Romanian Bridgehead: Difference between revisions
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[[Image:Poland1939 after 14 Sep.png|thumb|right|300px|Polish and German forces after 14 September 1939 and troop movements after this date.]] |
[[Image:Poland1939 after 14 Sep.png|thumb|right|300px|Polish and German forces after 14 September 1939 and troop movements after this date.]] |
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The '''Romanian Bridgehead''' ({{lang-pl|Przedmoście rumuńskie}}; {{lang-ro|Capul de pod român}}) was an area in southeastern [[Poland]], now located in [[Ukraine]]. During the [[invasion of Poland]] of 1939 (at the start of [[World War II]]), on 14 September the Polish commander-in-chief [[Marshal of Poland]] [[Edward Rydz-Śmigły]] ordered all Polish troops fighting east of the [[Vistula]] (approximately 20 divisions still retaining the ability to cooperate) to withdraw towards [[Lwów]], and then to the hills along the borders with [[Romania]] and the [[Soviet Union|USSR]]. |
The '''Romanian Bridgehead''' ({{lang-pl|Przedmoście rumuńskie}}; {{lang-ro|Capul de pod român}}) was an area in southeastern [[Poland]], now located in [[Ukraine]]. During the [[invasion of Poland]] of 1939 (at the start of [[World War II]]), on 14 September the Polish commander-in-chief [[Marshal of Poland]] [[Edward Rydz-Śmigły]] ordered all Polish troops fighting east of the [[Vistula]] (approximately 20 divisions still retaining the ability to cooperate) to withdraw towards [[Lwów]], and then to the hills along the borders with [[Romania]] and the [[Soviet Union|USSR]]. After the USSR attacked on 17 September, Rydz-Śmigły ordered all units to withdraw to Romania and [[Hungary]], but by this point communications were disrupted, while smaller units were able to cross outside of the major battles.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Koskodan |first=Kenneth K. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4auHCwAAQBAJ&newbks=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PT34&dq=romanian+bridgehead&hl=en&redir_esc=y |title=No Greater Ally: The Untold Story of Poland’s Forces in World War II |date=2011-12-20 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-78096-222-1 |language=en}}</ref> |
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The plan was a default plan in case it was impossible to defend the Polish borders, and assumed that the Polish forces would be able to retreat to the area, organise a successful defence until the winter, and hold out until the promised [[France|French]] offensive on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]] started. Rydz-Śmigły predicted that the hills, valleys, swamps, and the rivers [[Stryi River|Stryj]] and [[Dniestr]] would provide natural lines of defence against the [[Nazi Germany|German]] advance. The area was also home to many [[ammunition dump]]s that were prepared for the third wave of Polish troops, and was linked by transport to the Romanian port of [[Constanța]], which could be used to resupply the Polish troops. |
The plan was a default plan in case it was impossible to defend the Polish borders, and assumed that the Polish forces would be able to retreat to the area, organise a successful defence until the winter, and hold out until the promised [[France|French]] offensive on the [[Western Front (World War II)|Western Front]] started. Rydz-Śmigły predicted that the hills, valleys, swamps, and the rivers [[Stryi River|Stryj]] and [[Dniestr]] would provide natural lines of defence against the [[Nazi Germany|German]] advance. The area was also home to many [[ammunition dump]]s that were prepared for the third wave of Polish troops, and was linked by transport to the Romanian port of [[Constanța]], which could be used to resupply the Polish troops. |
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This plan is one of the reasons the [[Polish–Romanian alliance]] was not activated by Poland. Poland and Romania had been allied since 1921 and the defensive pact was still valid in 1939. However, the Polish government decided that it would be much more helpful to have a safe haven in Romania and a safe port of Constanța that could accept as many [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] merchant ships as required to keep Poland fighting. The [[Polish Navy]] and merchant marine were mostly evacuated prior to 1 September (see [[Peking Plan]]); they were to operate from French and [[United Kingdom|British]] ports and deliver the supplies through Romania. |
This plan is one of the reasons the [[Polish–Romanian alliance]] was not activated by Poland. Poland and Romania had been allied since 1921 and the defensive pact was still valid in 1939. However, the Polish government decided that it would be much more helpful to have a safe haven in Romania and a safe port of Constanța that could accept as many [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] merchant ships as required to keep Poland fighting. The [[Polish Navy]] and merchant marine were mostly evacuated prior to 1 September (see [[Peking Plan]]); they were to operate from French and [[United Kingdom|British]] ports and deliver the supplies through Romania. |
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In adherence with the secret protocol of the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] which provided for the partition of Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the [[Soviet invasion of Poland (1939)|USSR invaded]] from the east during the early hours of 17 September, violating its [[Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact|non-aggression pact with Poland]], while the French, despite their promises, had not begun any [[Phoney War|significant offensive]] against Germany, making it impossible for the Polish army to hold out, at least in eastern parts of the country. During the late hours of that day, the Polish government and members of the military high command crossed the Polish–Romanian border with the intention of relocating to France where the Polish forces in the west were being formed.<ref>Michael Alfred Peszke. ''The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II''. [[McFarland & Company]]. 2005. pp. 16, 20, 23–26.</ref><ref>Mieczysław B. Biskupski. ''The History of Poland''. [[Greenwood Publishing Group]]. 2000. p. 102.</ref><ref>Gerhard L. Weinberg. ''A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II''. [[Cambridge University Press]]. 2005. pp. 51–52.</ref> |
