Jump to content

Causes of World War I: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
changed july 2012 to july 1914
dab
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Short description|Explanations, hypotheses and claims for how the war started}}
{{For|the article on the war itself|World War I}}
{{For|the historiographical debate about this topic|Historiography of the causes of World War I}}
[[File:Balkan troubles1.jpg|thumb|Personifications of Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the United Kingdom attempting to keep the lid on the simmering cauldron of imperialist and nationalist tensions in the Balkans to prevent a general European war. They were successful in 1912 and 1913 but did not succeed in in 1914.]]
[[File:WWIchartX.svg|350px|thumb|European diplomatic alignments shortly before the war. The Ottomans joined the [[Central Powers]] shortly after the war started, with Bulgaria joining the following year. Italy remained neutral in 1914 and joined the [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] in 1915.]]
[[File:World War I alliances.png|thumb|350x350px|Map of the world with the participants in World War I {{Circa|1917}}. Allied Powers in blue, Central Powers in orange, and the neutral countries are in grey.]]
{{Events leading to World War I}}
The identification of the '''causes of World War I''' remains a debated issue. [[World War I]] began in the [[Balkans]] on July 28, 1914, and hostilities [[Armistice of 11 November 1918|ended on November 11, 1918]], leaving [[World War I casualties|17 million dead and 25 million wounded]]. Moreover, the [[Russian Civil War]] can in many ways be considered a continuation of World War I, as can various other conflicts in the direct aftermath of 1918.


Scholars looking at the long term seek to explain why two rival sets of powers (the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire, France, and the British Empire) came into conflict by the start of 1914. They look at such factors as political, territorial and economic competition; [[militarism]], a complex web of alliances and alignments; [[imperialism]], the growth of [[nationalism]]; and the power vacuum created by the [[decline of the Ottoman Empire]]. Other important long-term or structural factors that are often studied include unresolved [[territorial dispute]]s, the perceived breakdown of the European [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]],<ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last=Van Evera |first=Stephen |title=The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War |journal=International Security |date=Summer 1984 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=58–107 |jstor=2538636 |doi=10.2307/2538636}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Fischer |first=Fritz |title=War of illusions: German policies from 1911 to 1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=owZoAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA69 |year=1975 |publisher=Chatto and Windus |page=69 |isbn=978-0-3930-5480-4}}</ref> convoluted and fragmented [[governance]], [[arms race]]s and [[security dilemma]]s,<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Snyder |first=Glenn H. |date=1984 |title=The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183 |journal=World Politics |volume=36 |issue=4 |pages=461–495 |doi=10.2307/2010183 |jstor=2010183 |s2cid=154759602 |issn=0043-8871}}</ref><ref name=":12" /> a [[cult of the offensive]],<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Snyder |first=Jack |date=1984 |title=Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538637 |journal=International Security |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=108–146 |doi=10.2307/2538637 |jstor=2538637 |s2cid=55976453 |issn=0162-2889}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Jervis |first=Robert |date=1978 |title=Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958 |journal=World Politics |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=167–214 |doi=10.2307/2009958 |issn=0043-8871 |jstor=2009958 |hdl-access=free |hdl=2027/uc1.31158011478350|s2cid=154923423 }}</ref> and [[military planning]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott D. |title=1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability |journal=International Security |date=Fall 1986 |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=151–175 |jstor=2538961 |doi=10.2307/2538961|s2cid=153783717 }}</ref>
The '''causes of [[World War I]]''', which began in central Europe in late July 1914 and finished in 1918, included many factors, such as the conflicts and hostility of the four decades leading up to the war. [[Militarism]], [[alliance]]s, [[imperialism]], and [[nationalism]] played major roles in the conflict as well. The immediate origins of the war, however, lay in the decisions taken by statesmen and generals during the [[July Crisis|Crisis of 1914]], [[casus belli]] for which was the [[Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria|assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (the Archduke of Austria Hungary) and his wife Sophie]] by [[Gavrilo Princip]], an [[irredentism|irredentist]] [[Serb]].<ref name=Henig2002>{{Cite book | last=Henig | | authorlink=Ruth B. Henig | coauthors= | title=The origins of the First World War | year=2002 | publisher=Routledge | location=London | isbn=0-415-26205-4 | pages=}}</ref>


Scholars seeking short-term analysis focus on the summer of 1914 and ask whether the conflict could have been stopped, or instead whether deeper causes made it inevitable. Among the immediate causes were the decisions made by statesmen and generals during the [[July Crisis]], which was triggered by the [[assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria]] by the [[Bosnian Serb]] nationalist [[Gavrilo Princip]], who had been supported by a nationalist organization in [[Kingdom of Serbia|Serbia]].<ref name="Henig2006">{{cite book |last=Henig |first=Ruth |author-link=Ruth Henig, Baroness Henig |title=The Origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=67iTFLWcsqQC |year=2006 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-85200-0}}</ref> The crisis escalated as the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was joined by their allies Russia, Germany, France, and ultimately [[Belgium]] and the United Kingdom. Other factors that came into play during the diplomatic crisis leading up to the war included misperceptions of intent (such as the German belief that Britain would remain neutral), the fatalistic belief that war was inevitable, and the speed with which the crisis escalated, partly due to delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications.
The crisis came after a long and difficult series of diplomatic clashes between the [[Great Powers]] (Italy, France, Germany, the British Empire, the Austria-Hungarian Empire and Russia) over European and colonial issues in the decade before 1914 that had left tensions high. In turn these diplomatic clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe since 1867.<ref>{{Cite book | last=Lieven | first=D. C. B. | authorlink=D. C. B. Lieven | coauthors= | title=Russia and the origins of the First World War | year=1983 | publisher=St. Martin's Press | location=New York | isbn=0-312-69608-6 | pages=}}</ref> The more immediate cause for the war was tensions over territory in the [[Balkans]]. [[Austria-Hungary]] competed with [[Serbia]] and [[Russia]] for territory and influence in the region and they pulled the rest of the Great Powers into the conflict through their various alliances and treaties.


The crisis followed a series of diplomatic clashes among the [[Great Powers]] ([[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]], [[French Third Republic|France]], [[German Empire|Germany]], [[British Empire|United Kingdom]], [[Austria-Hungary]] and [[Russian Empire|Russia]]) over European and [[colonialism|colonial issues]] in the decades before 1914 that had left tensions high. And the cause of the public clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe that had been taking place since 1867.<ref>{{cite book |last=Lieven |first=D. C. B. |author-link=Dominic Lieven |title=Russia and the Origins of the First World War |url=https://archive.org/details/russiaoriginsoff0000liev |url-access=registration |year=1983 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=978-0-312-69611-5}}</ref>
Although the chain of events unleashed by the assassination triggered the war, the war's origins go deeper, involving national politics, cultures, economics, and a complex web of alliances and counterbalances that had developed between the various European powers since 1870. Some of the most important long term or structural causes are: the growth of [[nationalism]] across Europe, unresolved territorial disputes, an intricate system of alliances, the perceived breakdown of the balance of power in Europe,<ref>Van Evera, Stephen. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." (Summer 1984), p. 62.</ref><ref>Fischer, Fritz. "War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914." trans. (1975), p. 69.</ref> convoluted and fragmented governance, the [[arms race]]s of the previous decades, previous military planning,<ref>Sagan, Scott D. ''1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability'' (1986)</ref> imperial and colonial rivalry for wealth, power and prestige, and economic and military rivalry in industry and trade – e.g., the ''[[Pig War (Serbia)|Pig War]]'' between Austria and Serbia. Other causes that came into play during the diplomatic crisis that preceded the war included misperceptions of intent (e.g., the German belief that the United Kingdom would remain neutral) and delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications.


Consensus on the origins of the war [[Historiography of the causes of World War I|remains elusive]], since historians disagree on key factors and place differing emphasis on a variety of factors. That is compounded by [[Historical revisionism|historical arguments changing over time]], particularly as classified historical archives become available, and as perspectives and ideologies of historians have changed. The deepest division among historians is between those who see Germany and Austria-Hungary as having driven events and those who focus on power dynamics among a wider set of actors and circumstances. Secondary fault lines exist between those who believe that Germany deliberately planned a European war, those who believe that the war was largely unplanned but was still caused principally by Germany and Austria-Hungary taking risks, and those who believe that some or all of the other powers (Russia, France, Serbia, United Kingdom) played a more significant role in causing the war than has been traditionally suggested.
The various categories of explanation for World War I correspond to different historians' overall [[Historiography#Approaches to history|methods]]. Most historians and popular commentators include causes from more than one category of explanation to provide a rounded account of the causes of the war. The deepest distinction among these accounts is between stories that see it as the inevitable and predictable outcome of certain factors, and those that describe it as an arbitrary and unfortunate mistake{{Citation needed|date=April 2007}}.


== Immediate causes ==
In attributing causes for the war, historians and academics had to deal with an unprecedented flood of memoirs and official documents, released as each country involved tried to avoid blame for starting the war. Early releases of information by governments, particularly those released for use by the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War" were shown to be incomplete and biased. In addition some documents, especially diplomatic cables between Russia and France, were found to have been doctored. Even in later decades however, when much more information had been released, historians from the same culture have been shown to come to differing conclusions on the causes of the war.<ref>Albertini (1965) page viii</ref>


=== Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists, 28 June 1914 ===
== Background ==
{{Main|Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand}}
In November 1912, Russia was humiliated because of its inability to support Serbia during the [[Bosnian crisis]] of 1908 or the [[First Balkan War]], and announced a major reconstruction of its military.
[[File:19140629 Austria Will Avenge Murder - The Winnipeg Tribune (compacted view).jpg|thumb|right|upright=2.0| Grave implications of the assassination were immediately recognized, as in this 29 June article with subtitles "War Sequel?" and "War May Result", and stating the assassination was "engineered by persons having a more mature organizing ability than that of the youthful assassins".<ref name="WinnipegTrib_19140629">{{cite news |date=29 June 1914 |title=Austria Will Avenge Murder |page=1 |work=The Winnipeg Tribune |url=https://newspaperarchive.com/browse/ca/mb/winnipeg/winnipeg-tribune/1914/jun-29-p-1/}}</ref>]]
On 28 June 1914, [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand]], the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, [[Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg]], were shot dead after a wrong turn by two gun shots<ref>{{Cite book |last=Martin |first=Connor |title=Bang! Europe At War. |year=2017 |isbn=9781389913839 |location=United Kingdom |pages=20}}</ref> in Sarajevo by [[Gavrilo Princip]], one of a group of six assassins (five Serbs and one Bosniak) co-ordinated by [[Danilo Ilić]], a [[Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian Serb]] and a member of the [[Black Hand (Serbia)|Black Hand]] secret society.


The assassination was significant because it was perceived by Austria-Hungary as an existential challenge and so was viewed as providing a ''[[casus belli]]'' with Serbia. [[Franz Joseph I of Austria|Emperor Franz Josef]] was eighty-four and so the assassination of his heir, so soon before he was likely to hand over the crown, was seen as a direct challenge to the empire. Many ministers in Austria, especially Berchtold, argued that the act must be avenged.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Martin |first=Connor |title=Bang! Europe At War. |year=2017 |isbn=9781389913839 |location=United Kingdom |pages=23}}</ref>
On November 28, German Foreign Secretary [[Gottlieb von Jagow]] told the [[Reichstag (German Empire)|Reichstag]] (the German parliament), that "If Austria is forced, for whatever reason, to fight for its position as a Great Power, then we must stand by her."<ref name=Fromkin88-92>{{Cite book | last=Fromkin | first=David | authorlink=David Fromkin | coauthors= | title=Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914? | date= | publisher=New York : Knopf : 2004. | location= | isbn=978-0-375-41156-4 | pages=88–92}}</ref> As a result, [[United Kingdom|British]] Foreign Secretary Sir [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]] responded by warning [[Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky|Prince Karl Lichnowsky]], the [[Germany]] Ambassador in London, that if Germany offered Austria a "blank cheque" for war in the Balkans, then "the consequences of such a policy would be incalculable." To reinforce this point, [[Richard Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane|R. B. Haldane]], the [[Germanophile]] Lord Chancellor, met with [[Prince Lichnowsky]] to offer an explicit warning that if Germany were to attack [[France]], [[United Kingdom|Britain]] would intervene in France's favor.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" />


=== July Crisis ===
With the recently announced Russian military reconstruction and certain British communications, the possibility of war was a leading topic at the [[German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912]] in [[Berlin]], an informal meeting of some of Germany's top military leadership called on short notice by the [[Wilhelm II, German Emperor|Kaiser]].<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> Attending the conference were Kaiser Wilhelm II, Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]] – the Naval State Secretary, Admiral [[Georg Alexander von Müller]], the Chief of the [[German Imperial Naval Cabinet]] (Marinekabinett), [[Helmuth von Moltke the Younger|General von Moltke]] – the Army's Chief of Staff, Admiral [[August von Heeringen]] - the Chief of the [[Oberkommando der Marine|Naval General Staff]] and General [[Moriz von Lyncker]], the Chief of the [[German Imperial Military Cabinet]].<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> The presence of the leaders of both the German Army and Navy at this War Council attests to its importance. However, Chancellor [[Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg]] and General [[Josias von Heeringen]], the [[Prussian Minister of War]], were not invited.<ref>The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany by John C. G. Röhl; Translated by Terence F. Cole, Cambridge University Press; 288 pages. p. 257.</ref>
{{Excerpt|July Crisis|only=paragraph|paragraphs=3-5|this=The following is}}


== Polarization of Europe, 1887–1914 ==
Wilhelm II called British balance of power principles "idiocy," but agreed that Haldane's statement was a "desirable clarification" of British policy.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> His opinion was that Austria should attack Serbia that December, and if "Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently does&nbsp;... then war would be unavoidable for us, too," <ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> and that would be better than going to war after Russia completed the massive modernization and expansion of their army that they had just begun. Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion "a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better".<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> Moltke "wanted to launch an immediate attack".<ref name=Rohl29-32>{{Cite book | last=Röhl | first=John C G | authorlink=John C G Röhl | coauthors= | title=1914: Delusion or Design | date= | publisher=Elek | location= | isbn=0-236-15466-4 | pages=29–32}}</ref>
In August 1914, ''[[The Independent (New York City)|The Independent]]'' magazine described the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife in June as a "deplorable but relatively insignificant" reason for which.<ref name="independent19140810">{{Cite magazine |date=1914-08-10 |title=The Forces Behind the Conflict |url=https://archive.org/details/independen79v80newy/page/n201/mode/1up |magazine=The Independent |page=196 |access-date=2022-05-17}}</ref>


{{blockquote|the financial system of the world is in chaos, that international commerce is suspended, that industries are everywhere demoralized and families ruined, and that millions of men in Europe have taken up arms with the intent to slaughter each other.}}
Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon. Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a "postponement of the great fight for one and a half years" <ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> because the Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of the construction of the U-boat base at [[Heligoland]] and the widening of the [[Kiel Canal]] were the Navy's prerequisites for war.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> As the British historian [[John Röhl]] has commented, the date for completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914.<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> Moltke "agreed to a postponement only reluctantly."<ref name="Rohl29-32" />


"It may be doubted whether the Archduke [is] worth all this carnage", the magazine added. It discussed and dismissed ethnicity, race, religion, and national interests as motivations for war. ''The Independent'' concluded that "such is the ridiculous and tragical situation resulting from the survival of the antiquated superstition of the '[[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]],' that is, the theory that the prosperity of one nation was an injury to others":{{r|independent19140810}}
Historians more sympathetic to the government of Wilhelm II often reject the importance of this War Council as only showing the thinking and recommendations of those present, with no decisions taken. They often cite the passage from [[Georg Alexander von Müller|Admiral Müller]]'s diary, which states: "That was the end of the conference. The result amounted to nothing."<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> Certainly the only decision taken was to do nothing.


{{blockquote|Most of the people concerned in the present conflict have neither racial antagonism nor economic interests as an excuse for enmity. They are no more enemies than the [[red team|Reds and the Blues]] into which an army corps is divided for practice maneuvers. But now the guns are loaded and those who bear them have nothing to say about whom they shall shoot.}}
Historians more sympathetic to the Entente, such as British historian [[John Röhl]], sometimes rather ambitiously interpret these words of Admiral Müller (an advocate of launching a war soon) as saying that "nothing" was decided for 1912–13, but that war was decided on for the summer of 1914.<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> Röhl is on safer ground when he argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision—which it clearly did not—it did nonetheless offer a clear view of their intentions,<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> or at least their thoughts, which were that if there was going to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit.<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> Entente sympathetic historians such as Röhl see this conference, in which "The result amounted to nothing,"<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> as setting a clear deadline for a war to begin, namely the summer of 1914.<ref name="Rohl29-32" />


"The only unexpected thing about the present European war is the date of it", the magazine added later that month:<ref name="independent19140817">{{Cite magazine |date=1914-08-17 |title=Anglo-German Antagonism |url=https://archive.org/details/independen79v80newy/page/n234/mode/1up?view=theater |magazine=The Independent |pages=229–230 |access-date=2022-05-17}}</ref>
With the November 1912 announcement of the Russian Great Military Programme, the leadership of the German Army began clamoring even more strongly for a "preventive war" against Russia.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /><ref name="Fromkin260-62">{{Cite book | last=Fromkin | first=David | authorlink=David Fromkin | coauthors= | title=Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914? | date= | publisher=New York : Knopf : 2004. | location= | isbn=978-0-375-41156-4 | pages=260–62}}</ref> Moltke declared that Germany could not win the arms race with France, Britain and Russia, which she herself had begun in 1911, because the financial structure of the German state, which gave the ''Reich'' government little power to tax, meant Germany would bankrupt herself in an arms race.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" /> As such, Moltke from late 1912 onwards was the leading advocate for a general war, and the sooner the better.<ref name="Fromkin88-92" />


{{blockquote|No war in history has been so long anticipated, so carefully prepared for and so thoroughly discussed, not only in the privy councils, but in the press of all nations. Every European soldier knew where his uniform and rifle were stored; he also thought he knew as well where he was to fight, with whom he was to fight and when.}}
Throughout May and June 1914, Moltke engaged in an "almost ultimative" demand for a German "preventive war" against Russia in 1914.<ref name="Rohl29-32" /> The German Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, reported on a discussion with Moltke at the end of May 1914: <blockquote>"Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near future." <ref name="Rohl29-32" /></blockquote>


To understand the long-term origins of the war in 1914, it is essential to understand how the powers formed into two competing sets that shared common aims and enemies. Both sets became, by August 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France, and Britain on the other side.
The new French President [[Raymond Poincaré]], who took office in 1913, was favourable to improving relations with Germany.<ref name=Fromkin80-82>{{Cite book | last=Fromkin | first=David | authorlink=David Fromkin | coauthors= | title=Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914? | date= | publisher=New York : Knopf : 2004. | location= | isbn=978-0-375-41156-4 | pages=80–82}}</ref> In January 1914 Poincaré became the first French President to dine at the German Embassy in Paris.<ref name="Fromkin80-82" /> Poincaré was more interested in the idea of French expansion in the Middle East than a war of revenge to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Had the ''Reich'' been interested in improved relations with France before August 1914, the opportunity was available, but the leadership of the Reich lacked such interests, and preferred a policy of war to destroy France. Because of France's smaller economy and population, by 1913 French leaders had largely accepted that France by itself could never defeat Germany.<ref>Howard, Michael "Europe on the Eve of the First World War" pages&nbsp;21–34 from ''The Outbreak of World War I'' edited by Holger Herwig, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997 page 26</ref>


=== German realignment to Austria-Hungary and Russian realignment to France, 1887–1892 ===
In May 1914, Serbian politics were polarized between two factions, one headed by the Prime Minister [[Nikola Pašić]], and the other by the radical nationalist chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel [[Dragutin Dimitrijević]], known by his codename Apis.<ref name=Fromkin124-25>{{Cite book | last=Fromkin | first=David | authorlink=David Fromkin | coauthors= | title=Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914? | date= | publisher=New York : Knopf : 2004. | location= | isbn=978-0-375-41156-4 | pages=124–25}}</ref> In that month, due to Colonel Dimitrigjevic's intrigues, King [[Peter I of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes|Peter]] dismissed Pašić's government.<ref name="Fromkin124-25" /> The Russian Minister in Belgrade intervened to have Pašić's government restored.<ref name="Fromkin124-25" /> Pašić, though he often talked tough in public, knew that Serbia was near-bankrupt and, having suffered heavy casualties in the Balkan Wars and in the suppression of a December 1913 Albanian revolt in Kosovo, needed peace.<ref name="Fromkin124-25" /> Since Russia also favoured peace in the Balkans, from the Russian viewpoint it was desirable to keep Pašić in power.<ref name="Fromkin124-25" /> It was in the midst of this political crisis that politically powerful members of the Serbian military armed and trained three Bosnian students as assassins and sent them into Austria-Hungary.<ref>Dedijer, Vladimir. ''The Road to Sarajevo,'' Simon and Schuster, New York, 1966, p 398</ref>
{{Main|Dual Alliance (1879)|Franco-Russian Alliance}}
{{Overlay legend
|image=Map of Bismarcks alliances-en.svg
|width=400
|height=238
|float=right
|grid=no
|legend1title=Map of Bismarck's alliances
|overlay1 = [[Dual Alliance (1879)]]
|overlay1colour = green
|overlay1left = 125
|overlay1top = 80
|overlay2 = [[League of the Three Emperors|League of the Three Emperors (1881)]]
|overlay2colour = orange
|overlay2left = 205
|overlay2top = 95
|overlay3 = [[Triple Alliance (1882)]]
|overlay3colour = saddlebrown
|overlay3left = 150
|overlay3top = 135
|overlay4 = [[Reinsurance Treaty|Reinsurance Treaty (1887)]]
|overlay4colour = blue
|overlay4left = 225
|overlay4top = 45
}}
In 1887, German and Russian alignment was secured by means of a secret [[Reinsurance Treaty]] arranged by [[Otto von Bismarck]]. However, in 1890, Bismarck fell from power, and the treaty was allowed to lapse in favor of the [[Dual Alliance (1879)]] between Germany and Austria-Hungary. That development was attributed to Count [[Leo von Caprivi]], the Prussian general who replaced Bismarck as chancellor. It is claimed that Caprivi recognized a personal inability to manage the European system as his predecessor had and so was counseled by contemporary figures such as [[Friedrich von Holstein]] to follow a more logical approach, as opposed to Bismarck's complex and even duplicitous strategy.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=The Ashgate Research Companion to Imperial Germany|last=Jefferies|first=Matthew|publisher=Ashgate Publishing|year=2015|isbn=9781409435518|location=Oxon|pages=355}}</ref> Thus, the treaty with Austria-Hungary was concluded despite the Russian willingness to amend the Reinsurance Treaty and to sacrifice a provision referred to as the "very secret additions"<ref name=":0" /> that concerned the [[Turkish Straits]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=MacFie|first=A. L.|date=1983|title=The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18|jstor=4282922|journal=Middle Eastern Studies|volume=19|issue=1|pages=43–74|doi=10.1080/00263208308700533}}</ref>


Caprivi's decision was also driven by the belief that the Reinsurance Treaty was no longer needed to ensure Russian neutrality if France attacked Germany, and the treaty would even preclude an offensive against France.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon|last=Gardner|first=Hall|publisher=Ashgate Publishing|year=2015|isbn=9781472430564|location=Burlington, VT|pages=86–88}}</ref> Lacking the capacity for Bismarck's strategic ambiguity, Caprivi pursued a policy that was oriented towards "getting Russia to accept Berlin's promises on good faith and to encourage [[St. Petersburg]] to engage in a direct understanding with Vienna, without a written accord."<ref name=":1" /> By 1882, the Dual Alliance was expanded to include Italy.<ref>{{Cite book|title=A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change|last1=Bideleux|first1=Robert|last2=Jeffries|first2=Ian|publisher=Routledge|year=1998|isbn=978-0415161114|location=London|pages=348}}</ref> In response, Russia secured in the same year the [[Franco-Russian Alliance]], a strong military relationship that was to last until 1917. That move was prompted by Russia's need for an ally since it was experiencing a major famine and a rise in antigovernment revolutionary activities.<ref name=":1" /> The alliance was gradually built throughout the years from when Bismarck refused the sale of Russian bonds in [[Berlin]], which drove Russia to the [[Paris]] capital market.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Europe 1850-1914: Progress, Participation and Apprehension|last=Sperber|first=Jonathan|publisher=Routledge|year=2014|isbn=9781405801348|location=London|pages=211}}</ref> That began the expansion of Russian and French financial ties, which eventually helped elevate the Franco-Russian entente to the diplomatic and military arenas.
== Domestic political factors ==


Caprivi's strategy appeared to work when, during the outbreak of the [[Bosnian crisis]] of 1908, Germany successfully demanded that Russia step back and demobilize.<ref>{{Cite book|title=ANZACs in Arkhangel|last=Challinger|first=Michael|publisher=Hardie Grant Publishing|year=2010|isbn=9781740667517|location=Melbourne|pages=2}}</ref> When Germany asked Russia the same thing later, Russia refused, which finally helped precipitate the war.

