1990s North Korean famine: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|1994–1998 famine in North Korea}} |
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{{Infobox famine |
{{Infobox famine |
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| name = Arduous March |
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| country = [[North Korea]] |
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| famine_name_in_local = (고난의 행군) |
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| location = Nationwide |
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| image_title_1 = |
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| image_width_1 = |
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| image_2 = |
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| image_title_2 = |
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| image_width_2 = |
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| country = [[North Korea]] |
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| location = national |
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| coordinates = |
| coordinates = |
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| period = 1994–1998 |
| period = 1994–1998 |
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| excess_mortality= |
| excess_mortality= |
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| from_disease = |
| from_disease = |
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| total_deaths = |
| total_deaths = 240,000 to 3.5 million |
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| death_rate = |
| death_rate = |
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| observations = Economic mismanagement,<ref name=noland>{{cite journal|last=Noland|first=Marcus|title=Famine and Reform in North Korea|journal=Asian Economic Papers|year=2004|volume=3|issue=2|pages=1–40|doi=10.1162/1535351044193411?journalCode=asep}}</ref> natural disasters,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.economist.com/node/147613|accessdate=24 September 2011 |title=North Korea: A terrible truth |work=[[The Economist]]|date=17 April 1997}}</ref> collapse of the Soviet bloc, [[Songun|military-first policy]] |
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| theory = |
| theory = |
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| relief = |
| relief =Food and humanitarian aid (1994–2002)<ref name="Hong, Yang-ho"/> |
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| food_situation = |
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| demographics = |
| demographics = |
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| consequences = Militarization of economy |
| consequences = Militarization of economy, spread of limited market activity, food aid from various countries<ref name = WFP/> |
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| memorial = |
| memorial = |
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| preceded = |
| preceded = |
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| succeeded = |
| succeeded = |
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|causes=Economic mismanagement,<ref name=noland>{{cite journal|last=Noland|first=Marcus|title=Famine and Reform in North Korea|journal=Asian Economic Papers|year=2004|volume=3|issue=2|pages=1–40|doi=10.1162/1535351044193411|citeseerx=10.1.1.6.8390|s2cid=57565869}}</ref> natural disasters,<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/node/147613|access-date=24 September 2011 |title=North Korea: A terrible truth |newspaper=[[The Economist]]|date=17 April 1997}}</ref> [[Sanctions against North Korea|international sanctions]],<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Haggard|first1=Stephan|author-link=Stephan Haggard|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6MoChuyC84gC|title=Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform|last2=Noland|first2=Marcus|date=2007|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-51152-0|pages=38|language=en|quote=The failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency, South Korea, and the United States to resolve the crisis in a timely manner and the tightening of sanctions against the country constituted an important background condition for the famine.}}</ref> [[Revolutions of 1989|collapse of the Soviet bloc]]}} |
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| footnotes = |
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}} |
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{{Infobox Korean name |
{{Infobox Korean name |
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|title=Arduous March |
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|context = north |
|context = north |
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|hangul=고난의 행군 |
|hangul=고난의 행군 |
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|hanja=苦難의 |
|hanja=苦難의行軍 |
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|rr=gonanui haenggun |
|rr=gonanui haenggun |
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|mr=konanŭi haenggun |
| mr = konanŭi haenggun |
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}} |
}} |
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{{History of North Korea}} |
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The '''North Korean famine''', which together with the accompanying general economic crisis are known as the '''Arduous March''' ([[Hangul]]: {{lang|ko|북한기근}}; [[Hangul|Chosŏn'gŭl]]: {{lang|ko|고난의 행군}}) in [[North Korea]], occurred in North Korea from 1994 to 1998.<ref>Hagard, Stephan and Noland, Marcus (2007). Famine in North Korea: markets, aid and reform. Columbia University Press:New York</ref> |
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The '''North Korean famine''' ({{Korean|조선기근}}), also known as the '''Arduous March''' ({{Korean|hangul=고난의 행군|labels=no}}), was a period of [[mass starvation]] together with a general [[economic crisis]] from 1994 to 1998 in [[North Korea]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=Famine in North Korea: markets, aid, and reform|last=Stephan.|first=Haggard|date=2007|publisher=Columbia University Press|others=Noland, Marcus, 1959–|isbn=978-0-231-14000-3|location=New York|oclc=166342476}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Hancocks |first=Paula |date=2023-03-03 |title=North Korea's food shortage is about to take a deadly turn for the worse, experts say |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/03/asia/north-korea-hunger-famine-food-shortages-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2024-01-27 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> During this time there was an increase in [[defection from North Korea]] which peaked towards the end of the famine period. |
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The famine stemmed from a variety of factors. Economic mismanagement and the [[North Korea–Russia relations# |
The famine stemmed from a variety of factors. Economic mismanagement and the [[North Korea–Russia relations#1990s|loss of Soviet support]] caused food production and imports to decline rapidly. A series of floods and droughts exacerbated the crisis. The [[Politics of North Korea|North Korean government]] and [[Economy of North Korea|its centrally planned system]] proved too inflexible to effectively curtail the disaster. North Korea attempted to obtain aid and commercial opportunities, but failed to receive initial attention.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Kang|first=David C.|date=2012-01-01|title=They Think They're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea—A Review Essay|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/461858|journal=International Security|volume=36|issue=3|pages=142–171|issn=1531-4804|via=Project MUSE|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00068|s2cid=57564589}}</ref><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Haggard |first1=Stephan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6MoChuyC84gC |title=Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform |last2=Noland |first2=Marcus |date=2007 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-51152-0 |pages=38–39 |language=en |quote="Most important for our purposes, however, are signs of more aggressive commercial diplomacy and "aid seeking" beginning in 1994. These proposals were initially either rebuffed or their significance ignored." |author-link=Stephan Haggard}}</ref> |
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Estimates of the death toll vary widely. Out of a total population of [[Demographics of North Korea#Size and growth rate|approximately 22 million]], somewhere between 240,000 and 3,500,000 North Koreans died from starvation or hunger-related illnesses, with the deaths peaking in 1997.<ref name="iie.com">Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson and Tao Wang, [http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/99-2.pdf Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110706214340/http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/99-2.pdf |date=2011-07-06}}, ''Institute for International Economics''.</ref><ref name="Spoorenberg, Thomas pp. 133–158">{{cite journal | last1 = Spoorenberg | first1 = Thomas | last2 = Schwekendiek | first2 = Daniel | year = 2012 | title = Demographic Changes in North Korea: 1993–2008 | journal = Population and Development Review | volume = 38 | issue = 1| pages = 133–158 | doi=10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00475.x| hdl = 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00475.x | hdl-access = free }}</ref> A 2011 U.S. Census Bureau report estimated the number of excess deaths from 1993 to 2000 to be between 500,000 and 600,000.<ref name=goodkind-2011/> |
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Though the worst of the famine has since passed, North Korea still relies heavily on foreign aid and has not resumed food self-sufficiency. Bouts of food shortage continue to occur, and malnutrition is still widespread. |
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== |
==Arduous March== |
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The term "Arduous March" became |
The term "Arduous March" or "March of Suffering" became the official metaphor for the famine following a state [[Propaganda in North Korea|propaganda]] campaign in 1993. The ''[[Rodong Sinmun]]'' urged the North Korean citizenry to invoke the memory of a propaganda [[fable]] from [[Kim Il Sung]]'s time as a commander of a small group of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. The story, referred to as the ''Arduous March'', is described as "fighting against thousands of [[Imperial Japanese Army|enemies]] in 20 degrees below zero, braving a heavy snowfall and starvation, the [[Communist symbolism|red flag]] fluttering in front of the rank".<ref>{{cite book | title = Nothing to Envy: Love, Life and Death in North Korea | last = Demick | first = Barbara | author-link = Barbara Demick | year = 2010 | publisher = Fourth Estate | location = Sydney| isbn = 978-0-7322-8661-3 |page=69}}</ref> |
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==Background== |
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The great famine, known in North Korea by the officially mandated code words '''''konanŭi haenggun''''' (The March of Suffering), was a central event in the country’s history, forcing the regime and its people to change in fundamental and unanticipated ways.<ref>p.153 They Think They’re Normal</ref> |
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As part of this state campaign, uses of words such as 'famine' and 'hunger' were banned because they implied government failure. Citizens who said deaths were due to the famine could be in [[Prisons in North Korea|serious trouble with the authorities]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Mapping a Hidden Disaster: Personal Histories of Hunger in North Korea|url=https://hazdoc.colorado.edu/bitstream/handle/10590/5438/C024508.pdf?sequence=1|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161128195312/https://hazdoc.colorado.edu/bitstream/handle/10590/5438/C024508.pdf?sequence=1|archive-date=28 November 2016|access-date=25 June 2018|website=Natural Hazards Center – University of Colorado|df=dmy-all}}</ref> A special group [[The Deepening Group Incident|(the Simhwajo) was set up to purge]] the citizens responsible.<ref>{{cite web |title=Kim Jong Il's North Korea -An Arduous March- / Spot Survey No.7 |url=https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Reports/Spot/07.html |website=Institute of Developing Economies |access-date=28 May 2024 |language=en}}</ref> |
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The famine of the 1990s was not the first in North Korea's history. The agricultural potential of the northern part of the country was historically inferior to that of the southern region, and hence the division of Korea produced a negative effect on the food supply of the northern areas. If this inherent weakness was further aggravated by crisis conditions, such as war, drought, floods, or a sudden unfavorable change in North Korea's balance of trade, famine was likely to break out. The first case of famine occurred during the [[Korean War]]. By early 1952, the government's food reserves had run out, and in May, Foreign Minister [[Pak Hon-yong]] told the Communist diplomats that about one-quarter of the rural population was starving. Many people actually died of hunger. Thanks to external aid (50,000 metric tons of flour and 20,000 metric tons of artificial fertilizer from the [[Soviet Union]], 10,000 metric tons of food from [[China]]), the authorities could provide extra food rations for workers, technical experts, and officials. The government also lent villagers 40,283 metric tons of food and seed grain, distributing only 10,946 metric tons for free. Government Decree No. 161, issued in September 1952, exempted certain groups of the rural population from the agricultural tax in kind, and partly cancelled their debts. These exemptions, however, affected a mere 5 to 7% (at most 14%) of the peasantry.<ref>Balázs Szalontai, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse in North Korea: The Forgotten Side of a Not-So-Forgotten War. In: Chris Springer and Balázs Szalontai, North Korea Caught in Time: Images of War and Reconstruction (Reading, U.K.: Garnet Publishing, 2010), xiv-xv. Downloadable at https://www.academia.edu/6129907/The_Four_Horsemen_of_the_Apocalypse_in_North_Korea .</ref> |
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==Background== |
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The second famine occurred in the first half of 1955, at which time the North Korean regime pursued a policy of rapid industrialization, and sought to introduce [[Collective farming]]. In the summer of 1954, the rainy season was shorter and colder than usual, and sunny weather was rare in the autumn. These adverse meteorological conditions seriously damaged the rice crop; in [[North Hamgyong Province]], as much as 70 to 100% of the crop fell victim to the vagaries of weather. Government policies further aggravated the crisis. In October 1954, Government decree 21 prohibited private grain trade in order to stamp out "speculation," and in November, the [[Central Committee]] of the [[Workers' Party of Korea]] resolved to speed up collectivization. These measures discouraged rural producers, and due to the high agricultural taxes, in many places the peasantry was left with hardly any grain reserve. In January 1955, rice started to disappear from state shops and the free market, and by the spring the situation became so grave that deaths from starvation began to occur, particularly in hardest-hit North Hamgyong. The government was compelled to appeal to the Soviet Union and China for |
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In North Korea, people are required to call the great famine the Arduous March ({{langx|ko|고난의 행군|ko'nan-ŭi haenggun}}). It was one of the most important events in the [[history of North Korea]], because it forced [[North Korean government|the regime]] and its people to change their lives in fundamental and unanticipated ways.<ref name=":0" /> |
