Jump to content

Iran–Turkey proxy conflict: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
No edit summary
Tags: Visual edit Mobile edit Mobile web edit Advanced mobile edit
No edit summary
Tags: Visual edit Mobile edit Mobile web edit
Line 3: Line 3:
| partof = [[Iran–Turkey relations]], [[Iran–Israel proxy conflict]], and [[Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict]]
| partof = [[Iran–Turkey relations]], [[Iran–Israel proxy conflict]], and [[Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict]]
| place = Mainly [[South Caucasus]], [[Iraq]] and [[Syria]],<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran and Syria concerned about Turkish intervention in Jarablus |url=http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/260820163 |access-date=10 December 2016 |website=Rudaw Media |publisher=Rudaw Media}}</ref> also [[Yemen]], [[Libya]], and [[Central Asia]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ankara-Tehran relations faced with many obstacles - analyst |url=https://ahvalnews.com/iran-turkey/ankara-tehran-relations-faced-many-obstacles-analyst |website=Ahval}}</ref>
| place = Mainly [[South Caucasus]], [[Iraq]] and [[Syria]],<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran and Syria concerned about Turkish intervention in Jarablus |url=http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/260820163 |access-date=10 December 2016 |website=Rudaw Media |publisher=Rudaw Media}}</ref> also [[Yemen]], [[Libya]], and [[Central Asia]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ankara-Tehran relations faced with many obstacles - analyst |url=https://ahvalnews.com/iran-turkey/ankara-tehran-relations-faced-many-obstacles-analyst |website=Ahval}}</ref>
| combatant1 = {{flag|Iran}}<br />{{flag|Armenia}}<br />{{flag|Ba'athist Syria}}{{surrender}}<br />{{flag|Iraq}} (sometimes)
| combatant1 = {{flag|Iran}}<br />{{flag|Armenia}}<br />{{flag|Syria|Ba'athist Syria}} (until 2024)<br />{{flag|Iraq}} (sometimes)
{{Collapsible list
{{Collapsible list
| title =''Proxies''
| title =''Proxies''

Revision as of 08:14, 22 December 2024

Iran–Turkey proxy conflict
Part of Iran–Turkey relations, Iran–Israel proxy conflict, and Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

  Turkey
  Iran
Date15 March 2011– present
Location
Mainly South Caucasus, Iraq and Syria,[1] also Yemen, Libya, and Central Asia.[2]
Result Ongoing
Belligerents

 Iran
 Armenia
 Syria (until 2024)
 Iraq (sometimes)

Proxies

 Turkey
 Azerbaijan
 Qatar
Syria (since 2024)

Proxies
Commanders and leaders
Iran Ali Khamenei Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The Iran–Turkey proxy conflict refers to the regional rivalry between Iran and Turkey in the Middle East, mainly during armed conflicts and struggles for influence.

History

The conflict has its roots in a period of tense relations between Iran and Turkey of after the Iranian Revolution. Despite the two countries cooperating in a wide variety of fields, Iran and Turkey have competed for influence since the 1990s. In September 2011, Turkey hosted the establishment of a NATO missile shield, causing a crisis with Iran. While criticising the missile shield, Ali Khamenei also stated that Turkey should rethink many of its regional policies.[3][4]

Yahya Rahim Safavi accused Turkish authorities of "acting in line with the goals of America", and that if Turkey did not change its policies, Iran, Iraq, and Syria would be "reassessing their political ties."[3]

The proxy conflict was worsened due to the active involvement of the AKP government in regional disputes in Iraq and Syria.[5] The proxy conflict also continued despite Erdoğan politically shifting away from the West and towards Russia and Iran.[6]

Syria

During the Syrian civil war, Iran intervened in support of Ba'athist Syria, while Turkey intervened in support of the opposition. Both Iran and Turkey were militarily involved. Turkey backed the Syrian National Army, while Iran backed the Syrian Arab Army, as well as Hezbollah, and other Shia militias. Hezbollah had clashed with the Turkish military in Syria.[7] Turkish media organisations like Yeni Akit and Yeni Şafak also spread Anti-Iranian sentiment due to the Iranian role in Syria.[8] Turkey and Iran continued to oppose each other during the Syrian civil war. In 2019, Turkey launched an offensive in northern Syria, against the SDF and SAA, causing Iran to criticize Turkey.[9] Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed that it was a violation of Syria's sovereignty.[10] Ali Larijani also canceled his trip to Turkey.[11] In December 2024, after the Syrian opposition offensives, Abbas Araghchi had a heated argument with Hakan Fidan, claiming that Turkey had allowed the offensive.[12][13]

Shared ethnic and cultural ties between Kurds and Iran were a factor in establishing relations between Iran and Kurdish groups in Iran and Syria, which Iran had supplied weapons to on many occasions.[14][15][16][17] Tensions between Iran and Turkey with regard to the Kurds were significant.[18] In addition, Iran condemned all the military operations launched by Turkey against Kurdish forces in Syria.[19][20][21] Iran had also secretly cooperated with various Syrian Kurdish groups such as the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the PKK to some extent, both of which Turkey considered terrorist groups, and Turkish sources often linked Iran to the PKK and the YPG.[22][23]