=== French distrust of Germany ===
{{Main|French entry into World War I}}
[[File:A new legend in an old dress - Keppler. LCCN2012647516.jpg|thumb|250px|American cartoon showing territorial dispute between France and Germany over [[Alsace-Lorraine]], 1898]]

Some of the distant origins of World War I can be seen in the results and consequences of the [[Franco-Prussian War]] in 1870 and 1871 and the concurrent [[unification of Germany]]. Germany had won decisively and established a powerful empire, but France fell into chaos and experienced a years-long decline in its military power. A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany after the German annexation of [[Alsace-Lorraine]]. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge that was known as [[revanchism]]. French sentiment was based on a desire to avenge military and territorial losses and the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power.<ref>Jean-Marie Mayeur, and Madeleine Rebirioux, ''The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914'' (1988)</ref> Bismarck was wary of the French desire for revenge and achieved peace by isolating France and by balancing the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. During his later years, he tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained.<ref>G. P. Gooch, ''Franco-German Relations, 1871–1914'' (1923).</ref>

France eventually recovered from its defeat, paid its war indemnity, and rebuilt its military strength. However, France was smaller than Germany in terms of population and industry and therefore many French felt insecure next to a more powerful neighbor.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Hewitson | first1 = Mark | year = 2000 | title = Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy | journal = English Historical Review | volume = 115 | issue = 462| pages = 570–606 | doi=10.1093/ehr/115.462.570}}</ref> By the 1890s, the desire for revenge over Alsace-Lorraine was no longer a major factor for the leaders of France but remained a force in public opinion. [[Jules Cambon]], the French ambassador to Berlin (1907–1914), worked hard to secure a détente, but the French government realized that Berlin was trying to weaken the Triple Entente and at the best, was not sincere in seeking peace. The French consensus was that war was inevitable.<ref>John Keiger, ''France and the Origins of the First World War'' (1985). p. 81.</ref>

=== British alignment towards France and Russia, 1898–1907: The Triple Entente ===
{{Main|Entente Cordiale|Anglo-Russian Convention|Triple Entente}}
After Bismarck's removal in 1890, French efforts to isolate Germany became successful. With the formation of the informal [[Triple Entente]], Germany began to feel encircled.<ref>Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered," ''Foreign Policy Analysis'' 7#2 (2011): 205-214.</ref> French Foreign Minister [[Théophile Delcassé]] went to great pains to woo Russia and Britain. Key markers were the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, the 1904 [[Entente Cordiale]] with Britain, and the 1907 [[Anglo-Russian Convention]], which led to the Triple Entente. France's informal alignment with Britain and its formal alliance with Russia against Germany and Austria eventually led Russia and Britain to enter World War I as France's allies.<ref>Taylor, ''The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918'' (1954) pp 345, 403–26</ref><ref>GP Gooch, ''Before the war: studies in diplomacy'' (1936), chapter on Delcassé pp. 87-186.</ref>

Britain abandoned its policy of [[splendid isolation]] in the 1900s, after it had been isolated during the [[Second Boer War]]. Britain concluded agreements, limited to colonial affairs, with its two major colonial rivals: the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Some historians see Britain's alignment as principally a reaction to an assertive German foreign policy and the buildup of its navy from 1898 that led to the [[Anglo-German naval arms race]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Strachan |first=Hew |title=The First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KZHITOPMf4gC |year=2005|publisher=Penguin |isbn=9781101153413 }}</ref><ref>J.A. Spender, ''Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents'' (1933) pp. 212-221.</ref>

Other scholars, most notably [[Niall Ferguson]], argue that Britain chose France and Russia over Germany because Germany was too weak an ally to provide an effective counterbalance to the other powers and could not provide Britain with the imperial security that was achieved by the Entente agreements.{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999}} In the words of the British diplomat [[Arthur Nicolson, 1st Baron Carnock|Arthur Nicolson]], it was "far more disadvantageous to us to have an unfriendly France and Russia than an unfriendly Germany."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=324}} Ferguson argues that the British government rejected German alliance overtures "not because Germany began to pose a threat to Britain, but, on the contrary because they realized she did not pose a threat."{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|p=53}} The impact of the Triple Entente was therefore twofold by improving British relations with France and its ally, Russia, and showing the importance to Britain of good relations with Germany. It was "not that antagonism toward Germany caused its isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=159}}

The Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia is often compared to the [[Triple Alliance (1882)|Triple Alliance]] between Germany, Austria–Hungary and Italy, but historians caution against that comparison as simplistic. The Entente, in contrast to the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defence, and so in 1914 Britain felt free to make its own foreign policy decisions. As the [[British Foreign Office]] official [[Eyre Crowe]] minuted: "The fundamental fact of course is that the ''Entente'' is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the ''Entente'' is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content."<ref>{{cite book |last=Hamilton |first=K.A. |editor-last=Hinsley |editor-first=F.H. |title=British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VJ08AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA324 |year=1977 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-21347-9 |page=[https://archive.org/details/britishforeignpo0000unse/page/324 324] |chapter=Great Britain and France, 1911–1914 |url=https://archive.org/details/britishforeignpo0000unse/page/324 }}</ref>

A series of diplomatic incidents between 1905 and 1914 heightened tensions between the Great Powers and reinforced the existing alignments, beginning with the First Moroccan Crisis.

=== First Moroccan Crisis, 1905–06: Strengthening the Entente ===
{{Main|First Moroccan Crisis}}
The [[First Moroccan Crisis]] was an international dispute between March 1905 and May 1906 over the status of Morocco. The crisis worsened German relations with both France and Britain, and helped ensure the success of the new Entente Cordiale. In the words of the historian [[Christopher Clark]], "The Anglo-French Entente was strengthened rather than weakened by the German challenge to France in Morocco."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=157}} Due to this crisis, [[Spain]] turned to the United Kingdom and France, and signed the [[Pact of Cartagena]] of 1907. Spain received British help to build the new [[España-class battleship]].

=== Bosnian Crisis, 1908: Worsening relations of Russia and Serbia with Austria-Hungary ===
{{Main|Bosnian crisis}}

In 1908, Austria-Hungary announced its [[Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina|annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina]], provinces in the [[Balkans]]. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been nominally under the sovereignty of the [[Ottoman Empire]] but administered by Austria-Hungary since the [[Congress of Berlin]] in 1878. The announcement upset the fragile balance of power in the Balkans and enraged Serbia and [[Pan-Slavism|pan-Slavic nationalists]] throughout Europe. The weakened Russia was forced to submit to its humiliation, but its foreign office still viewed Austria-Hungary's actions as overly aggressive and threatening. Russia's response was to encourage pro-Russian and [[anti-Austrian sentiment]] in Serbia and other Balkan provinces, provoking Austrian fears of Slavic expansionism in the region.<ref>J. A. Spender, ''Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents'' (1933) pp 297-312</ref>

===Agadir crisis in Morocco, 1911===
{{Main|Agadir crisis}}
[[File:French troops in Morocco during the Agadir Crisis, March 30, 1912.jpg|thumb|250px|French troops in Morocco, 1912]]

Imperial rivalries pushed France, Germany, and Britain to compete for control of Morocco, leading to a short-lived war scare in 1911. In the end, France established a [[French protectorate in Morocco|protectorate over Morocco]] that increased European tensions. The [[Agadir Crisis]] resulted from the deployment of a substantial force of French troops into the interior of Morocco in April 1911. Germany reacted by sending the gunboat {{SMS|Panther|1901|6}} to the Moroccan port of [[Agadir]] on 1 July 1911. The main result was deeper suspicion between London and Berlin and closer military ties between London and Paris.<ref>Margaret MacMillan, ''The War That Ended Peace''. pp. 438-65.</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Falls | first1 = Nigel | date = January 2007 | title = The Panther at Agadir |url=https://www.historytoday.com/archive/panther-agadir |url-access=subscription | journal = History Today | volume = 57 | issue = 1| pages = 33–37}}</ref>

British backing of France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries and with Russia, increased Anglo-German estrangement, and deepened the divisions that would erupt in 1914.<ref>Sidney B. Fay (1930), ''The Origins of the World War'' (2nd ed.): 1:290–293.</ref> In terms of internal British jousting, the crisis was part of a five-year struggle inside the British cabinet between Radical isolationists and the [[Liberal Party (UK)|Liberal Party]]'s imperialist interventionists. The interventionists sought to use the Triple Entente to contain German expansion. The Radical isolationists obtained an agreement for official cabinet approval of all initiatives that might lead to war. However, the interventionists were joined by the two leading Radicals, [[David Lloyd George]] and [[Winston Churchill]]. Lloyd George's famous [[Mansion House speech]] of 21 July 1911 angered the Germans and encouraged the French.<ref>Keith Wilson, "The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements." ''Historical Journal'' 15.3 (1972): 513–532. {{JSTOR|2637768}}.</ref>

The crisis led British Foreign Secretary [[Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon|Edward Grey]], a Liberal, and French leaders to make a secret naval agreement by which the Royal Navy would protect the northern coast of France from German attack, and France agreed to concentrate the [[French Navy]] in the [[western Mediterranean]] and to protect British interests there. France was thus able to guard its communications with its [[French North Africa|North African colonies]], and Britain to concentrate more force in [[Exclusive economic zone of the United Kingdom|home waters]] to oppose the [[German High Seas Fleet]]. The British cabinet was not informed of the agreement until August 1914. Meanwhile, the episode strengthened the hand of German Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]], who was calling for a greatly-increased navy and obtained it in 1912.<ref>J.A. Spender, ''Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents'' (1933). pp. 329–40.</ref>

The American historian [[Raymond James Sontag]] argues that Agadir was a comedy of errors that became a tragic prelude to the World War I:

<blockquote>The crisis seems comic—its obscure origin, the questions at stake, the conduct of the actors—all comic. The results were tragic. Tension between France and Germany and between Germany and England have been increased; the armaments race receive new impetus; the conviction that an early war was inevitable spread through the governing class of Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sontag |first=Raymond James |date=1933 |title=European Diplomatic History 1871—1930 |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503351 |url-access=registration |series=The Century Historical Series |location=New York |publisher=Appleton-Century-Crofts |page=[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.503351/page/n175/mode/2up p. 160] |lccn=33004046 |oclc=397267 |access-date=28 June 2024}}</ref></blockquote>

=== Italo-Turkish War: Isolation of the Ottomans, 1911–1912 ===
{{Main|Italo-Turkish War}}
[[File:Kurmay Binbaşı Mustafa Kemal, Mücahit Bedevi Kuvvetleri önünde emirlerini yazdırırken.jpg|thumb|[[Mustafa Kemal Atatürk|Mustafa Kemal]] (left) with an Ottoman military officer and [[Bedouin]] forces in [[Derna, Libya|Derna]], [[Tripolitania Vilayet]], 1912]]

In the [[Italo-Turkish War]], the [[Kingdom of Italy]] defeated the Ottoman Empire in North Africa in 1911–1912.<ref>William C. Askew, ''Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911–1912'' (1942) [https://www.questia.com/read/3044731/europe-and-italy-s-acquisition-of-libya-1911-1912 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616053907/https://www.questia.com/read/3044731/europe-and-italy-s-acquisition-of-libya-1911-1912 |date=2018-06-16 }}</ref> Italy easily captured the important coastal cities, but [[Royal Italian Army|its army]] failed to advance far into the interior. Italy captured the Ottoman [[Tripolitania Vilayet]], a province whose most notable subprovinces, or sanjaks, were [[Fezzan]], [[Cyrenaica]], and [[Tripoli, Libya|Tripoli]] itself. The territories together formed what was later known as [[Italian Libya]]. The main significance for World War I was that it was now clear that no Great Power still appeared to wish to support the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for the [[Balkan Wars]]. Christopher Clark stated, "Italy launched a war of conquest on an African province of the Ottoman Empire, triggering a chain of opportunistic assaults on Ottoman territories across the Balkans. The system of geographical balances that had enabled local conflicts to be contained was swept away." {{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=242}}

=== Balkan Wars, 1912–13: Growth of Serbian and Russian power ===
{{Main|Balkan Wars}}
The Balkan Wars were two conflicts that took place in the [[Balkan Peninsula]] in southeastern Europe in 1912 and 1913. Four Balkan states defeated the Ottoman Empire in the [[First Balkan War|first war]]; one of them, Bulgaria, was defeated in the [[Second Balkan War|second war]]. The Ottoman Empire lost nearly all of its territory in Europe. Austria-Hungary, although not a combatant, was weakened, as a much-enlarged [[Kingdom of Serbia]] pushed for union of all [[South Slavs]].

The Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 increased international tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary. It also led to a strengthening of Serbia and a weakening of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which might otherwise have kept Serbia under control, thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe toward Russia.

Russia initially agreed to avoid territorial changes, but later in 1912, it supported Serbia's demand for an Albanian port. The [[London Conference of 1912–13]] agreed to create an independent [[Albania]], but both Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After an Austrian and then an international naval demonstration in early 1912 and Russia's withdrawal of support, Serbia backed down. Montenegro was not as compliant, and on May 2, the Austrian council of ministers met and decided to give Montenegro a last chance to comply, or it would resort to military action. However, seeing the Austro-Hungarian military preparations, the Montenegrins requested for the ultimatum to be delayed, and they complied.{{sfnp|Williamson|1991|pp=125–140}}

[[File:Guerre balcaniche.png|thumb|right|Territorial gains of the Balkan states after the Balkan Wars]]
The Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, now demanded for the other spoils of the [[First Balkan War]] to be reapportioned, and Russia failed to pressure Serbia to back down. Serbia and Greece allied against Bulgaria, which responded with a pre-emptive strike against their forces and so began the [[Second Balkan War]].{{sfnp|Williamson|1991|pp=143-145}} The Bulgarian army crumbled quickly after the Ottoman Empire and Romania joined the war.

The Balkan Wars strained the German alliance with Austria-Hungary. The attitude of the German government to Austro-Hungarian requests of support against Serbia was initially divided and inconsistent. After the German [[Imperial War Council]] of 8 December 1912, it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-Hungary in a war against Serbia and its likely allies.

In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and pro-Romanian and against Austria-Hungary's increasing pro-Bulgarian sympathies. The result was tremendous damage to relations between both empires. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister [[Leopold von Berchtold]] remarked to the German ambassador, [[Heinrich von Tschirschky]] in July 1913, "Austria-Hungary might as well belong 'to the other grouping' for all the good Berlin had been."{{sfnp|Williamson|1991|pp=147-149}}

In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia was moving into Albania, and Russia was doing nothing to restrain it, and the Serbian government would not guarantee to respect Albania's territorial integrity and suggested that some frontier modifications would occur. In October 1913, the council of ministers decided to send Serbia a warning followed by an ultimatum for Germany and Italy to be notified of some action and asked for support and for spies to be sent to report if there was an actual withdrawal. Serbia responded to the warning with defiance, and the ultimatum was dispatched on October 17 and received the following day. It demanded for Serbia to evacuate from Albania within eight days. After Serbia complied, the Kaiser made a congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year.{{sfnp|Williamson|1991|pp=151-154}}

By then, Russia had mostly recovered from its defeat in the [[Russo-Japanese War]], and the calculations of Germany and Austria were driven by a fear that Russia would eventually become too strong to be challenged. The conclusion was that any war with Russia had to occur within the next few years to have any chance of success.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Wohlforth |first=William C. |title=The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance |journal=[[World Politics]] |volume=39 |issue=3 |pages=353–381 |date=April 1987 |url=http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/wohlwforth%20perceptions%20of%20power%20russia.pdf |jstor=2010224 |doi=10.2307/2010224 |s2cid=53333300 |access-date=2016-02-05 |archive-date=2018-05-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180517100519/http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/wohlwforth%20perceptions%20of%20power%20russia.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>

=== Franco-Russian Alliance changes to Balkan inception scenario, 1911–1913 ===
The original Franco-Russian alliance was formed to protect both France and Russia from a German attack. In the event of such an attack, both states would mobilize in tandem, placing Germany under the threat of a [[two-front war]]. However, there were limits placed on the alliance so that it was essentially defensive in character.

Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s, the French and the Russians made clear the limits of the alliance did not extend to provocations caused by each other's adventurous foreign policy. For example, Russia warned France that the alliance would not operate if the French provoked the Germans in North Africa. Equally, the French insisted that the Russians should not use the alliance to provoke Austria-Hungary or Germany in the Balkans and that France did not recognize in the Balkans a vital strategic interest for France or Russia.

That changed in the last 18 to 24 months before the outbreak of the war. At the end of 1911, particularly during the [[Balkan Wars]] in 1912–1913, the French view changed to accept the importance of the Balkans to Russia. Moreover, France clearly stated that if, as a result of a conflict in the Balkans, war broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, France would stand by Russia. Thus, the alliance changed in character and Serbia now became a security salient for Russia and France. A war of Balkan inception, regardless of who started such a war, would cause the alliance to respond by viewing the conflict as a ''[[casus foederis]]'', a trigger for the alliance. [[Christopher Clark]] described that change as "a very important development in the pre-war system which made the events of 1914 possible."<ref>{{cite AV media |first=Christopher |last=Clark |title=Europe: Then and Now |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies l |date=17 April 2014 |minutes=26-27 |via=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMPprNYRzs4| archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211107/oMPprNYRzs4| archive-date=2021-11-07 | url-status=live}}{{cbignore}}</ref>
Otte also agrees that France became significantly less keen on restraining Russia after the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1912, and sought to embolden Russia against Austria. The Russian ambassador conveyed Poincare's message as saying that "if Russia wages war, France also wages war."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Otte |first1=T. G. |title=July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914 |date=2014 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1107064904 |pages=134–135}}</ref>

===Liman von Sanders Affair: 1913-14===
This was a crisis caused by the appointment of an [[Imperial German Army]] officer, [[Liman von Sanders|Otto Liman von Sanders]], to command the [[First Army (Ottoman Empire)|Ottoman First Army Corps]] guarding [[Constantinople]] and the subsequent Russian objections. In November, 1913, Russian Foreign Minister [[Sergei Sazonov]] complained to Berlin that the Sanders mission was an "openly hostile act." In addition to threatening Russia's foreign trade, half of which flowed through the Turkish Straits, the mission raised the possibility of a German-led Ottoman assault on Russia's [[Black Sea]] ports, and it imperiled Russian plans for expansion in eastern [[Anatolia]]. A compromise arrangement was agreed for Sanders to be appointed to the rather less senior and less influential position of Inspector General in January 1914.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/liman.htm|title=First World War.com - Who's Who - Otto Liman von Sanders|website=www.firstworldwar.com}}</ref> When the war came Sanders provided only limited help to the Ottoman forces.<ref>Ulrich Trumpener, "Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman alliance." ''Journal of Contemporary History'' 1.4 (1966): 179-192. [www.jstor.org/stable/259896 online]</ref>

=== Anglo-German détente, 1912–14 ===

Historians have cautioned that taken together, the preceding crises should not be seen as an argument that a European war was inevitable in 1914.

[[File:2nd_Battle_Squadron.jpg|thumb|350px|The [[Anglo-German naval arms race]] became a considerable source of tension between Germany and Britain prior to World War I. Royal Navy warships pictured above in battle formation.]]

Although the [[Haldane Mission]] of February 1912 failed to halt the [[Anglo-German naval arms race]], the race suddenly paused in late 1912 as Germany cut its naval budget. In April 1913, Britain and Germany signed an agreement over the [[Lusophone Africa|African territories]] of the [[Portuguese Empire]], which was expected to collapse imminently. (That empire lasted into the 1970s.) Moreover, the Russians were again threatening British interests in [[Qajar Iran|Persia]] and [[British Raj|India]]. The British were "deeply annoyed by St Petersburg's failure to observe the terms of the agreement struck in 1907 and began to feel an arrangement of some kind with Germany might serve as a useful corrective."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=324}} Despite the infamous 1908 interview in ''[[The Daily Telegraph]]'', which implied that Kaiser Wilhelm wanted war, he came to be regarded as a guardian of peace. After the Moroccan Crisis, in the Anglo-German press wars, previously an important feature of international politics during the first decade of the century, virtually ceased. In early 1913, [[H. H. Asquith]] stated, "Public opinion in both countries seems to point to an intimate and friendly understanding." The end of the naval arms race, the relaxation of colonial rivalries, and the increased diplomatic co-operation in the Balkans all resulted in an improvement in Germany's image in Britain by the eve of the war.<ref>William Mulligan, ''The Origins of the First World War'' (Cambridge UP, 2017), p.147</ref>

The British diplomat Arthur Nicolson wrote in May 1914, "Since I have been at the Foreign Office I have not seen such calm waters."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Bang! Europe At War.|last=Martin|first=Connor|year=2017|isbn=978-1366291004|location=United Kingdom|pages=23}}</ref> The Anglophile German Ambassador [[Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky]], deplored that Germany had acted hastily without waiting for the British offer of mediation in July 1914 to be given a chance.

== Domestic political factors ==
=== German domestic politics ===
=== German domestic politics ===
{{Further|Fischer controversy}}
Left-wing parties, especially the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] (SPD) made large gains in the [[German election, 1912|1912 German election]]. German government at the time was still dominated by the [[Prussia]]n [[Junker]]s who feared the rise of these left-wing parties. [[Fritz Fischer]] famously argued that they deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government.<ref>* [[Fritz Fischer|Fischer, Fritz]] ''Germany's Aims In the First World War'', W. W. Norton; 1967 ISBN 0-393-05347-4</ref> Russia was in the midst of a large-scale military build-up and reform that they completed in 1916-1917.
Left-wing parties, especially the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] (SPD), made large gains in the [[1912 German federal election]]. The German government was still dominated by the [[Prussian Junkers]], who feared the rise of left-wing parties. [[Fritz Fischer (historian)|Fritz Fischer]] famously argued that the Junker class deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and to whip up patriotic support for the government.<ref>{{cite book |last=Fischer |first=Fritz |author-link=Fritz Fischer (historian) |title=Germany's Aims in the First World War |url=https://archive.org/details/FischerFritzGermanysAimsInTheFirstWorldWar |year=1967 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-0-393-09798-6}}</ref> Indeed, one German military leader, [[Moriz von Lyncker|Moritz von Lynker]], the chief of the military cabinet, wanted war in 1909 because it was "desirable in order to escape from difficulties at home and abroad."<ref>{{cite book |last=Hull |first=Isabel V. |title=The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pesmqV6vskkC&pg=PA259 |year=2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-53321-8 |page=259}}</ref> The Conservative Party leader Ernst von Heydebrand und der Lasa suggested that "a war would strengthen patriarchal order."<ref>{{cite book |last=Neiberg |first=Michael S. |title=The World War I Reader |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Zof_mkPPJzgC&pg=PA309 |year=2007 |publisher=NYU Press |isbn=978-0-8147-5833-5 |page=309}}</ref>
Other authors argue that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or difficult.<ref name="Ferguson">[[Niall Ferguson|Ferguson, Niall]] ''The Pity of War'' Basic Books, 1999 ISBN 0-465-05712-8</ref>


Other authors argue that [[Conservatism in Germany|German conservatives]] were ambivalent about a war for fear that losing a war would have disastrous consequences and believed that even a successful war might alienate the population if it was lengthy or difficult.{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|p=}} Many German people complained of a need to conform to the euphoria around them, which allowed later [[Propaganda in Nazi Germany|Nazi propagandists]] to "foster an image of national fulfillment later destroyed by wartime betrayal and subversion culminating in the alleged ''[[Dolchstoss]]'' (stab in the back) of the army by socialists."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lebow |first1=Richard Ned |title=Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations |date=2010 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1400835126 |page=70 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XpCYr9f2QagC&pg=PA70 |access-date=26 September 2018}}</ref>
=== French domestic politics ===
The situation in France was quite different from that in Germany as going to war appeared to the majority of political and military leaders to be a potentially costly gamble. It is undeniable that forty years after the loss of [[Alsace-Lorraine]] a vast number of French were still angered by the territorial loss, as well as by the humiliation of being compelled to pay a large reparation to Germany in 1870. The diplomatic alienation of France orchestrated by Germany prior to World War I caused further resentment in France. Nevertheless, the leaders of France recognized Germany's strong military advantage against them, as Germany had nearly twice as much population and a better equipped army. At the same time, the episodes of the [[Tangier Crisis]] in 1905 and the [[Agadir Crisis]] in 1911 had given France a strong indication that war with Germany could be inevitable if Germany continued to oppose French colonial expansionism.


However, [[David G. Williamson]] believes that despite the ambivalence felt among some in the German Empire in its main land in Europe, especially certain actors in the [[Labour movement|labor movement]], the [[spirit of 1914]] was widely shared enough among all social classes to prove that the Empire was the primary cause of World War I.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Williamson |first=David G. |author-link=David G. Williamson |title=Germany Since 1789: A Nation Forged and Renewed |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |year=2016 |isbn=978-1-137-35004-6 |edition=2nd |location=New York |pages=167, 399}}</ref>
More than a century after the [[French Revolution]], there was still a fierce struggle between the left-wing French government and its right-wing opponents, as socialists like [[Jean Jaurès]] pushed for peace against nationalists like [[Paul Déroulède]] who were inclined to go to war. Recent social reforms created a climate of insecurity which some right-wing politicians thought could be resolved by the nationalistic spirit of war. France in 1914 had never been so prosperous and influential in Europe since 1870, nor its military so strong and confident in its leaders, emboldened by its success in North Africa and the overall pacification of its vast colonial empire. Indeed, if France had attempted for more than forty years to appease bellicose Germany, a majority of the Frenchmen now believed it could face the German threat with more tranquility than before. The ''[[Entente Cordiale]]'' with [[Great Britain]] signed in 1904 seemed to last, being aided by mutual interests abroad and strong economic ties. Russia had fled the ''triple crown alliance'' with Germany and [[Austria-Hungary]] because of disagreements with Austria-Hungary over policy in the [[Balkans]]. Russia also hoped that large French investments in its industry and infrastructures coupled with an important military partnership would prove themselves profitable and durable.


===Drivers of Austro-Hungarian policy===
France ultimately perceived it could fight Germany and attempt to gain back the German-speaking provinces of [[Alsace-Lorraine]]. It is important to note however, that France never could have permitted itself to initiate a war with Germany, as its military pact with Great-Britain was only purely defensive. The misperception that Germany wouldn't, as prepared by the [[Schlieffen Plan]] invade neutral [[Belgium]], would find itself lethal to the defensive French military doctrine on the eve of the first worldwide conflict.
[[File:Austria Hungary ethnic.svg|thumb|240px|Ethno-linguistic map of Austria-Hungary, 1910. [[Bosnian Crisis|Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed]] in 1908.]]
The argument that [[Austria-Hungary]] was a moribund political entity, whose disappearance was only a matter of time, was deployed by hostile contemporaries to suggest that its efforts to defend its integrity during the last years before the war were, in some sense, illegitimate.{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=68}}


Clark states, "Evaluating the prospects of the Austro-Hungarian empire on the eve of the first world war confronts us in an acute way with the problem of temporal perspective.... The collapse of the empire amid war and defeat in 1918 impressed itself upon the retrospective view of the Habsburg lands, overshadowing the scene with auguries of imminent and ineluctable decline."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|pp=77-78}}
=== Changes in Austria ===
In 1867, the [[Austrian Empire]] fundamentally changed its governmental structure, becoming the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. For hundreds of years, the empire had been run in an essentially [[feudal]] manner with a [[German language|German-speaking]] [[aristocracy]] at its head. However, with the threat represented by an emergence of nationalism within the empire's many component ethnicities, some elements, including Emperor [[Franz Joseph]], decided that a compromise was required to preserve the power of the German aristocracy. In 1867, the ''[[Ausgleich]]'' was agreed on, which made the [[Magyars|Magyar]] (Hungarian) elite in Hungary almost equal partners in the government of Austria-Hungary.
[[File:Austria Hungary ethnic.svg|thumb|left|400px|Ethno-linguistic map of Austria–Hungary in 1910]]


It is true that Austro-Hungarian politics in the decades before the war were increasingly dominated by the struggle for national rights among the empire's eleven official nationalities: [[Germans]], [[Hungarians]], [[Czechs]], [[Slovaks]], [[Slovenes]], [[Croats]], [[Serbs]], [[Romanians]], [[Ruthenians]] ([[Ukrainians]]), [[Polish people|Poles]], and [[Italians]]. However, before 1914, radical nationalists seeking full separation from the empire were still a small minority, and Austria-Hungary's political turbulence was more noisy than deep.{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=77}}
This arrangement fostered a tremendous degree of dissatisfaction amongst many in the traditional German ruling classes.<ref>{{cite book | last=Wank |first= Soloman | title=After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building |chapter=The Habsburg Empire |year=1997 |publisher= Oxford University Press |editor=Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen |place=Oxford}}</ref> Some of them considered the ''Ausgleich'' to have been a calamity because it often frustrated their intentions in the governance of Austria-Hungary.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Garland |first= John | journal=New Perspective |title=The Strength of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1914 (Part 1) |year=1997 |url=http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~semp/strength1.htm|accessdate=May 15, 2010}}</ref> For example, it was extremely difficult for Austria-Hungary to form a coherent [[foreign policy]] that suited the interests of both the German and Magyar elite.<ref name="Williamson15">{{cite book|last=Williamson|first=Samuel R.|title=Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=1991|page=15|isbn=0-312-05239-1}}</ref>


In fact, in the decade before the war, the Habsburg lands passed through a phase of strong, widely-shared economic growth. Most inhabitants associated the Habsburgs with the benefits of orderly government, public education, welfare, sanitation, the rule of law, and the maintenance of a sophisticated infrastructure.
Throughout the fifty years from 1867 to 1914, it proved difficult to reach adequate compromises in the governance of Austria-Hungary, leading many to search for non-diplomatic solutions. At the same time, a form of [[social Darwinism]] became popular among many in the Austrian half of the government. This thinking emphasised the primacy of armed struggle between nations, and the need for nations to arm themselves for an ultimate struggle for survival.<ref name="Bridge">{{cite book |last=Bridge|first=F.R.|title=The Last years of Austria-Hungary|editor=Mark Cornwall|place=Exeter|publisher=University of Exeter Press|year=2002|chapter=The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy|page=26}}</ref><ref name="Fellner">{{cite book |last=Fellner|first=Fritz|chapter=Austria-Hungary|title=Decisions for War|editor=Keith Wilson|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=1995|place=New York}}</ref>


Christopher Clark states: "Prosperous and relatively well administered, the empire, like its elderly sovereign, exhibited a curious stability amid turmoil. Crises came and went without appearing to threaten the existence of the system as such. The situation was always, as the Viennese journalist [[Karl Kraus (writer)|Karl Kraus]] quipped, 'desperate but not serious'."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=77}}
As a result, at least two distinct strains of thought advocated war with Serbia, often unified in the same people.


