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Center of gravity (COG) is a military concept referring to the primary source of strength, balance, or stability necessary for a force to maintain combat operations. Centers of gravity can be physical, moral, or both, and exist for all belligerents at all tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war simultaneously.^[1] COGs play a central role in military planning, though exact definition has been elusive, with interpretations varying substantially over time, across forces, and between theorists. Generally, a COG can be thought of as an essential part of a combatant's warfighting system, interference with which would result in disproportionate impact on their combat effectiveness.^[2]^: 60–64^[3]^: 1041

The concept was first developed by Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his work On War.^[4]^{: 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444} After the end of the Vietnam War, interest in the idea was revitalized, resulting in several competing conceptualizations.^[2]^[5]^[3] Although the framework is used by armed forces around the world, there is widespread controversy regarding its definition and utility. Present academic literature on the subject generally agrees the term needs further clarification and careful application, while some theorists call for its complete removal from military doctrine.^[5]

United States

The United States Department of Defense defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act",^[6]^: 33 although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase.^[7]^{: 45–49, 77, 82, 92}^[8]^: 2, 43 There are twelve qualities of COGs the Joint Chiefs of Staff have doctrinally recognized:^[1]^: IV-23^[9]^: III-39

Exists at each level of warfare
Mostly physical at operational and tactical levels
Is a source of leverage
Allows or enhances freedom of action
May be where the enemy's force is most densely concentrated
Can endanger one's own COGs
May be transitory in nature
Linked to objective(s)
Dependent upon adversarial relationship
Can shift over time or between phases
Often depends on factors of time and space
Contains many intangible elements at strategic level

Because the COG is one or multiple root enablers of a combatant's ability to interfere with the objectives of an opponent, friendly force composition plays just as significant a role in how this concept is interpreted as that of the opponent. As such, each of the various United States Armed Forces Service branches understand the concept through a unique lens specific to that branch's structure and operational priorities and capabilities.^[10]^: 20–27^[11]^: 1^[12] Due to the size and scale of the United States Army, it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's strongest characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, due to the lower personnel count of the United States Marine Corps, they tend to view a COG as the weakness of a combatant. On the other hand, the United States Air Force takes a "targeting" approach to warfare, meaning they often treat COGs as a series of bombable strategic and operational-critical targets.

This means, in the case of an insurgency, the U.S. military may define their opponent's COG as the entire host population, a core group of leaders/believers, or an external nation's material, financial, or political support.^[13]^: 7-6^[14]^{: 93, 102, 120–121}

Center of gravity analysis

COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.^[15]^: 106 Most modern systems of COG analysis rely on Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.^[8]^{: ix–xvi, 2, 43} Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of a combatant's mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Defense University and Joint Forces Quarterly discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:^[16]^{: 129–135}

Critical Factors Analysis (CFA)^[1]^{: IV-24–IV-27}
Eikmeier method^[17]^: 62–66^[18]^{: 156–158}^[19]^{: 109–115}^[20]^: 7
Godzilla method^[21]^: 26–30

Both the Eikmeier and Godzilla methods provide testable criteria for measuring and assessing various factors in the analysis. Meanwhile, CFA uses a subjective system of "means, ways, and ends" to assess critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. CFA is the only system officially recognized by Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publications.

Critical Factors Analysis

When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only COG analysis system officially recognized in Joint Publications.^[1]^: IV-24

Eikmeier method

There are six steps involved in Eikmeier's method of COG analysis:

Identify the organization's desired ends or objectives.
Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
List the organization's means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.

Godzilla method

In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of Godzilla "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.

Notes

References

^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020-12-01). "Chapter IV: Operational Design". Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (2020 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. IV-23, IV-24 – IV-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ ^a ^b Angstrom, Jan; Widen, J. J. (2014-07-17). Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war. Routledge. pp. 60–64. ISBN 978-1-136-16920-5.
^ ^a ^b Šlebir, Miha (2022-10-01). "Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept". Revista Científica General José María Córdova. 20 (40): 1025–1044. doi:10.21830/19006586.979. ISSN 2500-7645.
^ Clausewitz, Carl Von (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444. ISBN 978-1-4344-0496-1.
^ ^a ^b Meyer, Eystein L. (2022-07-03). "The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications". Defence Studies. 22 (3): 327–353. doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715. ISSN 1470-2436.
^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017-03-01). Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 33. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ United States Marine Corps (1997-06-20). MCDP 1 Warfighting (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps. pp. 45–49, 77, 82, 92. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ ^a ^b Strange, Joseph L. (1996). Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (PDF). 4 (2nd ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. pp. ix–xvi, 2, 43. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018-10-22) [2017-01-17]. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
^ Strange, Joseph L.; Iron, Richard (October 2004). "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (35). Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies: 20–27. Retrieved 2023-09-01 – via National Defense University.
^ Echevarria, Antulio J. (2003). "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought". Naval War College Review. 56. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Archived from the original on 2023-09-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
^ Echevarria, Antulio J. II (2002-09-01). Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!. United States Army War College Press. Retrieved 2023-09-27. Clausewitz's military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together.
^ United States Department of the Army (2014-05-13). "Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations". FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Army. p. 7-6. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Army University (2011). Cox, Dan; Bruscino, Thomas (eds.). Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center. pp. 93, 102, 120–121. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ NATO (2022-12-19). AJP-01 (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (F ed.). NATO Standardization Office. p. 106. STANAG 2437. Retrieved 2023-09-26.
^ Smith, Daniel J.; Jeter, Kelley; Westgaard, Odin (July 2015). "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (78). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 129–135. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (September 2007). "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 62–66. Retrieved 2023-09-27 – via Army University.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2010). "Redefining the Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (59). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 156–158. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2016). "Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly (83). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 109–115. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Eikmeier, Dale C. (May 2017). "The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University: 7. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
^ Butler, James P. (January 2014). "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (72). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 26–30. Retrieved 2023-11-09.