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emergency aid. In April, Soviet and Chinese grain shipments began to arrive, but the food crisis continued to worsen until June, when the North Korean leadership rescinded the decree that banned the private grain trade, and increased investments in the agricultural sector. These reform measures, which finally alleviated the situation but turned out to be temporary, were introduced on the insistence of the Soviet leaders, who, as North Korea's aid donors, still had considerable leverage over the DPRK.<ref>Balázs Szalontai, ''Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964'' (Stanford: Stanford University Press; Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 62-74. Downloadable at https://www.academia.edu/6390213/Chapter_3_of_Kim_Il_Sung_in_the_Khrushchev_Era_Soviet-DPRK_Relations_and_the_Roots_of_North_Korean_Despotism_1953-1964_ .</ref> |
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Only about 20% of North Korea's mountainous terrain is arable land. Much of the land is only frost-free for six months, and only one crop can be grown on it per year. The country has never been self-sufficient in food production, and many experts considered it unrealistic for the country to try to be.<ref>{{Cite book| last1= Oberdorfer| first1=Don| last2= Carlin| first2=Robert | title=The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History | publisher = Basic Books| year = 2014 | page = 291 | isbn = 978-0-465-03123-8}}</ref> Due to North Korea's terrain, [[Agriculture in North Korea|farming]] is mainly concentrated along the flatlands of the four western coastal provinces, where there is a longer growing season, level land, substantial rainfall, and well-irrigated soil conducive to the high cultivation of crops. Along with the western coastal provinces, fertile land also runs through the eastern seaboard provinces. However, interior provinces such as [[Chagang Province|Chagang]] and [[Ryanggang Province|Ryanggang]] are too mountainous, dry, and cold to support farming. |
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In the late 1980s, when the [[Soviet Union]] was embarking on [[perestroika|political and economic reform]], it began demanding payment from North Korea for past and current aid—amounts North Korea could not repay.<ref>NOLAND, ROBINSON & WANG, supra note 137, at 3; HAGGARD & NOLAND, FAMINE, supra</ref> When the [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|Soviet Union collapsed]] in 1991, trade between the two countries ceased altogether and the North Korean economy collapsed. Without Soviet aid, the flow of inputs to the North Korean agricultural sector ended, and the government proved too inflexible to respond.<ref>NOLAND, supra note 105, at 3; see also HAGGARD & NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 14; See NOLAND, ROBINSON & WANG, supra note 137, at 5.</ref> As a result, food production |
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decreased precipitously.<ref name="nk">{{cite book | authorlink=Barbara Demick | title=Nothing to Envy: Real Lives in North Korea | first1=Barbara | last1=Demick | publisher=[[Granta Publications]] | year=2010 | edition=UK | isbn=978-1-84708-141-4}}</ref> |
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In the 1980s, the [[Soviet Union]] embarked on [[perestroika|political and economic reform]]. It began to demand that North Korea repay the Soviet Union for all of the past and current aid which it sent to North Korea – amounts which North Korea could not repay. By 1991, the [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|Soviet Union dissolved]], ending all aid and trade concessions, such as cheap oil.<ref name="iie.com" /> Without Soviet aid, the flow of imports to the North Korean agricultural sector ended, and the government proved to be too inflexible to respond.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Hunger and human rights: the politics of famine in North Korea|last=Stephan.|first=Haggard|date=2005|publisher=U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea|others=Noland, Marcus, 1959–, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.|isbn=978-0-9771111-0-7|edition=1st|location=Washington, DC|oclc=64390356}}</ref> Energy imports fell by 75%.<ref>{{Cite book| last1= Oberdorfer| first1=Don| last2=Carlin| first2=Robert | title=The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History | publisher = Basic Books| year = 2014 | page = 181 | isbn = 978-0-465-03123-8}}</ref> The economy went into a downward spiral, with imports and exports falling in tandem. Flooded coal mines required electricity to operate pumps, and the shortage of coal worsened the shortage of electricity. Agriculture reliant on electrically powered irrigation systems, artificial fertilizers and pesticides was hit particularly hard by the economic collapse.<ref>{{cite book | title = Nothing to Envy: Love, Life and Death in North Korea | last = Demick | first = Barbara | author-link = Barbara Demick | year = 2010 | publisher = Fourth Estate | location = Sydney| isbn = 978-0-7322-8661-3 |page=67}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| last1= Oberdorfer| first1=Don| last2=Carlin| first2=Robert | title=The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History | publisher = Basic Books| year = 2014 | page = 308 | isbn = 978-0-465-03123-8}}</ref> |
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Most North Koreans had experienced nutritional deprivation long before the mid-1990s. The country had once been fed with a centrally planned economic system that overproduced food, had long ago reached the limits of its productive capacity, and could not respond effectively to exogenous shocks.<ref>(p. 153 They Think They’re Normal)</ref> |
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Most North Koreans had experienced nutritional deprivation long before the mid-1990s. The country had reached the limits of its productive capacity, and could not respond effectively to exogenous [[Supply shock|shocks]].<ref name=":0" /> |
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North Korea’s state trading companies emerged as an alternative means of conducting foreign economic relations. Over the past two decades, these stated trading companies have become important conduits of funding for the regime, with a percentage of all revenues going “directly into [[Kim Jong-il]]’s personal accounts … [which have been] used to secure and maintain the loyalty of the senior leadership.” <ref>(Frank, “Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998–2004) p. 10”)</ref> |
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North Korea's state trading companies emerged as an alternative means of conducting foreign economic relations. From the mid-1980s, these state trading companies became important conduits of funding for the regime, with a percentage of all revenues going "directly into [[Kim Jong Il]]'s personal accounts... [which have been] used to secure and maintain the loyalty of the senior leadership".<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Frank|first=Ruediger|date=2005-01-01|title=Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998–2004): Systemic Restrictions, Quantitative Analysis, Ideological Background|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860500163613|journal=Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy|volume=10|issue=3|pages=278–311|doi=10.1080/13547860500163613|s2cid=154438679|issn=1354-7860}}</ref> |
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“The River Kumjin Changes its Appearance,”<ref>Korea 557 (January 2003), Juche 92, 16–17</ref> The country soon instigated austerity measures, dubbed the “eat two meals a day” campaign.<ref>“The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History”, Don Oberdorfer. Warner Books 1997</ref> These measures proved inadequate in stemming the economic decline. According to Professor Hazel Smith of Cranfield University,<ref>“Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea”, Hazel Smith, p. 66, United States Institute of Peace, 2005.</ref> |
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{{quote|... the methods of the past that had produced short-to medium-term gains might have continued producing further small economic benefits if the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had remained and continued to supply oil, technology, and expertise.|Hazel Smith|Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea}} Without the help from these countries, North Korea was unable to respond adequately to the coming famine. For a time, China filled the gap left by the Soviet Union’s collapse and propped up North Korea’s food supply with significant aid.<ref>HAGGARD & NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 70, at 14.</ref> By 1993, China was supplying North Korea with 77 percent of its fuel imports and 68 percent of its food imports. Thus, North Korea replaced dependence on the Soviet Union with dependence on China – with predictably dire consequences. In 1993, China faced its own grain shortfalls and need for hard currency, and it sharply cut aid to North Korea.<ref name="nk"/> |
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The country soon imposed austerity measures, dubbed the "eat two meals a day" campaign.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Oberdorfer|first=Don|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rkKhPwAACAAJ|title=The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History|date=1999|publisher=Warner|isbn=978-0-7515-2668-4|language=en}}</ref> These measures proved inadequate in stemming the economic decline. According to Professor Hazel Smith of [[Cranfield University]]: |
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===Floods=== |
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The economic decline and failed policies provided the context for the famine in the early 1990s,<ref name="nk"/> but the floods and storms of the mid-1990s provided the catalyst. Specifically, the floods in July 1995 were described as being "of biblical proportions"<ref>" The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History", Don Oberdorfer. Warner Books 1997</ref> by independent observers. |
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{{blockquote|the methods of the past that had produced short-to medium-term gains might have continued producing further small economic benefits if the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had remained and continued to supply oil, technology, and expertise.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Smith|first=Hazel|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=5OPTQevWE70C|title=Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea|date=2005|publisher=US Institute of Peace Press|isbn=978-1-929223-59-6|page =66}}</ref>}} |
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As devastating floods ravaged the country in 1995, [[arable land]], [[harvests]], grain reserves, and social and economic infrastructure were destroyed. The [[Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs|United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs]] reported that "between 30 July and 18 August 1995, torrential rains caused devastating floods in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In one area, in [[Pyongsan]] county in North Hwanghae province, 877 mm of rain was recorded to have fallen in just seven hours, an intensity of precipitation unheard of in this area... water flow in the engorged [[Yalu River|Amnoc River]], which runs along the Korea/China border, was estimated at 4.8 billion tons over a 72 hour period. Flooding of this magnitude had not been recorded in at least 70 years."<ref>UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, “United Nations Consolidated UN Inter-Agency Appeal for Flood-Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 1 July 1996-31 March 1997” April 1996, reproduced on http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/appeals/96appeals/dprk/prk_atxl.html#top</ref> |
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Without help from these countries, North Korea was unable to respond adequately to the coming famine. For a time, [[China]] filled the gap left by the Soviet Union's collapse and propped up North Korea's food supply with significant aid.<ref>Haggard & Noland, Hunger and Human Rights, supra note 70, at 14.</ref> By 1993, China was supplying North Korea with 77 percent of its fuel imports and 68 percent of its food imports. Thus, North Korea replaced its dependence on the Soviet Union with dependence on China. In 1993, China faced its own grain shortfalls and need for hard currency, and it sharply cut aid to North Korea. |
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The major issues created by the flood were not only the destruction of crop lands and harvests, but also the loss of emergency grain reserves, as much of it was stored underground. According to the United Nations, the floods of 1994 and 1995 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of grain reserves,<ref>UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated UN Inter Agency-Appeal," 1 July 1996-21 March 1997</ref> and the [[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]] stated that 1.2 million tons (or 12%) of grain production was lost in the 1995 flood.<ref>[http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr.preview.mmwrhtml.00048030.htm#top UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs], "Status of Public Health-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, April 1997" {{dead link|date=March 2014}}</ref> |
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In 1997, [[So Kwan-hui]], the North Korean minister for agriculture, was accused of spying for the United States government and sabotaging North Korean agriculture on purpose, thus leading to the famine.<ref name="thesuntyrant21">{{cite book|last1=Floru|first1= J.P. |title=The Sun Tyrant: A Nightmare Called North Korea|date= 2017|publisher=Biteback Publishing|location=London, U.K.|isbn= 978-1-78590-221-5|oclc=984074543|page=21|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i-EoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT20|quote=When the size of the catastrophe he had caused became apparent, Kim Jong-il had his agricultural minister Seo Gwan Hee executed by firing squad. Seo was accused of being a spy for 'the American imperialists and their South Korean lackeys' and of having sabotaged North Korea's self-reliance in agriculture.}}</ref> As a result, he was [[Public executions in North Korea|publicly executed]] by [[firing squad]] by the North Korean government.<ref name= "nytimesnkoreaissaidtoexecute">{{cite news|last1=Sang-Hun|first1= Choe |title=N. Korea Is Said to Execute Finance Chief |url= https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/19/world/asia/19korea.html|access-date= July 10, 2017|work=The New York Times|date=March 18, 2010|quote= North Korea publicly executed Seo Gwan-hee, a party secretary in charge of agriculture, on spying charges in 1997 when a famine decimated the population, according to defectors.}}</ref> |
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Due to the declining economy and devastating natural disasters, the DPRK did not have the resources to import food or resources, and people were faced with death and starvation. The floods, however, did not have a statistically significant impact on the nutritional status of North Korean children at that time.{{dubious|date=March 2013}}<ref>Schwekendiek, Daniel. "The North Korean standard of living during the famine", Social Science and Medicine, 66(3), pp. 596–608.</ref>{{Verify source|date=March 2013}} |
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==Causes== |
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==Widespread malnutrition== |
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===Floods and drought=== |
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With the widespread destruction of harvests and food reserves, the majority of the population became desperate for food, including areas well established in food production. In 1996, it was reported that people in "the so-called better-off parts of the country, were so hungry that they ate the [[maize]] cobs before the crop was fully developed."<ref name="Peace pg 66">“Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea”, Hazel Smith, p. 66, United States Institute of Peace, 2005.</ref> This reduced expected production of an already ravaged harvest by 50%.<ref>FAO/WFP, “Food and Crop Assessment Mission to the DPRK,” Rome, December 10, 1997</ref> |
