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{{Short description|1987 attempt to resolve the Sri Lankan Civil War}}
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{{Infobox treaty
{{Infobox treaty
| name = Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
| name = Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
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| mediators =
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| signatories =[[Rajiv Gandhi]]<br /><sub>([[Prime Minister of India ]])</sub><br/>[[Junius Richard Jayewardene]]<br/><sub>([[President of Sri Lanka]])</sub>
| signatories = *{{flagdeco|IND}} [[Rajiv Gandhi]]<br />([[Prime Minister of India ]])
*{{flagdeco|SRI}} [[Junius Richard Jayewardene]]<br/>([[President of Sri Lanka]])
| parties ={{flag|India}}<br/>{{flag|Sri Lanka}}
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* [[English language|English ]]
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The '''Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord''' was an accord signed in [[Colombo]] on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister [[Rajiv Gandhi]] and Sri Lankan President [[J. R. Jayewardene]]. The accord was expected to resolve the [[Sri Lankan Civil War]] by enabling the [[thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka]] and the Provincial Councils Act of 1987. Under the terms of the agreement,<ref name=iclq>[http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020589300047734 M. L. Marasinghe (1988). Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 37, pp 551–587 ] {{doi|10.1093/iclqaj/37.3.551}}</ref><ref name=atimes>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html|title=Asia Times: SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord|website=www.atimes.com}}</ref> [[Colombo]] agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms.<ref name=TamilNation>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=July 2016 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref name=TN>Text of the Peace accord.[http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/tamileelam/87peaceaccord.htm#a1 Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=April 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
The '''Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord''' was an accord signed in [[Colombo]] on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister [[Rajiv Gandhi]] and Sri Lankan President [[J. R. Jayewardene]]. The accord was expected to resolve the [[Sri Lankan civil war|Sri Lankan Civil War]] by enabling the [[thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka]] and the Provincial Councils Act of 1987. Under the terms of the agreement,<ref name=iclq>[http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020589300047734 M. L. Marasinghe (1988). Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 37, pp 551–587 ] {{doi|10.1093/iclqaj/37.3.551}}</ref><ref name=atimes>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html|archive-url=https://archive.today/20021001211331/http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html|url-status=unfit|archive-date=2002-10-01|title=Asia Times: SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord|website=www.atimes.com}}</ref> [[Colombo]] agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms.<ref name=TamilNation>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=July 2016 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref name=TN>Text of the Peace accord.[http://www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/tamileelam/87peaceaccord.htm#a1 Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=April 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>


Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]] (LTTE) (which at the time was one of the strongest Tamil forces), had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] (IPKF) only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent [[Tamil Eelam]] and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning [[Sinhalese people|Sinhalese]] insurgency in the south.
Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]] (LTTE) (which at the time was one of the strongest Tamil forces), had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] (IPKF) only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent [[Tamil Eelam]] and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further complicating the return to peace, a Marxist [[1987-1989 JVP insurrection|insurgency]] began in the south of the island.


==Background==
==Background==
[[Image:LocationSriLanka.png|right|thumb|Location of [[Sri Lanka]]]]
[[File:LocationSriLanka.png|right|thumb|Location of [[Sri Lanka]]]]
{{Main|Sri Lankan Civil War}}
{{Main|Sri Lankan Civil War}}
Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly violent [[Sri Lankan Civil War|ethnic strife]]. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the independence of the island from [[British Ceylon|Britain]] in 1948. At the time, a [[Sinhalese people|Sinhala]] majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were deemed discriminatory against the substantial [[Tamil people|Tamil]] minority population. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the [[Tamil United Liberation Front]] (TULF) that started agitation for a separate state of [[Tamil Eelam]] within the system in a federal structure in the north and eastern Sri Lanka<ref name= GlobSec>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm|title=Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) / World Tamil Association (WTA)|first=John|last=Pike|website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref> that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the sixth amendment of the [[Constitution of Sri Lanka|Sri Lankan Constitution]] in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,<ref name=Hennayake>The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1989), pp. 401–415.</ref> effectively rendering the TULF ineffective.<ref name=Hennayake/> Outside the TULF, however, factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.<ref name= GlobSec/>
Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly violent [[Sri Lankan civil war|ethnic strife]]. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the independence of the island from [[British Ceylon|Britain]] in 1948. At the time, a [[Sinhalese people|Sinhala]] majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were deemed discriminatory against the substantial [[Tamil people|Tamil]] minority population. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the [[Tamil United Liberation Front]] (TULF) that started agitation for a separate state of [[Tamil Eelam]] within the system in a federal structure in the north and eastern Sri Lanka<ref name= GlobSec>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm|title=Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) / World Tamil Association (WTA)|first=John|last=Pike|website=www.globalsecurity.org}}</ref> that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the sixth amendment of the [[Constitution of Sri Lanka|Sri Lankan Constitution]] in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,<ref name=Hennayake>The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1989), pp. 401–415.</ref> effectively rendering the TULF ineffective.<ref name=Hennayake/> Outside the TULF, however, factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.<ref name= GlobSec/>