In adherence with the secret protocol of the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] which provided for the partition of Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the [[Soviet invasion of Poland (1939)|USSR invaded]] from the east during the early hours of 17 September, violating its [[Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact|non-aggression pact with Poland]], while the French, despite their promises, had not begun any [[Phoney War|significant offensive]] against Germany, making it impossible for the Polish army to hold out, at least in eastern parts of the country. During the late hours of that day, the Polish government and members of the military high command crossed the Polish–Romanian border with the intention of relocating to France where the Polish forces in the west were being formed.<ref>Michael Alfred Peszke. ''The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II''. [[McFarland & Company]]. 2005. pp. 16, 20, 23–26.</ref><ref>Mieczysław B. Biskupski. ''The History of Poland''. [[Greenwood Publishing Group]]. 2000. p. 102.</ref><ref>Gerhard L. Weinberg. ''A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II''. [[Cambridge University Press]]. 2005. pp. 51–52.</ref> |
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Polish units were ordered to evacuate Poland and reorganize in France. Polish units launched new counteroffensives in attempt to clear a path towards the Romanian bridgehead, such as [[Kraków Army|Army Krakow]] in the [[Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski]]. Some of [[Kazimierz Sosnkowski]]'s units managed to evade German capture and continued the fight in [[Lviv|Lwow]], while others were stopped and captured by Soviet armored units.<ref name=":0" /> It was the intervention by the [[Red Army]] creating a two-front war that sealed the fate of the Romanian Bridgehead. Fragmented Polish units attempted to push southward and clear paths with limited success, as well as started diversionary skirmishes slowing the Germans. The defeat in the [[Battle of Lwów (1939)|Battle of Lwów]] by the Germans and Soviets disintegrated the efforts to clear a path to the Romanian Bridgehead. Nonetheless, many small groups of Polish soldiers were able to cross the border by night.<ref name=":0" /> |
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As many as 120,000 Polish troops withdrew through the Romanian Bridgehead area to neutral Romania and [[Hungary]]. The majority of those troops joined the newly formed [[Polish Armed Forces in the West]] in France and the [[United Kingdom]] during 1939 and 1940. Until Germany attacked the USSR (''[[Operation Barbarossa]]'') and the [[United States|USA]] joined the war, the Polish army was one of the largest forces of the Allies.<ref name="FT06">Kwan Yuk Pan, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0d441dfa-ecf1-11d9-9d20-00000e2511c8.html "Polish veterans to take pride of place in victory parade"], ''[[Financial Times]]'', May 25, 2007. Last accessed on 31 March 2006.</ref> |
As many as 120,000 Polish troops withdrew through the Romanian Bridgehead area to neutral Romania and [[Hungary]]. The majority of those troops joined the newly formed [[Polish Armed Forces in the West]] in France and the [[United Kingdom]] during 1939 and 1940. Until Germany attacked the USSR (''[[Operation Barbarossa]]'') and the [[United States|USA]] joined the war, the Polish army was one of the largest forces of the Allies.<ref name="FT06">Kwan Yuk Pan, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0d441dfa-ecf1-11d9-9d20-00000e2511c8.html "Polish veterans to take pride of place in victory parade"], ''[[Financial Times]]'', May 25, 2007. Last accessed on 31 March 2006.</ref> |
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Revision as of 01:22, 10 May 2022
 | This article needs additional citations for verification. (June 2013) |
The Romanian Bridgehead (Template:Lang-pl; Template:Lang-ro) was an area in southeastern Poland, now located in Ukraine. During the invasion of Poland of 1939 (at the start of World War II), on 14 September the Polish commander-in-chief Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-Śmigły ordered all Polish troops fighting east of the Vistula (approximately 20 divisions still retaining the ability to cooperate) to withdraw towards Lwów, and then to the hills along the borders with Romania and the USSR. After the USSR attacked on 17 September, Rydz-Śmigły ordered all units to withdraw to Romania and Hungary, but by this point communications were disrupted, while smaller units were able to cross outside of the major battles.[1]
The plan was a default plan in case it was impossible to defend the Polish borders, and assumed that the Polish forces would be able to retreat to the area, organise a successful defence until the winter, and hold out until the promised French offensive on the Western Front started. Rydz-Śmigły predicted that the hills, valleys, swamps, and the rivers Stryj and Dniestr would provide natural lines of defence against the German advance. The area was also home to many ammunition dumps that were prepared for the third wave of Polish troops, and was linked by transport to the Romanian port of Constanța, which could be used to resupply the Polish troops.