External links

Echevarria, Antulio J. II (Summer 2003). "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept". Air and Space Power Journal. 17 (2). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-04-23. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Sidoti, Anthony F. "The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom". Air and Space Power Journal. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-02-26. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Kornatz, Steven D. (2016-07-01). "The Primacy of COG in Planning: Getting Back to Basics" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 91–96. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
Eikmeier, Dale C. (2015-10-13). Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity (Video). United States Army Command and General Staff College – via YouTube.
Heerwagen, Belinda (2007-03-30). "Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist" (PDF). Strategy Research Project. United States Army War College.

[JP_5-0-1] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020-12-01). "Chapter IV: Operational Design". Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (2020 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. IV-23, IV-24 – IV-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[Contemporary_Military_Theory-2] Angstrom, Jan; Widen, J. J. (2014-07-17). Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war. Routledge. pp. 60–64. ISBN 978-1-136-16920-5.

[Re-examining_Miha-3] Šlebir, Miha (2022-10-01). "Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept". Revista Científica General José María Córdova. 20 (40): 1025–1044. doi:10.21830/19006586.979. ISSN 2500-7645.

[On_War-4] Clausewitz, Carl Von (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444. ISBN 978-1-4344-0496-1.

[Contemporary_Meyer-5] Meyer, Eystein L. (2022-07-03). "The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications". Defence Studies. 22 (3): 327–353. doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715. ISSN 1470-2436.

[DoD_Dictionary-6] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017-03-01). Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 33. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Warfighting-7] United States Marine Corps (1997-06-20). MCDP 1 Warfighting (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps. pp. 45–49, 77, 82, 92. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[Strange_Framework-8] Strange, Joseph L. (1996). Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (PDF). 4 (2nd ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. pp. ix–xvi, 2, 43. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[JP_3-0-9] Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018-10-22) [2017-01-17]. Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved 2023-09-27.

[What_Clausewitz_Really_Meant-10] Strange, Joseph L.; Iron, Richard (October 2004). "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (35). Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies: 20–27. Retrieved 2023-09-01 – via National Defense University.

[Clausewitz's_Center_of_Gravity:_It's_Not_What_We_Thought-11] Echevarria, Antulio J. (2003). "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought". Naval War College Review. 56. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Archived from the original on 2023-09-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)

[12] Echevarria, Antulio J. II (2002-09-01). Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!. United States Army War College Press. Retrieved 2023-09-27. Clausewitz's military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together.

[FM_3-24-13] United States Department of the Army (2014-05-13). "Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations". FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Army. p. 7-6. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Population-Centric_Counterinsurgency-14] Army University (2011). Cox, Dan; Bruscino, Thomas (eds.). Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center. pp. 93, 102, 120–121. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[15] NATO (2022-12-19). AJP-01 (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (F ed.). NATO Standardization Office. p. 106. STANAG 2437. Retrieved 2023-09-26.

[Three_Approaches_to_Center_of_Gravity_Analysis-16] Smith, Daniel J.; Jeter, Kelley; Westgaard, Odin (July 2015). "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (78). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 129–135. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[A_Logical_Method_for_Center-of-Gravity_Analysis-17] Eikmeier, Dale C. (September 2007). "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 62–66. Retrieved 2023-09-27 – via Army University.

[Redefining_the_Center_of_Gravity-18] Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2010). "Redefining the Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (59). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 156–158. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Let’s_Fix_or_Kill_the_Center_of_Gravity_Concept-19] Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2016). "Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly (83). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 109–115. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[The_Center_of_Gravity:_Still_Relevant_After_All_These_Years?-20] Eikmeier, Dale C. (May 2017). "The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University: 7. Retrieved 2023-09-01.

[Godzilla_Methodology:_Means_for_Determining_Center_of_Gravity-21] Butler, James P. (January 2014). "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (72). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 26–30. Retrieved 2023-11-09.