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The economic decline and failed policies provided the context for the famine, but the floods of the mid-1990s were the immediate cause. The floods in July and August 1995 were described as being "of biblical proportions" by independent observers.<ref>{{Cite book| last1= Oberdorfer| first1=Don| last2=Carlin| first2=Robert | title=The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History | publisher = Basic Books| year = 2014 | page = 290 | isbn = 978-0-465-03123-8}}</ref> They were estimated to affect as much as 30 percent of the country.<ref>{{cite book| title = The Making of Modern Korea | last = Buzo | first = Adrian | year = 2002| publisher = Routledge| location = London | isbn = 978-0-415-23749-9 |page=175}}</ref> |
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As devastating floods ravaged the country in 1995, [[arable land]], [[harvests]], grain reserves, and social and economic infrastructure were destroyed. The [[Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs|United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs]] reported that "between 30 July and 18 August 1995, torrential rains caused devastating floods in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In one area, in [[Pyongsan]] county in North Hwanghae province, {{convert|877|mm|in|0|disp=or}} of rain were recorded to have fallen in just seven hours, an intensity of precipitation unheard of in this area... water flow in the engorged [[Yalu River|Amnok River]], which runs along the Korea/China border, was estimated at 4.8 billion tons over a 72 hour period. Flooding of this magnitude had not been recorded in at least 70 years".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/un-consolidated-inter-agency-appeal-flood-related-emergency|title=UN Consolidated Inter-Agency appeal for Flood-Related Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 1 July 1996 – 31 March 1997 – Democratic People's Republic of Korea | ReliefWeb|website=reliefweb.int|date=July 1996 |accessdate=Mar 11, 2023}}</ref> |
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People everywhere were affected by the crisis, regardless of gender, affiliation or social class. Child malnutrition, as indicated by severe underweight, was found at 3.21% in 1987, 14% in 1997 and 7% in 2002.<ref>Schwekendiek, Daniel. "A socioeconomic history of North Korea", Jefferson and London, McFarland Publishers, 2011, p. 60</ref> |
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The major issues created by the floods were not only the destruction of crop lands and harvests, but also the loss of emergency grain reserves, because many of them were stored underground. According to the United Nations, the floods of 1994 and 1995 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of grain reserves,<ref>UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated UN Inter Agency-Appeal", 1 July 1996-21 March 1997.</ref> and the [[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]] stated that 1.2 million tons (or 12%) of grain production was lost in the 1995 flood.<ref>UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "[https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00048030.htm Status of Public Health-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, April 1997]"</ref> There were further major floods in 1996 and a drought in 1997.<ref>{{cite book | title = Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History| last = Cumings| first = Bruce| author-link = Bruce Cumings| year = 2005| publisher = [[W. W. Norton & Company]]| location = New York| isbn = 978-0-393-32702-1 |page=442}}</ref> |
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{| cellpadding="10" cellspacing="0" border="1" width="100%" |
|||
|+Rice and maize production of North Korea from 1989 to 1997 |
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|- |
|||
! Year |
|||
! 1989 !! 1990 !! 1991 !! 1992 !! 1993 !! 1994 !! 1995 !! 1996 !! 1997 |
|||
|- |
|||
! Rice milled (per 1 million tons) |
|||
! 3.24 !! 3.36 !! 3.07 !! 3.34 !! 3.56 !! 2.18 !! 1.40 !! 0.98 !! 1.10 |
|||
|- |
|||
! Corn harvested (per 1 million tons) |
|||
! 4.34 !! 3.90 !! 4.20 !! 3.72 !! 3.94 !! 3.55 !! 1.37 !! 0.83 !! 1.01 |
|||
|}<ref>『UNDP[1998]』</ref> |
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North Korea lost an estimated 85% of its power generation capacity due to flood damage to infrastructure such as [[hydropower]] plants, coal mines, and supply and transport facilities.<ref>David F. Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, "North Korean Energy Sector: Current Status and Scenarios for 2000 and 2005", in Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, ed. Noland, 89.</ref> UN officials reported that the power shortage from 1995 to 1997 was not due to a shortage of oil, because only two out of a total of two dozen power stations were dependent on heavy fuel oil for power generation, and these were supplied by KEDO (the [[Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization]]). About 70% of power generated in the DPRK came from hydropower sources, and the serious winter-spring droughts of 1996 and 1997 (and a breakdown on one of the [[Yalu River]]'s large hydro turbines) created major shortages throughout the country at that time, severely cutting back railway transportation (which was almost entirely dependent on electric power), which in turn resulted in coal supply shortages to the coal-fueled power stations which supplied the remaining 20% of power in the country.<ref>Ian Davies, quoted in Beal, "Waters of Prosperity"</ref> |
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===Military=== |
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''[[Sŏn'gun]]'', often spelled ''Songun'', is [[North Korea]]'s "Military First" policy, which prioritizes the [[Korean People's Army]] in affairs of state and allocates national resources to the "army first". Even though the armed forces were given priority for the distribution of food, this did not mean they all received generous rations.<ref>John Powell, “Testimony to the Sub-committee on East Asia and the Pacific of the US House of Representatives, 2 May 2002,” reproduced as “Special Report, North East Asia Peace and Security Network,” May 20, 2002.</ref> |
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===Failure of the public distribution system=== |
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The army was supposed to find ways to grow food to feed itself and develop industries that would permit it to purchase food and supplies from abroad. The rations received by military personnel were very basic, and “ordinary soldiers of the million-strong army often remained hungry, as did their families, who did not receive preferential treatment simply because a son or daughter was serving in the armed forces."<ref>International FIDES Service no. 4144, “Hell on Earth: The Church Must Wipe the Tears,” April 23, 1999, http://www.fides.org/english/1999/e19990423.html.</ref> |
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North Korea's vulnerability to the floods and famine was exacerbated by the failure of the public distribution system.<ref name=":0" /> The regime refused to pursue policies that would have allowed food imports and distribution without discrimination to all regions of the country.<ref name=":0" /> During the famine, the urban working class of the cities and towns of the eastern provinces of the country was hit particularly hard.<ref>Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.51</ref> |
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The distribution of food reflected basic principles of stratification of the communist system.<ref>Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.53</ref> |
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===Women=== |
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Women suffered significantly due to the gendered structure of North Korean society, which deemed women responsible for obtaining food, water and fuel for the family, often including extended family.<ref>Smith, Hazel “WFP DPRK Programmes and Activities: A Gender Perspective. Pyongyang: WFP, December 1999.</ref> Simultaneously, women had the highest participation in the workforce of any country in the world, calculated at 89%.<ref>United Nations Development Program and Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection. “Report of the Second Thematic Round Table Conference for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Found in Annex K: Labor Force and Employment. Geneva: UNDP, June 2000</ref> Therefore, women not only had to remain in the work force but also obtain supplies for the family. Pregnant and nursing women faced severe difficulties in staying healthy; maternal mortality rates increased to approximately 41 per 1000, while simple complications such as [[anemia]], [[hemorrhage]] and [[premature birth]] became common due to [[vitamin deficiency]].<ref>UNICEF, “Situation of Children and Women (1999)</ref><ref>Dilawar Ali Khan, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Improving the Quality of Vasic Social Services for the Most Vulnerable Children and Women,” mimeo, UNICEF Pyongyang, April 2001</ref> It was estimated that the number of children per woman declined by about 0.3 during that period.<ref name="Spoorenberg, Thomas pp. 133–158">Spoorenberg, Thomas; Schwekendiek, Daniel. 2012. [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00475.x/pdf "Demographic Changes in North Korea: 1993–2008"], ''Population and Development Review'', 38(1), pp. 133-158.</ref><ref name="spo">Spoorenberg, Thomas. 2014. [http://www.journal-population.com/articles/2014-3-fertility-levels-and-trends-in-north-korea/ "Fertility levels and trends in North Korea"], ''Population-E'', 69(4), pp. 433-445.</ref> |
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===Children=== |
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Children, especially those under two years old, were the most affected by the famine and poverty of the period. The [[World Health Organization]] reported death rates for children at 93 of every 1000, while those of infants were cited at 23 of every thousand.<ref>”Winter Set to Be Cruel in North Korea,” ABC World Today, November 23, 2001, on http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/s424241.htm. Statistics for 1993 from UNICEF, Situation of Children and Women, (1991).</ref> Understandably, "undernourished mothers found it difficult to maintain exclusive breast-feeding, and no suitable alternative was available. Infant formula was not produced locally, and only a minuscule amount was imported."<ref name="Peace pg 66"/> |
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Food was distributed to people according to their political standing and their [[Songbun|degree of loyalty]] to the state.<ref>Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.54</ref> |
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Accurate statistics do not exist because of government policies, and it is likely that the mortality rates were understated.<ref name="nk"/> The famine resulted in a population of homeless, migrant children known as [[Kotjebi]]. |
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The structure is as follows (the World Food Program considers 600 grams of cereal per day to be less than a "survival ration"): |
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==Public Distribution System== |
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The food shortage was augmented by the Public Distribution System (PDS)’s inefficiency.<ref>{{cite report|title=Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea |author=Marcus Noland |date=March 20, 2006 |url=http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/noland0306.pdf |page=6}}</ref> |
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The PDS distributed food according to political standing and [[Songbun|degree of loyalty]] to the state. |
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The structure is as follows (the World Food Program has estimated that at least 600 grams/day of cereal is needed for a "survival ration"<ref>Brooke, James (11 December 2003) [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/world/as-donations-fall-un-plans-to-reduce-north-korea-s-food-aid.html As Donations Fall, U.N. Plans to Reduce North Korea's Food Aid] The New York Times, Retrieved 31 January 2013</ref>): |
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{| class="wikitable" |
{| class="wikitable" |
||
|- |
|- |
||
! |
! Category !! Amount allocated |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| Privileged |
| Privileged industrial worker || 900 grams/day |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| Ordinary |
| Ordinary worker || 700 grams/day |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| Retired |
| Retired citizen || 300 grams/day |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| 2- |
| 2~4-year-old || 200 grams/day |
||
|} |
|} |
||
However, the extended period of food |
However, the extended period of food shortages put a strain on the system, and it spread the amount of available food allocations thinly across the groups, affecting 62% of the population who were entirely reliant on public distribution. The system was feeding only 6% of the population by 1997. |
||
{| class="wikitable" |
{| class="wikitable" |
||
|- |
|- |
||
Line 126: | Line 96: | ||
| 1992 || Reduced another 10% |
| 1992 || Reduced another 10% |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| 1994 || |
| 1994 || 470 grams/day down 420 grams/day |
||
|- |
|- |
||
| 1997 || 128 grams/day |
| 1997 || 128 grams/day |
||
|} |
|} |
||
A 2008 study, however, found no variation in children's nutrition between counties that had experienced flooding and those that had not.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schwekendiek |first=Daniel |title=The North Korean standard of living during the famine |journal=Social Science and Medicine |volume=66 |issue=3 |pages=596–608 |date=February 2008 |pmid=18006130 |doi=10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.09.018}}</ref> |
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The annual amount farmers could keep fell from 167 to 107 kilograms each. |
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===Long-term causes=== |
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In a contentious attempt to solve the famine, the North Korean government suggested “alternative foods” for the people to sustain themselves on. For example, small bricks of bark, leaves and grass were added into the diets of some.<ref>{{Cite report |author= Václav Havel |authorlink= |author2=Kjell Magne Bondevik |author3=Elie Wiesel |date=October 30, 2006 |title=Failure to Protect – A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea |url=http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/North%20Korea%20Report.pdf |publisher=DLA Piper and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea |page=17-21 }}</ref> |
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The famine was also a result of the culmination of a long series of government decisions that accrued slowly over decades.<ref name=":0" /> The attempt to follow a closed-economic model caused the regime to abandon the possibility of engaging in international markets and importing food and instead restrict demand such as carrying out a "Let's eat two meals a day" campaign in 1991.<ref name=":0" /> Attempts to increase exports and earn foreign exchange through the [[Rason Special Economic Zone|Rajin Sonbong free trade zone]] in 1991 were unsuccessful – it was located in the most isolated part of North Korea and lacked a clear legal foundation for international business.<ref name=":0" /> The [[Government of North Korea|North Korean government]] also missed the opportunity for the short-term option to borrow from abroad to finance food imports after defaulting on foreign loans in the 1970s.<ref name=":1" /> |
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==Healthcare== |
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==Failure of sanitation, energy and health systems== |
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{{main|Health in North Korea}} |
