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Argument from free will

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+#REDIRECT [[Argument from free will]]
-'''Theological fatalism''' is an attempt to demonstrate a logical contradiction between an [[omniscience|omniscient]] God and [[free will]] , where free-will is simply defined as the ability to choose between alternatives.  In this it is similar in purpose to the conundrum, "Can an omnipotent God make a rock so heavy that even he is not able to lift it?"
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-It's premises are stated as follows:
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-# God is omniscient.
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-# Since God is omniscient, God has infallible foreknowledge. [1]
-# If God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X, then you must invariably engage in event X.
-# You must invariably engage in event X. [[modus ponens]] [3] [2]
-Therefore, free-will is not possible since you have no alternative except to engage in event X. In the event that you do not fulfil event X, then God is not omniscient. Alternatively, if you engage in event X, then you don't have free-will on account of the inability to choose another alternative.
-An opposing argument can state:
-# God is omniscient
-# Since God is omniscient, he is also infallible.
-# If God has infallible foreknowledge that tomorrow you will engage in event X, then you will freely choose this based on your free will, not obligation or lack of choice in event X.
-# You still have free will to engage in event X; God merely knows your choice before you make it. You are not obliged to make choice 'X' anymore than choice 'A'. If you were going to change your mind, God would have seen that also, so you still have full free will in all matters. Also, you will still make the same choices [with free will] even if God chose to not see the future. Seeing the future or not does not alter your free will.
-* With passive foreknowledge, if it were kept hidden, it would not invalidate free will in any logical or rational way. The individual choosing event X, would be making the exact same choices regardless of whether God knew the choices beforehand or not. God Knowing or not knowing the future [passively] would not alter the free will of individuals at all. The demise of free will would only logically come if God made His knowledge public in regard to the free will choice of individuals; this would therefore alter future free will, and make it an obligation. One simple illustration could be a psychic person foreseeing someone the other side of the world tripping and breaking their leg when they run to catch a bus. The psychic would not be altering reality be foreseeing this event, as this event would still happen regardless of whether someone has seen it or not, the same application can be applied to God's omniscience, as long as it is passive, and non-interfering with reality or other's knowledge of it, then it is not contravening the free will of humans.
-However, if it is to be understood that God created all that is created, this poses a problem for any passive knowledge on God's part.  An understanding of omniscience must be joined with an understanding of God's omnipresence in time.  If God knows all events past, future, and present then he would know all events and decisions an individual would make though from the individuals perspective those events and decisions have not yet occurred.  This can be viewed, at least implicitly, as a nullification of any concept of free will for any individual though no mechanism for God's apparent foreknowledge restraining the freedom to act of the individual is posited by the principle of theological fatalism.  Since, according the Christian theology, God is atemporal (existing outside of time) God knows from creation the entire course of one's life, all the actions in which he will partake, and even whether or not that individual will accept his divine authority.  With these preconditions, only a starkly fatalist theological position seems imaginable to some.
-==See also==
-* [[Newcomb's paradox]]
-* [[Compatibilism]]
-[[Category:Theology]]