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== Translations == |
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=== Greek === |
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* eternalism: (ο) αιωνισμός [masculine noun] |
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Although I wrote a philosophical proof of a creator based upon eternalism as implied by STR, I am not completely convinced of the theory. The reason is that I cannot comprehend how even an illusion of motion can be generated by a static material realty. My proof and Western scientific eternalism assumes a material paradigm. Therefore, I was wondering if the Eastern metaphysical view that matter is an epiphenomenon of consciousness (“Brahman”) rather than visa versa as in the Western scientific and religious view might be compatible with what we deduce as eternalism from the apparent validity of STR. Could such a paradigm account for an illusion of material eternalism? |
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* block universe: Σύμπαν στατικού τετραδιάστατου χωροχρόνου |
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My favorite Zen anecdote is: “Two Zen students were arguing about a flag blowing in the wind. One argued the flag was moving while the other the wind. The master happened along and settled the matter with: ‘Mind Moves’” [Mind = Brahman (consciousness) in Zen terms.] |
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By way of analogy, consider consciousness (in this view) to be as a Rubik’s cube constantly moving and changing its faces and resulting patterns (yet retaining its structural integrity as one.) From the vantage point of humans who only (except perhaps through mysticism) perceive the illusion of material realty would this seem to us to be compatible with material eternalism? Does anyone know of any works regarding this consideration?[[User:HistoryBuff14|HistoryBuff14]] ([[User talk:HistoryBuff14|talk]]) 19:31, 26 July 2012 (UTC) |
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:There may well be philosophers who argue this way, though I don't know much about the subject (the book [http://www.amazon.com/Time-Mind-History-Philosophical-Intellectual/dp/9004141529/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1343402400&sr=8-1&keywords=mooij+time+and+mind Time and Mind] might have relevant information, though it's an expensive academic book so you'd probably have to order it through an interlibrary loan). I know there are also some idealist philosophers who accept eternalism though, see [http://www.the-philosopher.co.uk/mchenry.htm this article on Timothy Sprigge], particular the section towards the end with a paragraph that starts "For Sprigge, time is unreal." And the eternalism article also has a brief section on ideas in Buddhism that seem to suggest eternalism, see [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)#Relation to Eastern body of thought]]. Also see [http://books.google.com/books?id=y8jLZ2nPgkYC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA68#v=onepage&q&f=false p. 68] of "What is Zen" by Alan Watts, about Dogen and Kumarajiva and the idea that "contrary to appearance, events in time are eternal, and that each event 'stays' in its own place.' [[User:Hypnosifl|Hypnosifl]] ([[User talk:Hypnosifl|talk]]) 15:28, 27 July 2012 (UTC) |
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::Hypno, thanks much for your response. It’s most appreciated. I shall investigate your suggestions presently. I answered your last message on the conflict board, though perhaps not in an entirely satisfactory manner for you. I put it just after your last posting. Thanks again![[User:HistoryBuff14|HistoryBuff14]] ([[User talk:HistoryBuff14|talk]]) 23:24, 27 July 2012 (UTC) |
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:::Also perhaps worth looking into on how Buddhism can contain at least some aspects of the B-theory is [http://web.archive.org/web/20101206055549/http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/dirck.htm this essay] about Dogen's philosophy of time, [http://books.google.com/books?id=83gsjo3WvaIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PT56#v=onepage&q&f=false this page] of the book "Nonduality" by David Lowe which also discusses Dogen (and says his view is not the same as the totally static "block universe", though Lowe's explanation of an eternal present which is in continual flux seems more mystically paradoxical than rationally comprehensible), and [http://books.google.com/books?id=al_Wlh2mwWIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PT125#v=onepage&q&f=false this page] of the book "Foundations of Buddhism" which says "One of the most intellectually creative explanations of these related sets of questions is expounded by the Sarvastivadins. Their theories are in the first place based on a radical understanding of the nature of time, the view that all three times—present, past, and future—exist (sarvasti-vada). According to this view, to say of dharmas that they are future or past is not to say that they do not exist; they exist, but they happen to exist in the past or the future, just as other dharmas happen, for a moment, to exist in the present. Time is thus conceived as a kind of dimension through which dharmas travel. Four different ways of understanding this are associated with the names of four Sarvastivadin theorists of the early centuries CE. From the perspective of modern philosophy Buddhadeva's suggestion that a dharma can be said to be 'present', relative to simultaneous dharmas, 'past' relative to dharmas that come after and 'future' relative to dharmas that come before—like a woman who is daughter and mother—is perhaps the most philosophically subtle." The reference after that comment about Buddhadeva is to the paper "Buddhadeva and Temporality" by Paul Williams which appears in the volume reviewed [http://www.exoticindiaart.com/book/details/essays-on-time-in-buddhism-IHL432/ here]. [[User:Hypnosifl|Hypnosifl]] ([[User talk:Hypnosifl|talk]]) 07:03, 31 July 2012 (UTC) |