==Indian Involvement==
==Indian involvement==
{{main|Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War|Indian Peace Keeping Force}}
{{main|Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War|Indian Peace Keeping Force}}


According to [[Rejaul Karim Laskar]], a scholar of Indian foreign policy, [[Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War|Indian intervention in Sri Lankan civil war]] became inevitable as that civil war threatened India’s “unity, national interest and territorial integrity.” <ref name="auto">{{cite journal|last1=Laskar|first1=Rejaul|title=Rajiv Gandhi’s Diplomacy: Historic Significance and Contemporary Relevance|journal=Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist|date=September 2014|volume=2|issue=9|page=47|url=http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom09y2014/article015.html|accessdate=8 March 2018}}</ref> According to Laskar, this threat came in two ways: On the one hand external powers could take advantage of the situation to establish their base in Sri Lanka thus posing a threat to India, on the other hand, the LTTE’s dream of a sovereign Tamil Eela] comprising all the Tamil-inhabited areas (of Sri Lanka and India) posed a threat to India’s territorial integrity. <ref name="auto"/>
According to [[Rejaul Karim Laskar]], a scholar of Indian foreign policy, [[Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War|Indian intervention in Sri Lankan civil war]] became inevitable as that civil war threatened India's "unity, national interest and territorial integrity."<ref name="auto">{{cite journal|last1=Laskar|first1=Rejaul|title=Rajiv Gandhi's Diplomacy: Historic Significance and Contemporary Relevance|journal=Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist|date=September 2014|volume=2|issue=9|page=47|url=http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom09y2014/article015.html|access-date=8 March 2018|archive-date=21 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180221161446/http://www.diplomatist.com/dipom09y2014/article015.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to Laskar, this threat came in two ways: On the one hand external powers could take advantage of the situation to establish their base in Sri Lanka thus posing a threat to India, on the other hand, the LTTE's dream of a sovereign Tamil Eelam comprising all the Tamil-inhabited areas (of Sri Lanka and India) posed a threat to India's territorial integrity.<ref name="auto"/>


India had, initially under [[Indira Gandhi]]<ref name=Manshingh>India's search for power:Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy.1966–1982. Mansingh S. New Delhi:Sage 1984. p282</ref><ref name=rediffcomment>{{cite web|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/dec/01mitra.htm|title=Rediff On The NeT: Ashok Mitra on how Indira Gandhi sowed the seeds of hate|website=www.rediff.com}}</ref> and later under [[Rajiv Gandhi]], provided support to Tamil interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas in [[Tamil Nadu]]<ref name=Haggerty>India's Regional Security Doctrine.
India had, initially under [[Indira Gandhi]]<ref name=Manshingh>India's search for power:Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy.1966–1982. Mansingh S. New Delhi:Sage 1984. p282</ref><ref name=rediffcomment>{{cite web|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/dec/01mitra.htm|title=Rediff On The NeT: Ashok Mitra on how Indira Gandhi sowed the seeds of hate|website=www.rediff.com}}</ref> and later under [[Rajiv Gandhi]], provided support to Tamil interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas in [[Tamil Nadu]]<ref name=Haggerty>India's Regional Security Doctrine.
Hagerty D.T. Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Apr., 1991), pp. 351–363</ref> of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in [[South India]], as well as India's regional security and interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United States, Pakistan, and China.<ref name=Haggerty/> To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it clear to Sri Lankan President [[J. R. Jayewardene]] that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail.<ref name=Haggerty/>
Hagerty D.T. Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Apr., 1991), pp. 351–363</ref> of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in [[South India]], as well as India's regional security and interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United States, Pakistan, and China.<ref name=Haggerty/> To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it clear to Sri Lankan President [[J. R. Jayewardene]] that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail.<ref name=Haggerty/>
Following the [[Black July|anti-Tamil riots]], the Tamil rebel movement grew progressively strong and increasingly violent. However, after [[Assassination of Indira Gandhi|Indira Gandhi's assassination]], the Indian support for the militant movement decreased. However, the succeeding Rajiv Gandhi government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with its neighbours. It still however maintained diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict as well as maintaining covert aid to the Tamil rebels.<ref name=Haggerty/><ref name=fo>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/|title=Research and Analysis Wing. Fas.org|publisher=}}</ref>
Following the [[Black July|anti-Tamil riots]], the Tamil rebel movement grew progressively strong and increasingly violent. However, after [[Assassination of Indira Gandhi|Indira Gandhi's assassination]], the Indian support for the militant movement decreased. However, the succeeding Rajiv Gandhi government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with its neighbours. It still however maintained diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict as well as maintaining covert aid to the Tamil rebels.<ref name=Haggerty/>