Jack Levy and William Mulligan argue that the death of Franz Ferdinand itself was a significant factor in helping escalate the July Crisis into a war by killing a powerful proponent for peace and thus encouraged a more belligerent decision-making process.<ref>Levy, Jack S., and William Mulligan. "Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors." Security Studies (2021): 1-32.</ref>
Some reasoned that dealing with political deadlock required that more Slavs be brought into Austria-Hungary to dilute the power of the Magyar elite. With more Slavs, the [[South Slavs]] of Austria-Hungary could force a new political compromise in which the Germans could play the Magyars against the South Slavs.<ref name="Leslie" /> Other variations on this theme existed, but the essential idea was to cure internal stagnation through external conquest.


===Drivers of Serbian policy===
Another fear was that the South Slavs, primarily under the leadership of Serbia, were organizing for a war against Austria-Hungary, and even all of Germanic civilization. Some leaders, such as [[Conrad von Hötzendorf]], argued that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.<ref name="Sked">{{cite book |last=Sked|first=Alan|title=The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918|publisher=Longman Group|place=Burnt Mill|year=1989|page=254}}</ref>
The principal aims of Serbian policy were to consolidate the Russian-backed expansion of Serbia in the Balkan Wars and to achieve dreams of a [[Greater Serbia]], which included the unification of lands with large ethnic Serb populations in Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia <ref name="Clark, Christopher 2013 p.22">Clark, Christopher (2013). ''The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914''. HarperCollins. {{ISBN|978-0-06-219922-5}}., p.22</ref>


Underlying that was a culture of extreme nationalism and a cult of assassination, which romanticized the slaying of the Ottoman Sultan [[Murad I]] as the heroic epilogue to the otherwise-disastrous [[Battle of Kosovo]] on 28 June 1389. Clark states: "The Greater Serbian vision was not just a question of government policy, however, or even of propaganda. It was woven deeply into the [[Culture of Serbia|culture]] and [[Serbian national identity|identity of the Serbs]]."<ref name="Clark, Christopher 2013 p.22"/> Famed [[Serbian Americans|Serbian-American]] scientist [[Michael Pupin]], for example, in July 1914 explicitly connected the Battle of Kosovo ("a natural heritage of every true Serb") to Franz Ferdinand's assassination. He wrote that the battle's "memory always served as a reminder to the Serbs that they must avenge the wrongs perpetrated upon their race".<ref name="pupin19140713">{{Cite magazine |last=Pupin |first=Michael |date=1914-07-13 |title=Serb and Austrian |url=https://archive.org/details/independen79v80newy/page/n72/mode/1up |magazine=The Independent |pages=67–68 |access-date=2022-05-17}}</ref>
A powerful contingent within the Austro-Hungarian government was motivated by these thoughts and advocated war with Serbia long before the war began. Prominent members of this group included [[Leopold von Berchtold]], [[Alexander Hoyos|Alexander von Hoyos]], and [[Count Johann von Forgách|Johann von Forgách]]. Although many other members of the government, notably Franz Ferdinand, [[Franz Joseph]], and many Hungarian politicians did not believe that a violent struggle with Serbia would necessarily solve any of Austria-Hungary's problems, the [[hawkish]] elements did exert a strong influence on government policy, holding key positions.<ref name="Leslie">{{cite journal |last=Leslie|first= John|year=1993|title=The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims|journal=Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit|editor=Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer|volume=20|pages=307–394}}</ref>


Serbian policy was complicated by the fact that the main actors in 1914 were both the official Serb government, led by [[Nikola Pašić]], and the "Black Hand" terrorists, led by the head of Serb military intelligence, known as Apis. The Black Hand believed that a Greater Serbia would be achieved by provoking a war with Austria-Hungary by an act of terror. The war would be won with Russian backing.
Samuel R. Williamson has emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary in starting the war. Convinced Serbian nationalism and Russian Balkan ambitions were disintegrating the Empire, Austria-Hungary hoped for a limited war against Serbia and that strong German support would force Russia to keep out of the war and weaken its Balkan prestige.<ref name="Williamson">{{cite book|last=Williamson|first=Samuel R.|title=Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War|publisher=St. Martin's Press|year=1991|isbn= 0-312-05239-1}}</ref>


The official government position was to focus on consolidating the gains made during the exhausting Balkan War and to avoid further conflicts. That official policy was temporized by the political necessity of simultaneously and clandestinely supporting dreams of a Greater Serbian state in the long term.<ref>Clark, Christopher (2013). ''The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914''. HarperCollins. {{ISBN|978-0-06-219922-5}}, p. 26</ref> The Serbian government found it impossible to put an end to the machinations of the Black Hand for fear it would itself be overthrown. Clark states: "Serbian authorities were partly unwilling and partly unable to suppress the irredentist activity that had given rise to the assassinations in the first place".<ref>Clark, Christopher (2013). ''The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914''. HarperCollins. {{ISBN|978-0-06-219922-5}}, p. 559</ref>
== International relations ==


Russia tended to support Serbia as a fellow Slavic state, considered Serbia its "client," and encouraged Serbia to focus its irredentism against Austria-Hungary because it would discourage conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria, another prospective Russian ally, in [[Macedonia (region)|Macedonia]].
=== Imperialism ===

== Imperialism ==
{{see also|New Imperialism}}
{{see also|New Imperialism}}
[[File:WWI-re.png|thumb|400px|Map of the world with the [[participants in World War I]] prior to the [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk]]. The [[Allies of World War I|Allies]] are depicted in green, the [[Central Powers]] in orange and neutral countries in grey.]]


===Impact of colonial rivalry and aggression on Europe in 1914===
Some scholars have attributed the start of the war to [[imperialism]].<ref>Bukharin, N., (1972), Imperialism and World Economy, (London).</ref> Countries such as the United Kingdom and France accumulated great wealth in the late 19th century through their control of trade in foreign resources, markets, territories, and people.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}} Other empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia all hoped to do so as well in economic advantage. Their frustrated ambitions, and British policies of strategic exclusion created tensions. In addition, the limits of natural resources in many European nations began to slowly alter trade balance, and make national industries seek new territories rich in natural resources.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}} Commercial interests contributed substantially to Anglo-German rivalry during the scramble for tropical Africa. This was the scene of sharpest conflict between certain German and British commercial interests. There have been two partitions of Africa. One involved the actual imposition of political boundaries across the continent during the last quarter of the 19th century; the other, which actually commenced in the mid-19th century, consisted of the so-called 'business' partition. In southern Africa the latter partition followed rapidly upon the discoveries of diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886 respectively. An integral part of this second partition was the expansion in the interior of British capital interests, primarily the [[British South Africa Company]] and mining companies such as [[De Beers]]. After 1886 the [[Witwatersrand]] goldfields prompted feverish activity among European as well as British capitalists. It was soon felt in Whitehall that German commercial penetration in particular constituted a direct threat to Britain's continued economic and political hegemony south of the Limpopo. Amid the expanding web of German business on the Rand, the most contentious operations were those of the German-financed [[N.Z.A.S.M.]] or Netherlands South African Railway Company, which possessed a railway monopoly in the Transvaal.
[[File:World empires and colonies around World War I.png|thumb|280px|World empires and colonies around 1914]]


Imperial rivalry and the consequences of the search for imperial security or for imperial expansion had important consequences for the origins of World War I.
Rivalries for not just colonies, but colonial trade and trade routes developed between the emerging economic powers and the incumbent [[great powers]]. Although still argued differently according to historical perspectives on the path to war, this rivalry was illustrated in the [[Berlin-Baghdad Railway]], which would have given German industry access to Iraqi oil, and German trade a southern port in the [[Persian Gulf]]. A history of this railroad in the context of World War I has arrived to describe the German interests in countering the British Empire at a global level, and Turkey's interest in countering their Russian rivals at a regional level.<ref>Sean McMeekin, 'The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's bid for world power. 2010, ISBN 978-0-674-05739-5</ref> As stated by a contemporary 'man on the ground' at the time, Jastrow wrote, "It was felt in England that if, as Napoleon is said to have remarked, Antwerp in the hands of a great continental power was a pistol leveled at the English coast, Bagdad and the Persian Gulf in the hands of Germany (or any other strong power) would be a 42-centimetre gun pointed at India." <ref>[http://www.archive.org/details/warandthebagdadr001985mbp Jastrow, 1917. page 97 in 'The War and the Bagdad Railway']</ref> On the other side, "Public opinion in Germany was feasting on visions of Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran, and the possibility of evading the British blockade through outlets to the Indian Ocean." <ref>[http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/pollard/HistoryWar.pdf AF Pollard, 1919. 'A Short History of the Great War' accessible at]</ref> Britain's initial strategic exclusion of others from northern access to a Persian Gulf port in the creation of [[Kuwait]] by treaty as a protected, subsidized client state showed political recognition of the importance of the issue.<ref>[http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm]</ref> If outcome is revealing, by the close of the war this political recognition was re-emphasized in the military effort to capture the railway itself, recounted with perspective in a contemporary history: "On the 26th Aleppo fell, and on the 28th we reached Muslimieh, that junction on the Baghdad railway on which longing eyes had been cast as the nodal point in the conflict of German and other ambitions in the East." <ref>Pollard, 1919. 'A Short History of the Great War' chapter 19, p204. available at [http://Socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/pollard/HistoryWar.pdf]</ref> The [[Treaty of Versailles]] explicitly removed all German ownership thereafter, which without Ottoman rule left access to Mesopotamian and Persian oil, and northern access to a southern port in British hands alone.


Imperial rivalries between France, Britain, Russia and Germany played an important part in the creation of the Triple Entente and the relative isolation of Germany. Imperial opportunism, in the form of the Italian attack on Ottoman Libyan provinces, also encouraged the Balkan wars of 1912–13, which changed the balance of power in the Balkans to the detriment of Austria-Hungary.
Rivalries among the great powers were exacerbated starting in the 1880s by the [[Scramble for Africa|scramble for colonies]], which brought much of Africa and Asia under European rule in the following quarter-century. It also created great Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian tensions and crises that prevented a British alliance with either until the early 20th century. Otto von Bismarck disliked the idea of an overseas empire, but pursued a colonial policy to court domestic political support. This started Anglo-German tensions since German acquisitions in Africa and the [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]] threatened to impinge upon British strategic and commercial interests. Bismarck supported French colonization in Africa because it diverted government attention and resources away from continental Europe and [[revanchism]]. In spite of all of Bismarck's deft diplomatic maneuvering, in 1890 he was forced to resign by the new Kaiser (Wilhelm II). His successor, [[Leo von Caprivi]], was the last German Chancellor who was successful in calming Anglo-German tensions. After his loss of office in 1894, German policy led to greater conflicts with the other colonial powers.


Some historians, such as [[Margaret MacMillan]], believe that Germany created its own diplomatic isolation in Europe, in part by an aggressive and pointless imperial policy known as [[Weltpolitik]]. Others, such as Clark, believe that German isolation was the unintended consequence of a détente between Britain, France, and Russia. The détente was driven by Britain's desire for imperial security in relation to France in North Africa and to Russia in Persia and India.
The status of [[Morocco]] had been guaranteed by international agreement, and when France attempted to greatly expand its influence there without the assent of all the other signatories Germany opposed it prompting the Moroccan Crises, the [[Tangier Crisis]] of 1905 and the [[Agadir Crisis]] of 1911. The intent of German policy was to drive a wedge between the British and French, but in both cases produced the opposite effect and Germany was isolated diplomatically, most notably lacking the support of Italy despite Italian membership in the Triple Alliance. The French protectorate over Morocco was established officially in 1912.


Either way, the isolation was important because it left Germany few options but to ally itself more strongly with Austria-Hungary, leading ultimately to unconditional support for Austria-Hungary's punitive war on Serbia during the July Crisis.
In 1914, there were no outstanding colonial conflicts, Africa essentially having been claimed fully, apart from [[Ethiopia]], for several years. However, the competitive mentality, as well as a fear of "being left behind" in the competition for the world's resources may have played a role in the decisions to begin the new conflict.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}}


===German isolation: The potential consequences of Weltpolitik===
=== Web of alliances ===
[[File:WWIchartX.svg|300px|thumb|European military alliances shortly after outbreak of war]]
[[File:Kongokonferenz.jpg|thumb|European officials staking claims to Africa in the [[Berlin Conference]], 1884]]
[[Otto von Bismarck]] disliked the idea of an overseas empire but supported [[French colonial empire|France's colonization in Africa]] because it diverted the French government, attention, and resources away from [[Continental Europe]] and revanchism after 1870. Germany's "New Course" in foreign affairs, ''Weltpolitik'' ("world policy"), was adopted in the 1890s after Bismarck's dismissal.
[[File:Chain of Friendship cartoon.gif|300px|thumb|"The Chain of Friendship", an American cartoon from 1914 depicting the web of alliances, captioned, "If Austria attacks Serbia, Russia will fall upon Austria, Germany upon Russia, and France and England upon Germany."]]


Its aim was ostensibly to transform Germany into a global power through assertive diplomacy, the acquisition of overseas colonies, and the development of a large navy.
A loose web of [[alliance]]s around the European nations existed (many of them requiring participants to agree to collective defense if attacked):
* [[Treaty of London, 1839]], about the neutrality of [[Belgium]]
* [[German-Austrian treaty]] (1879) or [[Dual Alliance, 1879|Dual Alliance]]
* Italy joining Germany and Austria in 1882
* [[Franco-Russian Alliance]] (1894)
* The "[[Entente Cordiale]]" between Britain and France (1904), which left the northern coast of France undefended, and the separate "entente" between Britain and Russia (1907) that formed the [[Triple Entente]]


Some historians, notably MacMillan and [[Hew Strachan]], believe that a consequence of the policy of ''Weltpolitik'' and Germany's associated assertiveness was to isolate it. ''Weltpolitik'', particularly as expressed in Germany's objections to France's growing influence in Morocco in 1904 and 1907, also helped cement the Triple Entente. The Anglo-German naval race also isolated Germany by reinforcing Britain's preference for agreements with Germany's continental rivals: France and Russia.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Greg Cashman|author2=Leonard C. Robinson|title=An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x7K2GYnXRngC&pg=PA54|year=2007|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|pages=54 |isbn=9780742555105}}</ref>
This complex set of treaties binding various players in Europe together before the war sometimes is thought to have been misunderstood by contemporary political leaders. The traditionalist theory of "Entangling Alliances" has been shown to be mistaken; The Triple Entente between Russia, France and the United Kingdom did not in fact force any of those powers to mobilize because it was not a military treaty. Mobilization by a relatively minor player would not have had a cascading effect that could rapidly run out of control, involving every country. The crisis between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could have been a localized issue. This is how Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia resulted in Britain declaring war on Germany:
* June 28, 1914: Serbian irredentists assassinate Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
* July 23: Austria-Hungary, following their own secret enquiry, sends an ultimatum to Serbia, containing several very severe demands. In particular, they gave only forty-eight hours to comply. Whilst both Great Britain and Russia sympathised with many of the demands, both agreed the timescale was far too short. Both nevertheless advised Serbia to comply.
* July 24: Germany officially declares support for Austria's position.
* July 24: Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the British government, asks that Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, "who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace simultaneously."<ref>How War Came About Between Great Britain and Germany; H E Legge</ref>
* July 25: The Serbian government replies to Austria, and agrees to most of the demands. However, certain demands brought into question her survival as an independent nation. On these points they asked that the [[Permanent Court of Arbitration|Hague Tribunal]] arbitrate.
* July 25: Russia enters a period preparatory to war and mobilization begins on all frontiers. Government decides on a partial mobilization in principle to begin on July 29.
* July 25: Serbia mobilizes its army; responds to Austro-Hungarian [[démarche]] with less than full acceptance; Austria-Hungary breaks diplomatic relations with Serbia.
* July 26: Serbia reservists accidentally violate Austro-Hungarian border at Temes-Kubin.<ref>Albertini, Luigi. ''Origins of the War of 1914'', Oxford University Press, London, 1953, Vol II pp&nbsp;461–462, 465</ref>
* July 26: Russia having agreed to stand aside whilst others conferred, a meeting is organised to take place between ambassadors from Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France to discuss the crisis. Germany declines the invitation.
* July 27: Sir Edward Grey meets the German ambassador independently. A telegram to Berlin after the meeting states, "Other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia&nbsp;... as long as Germany would work to keep peace I would keep closely in touch."
* July 28: Austria-Hungary, having failed to accept Serbia's response of the 25th, declares war on Serbia. Mobilisation against Serbia begins.
* July 29: Russian general mobilization is ordered, and then changed to partial mobilization.
* July 29: Sir Edward Grey appeals to Germany to intervene to maintain peace.
* July 29: The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, is informed by the German Chancellor that Germany is contemplating war with France, and furthermore, wishes to send its army through Belgium. He tries to secure Britain's neutrality in such an action.
* July 30: Russian general mobilization is reordered at 5:00 P.M.
* July 31: Austrian general mobilization is ordered.
* July 31: Germany enters a period preparatory to war.
* July 31: Germany sends an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that they halt military preparations within twelve hours.
* July 31: Both France and Germany are asked by Britain to declare their support for the ongoing neutrality of Belgium. France agrees to this. Germany does not respond.
* August 1 (3 A.M.): [[George V|King George V]] of Great Britain personally telegraphs [[Nicholas II of Russia|Tsar Nicholas II of Russia]].
* August 1: French general mobilization is ordered.
* August 1: German general mobilization is ordered.
* August 1: Germany declares war against Russia.
* August 1: The Tsar responds to the king's telegram, stating, "I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not the German ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war."
* August 2: Germany and [[The Ottoman Empire]] sign a secret treaty.<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/turkgerm.htm The Treaty of Alliance Between Germany and Turkey] August 2, 1914</ref> entrenching the [[Ottoman-German Alliance]]
* August 3: Germany, after France declines (''See Note'') its demand to remain neutral,<ref name=Taylor524>{{cite book |last= Taylor |first= A. J. P. |authorlink= A. J. P. Taylor |title= The Struggle For Mastery In Europe 1848–1918 |publisher= Oxford University Press |isbn= 0-19-881270-1 |page= 524 |year= 1954}}</ref> declares war on France. Germany states to Belgium that she would "treat her as an enemy" if she did not allow free passage of German troops across her lands.
* August 3: Britain, expecting German naval attack on the northern French coast, states that Britain would give "...&nbsp;all the protection in its powers."
* August 4: Germany invades Belgium according to the modified [[Schlieffen Plan]].
* August 4 (midnight): Having failed to receive notice from Germany assuring the neutrality of Belgium, Britain declares war on Germany.
* August 6: Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
* August 23: [[Japan]], honouring the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]], declares war on Germany.
* August 25: Japan declares war on Austria-Hungary.


===German isolation: The potential consequences of the Triple Entente===
''Note: French Prime Minister [[Rene Viviani]] merely replied to the German ultimatum that, "France will act in accordance with her interests."<ref name="Taylor524"/>'' Had the French agreed to remain neutral, the German Ambassador was authorized to ask the French to temporarily surrender the Fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee of neutrality.
Historians like Ferguson and Clark believe that Germany's isolation was the unintended consequences of the need for Britain to defend its empire against threats from France and Russia. They also downplay the impact of ''Weltpolitik'' and the Anglo-German naval race, which ended in 1911.

Britain and France signed a series of agreements in 1904, which became known as the [[Entente Cordiale]]. Most importantly, it granted freedom of action to Britain in Egypt and to France in Morocco. Equally, the 1907 [[Anglo-Russian Convention]] greatly improved British–Russian relations by solidifying boundaries that identified respective control in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

The alignment between Britain, France, and Russia became known as the Triple Entente. However, the Triple Entente was not conceived as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance but as a formula to secure imperial security among the three powers.<ref>{{cite book|author=Marvin Perry |display-authors=etal |title=Western Civilization: Since 1400|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N6jytVCocwMC&pg=PA703|year=2012|publisher=Cengage Learning|page=703|isbn=978-1111831691 }}</ref> The impact of the Triple Entente was twofold: improving British relations with France and its ally, Russia, and showing the importance to Britain of good relations with Germany. Clark states it was "not that antagonism toward Germany caused its isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire."<ref>Clark, ''The Sleepwalkers'' p 159.</ref>

===Imperial opportunism===
The Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912 was fought between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy in North Africa. The war made it clear that no great power still appeared to wish to support the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for the Balkan Wars.

The status of Morocco had been guaranteed by international agreement, and when France attempted a great expansion of its influence there without the assent of all other signatories, Germany opposed and prompted the Moroccan Crises: the Tangier Crisis of 1905 and the Agadir Crisis of 1911. The intent of German policy was to drive a wedge between the British and French, but in both cases, it produced the opposite effect and Germany was isolated diplomatically, most notably by lacking the support of Italy despite it being in the Triple Alliance. The French protectorate over Morocco was established officially in 1912.

In 1914, however, the African scene was peaceful. The continent was almost fully divided up by the imperial powers, with only Liberia and Ethiopia still independent. There were no major disputes there pitting any two European powers against each other.<ref>{{cite book|editor-last=Mowat|editor-first=C. L. |editor-link= C. L. Mowat |title=The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 12, The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898-1945 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jpfJoQEACAAJ&pg=PA151 |year=1968 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-04551-3 |pages=151–152}}</ref>

=== Role of businesses and financial institutions ===

==== Lenin's interpretation ====
[[Marxism]] attributes war to economic interests and rivalries, in this case, imperialism. [[Vladimir Lenin]] argued that "imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism," which emerges from the "free competition" stage of capitalism and is characterized by the presence of "five basic features":<blockquote>"(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital,' of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed."<ref name=":2">{{cite web |last=Lenin |first=V.I. |date= |title=VII. IMPERIALISM AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM |url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch07.htm |access-date=2022-08-24 |website=www.marxists.org}}</ref></blockquote>Lenin concluded that these five features of imperialism had been established by the turn of the 20th century, after the great powers had spent the final decades of the prior century acquiring nearly all the remaining territory of the world that had not yet been colonized.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=Lenin |first=V.I. |date=August 24, 2022 |title=VI. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. |url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch06.htm}}</ref> The largest and most lucrative uncolonized or semi-colonized territories at the time of the war were that of Persia (Iran), Turkey (including all of the pre-industrial territories of the declining Ottoman Empire), and most of China beyond [[Treaty ports|the treaty ports]].<ref name=":3" /> Having completed the division of the world among themselves at the beginning of the century, the developed capitalist states would thereafter compete for hegemony in the form of a ''redivision'' of those territories, both in the industrialized areas (e.g., "German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine"), and in primarily agrarian areas.<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lenin |first=V.I. |title=VIII. PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM |url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch08.htm |access-date=2022-08-24}}</ref>

==== Other views ====
Richard Hamilton observed that the argument went that since industrialists and bankers were seeking [[raw material]]s, new markets and new investments overseas, if one was strategically blocked by other powers, the "obvious" or "necessary" solution was war.<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.242</ref> Hamilton somewhat criticized the view that the war was launched to secure [[Colony|colonies]], but agreed that imperialism may have been on the mind of key decision makers. He argued that it was not necessarily for logical, economic reasons. Hamilton noted that Bismarck was famously not moved by such [[peer pressure]] and ended Germany's limited imperialist movement. He regarded colonial ambitions as a waste of money but simultaneously recommended them to other nations.<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.27-29</ref>

While some bankers and industrialists tried to curb Wilhelm II away from war, their efforts ended in failure. There is no evidence they ever received a direct response from the Kaiser, chancellor, or foreign secretary or that their advice was discussed in depth by the Foreign Office or the General Staff. The German leadership measured power not in financial ledgers but land and military might.<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 79-80</ref>

Hamilton argued that, generally speaking, the European business leaders were in favour of profits and peace allowed for stability and investment opportunities across national borders, but war brought the disruption trade, the confiscation of holdings, and the risk of increased taxation. While arms manufacturers could make money selling weapons at home, they could also lose access to foreign markets. [[Krupp]], a major arms manufacturer, started the war with 48 million marks in profits but ended it 148 million marks in debt, and the first year of peace saw further losses of 36 million marks.<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.242-246</ref><ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 481-499</ref>

William Mulligan argues that while economic and political factors were often interdependent, economic factors tended towards peace. Prewar trade wars and financial rivalries never threatened to escalate into conflict. Governments would mobilise bankers and financiers to serve their interests, rather than the reverse. The commercial and financial elite recognized peace as necessary for economic development and used its influence to resolve diplomatic crises. Economic rivalries existed but were framed largely by political concerns. Prior to the war, there were few signs that the international economy stood for war in the summer of 1914.<ref>Mulligan, William. The Origins of the First World War. Vol. 52. Cambridge University Press, 2017.</ref>