This plan is one of the reasons the Polish–Romanian alliance was not activated by Poland. Poland and Romania had been allied since 1921 and the defensive pact was still valid in 1939. However, the Polish government decided that it would be much more helpful to have a safe haven in Romania and a safe port of Constanța that could accept as many Allied merchant ships as required to keep Poland fighting. The Polish Navy and merchant marine were mostly evacuated prior to 1 September (see Peking Plan); they were to operate from French and British ports and deliver the supplies through Romania.
In adherence with the secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact which provided for the partition of Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the USSR invaded from the east during the early hours of 17 September, violating its non-aggression pact with Poland, while the French, despite their promises, had not begun any significant offensive against Germany, making it impossible for the Polish army to hold out, at least in eastern parts of the country. During the late hours of that day, the Polish government and members of the military high command crossed the Polish–Romanian border with the intention of relocating to France where the Polish forces in the west were being formed.[2][3][4]
Polish units were ordered to evacuate Poland and reorganize in France. Polish units launched new counteroffensives in attempt to clear a path towards the Romanian bridgehead, such as Army Krakow in the Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski. Some of Kazimierz Sosnkowski's units managed to evade German capture and continued the fight in Lwow, while others were stopped and captured by Soviet armored units.[1] It was the intervention by the Red Army creating a two-front war that sealed the fate of the Romanian Bridgehead. Fragmented Polish units attempted to push southward and clear paths with limited success, as well as started diversionary skirmishes slowing the Germans. The defeat in the Battle of Lwów by the Germans and Soviets disintegrated the efforts to clear a path to the Romanian Bridgehead. Nonetheless, many small groups of Polish soldiers were able to cross the border by night.[1]
As many as 120,000 Polish troops withdrew through the Romanian Bridgehead area to neutral Romania and Hungary. The majority of those troops joined the newly formed Polish Armed Forces in the West in France and the United Kingdom during 1939 and 1940. Until Germany attacked the USSR (Operation Barbarossa) and the USA joined the war, the Polish army was one of the largest forces of the Allies.[5]
The Romanian government also received the treasury of the National Bank of Poland in 1939. One part of it, consisting of 1,261 crates containing 82,403 kg of gold, was loaded aboard a commercial ship in the port of Constanța, and transported to Western Europe. The transport was escorted by ships of the Romanian Navy, in order to prevent interception by Soviet submarines in the Black Sea. The second part of the treasury was deposited in the Romanian National Bank. It was returned to Poland on 17 September 1947.
Gallery
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Crossing the border at Zaleszczyki into Romania on 15 September 1939, 2 days before the Soviet invasion from the east - passport. -
Polish troops, escapees from Nazi-Soviet occupied Poland, being welcomed by Romanian population while crossing the Romanian border.
See also
References
- ^ a b c Koskodan, Kenneth K. (2011-12-20). No Greater Ally: The Untold Story of Poland’s Forces in World War II. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-222-1.
- ^ Michael Alfred Peszke. The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II. McFarland & Company. 2005. pp. 16, 20, 23–26.
- ^ Mieczysław B. Biskupski. The History of Poland. Greenwood Publishing Group. 2000. p. 102.
- ^ Gerhard L. Weinberg. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge University Press. 2005. pp. 51–52.
- ^ Kwan Yuk Pan, "Polish veterans to take pride of place in victory parade", Financial Times, May 25, 2007. Last accessed on 31 March 2006.
- Dariusz Baliszewski (19 September 2004). "Most honoru". Tygodnik Wprost (in Polish) (1138). Archived from the original on 14 May 2007. Retrieved 24 March 2005.
- Michael Alfred Peszke, The Polish Underground Army, The Western Allies, And The Failure Of Strategic Unity in World War II, McFarland & Company, 2004, ISBN 0-7864-2009-X, Google Print, pp. 27–32
- (in Romanian) Toma Virgiliu, "Agresorii în ofensivă", in România Liberă, October 13, 2007
- Wojciech Włodarkiewicz, Przedmoście rumuńskie 1939; Bellona, Warsaw, 2001. ISBN 83-11-09255-9