Talk:Continental Army

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16 Additional battalions

On 27 December 1776, Congress authorized Washington to raise "16 battalions" in addition to the 88 authorized in September 1776. Please see Extra Continental regiments and Additional Continental regiments. Cheers. User talk:Tfhentz 14:10, Nov. 3, 2008 (UTC)

\The Men of the French and Indian War/ …After the War these men some of whom resided in Massachusetts went to their place of begining. Residence perhaps. They were supposed to excerise every now and then, they were still considered a Malitia. They did not. After being recognized as a group of uncomfortableness, they yet continued. A Coffe House was the recomendation through the woman of the Colonies as rather a Tavern was then to be called, for respect you see. Well these men went off into the fields now to drink, they became disorderly. Many times they were of repremand. This drunkiness continued. I read that issue was givin to these men and perhaps, before 1775 even arrived to unite and make thrift of their ability. The authorization came from their commanders of the War they then had faught in. Oliver DeLancey was one of many respectable people to give this orderly a clue. This Predicament with respect was givin the name Continental, an Army to Police the Area from any or further encroachments of any habitat.

Does anyone have issue with this. I hope to regain my inventory for it, for it has been lost through a transaction and I wish to give apology of not being patient and finding yet source. Though maybe just through this a recommendation may accure. There was infact another opposition with the Continental Army and the acceptance of a Grouped Malitia, being a standing force. I Guess controll of one thing can lead to an opposition of another. Perhaps, why even a group could also have the opportunity, of to choose a declaring vantage.

Please help me with this extensive research of whom or what acquired whom. By The way wasn't the Clintons on the British side for some time. And what exactly was Livingston as Brigadeer General supporting, could it have been a recognition of transport, postal service, committee's of correspondence. I Mean he left New York through some Powered Faction. And after loosing power of the mobile personage in New York. What's up with that. Sure the law is the law and if within a law one may have no choice but to assist a law, or is it a standing, or forming law.? Well till next time. Lets not forget before the United States allot of people and documents mentioned In America, about America, or such as in conclusion of the American Colonies had historical evaluational and presence. Isn't the term being used already as an entity of self being. Also lets remember the DeLancey Faction in the creation and continuance of law whom represented the people through and with England. History is important. No-Taxation-without-Representation. Sure the Sons of Liberty dissolved an Assembly because they (the DeLancey faction) wouldn't agree with their (the sons of liberty) non-importation act. If there is no one invovled in an assembly of representation than a purpose of law by law has right. Thus the purpose of continuing government with the Declaration of Independence. Thus to be Independent of former Government, such be said and delared as a whole as to understand a circumstance, enabling it a law. Who's invovled. Now separation of New York to Pennsylvania.~Art Economics HistoryDavid George DeLancey (talk) 20:20, 26 October 2009 (UTC) _11:19 a.m. e.s.t. 6/6/2016~Fixed some spelling todayDavid George DeLancey (talk) 15:19, 6 June 2015 (UTC)

Racial Integration

The article notes that the Continental Army was integrated and cites a documentary. This is an inaccurate picture of the Continental Army. At the beginning of the war, African Americans were not allowed in the military and it's not until 1778, I think, that George Washington began to allow for African American troops to join. Even then, the regiments were segregated and could only be from Northern colonies. Washington demurred the idea of having African American regiments coming from the Southern colonies. I suggest that a section be created to explain this aspect of the Continental Army more fully. Hateloveschool (talk) 11:22, 14 May 2012 (UTC)

Missing a classification.

As usual, a classification is missing, Engineering. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.208.189.225 (talk) 16:41, 1 November 2014 (UTC)

Size of the Army

I take issue with the assertion that the size of the army was "80,000 at its peak." This is very misleading. At no time did Washington have anything like those numbers. His army at Germantown numbered about 11,000 men. At Yorktown, French and Americans numbered about 19,000. At Saratoga Gates had about 15,000 men at the end. At Trenton Washington had about 3,000, tops. Breed's Hill, 2,500. At the very least there needs to be clarification with an assertion of 80,000 troops. Spread out through the entire colonies? And when? - Me. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.31.140.198 (talk) 15:19, 5 December 2018 (UTC)

• This is not misleading at all. Of course it is spread over all the colonies, the article is about the Continenal Army as a whole and not about a single field army. It includes everyone, everywhere, with peak strength being the point in time with the most serving. In this case they even included militia. The entry even has the note "80,000 militia and Continental Army soldiers served at the height of the war" in case somebody doesn´t get it. ...GELongstreet (talk) 15:34, 5 December 2018 (UTC)

The Irish question (again)

So an edit was made in the "Soldiers" section, regarding the Irish participation in the war, which switched "Protestants" to "Roman Catholics", in what appears to have been an attempt to imply that the majority of the (quarter or so) Irish soldiers in the CA were Catholic. As some of you may be aware, there's a lot of edit warring on articles pertaining to Irish Americans, thanks to certain "Scots-Irish" and "Catholic Irish" partisans, who appear to be too emotionally involved in their personal ancestries to edit such subjects.