== Social Darwinism ==
{{Main|Social Darwinism}}
[[Social Darwinism]] was a theory of [[human evolution]] loosely based on [[Darwinism]] that influenced many European intellectuals and strategic thinkers from 1870 to 1914. It emphasised that struggle between [[nation]]s and races was natural and that only the [[Survival of the fittest|fittest nations deserved to survive]].<ref>Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895." ''Journal of the History of Ideas'' 54.3 (1993): 469-488 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2710024 in JSTOR].</ref> It gave an impetus to German assertiveness as a world economic and military power, aimed at competing with France and Britain for world power. [[German colonial empire|German colonial rule in Africa]] in 1884 to 1914 was an expression of [[nationalism]] and moral superiority, which was justified by constructing an image of the natives as "Other." The approach highlighted racist views of mankind. German colonization was characterized by the use of repressive violence in the name of "culture" and "civilisation." Germany's cultural-missionary project boasted that its colonial programmes were humanitarian and educational endeavours. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of Social Darwinism by intellectuals justified Germany's right to acquire colonial territories as a matter of the "survival of the fittest," according to the historian Michael Schubert.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Schubert | first1 = Michael | year = 2011 | title = The 'German nation' and the 'black Other': social Darwinism and the cultural mission in German colonial discourse | journal = Patterns of Prejudice | volume = 45 | issue = 5| pages = 399–416 | doi=10.1080/0031322x.2011.624754| s2cid = 143888654 }}</ref><ref>Felicity Rash, ''The Discourse Strategies of Imperialist Writing: The German Colonial Idea and Africa, 1848-1945'' (Routledge, 2016).</ref>

The model suggested an explanation of why some ethnic groups, then called "races," had been for so long antagonistic, such as [[Germans]] and [[Slavs]]. They were natural rivals, destined to clash. Senior German generals like [[Helmuth von Moltke the Younger]] talked in apocalyptic terms about the need for Germans to fight for their existence as a people and culture. MacMillan states: "Reflecting the Social Darwinist theories of the era, many Germans saw Slavs, especially Russia, as the natural opponent of the Teutonic races."<ref name="MacMillan, Margaret 2013 p524">MacMillan, Margaret (2013). The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Random House. {{ISBN|978-0-8129-9470-4}}. p524</ref> Also, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff declared: "A people that lays down its weapons seals its fate."<ref name="MacMillan, Margaret 2013 p524" /> In July 1914, the Austrian press described Serbia and the South Slavs in terms that owed much to Social Darwinism.<ref name="MacMillan, Margaret 2013 p524" /> In 1914, the German economist [[Johann Plenge]] described the war as a clash between the German "ideas of 1914" (duty, order, justice) and the French "ideas of 1789" ([[Liberté, égalité, fraternité|liberty, equality, fraternity]]).<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.75</ref> William Mulligen argues that Anglo-German antagonism was also about a clash of two political cultures as well as more traditional geopolitical and military concerns. Britain admired Germany for its economic successes and social welfare provision but also regarded Germany as illiberal, militaristic, and technocratic.<ref>Mulligan, William. The Origins of the First World War. Vol. 52. Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 147</ref>

War was seen as a natural and viable or even useful instrument of policy. "War was compared to a tonic for a sick patient or a life-saving operation to cut out diseased flesh."<ref name="MacMillan, Margaret 2013 p524"/> Since war was natural for some leaders, it was simply a question of timing and so it would be better to have a war when the circumstances were most propitious. "I consider a war inevitable," declared Moltke in 1912. "The sooner the better."<ref>MacMillan, Margaret (2013). The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Random House. {{ISBN|978-0-8129-9470-4}}. p479</ref> In German ruling circles, war was viewed as the only way to rejuvenate Germany. Russia was viewed as growing stronger every day, and it was believed that Germany had to strike while it still could before it was crushed by Russia.<ref>Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.76</ref>

Nationalism made war a competition between peoples, nations or races, rather than kings and elites.<ref>{{cite book |last=Weikart |first=Richard |title=From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UySSQgAACAAJ |year=2004 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |isbn=978-1-4039-6502-8}}{{page needed|date=August 2016}}</ref> Social Darwinism carried a sense of inevitability to conflict and downplayed the use of diplomacy or international agreements to end warfare. It tended to glorify warfare, the taking of initiative, and the warrior male role.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hamilton |first1=Richard F. |last2=Herwig |first2=Holger H. |title=The Origins of World War I |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2EyJY8uE4WYC&pg=PA26 |year=2003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=26 |isbn=9780521817356}}</ref>

Social Darwinism played an important role across Europe, but J. Leslie has argued that it played a critical and immediate role in the strategic thinking of some important [[hawkish]] members of the Austro-Hungarian government.<ref>{{cite book |last=Leslie |first=John |chapter=The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims: Policies and Policymakers in Vienna and Budapest before and during 1914 |editor1-first=Elibabeth |editor1-last=Springer |editor2-first=Leopold |editor2-last=Kammerhofer |title=Archiv und Forschung das Haus-, Hof- und Staats-Archiv in Seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas |trans-title=Archive and research the Household, Court and State Archives in its importance for the history of Austria and Europe |language=de |publisher=Verlag für Geschichte und Politik |location=Munich, Germany |year=1993 |pages=307–394}}</ref> Social Darwinism, therefore, normalized war as an instrument of policy and justified its use.

== Arms race ==
By the 1870s to 1880s, all the major powers were preparing for a large-scale war - although none expected one.<ref>Eric Brose, "Arms Race prior to 1914, Armament Policy" in: ''1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War'' (Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08). DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10219. [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/arms_race_prior_to_1914_armament_policy online]</ref> Britain neglected its small army but focused on building up the Royal Navy, which was already stronger than the next two largest navies combined. Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Russia, and some smaller countries set up [[conscription]] systems in which young men would serve from one to three years in the army and then spend the next twenty years or so in the reserves, with annual summer training. Men with higher social status became officers. Each country devised a mobilization system to call up reserves quickly and send them to key points by rail.

Every year, [[general staff]]s updated and expanded their plans in terms of complexity. Each country stockpiled arms and supplies for an army that ran into the millions. Germany in 1874 had a regular professional army of 420,000 with an additional 1.3 million reserves. By 1897, the regular army was 545,000 strong and the reserves 3.4 million. The French in 1897 had 3.4 million reservists, Austria 2.6 million, and Russia 4.0 million. The size of military manpower increased: conscription-law changes in France in 1913, for example, boosted numbers in the French military on the eve of conflict.<ref>
{{cite book
|last1 = Grimmer-Solem
|first1 = Erik
|date = 26 September 2019
|title = Learning Empire
|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=-PSpDwAAQBAJ
|publication-place = Cambridge
|publisher = Cambridge University Press
|isbn = 9781108483827
|access-date = 19 August 2023
|quote = [...] France passed the Three Year Law in July 1913 raising the term of French military service to three years and thereby raising France's peacetime military strength to over 700,000 men.
}}
</ref>
The various national war-plans had been perfected by 1914, but with Russia and Austria trailing in effectiveness. Recent wars since 1865 had typically been short: a matter of months. All war-plans called for a decisive opening and assumed victory would come after a short war. None planned for the food and munitions needs of the long stalemate that actually unfolded from 1914 to 1918.<ref>{{cite book |editor-last=Hinsley |editor-first=F. H. |title=The New Cambridge Modern History: Material progress and world-wide problems, 1870-189|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=woIUAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA204 |year= 1962 |publisher= University Press |pages=204–242|isbn= 9780521075244 }}</ref>{{sfnp|Mulligan|2014|pp=643–649}}

As [[David Stevenson (historian)|David Stevenson]] puts it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness... was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster.... The armaments race... was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities." David Herrmann goes further by arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for victorious wars" were closing, meaning that "the arms race did precipitate the First World War". If the assassination of Franz Ferdinand had occurred in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war. It was "the armaments race and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" that made his death in 1914 the trigger for war.{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|p=82}}

One of the aims of the [[First Hague Conference]] of 1899, held at the suggestion of Emperor [[Nicholas II]] of Russia, was to discuss disarmament. The [[Second Hague Conference]] took place in 1907. All signatories except for Germany supported disarmament. Germany also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed. All parties tried to revise international law to their own advantage.{{sfnp|Mulligan|2014|pp=646–647}}

=== Anglo-German naval race ===
{{Main|Anglo–German naval arms race}}
[[File:Naval-race-1909.jpg|thumb|290px|right|1909 cartoon in the American magazine ''Puck'' shows (clockwise) US, Germany, Britain, France and Japan engaged in naval race in a "no limit" game.]]
Historians have debated the role of the German naval buildup as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations. In any case, Germany never came close to catching up with Britain.


Supported by [[Wilhelm II]]'s enthusiasm for an expanded [[Imperial German Navy|German navy]], Grand Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]] championed four [[German Naval Laws|Fleet Acts]] from 1898 to 1912. From 1902 to 1910, Britain's Royal Navy embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. The competition came to focus on the revolutionary new ships based on the design of [[HMS Dreadnought (1906)|''Dreadnought'']], which was launched in 1906 and gave Britain a battleship that far outclassed any other in Europe.<ref>{{cite journal |first= Angus |last= Ross |title= HMS ''Dreadnought'' (1906): A Naval Revolution Misinterpreted or Mishandled? |journal= [[Northern Mariner]] |date= April 2010 |volume= XX |issue= 2 |pages= 175–198 |doi= 10.25071/2561-5467.491 |s2cid= 247286659 |url= http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol20/tnm_20_175-198.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |editor1-last= Blyth |editor1-first= Robert J. |editor2-last= Lambert |editor2-first= Andrew |editor3-last= Rüger |editor3-first= Jan |title= The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=rzU2NdB7GAIC |year= 2011 |publisher= Ashgate |isbn= 978-0-7546-6315-7}}</ref>
=== Arms race ===
As [[David Stevenson (WW1 historian)|David Stevenson]] has put it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness&nbsp;... was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster&nbsp;... The armaments race&nbsp;... was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities." David Herrmann goes further, arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for victorious wars" were closing, "the arms race did precipitate the First World War." If Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war. It was "...&nbsp;the armaments race&nbsp;... and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" that made his death in 1914 the trigger for war.<ref name=Ferguson82>Ferguson 1999, p. 82.</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|-
! colspan=4 | The naval strength of the powers in 1914
! colspan=4 | Naval strength of powers in 1914
|-
|-
! Country
! Country
! Personnel
! Personnel
! Large Naval Vessels<br>([[Dreadnoughts]])
! Large Naval Vessels<br />([[Dreadnoughts]])
! Tonnage
! Tonnage
|-
|-
Line 176: Line 332:
| style="text-align: right" | '''1,268,000'''
| style="text-align: right" | '''1,268,000'''
|-
|-
| colspan=4 | (Source: Ferguson 1999, p.&nbsp;85)
| colspan=4 | (Source: {{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|p=85}})
|}
|}


The overwhelming British response proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely ever to equal those of the Royal Navy. In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910, the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, it reached 2.1:1. Ferguson argues: "So decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War."{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|pp=83-85}} However, the {{lang | de | [[Kaiserliche Marine]]}} had narrowed the gap by nearly half and that the Royal Navy had had a [[two-power standard|long-standing policy of surpassing any two potential opponents combined]]. The [[US Navy]] was in a period of growth, which made the German gains seem very ominous in London.{{citation needed|date=May 2024}}
Some historians see the German naval build-up as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations.


In Britain in 1913, there was intense internal debate about new ships because of the growing influence of Admiral [[John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher|John Fisher]]'s ideas and increasing financial constraints. In 1914, Germany adopted a policy of building submarines, instead of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively abandoning the naval arms-race, but Berlin kept the new policy secret to delay other powers from following suit.<ref>{{cite journal |last= Lambert |first= Nicholas A. |title= British Naval Policy, 1913–1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution |journal=[[The Journal of Modern History]] |volume= 67 |issue= 3 |date= September 1995 |pages= 623–626 |jstor= 2124221 |doi= 10.1086/245174|s2cid=153540797 }}</ref>
The overwhelming British response, however, proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely to equal the [[Royal Navy]]. In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910 the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, 2.1:1. Ferguson argues that, "So decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War."<ref name=Ferguson8385>Ferguson 1999, pp. 83–85.</ref> This ignores the fact that the ''[[Kaiserliche Marine]]'' had narrowed the gap by nearly half, and that the Royal Navy had long intended to be stronger than any two potential opponents; the [[United States Navy]] was in a period of growth, making the German gains very ominous. Technological changes, with oil- rather than coal-fuelled ships, decreasing refuelling time while increasing speed and range, and with superior armour and artillery also would favour the growing and newer German fleet.


=== Russian interests in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire ===
One of the aims of the '''First Hague Conference''' of 1899, held at the suggestion of Emperor Nicholas II, was to discuss disarmament. The '''Second Hague Conference''' was held in 1907. All the signatories except for Germany supported disarmament. Germany also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed.{{citation needed|date=September 2012}}
Major Russian goals included strengthening Saint Petersburg's role as the protector of Eastern Christians in the Balkans, such as in Serbia.<ref>{{cite book |last=Jelavich |first=Barbara |title=Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=K9kmX-OBDOEC&pg=PA10 |year= 2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-52250-2 |page=10}}</ref> Although Russia enjoyed a booming economy, growing population, and large armed forces, its strategic position was threatened by an expanding Ottoman military - trained by German experts and using the latest technology. The start of the war re-focussed attention on old Russian goals: expelling the Ottomans from Constantinople, extending Russian dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and annexing Galicia. Conquest of the [[Turkish straits|Straits]] would have assured Russian predominance in the Black Sea and Russian access to the Mediterranean.<ref>
{{cite book |last= McMeekin |first= Sean |title= The Russian Origins of the First World War |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=vQF099JYW_EC&pg=PA7 |year= 2011 |publisher= Harvard University Press |isbn= 978-0-674-06320-4 |page= 7}}</ref>


== Technical and military factors ==
==== Anglo–German naval race ====
===Short-war illusion===
{{Main|Anglo–German naval arms race}}
Traditional narratives of the war suggested that when the war began, both sides believed that the war would end quickly. Rhetorically speaking, there was an expectation that the war would be "over by Christmas" in 1914. That is important for the origins of the conflict since it suggests that since it was expected that the war would be short, statesmen tended not to take gravity of military action as seriously as they might have done so otherwise. Modern historians suggest a nuanced approach. There is ample evidence to suggest that statesmen and military leaders thought the war would be lengthy and terrible and have profound political consequences.{{citation needed|date=September 2019}}
Motivated by [[Wilhelm II]]'s enthusiasm for an expanded German navy, Grand Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]] championed four [[German Naval Laws|Fleet Acts]] from 1898 to 1912, and, from 1902 to 1910, the [[Royal Navy]] embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. This competition came to focus on the revolutionary new ships based on the [[HMS Dreadnought (1906)|''Dreadnought'']], which was launched in 1906.


While it is true all military leaders planned for a swift victory, many military and civilian {{citation needed|date=September 2021}} leaders recognized that the war might be long and highly destructive. The principal German and French military leaders, including Moltke, Ludendorff, and Joffre, expected a long war.{{sfnp|Ferguson|1999|p=97}} British Secretary of State for War [[Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener|Lord Kitchener]] expected a long war: "three years" or longer, he told an amazed colleague.
In 1913, there was intense internal debate about new ships due to the growing influence of [[John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher|John Fisher's]] ideas and increasing financial constraints. It is now generally accepted by historians that in early-mid 1914 the Germans adopted a policy of building submarines instead{{Dubious|date=February 2010}} of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively abandoning the two power standard, but kept this new policy secret to delay other powers following suit.<ref>Lambert, Nicholas A. "British Naval Policy, 1913–1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution" ''The Journal of Modern History'', 67, no.3 (1995), pages&nbsp;623–626.</ref>

Though the Germans abandoned the naval race, as such, before the war broke out, it had been one of the chief factors in the United Kingdom joining the [[Triple Entente]] and therefore important in the formation of the alliance system as a whole.

==== Russian interests in Balkans and Ottoman Empire ====
The main Russian goals included strengthening its role as the protector of Eastern Christians in the Balkans (such as the Serbians).<ref>Barbara Jelavich. ''Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806–1914'' (2004) p 10</ref> Although Russia enjoyed a booming economy, growing population, and large armed forces, its strategic position was threatened by an expanding Turkish military trained by German experts using the latest technology. The start of the war renewed attention of old goals: expelling the Turks from Constantinople, extending Russian dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and annexing Galicia. These conquests would assure Russian predominance in the Black Sea.<ref>Sean McMeekin, ''The Russian Origins of the First World War'' (Harvard University Press, 2011).</ref>

== Technical and military factors ==


Moltke hoped that if a European war broke out, it would be resolved swiftly, but he also conceded that it might drag on for years, wreaking immeasurable ruin. Asquith wrote of the approach of "Armageddon" and French and Russian generals spoke of a "war of extermination" and the "end of civilization." British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey famously stated just hours before Britain declared war, "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."
=== Over by Christmas ===
Both sides believed, and publicly stated, that the war would end soon. The Kaiser told his troops that they would be "...&nbsp;home before the leaves have fallen from the trees", and one German officer said he expected to be in Paris by [[Sedantag]], about six weeks away. Germany only stockpiled enough [[potassium nitrate]] for gunpowder for six months. Russian officers similarly expected to be in Berlin in six weeks, and those who suggested that the war would last for six months were considered pessimists. Von Moltke and his French counterpart [[Joseph Joffre]] were among the few who expected a long war, but neither adjusted his nation's military plans accordingly. The new British [[Secretary of State for War]] [[Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener|Lord Kitchener]] was the only leading official on either side to both expect a long war ("three years" or longer, he told an amazed colleague) and act accordingly, immediately [[Recruitment to the British Army during the First World War|building an army of millions of soldiers]] who would fight for years.<ref name=Tuchman>{{cite book|title=[[The Guns of August]]|last=Tuchman|first=Barbara|year=1962|publisher=Random House|pages=158–159|place=New York}}</ref>


Clark concluded, "In the minds of many statesmen, the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seemed to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=562}}
Some authors such as [[Niall Ferguson]] argue that the belief in a swift war has been greatly exaggerated since the war.<ref name="Ferguson" /> He argues that the military planners, especially in Germany, were aware of the potential for a long war, as shown by the [[The Willy-Nicky Correspondence|Willy-Nicky telegraphic correspondence]] between the emperors of Russia and Germany. He also argues that most informed people considered a swift war unlikely. However, it was in the belligerent governments' interests to convince their populaces, through skillful [[propaganda]], that the war would be brief. Such a message encouraged men to join the offensive, made the war seem less serious, and promoted general high spirits.


=== Primacy of the offensive and war by timetable ===
=== Primacy of offensive and war by timetable ===
{{see also|Cult of the offensive}}
{{see also|Cult of the offensive}}
Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all belligerents to strike first to gain the advantage. This attitude shortened the window for diplomacy. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive.
Moltke, Joffre, Conrad, and other military commanders held that seizing the initiative was extremely important. That theory encouraged all belligerents to devise war plans to strike first to gain the advantage. The war plans all included complex plans for mobilization of the armed forces, either as a prelude to war or as a deterrent. The continental Great Powers' mobilization plans included arming and transporting millions of men and their equipment, typically by rail and to strict schedules.


The mobilization plans limited the scope of diplomacy, as military planners wanted to begin mobilisation as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. They also put pressure on policymakers to begin their own mobilization once it was discovered that other nations had begun to mobilize.
Some historians assert that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganization and so diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.<ref>Taylor, A. J. P. "War by Timetable: How the First World War Began" (London, 1969)</ref> However in practice these timetables were not always decisive. The Tsar ordered general mobilization canceled on July 29 despite his chief of staff's objections that this was impossible.<ref>Trachtenberg, Marc "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914" ''International Security'' Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990–1991), 141.</ref> A similar cancellation was made in Germany by the Kaiser on August 1 over the same objections,<ref name=Stevenson>Stevenson, David "War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914" ''Past and Present'', 162 (1999), 192. Also see Williamson Samuel R. Jr. and Ernest R. May "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914" ''The Journal of Modern History'' 79, (June 2007), 361-362, or Trachtenberg, Marc "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914" ''International Security'' Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990–1991), 140-141.</ref> although in theory Germany should have been the country most firmly bound by its mobilization schedule. [[Barbara Tuchman]] offers another explanation in the [[The Guns of August|''Guns of August'']]—that the nations involved were concerned about falling behind their adversaries in mobilization. According to Tuchman, war pressed against every frontier. Suddenly dismayed, governments struggled and twisted to fend it off. It was no use. Agents at frontiers were reporting every cavalry patrol as a deployment to beat the mobilization gun. General staffs, goaded by their relentless timetables, were pounding the table for the signal to move lest their opponents gain an hour's head start. Appalled on the brink, the chiefs of state ultimately responsible for their country's fate attempted to back away, but the pull of military schedules dragged them forward.<ref>{{cite book |title= The Guns of August|last= Tuchman|first= Barbara|year= 1962|publisher= Macmillan|location= New York|isbn= 627515|page= 72}}</ref></blockquote>


In 1969, [[A. J. P. Taylor]] wrote that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once they were begun, they could not be canceled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation, and they could not proceed without physical invasion (of Belgium by Germany). Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.<ref>{{cite book |last=Taylor |first=A.J.P. |author-link=A. J. P. Taylor |title=War by Time-table: How the First World War Began |url=https://archive.org/details/warbytimetableho00tayl |url-access=registration |year=1969 |publisher=Macdonald & Co.|isbn=9780356028187 }}</ref> Hence the metaphor "war by timetable."
=== Schlieffen Plan ===
[[File:Schlieffen Plan fr.svg|350px
|thumb|Map of the [[Schlieffen Plan]] and planned French counter-offensives]]
Germany's strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between its allied rivals, led to the development of the audacious (and incredibly expensive) [[Schlieffen Plan]]. It aimed to knock France instantly out of contention, before Russia had time to mobilize its gigantic human reserves. It aimed to accomplish this task within 6 weeks. Germany could then turn her full resources to meeting the Russian threat. Although Count [[Alfred von Schlieffen]] initially conceived the plan before his retirement in 1906, Japan's defeat of Russia in the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of 1904 exposed Russia's organizational weakness and added greatly to the plan's credibility.


Russia ordered a partial mobilization on 25 July against Austria-Hungary only. Their lack of prewar planning for the partial mobilization made the Russians realize by 29 July that it would be impossible to interfere with a general mobilization.
The plan called for a rapid German mobilization, sweeping through the [[Netherlands]], Luxembourg, and Belgium, into France. Schlieffen called for overwhelming numbers on the far right flank, the northernmost spearhead of the force with only minimum troops making up the arm and axis of the formation as well as a minimum force stationed on the Russian eastern front.


Only a general mobilization could be carried out successfully. The Russians were, therefore, faced with only two options: canceling the mobilization during a crisis or moving to full mobilization, the latter of which they did on 30 July. They, therefore, mobilized along both the Russian border with Austria-Hungary and the border with Germany.
Schlieffen was replaced by [[Helmuth von Moltke the Younger|Helmuth von Moltke]], and in 1907–08 Moltke adjusted the plan, reducing the proportional distribution of the forces, lessening the crucial right wing in favor of a slightly more defensive strategy. Also, judging Holland unlikely to grant permission to cross its borders, the plan was revised to make a direct move through Belgium and an artillery assault on the Belgian city of [[Liège (city)|Liège]]. With the rail lines and the unprecedented firepower the German army brought, Moltke did not expect any significant defense of the fortress.


German mobilization plans assumed a two-front war against France and Russia and had the bulk of the German army massed against France and taking the offensive in the west, and a smaller force holding East Prussia. The plans were based on the assumption that France would mobilize significantly faster than Russia.
The significance of the Schlieffen Plan is that it forced German military planners to prepare for a [[pre-emptive strike]] when war was deemed unavoidable. Otherwise Russia would have time to mobilize and crush Germany with its massive army. On August 1, Kaiser Wilhelm II briefly became convinced that it might be possible to ensure French and British neutrality and cancelled the plan despite the objections of the Chief of Staff that this could not be done and resuming it only when the offer of a neutral France and Britain was withdrawn.<ref name=Stevenson />


On 28 July, Germany learned through its spy network that Russia had implemented partial mobilisation and its "Period Preparatory to War." The Germans assumed that Russia had decided upon war and that its mobilisation put Germany in danger, especially since because German war plans, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, relied upon Germany to mobilise speedily enough to defeat France first by attacking largely through neutral Belgium before it turned to defeat the slower-moving Russians.
It appears that no war planners in any country had prepared effectively for the Schlieffen Plan. The French were not concerned about such a move. They were confident their offensive ([[Plan XVII]]) would break the German center and cut off the German right wing moving through Belgium. They also expected that an early Russian offensive in East Prussia would tie down German forces.


Christopher Clark states: "German efforts at mediation – which suggested that Austria should 'Halt in Belgrade' and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its terms were met – were rendered futile by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take counter-measures before mediation could begin to take effect."{{sfnp|Clark|2013|p=509}}
===British security issues===
In explaining why neutral Britain went to war with Germany, [[Paul Kennedy]], in ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914'', claimed that it was critical for war that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain, but he downplayed the disputes over economic trade imperialism, the [[Baghdad Railway]], confrontations in Eastern Europe, high-charged political rhetoric and domestic pressure-groups. Germany's reliance time and again on sheer power, while Britain increasingly appealed to moral sensibilities, played a role, especially in seeing the invasion of Belgium as a necessary military tactic or a profound moral crime. The German invasion of Belgium was not important because the British decision had already been made and the British were more concerned with the fate of France.<ref>Kennedy, Paul ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914'', Allen & Unwin, 1980 ISBN 0-04-940060-6, pp 457–62.</ref> Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of 1870—when Prussia and the German states smashed France—would mean Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the English Channel, and northwest France. British policy makers insisted that would be a catastrophe for British security.<ref>Paul M. Kennedy, ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914'' (1980) pp&nbsp;464–70</ref>


Clark also states: "The Germans declared war on Russia before the Russians declared war on Germany. But by the time that happened, the Russian government had been moving troops and equipment to the German front for a week. The Russians were the first great power to issue an order of general mobilisation and the first Russo-German clash took place on German, not on Russian soil, following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. That doesn't mean that the Russians should be 'blamed' for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor."<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n16/christopher-clark/the-first-calamity|title=The First Calamity|first=Christopher|last=Clark|date=29 August 2013|issue=16 |pages=3–6|journal=London Review of Books|volume=35 |ref=none}}</ref>
== Specific events ==


== Historiography ==
=== Franco–Prussian War (1870–1871) ===
{{Main|Historiography of the causes of World War I}}
[[File:BismarckundNapoleonIII.jpg|thumb|[[Napoleon III]] and [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] after the 1870 [[Battle of Sedan]], of the [[Franco-Prussian War]].]]
[[File:Europe as it should be map.jpg|thumb|[[Louis P. Bénézet]]'s map of "Europe As It Should Be" (1918), depicting imagined nations based on ethnic and linguistic criteria. It blamed German aggression on perceived threats to the traditional social order from radicals and ethnic nationalists.]]
Many of the direct origins of World War I can be seen in the results and consequences of the [[Franco-Prussian War]]. This conflict brought the establishment of a powerful and dynamic Germany, causing what was seen as a displacement or unbalancing of power: this new and prosperous nation had the industrial and military potential to threaten Europe, and particularly the already established European powers. Germany's nationalism, its natural resources, its economic strengths and its ambitions sparked colonial and military rivalries with other nations, particularly the Anglo-German naval [[arms race]].
Immediately after the end of hostilities, Anglo-American historians argued that Germany was solely responsible for the start of the war. However, academic work in the English-speaking world in the late 1920s and the 1930s blamed the participants more equally. Meanwhile German academics also challenged the claim that Germany was solely or primarily to blame.