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::::Found two more sources relating to your question about consciousness and time. The first is "Time and Reality of Phenomenal Becoming" by Sergio Galvan which argues that our experience should lead us to favor the A-theory, you can read it on google books [http://books.google.com/books?id=fBdNzAtwsBMC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false here] (it's fairly technical, involving a lot of logical notation). The second is "The Phenomenology of B-Time" by Clifford Williams which argues that are experience is consistent with the B theory, you can read the first two pages [http://books.google.com/books?id=-Wv59xyNDjsC&lpg=PA361&dq=%22b%20theory%22%20consciousness&pg=PA361#v=onepage&q=%22b%20theory%22%20consciousness&f=false here]. Also might be worth looking at the "metaphysics" section of [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time-experience/#7 The Experience and Perception of Time] at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy website. [[User:Hypnosifl|Hypnosifl]] ([[User talk:Hypnosifl|talk]]) 22:44, 31 July 2012 (UTC) |
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:"[...] I cannot comprehend how even an illusion of motion can be generated by a static material realty." |
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:Is movement necessary for the illusion of movement though? I think that is the question everyone misses. |
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:For example does a person feel like there's movement during an instant of time? Or do they require a period of time. If you say they need a period of time then you are saying they feel nothing during each instant yet when all those instants are put together they do feel movement. |
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:Eternalism says the 'illusion' is there for an instant or a series of instants, it doesn't matter. The illusion is created purely by the person's memory at an instant. i.e. the person's memory contains a collection of images from the previous timeslices. So at any given time their brainstate is set up with the illusion fully in progress. [[User:LegendLength|LegendLength]] ([[User talk:LegendLength|talk]]) 04:38, 15 September 2012 (UTC) |
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== Changes == |
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Could do with some discussion of [[Julian Barbour]]s theories, and relation to multiverses. |
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Note that there is a logical independence between the claims: |
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# All moments of time exist on the same footing |
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# Time is a space-like dimension, and there is a single unambiguous past and present for each moment |
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within it. |
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Barbour accepts the first but not the second. This in turn illustrates a shade of difference between |
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older (eg paremidean) philosophical eternalism (1) and block theory (1 & 2). |
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18:07, 4 August 2012 (UTC) |
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:Could you expand on what you mean by the 'same footing'? I had a glance at Barbour's wiki page but it didn't seem to describe any coherent mechanism for time. He seems to deny change exists yet he claims there are different 'nows' that we experience. How could that possible be? [[User:LegendLength|LegendLength]] ([[User talk:LegendLength|talk]]) 04:46, 15 September 2012 (UTC) |
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== Inconsistency in: Apparent differences between past, present and future == |
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There exists inconsistency in the following sections under the heading: |
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Apparent differences between past, present and future |
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== Wikipedia has a mistake (in physics the difference is of core importance) == |
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* We apparently fear death because we believe that we will no longer exist after we die. But if Eternalism is correct, death is just one of our temporal borders, and should be no more worrisome than birth. |
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* Universe: the name of our own universe |
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* universe: any spatiotemporal-like connectome of mathematically procedural (mechanistic) interactions |
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Physics doesn't have the same criteria with literature. Some Wikipedia users don't know it. Modern science accepts '''both''' rigorous observational empiricism '''and''' mathematical foundational descriptions. Hard or strong empiricists deviate from mainstream science and claim that mere rigorous empiricism is enough to mathematically describe the ontological mechanisms of substantiality, thus the universe for them is identical/tautological to the Universe and vice versa. They don’t care about the field of study: "foundations of substantiality" like David Deutsch’s constructor theory and Max Tegmark’s struogony (the term mathematical universe hypothesis is very general; [[mathematical structure]]s are more specific). |
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* You are about to go to the dentist, or you have already been. Commonsense says you should prefer to have been. But if Eternalism is correct, it shouldn't matter which situation you're in. |
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== Origin of theory == |
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* When some unpleasant experience is behind us, we feel glad that it is over. But if the Eternalism is correct, there is no such property as being over or no longer happening now—it continues to exist timelessly. |
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Who first postulated this theory this theory? [[User:Cleverfellow|Cleverfellow]] ([[User talk:Cleverfellow|talk]]) 02:55, 17 December 2022 (UTC) |
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... |
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== “In Fiction” == |
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These preceding sections make statements which are in obvious conflict. |
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People generally fear death (for themselves of a loved one). Most people probably consider the death of a loved one (and perhaps also the prospect of their own death) to be an unpleasant experience. I doubt however that most people would rather their close relatives go ahead and die, so they can be glad that it is over. Equally dubious is the idea that when someone loses loved ones, they are happy they have died so they don't have to experience them dying in the future. |
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. |