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The threats from famine were compounded by severe damage to health systems and water, sanitation, and energy distribution systems. The DPRK lost an estimated 85% of its power-generation capacity due to flood-induced damage to infrastructure facilities such as hydropower plants, as well as coal mines, supply and transport facilities. This greatly reduced the ability of the country to produce its own energy.<ref>David F. Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “North Korean Energy Sector: Current Status and Scenarios for 2000 and 2005,” in Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, ed. Noland, 89.</ref> UN officials reported a complex set of problems, commenting that the power-shortage problem of 1995-1997 {{quote|was not due to a shortage of oil as only two of two dozen power stations were dependent on heavy fuel oil for power generation... and these were supplied by KEDO (the [[Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization]]).... About 70% of power generated in the DPRK came from [[hydropower]] sources, and the serious winter-spring droughts of 1996 and 1997 (and a breakdown on one of the [[Yalu River]]’s large hydro turbines) created major shortages throughout the country at that time, severely cutting back railway transportation (which was almost entirely dependent on electric power), which in turn resulted in coal supply shortages to the coal-fueled power stations which supplied the remaining 20% of power in the country.<ref>Ian Davies, quoted in Beal, “Waters of Prosperity”</ref>}} |
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Inadequate medical supplies, water and environmental contamination, frequent power failures, and outdated training led to a health care crisis that added to the overall devastation. According to a 1997 [[UNICEF]] delegation, hospitals were clean but wards were devoid of even the most rudimentary supplies and equipment; [[sphygmomanometer]]s, thermometers, scales, kidney dishes, spatulas, IV giving sets, etc. The mission saw numerous patients being treated with homemade beer bottle IV sets, which were clearly not sterile. There was an absence of ORS (oral rehydration solution) and even the most basic drugs such as analgesics and antibiotics.<ref>Unicef, "DPRK Mission Report", 1997.</ref> |
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==Widespread malnutrition== |
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==Estimated deaths== |
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{{See also|Health in North Korea#Malnutrition}} |
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An exact statistical number of deaths during the acute phase of the crisis, from 1994 to 1998, will probably never be fully determined. Independent analysis estimates between 800,000 and 1.5 million people died due to starvation, disease, or sickness caused by lack of food.<ref>W. Courtland Robinson, Myung Ken Lee, Kenneth Hill, and Gilbert M. Burnham, “Mortality in North Korean Migrant Households: A retrospective Study,” Lancet 293 no. 9175 (July 24, 2000)</ref><ref>Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,” Population and Development Review 27, no. 2 (June 2001)</ref> |
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With the widespread destruction of harvests and food reserves, the majority of the population became desperate for food, including areas well established in food production. In 1996, it was reported that people in "the so-called better-off parts of the country, were so hungry that they ate the [[maize]] cobs before the crop was fully developed".<ref name="Peace pg 66">"Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea", Hazel Smith, p. 66, United States Institute of Peace, 2005.</ref> This reduced expected production of an already ravaged harvest by 50%.<ref>FAO/WFP, "Food and Crop Assessment Mission to the DPRK", Rome, December 10, 1997.</ref> |
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People everywhere were affected by the crisis, regardless of gender, affiliation or social class. Child malnutrition, indicated as being severely underweight, was found at 3% in 1987, 14% in 1997 and 7% in 2002.<ref>Schwekendiek, Daniel. "A socioeconomic history of North Korea", Jefferson and London, McFarland Publishers, 2011, p. 60</ref> |
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In a detailed discussion, Haggard and Noland review all estimates of the “excess” deaths caused by the famine. Estimates range as high as 4,000,000 to a low of 220,000 between 1995 and 1998, as claimed by the North Korean government.<ref>The resource above is based on Andrew S.Natsios states, “From 1994 to 1998, 2-3 million people died of starvation and hunger-related illnesses, and the famine has generated a range of social and political effects.” Natsios, “The Politics of Famine in North Korea”</ref> |
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{| class=wikitable |
|||
In 1998, [[US Congress]]ional staffers who visited the country reported that: "Therefore, we gave a range of estimates, from 300,000 to 800,000 dying per year, peaking in 1997. That would put the total dead from the North Korean food shortage at between 900,000 to 2.4 million between 1995 and 1998."<ref>[http://www.tomcoyner.com/kirk_report.htm Final Report<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref> Higher estimates range from 2-3 million.<ref name="iie.com"/> |
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|+Rice and maize production of North Korea from 1989 to 1997<ref>『UNDP[1998]』</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lee |first=Suk |url=https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/827/1/0000605327.pdf |title=The DPRK Famine of 1994–2000: Existence and Impact |date=May 2005 |publisher=Korea Institute for National Unification |year=2005 |isbn=89-8479-292-6 |pages=38 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230609163204/https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/827/1/0000605327.pdf |archive-date=9 June 2023}}</ref> |
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|- |
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! Year |
|||
! 1989 !! 1990 !! 1991 !! 1992 !! 1993 !! 1994 !! 1995 !! 1996 !! 1997 |
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|- |
|||
| Rice milled (million tons) |
|||
| 3.24 || 3.36 || 3.07 || 3.34 || 3.56 || 2.18 || 1.40 || 0.98 || 1.10 |
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|- |
|||
| Corn harvested (million tons) |
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| 4.34 || 3.90 || 4.20 || 3.72 || 3.94 || 3.55 || 1.37 || 0.83 || 1.01 |
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|} |
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===Military=== |
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A survey by North Korea's Public Security Ministry suggests that 2.5 to 3 million people died from 1995 to March 1998, although the numbers may have been inflated to secure additional food aid.<ref>{{Cite news|title = North Korea 'loses 3 million to famine' |date = February 17, 1999|url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/281132.stm |newspaper=[[BBC]] News |accessdate=5 January 2010 |ref = harv|postscript = <!--None-->}}</ref> The most sophisticated estimates to measure excess deaths based on different data from multiple sources give a total number ranging roughly from 600,000 to 1 million, or approximately 3 to 5 percent of the pre-crisis population<ref>Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 72–76</ref> |
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''[[Songun]]'' is [[North Korea]]'s "Military First" policy, which prioritizes the [[Korean People's Army]] in affairs of state and allocates national resources to the "army first". Even though the armed forces were given priority for the distribution of food, this did not mean that they all received generous rations.<ref>John Powell, "Testimony to the Sub-committee on East Asia and the Pacific of the US House of Representatives, 2 May 2002", reproduced as "Special Report, North East Asia Peace and Security Network", May 20, 2002.</ref> |
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The army was supposed to find ways to grow food to feed itself and to develop industries that would permit it to purchase food and supplies from abroad. The rations received by military personnel were very basic, and "ordinary soldiers of the million-strong army often remained hungry, as did their families, who did not receive preferential treatment simply because a son or daughter was serving in the armed forces".<ref>International FIDES Service no. 4144, "Hell on Earth: The Church Must Wipe the Tears", April 23, 1999, {{cite web |url=http://www.fides.org/english/1999/e19990423.html |title=Fides – e19990423 |access-date=2011-10-24 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030317122115/http://www.fides.org/English/1999/e19990423.html |archive-date=2003-03-17}}.</ref> |
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===Women=== |
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Women suffered significantly due to the gendered structure of North Korean society, which deemed women responsible for obtaining food, water and fuel for their families, which often included extended families.<ref>Smith, Hazel "WFP DPRK Programmes and Activities: A Gender Perspective. Pyongyang: WFP, December 1999.</ref> Simultaneously, women had the highest participation rate in the workforce of any country in the world, calculated at 89%.<ref>United Nations Development Program and Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection. "Report of the Second Thematic Round Table Conference for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". Found in Annex K: Labor Force and Employment. Geneva: UNDP, June 2000.</ref> Therefore, women had to remain in the workforce and obtain supplies for their families. |
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Pregnant and nursing women faced severe difficulties in staying healthy; maternal mortality rates increased to approximately 41 per 1000, while simple complications such as [[anemia]], [[hemorrhage]] and [[premature birth]] became common due to [[vitamin deficiency]].<ref>UNICEF, "Situation of Children and Women (1999)</ref><ref>Dilawar Ali Khan, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Improving the Quality of Vasic Social Services for the Most Vulnerable Children and Women", mimeo, UNICEF Pyongyang, April 2001.</ref> It was estimated that the number of births declined by about 0.3 children per woman during that period.<ref name="Spoorenberg, Thomas pp. 133–158"/><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Spoorenberg|first1=Thomas|year=2014|title=Fertility levels and trends in North Korea|url=http://www.journal-population.com/articles/2014-3-fertility-levels-and-trends-in-north-korea/|journal=Population-E|volume=69|issue=4|pages=433–445|access-date=2015-03-27|archive-date=2015-04-02|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402172531/http://www.journal-population.com/articles/2014-3-fertility-levels-and-trends-in-north-korea/|url-status=dead}}</ref> |
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===Children=== |
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Children, especially those under two years old, were most affected by both the famine and the poverty of the period. The [[World Health Organization]] reported death rates for children at 93 out of every 1000, while those of infants were cited at 23 out of every 1000.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/worldtoday|title=The World Today with Sally Sara – ABC Radio|website=World Today – ABC Radio|accessdate=Mar 11, 2023}}</ref> Undernourished mothers found it difficult to breast-feed. No suitable alternative to the practice was available. Infant formula was not produced locally, and only a small amount of it was imported.<ref name="Peace pg 66"/> |
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The famine resulted in a population of homeless, migrant children known as [[Kotjebi]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Nothing to Envy: Love, Life and Death in North Korea|last=Demick|first=Barbara|publisher=Fourth Estate|year=2010|isbn=978-0-7322-8661-3|location=Sydney|page=160|author-link=Barbara Demick}}</ref> |
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The consequences of the famine are still playing out – most notably, in the breakdown of the Public Distribution System (PDS or government food-rationing system) and other economic institutions, as well as increasing self-reliance by North Koreans in providing for themselves and their families.<ref name="They Think They’re Normal p.155">(They Think They’re Normal p. 155)</ref> |
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==Estimated number of deaths== |
|||
Robinson’s team found 245,000 “excess” deaths (an elevated mortality rate as a result of premature death), 12 percent of the population in one affected region. Taking those results as the upper limit of such deaths and extrapolating across the entire North Korean population and across all of the country’s provinces produces an upper limit of 2 million total famine-related deaths.<ref name="They Think They’re Normal p.155"/> |
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The exact number of deaths during the acute phase of the crisis, from 1994 to 1998, is uncertain. According to the researcher [[Andrei Lankov]], both the extreme high and low ends of the estimates are considered inaccurate.<ref name="Lankov2015">{{cite book|last=Lankov|first=Andrei|title=[[The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia]]|year=2015|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-939003-8|page=81}}</ref> In 2001 and 2007, independent groups of researchers have estimated that between 600,000 and 1 million people, or 3 to 5 percent of the pre-crisis population, died due to starvation and hunger-related illness.<ref>Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, "The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact", ''Population and Development Review'' 27, no. 2 (June 2001)</ref><ref>Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 72–76</ref> In 1998, [[US Congress]]ional staffers who visited the country reported that: "Therefore, we gave a range of estimates, from 300,000 to 800,000 dying per year, peaking in 1997. That would put the total number of deaths from the North Korean food shortage at between 900,000 and 2.4 million between 1995 and 1998".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.tomcoyner.com/kirk_report.htm|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20101225021520/http://tomcoyner.com/kirk_report.htm|url-status=dead|title=Final Reportto Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) Chairman, International Relations Committee U.S. House of Representatives {{!}} Mission to North Korea and China {{!}} August 11–23, 1998 International Relations Committee {{!}} U.S. House of Representatives|archivedate=Dec 25, 2010|website=www.tomcoyner.com|accessdate=Mar 11, 2023}}</ref> W. Courtland Robinson's team found 245,000 "excess" deaths (an elevated mortality rate as a result of premature death), 12 percent of the population in one affected region. Taking those results as the upper limit and extrapolating across the entire North Korean population across the country's provinces produces an upper limit of 2,000,000 famine-related deaths.<ref name="They Think They're Normal p.155">They Think They're Normal p. 155</ref> Andrew Natsios and others estimated 2–3 million deaths.<ref>[http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr990802.pdf Andrew S. Natsios states, "From 1994 to 1998, 2–3 million people died of starvation and hunger-related illnesses, and the famine has generated a range of social and political effects". Natsios, "The Politics of Famine in North Korea" (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2, 1999.)]</ref><ref name="iie.com"/> |
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According to |