A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany following the German annexation of parts of the formerly French territory of [[Alsace-Lorraine]]. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge, known as [[revanchism]]. French sentiments wanted to avenge military and territorial losses, and the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power. French defeat in the war had sparked political instability, culminating in a [[revolution]] and the formation of the [[French Third Republic]]. Bismarck was wary of this during his later years and tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained. A Franco–German colonial [[wiktionary:Entente|entente]] that was made in 1884 in protest of an Anglo–Portuguese agreement in West Africa proved short-lived after a pro-imperialist government under [[Jules Ferry]] in France fell in 1885.

France quickly recovered from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. France paid its war remunerations and began to build its military strength again. Bismarck allowed the idea that Germany was planning a preventative war against France to be leaked through a German newspaper so that this recovery could not be realized. However, the [[Dreikaiserbund]] sided with France rather than with Germany, forcing Bismarck to back down.

=== Austrian-Serbian tensions and Bosnian Annexation Crisis ===
{{Main|May Overthrow|Pig War (Serbia)|Bosnian crisis}}
[[File:Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sanjak of Novibazar.JPG|thumb|350px|Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar]]
On night between June 10/11 1903, a group of Serbian officers assassinated unpopular King [[Alexander I of Serbia]]. The Serbian parliament elected [[Peter I of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes|Peter Karađorđević]] as the new king of Serbia. The consequence of this dynastic change had Serbia relying on Russia and France rather than on Austria-Hungary, as had been the case during rule of [[Obrenović]] dynasty. Serbian desire to relieve itself of Austrian influence provoked the [[Pig War (Serbia)|Pig War]], an economic conflict, from which Serbia eventually came out as the victor.

[[Austria-Hungary]], desirous of solidifying its position in [[Bosnia-Herzegovina]], [[Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina|annexed the provinces]] on October 6, 1908.<ref>Albertini, Luigi. ''Origins of the War of 1914'', Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p&nbsp;218–219</ref> The annexation set off a wave of protests and diplomatic maneuvers that became known as the [[Bosnian crisis]], or annexation crisis. The crisis continued until April 1909, when the annexation received grudging international approval through amendment of the [[Treaty of Berlin (1878)|Treaty of Berlin]]. During the crisis, relations between [[Austria-Hungary]], on the one hand, and [[Russia]] and [[Serbia]], on the other, were permanently damaged.


In the 1960s the German historian [[Fritz Fischer (historian)|Fritz Fischer]] challenged prevailing German academic opinion by arguing that Germany's conservative leaders had deliberately sought war. This in turn unleashed an intense worldwide debate on Imperial Germany's long-term goals. The American historian [[Paul Schroeder]] agrees with the critics that Fisher exaggerated and misinterpreted many points. However, Schroeder endorses Fisher's basic conclusion:
After an exchange of letters outlining a possible deal, Russian Foreign Minister [[Alexander Izvolsky]] and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal met privately at Buchlau Castle in Moravia on September 16, 1908. At Buchlau the two agreed that Austria-Hungary could annex the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary occupied and administered since 1878 under a mandate from the [[Treaty of Berlin (1878)|Treaty of Berlin]]. In return, Austria-Hungary would withdraw its troops from the Ottoman [[Sanjak of Novi Pazar|Sanjak of Novibazar]] and support Russia in its efforts to amend the Treaty of Berlin to allow Russian war ships to navigate the [[Bosporus|Straits of Constantinople]] during times of war. The two jointly agreed not to oppose Bulgarian independence.


{{blockquote|From 1890 on, Germany did pursue world power. This bid arose from deep roots within Germany's economic, political, and social structures. Once the war broke out, world power became Germany's essential goal.<ref>Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," ''Journal of Modern History'' 44#3 (1972), pp. 319-345, at p. 320. {{JSTOR|1876415}}.</ref>}}
While Izvolsky moved slowly from capital to capital vacationing and seeking international support for opening the Straits, [[Bulgaria]] and Austria-Hungary moved swiftly. On October 5, Bulgaria declared its independence from the [[Ottoman Empire]]. The next day, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 7, Austria-Hungary announced its withdrawal from the [[Sanjak]] of Novi Pazar. Russia, unable to obtain Britain's assent to Russia's Straits proposal, joined Serbia in assuming an attitude of protest. Britain lodged a milder protest, taking the position that annexation was a matter concerning Europe, not a bilateral issue, and so a conference should be held. France fell in line behind Britain. Italy proposed that the conference be held in Italy. German opposition to the conference and complex diplomatic maneuvering scuttled the conference. On February 20, 1909, the Ottoman Empire acquiesced to the annexation and received ₤2.2 million from Austria-Hungary.<ref>Albertini, Luigi.'Origins of the War of 1914'', Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p 277</ref>


However, Schroeder argues that all of that was not the main cause of the war in 1914. Indeed, the search for a single main cause is not a helpful approach to history. Instead, there are multiple causes any one or two of which could have launched the war. He argues, "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze the causal factors involved can ever fully succeed."<ref>Schroeder p 320</ref>
Austria-Hungary began releasing secret documents in which Russia, since 1878, had repeatedly stated that Austria-Hungary had a free hand in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar. At the same time, Germany stated it would only continue its active involvement in negotiations if Russia accepted the annexation. Under these pressures, Russia agreed to the annexation,<ref>Albertini, Luigi. ''Origins of the War of 1914'', Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p 287</ref> and persuaded Serbia to do the same. The Treaty of Berlin then was amended by correspondence between capitals from April 7 to April 19, 1909, to reflect the annexation.


Debate over the country that "started" the war and who bears the blame still continues.<ref>{{cite news |title=World War One: 10 interpretations of who started WW1 |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26048324 |work=BBC News |date=12 February 2014}}</ref> According to [[Annika Mombauer]], a new consensus among scholars had emerged by the 1980s, mainly as a result of Fischer's intervention:
=== The Balkan Wars (1912&ndash;1913) ===
{{Main|First Balkan War|Second Balkan War}}
The [[Balkan Wars]] in 1912–1913 increased international tension between [[Russia]] and [[Austria-Hungary|Austria]]. It also led to a strengthening of Serbia and a weakening of [[Ottoman Empire|Turkey]] and [[Bulgaria]], who might otherwise have kept [[Serbia]] in check, thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe in favor of Russia.


{{blockquote|Few historians agreed wholly with his [Fischer's] thesis of a premeditated war to achieve aggressive foreign policy aims, but it was generally accepted that Germany's share of responsibility was larger than that of the other great powers.<ref>Annika Mombauer, "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I." ''Central European History'' 48#4 (2015): 541–564, quote on p. 543.</ref>}}
Russia initially agreed to avoid territorial changes, but later in 1912 supported Serbia's demand for an [[Durazzo|Albanian port]]. An international conference was held in London in 1912–1913 where it was agreed to create an independent [[Albania]], however both Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After an Austrian, and then an international naval demonstration in early 1912 and Russia's withdrawal of support Serbia backed down. Montenegro was not as compliant and on May 2, the Austrian council of ministers met and decided to give [[Montenegro]] a last chance to comply and, if it would not, then to resort to military action. However, seeing the Austrian military preparations, the Montenegrins requested the ultimatum be delayed and complied.<ref>Williamson, Samuel R. Jr., ''Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War'', 125-140.</ref>


On historians inside Germany, she adds, "There was 'a far-reaching consensus about the special responsibility of the German Reich' in the writings of leading historians, though they differed in how they weighted Germany's role."<ref>Mombauer, p. 544</ref>
The Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, now demanded that the other spoils of the [[First Balkan War]] be reapportioned and Russia failed to pressure Serbia to back down. Serbia and Greece allied against Bulgaria, which responded with a preemptive strike against their forces beginning the [[Second Balkan War]].<ref>Williamson, Samuel R. Jr., ''Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War'', 143-145.</ref> The Bulgarian army crumbled quickly when Turkey and Romania joined the war.

The Balkan Wars strained the German/Austro-Hungarian alliance. The attitude of the German government to Austrian requests of support against Serbia was initially both divided and inconsistent. After the [[German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912]], it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-Hungary in a war against Serbia and her likely allies.

In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and pro-Romanian and in opposition to Austria-Hungary's increasingly pro-Bulgarian views. The result was tremendous damage to Austro-German relations. Austrian foreign minister [[Leopold von Berchtold]] remarked to German ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky in July 1913 that "Austria-Hungary might as well belong 'to the other grouping' for all the good Berlin had been".<ref>Williamson, Samuel R. Jr., ''Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War'', 147-149.</ref>

In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia was moving into Albania and Russia was doing nothing to restrain it, while the Serbian government would not guarantee to respect Albania's territorial integrity and suggested there would be some frontier modifications. In October 1913, the council of ministers decided to send Serbia a warning followed by an ultimatum: that Germany and Italy be notified of some action and asked for support, and that spies be sent to report if there was an actual withdrawal. Serbia responded to the warning with defiance and the Ultimatum was dispatched on October 17 and received the following day. It demanded that Serbia evacuate Albanian territory within eight days. Serbia complied, and the Kaiser made a congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year.<ref>Williamson, Samuel R. Jr., ''Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War'', 151-154.</ref>

The conflicts demonstrated that a localized war in the Balkans could alter the balance of power without provoking general war and reinforced the attitude in the Austrian government. This attitude had been developing since the [[Bosnian crisis|Bosnian annexation crisis]] that ultimatums were the only effective means of influencing Serbia and that Russia would not back its refusal with force. They also dealt catastrophic damage to the Habsburg economy.{{Citation needed|date=June 2011}}

== Historiography ==
{{Main|Historiography of the Causes of World War I}}
[[File:Europe as it should be map.jpg|thumb|[[Louis P. Bénézet]]'s map of "Europe As It Should Be" (1918), depicting imagined nations based on ethnic and linguistic criteria. Bénézet's book ''The World War and What was Behind It'' (1918) blamed on German aggression combined with perceived threats to the traditional social order from radicals and ethnic nationalists.]]
During the period immediately following the end of hostilities, Anglo-American historians argued that Germany was solely responsible for the start of the war. However, academic work in the English-speaking world in the later 1920s and 1930s blamed participants more equally.

Since 1960, the tendency has been to reassert the guilt of Germany, e.g., "The Berlin War Party," although some historians have argued for shared guilt or pointed to the Entente.


== See also ==
== See also ==
{{Portal|World War I}}
* [[American entry into World War I]]
* [[Zimmermann Telegram]], a key cause for the above event
* [[Causes of World War II]]
* [[Causes of World War II]]
* [[European Civil War]]
* [[Diplomatic history of World War I]]
** [[American entry into World War I]]
** [[Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I]]
** [[British entry into World War I]]
** [[French entry into World War I]]
** [[German entry into World War I]]
** [[Italian entry into World War I]]
** [[Japanese entry into World War I]]
** [[Ottoman entry into World War I]]
** [[Russian entry into World War I]]
* [[History of the Balkans]]
* [[History of the Balkans]]
* [[Historiography of the causes of World War I]]
* [[International relations (1814–1919)]]
** [[Anglo-German naval arms race]]

==Notes==
{{notelist}}
<!--
==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note}}
-->


== References ==
== References ==
{{Reflist|30em}}
{{Reflist|30em}}

== Sources ==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |last=Clark |first=Christopher|author-link=Chris Clark (historian) |title=The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780061146657 |url-access=registration |year=2013 |publisher=HarperCollins |isbn=978-0-06-219922-5}}
* {{cite book |last=Ferguson |first=Niall |author-link=Niall Ferguson |title=The Pity of War |url=https://archive.org/details/pityofwar00ferg |url-access=registration |year=1999 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0-465-05712-2}}
* {{cite book|last=Gilbert |first=Martin |title=First World War|publisher=Stoddart Publishing |year=1994|isbn=978-0-7737-2848-6}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lieven |first1=Dominic |title=Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia |date=2016 |publisher=Penguin |isbn=978-0-14-139974-4}}
* {{cite book |last=Martel |first=Gordon|year=2014|title=The Month that Changed the World: July 1914|publisher=OUP|isbn=978-0-19-966538-9}}
* {{cite journal |last=Mulligan |first=William |author-link=William Mulligan (historian) |title=The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War |journal=[[The English Historical Review]] |date=2014 |volume=129 |issue=538 |pages=639–666 |doi=10.1093/ehr/ceu139 |doi-access= }}
* {{cite book |last=Williamson |first=Samuel R. Jr. |author-link=Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. |title=Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=isJvQgAACAAJ |year=1991 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=978-0-312-05283-6}}
{{refend}}


== Further reading ==
== Further reading ==
{{Main|Bibliography of World War I}}
{{Refbegin|colwidth=60em}}
{{Refbegin|30em}}
* [[Luigi Albertini|Albertini, Luigi]]. ''The Origins of the War of 1914'', trans. Isabella M. Massey, 3 vols., London, Oxford University Press, 1952
* Albertini, Luigi. ''The Origins of the War of 1914'' (3 vol 1952). [https://archive.org/details/albertinitheoriginsofthewar1914 vol 2 online covers July 1914]
* [[Harry Elmer Barnes|Barnes, Harry Elmer]] ''The Genesis Of The World War; An Introduction To The Problem Of War Guilt'', New York, Knopf, 1929 {{oclc number|3300340}}
* Albrecht-Carrié, René. ''A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna'' (1958), 736pp; a basic introduction, 1815–1955 [https://archive.org/details/diplomatichistor0000albr_b4c1 online free to borrow]
*Barnes, Harry Elmer ''In Quest Of Truth And Justice: De-bunking The War Guilt Myth'', New York: Arno Press, 1972,1928 ISBN 0-405-00414-1
* Anderson Frank Maloy, and Amos Shartle Hershey. '' Handbook for the diplomatic history of Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1870-1914'' (1918) detailed coverage of all major diplomatic events and many minor one [https://archive.org/details/handbookfordipl00hersgoog/page/n470/mode/2up online]
* Carter, Miranda ''Three Emperors: Three Cousins, Three Empires and the Road to the First World War''. London, Penguin, 2009. ISBN 978-0-670-91556-9
* {{cite book |author-link=Harry Elmer Barnes |last=Barnes |first=Harry Elmer |title=In Quest of Truth And Justice: De-bunking The War Guilt Myth |location=New York |publisher=Arno Press |year=1972 |orig-year=1928 |isbn=978-0-405-00414-8 |oclc=364103}}; revisionist (argues that Germany was certainly not guilty)
* [[William Engdahl|Engdahl, F.William]], ''A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order'' (1994) ISBN 0-7453-2310-3
* Beatty, Kack. ''The Lost History of 1914: The Year the Great War Began'' (2012) looks at major powers and argues war was not inevitable. [https://www.amazon.com/dp/0802778119/ excerpt]
* Evans, R. J. W. and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandman, eds. ''The Coming of the First World War'' (1990), essays by scholars from both sides ISBN 0-19-822899-6
* Brandenburg, Erich. (1927) ''From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914'' (1927) [https://web.archive.org/web/20170315175229/http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/12322 online].
* Fay, Sidney ''The Origins Of The World War'', New York: Macmillan, 1929, 1928 {{oclc|47080822}}.
* Brose, Eric. "Arms Race prior to 1914, Armament Policy," in: ''1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War'' (Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08). DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10219. [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/arms_race_prior_to_1914_armament_policy online]
* [[Niall Ferguson|Ferguson, Niall]] ''The Pity of War'' Basic Books, 1999 ISBN 0-465-05712-8
* Carroll, E. Malcolm, ''French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1870-1914'' (1931). [https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069649799 online]
* [[Fritz Fischer|Fischer, Fritz]] ''From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German history, 1871–1945'', Allen & Unwin, 1986 ISBN 0-04-943043-2
* Carroll, E. Malcolm. ''Germany and the great powers, 1866-1914: A study in public opinion and foreign policy'' (1938) [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015002369133;view=1up;seq=6 online]; [https://www.questia.com/library/80995518/germany-and-the-great-powers-1866-1914-a-study-in online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801024342/https://www.questia.com/library/80995518/germany-and-the-great-powers-1866-1914-a-study-in |date=2020-08-01 }}
*Fischer, Fritz. ''Germany's Aims In the First World War'', W. W. Norton; 1967 ISBN 0-393-05347-4
* {{cite book |last=Carter |first=Miranda |title=The Three Emperors: Three Cousins, Three Empires and the Road to World War One |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9cEsAQAAIAAJ |year=2009 |publisher=Fig Tree |isbn=978-0-670-91556-9 }}
*Fischer, Fritz. ''War of Illusions:German policies from 1911 to 1914'' Norton, 1975 ISBN 0-393-05480-2
* Clark, Christopher. ''Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914'' (2012), major comprehensive overview
*French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.amazon.com/dp/B004J8HUMK ''The French Yellow Book'']: Diplomatic Documents (1914)
** ''Sleepwalkers'' lecture by Clark. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6snYQFcyiyg online]
*Fromkin, David. ''Europe's Last Summer: Who Started The Great War in 1914?,'' Knopf 2004 ISBN 0-375-41156-9
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Evans |editor1-first=R. J. W. |editor2-last=von Strandmann |editor2-first=Hartmut Pogge |title=The Coming of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wVrbG_s6m2oC |year=1988 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-150059-6 }} essays by scholars from both sides
*Gilpin, Robert. ''War and Change in World Politics'' Cambridge University Press, 1981 ISBN 0-521-24018-2
* {{cite book |last=Fay |first=Sidney Bradshaw |author-link=Sidney Bradshaw Fay |title=The origins of the world war |volume=1 |year=1928 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.176432 }}
* Hamilton, Richard and Herwig, Holger. ''Decisions for War, 1914–1917'' Cambridge University Press, 2004 ISBN 0-521-83679-4
** {{cite book |last=Fay |first=Sidney Bradshaw |author-link=Sidney Bradshaw Fay |title=The origins of the world war |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2dhwAAAAIAAJ |volume=2 |year=1929 |publisher=Macmillan }}
* Henig, Ruth ''The Origins of the First World War'' (2002) ISBN 0-415-26205-4
* {{cite book |last=Gilpin |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Gilpin |title=War and Change in World Politics |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2iKL7zr3kl0C |year=1981 |publisher=Cambridge UP |isbn=978-0-521-27376-3 }}
* [[Andreas Hillgruber|Hillgruber, Andreas]] ''Germany and the Two World Wars'', Harvard University Press, 1981 ISBN 0-674-35321-8
* Gooch, G.P. ''History of modern Europe, 1878-1919'' (2nd ed. 1956) pp 386–413. [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.125610 online], diplomatic history
* Rolf Hobson. ''Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan'' (2002) ISBN 0-391-04105-3
* Gooch, G.P. ''Before the war: studies in diplomacy'' (2 vol 1936, 1938) [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.2275 online] long scholarly chapters on Britain's Landsdowne; France's [[Théophile Delcassé]]; Germany's [[Bernhard von Bülow]] pp 187–284; Russia's [[Alexander Izvolsky]] 285–365; and Austria' [[Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal|Aehrenthal]] pp 366–438. vol 2: Grey, 1–133; Poincaré, 135–200; Bethmann Hollweg, 201–85; Sazonoff, 287–369; Berchtold, 371–447. [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.278612 vol 2 online]
* [[James Joll|Joll, James]]. ''The Origins of the First World War'' (1984) ISBN 0-582-49016-2
* Hamilton, Richard F. and Holger H. Herwig, eds. ''Decisions for War, 1914-1917'' (2004), scholarly essays on Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain, Japan, Ottoman Empire, Italy, the United States, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. [https://books.google.com/books?id=8aFhQ0tQUxEC excerpt]
* Keiger, John F.V. ''France and the Origins of the First World War'', St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0-312-30292-4
* {{cite book |last=Herrmann |first=David G. |title=The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NXMPCA9NsvoC |year=1997 |publisher=Princeton UP |isbn=978-0-691-01595-8 }}
* [[Paul Kennedy|Kennedy, Paul]] ''The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914'', Allen & Unwin, 1980 ISBN 0-04-940060-6.
* Herwig, Holger H. and Neil Heyman. ''Biographical Dictionary of World War I'' (1982)
*Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.). ''The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914.'' (1979) ISBN 0-04-940056-8
* Hewitson, Mark. "Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy." ''English Historical Review'' 115.462 (2000): 570–606; argues Germany had a growing sense of military superiority.
*Knutsen, Torbjørn L. ''The Rise and Fall of World Orders'' Manchester University Press, 1999 ISBN 0-7190-4057-4
* Hewitson, Mark. ''Germany and the Causes of the First World War'' (2004) [https://www.questia.com/library/117734903/germany-and-the-causes-of-the-first-world-war online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170409111908/https://www.questia.com/library/117734903/germany-and-the-causes-of-the-first-world-war |date=2017-04-09 }}
*[http://simon31.narod.ru/article-eng.htm Kuliabin A. Semin S.Russia - a counterbalancing agent to the Asia. "Zavtra Rossii", #28, 17 July 1997]
* {{cite book |last=Hillgruber |first=Andreas |author-link=Andreas Hillgruber |title=Germany and the Two World Wars |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5woxABMUOlIC |year=1981 |publisher=Harvard UP |isbn=978-0-674-35322-0 |orig-year=1967 }}
* Lee, Dwight E. ed. ''The Outbreak of the First World War: Who Was Responsible?'' (1958) {{oclc|66082903}}, readings from, multiple points of view
* {{cite book |last=Hobson |first=Rolf |title=Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sbo3f1VmDFoC |year=2002 |publisher=BRILL |isbn=978-0-391-04105-9 }}
* [[Lenin]], ''Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism'' Progress Publishers, Moscow, (1978)
* {{cite book |last1=Joll |first1=James |author-link1=James Joll |last2=Martel |first2=Gordon |author-link2=Gordon Martel |title=The Origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uwAvAgAAQBAJ |edition=3rd |year=2013 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-317-87535-2 }}
* Leslie, John (1993). "The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims," ''Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit'' Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Eds.), 20: 307-394.
* Kapp, Richard W. "Divided Loyalties: The German Reich and Austria-Hungary in Austro-German Discussions of War Aims, 1914–1916." ''Central European History'' 17.2-3 (1984): 120–139.
*Leuer, Eric A. ''Die Mission Hoyos. Wie österreichisch-ungarische Diplomaten den ersten Weltkrieg begannen'', Centaurus Verlag, Freiburg i.Br., 2011 ISBN 978-3-86226-048-5
* Karpat, Kemal H. "The entry of the Ottoman empire into World War I." ''Belleten'' 68.253 (2004): 1-40. [https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/977737 online]
*Lieven, D.C.B ''Russia and the Origins of the First World War'', St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0-312-69608-6
* Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Stephen Van Evera (eds.) ''Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War'' (2nd ed., Princeton UP, 1991) ISBN 0-691-02349-2
* {{cite book |last=Keiger |first=John F. V. |title=France and the origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KjwmAQAAMAAJ |year=1983 |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-312-30292-4 }}
* {{cite book |last=Kennedy |first=Paul M. |author-link=Paul Kennedy |title=The rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860-1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rRYTAQAAIAAJ |year=1980 |publisher=Ashfield Press |isbn=978-0-948660-06-1 }}
* McMeekin, Sean. ''The Russian Origins of the First World War'' (Harvard University Press, 2011)
* {{cite book |editor-last=Kennedy |editor-first=Paul M. |title=The War Plans of the Great Powers: 1880-1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T7twAwAAQBAJ |year=2014 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-70251-1 |orig-year=1979 }}, scholarly articles; no primary sources included
* [[Arno J. Mayer|Mayer, Arno]] ''The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War'' Croom Helm, 1981 ISBN 0-394-51141-7
* Keiger, John F.V. ''France and the origins of the First World War'' (Macmillan, 1983) [http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t040831c.html summary].
* Ponting, Clive (2002). ''Thirteen Days.'' Chatto & Windus.
* {{cite book |last=Knutsen |first=Torbjørn L. |title=The Rise and Fall of World Orders |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZYn_f1jxNDoC |year=1999 |publisher=Manchester UP |isbn=978-0-7190-4058-0 }}
* Remak, Joachim ''The Origins of World War I, 1871–1914'', 1967 ISBN 0-03-082839-2
* {{cite web |last1=Kuliabin |first1=Alexander |last2=Semin |first2=Sergey |title=Russia – a Counterbalancing Agent to the Asia |work=Zavtra Rossii |issue=28 |date=17 July 1997 |url=http://simon31.narod.ru/article-eng.htm }}
* [[Gerhard Ritter|Ritter, Gerhard]] "Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese?" pages&nbsp;657–668 from ''Historische Zeitschrift'' Volume 194, June 1962, translated into English as "Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis?" pages&nbsp;135–142 from ''The Outbreak of World War One: Causes and Responsibilities'', edited by Holger Herwig, 1997
* {{cite book |editor-last=Lee |editor-first=Dwight Erwin |title=The Outbreak of the First World War: Who was Responsible? |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gqLRAAAAMAAJ |year=1958 |publisher=Heath }} readings from multiple points of view
*Schroeder, Paul W. (2000) ''[http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t040829a/counter.html Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War]'' (PDF file)
* {{cite book |last=Lieven |first=D. C. B. |title=Russia and the Origins of the First World War |url=https://archive.org/details/russiaoriginsoff0000liev |url-access=registration |year=1983 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=978-0-312-69611-5 }}
* Snyder, Jack. "Civil—Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," ''International Security'' 9 #1 (1984)
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=Cedric James |last2=Dockrill |first2=Michael L. |title=The Mirage of Power |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aZYS7r1pw1oC |year=2001 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-27367-1 |orig-year=1972 }} all three volumes combined
*Steiner, Zara ''Britain and the Origins of the First World War'' Macmillan Press, 1977 ISBN 0-312-09818-9
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=Cedric James |last2=Dockrill |first2=Michael L. |title=Mirage Of Power: British Foreign Policy 1902-14 |volume=I |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I5MFjeZpHpwC |year=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-03377-4 |orig-year=1972 }}
*[[David Stevenson (WW1 historian)|Stevenson, David]]. ''Cataclysm: The First World War As Political Tragedy'' (2004) major reinterpretation ISBN 0-465-08184-3
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=Cedric James |last2=Dockrill |first2=Michael L. |title=Mirage Of Power: British Foreign Policy 1914-22 |volume=II |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRJFAQAAQBAJ |year=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-46774-5 |orig-year=1972 }}
*Stevenson, David. ''The First World War and International Politics'' (2005)
* {{cite book |last=MacMillan |first=Margaret |title=The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xjLz2685I74C |year=2013 |publisher=Random House |isbn=978-0-8129-9470-4 }}; major scholarly overview
*[[Hew Strachan|Strachan, Hew]]. ''The First World War: Volume I: To Arms'' (2004): the major scholarly synthesis. Thorough coverage of 1914; Also: ''The First World War'' (2004): a 385pp version of his multivolume history
* Massie, Robert K. ''Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War'' (Random House, 1991) [https://www.amazon.com/Dreadnought-Britain-Germany-Coming-Great/dp/0345375564 excerpt] see [[Dreadnought (book)]], popular history
* [[A.J.P. Taylor|Taylor, A.J.P.]] ''War by Time-Table: How The First World War Began'', Macdonald & Co., 1969 ISBN 0-356-04206-5
* {{cite book |last=Mayer |first=Arno J. |author-link=Arno J. Mayer |title=The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4-8NAAAAQAAJ |year=1981 |publisher=Croom Helm |isbn=978-0-7099-1724-3 }}
*Tuchman, Barbara. ''[[The Guns of August]]'', New York. The Macmillan Company, 1962. Describes the opening diplomatic and military manoeuvres.
* {{cite book |last1=McMeekin |first1=Sean |author-link=Sean McMeekin |title=The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power |date=2010 |publisher=Belknap Press |location=Cambridge, MA |isbn=978-0674057395}}
*Turner, L. C. F. ''Origins of the First World War'', New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970. ISBN 0-393-09947-4
*Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in ''International Security'' 9 #1 (1984)
* {{cite book |last1=McMeekin |first1=Sean |author-link=Sean McMeekin |title=The Russian Origins of the First World War |date=2011 |publisher=Belknap Press |location=Cambridge, MA |isbn=978-0674062108}}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Miller |editor1-first=Steven E. |editor2-last=Lynn-Jones |editor2-first=Sean M. |editor3-first=Stephen |editor3-last=Van Evera |title=Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War |edition=2nd |publisher=Princeton UP|year=1991 |isbn=978-0-6910-2349-6}}
* [[Hans-Ulrich Wehler|Wehler, Hans-Ulrich]] ''The German Empire, 1871–1918'', Berg Publishers, 1985 ISBN 0-907582-22-2
* {{cite book |last=Neiberg |first=Michael S. |author-link=Michael S. Neiberg |title=Dance of the Furies |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Q8EO8opjGtUC |year=2011 |publisher=Harvard UP |isbn=978-0-674-04954-3 }} role of public opinion
* [[Samuel R. Williamson, Jr.|Williamson, Samuel R.]] ''Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War'', St. Martin's Press, 1991 ISBN 0-312-05239-1
* {{cite journal | last1 = Nester | first1 = Cody | year = 2015 | title = France and the Great War: Belligerent Warmonger or Failed Peacekeeper? A Literature Review | journal = History | volume = 12 | page = 2 }}
* Otte, T. G. ''July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914'' (Cambridge University Press, 2014). [https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/sites/www.alistairlexden.org.uk/files/lord_lexden_-_july_crisis.pdf online review]
* {{Cite book|last=Radojević|first=Mira|chapter=Jovan M. Jovanović on the outbreak of the First World War|title=The Serbs and the First World War 1914-1918|year=2015|location=Belgrade|publisher=Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts|pages=187–204|isbn=9788670256590|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gUjRjwEACAAJ}}
* {{cite book |last=Remak |first=Joachim |author-link=Joachim Remak |title=The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AzITAQAAIAAJ |year=1995 |publisher=Harcourt Brace College Publishers |isbn=978-0-15-501438-1 |orig-year=1967 }}
* [[Gerhard Ritter|Ritter, Gerhard]]. ''The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany: volume 2: The European powers and the Wilhelminian Empire, 1890-1914'' (1970) [https://archive.org/details/swordscepterprob0000ritt online], chapters on the army role in politics in France, Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary and especially Germany
* Seligmann, Matthew S. "Failing to Prepare for the Great War? The Absence of Grand Strategy in British War Planning before 1914" ''War in History'' (2017) 24#4 414–37.
* {{cite journal |last=Snyder |first=Jack |title=Civil—Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984 |journal=International Security |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=108–146 |date=Summer 1984 |doi=10.2307/2538637 |jstor=2538637 |s2cid=55976453 }}
* Spender, J.A. ''Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents'' (1933) covers 1871 to 1914, 438pp
* Stavrianos, L.S. '' The Balkans Since 1453'' (1958), major scholarly history; [https://archive.org/details/balkanssince145300lsst online free to borrow]
* {{cite book |last1=Steiner |first1=Zara S. |last2=Neilson |first2=Keith |title=Britain and the Origins of the First World War |edition=Second |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dPYnBQAAQBAJ |year=2003 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-1-137-18217-3 |orig-year=1977 }}{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
* {{cite book |last=Stevenson |first=David |author-link=David Stevenson (historian) |title=Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DSc9CraE4OQC |year=2004 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0-7867-3885-4 }} major reinterpretation
* {{cite book |last=Stevenson |first=David |title=The First World War and international politics |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HXdsAAAAIAAJ |year=1988 |publisher=Oxford UP |isbn=978-0-19-873049-1 }}
* {{cite book |last=Strachan |first=Hew |author-link=Hew Strachan |title=The First World War: Volume I: To Arms |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ChpqA02Sa10C |year=2001 |publisher=Oxford UP |isbn=978-0-19-160834-6 }} a major scholarly synthesis
* Taylor, A.J.P. ''[[The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918]]'' (1954) [https://archive.org/details/struggleformaste00ajpt online free]
* {{cite book |editor-last=Tucker |editor-first=Spencer C. |title=The European Powers in the First World War: An Encyclopedia |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mkFdAgAAQBAJ |year=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-50694-0 |orig-year=1996 }}
* {{cite book |last=Turner |first=Leonard Charles Frederick |title=Origins of the First World War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hjVaAAAAYAAJ |year=1970 |publisher=Norton |isbn=978-0-393-09947-8 }}
* Zametica, John. ''Folly and malice: the Habsburg empire, the Balkans and the start of World War One'' (London: Shepheard–Walwyn, 2017). 416pp.
{{refend}}