From 1985 however, the Sri-Lankan Government started rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa.<ref name=Haggerty/><ref name=Bobb>"The Colombo Chill". Bobb, D. ''[[India Today]]''. March 31, 1986. p95.</ref> In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up and in 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, [[Operation Liberation]] was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by [[helicopter gunship]]s as well as [[ground attack aircraft]].<ref name=Haggerty/> In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of [[Jaffna]].<ref name=NYT>[https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9B0DE0D8173FF936A35755C0A961948260&n=Top%2fNews%2fWorld%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIndia India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels"], ''[[The New York Times]]''. 5 June 1987</ref> As civilian casualties grew,<ref name=PfaffB>Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP.
From 1985 however, the Sri-Lankan Government started rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa.<ref name=Haggerty/><ref name=Bobb>"The Colombo Chill". Bobb, D. ''[[India Today]]''. March 31, 1986. p95.</ref> In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up and in 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, [[Operation Liberation]] was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by [[helicopter gunship]]s as well as [[ground attack aircraft]].<ref name=Haggerty/> In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of [[Jaffna]].<ref name=NYT>[https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9B0DE0D8173FF936A35755C0A961948260&n=Top%2fNews%2fWorld%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIndia India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels"], ''[[The New York Times]]''. 5 June 1987</ref> As civilian casualties grew,<ref name=PfaffB>Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II. (Feb., 1988), pp. 139</ref><ref name=UTHRCh8>{{cite web|url=http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume1/Chapter8.htm|title=Chapter 8|website=www.uthr.org}}</ref> calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports use of aerial support against rebel positions in civilian areas.<ref name=UTHRCh8/> India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.
Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II. (Feb., 1988), pp. 139</ref><ref name=UTHRCh8>{{cite web|url=http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume1/Chapter8.htm|title=Chapter 8|website=www.uthr.org}}</ref> calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports use of aerial support against rebel positions in civilian areas.<ref name=UTHRCh8/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/jaincommission/growth_of_tamil_militancy/ch1sec5.html|title=Web Page Under Construction|website=www.tamilnation.org}}</ref> India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.


However, the Indian efforts were futile. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani and Israeli advisors, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force.<ref name=Haggerty/> Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance<ref name= NYT1>"Indians To Send convoy to Sri Lanka", ''[[The New York Times]]''. 2 June 1987</ref> but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.<ref name=NYT2>"Indian Flotilla is turned back by Sri Lankan Naval Vessels", ''[[The New York Times]]''. 4 June 1987</ref>
However, the Indian efforts were futile. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani and Israeli advisors, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force.<ref name=Haggerty/> Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance<ref name= NYT1>"Indians To Send convoy to Sri Lanka", ''[[The New York Times]]''. 2 June 1987</ref> but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.<ref name=NYT2>"Indian Flotilla is turned back by Sri Lankan Naval Vessels", ''[[The New York Times]]''. 4 June 1987</ref>


Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force, the [[Indian Air Force]] mounted [[Operation Poomalai]] in broad daylight. Five [[An-32]]s of the Indian Air Force under cover of heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the [[Indian Foreign Minister|Minister of External Affairs]], [[K. Natwar Singh]], of the ongoing operation. It was also indicated to the ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka.<ref name=Bharat-rakshak.com>[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html "Indian Air Force in Sri Lanka.Operation Poomalai – The Jaffna Food drop." Bharat-rakshak.com] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110609120451/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html |date=2011-06-09 }}</ref> The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a symbolic act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve [[Rajiv Gandhi|Rajiv Gandhi's]] credibility.<ref name=BS>[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html "Operation Poomalai – India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060907053333/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html |date=September 7, 2006 }}</ref>
Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force, the [[Indian Air Force]] mounted [[Operation Poomalai]] in broad daylight. Five [[An-32]]s of the Indian Air Force under cover of heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the [[Indian Foreign Minister|Minister of External Affairs]], [[K. Natwar Singh]], of the ongoing operation. It was also indicated to the ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka.<ref name=Bharat-rakshak.com>[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html "Indian Air Force in Sri Lanka.Operation Poomalai – The Jaffna Food drop." Bharat-rakshak.com] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110609120451/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html |date=2011-06-09 }}</ref> The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a symbolic act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve [[Rajiv Gandhi|Rajiv Gandhi's]] credibility.<ref name=BS>[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html "Operation Poomalai – India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060907053333/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html |date=September 7, 2006 }}</ref>


Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary population at home,<ref name=Premdas>"Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord". Ralph R. Premdas; S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, ''Asian Survey'', Vol. 28, No. 6. (Jun., 1988), pp. 676–690.</ref> the Sri Lankan President, [[J. R. Jayewardene]], offered to hold talks with the [[Rajiv Gandhi]] government on future moves.<ref name=NYT/> The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the [[Indo-Sri-Lankan accord]] on July 29, 1987<ref name=USDS>{{cite web|url=https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm|title=Sri Lanka|publisher=}}</ref> that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm,<ref name=TamilNation/> and saw the induction of the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] in Sri Lanka.
Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary population at home,<ref name=Premdas>"Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord". Ralph R. Premdas; S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, ''Asian Survey'', Vol. 28, No. 6. (Jun., 1988), pp. 676–690.</ref> the Sri Lankan President, [[J. R. Jayewardene]], offered to hold talks with the [[Rajiv Gandhi]] government on future moves.<ref name=NYT/> The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the [[Indo-Sri-Lankan accord]] on July 29, 1987<ref name=USDS>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm|title=Sri Lanka}}</ref> that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm,{{citation needed|date=July 2020}} and saw the induction of the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] in Sri Lanka.{{Citation needed|date=July 2019}}


==Peace Accord==
==Peace accord==
{{More citations needed section|date=July 2020}}
Among the salient points of the agreement,<ref name=TN/> the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included<ref name="iclq"/><ref name="atimes"/>
Colombo devolution of power to the provinces, merger (subject to later referendum) of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language.<ref name=TN/> More immediately, Operation Liberation — the successful, ongoing anti-insurgent operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula — was ended. Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.<ref name="TamilNation"/> India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri Lanka.<ref name=TN/> The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military assistance on which the IPKF came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.
Among the salient points of the agreement,{{citation needed|date=July 2020}} the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included<ref name="iclq"/><ref name="atimes"/> Colombo devolution of power to the provinces, merger (subject to later referendum) of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language.{{citation needed|date=July 2020}} More immediately, Operation Liberation — the successful, ongoing anti-insurgent operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula — was ended. Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.{{citation needed|date=July 2020}}India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri Lanka.{{citation needed|date=July 2020}} The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military assistance on which the IPKF came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.{{Citation needed|date=July 2019}}


In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE and the government resumed. The Sri Lankan Government committed serious human rights violations.{{Citation needed|date=November 2017}}
In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE and the government resumed.


In January 1995, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE agreed to a ceasefire as a preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months, however, the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities.
In January 1995, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE agreed to a ceasefire as a preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months, however, the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities.{{Citation needed|date=July 2019}}


The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers, with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the [[Vanni (Sri Lanka)|Vanni]]. An LTTE counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains; and by May 2000, threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.
The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers, with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the [[Vanni (Sri Lanka)|Vanni]]. An LTTE counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains; and by May 2000, threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.{{Citation needed|date=July 2019}}


===Reaction===
===Reaction===
On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by [[Leading Rate]] [[Vijitha Rohana]] at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was [[Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi|assassinated]] by a LTTE suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north and eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, [[Sonia Gandhi]] was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.
On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by [[Leading Rate]] [[Vijitha Rohana]] at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was [[Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi|assassinated]] by a LTTE suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north and eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, [[Sonia Gandhi]] was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.{{Citation needed|date=July 2019}}