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-{{for|the general concept|center of gravity}}
+{{Short description|Military concept}}
+{{For|the physics concept|center of gravity}}
-{{Globalize/US|date=May 2013}}
+{{Globalize|article|US|date=October 2023}}
-The '''center of gravity (CoG)''' is a concept developed by [[Carl Von Clausewitz]], a [[Prussia]]n military theorist, in his work ''[[On War]]''.<ref>{{cite book|author=General Carl Von Clausewitz|title=On War: The Complete Edition|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC|year=2009|publisher=Wildside Press LLC|isbn=978-1-4344-0496-1|pages=[http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA144 144], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA151 151], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA253 253], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA331 331–4], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA413 413–4], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA430 430–1], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA437 437], [http://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA444 444], }}</ref>
+{{War}}
+'''Center of gravity''' ('''COG''') is a military concept referring to the primary source of strength, balance, or stability necessary for a [[Military|force]] to maintain [[Military operation|combat operations]]. Centers of gravity can be physical, moral, or both, and exist for all belligerents at all [[Military tactics|tactical]], [[Military strategy|strategic]], and [[Operational level of war|operational levels of war]] simultaneously.<ref name="JP 5-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf#page=179 |title=Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning |date=2020-12-01 |publisher=Joint Chiefs of Staff |edition=2020 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=IV-23, IV-24{{ndash}}IV-27 |chapter=Chapter IV: Operational Design |type={{PD-notice}} |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref> COGs play a central role in [[Military operation plan|military planning]], though exact definition has been elusive, with interpretations varying substantially over time, across forces, and between [[Military_theory|theorists]]. Generally, a COG can be thought of as an essential part of a combatant's warfighting system, interference with which would result in disproportionate impact on their [[combat effectiveness]].<ref name="Contemporary Military Theory">{{Cite book |last1=Angstrom |first1=Jan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0GQKBAAAQBAJ |title=Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war |last2=Widen |first2=J. J. |date=2014-07-17 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-16920-5 |pages=60–64 |language=en}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=60{{ndash}}64|quote={{Request quotation|date=March 2024}}}}<ref name="Re-examining Miha">{{Cite journal |last=Šlebir |first=Miha |date=2022-10-01 |title=Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept |url=https://revistacientificaesmic.com/index.php/esmic/article/view/979/887 |journal=Revista Científica General José María Córdova |language=en |volume=20 |issue=40 |pages=1025–1044 |doi=10.21830/19006586.979 |issn=2500-7645|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{Rp|page=1041|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}
+The concept was first developed by [[Carl von Clausewitz]], a [[Prussia|Prussian]] [[Military theory|military theorist]], in his work ''[[On War]]''.<ref name="On War">{{cite book |author=Clausewitz |first=Carl Von |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC |title=On War: The Complete Edition |publisher=Wildside Press LLC |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4344-0496-1 |pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA144 144], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA151 151], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA253 253], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA331 331–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA413 413–4], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA430 430–1], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA437 437], [https://books.google.com/books?id=fG1l9YBsusEC&pg=PA444 444]}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=144,151,253,331–4,413–4,430–1,437,444}} After the end of the [[Vietnam War]], interest in the idea was revitalized, resulting in several competing conceptualizations.<ref name="Contemporary Military Theory" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}<ref name="Contemporary Meyer">{{Cite journal |last=Meyer |first=Eystein L. |date=2022-07-03 |title=The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications |journal=Defence Studies |language=en |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=327–353 |doi=10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715 |issn=1470-2436|doi-access=free }}</ref>{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}<ref name="Re-examining Miha" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotatio}}n|date=March 2024}} Although the framework is used by armed forces around the world, there is widespread controversy regarding its definition and utility. Present academic literature on the subject generally agrees the term needs further clarification and careful application, while some theorists call for its complete removal from military doctrine.<ref name="Contemporary Meyer" />{{Rp|quote={{Request quotation}}|date=March 2024}}
-==United States Department of Defense==
-The definition of a CoG is "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act."<ref>{{Cite book|publisher=Joint Publication 1-02|title=DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms|year=2008}}</ref> Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength".
-==United States Army==
+== United States ==
+[[File:JP 5-0- Characteristics of a Center of Gravity.png|alt=Characteristics of a Center of Gravity|thumb|Characteristics of a Center of Gravity]]{{Expand section|Analysis of a conventional force's COG(s). This should be placed at the end of the section near existing text regarding that of an insurgency.|date=August 2024|period=no}}
-The United States Army tends to look for a single center of gravity, normally in the principal capability that stands in the way of the accomplishment of its own mission. In short, the army considers a "friendly" CoG as that element—a characteristic, capability, or locality—that enables one's own or allied forces to accomplish their objectives. Conversely, an opponent's CoG is that element that prevents friendly forces from accomplishing their objectives.