=== Historiography ===
{{Refbegin|30em}}
* Bresciani, Marco. "From 'East to West', the 'world crisis' of 1905-1920: a re-reading of Elie Halévy." ''First World War Studies'' 9.3 (2018): 275–295.
* {{cite book |last=Cohen |first=Warren I.|title=The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0duEtQAACAAJ |year=1967|publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-11213-8}}
* Cornelissen, Christoph, and Arndt Weinrich, eds. ''Writing the Great War - The Historiography of World War I from 1918 to the Present'' (2020) [https://www.berghahnbooks.com/title/CornelissenWriting free download]; full coverage for major countries.
* {{cite journal |last=D'Agostino |first=Anthony |title=The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History |journal=Journal of the Historical Society |date=Spring 2004 |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=255–287 |doi=10.1111/j.1529-921X.2004.00098.x }}
* Evans, R. J. W. "The Greatest Catastrophe the World Has Seen" ''The New York Review of Books'' Feb 6, 2014 [http://email.nybooks.com/t/y-l-kduioy-ttnoirkr-d/ online]
* {{cite journal |last=Gillette |first=Aaron |title=Why Did They Fight the Great War? A Multi-Level Class Analysis of the Causes of the First World War |journal=[[The History Teacher]] |date=November 2006 |volume=40 |issue=1 |pages=45–58 |jstor=30036938 |doi=10.2307/30036938 }}
* {{cite book|last=Hewitson|first=Mark|title=Germany and the Causes of the First World War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bn4SBwAAQBAJ |year=2014|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|isbn=978-1-84520-729-8}}
* Horne, John, ed. ''A Companion to World War I'' (2012) 38 topics essays by scholars; emphasis on historiography.
* {{cite journal |last=Iriye |first=Akira |title=The Historiographic Impact of the Great War |journal=[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]] |date=September 2014 |volume=38 |issue=4 |pages=751–762 |doi=10.1093/dh/dhu035 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Jones |first=Heather |title=As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War Historiography |journal=[[The Historical Journal]] |date=September 2013 |volume=56 |issue=4 |pages=857–878 |doi=10.1017/S0018246X13000216|doi-access=free }}
* {{cite journal |last=Keiger |first=J.F.V. |title=The Fischer Controversy, the War Origins Debate and France: A Non-History |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |date=April 2013 |volume=48 |issue=2 |pages=363–375 |doi=10.1177/0022009412472715|s2cid=159493977 |url=http://usir.salford.ac.uk/23060/2/Fischer_Controversy_War_origins_and_France_a_non_history_corrected_AM_20_3_12_anonymised.pdf }}
* {{cite journal |last=Kramer |first=Alan |title=Recent Historiography of the First World War-Part I |journal=Journal of Modern European History |date=February 2014 |volume=12 |issue=1 |pages=5–27 |doi=10.17104/1611-8944_2014_1_5|s2cid=202927667 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Kramer |first=Alan |title=Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part II) |journal=Journal of Modern European History |date=May 2014 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=155–174 |doi=10.17104/1611-8944_2014_2_155|s2cid=146860980 }}
* Levy, Jack S., and John A. Vasquez, eds. ''The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making'' (Cambridge UP, 2014).
* Lieber, Keir A. "The new history of World War I and what it means for international relations theory." ''International Security'' 32.2 (2007): 155–191. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/30133878 online]
* {{cite journal |last=Marczewski |first=Jerzy |title=German Historiography and the Problem of Germany's Responsibility for World War I |journal=[[Polish Western Affairs]] |date=1977 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=289–309}}
* {{cite journal |last=Mombauer |first=Annika |author-link= Annika Mombauer|title=The First World War: Inevitable, Avoidable, Improbable Or Desirable? Recent Interpretations On War Guilt and the War's Origins |journal=[[German History (journal)|German History]] |date=2007 |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=78–95 |doi= 10.1177/0266355407071695}}
* Mombauer, Annika. ''The origins of the First World War: controversies and consensus.'' (2002)
* {{cite journal |last=Mulligan |first=William |title=The Trial Continues: New Directions in the Study of the Origins of the First World War |journal=[[The English Historical Review]] |date=2014 |volume=129 |issue=538 |pages=639–666 |doi=10.1093/ehr/ceu139 |doi-access= |ref=none}}
* {{cite journal |last=Nugent |first=Christine |title=The Fischer Controversy: Historiographical Revolution or Just Another Historians' Quarrel? |journal=Journal of the North Carolina Association of Historians |date=April 2008 |volume=16 |pages=77–114 }}
* {{cite book |last=Ritter |first=Gerhard |author-link=Gerhard Ritter |chapter=Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis? |pages=135–142 |title=The Outbreak of World War One: Causes and Responsibilities |editor-first=Holger |editor-last=Herwig |editor-link=Holger Herwig |date=1997 |orig-year=1962 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GD_zAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA135 |isbn=978-0-6694-1692-3}}
* {{cite book |last=Schroeder |first=Paul W. | author-link = Paul W. Schroeder|chapter=Necessary conditions and World War I as an unavoidable war |editor1-last=Levy |editor1-first=Jack |editor2-last=Goertz |editor2-first=Gary |title=Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k8Bq5bUmECkC&pg=PA147 |year=2007 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-10140-5 |pages=147–236}}
* {{cite book|last=Schroeder|first=Paul W.|title=Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xXKFQgAACAAJ |year=2004|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US|isbn=978-1-4039-6357-4|chapter=Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War}}
* {{cite journal |last=Seipp |first=Adam R. |title=Beyond the 'Seminal Catastrophe': Re-imagining the First World War |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary History]] |date=October 2006 |volume=41 |issue=4 |pages=757–766 |jstor=30036418 |doi=10.1177/0022009406067756|s2cid=162385648 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Showalter |first=Dennis | author-link = Dennis Showalter|title=The Great War and Its Historiography |journal=[[The Historian (journal)|The Historian]] |date=Winter 2006 |volume=68 |issue=4 |pages=713–721 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-6563.2006.00164.x |jstor=24453743|s2cid=144511421 }}
* Sked, Alan. "Austria-Hungary and the First World War." ''Histoire Politique'' 1 (2014): 16–49. [https://www.cairn.info/revue-histoire-politique-2014-1-page-16.htm online free]
* {{cite journal |last=Smith |first=Leonard V. |title=The ''Culture De Guerre'' and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918 |journal=[[History Compass]] |date=November 2007 |volume=5 |issue=6 |pages=1967–1979 |doi=10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00484.x }}
* {{cite journal |last=Strachan |first=Hew | author-link = Hew Strachan|title=The origins of the First World War |journal=[[International Affairs (journal)|International Affairs]] |date=March 2014 |volume=90 |issue=2 |pages=429–439 |doi=10.1111/1468-2346.12118}}
* Trachtenberg, Marc. "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914" ''International Security'' 15#3 (1991) pp.&nbsp;120–150 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538909 online]
* Vasquez, John A. "The First World War and International Relations Theory: A Review of Books on the 100th Anniversary." ''International Studies Review'' 16#4 (2014): 623–644.
* Williamson Jr, Samuel R., and Ernest R. May. "An identity of opinion: Historians and July 1914." ''Journal of Modern History'' 79.2 (2007): 335–387. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/519317 online]

{{Refend}}


===Historiography===
=== Primary sources ===
{{Refbegin}}
* Cohen, Warren I. ''American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War One'' (1967)
* Collins, Ross F. ed. '' World War I: Primary Documents on Events from 1914 to 1919'' (2007) [https://www.amazon.com/dp/0313320829/ excerpt and text search]
* D'Agostino, Anthony. "The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History," ''Journal of the Historical Society,'' Spring 2004, Vol. 4 Issue 2, p&nbsp;255–287 {{doi|10.1111/j.1529-921X.2004.00098.x}}
* Dugdale, E.T.S. ed. ''German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914'' (4 vol 1928–31), in English translation. [https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%28Dugdale%29%20german online]
* Gillette, Aaron. "Why Did They Fight the Great War? A Multi-Level Class Analysis of the Causes of the First World War," ''History Teacher,'' November 2006, Vol. 40 Issue 1, pp 45–58 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/30036938 in JSTOR]
* French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ''The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Documents'' (1914)
* Marczewski, Jerzy. "German Historiography and the Problem of Germany's Responsibility for World War I," ''Polish Western Affairs,'' 1977, Vol. 12 Issue 2, pp 289–309
* Gooch, G. P. ''Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy'' (1940); 475pp detailed summaries of memoirs from all the major belligerents
* Mombauer, Annika. "The First World War: Inevitable, Avoidable, Improbable Or Desirable? Recent Interpretations On War Guilt and the War's Origins," ''German History,'' (January 2007) 25#1 pp 78–95, [http://gh.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/1/78.extract online]
* Gooch, G.P. and Harold Temperley, eds. ''British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914'' (11 vol. ) [https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A%28gooch%20%20temperley%29 online]
* Nugent, Christine. "The Fischer Controversy: Historiographical Revolution or Just Another Historians' Quarrel?," ''Journal of the North Carolina Association of Historians,'' April 2008, Vol. 16, pp 77–114
** v. i The end of British isolation—v.2. From the occupation of Kiao-Chau to the making of the Anglo-French entente Dec. 1897-Apr. 1904—V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v.7. The Agadir crisis—v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace—v.11. The outbreak of war V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v.7. The Agadir crisis—v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace—v.11. The outbreak of war.
* Seipp, Adam R. "Beyond the 'Seminal Catastrophe': Re-imagining the First World War," ''Journal of Contemporary History,'' October 2006, Vol. 41 Issue 4, pp 757–766 [http://www.jstor.org/pss/30036418 in JSTOR]
** Gooch, G. P. and Harold Temperley, eds. ''British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Volume XI, the Outbreak of War Foreign Office Documents'' (1926) [https://archive.org/details/britishdocuments11grea online]
* Showalter, Dennis. "The Great War and Its Historiography," ''Historian,'' Winter 2006, Vol. 68 Issue 4, pp 713–721 [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6563.2006.00164.x/full online]
* Gooch, G.P. ''Recent revelations of European diplomacy'' (1928) pp 269–330. [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.217813 online]; summarizes new documents from Germany, pp 3–100; Austria, 103–17; Russia, 161–211; Serbia and the Balkans, 215–42; France, 269–330; Great Britain, 343–429; United States, 433–62.
* Smith, Leonard V. "The 'Culture De Guerre' and French Historiography of the Great War of 1914–1918," ''History Compass,'' November 2007, Vol. 5 Issue 6, pp 1967–1979 [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00484.x/full online]
* ''Hammond's frontier atlas of the world war : containing large scale maps of all the battle fronts of Europe and Asia, together with a military map of the United States'' (1916) [https://archive.org/details/hammondsfrontier00csha/page/n4 online free]
* Williamson, Jr., Samuel R. and Ernest R. May. "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914," ''Journal of Modern History,'' June 2007, Vol. 79 Issue 2, pp 335–387 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/519317 in JSTOR] comprehensive historiography
* Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill, eds. ''The Mirage of Power: The Documents of British Foreign Policy 1914-22'' (vol 3, 1972), pp 423–759
* Mombauer, Annika. ''The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents'' (2013), 592pp;
* ''Reichstag speeches'' [https://web.archive.org/web/20180309124418/http://www.4august1914.org/]
{{Refend}}
{{Refend}}


== External links ==
== External links ==
{{Commons category|World War I origins}}
{{Commons category|World War I origins}}
* Mombauer, Annika: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/july_crisis_1914 July Crisis 1914], in: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home/ 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War].
* [http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm Overview of Causes and Primary Sources]
* Mulligan, William: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/the_historiography_of_the_origins_of_the_first_world_war The Historiography of the Origins of the First World War], in: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home/ 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War].
* [http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/historian/hist_stone_01_russia.html Russia - Getting Too Strong for Germany] by [[Norman Stone]]
* Williamson, Jr., Samuel R.: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/the_way_to_war The Way to War], in: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home/ 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War].
* [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml The Origins of World War One]: An article by Dr. Gary Sheffield at the BBC History site.
* Brose, Eric: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/arms_race_prior_to_1914_armament_policy Arms Race prior to 1914, Armament Policy], in: [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/home/ 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War].
* [http://www.heeve.com/modern-history/causes-of-world-war-1.html What caused World War I]: Timeline of events and origins of WWI
* [https://www.pbs.org/greatwar/historian/hist_stone_01_russia.html Russia – Getting Too Strong for Germany] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161001213635/https://www.pbs.org/greatwar/historian/hist_stone_01_russia.html |date=2016-10-01 }} by [[Norman Stone]]
* [http://simon31.narod.ru/syndromeofsocialism.htm Kuliabin A. Semine S. Some of aspects of state national economy evolution in the system of the international economic order.- USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES FAR EAST DIVISION INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL OCEAN STUDIES Vladivostok, 1991]
* [https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml The Origins of World War One]: An article by Dr. Gary Sheffield at the BBC History site.
*[http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/31457 The Evidenc in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia] by [[James M. Beck]]
* [https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31457 The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia] by [[James M. Beck]]
<!--spacing, please do not remove-->
*[http://www.ariannascuola.eu/joomla/storia/la-narrazione-dei-fatti/la-prima-guerra-mondiale/222-la-prima-guerra-mondiale/308-le-cause-della-prima-guerra-mondiale-mappa-concettuale.html Concept Map of the Causes of WWI]
{{World War I}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Causes Of World War I}}
{{World War I}}{{Historiography}}
[[Category:Causes of war|World War I, Causes of]]
[[Category:Causes of World War I|*]]


[[Category:Causes of World War I| ]]
{{Link GA|de}}
[[Category:Causes of wars|World War I]]
{{Link FA|fr}}

Latest revision as of 15:50, 11 December 2024

European diplomatic alignments shortly before the war. The Ottomans joined the Central Powers shortly after the war started, with Bulgaria joining the following year. Italy remained neutral in 1914 and joined the Allies in 1915.
Map of the world with the participants in World War I c. 1917. Allied Powers in blue, Central Powers in orange, and the neutral countries are in grey.

The identification of the causes of World War I remains a debated issue. World War I began in the Balkans on July 28, 1914, and hostilities ended on November 11, 1918, leaving 17 million dead and 25 million wounded. Moreover, the Russian Civil War can in many ways be considered a continuation of World War I, as can various other conflicts in the direct aftermath of 1918.

Scholars looking at the long term seek to explain why two rival sets of powers (the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire, France, and the British Empire) came into conflict by the start of 1914. They look at such factors as political, territorial and economic competition; militarism, a complex web of alliances and alignments; imperialism, the growth of nationalism; and the power vacuum created by the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Other important long-term or structural factors that are often studied include unresolved territorial disputes, the perceived breakdown of the European balance of power,[1][2] convoluted and fragmented governance, arms races and security dilemmas,[3][4] a cult of the offensive,[1][5][4] and military planning.[6]

Scholars seeking short-term analysis focus on the summer of 1914 and ask whether the conflict could have been stopped, or instead whether deeper causes made it inevitable. Among the immediate causes were the decisions made by statesmen and generals during the July Crisis, which was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by the Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip, who had been supported by a nationalist organization in Serbia.[7] The crisis escalated as the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was joined by their allies Russia, Germany, France, and ultimately Belgium and the United Kingdom. Other factors that came into play during the diplomatic crisis leading up to the war included misperceptions of intent (such as the German belief that Britain would remain neutral), the fatalistic belief that war was inevitable, and the speed with which the crisis escalated, partly due to delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications.

The crisis followed a series of diplomatic clashes among the Great Powers (Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary and Russia) over European and colonial issues in the decades before 1914 that had left tensions high. And the cause of the public clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe that had been taking place since 1867.[8]

Consensus on the origins of the war remains elusive, since historians disagree on key factors and place differing emphasis on a variety of factors. That is compounded by historical arguments changing over time, particularly as classified historical archives become available, and as perspectives and ideologies of historians have changed. The deepest division among historians is between those who see Germany and Austria-Hungary as having driven events and those who focus on power dynamics among a wider set of actors and circumstances. Secondary fault lines exist between those who believe that Germany deliberately planned a European war, those who believe that the war was largely unplanned but was still caused principally by Germany and Austria-Hungary taking risks, and those who believe that some or all of the other powers (Russia, France, Serbia, United Kingdom) played a more significant role in causing the war than has been traditionally suggested.

Immediate causes

[edit]

Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists, 28 June 1914

[edit]
Grave implications of the assassination were immediately recognized, as in this 29 June article with subtitles "War Sequel?" and "War May Result", and stating the assassination was "engineered by persons having a more mature organizing ability than that of the youthful assassins".[9]

On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife, Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were shot dead after a wrong turn by two gun shots[10] in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, one of a group of six assassins (five Serbs and one Bosniak) co-ordinated by Danilo Ilić, a Bosnian Serb and a member of the Black Hand secret society.

The assassination was significant because it was perceived by Austria-Hungary as an existential challenge and so was viewed as providing a casus belli with Serbia. Emperor Franz Josef was eighty-four and so the assassination of his heir, so soon before he was likely to hand over the crown, was seen as a direct challenge to the empire. Many ministers in Austria, especially Berchtold, argued that the act must be avenged.[11]

July Crisis

[edit]

Following the murder, Austria-Hungary sought to inflict a military blow on Serbia, to demonstrate its own strength and to dampen Serbian support for Yugoslav nationalism, viewing it as a threat to the unity of its multi-national empire. However, Vienna, wary of the reaction of Russia (a major supporter of Serbia), sought a guarantee from its ally, Germany, that Berlin would support Austria in any conflict. Germany guaranteed its support through what came to be known as the "blank cheque",[a] but urged Austria-Hungary to attack quickly to localise the war and avoid drawing in Russia. However, Austro-Hungarian leaders would deliberate into mid-July before deciding to give Serbia a harsh ultimatum, and would not attack without a full mobilisation of the army. In the meantime, France met with Russia, reaffirmed their alliance, and agreed they would support Serbia against Austria-Hungary in the event of a war.

Austria-Hungary made its ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July; before Serbia replied, Russia ordered a secret, but noticed, partial mobilisation of its armed forces. Though Russia's military leadership knew they were not yet strong enough for a general war, they believed that the Austro-Hungarian grievance against Serbia was a pretext orchestrated by Germany, and considered a forceful response to be the best course of action. Russia’s partial mobilisation—the first major military action not undertaken by a direct participant in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—increased the willingness of Serbia to defy the threat of an Austro-Hungarian attack; it also alarmed the German leadership, having not anticipated the idea of needing to fight Russia before France.[b]

While the United Kingdom was semi-formally aligned with Russia and France, many British leaders saw no compelling reason to get involved militarily; the UK made repeated offers to mediate, and Germany made various promises to try to ensure British neutrality. However, fearing the possibility of Germany overrunning France, Britain entered the war against them on 4 August, and used the German invasion of Belgium to galvanise popular support. By early August, the ostensible reason for armed conflict—the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian archduke—had already become a side-note to a larger European war.

Polarization of Europe, 1887–1914

[edit]

In August 1914, The Independent magazine described the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife in June as a "deplorable but relatively insignificant" reason for which.[13]

the financial system of the world is in chaos, that international commerce is suspended, that industries are everywhere demoralized and families ruined, and that millions of men in Europe have taken up arms with the intent to slaughter each other.

"It may be doubted whether the Archduke [is] worth all this carnage", the magazine added. It discussed and dismissed ethnicity, race, religion, and national interests as motivations for war. The Independent concluded that "such is the ridiculous and tragical situation resulting from the survival of the antiquated superstition of the 'balance of power,' that is, the theory that the prosperity of one nation was an injury to others":[13]

Most of the people concerned in the present conflict have neither racial antagonism nor economic interests as an excuse for enmity. They are no more enemies than the Reds and the Blues into which an army corps is divided for practice maneuvers. But now the guns are loaded and those who bear them have nothing to say about whom they shall shoot.

"The only unexpected thing about the present European war is the date of it", the magazine added later that month:[14]

No war in history has been so long anticipated, so carefully prepared for and so thoroughly discussed, not only in the privy councils, but in the press of all nations. Every European soldier knew where his uniform and rifle were stored; he also thought he knew as well where he was to fight, with whom he was to fight and when.

To understand the long-term origins of the war in 1914, it is essential to understand how the powers formed into two competing sets that shared common aims and enemies. Both sets became, by August 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France, and Britain on the other side.