Iraq

Iran and Turkey backed opposing political factions in Iraq. They also backed opposing militant groups. In 1982, During the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Shia militias captured Sinjar from the KDP Peshmerga.[24] The Shia militias also entered a tactical alliance with the YBŞ and the PKK.[25] Turkey turned against the Shia militias, as it supported the Kurdistan Region, especially the KDP, and opposed the PKK. The conflict escalated in October 2020, after the Sinjar agreement mediated by the United Nations between the KRG and Iraq, which mandated the withdrawal of both the PKK and PMF.[26] In 2021, various Shia militias began attacking Turkish presence in Iraq after Turkey launched operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. After the Fall of the Assad regime, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba warned about the existence of a Turkish-backed "operations room" in Iraq which planned on launching an attack similar to the 2024 Syrian offensives, and stressed that the United Kingdom was leading the operations room, with intelligence participation from NATO and Israel.[27]

Yemen

During the Yemeni civil war, Iran and Turkey supported rival groups, causing official arguments between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mohammad Javad Zarif. Erdoğan stated that "Iran and the terrorist groups must withdraw", while Zarif stated that "Turkey makes strategic mistakes".[28] Turkey was also accused of providing intelligence and aid to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen.[29]

Libya

During the Second Libyan conflict, Iran provided support to the anti-Turkish Khalifa Haftar and supplied his forces with anti-tank missiles.[30][31][32]

Iran

In the 1990s, Iranian Azerbaijani secularists who were frustrated with both religion and the Iranian government became the basis of Pan-Turkism and Pro-Turkey politics among Iranian Azerbaijanis.[33] With the spread of Turkish media after the 2000s, nationalism increased among Iranian Azerbaijanis, with the Iranian government attempting to counter it. Tractor S.C. acted as a base for extreme nationalism, as well as racism particularly towards Persians and Kurds.[34] Supporters also carry the flag of the Republic of Azerbaijan inside the stadium.[35] In 2020, Suleyman Soylu claimed that there were 100 PKK fighters present in Iran with the tacit approval of the Iranian government.[36]

Turkey

The Turkish government accused Iran of various forms of support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party.[37] The Turkish government also alleged that Iran financed and trained the Kurdish Hezbollah, and accused Iran of planning to use the Kurdish Hezbollah against Turkey.[38][39][40] In March 1993, after Abdullah Öcalan left Syria, the Turkish government accused Iran of organising a ceasefire between the Kurdish Hezbollah and PKK.[41] A Turkish parliamentary report also revealed Kurdish Hezbollah operatives had trained in Iran.[42]

Although the majority of Alevis in Turkey embraced secular values, were loyal to Turkey, and supported the Republican People's Party, Iran attempted to grow its influence over Alevis, while also attempting to convert them into the mainstream Twelver Shi'ism practiced in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan. Some Turkish Alevi representatives had complained about Iran undermining Alevism.[43][44] The Turkish government uncovered a secret plot by the Quds Force in June 2012. The investigation led the Turkish government to uncover a plot by the Quds Force and its assets, aiming to grow Iranian influence in Shia, Alevi, and ethnic Kurdish communities in Turkey. The plot aimed to religiously motivate the Shias and Alevis to start an uprising against Turkey. It also aimed to ethnically motivate the Kurds to start a separatist insurgency in Turkey. In both of these planned insurgencies, Iran would have provided support for the secessionists. Iranian attempts at converting Alevis to Shia Islam were also in the plot. In 2014, the Turkish government intervened in the case when senior aides of Erdoğan were involved in the plot.[45]

Turkey and the United States are both members of NATO. Despite strained relations, they continued to cooperate against Iranian interests.[46] Turkey supported various US policies against Iran, notably the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, in which Turkey secretly agreed to remove the Iranian obstacle to its ambitions.[47][48][49][50][51]

Azerbaijan

In the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence from the Soviet Union. Iran and Turkey quickly recognized the independence of both countries, but Iran wanted to transform Azerbaijan into a similar theocratic Islamic regime, and it went so far as to try to fund the Azerbaijani armed forces and send men to fight for them in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.[52][53][54] However, Azerbaijani leadership instead cooperated with Turkey and not Iran.[55] In 1992, the Azerbaijanis elected Abulfaz Elchibey, whose pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian rhetorics alienated Iran.[56][57] Turkey provided Azerbaijan with military equipment, as well as assisted Azerbaijan in the war with Armenia, while Turkish members of the Grey Wolves publicly participated in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War on the Azerbaijani side. Iran cooperated with Armenia and provided aid to Armenia and Artsakh.[58][59][60]