+The [[United States Department of Defense]] defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act",<ref name="DoD Dictionary">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1029823.pdf#page=39 |title=Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms |date=2017-03-01 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |location=Washington, D.C. |publication-date=2017-03-01 |pages=33 |format=PDF |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-01 }}</ref>{{Rp|page=33|quote=The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.}} although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase.<ref name="Warfighting">{{Cite book |last=United States Marine Corps |url=https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf |title=MCDP 1 Warfighting |date=1997-06-20 |publisher=[[United States Marine Corps]] |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92 |author-link=United States Marine Corps |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=45{{ndash}}49, 77, 82, 92|quote=Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will? These are centers of gravity.}}<ref name="Strange Framework">{{Cite book |last=Strange |first=Joseph L. |url=https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Portals/72/Documents/JC2IOS/Additional_Reading/3B_COG_and_Critical_Vulnerabilities.pdf |title=Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language |publisher=[[Marine Corps University]] |year=1996 |edition=2nd |series=4 |location=Quantico, VA |pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi, 2, 43 |type= |quote= |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=We should as a minimum return to the Clausewitzian meaning of centers of gravity as moral and physical sources of strength, while simultaneously retaining the concept of "critical vulnerabilities" as critical weaknesses as explained in USMC FMFM 1 Warfighting, without of course the infamous footnote 28.|pages=2,43|page=}} There are twelve qualities of COGs the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] have doctrinally recognized:<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|page=IV-23|quote=The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help commanders analyze
+friendly and adversary or enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and
+vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly.|pages=}}<ref name="JP 3-0">{{Cite book |last=Joint Chiefs of Staff |url=https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf |title=Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations |date=2018-10-22 |publisher=[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] |edition=Change 1 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=Joint Chiefs of Staff |access-date=2023-09-27 |orig-date=2017-01-17}}</ref>{{Rp|page=III-39|quote=The objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive point.}}
+# Exists at each level of warfare
-For example, according to US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency is the protection of the population that hosts it.<ref>[http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24], p. 3-13 (page 69 of the PDF) [http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ FAS Intelligence Resource Program].</ref>
+# Mostly physical at operational and tactical levels
+# Is a source of leverage
+# Allows or enhances freedom of action
+# May be where the enemy's force is most densely concentrated
+# Can endanger one's own COGs
+# May be transitory in nature
+# Linked to objective(s)
+# Dependent upon adversarial relationship
+# Can shift over time or between phases
+# Often depends on factors of time and space
+# Contains many intangible elements at strategic level
+Because the COG is one or multiple root enablers of a combatant's ability to interfere with the objectives of an opponent, friendly force composition plays just as significant a role in how this concept is interpreted as that of the opponent. As such, each of the various [[United States Armed Forces#Service branches|United States Armed Forces Service branches]] understand the concept through a unique lens specific to that branch's structure and operational priorities and capabilities.<ref name="What Clausewitz Really Meant">{{Cite journal |last1=Strange |first1=Joseph L. |last2=Iron |first2=Richard |date=October 2004 |title=Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-35.pdf#page=28 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies |issue=35 |pages=20{{ndash}}27 |access-date=2023-09-01 |quote= |via=[[National Defense University]]}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=The discussion of centers of gravity in book eight [of ''On War'' by Carl von Clausewitz] is much less precise and is the source of misunderstanding for two reasons. First, the Howard and Paret translation of On War, the most commonly used English edition, may have confused some aspects of the original text. Moreover, some interpretations have taken the original out of context. Notwithstanding possible mistranslations, Howard and Paret are usually clear and consistent—provided the text is interpreted within the context of the relevant passages elsewhere.|pages=20{{ndash}}27}}<ref name="Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought">{{Cite journal |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. |date=2003 |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |journal=Naval War College Review |location=Newport, Rhode Island |publisher=[[Naval War College]] |volume=56 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230927212312/https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2180&context=nwc-review |archive-date=2023-09-27 |access-date=2023-09-27 |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual perspectives to Clausewitz's expression and redefined it in its respective image.|page=1}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1814&context=monographs |title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again! |date=2002-09-01 |publisher=[[United States Army War College]] Press |quote=Clausewitz’s military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together. |access-date=2023-09-27}}</ref> Due to the size and scale of the [[United States Army]], it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's ''strongest'' characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, due to the lower personnel count of the [[United States Marine Corps]], they tend to view a COG as the ''weakness'' of a combatant. On the other hand, the [[United States Air Force]] takes a "targeting" approach to warfare, meaning they often treat COGs as a series of bombable strategic and operational-critical targets.