According to research by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2011, the likely range of excess deaths between 1993 and 2000 was between 500,000 and 600,000, and a total of 600,000 to 1,000,000 excess deaths from the year 1993 to the year 2008.<ref name="Spoorenberg, Thomas pp. 133–158"/>{{page needed|date=April 2017}}<ref name=goodkind-2011>{{cite web |url=https://paa2011.populationassociation.org/papers/111030 |title=A Reassessment of Mortality in North Korea, 1993–2008 |page=3|author1=Daniel Goodkind |author2=Loraine West |author3=Peter Johnson |publisher=U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division |date=28 March 2011 |access-date=8 November 2014}}</ref> |
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==Black markets== |
==Black markets== |
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At the same time, the years of famine were also marked by dramatic revival of [[ |
At the same time, the years of famine were also marked by a dramatic revival of [[Shadow economy of North Korea|illegal, private market activities]]. Smuggling across the [[China–North Korea border|border]] boomed, and up to 250,000 North Koreans [[North Korean defectors|moved to China]].<ref>{{Cite book|url= https://www.nap.edu/read/10086/chapter/5|title= Forced Migration and Mortality |year=2001|doi=10.17226/10086|pmid= 25057553|isbn= 978-0-309-07334-9 | publisher =National Research Council (US) Roundtable on the Demography of Forced Migration |last1 = Reed|first1 = H. E.|last2 =Keely|first2 =C. B.|hdl= 10419/170700}}</ref> [[Amartya Sen]] had mentioned bad governance as one of the structural and economic problems which contributed to the famine, but it seems that the famine also led to widespread government corruption, which nearly resulted in the collapse of old government controls and regulations.<ref name="Marcus Noland 2007">Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, 2007, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform, New York: Columbia University Press.</ref> |
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When fuel became scarce while demand for logistics rose, so-called ''servi-cha'' ({{ |
When fuel became scarce while demand for logistics rose, so-called ''servi-cha'' ({{Korean|hangul=써비차|mr=ssŏbich'a|context=north}}, "service cars") operations formed, wherein an entrepreneur provides transportation to businesses, institutions and individuals without access to other means of transportation, while the car is formally owned by a legitimate enterprise or unit that also provides transportation permits.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.dailynk.com/english/read_print.php?cataId=nk02900&num=6954 |title=Servi-Cha: the Lifeblood of the People's Economy |author=Im Jeong Jin |date=28 October 2010 |work=[[Daily NK]] |access-date= 5 December 2010 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130928062628/http://www.dailynk.com/english/read_print.php?cataId=nk02900&num=6954 |archive-date= 28 September 2013 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all}}</ref> |
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With the desperation derived from famine and informal trade and commercialization, North Koreans developed their black market, and moreover, they were surviving by adapting.<ref>David Kang, "They Think They're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea", ''International Security'', Vol. 36 No. 3, Winter 2011/12, pp. |
With the desperation derived from famine and informal trade and commercialization, North Koreans developed their black market, and moreover, they were surviving by adapting.<ref>David Kang, "They Think They're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea", ''International Security'', Vol. 36 No. 3, Winter 2011/12, pp. 141–71</ref> [[Andrei Lankov]] has described the process as the "natural death of North Korean Stalinism".<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/pdf/ap1-lankov.pdf |title= The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism |publisher=Asia Policy, January 2006 |date=2006-01-01 |access-date=17 August 2007 | first =Andrei | last = Lankov |author-link=Andrei Lankov |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070724031859/http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/pdf/ap1-lankov.pdf |archive-date=24 July 2007 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all}}</ref> |
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|format=PDF|title=The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism |publisher=Asia Policy, January 2006 |
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|date=2006-01-01 |accessdate=17 August 2007 |author=[[Andrei Lankov]]}}</ref> |
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The average official salary in 2011 was equivalent to $2 per month |
The average official salary in 2011 was equivalent to US$2 per month. However, the actual monthly income could be estimated to be around US$15 as most North Koreans were earning money from illegal small businesses; trade, subsistence farming, and handicrafts. The illegal economy is largely dominated by women. This is because men are expected to attend their places of official work despite most of the factories being non-functional.<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/304_96327.html |title= NK is no Stalinist country |newspaper=[[The Korea Times]] |date= 2011-10-09 |access-date=9 October 2011 |author=Andrei Lankov |author-link=Andrei Lankov}}</ref> |
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==International response== |
==International response== |
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Initial assistance to North Korea started as early as 1990, with small-scale support from religious groups in South Korea and assistance from [[UNICEF]].<ref name="Hong, Yang-ho">"Humanitarian Aid Toward North Korea: A Global Peace-Building Process |
Initial assistance to North Korea started as early as 1990, with small-scale support from religious groups in South Korea and assistance from [[UNICEF]].<ref name="Hong, Yang-ho">"Humanitarian Aid Toward North Korea: A Global Peace-Building Process", East Asian Review, Winter 2001.</ref> In August 1995, North Korea made an official request for humanitarian aid and the international community responded accordingly:<ref name = WFP>Staff (January 2013) [http://www.wfp.org/fais/reports/quantities-delivered-report/run/donor/All/cat/All/year/All/recipient/Democratic+People%27s+Republic+of+Korea+%28DPRK%29/code/All/mode/All/basis/0/subtotal/0/ Quantity Reporting – Food Aid to North Korea] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141224072546/http://www.wfp.org/fais/reports/quantities-delivered-report/run/donor/All/cat/All/year/All/recipient/Democratic%20People's%20Republic%20of%20Korea%20(DPRK)/code/All/mode/All/basis/0/subtotal/0 |date=2014-12-24}} World Food Program, Retrieved 2 February 2013.</ref> |
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{| class="wikitable sortable" |
{| class="wikitable sortable" |
||
Line 210: | Line 203: | ||
| 3,314 |
| 3,314 |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|China || |
|China || ||100 ||150 ||151 ||201 ||280 ||420 ||330 ||212 ||132 ||451||207 ||264 || ||116 || || ||3,015 |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|U.S.A. |
|U.S.A. || ||22 ||193 ||231 ||589 ||351 ||319 ||222 ||47 ||105 ||28 || || ||171 ||121 ||1 || ||2,400 |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|Others |
|Others ||394 ||380 ||501 ||361 ||198 ||248 ||571 ||168 ||143 ||201 ||125 ||20 ||26 ||145 ||61 ||71 ||47 ||3,661 |
||
|- |
|- |
||
|Total |
|Total |
||
Line 235: | Line 228: | ||
| 47 |
| 47 |
||
|12,390 |
|12,390 |
||
|}[[File:501 cows sent to North Korea.jpg|thumb|A South Korean relief caravan of 501 cattle in 50 vehicles bound for North Korea, Oct. 27, 1998.]] |
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|} |
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Beginning in 1996, the U.S. also |
Beginning in 1996, the U.S. also started shipping food aid to North Korea through the United Nations [[World Food Programme]] (WFP) to combat the famine. Shipments peaked in 1999 at nearly 600,000 tons making the U.S. the largest foreign aid donor to the country at the time. Under the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush administration]], aid was drastically reduced year after year from 320,000 tons in 2001 to 28,000 tons in 2005.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/hunger/relief/2005/0520nkorea.htm |title=US Has Put Food Aid for North Korea on Hold |access-date=1 August 2007 |author=Solomon, Jay |date=2005-05-20 |work=Wall Street Journal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070714092016/http://www.globalpolicy.org///socecon/hunger/relief/2005/0520nkorea.htm |archive-date=July 14, 2007}}</ref> The Bush administration was criticized for "using food as a weapon" during talks over the North's nuclear weapons program, but insisted the [[United States Agency for International Development|U.S. Agency for International Development]] (USAID) criteria were the same for all countries and the situation in North Korea had "improved significantly since its collapse in the mid-1990s". |
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South Korea (before the [[Lee Myung-bak government]]) and China remained the largest donors of food aid to North Korea. The U.S. objects to this manner of donating food due to the North Korean state's refusal to allow donor representatives to supervise the distribution of their aid inside North Korea.<ref name="assistance"/> Such supervision would ensure aid does not get seized and sold by well-connected elites or diverted to feed North Korea's large [[Korean People's Army|military]]. In 2005, South Korea and China together provided almost 1 million tons of food aid, each contributing half.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/10/nkorea14381.htm |title=North Korea: Ending Food Aid Would Deepen Hunger | |
South Korea (before the [[Lee Myung-bak government]]) and China remained the largest donors of food aid to North Korea. The U.S. objects to this manner of donating food due to the North Korean state's refusal to allow donor representatives to supervise the distribution of their aid inside North Korea.<ref name="assistance"/> Such supervision would ensure that aid does not get seized and sold by well-connected elites or diverted to feed North Korea's large [[Korean People's Army|military]]. In 2005, South Korea and China together provided almost 1 million tons of food aid, each contributing half.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/10/nkorea14381.htm |title=North Korea: Ending Food Aid Would Deepen Hunger |access-date=2 August 2007 |date=2006-10-11 |work=[[Human Rights Watch]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929135636/http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/10/nkorea14381.htm |archive-date=29 September 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref> |
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Humanitarian aid from North Korea's neighbors has been cut off at times to provoke North Korea into resuming boycotted talks. For example, South Korea decided to "postpone consideration" of 500,000 tons of rice for the North in 2006, but the idea of providing food as a clear incentive (as opposed to resuming "general humanitarian aid") has been avoided.<ref>{{Cite news|url= |
Humanitarian aid from North Korea's neighbors has been cut off at times in order to provoke North Korea into resuming boycotted talks. For example, South Korea decided to "postpone consideration" of 500,000 tons of rice for the North in 2006, but the idea of providing food as a clear incentive (as opposed to resuming "general humanitarian aid") has been avoided.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/13/AR2006071300751.html |title=S. Korea Suspends Food Aid to North |access-date=2 August 2007 |author=Faiola, Anthony |date=2006-07-14 |newspaper=[[Washington Post]]}}</ref> There have also been aid disruptions due to widespread theft of [[railroad cars|railway cars]] used by mainland China to deliver food relief.<ref name="FT">{{Cite web|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bfc9a8a8-7d9c-11dc-9f47-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 |title=China halts rail freight to North Korea|access-date=18 October 2007 |date=2007-10-18 |work=Financial Times}}</ref> |
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==Post-famine developments== |
==Post-famine developments== |
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North Korea has not yet resumed |
North Korea has not yet resumed reliable self-sufficiency in food production and as a result, it periodically relies on external [[food aid]] from [[South Korea]], [[China]], the [[United States]], [[Japan]], the [[European Union]] and other countries.<ref name=ap-20190322>{{cite news |url=https://apnews.com/fe394eef5f7848f5be284d21a4b7624a |title=North Korea, seeking food aid, links sanctions to shortages |last=Talmadge |first=Eric |publisher=Associated Press |date=22 March 2019 |access-date=2 April 2019}}</ref> In 2002, North Korea requested that food supplies no longer be delivered.<ref name="personal.lse.ac.uk">[http://personal.lse.ac.uk/SIDEL/images/WooFamine.pdf Woo-Cumings, Meredith (2002). The political ecology of famine: the North Korean catastrophe and its lessons] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130927203219/http://personal.lse.ac.uk/SIDEL/images/WooFamine.pdf |date=2013-09-27}}</ref> |
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In |
In 2005, the [[World Food Programme]] (WFP) reported that famine conditions were in imminent danger of returning to North Korea, and the government was reported to have mobilized millions of city-dwellers in order to help rice farmers.<ref>Brooke, James (1 June 2005) [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20810F6345D0C728CDDAF0894DD404482 North Korea, Facing Food Shortages, Mobilizes Millions From the Cities to Help Rice Farmers] The New York Times, Retrieved 30 January 2013.</ref><ref>{{Cite news | last = Buckley | first = Sarah | title = North Korea's problem with food|newspaper = [[BBC News]] | date = September 23, 2005 | url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4072280.stm}}</ref> In 2012, the WFP reported that food would be sent to North Korea as soon as possible. The food would first be processed by a local processor and it would then be delivered directly to North Korean citizens. |
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{{Cite news |
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|last = Buckley |
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|first = Sarah |
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|title = North Korea's problem with food |
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|newspaper = [[BBC News]] |
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|date = September 23, 2005 |
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|url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4072280.stm |
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|postscript = <!-- Bot inserted parameter. Either remove it; or change its value to "." for the cite to end in a ".", as necessary. -->{{inconsistent citations}} |
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}}</ref> In 2012, WFP reported that food would be sent to North Korea as soon as possible. The food would be processed by a local processor and delivered directly to North Korean citizens. |
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Agricultural production increased from about 2.7 million [[tonne|metric tons]] in 1997 to 4.2 million metric tons in 2004.<ref name="assistance">{{Cite web|url=http://internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/4-06usaid.pdf |title=Report on U.S. Humanitarian assistance to North Koreans | |
Agricultural production increased from about 2.7 million [[tonne|metric tons]] in 1997 to 4.2 million metric tons in 2004.<ref name="assistance">{{Cite web |url=http://internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/4-06usaid.pdf |title=Report on U.S. Humanitarian assistance to North Koreans |access-date=1 August 2007 |date=2006-04-15 |work=[[United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070309205512/http://internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/4-06usaid.pdf |archive-date=9 March 2007}}</ref> In 2008, food shortages continued to be a problem in North Korea, although less so than in the mid to late 1990s. Flooding in 2007 and reductions in food aid exacerbated the problem.<ref>{{Cite news | last = Branigan | first = Tania | title = UN fears tragedy over North Korean food shortage |newspaper = [[The Guardian]] | date = April 17, 2008 | url = https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/17/korea.food}}</ref> |