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Perhaps someone will address this conflict? |
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| ⚫ | |||
BGriffin |
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The “In Fiction” section refers to “a clause of eternalism” and “the rules of eternalism” when referring to things that, as far as I can see, do not form a necessary part of eternalism, and are referenced as if there were some “eternalism” text that lays them out. |
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:I think all 3 should be removed because they ignore the fact that humans still have systems of consciousness in a block universe. They are not simply robots they have all of the normal emotions, fears etc. as a normal universe. [[User:LegendLength|LegendLength]] ([[User talk:LegendLength|talk]]) 08:22, 26 March 2013 (UTC) |
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Is it that these fictional works have their own things that they call “eternalism”, of which they say these are clauses or rules? Or are Wikipedians just getting over-excited talking about things they like? |
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::Regardless of any other issues, these examples do not hold for all humans (especially the first one regarding death); therefore, they are not factual. Also, they are not written in the preferred Wikipedia style (e.g. they contain weasel words). While these may not need to be removed, they should certainly be improved.[[User:Mousenight|Mousenight]] ([[User talk:Mousenight|talk]]) 22:30, 15 October 2015 (UTC) |
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Either way, we possibly do not need what looks suspiciously like the old “in popular culture” section. |
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== McTaggart's argument == |
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Since this sub-section covers the origin of the A- and B-Theories associated with this subject, perhaps it should be mentioned sooner in the article so that readers get accustomed with the idea of the different theories before they read about the arguments for and against that are currently found in previous sub-sections (i.e. Simultaneity, Time as object or environment). [[User:Mousenight|Mousenight]] ([[User talk:Mousenight|talk]]) 22:12, 15 October 2015 (UTC) |
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== Add mention of Arrival (2016)? == |
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== 1908, or 1895 (or earlier)? -- a simple question == |
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I'm thinking that the movie Arrival might belong in the section on popular culture, as the movie is well known for featuring extraterrestrial beings that "remember" the future and enable the protagonist to do the same. They omit chronology in their linguistic rules and conceptualize time in an arguably eternalist perspective. Further, the structure of the film signals that the past and future are on equal grounds, given the non-chronological interpolation of scenes and ambiguity about the order of events. [[User:Quesoteric|Quesoteric]] ([[User talk:Quesoteric|talk]]) 09:30, 14 February 2024 (UTC) |
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I vividly recall sitting on the stoop of a little-used external door of my junior-high during the lunch break, reading early pages of "[[The Time Machine]]" from a thick volume of [[H. G. Wells]]'s long short stories. The 1st-person character makes the argument that time is just another dimension (except that in some bizarre sense there's no means of controlling our motion -- whatever that means -- in that 4th dimension). The story was published in 1895, so i'd like for us to be more explicit about what (besides "seriousness") lacked in Wells's argument -- BTW more than likely not simply his own concoction -- (and for that matter in AE's 1905 relativity paper) that was present in the 1908 [[also-ran]]'s paper).<br>--[[User:Jerzy|Jerzy]]•[[User talk:Jerzy|t]] 14:57, 21 July 2016 (UTC)<br> |
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Latest revision as of 12:26, 14 February 2024
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Translations
[edit]Greek
[edit]- eternalism: (ο) αιωνισμός [masculine noun]
- block universe: Σύμπαν στατικού τετραδιάστατου χωροχρόνου
Wikipedia has a mistake (in physics the difference is of core importance)
[edit]- Universe: the name of our own universe
- universe: any spatiotemporal-like connectome of mathematically procedural (mechanistic) interactions
Physics doesn't have the same criteria with literature. Some Wikipedia users don't know it. Modern science accepts both rigorous observational empiricism and mathematical foundational descriptions. Hard or strong empiricists deviate from mainstream science and claim that mere rigorous empiricism is enough to mathematically describe the ontological mechanisms of substantiality, thus the universe for them is identical/tautological to the Universe and vice versa. They don’t care about the field of study: "foundations of substantiality" like David Deutsch’s constructor theory and Max Tegmark’s struogony (the term mathematical universe hypothesis is very general; mathematical structures are more specific).
Origin of theory
[edit]Who first postulated this theory this theory? Cleverfellow (talk) 02:55, 17 December 2022 (UTC)
“In Fiction”
[edit]The “In Fiction” section refers to “a clause of eternalism” and “the rules of eternalism” when referring to things that, as far as I can see, do not form a necessary part of eternalism, and are referenced as if there were some “eternalism” text that lays them out.
Is it that these fictional works have their own things that they call “eternalism”, of which they say these are clauses or rules? Or are Wikipedians just getting over-excited talking about things they like?
Either way, we possibly do not need what looks suspiciously like the old “in popular culture” section.
90.242.137.43 (talk) 16:35, 4 June 2023 (UTC)
Add mention of Arrival (2016)?
[edit]I'm thinking that the movie Arrival might belong in the section on popular culture, as the movie is well known for featuring extraterrestrial beings that "remember" the future and enable the protagonist to do the same. They omit chronology in their linguistic rules and conceptualize time in an arguably eternalist perspective. Further, the structure of the film signals that the past and future are on equal grounds, given the non-chronological interpolation of scenes and ambiguity about the order of events. Quesoteric (talk) 09:30, 14 February 2024 (UTC)