neumann", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 4. (October 1922), pp. 704–708.
- ^ G. A. Finch, "Superior Orders and War Crimes", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3. (July 1921), pp. 440–445.
- ^ "German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt". The American Journal of International Law, vol. 16, no. 4, 1922, pp. 708–724.
- ^ de Zayas, Alfred-Maurice (1989). The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945. University of Nebraska Press. p. 5. ISBN 0-8032-9908-7.
- ^ Crossland, John (2006-01-01). "Churchill: execute Hitler without trial". The Times. Retrieved 2024-05-26.
- ^ Moghalu, K. C. (2006). Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials. Greenwood.
- ^ Militär-Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich, § 47. The difference to the present regulation, as found in the Wehrstrafgesetz § 5, is only marginal, at least as far as the letter of the law is concerned.
- ^ "... wenn ihm bekannt gewesen, daß der Befehl des Vorgesetzten eine Handlung betraf, welche ein bürgerliches oder militärisches Verbrechen oder Vergehen bezweckte", i.e., "... if it was known to him that the superior's order concerned an action that aimed at a civil or military felony or misdemeanor". According to general legal interpretation,[citation needed] "if he knew" means "unless he did not know and had a valid excuse for not knowing".
- ^ Taylor, Telford (1970). Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy. New York: The New York Times Group. p. 15.
The claim that American intervention in Vietnam is itself an aggressive war and therefore criminal - the so-called 'Nuremberg defense' - has been put forward by draft card burners, draftees facing induction and soldiers about to be shipped to Vietnam.
- ^ The Secret in Their Eyes: Historical Memory, Production Models, and the Foreign Film Oscar (WEB EXCLUSIVE) Archived 2012-01-27 at the Wayback Machine Matt Losada, Cineaste Magazine, 2010
- ^ Conadep, Nunca Más Report, Chapter II, Section One:Advertencia, [1] (in Spanish)
- ^ Atrocities in Argentina (1976–1983) Holocaust Museum Houston
- ^ Kellerhoff, Sven Felix (15 July 2015). "Hatten SS-Mitglieder damals wirklich 'keine Wahl'?" [Did SS members really have "no choice"?]. Die Welt (in German). Retrieved 17 October 2018.
- ^ M. R. Lippman, "Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior Orders Defense", Penn State International Law Review, Fall 2001.
- ^ Leora Y. Bilsky, Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial (Law, Meaning, and Violence), University of Michigan Press, 2004, ISBN 0-472-03037-X, pp. 169–197, 310–324.
- ^ Haviv, Itai. "Black Flag". seruv.org.il. Archived from the original on 4 October 2018. Retrieved 18 October 2022.
- ^ Marshall, Burke; Goldstein, Joseph (2 April 1976). "Learning From My Lai: A Proposal on War Crimes". The New York Times. p. 26.
- ^ Powers, Rod. "Military Orders To Obey or Not to Obey?". About.com: US Military. Archived from the original on 5 December 2010. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link) - ^ Brewster, Murray (28 September 2023). "After Parliament's humiliation, Canada has to reckon with its past treatment of Nazis, experts say". CBC News.
- ^ "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Part 3: General Principles of Criminal Law; Article 33: Superior orders and prescription of law". United Nations. 12 July 1999. Retrieved 21 March 2010.
- ^ a b Mernagh, M. (2006-05-18). "AWOL GIs Dealt Legal Blow". Toronto's Now Magazine. Archived from the original on 2011-06-05. Retrieved 2008-06-02.
- ^ "Hinzman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2006 FC 420". Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. pp. (see Held, Para. (1)). Archived from the original on 2009-02-16. Retrieved 2008-06-16.
- ^ Hinzman v. Canada Federal Court decision. Paras (157) and (158). Accessed 2008-06-18
- ^ Goergen, Roman (February 23, 2011). "Sanctuary Denied". In These Times. Retrieved 6 March 2011.
- ^ "Top court refuses to hear cases of U.S. deserters". CBC News. 2007-11-15. Retrieved 2008-06-02.
- ^ Supreme Court of Canada. "Decisions – Bulletin of November 16, 2007". Sections 32111 and 32112. Archived from the original on February 16, 2009.
- ^ "Soldier's Iraq war stance backed: Watada has right to refuse to go, retired officer says", Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 20, 2006.
- ^ "Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law" HTML version by Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, September 15, 2004
- ^ Anne E, Mahle. "Command Responsibility – An International Focus". pbs.org. Public Broadcasting Service. Archived from the original on 8 November 2012. Retrieved 18 October 2022.
- ^ "Command, superior and ministerial responsibility" by Robin Rowland, CBC News Online, May 6, 2004
- ^ "Lawyer asks Kyiv war crimes trial to acquit Russian soldier". Times of Malta. 20 May 2022. Retrieved 2022-05-23.
- ^ "Russian soldier in Ukraine war crimes trial says he did not want to kill". Reuters. 2022-05-20. Retrieved 2022-05-23.
- ^ "Ukraine war: Russian soldier Vadim Shishimarin jailed for life over war crime". BBC News. 2022-05-23. Retrieved 2022-05-23.
- ^ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) References Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950: Introduction
- ^ Kiddushin 42b. Qtd. in Telushkin, The Book of Jewish Values, 330.
- ^ Telushkin, Joseph. The Book of Jewish Values: A Day-By-Day Guide to Ethical Living. New York: Bell Tower, 2000. p. 330
- ^ See, e.g., Superior Growers, 982 F.2d at 177–78; United States v. Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1013 (lst Cir. 1982).