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{{Cite news |
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|last = Branigan |
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|first = Tania |
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|title = UN fears tragedy over North Korean food shortage |
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|newspaper = [[The Guardian]] |
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|date = April 17, 2008 |
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|url = http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/17/korea.food |
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|postscript = <!-- Bot inserted parameter. Either remove it; or change its value to "." for the cite to end in a ".", as necessary. -->{{inconsistent citations}} |
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}} |
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</ref> |
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In 2011, during a visit to North Korea, former US President [[Jimmy Carter]] reported that one third of children in North Korea were malnourished and stunted in their growth because of a lack of food. He also said that the North Korean government had reduced daily food intake from {{convert|1400|to|700|kcal|kJ|abbr=on|order=flip}} in 2011.<ref>Bristow, Michael [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13185053 Ex-leaders head for North Korea] BBC News Asia-Pacific, 25 April 2011, Retrieved 25 April 2011.</ref> Some scholars believed that North Korea was purposefully exaggerating the food shortage, aiming to receive additional food supplies for its planned mass-celebrations of Kim Il Sung's 100th birthday in 2012 by means of foreign aid.<ref>[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-north-korea-luxuries-20110722,0,3245820.story North Korea flouts ban on luxury goods, South Korea charges], Los Angeles Times, 22 July 2011.</ref> |
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=== Stunted growth of North Koreans === |
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In 2011, during a visit to North Korea, former US President [[Jimmy Carter]] reported that one third of children in North Korea were malnourished and stunted in their growth because of a lack of food. He also said that the North Korean government had reduced daily food intake from {{convert|1400|to|700|kcal|kJ|abbr=on|disp=flip}} in 2011<ref>Bristow, Michael [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13185053 Ex-leaders head for North Korea] BBC News Asia-Pacific, 25 April 2011, Retrieved 25 April 2011</ref> (by comparison, a normal food intake for a healthy European is {{convert|2000|to|2500|kcal|kJ|abbr=on|disp=flip}} per day<ref>Epstein, Angela [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-414985/Why-Britain-Fat-Man-Europe.html Why Britain is the Fat Man of Europe] The Daily Mail Online, Health, 14 November 2006, Retrieved 25 April 2011</ref>). Some scholars believed that North Korea was purposefully exaggerating the food shortage, aiming to receive additional food supplies for its planned 2012 mass celebrations by means of foreign aid.<ref>[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-north-korea-luxuries-20110722,0,3245820.story North Korea flouts ban on luxury goods, South Korea charges], Los Angeles Times, 22 July 2011.</ref> |
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Escaped North Koreans reported in September 2010 that starvation had returned to the nation.<ref>{{cite web |url= |
Escaped North Koreans reported in September 2010 that starvation had returned to the nation.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11244825 |title=BBC News — Tales of starvation and death in North Korea |work=[[BBC]] |year=2010 |access-date=30 January 2013}}</ref> North Korean pre-school children are reported to be an average of {{convert|3|to(-)|4|cm|in|frac=4|spell=in}} shorter than South Koreans, which some researchers believe can only be explained by conditions of famine and malnutrition.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17774210 |title=BBC News — Are North Koreans really three inches shorter than South Koreans?|work=[[BBC]] |year=2012 |access-date=4 November 2013}}</ref> Most people only eat meat on public holidays, namely [[Kim Jong Il]]'s birthday, the [[Day of the Shining Star]] on February 16 and [[Kim Il Sung]]'s birthday, the Day of the Sun on April 15.<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8809102/The-unpalatable-appetites-of-Kim-Jong-il.html |title=The unpalatable appetites of Kim Jong-il |date = October 8, 2011 |access-date=8 October 2011|last1=Demick |first1=Barbara}}</ref> |
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Roughly 45% of North Korean children under the age of five are stunted from malnutrition and the population of [[kotjebi]] persists.<ref name='AP_2013-06-05'>{{cite news | first = Hyung-Jin | last = Kim | title = Activist: Smiling NKorean defectors told of misery | date=5 June 2013 | publisher = [[Yahoo!]] | url = http://news.yahoo.com/activist-smiling-nkorean-defectors-told-misery-112343717.html | work = [[Associated Press]] | accessdate=5 June 2013}}</ref> Most people eat meat only on public holidays, namely [[Kim Il-sung]]'s and [[Kim Jong-il]]'s birthdays.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8809102/The-unpalatable-appetites-of-Kim-Jong-il.html |title=The unpalatable appetites of Kim Jong-il |date = October 8, 2011 |accessdate=8 October 2011}}</ref> |
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One report by the [[Tokyo Shimbun]] in April 2012 claimed that since the death of Kim Jong |
One report by the ''[[Tokyo Shimbun]]'' in April 2012 claimed that since the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, around 20,000 people had starved to death in [[South Hwanghae Province]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/23/2012042300587.html|title=20,000 N.Koreans Die of Starvation|access-date=25 June 2018}}</ref> Another report by the Japanese Asia Press agency in January 2013 claimed that in [[North Hwanghae|North]] and South Hwanghae provinces more than 10,000 people had died of famine. Other international news agencies have begun circulating stories of [[Human cannibalism|cannibalism]].<ref>Williams, Robb (28 January 2013) [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korean-cannibalism-fears-amid-claims-starving-people-forced-to-desperate-measures-8468781.html North Korean cannibalism fears amid claims starving people forced to desperate measures] The Independent, Retrieved 30 January 2013.</ref> |
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On the other hand, the WFP has reported malnutrition and food shortages, but not famine.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk/overview |title=Korea, Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) | WFP | United Nations World Food Programme – Fighting Hunger Worldwide |publisher=WFP}}</ref> In 2016, [[UN Committee on the Rights of the Child]] reported a steady decline in the infant mortality rate since 2008.<ref>{{cite news|title=North Korea mortality rates are declining, UN group says|url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/06/01/North-Korea-mortality-rates-are-declining-UN-group-says/6591464832413/|first=Elizabeth|last=Shim|publisher=UPI|date=1 June 2016}}</ref> An academic analysis in 2016 found that the situation had greatly improved since the 1990s and that North Korea's levels of health and nutrition were on par with other developing countries.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Nutrition and Health in North Korea: What's New, What's Changed and Why It Matters|url=https://www.academia.edu/25554321|first=Hazel|last=Smith|journal=North Korean Review|date=Spring 2016|page=8}}</ref> In 2017, the analyst [[Andrei Lankov]] argued that previous predictions of a return to famine were unfounded, and that the days of starvation had long since passed.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-myth-starvation-2014319124439924471.html|title=N Korea and the myth of starvation|first=Andrei|last=Lankov|publisher=Aljazeera|date=27 March 2017}}</ref> |
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==See also== |
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*[[2006 North Korea flooding]] |
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*[[2007 North Korea flooding]] |
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*[[Kotjebi]] |
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*[[Potato production in North Korea]] |
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A survey in 2017 found that the famine had skewed North Korea's demography, impacting particularly male babies. Women aged 20–24 made up 4% of the population, while men in the same age group made up only 2.5%.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-unicef/tackling-north-koreas-chronically-poor-sewage-not-rocket-science-u-n-idUSKBN1JG2Q4|title=Tackling North Korea's chronically poor sewage 'not rocket science': U.N.|first=Tom|last=Miles|work=[[Reuters]]|date=21 June 2018}}</ref> Chronic or recurrent malnutrition dropped from 28 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2017.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/better-indicators-children-dpr-korea-challenges-persist-new-data-situation-children|title=Better indicators for children in DPR Korea but challenges persist, new data on the situation of children and women shows|website=www.unicef.org|access-date=25 June 2018}}</ref> |
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'''Analogous famines:''' |
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*[[Great Chinese Famine]] |
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*[[Holodomor]] |
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In June 2019, after a report made by the United Nations stated that North Korea had experienced the worst harvests in over a decade along with severe food shortages that affected 40% of North Korea's population, South Korea enacted a plan to provide US$8 million worth of food aid to North Korea. The South Korean government's aid to North Korea is widely viewed as having a political agenda of improving inter-Korean relations, despite the South's government's insistence on separating the aid from politics.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/06/09/730441007/why-aid-wont-fix-north-koreas-recurring-food-shortages|title=Why South Korea Is Sending $8 Million In Food Aid To North Korea|website=NPR.org|language=en|access-date=2019-09-25}}</ref> |
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'''General:''' |
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==See also== |
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{{Portal|North Korea|1990s}} |
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*[[Agriculture in North Korea]] |
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*[[Economy of North Korea]] |
*[[Economy of North Korea]] |
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*[[Foreign relations of North Korea]] |
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*[[History of North Korea]] |
*[[History of North Korea]] |
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*[[Human rights in North Korea]] |
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*[[Japan–North Korea relations]] |
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*[[Kotjebi]] |
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*[[North Korea–China relations]] |
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*[[North Korea–South Korea relations]] |
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*[[North Korea–Russia relations]] |
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*[[North Korea–United States relations]] |
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*[[Politics of North Korea]] |
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*[[Potato production in North Korea]] |
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*[[Special Period]] |
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*[[Sunshine Policy]] |
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*[[World Food Programme]] |
*[[World Food Programme]] |
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==References== |
==References== |
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{{ |
{{Reflist}} |
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==Further reading== |
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* Lankov, Andrei. "Trouble Brewing: The North Korean Famine of 1954–1955 and Soviet Attitudes toward North Korea". ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 22:2 (Spring 2020) pp:3–25. [https://hdiplo.org/to/AR1020 online] |
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* {{cite book|last=Natsios|first=Andrew S.|title=The Great North Korean Famine|year=2001|publisher=Institute of Peace Press|location=Washington|isbn=978-1-929223-34-3}} |
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* {{cite book|last=Vollertsen|first=Norbert|title=Inside North Korea: Diary of a Mad Place|year=2004|publisher=Encounter Books|location=San Francisco|isbn=978-1-893554-87-0}} |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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*[ |
*[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/7249849/North-Korea-secrets-and-lies.html Newspaper account] (''[[Daily Telegraph]]'') including famine deaths of [[kindergarten]] children. |
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* [http://www.forest.go.kr/newkfsweb/kfs/idx/Index.do?mn=KFS_01 Korea Forest Service] |
* [http://www.forest.go.kr/newkfsweb/kfs/idx/Index.do?mn=KFS_01 Korea Forest Service] |
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{{Korea topics|expanded=Economy}} |
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{{Kim Il Sung}} |
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{{Kim Jong Il}} |
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{{Asia in topic|Famine in |RU=Russian famine (disambiguation)}} |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:North Korean Famine}} |
{{DEFAULTSORT:North Korean Famine}} |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:1994 in North Korea]] |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:1995 in North Korea]] |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:1996 in North Korea]] |
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[[Category: |
[[Category:1997 in North Korea]] |
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[[Category:1998 in North Korea]] |
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[[Category:Agriculture in North Korea]] |
[[Category:Agriculture in North Korea]] |
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[[Category:Famines in Asia]] |
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[[Category:Kim Il Sung]] |
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[[Category:Kim Jong Il]] |
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[[Category:Disasters in North Korea]] |
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[[Category:20th-century famines]] |
Latest revision as of 03:59, 18 November 2024
Arduous March | |
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Country | North Korea |
Location | Nationwide |
Period | 1994–1998 |
Total deaths | 240,000 to 3.5 million |
Causes | Economic mismanagement,[1] natural disasters,[2] international sanctions,[3] collapse of the Soviet bloc |
Relief | Food and humanitarian aid (1994–2002)[4] |
Consequences | Militarization of economy, spread of limited market activity, food aid from various countries[5] |
Arduous March | |
Chosŏn'gŭl | 고난의 행군 |
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Hancha | 苦難의行軍 |
Revised Romanization | gonanui haenggun |
McCune–Reischauer | konanŭi haenggun |
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The North Korean famine (Korean: 조선기근), also known as the Arduous March (고난의 행군), was a period of mass starvation together with a general economic crisis from 1994 to 1998 in North Korea.[6][7] During this time there was an increase in defection from North Korea which peaked towards the end of the famine period.