-In modern military theory the Center of Gravity (CoG) is the very heart of operational planning because their destruction or protection is the key to attaining the objective.  According to U.S. Joint Military Doctrine, “The essence of operational art[conceptual military planning] lies in determining how to allocate available friendly resources against an adversary’s CoGs to achieve friendly strategic and operational objectives.<ref>  JP 5-0, 2006 , Pg. IV-18</ref>   Accordingly, military theory and doctrine places significant value on the center of gravity.  One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s [Joint Force Commander’s] staff in operational design is the identification of friendly and adversary CoGs. The U.S.military’s Joint Publication 5-0 goes on to state that, “This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost”.<ref>JP 5-0, 2011, Pg. III-22</ref>   The application of operational art, the development of an operational approach [a solution to an operational problem], the identification of lines of operation and effort, decisive points, and objectives all depend on the correct identification of friendly and adversary centers of gravity.
+This means, in the case of an insurgency, the U.S. military may define their opponent's COG as the entire host population, a core group of leaders/believers, or an external nation's material, financial, or political support.<ref name="FM 3-24">{{Cite book |last=United States Department of the Army |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/NOCASE-FM_3-24-001-WEB-5.pdf#page=92 |title=FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies |date=2014-05-13 |publisher=[[United States Department of the Army]] |location=Washington, D.C. |page=7-6 |chapter=Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations |format=PDF |quote= |author-link=United States Department of the Army |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7-6|quote=In an insurgency, the population is not necessarily the center of gravity for an insurgent. A center of gravity could be external support from another country, it could be a group of core leadership or believers, or it could be a host of other factors or vital functions.|quote-location=7-21}}<ref name="Population-Centric Counterinsurgency">{{Cite book |last=Army University |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Population-CentricCounterinsurgency.pdf |title=Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? |publisher=[[US Army Combined Arms Center]] |year=2011 |editor-last=Cox |editor-first=Dan |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121 |quote= |author-link=Army University |access-date=2023-09-01 |editor-last2=Bruscino |editor-first2=Thomas}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=In essence, the population is the insurgent's center of gravity. Therefore, the counterinsurgent must drive a wedge between the insurgent and the population by establishing a level of security that is inhospitable to the insurgent's attempts to manipulate the population.|pages=93, 102, 120{{ndash}}121}}
- While U.S. military doctrine is clear on the center of gravity’s value, it is less clear on what a center of gravity is.  Most definitions include some phrasing such as, “a source of moral or physical strength, power and resistance”, or the source “that provides freedom of action or will to act.”<ref>JP 5-0, 2011, Pg. III-22</ref>    Recognizing that these definitions are vague, U.S. military doctrine attempts to achieve clarity by providing descriptions of what a center of gravity might be.  For example, a friendly or adversary CoG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will.  A criticism is that these definitions and examples lack clarity, are imprecise, have no basis in logic and are not testable.  Thus they are overly inclusive and just about anything can be argued to be a center of gravity if it is a source of power.  This leads to a situation where the final determinant is persistence of the argument, not precision of the definition.
+== Center of gravity analysis ==
-  To fix the definitional problem Colonel Dale Eikmeier (U.S. Army retired) recommend planners think critically and view the center of gravity as something that is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability (power) to achieve the objective.  He argues this thinking still fits the doctrinal definitions; however it has the advantage of directly linking the center of gravity to the objective, while excluding extraneous factors that the doctrinal definitions could include.  Think of the CoG as the primary “source of strength, power and resistance” that can achieve the objective.  By including the limiting factor of “primary” and linking strength or power to the ability to achieve an objective, one can be more precise in their CoG selection.
+[[File:JP 5-0- Center of Gravity Analysis.png|alt=Center of Gravity Analysis|thumb|Center of Gravity Analysis]]
+COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=NATO |url=https://archive.org/details/AJP-01-F1/ |title=AJP-01 |date=2022-12-19 |publisher=[[NATO Standardization Office]] |edition=F |page=106 |type={{PD-notice}} |format=PDF |id=STANAG 2437 |author-link=NATO |access-date=2023-09-26}}</ref>{{Rp|quote=Centre of gravity analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives.|page=106}} Most modern systems of COG analysis rely on Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities.<ref name="Strange Framework"/>{{Rp|quote=We should also incorporate into Joint/Service doctrine two new conceptual terms - "critical capabilities" (CCs) and "critical requirements" (CRs) - which bridge the gap and explain the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.|pages=ix{{ndash}}xvi,2,43}} Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of a combatant's mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the [[National Defense University]] and Joint Forces Quarterly discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:<ref name="Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis">{{Cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Daniel J. |last2=Jeter |first2=Kelley |last3=Westgaard |first3=Odin |date=July 2015 |title=Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-78/jfq-78.pdf#page=131 |journal=Joint Force Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=78 |pages=129{{ndash}}135 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=129{{ndash}}135|quote=Speculation on proper COG determination has given rise to other COG methodologies, which have both questioned and challenged established doctrine for COG determination. Therefore, the objective of this article is to compare and contrast different COG determination methodologies to reveal strengths and weaknesses of each and ultimately to make recommendations for changes to joint doctrine.}}