German realignment to Austria-Hungary and Russian realignment to France, 1887–1892

[edit]
1
2
3
4
Map of Bismarck's alliances
1
Dual Alliance (1879)
2
League of the Three Emperors (1881)
3
Triple Alliance (1882)
4
Reinsurance Treaty (1887)

In 1887, German and Russian alignment was secured by means of a secret Reinsurance Treaty arranged by Otto von Bismarck. However, in 1890, Bismarck fell from power, and the treaty was allowed to lapse in favor of the Dual Alliance (1879) between Germany and Austria-Hungary. That development was attributed to Count Leo von Caprivi, the Prussian general who replaced Bismarck as chancellor. It is claimed that Caprivi recognized a personal inability to manage the European system as his predecessor had and so was counseled by contemporary figures such as Friedrich von Holstein to follow a more logical approach, as opposed to Bismarck's complex and even duplicitous strategy.[15] Thus, the treaty with Austria-Hungary was concluded despite the Russian willingness to amend the Reinsurance Treaty and to sacrifice a provision referred to as the "very secret additions"[15] that concerned the Turkish Straits.[16]

Caprivi's decision was also driven by the belief that the Reinsurance Treaty was no longer needed to ensure Russian neutrality if France attacked Germany, and the treaty would even preclude an offensive against France.[17] Lacking the capacity for Bismarck's strategic ambiguity, Caprivi pursued a policy that was oriented towards "getting Russia to accept Berlin's promises on good faith and to encourage St. Petersburg to engage in a direct understanding with Vienna, without a written accord."[17] By 1882, the Dual Alliance was expanded to include Italy.[18] In response, Russia secured in the same year the Franco-Russian Alliance, a strong military relationship that was to last until 1917. That move was prompted by Russia's need for an ally since it was experiencing a major famine and a rise in antigovernment revolutionary activities.[17] The alliance was gradually built throughout the years from when Bismarck refused the sale of Russian bonds in Berlin, which drove Russia to the Paris capital market.[19] That began the expansion of Russian and French financial ties, which eventually helped elevate the Franco-Russian entente to the diplomatic and military arenas.

Caprivi's strategy appeared to work when, during the outbreak of the Bosnian crisis of 1908, Germany successfully demanded that Russia step back and demobilize.[20] When Germany asked Russia the same thing later, Russia refused, which finally helped precipitate the war.

French distrust of Germany

[edit]
American cartoon showing territorial dispute between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine, 1898

Some of the distant origins of World War I can be seen in the results and consequences of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and 1871 and the concurrent unification of Germany. Germany had won decisively and established a powerful empire, but France fell into chaos and experienced a years-long decline in its military power. A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany after the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge that was known as revanchism. French sentiment was based on a desire to avenge military and territorial losses and the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power.[21] Bismarck was wary of the French desire for revenge and achieved peace by isolating France and by balancing the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. During his later years, he tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained.[22]

France eventually recovered from its defeat, paid its war indemnity, and rebuilt its military strength. However, France was smaller than Germany in terms of population and industry and therefore many French felt insecure next to a more powerful neighbor.[23] By the 1890s, the desire for revenge over Alsace-Lorraine was no longer a major factor for the leaders of France but remained a force in public opinion. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador to Berlin (1907–1914), worked hard to secure a détente, but the French government realized that Berlin was trying to weaken the Triple Entente and at the best, was not sincere in seeking peace. The French consensus was that war was inevitable.[24]

British alignment towards France and Russia, 1898–1907: The Triple Entente

[edit]

After Bismarck's removal in 1890, French efforts to isolate Germany became successful. With the formation of the informal Triple Entente, Germany began to feel encircled.[25] French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé went to great pains to woo Russia and Britain. Key markers were the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain, and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, which led to the Triple Entente. France's informal alignment with Britain and its formal alliance with Russia against Germany and Austria eventually led Russia and Britain to enter World War I as France's allies.[26][27]

Britain abandoned its policy of splendid isolation in the 1900s, after it had been isolated during the Second Boer War. Britain concluded agreements, limited to colonial affairs, with its two major colonial rivals: the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Some historians see Britain's alignment as principally a reaction to an assertive German foreign policy and the buildup of its navy from 1898 that led to the Anglo-German naval arms race.[28][29]

Other scholars, most notably Niall Ferguson, argue that Britain chose France and Russia over Germany because Germany was too weak an ally to provide an effective counterbalance to the other powers and could not provide Britain with the imperial security that was achieved by the Entente agreements.[30] In the words of the British diplomat Arthur Nicolson, it was "far more disadvantageous to us to have an unfriendly France and Russia than an unfriendly Germany."[31] Ferguson argues that the British government rejected German alliance overtures "not because Germany began to pose a threat to Britain, but, on the contrary because they realized she did not pose a threat."[32] The impact of the Triple Entente was therefore twofold by improving British relations with France and its ally, Russia, and showing the importance to Britain of good relations with Germany. It was "not that antagonism toward Germany caused its isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire."[33]

The Triple Entente between Britain, France, and Russia is often compared to the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria–Hungary and Italy, but historians caution against that comparison as simplistic. The Entente, in contrast to the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defence, and so in 1914 Britain felt free to make its own foreign policy decisions. As the British Foreign Office official Eyre Crowe minuted: "The fundamental fact of course is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content."[34]

A series of diplomatic incidents between 1905 and 1914 heightened tensions between the Great Powers and reinforced the existing alignments, beginning with the First Moroccan Crisis.

First Moroccan Crisis, 1905–06: Strengthening the Entente

[edit]

The First Moroccan Crisis was an international dispute between March 1905 and May 1906 over the status of Morocco. The crisis worsened German relations with both France and Britain, and helped ensure the success of the new Entente Cordiale. In the words of the historian Christopher Clark, "The Anglo-French Entente was strengthened rather than weakened by the German challenge to France in Morocco."[35] Due to this crisis, Spain turned to the United Kingdom and France, and signed the Pact of Cartagena of 1907. Spain received British help to build the new España-class battleship.

Bosnian Crisis, 1908: Worsening relations of Russia and Serbia with Austria-Hungary

[edit]

In 1908, Austria-Hungary announced its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, provinces in the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been nominally under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire but administered by Austria-Hungary since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The announcement upset the fragile balance of power in the Balkans and enraged Serbia and pan-Slavic nationalists throughout Europe. The weakened Russia was forced to submit to its humiliation, but its foreign office still viewed Austria-Hungary's actions as overly aggressive and threatening. Russia's response was to encourage pro-Russian and anti-Austrian sentiment in Serbia and other Balkan provinces, provoking Austrian fears of Slavic expansionism in the region.[36]

Agadir crisis in Morocco, 1911

[edit]
French troops in Morocco, 1912

Imperial rivalries pushed France, Germany, and Britain to compete for control of Morocco, leading to a short-lived war scare in 1911. In the end, France established a protectorate over Morocco that increased European tensions. The Agadir Crisis resulted from the deployment of a substantial force of French troops into the interior of Morocco in April 1911. Germany reacted by sending the gunboat SMS Panther to the Moroccan port of Agadir on 1 July 1911. The main result was deeper suspicion between London and Berlin and closer military ties between London and Paris.[37][38]

British backing of France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries and with Russia, increased Anglo-German estrangement, and deepened the divisions that would erupt in 1914.[39] In terms of internal British jousting, the crisis was part of a five-year struggle inside the British cabinet between Radical isolationists and the Liberal Party's imperialist interventionists. The interventionists sought to use the Triple Entente to contain German expansion. The Radical isolationists obtained an agreement for official cabinet approval of all initiatives that might lead to war. However, the interventionists were joined by the two leading Radicals, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Lloyd George's famous Mansion House speech of 21 July 1911 angered the Germans and encouraged the French.[40]

The crisis led British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, a Liberal, and French leaders to make a secret naval agreement by which the Royal Navy would protect the northern coast of France from German attack, and France agreed to concentrate the French Navy in the western Mediterranean and to protect British interests there. France was thus able to guard its communications with its North African colonies, and Britain to concentrate more force in home waters to oppose the German High Seas Fleet. The British cabinet was not informed of the agreement until August 1914. Meanwhile, the episode strengthened the hand of German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who was calling for a greatly-increased navy and obtained it in 1912.[41]

The American historian Raymond James Sontag argues that Agadir was a comedy of errors that became a tragic prelude to the World War I:

The crisis seems comic—its obscure origin, the questions at stake, the conduct of the actors—all comic. The results were tragic. Tension between France and Germany and between Germany and England have been increased; the armaments race receive new impetus; the conviction that an early war was inevitable spread through the governing class of Europe.[42]

Italo-Turkish War: Isolation of the Ottomans, 1911–1912

[edit]
Mustafa Kemal (left) with an Ottoman military officer and Bedouin forces in Derna, Tripolitania Vilayet, 1912

In the Italo-Turkish War, the Kingdom of Italy defeated the Ottoman Empire in North Africa in 1911–1912.[43] Italy easily captured the important coastal cities, but its army failed to advance far into the interior. Italy captured the Ottoman Tripolitania Vilayet, a province whose most notable subprovinces, or sanjaks, were Fezzan, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli itself. The territories together formed what was later known as Italian Libya. The main significance for World War I was that it was now clear that no Great Power still appeared to wish to support the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for the Balkan Wars. Christopher Clark stated, "Italy launched a war of conquest on an African province of the Ottoman Empire, triggering a chain of opportunistic assaults on Ottoman territories across the Balkans. The system of geographical balances that had enabled local conflicts to be contained was swept away." [44]

Balkan Wars, 1912–13: Growth of Serbian and Russian power

[edit]

The Balkan Wars were two conflicts that took place in the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe in 1912 and 1913. Four Balkan states defeated the Ottoman Empire in the first war; one of them, Bulgaria, was defeated in the second war. The Ottoman Empire lost nearly all of its territory in Europe. Austria-Hungary, although not a combatant, was weakened, as a much-enlarged Kingdom of Serbia pushed for union of all South Slavs.

The Balkan Wars in 1912–1913 increased international tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary. It also led to a strengthening of Serbia and a weakening of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which might otherwise have kept Serbia under control, thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe toward Russia.

Russia initially agreed to avoid territorial changes, but later in 1912, it supported Serbia's demand for an Albanian port. The London Conference of 1912–13 agreed to create an independent Albania, but both Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After an Austrian and then an international naval demonstration in early 1912 and Russia's withdrawal of support, Serbia backed down. Montenegro was not as compliant, and on May 2, the Austrian council of ministers met and decided to give Montenegro a last chance to comply, or it would resort to military action. However, seeing the Austro-Hungarian military preparations, the Montenegrins requested for the ultimatum to be delayed, and they complied.[45]

Territorial gains of the Balkan states after the Balkan Wars

The Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, now demanded for the other spoils of the First Balkan War to be reapportioned, and Russia failed to pressure Serbia to back down. Serbia and Greece allied against Bulgaria, which responded with a pre-emptive strike against their forces and so began the Second Balkan War.[46] The Bulgarian army crumbled quickly after the Ottoman Empire and Romania joined the war.

The Balkan Wars strained the German alliance with Austria-Hungary. The attitude of the German government to Austro-Hungarian requests of support against Serbia was initially divided and inconsistent. After the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912, it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-Hungary in a war against Serbia and its likely allies.

In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and pro-Romanian and against Austria-Hungary's increasing pro-Bulgarian sympathies. The result was tremendous damage to relations between both empires. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold remarked to the German ambassador, Heinrich von Tschirschky in July 1913, "Austria-Hungary might as well belong 'to the other grouping' for all the good Berlin had been."[47]

In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia was moving into Albania, and Russia was doing nothing to restrain it, and the Serbian government would not guarantee to respect Albania's territorial integrity and suggested that some frontier modifications would occur. In October 1913, the council of ministers decided to send Serbia a warning followed by an ultimatum for Germany and Italy to be notified of some action and asked for support and for spies to be sent to report if there was an actual withdrawal. Serbia responded to the warning with defiance, and the ultimatum was dispatched on October 17 and received the following day. It demanded for Serbia to evacuate from Albania within eight days. After Serbia complied, the Kaiser made a congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year.[48]

By then, Russia had mostly recovered from its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, and the calculations of Germany and Austria were driven by a fear that Russia would eventually become too strong to be challenged. The conclusion was that any war with Russia had to occur within the next few years to have any chance of success.[49]

Franco-Russian Alliance changes to Balkan inception scenario, 1911–1913

[edit]

The original Franco-Russian alliance was formed to protect both France and Russia from a German attack. In the event of such an attack, both states would mobilize in tandem, placing Germany under the threat of a two-front war. However, there were limits placed on the alliance so that it was essentially defensive in character.

Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s, the French and the Russians made clear the limits of the alliance did not extend to provocations caused by each other's adventurous foreign policy. For example, Russia warned France that the alliance would not operate if the French provoked the Germans in North Africa. Equally, the French insisted that the Russians should not use the alliance to provoke Austria-Hungary or Germany in the Balkans and that France did not recognize in the Balkans a vital strategic interest for France or Russia.

That changed in the last 18 to 24 months before the outbreak of the war. At the end of 1911, particularly during the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913, the French view changed to accept the importance of the Balkans to Russia. Moreover, France clearly stated that if, as a result of a conflict in the Balkans, war broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, France would stand by Russia. Thus, the alliance changed in character and Serbia now became a security salient for Russia and France. A war of Balkan inception, regardless of who started such a war, would cause the alliance to respond by viewing the conflict as a casus foederis, a trigger for the alliance. Christopher Clark described that change as "a very important development in the pre-war system which made the events of 1914 possible."[50] Otte also agrees that France became significantly less keen on restraining Russia after the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1912, and sought to embolden Russia against Austria. The Russian ambassador conveyed Poincare's message as saying that "if Russia wages war, France also wages war."[51]

Liman von Sanders Affair: 1913-14

[edit]

This was a crisis caused by the appointment of an Imperial German Army officer, Otto Liman von Sanders, to command the Ottoman First Army Corps guarding Constantinople and the subsequent Russian objections. In November, 1913, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov complained to Berlin that the Sanders mission was an "openly hostile act." In addition to threatening Russia's foreign trade, half of which flowed through the Turkish Straits, the mission raised the possibility of a German-led Ottoman assault on Russia's Black Sea ports, and it imperiled Russian plans for expansion in eastern Anatolia. A compromise arrangement was agreed for Sanders to be appointed to the rather less senior and less influential position of Inspector General in January 1914.[52] When the war came Sanders provided only limited help to the Ottoman forces.[53]

Anglo-German détente, 1912–14

[edit]

Historians have cautioned that taken together, the preceding crises should not be seen as an argument that a European war was inevitable in 1914.

The Anglo-German naval arms race became a considerable source of tension between Germany and Britain prior to World War I. Royal Navy warships pictured above in battle formation.

Although the Haldane Mission of February 1912 failed to halt the Anglo-German naval arms race, the race suddenly paused in late 1912 as Germany cut its naval budget. In April 1913, Britain and Germany signed an agreement over the African territories of the Portuguese Empire, which was expected to collapse imminently. (That empire lasted into the 1970s.) Moreover, the Russians were again threatening British interests in Persia and India. The British were "deeply annoyed by St Petersburg's failure to observe the terms of the agreement struck in 1907 and began to feel an arrangement of some kind with Germany might serve as a useful corrective."[31] Despite the infamous 1908 interview in The Daily Telegraph, which implied that Kaiser Wilhelm wanted war, he came to be regarded as a guardian of peace. After the Moroccan Crisis, in the Anglo-German press wars, previously an important feature of international politics during the first decade of the century, virtually ceased. In early 1913, H. H. Asquith stated, "Public opinion in both countries seems to point to an intimate and friendly understanding." The end of the naval arms race, the relaxation of colonial rivalries, and the increased diplomatic co-operation in the Balkans all resulted in an improvement in Germany's image in Britain by the eve of the war.[54]

The British diplomat Arthur Nicolson wrote in May 1914, "Since I have been at the Foreign Office I have not seen such calm waters."[55] The Anglophile German Ambassador Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky, deplored that Germany had acted hastily without waiting for the British offer of mediation in July 1914 to be given a chance.

Domestic political factors

[edit]

German domestic politics

[edit]

Left-wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), made large gains in the 1912 German federal election. The German government was still dominated by the Prussian Junkers, who feared the rise of left-wing parties. Fritz Fischer famously argued that the Junker class deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and to whip up patriotic support for the government.[56] Indeed, one German military leader, Moritz von Lynker, the chief of the military cabinet, wanted war in 1909 because it was "desirable in order to escape from difficulties at home and abroad."[57] The Conservative Party leader Ernst von Heydebrand und der Lasa suggested that "a war would strengthen patriarchal order."[58]

Other authors argue that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war for fear that losing a war would have disastrous consequences and believed that even a successful war might alienate the population if it was lengthy or difficult.[30] Many German people complained of a need to conform to the euphoria around them, which allowed later Nazi propagandists to "foster an image of national fulfillment later destroyed by wartime betrayal and subversion culminating in the alleged Dolchstoss (stab in the back) of the army by socialists."[59]

However, David G. Williamson believes that despite the ambivalence felt among some in the German Empire in its main land in Europe, especially certain actors in the labor movement, the spirit of 1914 was widely shared enough among all social classes to prove that the Empire was the primary cause of World War I.[60]

Drivers of Austro-Hungarian policy

[edit]
Ethno-linguistic map of Austria-Hungary, 1910. Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed in 1908.

The argument that Austria-Hungary was a moribund political entity, whose disappearance was only a matter of time, was deployed by hostile contemporaries to suggest that its efforts to defend its integrity during the last years before the war were, in some sense, illegitimate.[61]

Clark states, "Evaluating the prospects of the Austro-Hungarian empire on the eve of the first world war confronts us in an acute way with the problem of temporal perspective.... The collapse of the empire amid war and defeat in 1918 impressed itself upon the retrospective view of the Habsburg lands, overshadowing the scene with auguries of imminent and ineluctable decline."[62]

It is true that Austro-Hungarian politics in the decades before the war were increasingly dominated by the struggle for national rights among the empire's eleven official nationalities: Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Romanians, Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Poles, and Italians. However, before 1914, radical nationalists seeking full separation from the empire were still a small minority, and Austria-Hungary's political turbulence was more noisy than deep.[63]

In fact, in the decade before the war, the Habsburg lands passed through a phase of strong, widely-shared economic growth. Most inhabitants associated the Habsburgs with the benefits of orderly government, public education, welfare, sanitation, the rule of law, and the maintenance of a sophisticated infrastructure.

Christopher Clark states: "Prosperous and relatively well administered, the empire, like its elderly sovereign, exhibited a curious stability amid turmoil. Crises came and went without appearing to threaten the existence of the system as such. The situation was always, as the Viennese journalist Karl Kraus quipped, 'desperate but not serious'."[63]

Jack Levy and William Mulligan argue that the death of Franz Ferdinand itself was a significant factor in helping escalate the July Crisis into a war by killing a powerful proponent for peace and thus encouraged a more belligerent decision-making process.[64]

Drivers of Serbian policy

[edit]

The principal aims of Serbian policy were to consolidate the Russian-backed expansion of Serbia in the Balkan Wars and to achieve dreams of a Greater Serbia, which included the unification of lands with large ethnic Serb populations in Austria-Hungary, including Bosnia [65]

Underlying that was a culture of extreme nationalism and a cult of assassination, which romanticized the slaying of the Ottoman Sultan Murad I as the heroic epilogue to the otherwise-disastrous Battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389. Clark states: "The Greater Serbian vision was not just a question of government policy, however, or even of propaganda. It was woven deeply into the culture and identity of the Serbs."[65] Famed Serbian-American scientist Michael Pupin, for example, in July 1914 explicitly connected the Battle of Kosovo ("a natural heritage of every true Serb") to Franz Ferdinand's assassination. He wrote that the battle's "memory always served as a reminder to the Serbs that they must avenge the wrongs perpetrated upon their race".[66]

Serbian policy was complicated by the fact that the main actors in 1914 were both the official Serb government, led by Nikola Pašić, and the "Black Hand" terrorists, led by the head of Serb military intelligence, known as Apis. The Black Hand believed that a Greater Serbia would be achieved by provoking a war with Austria-Hungary by an act of terror. The war would be won with Russian backing.

The official government position was to focus on consolidating the gains made during the exhausting Balkan War and to avoid further conflicts. That official policy was temporized by the political necessity of simultaneously and clandestinely supporting dreams of a Greater Serbian state in the long term.[67] The Serbian government found it impossible to put an end to the machinations of the Black Hand for fear it would itself be overthrown. Clark states: "Serbian authorities were partly unwilling and partly unable to suppress the irredentist activity that had given rise to the assassinations in the first place".[68]

Russia tended to support Serbia as a fellow Slavic state, considered Serbia its "client," and encouraged Serbia to focus its irredentism against Austria-Hungary because it would discourage conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria, another prospective Russian ally, in Macedonia.

Imperialism

[edit]

Impact of colonial rivalry and aggression on Europe in 1914

[edit]
World empires and colonies around 1914

Imperial rivalry and the consequences of the search for imperial security or for imperial expansion had important consequences for the origins of World War I.

Imperial rivalries between France, Britain, Russia and Germany played an important part in the creation of the Triple Entente and the relative isolation of Germany. Imperial opportunism, in the form of the Italian attack on Ottoman Libyan provinces, also encouraged the Balkan wars of 1912–13, which changed the balance of power in the Balkans to the detriment of Austria-Hungary.

Some historians, such as Margaret MacMillan, believe that Germany created its own diplomatic isolation in Europe, in part by an aggressive and pointless imperial policy known as Weltpolitik. Others, such as Clark, believe that German isolation was the unintended consequence of a détente between Britain, France, and Russia. The détente was driven by Britain's desire for imperial security in relation to France in North Africa and to Russia in Persia and India.

Either way, the isolation was important because it left Germany few options but to ally itself more strongly with Austria-Hungary, leading ultimately to unconditional support for Austria-Hungary's punitive war on Serbia during the July Crisis.

German isolation: The potential consequences of Weltpolitik

[edit]
European officials staking claims to Africa in the Berlin Conference, 1884

Otto von Bismarck disliked the idea of an overseas empire but supported France's colonization in Africa because it diverted the French government, attention, and resources away from Continental Europe and revanchism after 1870. Germany's "New Course" in foreign affairs, Weltpolitik ("world policy"), was adopted in the 1890s after Bismarck's dismissal.

Its aim was ostensibly to transform Germany into a global power through assertive diplomacy, the acquisition of overseas colonies, and the development of a large navy.

Some historians, notably MacMillan and Hew Strachan, believe that a consequence of the policy of Weltpolitik and Germany's associated assertiveness was to isolate it. Weltpolitik, particularly as expressed in Germany's objections to France's growing influence in Morocco in 1904 and 1907, also helped cement the Triple Entente. The Anglo-German naval race also isolated Germany by reinforcing Britain's preference for agreements with Germany's continental rivals: France and Russia.[69]

German isolation: The potential consequences of the Triple Entente

[edit]

Historians like Ferguson and Clark believe that Germany's isolation was the unintended consequences of the need for Britain to defend its empire against threats from France and Russia. They also downplay the impact of Weltpolitik and the Anglo-German naval race, which ended in 1911.

Britain and France signed a series of agreements in 1904, which became known as the Entente Cordiale. Most importantly, it granted freedom of action to Britain in Egypt and to France in Morocco. Equally, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention greatly improved British–Russian relations by solidifying boundaries that identified respective control in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

The alignment between Britain, France, and Russia became known as the Triple Entente. However, the Triple Entente was not conceived as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance but as a formula to secure imperial security among the three powers.[70] The impact of the Triple Entente was twofold: improving British relations with France and its ally, Russia, and showing the importance to Britain of good relations with Germany. Clark states it was "not that antagonism toward Germany caused its isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and intensified hostility towards the German Empire."[71]

Imperial opportunism

[edit]

The Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912 was fought between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy in North Africa. The war made it clear that no great power still appeared to wish to support the Ottoman Empire, which paved the way for the Balkan Wars.

The status of Morocco had been guaranteed by international agreement, and when France attempted a great expansion of its influence there without the assent of all other signatories, Germany opposed and prompted the Moroccan Crises: the Tangier Crisis of 1905 and the Agadir Crisis of 1911. The intent of German policy was to drive a wedge between the British and French, but in both cases, it produced the opposite effect and Germany was isolated diplomatically, most notably by lacking the support of Italy despite it being in the Triple Alliance. The French protectorate over Morocco was established officially in 1912.

In 1914, however, the African scene was peaceful. The continent was almost fully divided up by the imperial powers, with only Liberia and Ethiopia still independent. There were no major disputes there pitting any two European powers against each other.[72]

Role of businesses and financial institutions

[edit]

Lenin's interpretation

[edit]

Marxism attributes war to economic interests and rivalries, in this case, imperialism. Vladimir Lenin argued that "imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism," which emerges from the "free competition" stage of capitalism and is characterized by the presence of "five basic features":

"(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital,' of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves and (5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed."[73]

Lenin concluded that these five features of imperialism had been established by the turn of the 20th century, after the great powers had spent the final decades of the prior century acquiring nearly all the remaining territory of the world that had not yet been colonized.[74] The largest and most lucrative uncolonized or semi-colonized territories at the time of the war were that of Persia (Iran), Turkey (including all of the pre-industrial territories of the declining Ottoman Empire), and most of China beyond the treaty ports.[74] Having completed the division of the world among themselves at the beginning of the century, the developed capitalist states would thereafter compete for hegemony in the form of a redivision of those territories, both in the industrialized areas (e.g., "German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine"), and in primarily agrarian areas.[73][75]

Other views

[edit]

Richard Hamilton observed that the argument went that since industrialists and bankers were seeking raw materials, new markets and new investments overseas, if one was strategically blocked by other powers, the "obvious" or "necessary" solution was war.[76] Hamilton somewhat criticized the view that the war was launched to secure colonies, but agreed that imperialism may have been on the mind of key decision makers. He argued that it was not necessarily for logical, economic reasons. Hamilton noted that Bismarck was famously not moved by such peer pressure and ended Germany's limited imperialist movement. He regarded colonial ambitions as a waste of money but simultaneously recommended them to other nations.[77]

While some bankers and industrialists tried to curb Wilhelm II away from war, their efforts ended in failure. There is no evidence they ever received a direct response from the Kaiser, chancellor, or foreign secretary or that their advice was discussed in depth by the Foreign Office or the General Staff. The German leadership measured power not in financial ledgers but land and military might.[78]

Hamilton argued that, generally speaking, the European business leaders were in favour of profits and peace allowed for stability and investment opportunities across national borders, but war brought the disruption trade, the confiscation of holdings, and the risk of increased taxation. While arms manufacturers could make money selling weapons at home, they could also lose access to foreign markets. Krupp, a major arms manufacturer, started the war with 48 million marks in profits but ended it 148 million marks in debt, and the first year of peace saw further losses of 36 million marks.[79][80]

William Mulligan argues that while economic and political factors were often interdependent, economic factors tended towards peace. Prewar trade wars and financial rivalries never threatened to escalate into conflict. Governments would mobilise bankers and financiers to serve their interests, rather than the reverse. The commercial and financial elite recognized peace as necessary for economic development and used its influence to resolve diplomatic crises. Economic rivalries existed but were framed largely by political concerns. Prior to the war, there were few signs that the international economy stood for war in the summer of 1914.[81]

Social Darwinism

[edit]

Social Darwinism was a theory of human evolution loosely based on Darwinism that influenced many European intellectuals and strategic thinkers from 1870 to 1914. It emphasised that struggle between nations and races was natural and that only the fittest nations deserved to survive.[82] It gave an impetus to German assertiveness as a world economic and military power, aimed at competing with France and Britain for world power. German colonial rule in Africa in 1884 to 1914 was an expression of nationalism and moral superiority, which was justified by constructing an image of the natives as "Other." The approach highlighted racist views of mankind. German colonization was characterized by the use of repressive violence in the name of "culture" and "civilisation." Germany's cultural-missionary project boasted that its colonial programmes were humanitarian and educational endeavours. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of Social Darwinism by intellectuals justified Germany's right to acquire colonial territories as a matter of the "survival of the fittest," according to the historian Michael Schubert.[83][84]

The model suggested an explanation of why some ethnic groups, then called "races," had been for so long antagonistic, such as Germans and Slavs. They were natural rivals, destined to clash. Senior German generals like Helmuth von Moltke the Younger talked in apocalyptic terms about the need for Germans to fight for their existence as a people and culture. MacMillan states: "Reflecting the Social Darwinist theories of the era, many Germans saw Slavs, especially Russia, as the natural opponent of the Teutonic races."[85] Also, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff declared: "A people that lays down its weapons seals its fate."[85] In July 1914, the Austrian press described Serbia and the South Slavs in terms that owed much to Social Darwinism.[85] In 1914, the German economist Johann Plenge described the war as a clash between the German "ideas of 1914" (duty, order, justice) and the French "ideas of 1789" (liberty, equality, fraternity).[86] William Mulligen argues that Anglo-German antagonism was also about a clash of two political cultures as well as more traditional geopolitical and military concerns. Britain admired Germany for its economic successes and social welfare provision but also regarded Germany as illiberal, militaristic, and technocratic.[87]

War was seen as a natural and viable or even useful instrument of policy. "War was compared to a tonic for a sick patient or a life-saving operation to cut out diseased flesh."[85] Since war was natural for some leaders, it was simply a question of timing and so it would be better to have a war when the circumstances were most propitious. "I consider a war inevitable," declared Moltke in 1912. "The sooner the better."[88] In German ruling circles, war was viewed as the only way to rejuvenate Germany. Russia was viewed as growing stronger every day, and it was believed that Germany had to strike while it still could before it was crushed by Russia.[89]

Nationalism made war a competition between peoples, nations or races, rather than kings and elites.[90] Social Darwinism carried a sense of inevitability to conflict and downplayed the use of diplomacy or international agreements to end warfare. It tended to glorify warfare, the taking of initiative, and the warrior male role.[91]

Social Darwinism played an important role across Europe, but J. Leslie has argued that it played a critical and immediate role in the strategic thinking of some important hawkish members of the Austro-Hungarian government.[92] Social Darwinism, therefore, normalized war as an instrument of policy and justified its use.