The validity of the Indo-Lanka Accord has been questioned by Sri Lankan politicians citing various reasons.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Silva|first=Pramod De|title=Indo-Lanka Accord: 31 years on|url=http://www.dailynews.lk/2018/07/30/features/158264/indo-lanka-accord-31-years|access-date=2021-01-07|website=Daily News|language=en}}</ref> In 2020 Minister of Public Security Sarath Weerasekara claimed as India failed to disarm the LTTE the agreement is no longer valid and Sri Lanka is not bound to uphold the agreement on provincial councils. <ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-12-18|title=Minister Sarath Weerasekara says the Indo Lanka accord is not valid anymore|url=https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/12/18/minister-sarath-weerasekara-says-the-indo-lanka-accord-is-not-valid-anymore/|access-date=2021-01-07|website=Sri Lanka News - Newsfirst|language=en}}</ref>


===Books===
===Books===
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==References==
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist}}


==External links==
==External links==
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*[http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1173 Full Text of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord]
*[http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1173 Full Text of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord]
*[http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Sri+Lanka Text of all peace accords for Sri Lanka]
*[http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=Sri+Lanka Text of all peace accords for Sri Lanka]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041011074514/http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/world/20031101-0.html Tigers go back to Indo-Lanka accord for federal state]
*{{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20041011074514/http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/world/20031101-0.html Tigers go back to Indo-Lanka accord for federal state]}}
*[https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/mforumsl/lw3.htm&date=2009-10-26+02:32:55 Muslims have a Case in Sri Lanka]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20021015035430/http://www.geocities.com/mforumsl/lw3.htm Muslims have a Case in Sri Lanka]
*[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC12Df05.html Indo-Sri Lanka trade: Hype and reality]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20040412015102/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FC12Df05.html Indo-Sri Lanka trade: Hype and reality]
*[http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord]
*[https://archive.today/20021001211331/http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041022094352/http://www.irs.org.pk/Focus%202003.htm PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA --- WITH AND WITHOUT MEDIATION]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041022094352/http://www.irs.org.pk/Focus%202003.htm PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA --- WITH AND WITHOUT MEDIATION]
*[http://www.american.edu/jrich/Richardson.peace.html ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A SURVEY]
*[http://www.american.edu/jrich/Richardson.peace.html ETHNIC PEACE ACCORDS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A SURVEY]
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041103093312/http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=11650 Wickremesinghe Apprises I K Gujral of Stalled Peace Process in Sri Lanka]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041103093312/http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=11650 Wickremesinghe Apprises I K Gujral of Stalled Peace Process in Sri Lanka]
*[http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items04/170204-1.html Tiger Rebels are either black or white but not both]
*[http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items04/170204-1.html Tiger Rebels are either black or white but not both]
*[http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/12/02/stories/2002120203591200.htm SLFP to discuss peace process with Indian leaders]
*{{usurped|[https://web.archive.org/web/20041127104945/http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/12/02/stories/2002120203591200.htm SLFP to discuss peace process with Indian leaders]}}
*[http://www.asian-affairs.com/Sri-Lanka/sugeeswara.html PEACE PROCESS IN SRI-LANKA]
*[http://www.asian-affairs.com/Sri-Lanka/sugeeswara.html PEACE PROCESS IN SRI-LANKA]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041013031742/http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sinhala/pandora.htm TIGERS, 'MODERATES' AND PANDORA'S PACKAGE]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041013031742/http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sinhala/pandora.htm TIGERS, 'MODERATES' AND PANDORA'S PACKAGE]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041015211722/http://flonnet.com/fl1909/19090120.htm The road ahead]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041015211722/http://flonnet.com/fl1909/19090120.htm The road ahead]
*[http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mag/2002/04/07/stories/2002040700140300.htm When guns cease to fire]
*{{usurped|[https://web.archive.org/web/20041211005115/http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mag/2002/04/07/stories/2002040700140300.htm When guns cease to fire]}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041224160801/http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=25634 LTTE to take Indo-Lankan accord in peace bid]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20041224160801/http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=25634 LTTE to take Indo-Lankan accord in peace bid]
{{Div col end}}
{{Div col end}}
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/indo-lanka-accord-is-a-sound-framework-say-experts/article22433003.ece
*[http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/indo-lanka-accord-is-a-sound-framework-say-experts/article22433003.ece]