+*  Critical Factors Analysis (CFA)<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|page=|quote=Critical factors analysis is a framework to assist in analyzing and identifying a COG and to aid operational planning against threat networks within the OE, including insurgent, resistance, terrorist, and criminal organizations that operate in the human dimension of complex OEs. During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment.|pages=IV-24{{ndash}}IV-27}}
-Testable.  The logic in the recommended definition above provides for a validation method called the Supported and Supporting (Doer and Used) test.
+* Eikmeier method<ref name="A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis">{{Cite journal |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |date=September 2007 |title=A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20071031_art001.pdf#page=64 |journal=Military Review |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |publisher=[[United States Army Combined Arms Center]] |pages=62{{ndash}}66 |access-date=2023-09-27 |via=[[Army University]]}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=62{{ndash}}66|quote=Linking the strategic framework with the COG concept provides a heuristic that contributes to a focused and disciplined approach to COG determination. This linkage suggests that the ends, ways, and means framework is the start point for any COG analysis. Only by starting with the ends, ways, and means analysis first can critical capabilities (ways), critical requirements, and the center of gravity (means) be determined. It is the critical capability contained in the ways, and the means that the critical capability requires, that identify a center of gravity.}}<ref name="Redefining the Center of Gravity">{{Cite journal |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |date=October 2010 |title=Redefining the Center of Gravity |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-59.pdf#page=158 |journal=Joint Forces Quarterly |type={{PD-notice}} |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=59 |pages=156{{ndash}}158 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=156{{ndash}}158|quote=Since the current definition fails the clarity, logic, precision, and testable criteria, it must be replaced with one that does not. Only then will the endless debates cease and will planners be able to focus on campaign planning assisted by the COG concept rather than being distracted by it. To fix the definitional problem, I propose this definition: ''The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.''}}<ref name="Let’s Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept">{{Cite journal |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |date=October 2016 |title=Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-83/jfq-83.pdf#page=111 |journal=Joint Forces Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=83 |pages=109{{ndash}}115 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=109{{ndash}}115|quote=Joint doctrine is clear on the concept’s purpose and utility. What doctrine needs is new definitions of the COG and its critical factors that end decades of debate that fuels the rejectionist argument. The criteria of clarity, logic, precision, and testability guide the proposed definitions. Additionally, the definitions should not only stand up to modern military theory but also be based on them. New definitions allow for improved COG identification and validation methods based on logic and objectivity, not metaphors or lists of characteristics. The modernized definition is as follows: ''The center of gravity is the primary entity that inherently possesses the critical capabilities to achieve the objective.''}}<ref name="The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?">{{Cite journal |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |date=May 2017 |title=The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years? |url=https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/online-publications/documents/Eikmeier-Center-of-Gravity-a.pdf |journal=Military Review |location=Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |publisher=[[Army University]] |page=7 |access-date=2023-09-01}}</ref>{{Rp|page=7|quote=The introduction of the 'ends, ways, and means' or 'Eikmeier method' in 2007 corrected this deficiency. The method is a logical systematic way to reduce guessing, subjectivity, and extraneous uncertainty.}}
+*  [[Godzilla]] method<ref name="Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity">{{Cite journal |last=Butler |first=James P. |date=January 2014 |title=Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72.pdf#page=28 |journal=Joint Forces Quarterly |type={{PD-notice}} |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |issue=72 |pages=26{{ndash}}30 |access-date=2023-11-09}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=26{{ndash}}30|quote=The basic premise of the Godzilla Methodology is to use this mythical monster to determine which force on the critical strengths list is required to achieve the objective. Godzilla destroys (removes) one force at a time from the list of critical strengths until removal of a particular force prevents the objective from being achieved. When that happens and the objective can no longer be achieved because of the removal (neutralization or destruction) of a particular force, then that force is the center of gravity.}}
+Both the Eikmeier and Godzilla methods provide testable criteria for measuring and assessing various factors in the analysis. Meanwhile, CFA uses a subjective system of "means, ways, and ends" to assess critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. CFA is the only system officially recognized by Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publications.
-Supported Test
-•	Only the center of gravity is inherently capable of achieving the purpose or objective.
-•	If something executes the primary action(s) (capability) that achieves the objective, it is the center of gravity.
-•	The center of gravity executes the action and uses or consumes resources to accomplish it.
-Supporting Test
-•	If something is used or consumed to execute the primary action (capability), it is a requirement.
-•	If something contributes to, but does not actually perform the action, it is a requirement, not a center of gravity.
+=== Critical Factors Analysis ===
-Center of Gravity Terminology: Critical Factors.