The famine stemmed from a variety of factors. Economic mismanagement and the loss of Soviet support caused food production and imports to decline rapidly. A series of floods and droughts exacerbated the crisis. The North Korean government and its centrally planned system proved too inflexible to effectively curtail the disaster. North Korea attempted to obtain aid and commercial opportunities, but failed to receive initial attention.[8][6][9]
Estimates of the death toll vary widely. Out of a total population of approximately 22 million, somewhere between 240,000 and 3,500,000 North Koreans died from starvation or hunger-related illnesses, with the deaths peaking in 1997.[10][11] A 2011 U.S. Census Bureau report estimated the number of excess deaths from 1993 to 2000 to be between 500,000 and 600,000.[12]
Arduous March
[edit]The term "Arduous March" or "March of Suffering" became the official metaphor for the famine following a state propaganda campaign in 1993. The Rodong Sinmun urged the North Korean citizenry to invoke the memory of a propaganda fable from Kim Il Sung's time as a commander of a small group of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. The story, referred to as the Arduous March, is described as "fighting against thousands of enemies in 20 degrees below zero, braving a heavy snowfall and starvation, the red flag fluttering in front of the rank".[13]
As part of this state campaign, uses of words such as 'famine' and 'hunger' were banned because they implied government failure. Citizens who said deaths were due to the famine could be in serious trouble with the authorities.[14] A special group (the Simhwajo) was set up to purge the citizens responsible.[15]
Background
[edit]In North Korea, people are required to call the great famine the Arduous March (Korean: 고난의 행군, romanized: ko'nan-ŭi haenggun). It was one of the most important events in the history of North Korea, because it forced the regime and its people to change their lives in fundamental and unanticipated ways.[8]
Only about 20% of North Korea's mountainous terrain is arable land. Much of the land is only frost-free for six months, and only one crop can be grown on it per year. The country has never been self-sufficient in food production, and many experts considered it unrealistic for the country to try to be.[16] Due to North Korea's terrain, farming is mainly concentrated along the flatlands of the four western coastal provinces, where there is a longer growing season, level land, substantial rainfall, and well-irrigated soil conducive to the high cultivation of crops. Along with the western coastal provinces, fertile land also runs through the eastern seaboard provinces. However, interior provinces such as Chagang and Ryanggang are too mountainous, dry, and cold to support farming.
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union embarked on political and economic reform. It began to demand that North Korea repay the Soviet Union for all of the past and current aid which it sent to North Korea – amounts which North Korea could not repay. By 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, ending all aid and trade concessions, such as cheap oil.[10] Without Soviet aid, the flow of imports to the North Korean agricultural sector ended, and the government proved to be too inflexible to respond.[17] Energy imports fell by 75%.[18] The economy went into a downward spiral, with imports and exports falling in tandem. Flooded coal mines required electricity to operate pumps, and the shortage of coal worsened the shortage of electricity. Agriculture reliant on electrically powered irrigation systems, artificial fertilizers and pesticides was hit particularly hard by the economic collapse.[19][20]
Most North Koreans had experienced nutritional deprivation long before the mid-1990s. The country had reached the limits of its productive capacity, and could not respond effectively to exogenous shocks.[8]
North Korea's state trading companies emerged as an alternative means of conducting foreign economic relations. From the mid-1980s, these state trading companies became important conduits of funding for the regime, with a percentage of all revenues going "directly into Kim Jong Il's personal accounts... [which have been] used to secure and maintain the loyalty of the senior leadership".[21]
The country soon imposed austerity measures, dubbed the "eat two meals a day" campaign.[22] These measures proved inadequate in stemming the economic decline. According to Professor Hazel Smith of Cranfield University:
the methods of the past that had produced short-to medium-term gains might have continued producing further small economic benefits if the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had remained and continued to supply oil, technology, and expertise.[23]
Without help from these countries, North Korea was unable to respond adequately to the coming famine. For a time, China filled the gap left by the Soviet Union's collapse and propped up North Korea's food supply with significant aid.[24] By 1993, China was supplying North Korea with 77 percent of its fuel imports and 68 percent of its food imports. Thus, North Korea replaced its dependence on the Soviet Union with dependence on China. In 1993, China faced its own grain shortfalls and need for hard currency, and it sharply cut aid to North Korea.
In 1997, So Kwan-hui, the North Korean minister for agriculture, was accused of spying for the United States government and sabotaging North Korean agriculture on purpose, thus leading to the famine.[25] As a result, he was publicly executed by firing squad by the North Korean government.[26]
Causes
[edit]Floods and drought
[edit]The economic decline and failed policies provided the context for the famine, but the floods of the mid-1990s were the immediate cause. The floods in July and August 1995 were described as being "of biblical proportions" by independent observers.[27] They were estimated to affect as much as 30 percent of the country.[28]
As devastating floods ravaged the country in 1995, arable land, harvests, grain reserves, and social and economic infrastructure were destroyed. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that "between 30 July and 18 August 1995, torrential rains caused devastating floods in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In one area, in Pyongsan county in North Hwanghae province, 877 millimetres or 35 inches of rain were recorded to have fallen in just seven hours, an intensity of precipitation unheard of in this area... water flow in the engorged Amnok River, which runs along the Korea/China border, was estimated at 4.8 billion tons over a 72 hour period. Flooding of this magnitude had not been recorded in at least 70 years".[29]
The major issues created by the floods were not only the destruction of crop lands and harvests, but also the loss of emergency grain reserves, because many of them were stored underground. According to the United Nations, the floods of 1994 and 1995 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of grain reserves,[30] and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated that 1.2 million tons (or 12%) of grain production was lost in the 1995 flood.[31] There were further major floods in 1996 and a drought in 1997.[32]
North Korea lost an estimated 85% of its power generation capacity due to flood damage to infrastructure such as hydropower plants, coal mines, and supply and transport facilities.[33] UN officials reported that the power shortage from 1995 to 1997 was not due to a shortage of oil, because only two out of a total of two dozen power stations were dependent on heavy fuel oil for power generation, and these were supplied by KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). About 70% of power generated in the DPRK came from hydropower sources, and the serious winter-spring droughts of 1996 and 1997 (and a breakdown on one of the Yalu River's large hydro turbines) created major shortages throughout the country at that time, severely cutting back railway transportation (which was almost entirely dependent on electric power), which in turn resulted in coal supply shortages to the coal-fueled power stations which supplied the remaining 20% of power in the country.[34]
Failure of the public distribution system
[edit]North Korea's vulnerability to the floods and famine was exacerbated by the failure of the public distribution system.[8] The regime refused to pursue policies that would have allowed food imports and distribution without discrimination to all regions of the country.[8] During the famine, the urban working class of the cities and towns of the eastern provinces of the country was hit particularly hard.[35] The distribution of food reflected basic principles of stratification of the communist system.[36]
Food was distributed to people according to their political standing and their degree of loyalty to the state.[37]
The structure is as follows (the World Food Program considers 600 grams of cereal per day to be less than a "survival ration"):
Category | Amount allocated |
---|---|
Privileged industrial worker | 900 grams/day |
Ordinary worker | 700 grams/day |
Retired citizen | 300 grams/day |
2~4-year-old | 200 grams/day |
However, the extended period of food shortages put a strain on the system, and it spread the amount of available food allocations thinly across the groups, affecting 62% of the population who were entirely reliant on public distribution. The system was feeding only 6% of the population by 1997.
Year | Changes |
---|---|
1987 | Reduced 10% |
1992 | Reduced another 10% |
1994 | 470 grams/day down 420 grams/day |
1997 | 128 grams/day |
A 2008 study, however, found no variation in children's nutrition between counties that had experienced flooding and those that had not.[38]
Long-term causes
[edit]The famine was also a result of the culmination of a long series of government decisions that accrued slowly over decades.[8] The attempt to follow a closed-economic model caused the regime to abandon the possibility of engaging in international markets and importing food and instead restrict demand such as carrying out a "Let's eat two meals a day" campaign in 1991.[8] Attempts to increase exports and earn foreign exchange through the Rajin Sonbong free trade zone in 1991 were unsuccessful – it was located in the most isolated part of North Korea and lacked a clear legal foundation for international business.[8] The North Korean government also missed the opportunity for the short-term option to borrow from abroad to finance food imports after defaulting on foreign loans in the 1970s.[6]
Healthcare
[edit]Inadequate medical supplies, water and environmental contamination, frequent power failures, and outdated training led to a health care crisis that added to the overall devastation. According to a 1997 UNICEF delegation, hospitals were clean but wards were devoid of even the most rudimentary supplies and equipment; sphygmomanometers, thermometers, scales, kidney dishes, spatulas, IV giving sets, etc. The mission saw numerous patients being treated with homemade beer bottle IV sets, which were clearly not sterile. There was an absence of ORS (oral rehydration solution) and even the most basic drugs such as analgesics and antibiotics.[39]
Widespread malnutrition
[edit]With the widespread destruction of harvests and food reserves, the majority of the population became desperate for food, including areas well established in food production. In 1996, it was reported that people in "the so-called better-off parts of the country, were so hungry that they ate the maize cobs before the crop was fully developed".[40] This reduced expected production of an already ravaged harvest by 50%.[41]
People everywhere were affected by the crisis, regardless of gender, affiliation or social class. Child malnutrition, indicated as being severely underweight, was found at 3% in 1987, 14% in 1997 and 7% in 2002.[42]
Year | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rice milled (million tons) | 3.24 | 3.36 | 3.07 | 3.34 | 3.56 | 2.18 | 1.40 | 0.98 | 1.10 |
Corn harvested (million tons) | 4.34 | 3.90 | 4.20 | 3.72 | 3.94 | 3.55 | 1.37 | 0.83 | 1.01 |
Military
[edit]Songun is North Korea's "Military First" policy, which prioritizes the Korean People's Army in affairs of state and allocates national resources to the "army first". Even though the armed forces were given priority for the distribution of food, this did not mean that they all received generous rations.[45]
The army was supposed to find ways to grow food to feed itself and to develop industries that would permit it to purchase food and supplies from abroad. The rations received by military personnel were very basic, and "ordinary soldiers of the million-strong army often remained hungry, as did their families, who did not receive preferential treatment simply because a son or daughter was serving in the armed forces".[46]
Women
[edit]Women suffered significantly due to the gendered structure of North Korean society, which deemed women responsible for obtaining food, water and fuel for their families, which often included extended families.[47] Simultaneously, women had the highest participation rate in the workforce of any country in the world, calculated at 89%.[48] Therefore, women had to remain in the workforce and obtain supplies for their families.