What does Charles Patrick Neimeyer specifically say in America Goes to War? I don't have access to the source, but editors should not be interpreting sources based on what they "think" is true, as opposed to what the author actually wrote. If the source contains information that is outdated, inaccurate, or fringe, then another RS would be required to edit the content.Jonathan f1 (talk) 18:39, 17 July 2020 (UTC)

American logistics

Below is a copy-paste of narrative with its HarvRef footnotes and references for your use here. It is removed completely from American Revolutionary War as too detailed for the survey account of military campaigns there. The effort is part of a trimming project in coordination with the Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Requests, to promote the ARW article to B-class status.

Generally throughout the Revolution, inadequate provisioning of the Continental Army led to serious difficulty in maintaining a force in the field. From July 1779 to July 1780, the Army shrunk from twenty-six thousand men to less than fifteen thousand. Only the most committed of revolutionaries persisted throughout the conflict, although some numbers reentered service after leaving at end-of-enlistment, desertion, or mutiny amnesty. Several factors contributed: lack of food regularly distributed in ration quantity, inadequate or no pay, and in 1780-81 the harshest winter of the war.

Overall, the problem was fundamentally a financial one. The Continental currency depreciated, inflation accelerated. The British government maintained a financial campaign counterfeiting a flood of paper currency in Continental dollars to sabotage the war effort. Continental currency became worthless, state treasuries were empty, towns went bankrupt, and the marketplace was paralyzed by Quartermaster and Commissary certificates. Both Congress and states shared in the failure of the “specific supplies” system that Congress undertook by committee. From the standpoint of legislation, states did not tell Congressional Boards nor their delegates in Congress what they had, and Congress requisitioned the states for food in resolves that were only published in Philadelphia newspapers. Congressional requisitions to each state were proportionately based on wealth and population, but those formulas did not match the ability to respond in each state.

Continental Army provisioning suffered from inadequate finances, markets and transportation

Even during the emergency of war with national survival at issue, American colonial traditions of local self-government thwarted efforts to supply a national "standing army". States interfered with shipments of army provisions, Continental Army and Navy supply officials were drafted into state militias, and local magistrates would not enforce impressment when farmers withheld food from the military for speculators. States either could not or refused to cooperate with Congress, civilians everywhere resisted and then refused to participate in markets to supply and provision the army. When Continental, state or local officials were given authority to impress goods for army use without compensation, it was either actively resisted or only half-heartedly attempted. State provincialism also played a part.

As a matter of administration and logistics, the most serious aspect limiting military supply was the immense difficulty in acquiring provisions and transportation. Middlemen and speculators bought up food before it reached market, adding their margins to state expense. French regiments in Maryland and Connecticut paid in gold and silver, preempting state purchase of army requisitions in Continental dollars or worse, by certificates. Even when states gathered supply, there was no administrative means provided to take it to the Continental Army. Unaccessed food rotted in state depositories. The most serious related event was the mutiny of the Continental Pennsylvania Line in January 1781, followed by that of the New Jersey Line later the same month. The two mutinies followed one years' service without pay of any kind, along with a sporadic supply of inadequate food and clothing.

Congressional delegates feared for the future of their revolution and the nation's independence. Among the correspondents of George Washington pleading in his daily correspondence for Continental Army support, a Nationalist movement developed within every state. State commissioners met in a Hartford Convention from 11 to 22 November 1780, recommending an end to the administrative Boards of mixed Congressional and civilian advisors. Nationalist majorities in state legislatures increased their Congressional delegations with numbers of former Continental Army officers. The Nationalist caucus in Congress replaced the Boards with independent executive Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, and Marine (Oceans). Unfortunately these were likewise mostly secretarial posts accumulating reports to submit to Congress for action.

Late in the war, Congress hoped that shifting direct responsibility onto the state legislatures for each state militia Line regiment in Continental service would result in better provisioning. It asked individual state legislatures to equip their own troops and pay upkeep for their own citizen soldiers in the Continental Army. When the war ended, the United States had spent $37 million at the national level and $114 million at the state level. The United States finally solved its debt problems in the 1790s when Congress assumed all state war debt to attach the states to the Constitution of the United States' central government, and it founded the First Bank of the United States to establish the good faith and credit of the United States.

Notes

Citations

Bibliography

• Carp, E. Wayne (1990). To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775–1783. UNC Press Books. ISBN 978-0-8078-4269-0.
• Baack, Ben. "The Economics of the American Revolutionary War". EH.net. Economic History Association. Retrieved July 27, 2020.
• Jensen, Merrill (2004). The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution 1763–1776. Hackett Publishing. ISBN 978-0-87220-705-9.

Sincerely - TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 20:30, 12 October 2020 (UTC)