+When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only COG analysis system officially recognized in Joint Publications.<ref name="JP 5-0" />{{Rp|quote=During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies those characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat.|pages=IV-24}}
-  To better understand the CoG, concept you must understand center of gravity terminology often referred to as “critical factors”.  These terms form a general framework for understanding and interpreting Centers of Gravity and are the creation of Dr. Joe Strange of the Marine Corps War College and were first described in his book, ''Perspectives on Warfighting''.<ref>Dr. Joe Strange.  Perspectives on Warfighting Number Four Second Edition , Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996)</ref>    The importance of understanding these terms cannot be overstated.  They are essential to identifying Centers of Gravity and their enablers which in turn are critical for the determination of lines of operation, decisive points and objectives.
+=== Eikmeier method ===
-Critical Capability (CC):  Primary abilities which merits a center of gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission. Critical capabilities are primary abilities (verbs) essential to the accomplishment of the objective which merits a Center of Gravity to be identified as such. It is what must be done.  The center of gravity is the “doer” that possesses that critical capability.
+There are six steps involved in Eikmeier's method of COG analysis:
+# Identify the organization's desired ends or objectives.
-Critical Requirements (CR):  Essential conditions, resources and means for a critical capability to be fully operative. [Colonel Eikmeier would restate it as, Essential conditions, resources and means the CoG requires to perform the critical capability.] Conditions, resources and means are nouns; they are the things that a CoG requires to perform the critical capability.  If the critical requirement is absent or deficient the CoG loses its ability to perform the critical capability.  Attacking critical requirements become an indirect approach to neutralizing a CoG.
+# Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
+# List the organization's means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
+# Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
+# From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
+# Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.
+=== Godzilla method ===
-Critical Vulnerabilities (CV):  Critical requirements or components thereof which are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction or attack in a manner achieving decisive results. Critical vulnerabilities are a sub-set of critical requirements.  They can be the requirement itself or part of a requirement.  For example, a single point of failure in a system is a critical vulnerability.  A common mistake planners make is to list vulnerabilities that have no relationship whatsoever with critical requirements.  This is a mistake that can lead to wasted effort going after irrelevant vulnerabilities.  Keep in mind there must be a link between a critical vulnerability and a critical requirement.   Vulnerability is determined by the adversary’s capability to adversely affect the requirement.  If there is no capability there is no vulnerability.
+In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of [[Godzilla]] "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.
-Identifying a Center of Gravity.
-Current U.S. military doctrine suggests planners use a holistic system of systems analysis to identify centers of gravity.  Commanders and staffs rely on an understanding of sufficient breadth and depth of enemy systems, the operational environment, and the interrelationships among the systems to permit them to understand how actors in the environment ultimately derive their physical strength, or what they use as their primary entity with the capability to achieve their objective.  Armed with this understanding, commanders and staffs attempt to identify a CoG.  Colonel Eikmeier argues this doctrinal method alone is usually insufficient; however the strategic framework for center of gravity analysis provides a more precise method and helps eliminate ambiguity.
+==See also==
-   This method of CoG identification avoids the complexity and ambiguity of the system of systems approach by combining a systems perspective with the strategic framework to answer three basic questions about the opposing and friendly systems.
+* [[Military strategy]]
+* [[United States Army Strategist]]
+==Notes==
-•	First, what is the end state or goal that we or our adversary want to achieve?
+{{Notelist}}
-•	Second, how (ways) can the end state be achieved?
-•	Lastly, what are the resources or means required to execute the way that achieves the end state?  It is important that planners devote sufficient study to these simple but critical questions.  Answering these questions is part of the Operational design, and mission analysis processes and is supported by the intelligence estimates that help provide understanding.
-Center of Gravity Identification Steps
-•	The first step is to identify the friendly or adversary end state or goal.
-•	Second, list the ways with an effort to identify the Primary way that achieves the end state.  It is also useful to think of the way as an action or verb because this will identify the critical capability required to achieve the end state.
-•	Third, list the resources or means required to execute and support the chosen way or critical capability.  This is generally a list of things or nouns, although it may include some actions.
-•	The last step is to select from the list of means that entity that inherently possesses the critical capability to execute the chosen way.  That entity is the center of gravity, all others are just requirements.
-Note that the key step in this process is identifying the critical capability that achieves the goal.  Identification of the critical capability occurs before identifying the CoG.  Identification of the CoG is the last step which is different from what many doctrinal or school methods advocate.  Another way to put this is to ask what do I need to do to reach my objective, and what can do it?  We can then validate our selection by using the does or uses test that helps separate the CoG from what are merely requirements.
-  Validation: Supported or Supporting (Does or Uses).