{{Sri Lankan Civil War}}
{{Sri Lankan Civil War}}
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{{Foreign relations of India}}
{{Foreign relations of India}}


[[Category:Foreign intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War]]
[[Category:Foreign intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war]]
[[Category:Treaties concluded in 1987]]
[[Category:Treaties concluded in 1987]]
[[Category:Treaties of India]]
[[Category:Bilateral treaties of India]]
[[Category:Treaties of Sri Lanka]]
[[Category:Treaties of Sri Lanka]]
[[Category:India–Sri Lanka relations]]
[[Category:India–Sri Lanka relations]]
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[[Category:Military history of Sri Lanka]]
[[Category:Military history of Sri Lanka]]
[[Category:Tamil Eelam]]
[[Category:Tamil Eelam]]
[[Category:Rajiv Gandhi administration]]

Latest revision as of 01:43, 21 December 2024

Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
ContextSri Lankan Civil War
Signed29 July 1987; 37 years ago (1987-07-29)
LocationColombo, Sri Lanka
Signatories
Parties
Languages
Wikisource has original text related to this article:

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene. The accord was expected to resolve the Sri Lankan Civil War by enabling the thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka and the Provincial Councils Act of 1987. Under the terms of the agreement,[1][2] Colombo agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms.[3][4]

Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (which at the time was one of the strongest Tamil forces), had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender their arms to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an active confrontation. The LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE. Further complicating the return to peace, a Marxist insurgency began in the south of the island.

Background

[edit]
Location of Sri Lanka
Main article: Sri Lankan Civil War

Sri Lanka, from the early part of the 1980s, was facing an increasingly violent ethnic strife. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the independence of the island from Britain in 1948. At the time, a Sinhala majority government was instituted which passed legislation that were deemed discriminatory against the substantial Tamil minority population. In the 1970s, two major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started agitation for a separate state of Tamil Eelam within the system in a federal structure in the north and eastern Sri Lanka[5] that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the sixth amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional,[6] effectively rendering the TULF ineffective.[6] Outside the TULF, however, factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.[5]

Indian involvement

[edit]
Main articles: Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War and Indian Peace Keeping Force

According to Rejaul Karim Laskar, a scholar of Indian foreign policy, Indian intervention in Sri Lankan civil war became inevitable as that civil war threatened India's "unity, national interest and territorial integrity."[7] According to Laskar, this threat came in two ways: On the one hand external powers could take advantage of the situation to establish their base in Sri Lanka thus posing a threat to India, on the other hand, the LTTE's dream of a sovereign Tamil Eelam comprising all the Tamil-inhabited areas (of Sri Lanka and India) posed a threat to India's territorial integrity.[7]

India had, initially under Indira Gandhi[8][9] and later under Rajiv Gandhi, provided support to Tamil interests from the very conception of the secessionist movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support the operations training camps for Tamil guerrillas in Tamil Nadu[10] of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force. This was both as a result of a large Tamil community in South India, as well as India's regional security and interests which attempted to reduce the scope of foreign intervention, especially those linked to the United States, Pakistan, and China.[10] To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it clear to Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if any diplomatic solutions should fail.[10] Following the anti-Tamil riots, the Tamil rebel movement grew progressively strong and increasingly violent. However, after Indira Gandhi's assassination, the Indian support for the militant movement decreased. However, the succeeding Rajiv Gandhi government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with its neighbours. It still however maintained diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict as well as maintaining covert aid to the Tamil rebels.[10]

From 1985 however, the Sri-Lankan Government started rearming itself extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore and South Africa.[10][11] In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up and in 1987, retaliating an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, Operation Liberation was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula, involving nearly four thousand troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as ground attack aircraft.[10] In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna.[12] As civilian casualties grew,[13][14] calls grew within India to intervene in what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian crisis, especially with reports use of aerial support against rebel positions in civilian areas.[14] India, which had a substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home, called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement.