Pregnant and nursing women faced severe difficulties in staying healthy; maternal mortality rates increased to approximately 41 per 1000, while simple complications such as anemia, hemorrhage and premature birth became common due to vitamin deficiency.[49][50] It was estimated that the number of births declined by about 0.3 children per woman during that period.[11][51]
Children
[edit]Children, especially those under two years old, were most affected by both the famine and the poverty of the period. The World Health Organization reported death rates for children at 93 out of every 1000, while those of infants were cited at 23 out of every 1000.[52] Undernourished mothers found it difficult to breast-feed. No suitable alternative to the practice was available. Infant formula was not produced locally, and only a small amount of it was imported.[40]
The famine resulted in a population of homeless, migrant children known as Kotjebi.[53]
Estimated number of deaths
[edit]The exact number of deaths during the acute phase of the crisis, from 1994 to 1998, is uncertain. According to the researcher Andrei Lankov, both the extreme high and low ends of the estimates are considered inaccurate.[54] In 2001 and 2007, independent groups of researchers have estimated that between 600,000 and 1 million people, or 3 to 5 percent of the pre-crisis population, died due to starvation and hunger-related illness.[55][56] In 1998, US Congressional staffers who visited the country reported that: "Therefore, we gave a range of estimates, from 300,000 to 800,000 dying per year, peaking in 1997. That would put the total number of deaths from the North Korean food shortage at between 900,000 and 2.4 million between 1995 and 1998".[57] W. Courtland Robinson's team found 245,000 "excess" deaths (an elevated mortality rate as a result of premature death), 12 percent of the population in one affected region. Taking those results as the upper limit and extrapolating across the entire North Korean population across the country's provinces produces an upper limit of 2,000,000 famine-related deaths.[58] Andrew Natsios and others estimated 2–3 million deaths.[59][10]
According to research by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2011, the likely range of excess deaths between 1993 and 2000 was between 500,000 and 600,000, and a total of 600,000 to 1,000,000 excess deaths from the year 1993 to the year 2008.[11][page needed][12]
Black markets
[edit]At the same time, the years of famine were also marked by a dramatic revival of illegal, private market activities. Smuggling across the border boomed, and up to 250,000 North Koreans moved to China.[60] Amartya Sen had mentioned bad governance as one of the structural and economic problems which contributed to the famine, but it seems that the famine also led to widespread government corruption, which nearly resulted in the collapse of old government controls and regulations.[61]
When fuel became scarce while demand for logistics rose, so-called servi-cha (Korean: 써비차; MR: ssŏbich'a, "service cars") operations formed, wherein an entrepreneur provides transportation to businesses, institutions and individuals without access to other means of transportation, while the car is formally owned by a legitimate enterprise or unit that also provides transportation permits.[62]
With the desperation derived from famine and informal trade and commercialization, North Koreans developed their black market, and moreover, they were surviving by adapting.[63] Andrei Lankov has described the process as the "natural death of North Korean Stalinism".[64]
The average official salary in 2011 was equivalent to US$2 per month. However, the actual monthly income could be estimated to be around US$15 as most North Koreans were earning money from illegal small businesses; trade, subsistence farming, and handicrafts. The illegal economy is largely dominated by women. This is because men are expected to attend their places of official work despite most of the factories being non-functional.[65]
International response
[edit]Initial assistance to North Korea started as early as 1990, with small-scale support from religious groups in South Korea and assistance from UNICEF.[4] In August 1995, North Korea made an official request for humanitarian aid and the international community responded accordingly:[5]
Donor | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
S. Korea | 150 | 3 | 60 | 48 | 12 | 352 | 198 | 458 | 542 | 407 | 493 | 80 | 431 | 59 | 23 | 3,314 | ||
China | 100 | 150 | 151 | 201 | 280 | 420 | 330 | 212 | 132 | 451 | 207 | 264 | 116 | 3,015 | ||||
U.S.A. | 22 | 193 | 231 | 589 | 351 | 319 | 222 | 47 | 105 | 28 | 171 | 121 | 1 | 2,400 | ||||
Others | 394 | 380 | 501 | 361 | 198 | 248 | 571 | 168 | 143 | 201 | 125 | 20 | 26 | 145 | 61 | 71 | 47 | 3,661 |
Total | 544 | 505 | 904 | 791 | 1,000 | 1,231 | 1,508 | 1,178 | 944 | 845 | 1,097 | 307 | 721 | 375 | 298 | 95 | 47 | 12,390 |
Beginning in 1996, the U.S. also started shipping food aid to North Korea through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) to combat the famine. Shipments peaked in 1999 at nearly 600,000 tons making the U.S. the largest foreign aid donor to the country at the time. Under the Bush administration, aid was drastically reduced year after year from 320,000 tons in 2001 to 28,000 tons in 2005.[66] The Bush administration was criticized for "using food as a weapon" during talks over the North's nuclear weapons program, but insisted the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) criteria were the same for all countries and the situation in North Korea had "improved significantly since its collapse in the mid-1990s".
South Korea (before the Lee Myung-bak government) and China remained the largest donors of food aid to North Korea. The U.S. objects to this manner of donating food due to the North Korean state's refusal to allow donor representatives to supervise the distribution of their aid inside North Korea.[67] Such supervision would ensure that aid does not get seized and sold by well-connected elites or diverted to feed North Korea's large military. In 2005, South Korea and China together provided almost 1 million tons of food aid, each contributing half.[68]
Humanitarian aid from North Korea's neighbors has been cut off at times in order to provoke North Korea into resuming boycotted talks. For example, South Korea decided to "postpone consideration" of 500,000 tons of rice for the North in 2006, but the idea of providing food as a clear incentive (as opposed to resuming "general humanitarian aid") has been avoided.[69] There have also been aid disruptions due to widespread theft of railway cars used by mainland China to deliver food relief.[70]
Post-famine developments
[edit]North Korea has not yet resumed reliable self-sufficiency in food production and as a result, it periodically relies on external food aid from South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, the European Union and other countries.[71] In 2002, North Korea requested that food supplies no longer be delivered.[72]
In 2005, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that famine conditions were in imminent danger of returning to North Korea, and the government was reported to have mobilized millions of city-dwellers in order to help rice farmers.[73][74] In 2012, the WFP reported that food would be sent to North Korea as soon as possible. The food would first be processed by a local processor and it would then be delivered directly to North Korean citizens.
Agricultural production increased from about 2.7 million metric tons in 1997 to 4.2 million metric tons in 2004.[67] In 2008, food shortages continued to be a problem in North Korea, although less so than in the mid to late 1990s. Flooding in 2007 and reductions in food aid exacerbated the problem.[75]
In 2011, during a visit to North Korea, former US President Jimmy Carter reported that one third of children in North Korea were malnourished and stunted in their growth because of a lack of food. He also said that the North Korean government had reduced daily food intake from 5,900 to 2,900 kJ (1,400 to 700 kcal) in 2011.[76] Some scholars believed that North Korea was purposefully exaggerating the food shortage, aiming to receive additional food supplies for its planned mass-celebrations of Kim Il Sung's 100th birthday in 2012 by means of foreign aid.[77]
Escaped North Koreans reported in September 2010 that starvation had returned to the nation.[78] North Korean pre-school children are reported to be an average of three to four centimetres (1+1⁄4–1+1⁄2 in) shorter than South Koreans, which some researchers believe can only be explained by conditions of famine and malnutrition.[79] Most people only eat meat on public holidays, namely Kim Jong Il's birthday, the Day of the Shining Star on February 16 and Kim Il Sung's birthday, the Day of the Sun on April 15.[80]
One report by the Tokyo Shimbun in April 2012 claimed that since the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, around 20,000 people had starved to death in South Hwanghae Province.[81] Another report by the Japanese Asia Press agency in January 2013 claimed that in North and South Hwanghae provinces more than 10,000 people had died of famine. Other international news agencies have begun circulating stories of cannibalism.[82]
On the other hand, the WFP has reported malnutrition and food shortages, but not famine.[83] In 2016, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reported a steady decline in the infant mortality rate since 2008.[84] An academic analysis in 2016 found that the situation had greatly improved since the 1990s and that North Korea's levels of health and nutrition were on par with other developing countries.[85] In 2017, the analyst Andrei Lankov argued that previous predictions of a return to famine were unfounded, and that the days of starvation had long since passed.[86]
A survey in 2017 found that the famine had skewed North Korea's demography, impacting particularly male babies. Women aged 20–24 made up 4% of the population, while men in the same age group made up only 2.5%.[87] Chronic or recurrent malnutrition dropped from 28 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2017.[88]
In June 2019, after a report made by the United Nations stated that North Korea had experienced the worst harvests in over a decade along with severe food shortages that affected 40% of North Korea's population, South Korea enacted a plan to provide US$8 million worth of food aid to North Korea. The South Korean government's aid to North Korea is widely viewed as having a political agenda of improving inter-Korean relations, despite the South's government's insistence on separating the aid from politics.[89]
See also
[edit]- Agriculture in North Korea
- Economy of North Korea
- Foreign relations of North Korea
- History of North Korea
- Human rights in North Korea
- Japan–North Korea relations
- Kotjebi
- North Korea–China relations
- North Korea–South Korea relations
- North Korea–Russia relations
- North Korea–United States relations
- Politics of North Korea
- Potato production in North Korea
- Special Period
- Sunshine Policy
- World Food Programme
References
[edit]- ^ Noland, Marcus (2004). "Famine and Reform in North Korea". Asian Economic Papers. 3 (2): 1–40. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.6.8390. doi:10.1162/1535351044193411. S2CID 57565869.
- ^ "North Korea: A terrible truth". The Economist. 17 April 1997. Retrieved 24 September 2011.
- ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2007). Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. Columbia University Press. p. 38. ISBN 978-0-231-51152-0.
The failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency, South Korea, and the United States to resolve the crisis in a timely manner and the tightening of sanctions against the country constituted an important background condition for the famine.
- ^ a b "Humanitarian Aid Toward North Korea: A Global Peace-Building Process", East Asian Review, Winter 2001.
- ^ a b Staff (January 2013) Quantity Reporting – Food Aid to North Korea Archived 2014-12-24 at the Wayback Machine World Food Program, Retrieved 2 February 2013.
- ^ a b c Stephan., Haggard (2007). Famine in North Korea: markets, aid, and reform. Noland, Marcus, 1959–. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-14000-3. OCLC 166342476.
- ^ Hancocks, Paula (2023-03-03). "North Korea's food shortage is about to take a deadly turn for the worse, experts say". CNN. Retrieved 2024-01-27.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Kang, David C. (2012-01-01). "They Think They're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea—A Review Essay". International Security. 36 (3): 142–171. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00068. ISSN 1531-4804. S2CID 57564589 – via Project MUSE.
- ^ Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2007). Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. Columbia University Press. pp. 38–39. ISBN 978-0-231-51152-0.
Most important for our purposes, however, are signs of more aggressive commercial diplomacy and "aid seeking" beginning in 1994. These proposals were initially either rebuffed or their significance ignored.
- ^ a b c Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson and Tao Wang, Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures Archived 2011-07-06 at the Wayback Machine, Institute for International Economics.
- ^ a b c Spoorenberg, Thomas; Schwekendiek, Daniel (2012). "Demographic Changes in North Korea: 1993–2008". Population and Development Review. 38 (1): 133–158. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00475.x. hdl:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00475.x.
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- ^ Stephan., Haggard (2005). Hunger and human rights: the politics of famine in North Korea. Noland, Marcus, 1959–, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. (1st ed.). Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. ISBN 978-0-9771111-0-7. OCLC 64390356.
- ^ Oberdorfer, Don; Carlin, Robert (2014). The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Basic Books. p. 181. ISBN 978-0-465-03123-8.
- ^ Demick, Barbara (2010). Nothing to Envy: Love, Life and Death in North Korea. Sydney: Fourth Estate. p. 67. ISBN 978-0-7322-8661-3.
- ^ Oberdorfer, Don; Carlin, Robert (2014). The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Basic Books. p. 308. ISBN 978-0-465-03123-8.
- ^ Frank, Ruediger (2005-01-01). "Economic Reforms in North Korea (1998–2004): Systemic Restrictions, Quantitative Analysis, Ideological Background". Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy. 10 (3): 278–311. doi:10.1080/13547860500163613. ISSN 1354-7860. S2CID 154438679.
- ^ Oberdorfer, Don (1999). The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Warner. ISBN 978-0-7515-2668-4.
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- ^ Haggard & Noland, Hunger and Human Rights, supra note 70, at 14.
- ^ Floru, J.P. (2017). The Sun Tyrant: A Nightmare Called North Korea. London, U.K.: Biteback Publishing. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-78590-221-5. OCLC 984074543.
When the size of the catastrophe he had caused became apparent, Kim Jong-il had his agricultural minister Seo Gwan Hee executed by firing squad. Seo was accused of being a spy for 'the American imperialists and their South Korean lackeys' and of having sabotaged North Korea's self-reliance in agriculture.
- ^ Sang-Hun, Choe (March 18, 2010). "N. Korea Is Said to Execute Finance Chief". The New York Times. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
North Korea publicly executed Seo Gwan-hee, a party secretary in charge of agriculture, on spying charges in 1997 when a famine decimated the population, according to defectors.
- ^ Oberdorfer, Don; Carlin, Robert (2014). The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Basic Books. p. 290. ISBN 978-0-465-03123-8.
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- ^ Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.51
- ^ Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.53
- ^ Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.54
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- ^ Unicef, "DPRK Mission Report", 1997.
- ^ a b "Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea", Hazel Smith, p. 66, United States Institute of Peace, 2005.
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Further reading
[edit]- Lankov, Andrei. "Trouble Brewing: The North Korean Famine of 1954–1955 and Soviet Attitudes toward North Korea". Journal of Cold War Studies 22:2 (Spring 2020) pp:3–25. online
- Natsios, Andrew S. (2001). The Great North Korean Famine. Washington: Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 978-1-929223-34-3.
- Vollertsen, Norbert (2004). Inside North Korea: Diary of a Mad Place. San Francisco: Encounter Books. ISBN 978-1-893554-87-0.
External links
[edit]- Newspaper account (Daily Telegraph) including famine deaths of kindergarten children.
- Korea Forest Service