- U.S. Joint doctrine’s CoG validation method is to use a war game to determine if the defeat, destruction or weakening of the CoG candidate causes the adversary to change courses of action or objectives.<ref>JP 5-0, pp. III-24</ref>    If it changes, according to doctrine, you validated the CoG selection.  However, what this actually validates is that the candidate is merely a critical node in the system.     The “Supported or Supporting” test is a technique that many find useful when defending or articulating the selection of a CoG.  The purpose of the test is to verify the selection of a center of gravity and to identify the critical requirements (nodes).  Here is an example.  Our system is a railroad.  The end state is to produce a profit for the railroad by transporting passengers and freight.  The way or critical capability is to transport freight and passengers from point A to point B.  To transport is the verb or critical capability.  Means and resources required include: tracks, fuel, freight and passenger cars, operators and support staff, and locomotives.
- We now ask, from the list of means, “what has the inherent capability to transport freight and passengers?” Tracks?  No. Tracks do nothing by themselves other than support and guide the train.  They are used by the train.  Fuel?  No.  Fuel does not move anything, it is used or consumed by the locomotive.  Cars?  No. They hold freight and passengers but do not transport them.  Cars are used by the locomotive to move them.  Operators and staff?  No.  They are critical but do not have the inherent capability to transport freight and passengers by themselves.  Locomotive?  Yes.  The locomotive is the doer, it has the inherent capability to transport.  But it cannot do so without the other means, such as fuel, and operators.  Therefore the other means are identified as critical requirements that the center of gravity requires to function.  From  an adversary’s perspective look at the critical requirements and identify any vulnerabilities.
-  Having identified a center of gravity and its relationship to other means helps identify both the CoG and its critical requirements and provide planners better understanding of what to protect and attack either directly or indirectly.<ref>Dale C Eikmeier, Military Review, “A Logical Method for Center of Gravity Analysis”, September-October. 2007:  Pg. 64 </ref>
-The Objective and the Center of Gravity.
-  The CoG is always linked to the objective but this relationship can be confusing.  To clarify, the CoG is what you need to attack (adversary) or protect (friendly) either directly or indirectly in order to achieve your assigned objective.   How you are going to attack, or defend that CoG determines the objectives you assign to subordinates.  The linkage is that objectives or tasks are derived from an analysis of the CoG and its critical factors.  Additionally if the objective or end state changes, the center of gravity should also be adjusted.  The reverse is also true, if the center of gravity changes the objective should also change.
-CC-CoG-CR-CV Construct.
-This is just another way of showing the relationship between the CoG and its critical factors.  The CoG and critical factors should logically follow the same hierarchy as the ends, ways and means relationship.  Recalling the ends, ways and means method described for determining the CoG, you identify the goal, then the way or ways (verbs) to achieve the goal which is then your critical capability.  From the list of means available, determine what has the inherent ability to perform the critical capability, this is your CoG.   The other means may be critical requirements, some of which are vulnerable.  This construct reinforces a logical relationship and the importance of asking what actions must take place to accomplish the objective and then what can perform the actions.  It also illustrates the relationship between the CoG and the objective.
-  Some doctrinal references and educational material will have a CoG-CC-CR-CV construct.<ref>JP 5-0, 2011, Pg. III-25.US Army War College  CAMPAIGN PLANNING HANDBOOK AY 11, Pg. 60</ref>  Critics argue that this is unfortunate in that it implies you identify the CoG first, and then ask what are its capabilities and requirements.  This reinforces a guessing methodology of CoG analysis and delinks the CoG from what is needed to achieve the objective.  Commanders and planners will be better served by the logic of a CC-CoG-CR-CV construct.
 ==References==
-{{reflist}}
+{{Reflist}}
-*{{cite book | author=Echevarria, Antulio J., II | title=Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought | publisher=Naval War College Press | year=2003}}
 ==External links==
+*{{Cite journal |last=Echevarria |first=Antulio J. II |date=Summer 2003 |title='Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-17_Issue-1-4/sum03.pdf#page=88 |journal=[[Air and Space Power Journal]] |volume=17 |issue=2 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070423201250/http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/echevarria.html |archive-date=2007-04-23 |access-date=2023-11-09}}
-* From Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College:  [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=363 Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!]
+*{{Cite journal |last=Sidoti |first=Anthony F. |title=The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/sidoti.pdf |journal=[[Air and Space Power Journal]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070226214019/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/sidoti.html |archive-date=2007-02-26 |access-date=2023-11-09}}
-* [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/echevarria.html Reining in” the Center of Gravity Concept]
+*{{Cite journal |date=2016-07-01 |title=The Primacy of COG in Planning: Getting Back to Basics |journal=Joint Forces Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=[[National Defense University]] |pages=91{{ndash}}96 |access-date=2023-11-09 |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-82/jfq-82.pdf#page=93 |last=Kornatz |first=Steven D.}}
-* [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/sidoti.html The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom]
+*{{Cite AV media |url=https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLkGvnfy3IadOrkQ_QkDfDCNHlny03N4PJ |title=Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity |date=2015-10-13 |last=Eikmeier |first=Dale C. |type=Video |publisher=[[United States Army Command and General Staff College]] |via=YouTube}}
-* [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ JP 1-02, US DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms]
+*{{Cite journal |last=Heerwagen |first=Belinda |date=2007-03-30 |title=Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468496.pdf |journal=Strategy Research Project |publisher=[[United States Army War College]]}}
 [[Category:Military strategy]]
+[[Category:Carl von Clausewitz]]
-{{mil-stub}}