However, the Indian efforts were futile. Added to this, in the growing involvement of Pakistani and Israeli advisors, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a show of force.[10] Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that it would send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian assistance[15] but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned back.[16]

Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made by the Indian government to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in support of rebel forces over the besieged city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a blatant show of force, the Indian Air Force mounted Operation Poomalai in broad daylight. Five An-32s of the Indian Air Force under cover of heavily armed Indian fighter jets flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25 tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation. It was also indicated to the ambassador that if the operation was in any way hindered by Sri Lanka, India would launch a full-force military retaliation against Sri Lanka.[17] The ultimate aim of the operation was both to demonstrate the credibility of the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan Government, as a symbolic act of support for the Tamil Rebels, as well to preserve Rajiv Gandhi's credibility.[18]

Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention and facing an increasingly war-weary population at home,[19] the Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayewardene, offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves.[12] The siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on July 29, 1987[20] that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels disarm,[citation needed] and saw the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.[citation needed]

Peace accord

[edit]

Among the salient points of the agreement,[citation needed] the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, which included[1][2] Colombo devolution of power to the provinces, merger (subject to later referendum) of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil language.[citation needed] More immediately, Operation Liberation — the successful, ongoing anti-insurgent operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula — was ended. Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.[citation needed]India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri Lanka.[citation needed] The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military assistance on which the IPKF came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.[citation needed]

In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE and the government resumed.

In January 1995, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE agreed to a ceasefire as a preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months, however, the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities.[citation needed]

The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers, with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the Vanni. An LTTE counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains; and by May 2000, threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.[citation needed]

Reaction

[edit]

On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by Leading Rate Vijitha Rohana at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north and eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.[citation needed]

The validity of the Indo-Lanka Accord has been questioned by Sri Lankan politicians citing various reasons.[21] In 2020 Minister of Public Security Sarath Weerasekara claimed as India failed to disarm the LTTE the agreement is no longer valid and Sri Lanka is not bound to uphold the agreement on provincial councils. [22]

Books

[edit]
  • Ramakrishnan, T. (2018), Ore Inapirachinayum Ore Oppandhamum, The Hindu Publishing Group (in Tamil)[23]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b M. L. Marasinghe (1988). Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 37, pp 551–587 doi:10.1093/iclqaj/37.3.551
  2. ^ a b "Asia Times: SRI LANKA: THE UNTOLD STORY Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord". www.atimes.com. Archived from the original on 1 October 2002.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  3. ^ New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation[permanent dead link‍]
  4. ^ Text of the Peace accord.Tamil Nation[permanent dead link‍]
  5. ^ a b Pike, John. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) / World Tamil Association (WTA)". www.globalsecurity.org.
  6. ^ a b The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1989), pp. 401–415.
  7. ^ a b Laskar, Rejaul (September 2014). "Rajiv Gandhi's Diplomacy: Historic Significance and Contemporary Relevance". Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist. 2 (9): 47. Archived from the original on 21 February 2018. Retrieved 8 March 2018.
  8. ^ India's search for power:Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy.1966–1982. Mansingh S. New Delhi:Sage 1984. p282
  9. ^ "Rediff On The NeT: Ashok Mitra on how Indira Gandhi sowed the seeds of hate". www.rediff.com.
  10. ^ a b c d e f g India's Regional Security Doctrine. Hagerty D.T. Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Apr., 1991), pp. 351–363
  11. ^ "The Colombo Chill". Bobb, D. India Today. March 31, 1986. p95.
  12. ^ a b India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels", The New York Times. 5 June 1987
  13. ^ Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II. (Feb., 1988), pp. 139
  14. ^ a b "Chapter 8". www.uthr.org.
  15. ^ "Indians To Send convoy to Sri Lanka", The New York Times. 2 June 1987
  16. ^ "Indian Flotilla is turned back by Sri Lankan Naval Vessels", The New York Times. 4 June 1987
  17. ^ "Indian Air Force in Sri Lanka.Operation Poomalai – The Jaffna Food drop." Bharat-rakshak.com Archived 2011-06-09 at the Wayback Machine
  18. ^ "Operation Poomalai – India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com Archived September 7, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
  19. ^ "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord". Ralph R. Premdas; S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 6. (Jun., 1988), pp. 676–690.
  20. ^ "Sri Lanka".
  21. ^ Silva, Pramod De. "Indo-Lanka Accord: 31 years on". Daily News. Retrieved 7 January 2021.
  22. ^ "Minister Sarath Weerasekara says the Indo Lanka accord is not valid anymore". Sri Lanka News - Newsfirst. 18 December 2020. Retrieved 7 January 2021.
  23. ^ "Indo-Lanka accord is a sound framework, say experts". The Hindu. 13 January 2013.
[edit]
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