Arms race

[edit]

By the 1870s to 1880s, all the major powers were preparing for a large-scale war - although none expected one.[93] Britain neglected its small army but focused on building up the Royal Navy, which was already stronger than the next two largest navies combined. Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Russia, and some smaller countries set up conscription systems in which young men would serve from one to three years in the army and then spend the next twenty years or so in the reserves, with annual summer training. Men with higher social status became officers. Each country devised a mobilization system to call up reserves quickly and send them to key points by rail.

Every year, general staffs updated and expanded their plans in terms of complexity. Each country stockpiled arms and supplies for an army that ran into the millions. Germany in 1874 had a regular professional army of 420,000 with an additional 1.3 million reserves. By 1897, the regular army was 545,000 strong and the reserves 3.4 million. The French in 1897 had 3.4 million reservists, Austria 2.6 million, and Russia 4.0 million. The size of military manpower increased: conscription-law changes in France in 1913, for example, boosted numbers in the French military on the eve of conflict.[94] The various national war-plans had been perfected by 1914, but with Russia and Austria trailing in effectiveness. Recent wars since 1865 had typically been short: a matter of months. All war-plans called for a decisive opening and assumed victory would come after a short war. None planned for the food and munitions needs of the long stalemate that actually unfolded from 1914 to 1918.[95][96]

As David Stevenson puts it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness... was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster.... The armaments race... was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities." David Herrmann goes further by arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for victorious wars" were closing, meaning that "the arms race did precipitate the First World War". If the assassination of Franz Ferdinand had occurred in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war. It was "the armaments race and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" that made his death in 1914 the trigger for war.[97]

One of the aims of the First Hague Conference of 1899, held at the suggestion of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, was to discuss disarmament. The Second Hague Conference took place in 1907. All signatories except for Germany supported disarmament. Germany also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed. All parties tried to revise international law to their own advantage.[98]

Anglo-German naval race

[edit]
1909 cartoon in the American magazine Puck shows (clockwise) US, Germany, Britain, France and Japan engaged in naval race in a "no limit" game.

Historians have debated the role of the German naval buildup as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations. In any case, Germany never came close to catching up with Britain.

Supported by Wilhelm II's enthusiasm for an expanded German navy, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz championed four Fleet Acts from 1898 to 1912. From 1902 to 1910, Britain's Royal Navy embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. The competition came to focus on the revolutionary new ships based on the design of Dreadnought, which was launched in 1906 and gave Britain a battleship that far outclassed any other in Europe.[99][100]

Naval strength of powers in 1914
Country Personnel Large Naval Vessels
(Dreadnoughts)
Tonnage
Russia 54,000 4 328,000
France 68,000 10 731,000
Britain 209,000 29 2,205,000
TOTAL 331,000 43 3,264,000
Germany 79,000 17 1,019,000
Austria-Hungary 16,000 4 249,000
TOTAL 95,000 21 1,268,000
(Source: [101])

The overwhelming British response proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely ever to equal those of the Royal Navy. In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910, the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, it reached 2.1:1. Ferguson argues: "So decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War."[102] However, the Kaiserliche Marine had narrowed the gap by nearly half and that the Royal Navy had had a long-standing policy of surpassing any two potential opponents combined. The US Navy was in a period of growth, which made the German gains seem very ominous in London.[citation needed]

In Britain in 1913, there was intense internal debate about new ships because of the growing influence of Admiral John Fisher's ideas and increasing financial constraints. In 1914, Germany adopted a policy of building submarines, instead of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively abandoning the naval arms-race, but Berlin kept the new policy secret to delay other powers from following suit.[103]

Russian interests in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire

[edit]

Major Russian goals included strengthening Saint Petersburg's role as the protector of Eastern Christians in the Balkans, such as in Serbia.[104] Although Russia enjoyed a booming economy, growing population, and large armed forces, its strategic position was threatened by an expanding Ottoman military - trained by German experts and using the latest technology. The start of the war re-focussed attention on old Russian goals: expelling the Ottomans from Constantinople, extending Russian dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and annexing Galicia. Conquest of the Straits would have assured Russian predominance in the Black Sea and Russian access to the Mediterranean.[105]

Technical and military factors

[edit]

Short-war illusion

[edit]

Traditional narratives of the war suggested that when the war began, both sides believed that the war would end quickly. Rhetorically speaking, there was an expectation that the war would be "over by Christmas" in 1914. That is important for the origins of the conflict since it suggests that since it was expected that the war would be short, statesmen tended not to take gravity of military action as seriously as they might have done so otherwise. Modern historians suggest a nuanced approach. There is ample evidence to suggest that statesmen and military leaders thought the war would be lengthy and terrible and have profound political consequences.[citation needed]

While it is true all military leaders planned for a swift victory, many military and civilian [citation needed] leaders recognized that the war might be long and highly destructive. The principal German and French military leaders, including Moltke, Ludendorff, and Joffre, expected a long war.[106] British Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener expected a long war: "three years" or longer, he told an amazed colleague.

Moltke hoped that if a European war broke out, it would be resolved swiftly, but he also conceded that it might drag on for years, wreaking immeasurable ruin. Asquith wrote of the approach of "Armageddon" and French and Russian generals spoke of a "war of extermination" and the "end of civilization." British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey famously stated just hours before Britain declared war, "The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime."

Clark concluded, "In the minds of many statesmen, the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seemed to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks."[107]

Primacy of offensive and war by timetable

[edit]

Moltke, Joffre, Conrad, and other military commanders held that seizing the initiative was extremely important. That theory encouraged all belligerents to devise war plans to strike first to gain the advantage. The war plans all included complex plans for mobilization of the armed forces, either as a prelude to war or as a deterrent. The continental Great Powers' mobilization plans included arming and transporting millions of men and their equipment, typically by rail and to strict schedules.

The mobilization plans limited the scope of diplomacy, as military planners wanted to begin mobilisation as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. They also put pressure on policymakers to begin their own mobilization once it was discovered that other nations had begun to mobilize.

In 1969, A. J. P. Taylor wrote that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once they were begun, they could not be canceled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation, and they could not proceed without physical invasion (of Belgium by Germany). Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.[108] Hence the metaphor "war by timetable."

Russia ordered a partial mobilization on 25 July against Austria-Hungary only. Their lack of prewar planning for the partial mobilization made the Russians realize by 29 July that it would be impossible to interfere with a general mobilization.

Only a general mobilization could be carried out successfully. The Russians were, therefore, faced with only two options: canceling the mobilization during a crisis or moving to full mobilization, the latter of which they did on 30 July. They, therefore, mobilized along both the Russian border with Austria-Hungary and the border with Germany.

German mobilization plans assumed a two-front war against France and Russia and had the bulk of the German army massed against France and taking the offensive in the west, and a smaller force holding East Prussia. The plans were based on the assumption that France would mobilize significantly faster than Russia.

On 28 July, Germany learned through its spy network that Russia had implemented partial mobilisation and its "Period Preparatory to War." The Germans assumed that Russia had decided upon war and that its mobilisation put Germany in danger, especially since because German war plans, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, relied upon Germany to mobilise speedily enough to defeat France first by attacking largely through neutral Belgium before it turned to defeat the slower-moving Russians.

Christopher Clark states: "German efforts at mediation – which suggested that Austria should 'Halt in Belgrade' and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its terms were met – were rendered futile by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take counter-measures before mediation could begin to take effect."[109]

Clark also states: "The Germans declared war on Russia before the Russians declared war on Germany. But by the time that happened, the Russian government had been moving troops and equipment to the German front for a week. The Russians were the first great power to issue an order of general mobilisation and the first Russo-German clash took place on German, not on Russian soil, following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. That doesn't mean that the Russians should be 'blamed' for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor."[110]

Historiography

[edit]
Louis P. Bénézet's map of "Europe As It Should Be" (1918), depicting imagined nations based on ethnic and linguistic criteria. It blamed German aggression on perceived threats to the traditional social order from radicals and ethnic nationalists.

Immediately after the end of hostilities, Anglo-American historians argued that Germany was solely responsible for the start of the war. However, academic work in the English-speaking world in the late 1920s and the 1930s blamed the participants more equally. Meanwhile German academics also challenged the claim that Germany was solely or primarily to blame.

In the 1960s the German historian Fritz Fischer challenged prevailing German academic opinion by arguing that Germany's conservative leaders had deliberately sought war. This in turn unleashed an intense worldwide debate on Imperial Germany's long-term goals. The American historian Paul Schroeder agrees with the critics that Fisher exaggerated and misinterpreted many points. However, Schroeder endorses Fisher's basic conclusion:

From 1890 on, Germany did pursue world power. This bid arose from deep roots within Germany's economic, political, and social structures. Once the war broke out, world power became Germany's essential goal.[111]

However, Schroeder argues that all of that was not the main cause of the war in 1914. Indeed, the search for a single main cause is not a helpful approach to history. Instead, there are multiple causes any one or two of which could have launched the war. He argues, "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze the causal factors involved can ever fully succeed."[112]

Debate over the country that "started" the war and who bears the blame still continues.[113] According to Annika Mombauer, a new consensus among scholars had emerged by the 1980s, mainly as a result of Fischer's intervention:

Few historians agreed wholly with his [Fischer's] thesis of a premeditated war to achieve aggressive foreign policy aims, but it was generally accepted that Germany's share of responsibility was larger than that of the other great powers.[114]

On historians inside Germany, she adds, "There was 'a far-reaching consensus about the special responsibility of the German Reich' in the writings of leading historians, though they differed in how they weighted Germany's role."[115]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Some German leaders believed that growing Russian economic power would change the balance of power between the two nations, that a war was inevitable, and that Germany would be better off if a war happened soon.[12]
  2. ^ Previously, the German General Staff had predicted that Russian mobilization in the east would be slower than that of France, Russia's ally to the west; they anticipated that any conflict with Russia would involve first attacking France through Belgium (to avoid French fixed defenses), quickly defeating them, and then turning to face Russia in the east.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Van Evera, Stephen (Summer 1984). "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War". International Security. 9 (1): 58–107. doi:10.2307/2538636. JSTOR 2538636.
  2. ^ Fischer, Fritz (1975). War of illusions: German policies from 1911 to 1914. Chatto and Windus. p. 69. ISBN 978-0-3930-5480-4.
  3. ^ Snyder, Glenn H. (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics". World Politics. 36 (4): 461–495. doi:10.2307/2010183. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2010183. S2CID 154759602.
  4. ^ a b Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma". World Politics. 30 (2): 167–214. doi:10.2307/2009958. hdl:2027/uc1.31158011478350. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2009958. S2CID 154923423.
  5. ^ Snyder, Jack (1984). "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984". International Security. 9 (1): 108–146. doi:10.2307/2538637. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2538637. S2CID 55976453.
  6. ^ Sagan, Scott D. (Fall 1986). "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability". International Security. 11 (2): 151–175. doi:10.2307/2538961. JSTOR 2538961. S2CID 153783717.
  7. ^ Henig, Ruth (2006). The Origins of the First World War. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-85200-0.
  8. ^ Lieven, D. C. B. (1983). Russia and the Origins of the First World War. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-0-312-69611-5.
  9. ^ "Austria Will Avenge Murder". The Winnipeg Tribune. 29 June 1914. p. 1.
  10. ^ Martin, Connor (2017). Bang! Europe At War. United Kingdom. p. 20. ISBN 9781389913839.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  11. ^ Martin, Connor (2017). Bang! Europe At War. United Kingdom. p. 23. ISBN 9781389913839.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  12. ^ Van Evera, Stephen (Summer 1984). "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War". International Security. 9 (1): 80–82. doi:10.2307/2538636. JSTOR 2538636.
  13. ^ a b "The Forces Behind the Conflict". The Independent. 1914-08-10. p. 196. Retrieved 2022-05-17.
  14. ^ "Anglo-German Antagonism". The Independent. 1914-08-17. pp. 229–230. Retrieved 2022-05-17.
  15. ^ a b Jefferies, Matthew (2015). The Ashgate Research Companion to Imperial Germany. Oxon: Ashgate Publishing. p. 355. ISBN 9781409435518.
  16. ^ MacFie, A. L. (1983). "The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914-18". Middle Eastern Studies. 19 (1): 43–74. doi:10.1080/00263208308700533. JSTOR 4282922.
  17. ^ a b c Gardner, Hall (2015). The Failure to Prevent World War I: The Unexpected Armageddon. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. pp. 86–88. ISBN 9781472430564.
  18. ^ Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (1998). A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change. London: Routledge. p. 348. ISBN 978-0415161114.
  19. ^ Sperber, Jonathan (2014). Europe 1850-1914: Progress, Participation and Apprehension. London: Routledge. p. 211. ISBN 9781405801348.
  20. ^ Challinger, Michael (2010). ANZACs in Arkhangel. Melbourne: Hardie Grant Publishing. p. 2. ISBN 9781740667517.
  21. ^ Jean-Marie Mayeur, and Madeleine Rebirioux, The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914 (1988)
  22. ^ G. P. Gooch, Franco-German Relations, 1871–1914 (1923).
  23. ^ Hewitson, Mark (2000). "Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy". English Historical Review. 115 (462): 570–606. doi:10.1093/ehr/115.462.570.
  24. ^ John Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (1985). p. 81.
  25. ^ Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered," Foreign Policy Analysis 7#2 (2011): 205-214.
  26. ^ Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (1954) pp 345, 403–26
  27. ^ GP Gooch, Before the war: studies in diplomacy (1936), chapter on Delcassé pp. 87-186.
  28. ^ Strachan, Hew (2005). The First World War. Penguin. ISBN 9781101153413.
  29. ^ J.A. Spender, Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents (1933) pp. 212-221.
  30. ^ a b Ferguson (1999).
  31. ^ a b Clark (2013), p. 324.
  32. ^ Ferguson (1999), p. 53.
  33. ^ Clark (2013), p. 159.
  34. ^ Hamilton, K.A. (1977). "Great Britain and France, 1911–1914". In Hinsley, F.H. (ed.). British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge University Press. p. 324. ISBN 978-0-521-21347-9.
  35. ^ Clark (2013), p. 157.
  36. ^ J. A. Spender, Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents (1933) pp 297-312
  37. ^ Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace. pp. 438-65.
  38. ^ Falls, Nigel (January 2007). "The Panther at Agadir". History Today. 57 (1): 33–37.
  39. ^ Sidney B. Fay (1930), The Origins of the World War (2nd ed.): 1:290–293.
  40. ^ Keith Wilson, "The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements." Historical Journal 15.3 (1972): 513–532. JSTOR 2637768.
  41. ^ J.A. Spender, Fifty years of Europe: a study in pre-war documents (1933). pp. 329–40.
  42. ^ Sontag, Raymond James (1933). European Diplomatic History 1871—1930. The Century Historical Series. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. p. p. 160. LCCN 33004046. OCLC 397267. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  43. ^ William C. Askew, Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911–1912 (1942) online Archived 2018-06-16 at the Wayback Machine
  44. ^ Clark (2013), p. 242.
  45. ^ Williamson (1991), pp. 125–140.
  46. ^ Williamson (1991), pp. 143–145.
  47. ^ Williamson (1991), pp. 147–149.
  48. ^ Williamson (1991), pp. 151–154.
  49. ^ Wohlforth, William C. (April 1987). "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance" (PDF). World Politics. 39 (3): 353–381. doi:10.2307/2010224. JSTOR 2010224. S2CID 53333300. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-05-17. Retrieved 2016-02-05.
  50. ^ Clark, Christopher (17 April 2014). Europe: Then and Now. Center for Strategic and International Studies l. 26-27 minutes in. Archived from the original on 2021-11-07 – via YouTube.
  51. ^ Otte, T. G. (2014). July Crisis: The World's Descent into War, Summer 1914. Cambridge University Press. pp. 134–135. ISBN 978-1107064904.
  52. ^ "First World War.com - Who's Who - Otto Liman von Sanders". www.firstworldwar.com.
  53. ^ Ulrich Trumpener, "Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman alliance." Journal of Contemporary History 1.4 (1966): 179-192. [www.jstor.org/stable/259896 online]
  54. ^ William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge UP, 2017), p.147
  55. ^ Martin, Connor (2017). Bang! Europe At War. United Kingdom. p. 23. ISBN 978-1366291004.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  56. ^ Fischer, Fritz (1967). Germany's Aims in the First World War. W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-09798-6.
  57. ^ Hull, Isabel V. (2004). The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918. Cambridge University Press. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-521-53321-8.
  58. ^ Neiberg, Michael S. (2007). The World War I Reader. NYU Press. p. 309. ISBN 978-0-8147-5833-5.
  59. ^ Lebow, Richard Ned (2010). Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations. Princeton University Press. p. 70. ISBN 978-1400835126. Retrieved 26 September 2018.
  60. ^ Williamson, David G. (2016). Germany Since 1789: A Nation Forged and Renewed (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 167, 399. ISBN 978-1-137-35004-6.
  61. ^ Clark (2013), p. 68.
  62. ^ Clark (2013), pp. 77–78.
  63. ^ a b Clark (2013), p. 77.
  64. ^ Levy, Jack S., and William Mulligan. "Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors." Security Studies (2021): 1-32.
  65. ^ a b Clark, Christopher (2013). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-219922-5., p.22
  66. ^ Pupin, Michael (1914-07-13). "Serb and Austrian". The Independent. pp. 67–68. Retrieved 2022-05-17.
  67. ^ Clark, Christopher (2013). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-219922-5, p. 26
  68. ^ Clark, Christopher (2013). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-219922-5, p. 559
  69. ^ Greg Cashman; Leonard C. Robinson (2007). An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 54. ISBN 9780742555105.
  70. ^ Marvin Perry; et al. (2012). Western Civilization: Since 1400. Cengage Learning. p. 703. ISBN 978-1111831691.
  71. ^ Clark, The Sleepwalkers p 159.
  72. ^ Mowat, C. L., ed. (1968). The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 12, The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898-1945. Cambridge University Press. pp. 151–152. ISBN 978-0-521-04551-3.
  73. ^ a b Lenin, V.I. "VII. IMPERIALISM AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM". www.marxists.org. Retrieved 2022-08-24.
  74. ^ a b Lenin, V.I. (August 24, 2022). "VI. DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS".
  75. ^ Lenin, V.I. "VIII. PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM". Retrieved 2022-08-24.
  76. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.242
  77. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.27-29
  78. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 79-80
  79. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.242-246
  80. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 481-499
  81. ^ Mulligan, William. The Origins of the First World War. Vol. 52. Cambridge University Press, 2017.
  82. ^ Richard Weikart, "The Origins of Social Darwinism in Germany, 1859-1895." Journal of the History of Ideas 54.3 (1993): 469-488 in JSTOR.
  83. ^ Schubert, Michael (2011). "The 'German nation' and the 'black Other': social Darwinism and the cultural mission in German colonial discourse". Patterns of Prejudice. 45 (5): 399–416. doi:10.1080/0031322x.2011.624754. S2CID 143888654.
  84. ^ Felicity Rash, The Discourse Strategies of Imperialist Writing: The German Colonial Idea and Africa, 1848-1945 (Routledge, 2016).
  85. ^ a b c d MacMillan, Margaret (2013). The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8129-9470-4. p524
  86. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.75
  87. ^ Mulligan, William. The Origins of the First World War. Vol. 52. Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 147
  88. ^ MacMillan, Margaret (2013). The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. Random House. ISBN 978-0-8129-9470-4. p479
  89. ^ Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for war, 1914-1917. Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.76
  90. ^ Weikart, Richard (2004). From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany. Palgrave Macmillan US. ISBN 978-1-4039-6502-8.[page needed]
  91. ^ Hamilton, Richard F.; Herwig, Holger H. (2003). The Origins of World War I. Cambridge University Press. p. 26. ISBN 9780521817356.
  92. ^ Leslie, John (1993). "The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims: Policies and Policymakers in Vienna and Budapest before and during 1914". In Springer, Elibabeth; Kammerhofer, Leopold (eds.). Archiv und Forschung das Haus-, Hof- und Staats-Archiv in Seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas [Archive and research the Household, Court and State Archives in its importance for the history of Austria and Europe] (in German). Munich, Germany: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik. pp. 307–394.
  93. ^ Eric Brose, "Arms Race prior to 1914, Armament Policy" in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08). DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10219. online
  94. ^ Grimmer-Solem, Erik (26 September 2019). Learning Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781108483827. Retrieved 19 August 2023. [...] France passed the Three Year Law in July 1913 raising the term of French military service to three years and thereby raising France's peacetime military strength to over 700,000 men.
  95. ^ Hinsley, F. H., ed. (1962). The New Cambridge Modern History: Material progress and world-wide problems, 1870-189. University Press. pp. 204–242. ISBN 9780521075244.
  96. ^ Mulligan (2014), pp. 643–649.
  97. ^ Ferguson (1999), p. 82.
  98. ^ Mulligan (2014), pp. 646–647.
  99. ^ Ross, Angus (April 2010). "HMS Dreadnought (1906): A Naval Revolution Misinterpreted or Mishandled?" (PDF). Northern Mariner. XX (2): 175–198. doi:10.25071/2561-5467.491. S2CID 247286659.
  100. ^ Blyth, Robert J.; Lambert, Andrew; Rüger, Jan, eds. (2011). The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age. Ashgate. ISBN 978-0-7546-6315-7.
  101. ^ Ferguson (1999), p. 85.
  102. ^ Ferguson (1999), pp. 83–85.
  103. ^ Lambert, Nicholas A. (September 1995). "British Naval Policy, 1913–1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution". The Journal of Modern History. 67 (3): 623–626. doi:10.1086/245174. JSTOR 2124221. S2CID 153540797.
  104. ^ Jelavich, Barbara (2004). Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914. Cambridge University Press. p. 10. ISBN 978-0-521-52250-2.
  105. ^ McMeekin, Sean (2011). The Russian Origins of the First World War. Harvard University Press. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-674-06320-4.
  106. ^ Ferguson (1999), p. 97.
  107. ^ Clark (2013), p. 562.
  108. ^ Taylor, A.J.P. (1969). War by Time-table: How the First World War Began. Macdonald & Co. ISBN 9780356028187.
  109. ^ Clark (2013), p. 509.
  110. ^ Clark, Christopher (29 August 2013). "The First Calamity". London Review of Books. 35 (16): 3–6.
  111. ^ Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," Journal of Modern History 44#3 (1972), pp. 319-345, at p. 320. JSTOR 1876415.
  112. ^ Schroeder p 320
  113. ^ "World War One: 10 interpretations of who started WW1". BBC News. 12 February 2014.
  114. ^ Annika Mombauer, "Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I." Central European History 48#4 (2015): 541–564, quote on p. 543.
  115. ^ Mombauer, p. 544

Sources

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]

Historiography

[edit]

Primary sources

[edit]
  • Collins, Ross F. ed. World War I: Primary Documents on Events from 1914 to 1919 (2007) excerpt and text search
  • Dugdale, E.T.S. ed. German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914 (4 vol 1928–31), in English translation. online
  • French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The French Yellow Book: Diplomatic Documents (1914)
  • Gooch, G. P. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (1940); 475pp detailed summaries of memoirs from all the major belligerents
  • Gooch, G.P. and Harold Temperley, eds. British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914 (11 vol. ) online
    • v. i The end of British isolation—v.2. From the occupation of Kiao-Chau to the making of the Anglo-French entente Dec. 1897-Apr. 1904—V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v.7. The Agadir crisis—v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace—v.11. The outbreak of war V.3. The testing of the Entente, 1904-6 -- v.4. The Anglo-Russian rapprochment, 1903-7 -- v.5. The Near East, 1903-9 -- v.6. Anglo-German tension. Armaments and negotiation, 1907-12—v.7. The Agadir crisis—v.8. Arbitration, neutrality and security—v.9. The Balkan wars, pt.1-2 -- v.10, pt.1. The Near and Middle East on the eve of war. pt.2. The last years of peace—v.11. The outbreak of war.
    • Gooch, G. P. and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Volume XI, the Outbreak of War Foreign Office Documents (1926) online
  • Gooch, G.P. Recent revelations of European diplomacy (1928) pp 269–330. online; summarizes new documents from Germany, pp 3–100; Austria, 103–17; Russia, 161–211; Serbia and the Balkans, 215–42; France, 269–330; Great Britain, 343–429; United States, 433–62.
  • Hammond's frontier atlas of the world war : containing large scale maps of all the battle fronts of Europe and Asia, together with a military map of the United States (1916) online free
  • Lowe, C.J. and M.L. Dockrill, eds. The Mirage of Power: The Documents of British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (vol 3, 1972), pp 423–759
  • Mombauer, Annika. The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (2013), 592pp;
  • Reichstag speeches [1]
[edit]