Iranian activities in Azerbaijan since the end of the war have also been the subject of tensions between Iran and Turkey due to Azerbaijan's strong alliance with Turkey.[61] Turkish and Azerbaijani support of Turkish nationalist separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan had been the source of tensions between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran.[62][63] Iranian repressive policies towards Iranian Azeris often put relations between Iran and Turkey in question.[64][65]

At the same time, after the victory of the Armenians in the war of the 1990s, Iran and Armenia became major trading partners while Armenia's relations with Turkey were hampered by the denial of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. Iran was accused of preferring its Armenian minority over its Azerbaijani minority.[66][67][68] Iran had frequently deployed trucks in the Karabakh region to assist Artsakh, drawing condemnation from Azerbaijan.[69]

During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iran criticised Turkey, claiming that all Turkey did was add "fuel to the fire".[70] Iran also criticised the presence of "terrorists" near its border, referring to alleged use of Syrian jihadists by Turkey and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh.[71] Iran arrested several pro-Azerbaijan activists in Iranian cities, including some Turkish citizens.[72] On December 12, Turkey summoned its Iranian ambassador due to the "aggressive" reaction from Iran to the poem read by Erdogan.[73] Iran boycotted Turkish products due to the poem.[74] After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Iranian influence in the South Caucasus diminished with Turkey emerging dominant.[75] The Iran-backed Husseiniyoun claimed that their goal was to repeat the Iranian revolution, but in Azerbaijan.[76][77][78]

Pakistan

Pakistan had been a close ally of Turkey, and had tensions with Iran due to their support of opposing groups in the 1992-1996 Afghan Civil War, in which Iran supported the Northern Alliance while Pakistan supported the Taliban. Turkey supported the anti-Taliban Abdul Rashid Dostum, although it did not interfere with its good relations with Pakistan.[79][80][81] After 2000, Iran attempted to lure Pakistani Shias to wars in Syria and Iraq against Turkish interests, sparking outrage in Pakistan demanding that the Pakistani authorities investigate Iran's interference in the country.[82][83][84] Pakistan was aligned with Turkish interests in the conflicts in the Caucasus and Syria.[85]

References

  1. ^ "Iran and Syria concerned about Turkish intervention in Jarablus". Rudaw Media. Rudaw Media. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
  2. ^ "Ankara-Tehran relations faced with many obstacles - analyst". Ahval.
  3. ^ a b Pomeroy, Robin (8 October 2011). "Iran tells Turkey: change tack or face trouble". Reuters. Retrieved 14 January 2021.
  4. ^ "Iran: NATO radar in Turkey serves to protect Israel". Ynetnews. October 4, 2011.
  5. ^ LaFranchi, Howard (6 April 2012). "Why Iran got huffy about a certain locale for next nuclear talks". The Christian Science Monitor.
  6. ^ "Erdogan Defies Trump Over Iran Sanctions | Voice of America - English". www.voanews.com.
  7. ^ "An Israeli-Turkish love affair over Hezbollah?". The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com.
  8. ^ Idiz, Semih (December 20, 2016). "Animosity toward Iran reaches fever pitch in Turkey after Aleppo". Al-Monitor.
  9. ^ "Iran opposes any Turkish military operation in Syria: Iran foreign ministry statement". Reuters. October 8, 2019 – via www.reuters.com.
  10. ^ "Iran opposes military action in Syria, Zarif tells Turkey". The Times of Israel. 8 October 2019. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
  11. ^ "Turkey-Syria border: All the latest updates". aljazeera.com.
  12. ^ Wintour, Patrick (2 December 2024). "Syria crisis due to Assad's refusal to engage with opposition, says Turkish minister". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
  13. ^ Wintour, Patrick. "As Assad's power crumbles, Turkey, Iran and Russia disagree on way forward for Syria". The Observer.
  14. ^ Iran provided weapons to Iraq's Kurds: Barzani | Middle East Eye édition française Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  15. ^ Iran and the YPG: Friends or Foes? - Politics Today Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  16. ^ The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations | Middle East Institute Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  17. ^ Iraq: Iran Arms Kurds in Fight Against ISIS | Time Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  18. ^ Turkey and Iran’s Approach to the YPG: A New Overlap of Interests? - İRAM Center | Center of Iranian Studies in Ankara Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  19. ^ How Iran views the Turkish invasion of northern Syria | Middle East Eye Archived 2020-11-17 at the Wayback Machine
  20. ^ Iran opposes any Turkish military operation in Syria: Iran foreign ministry statement | Reuters Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  21. ^ Senior Iranian cleric condemns Turkish aggression on Syria - Tehran Times Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  22. ^ Iran and the YPG: Friends or Foes? - Politics Today Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  23. ^ Iranian YPG terrorist tells supporters to attack Turkish community in Europe | Daily Sabah Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  24. ^ Chughtai, Alia. "Territory lost by Kurds in Iraq". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  25. ^ "Iraq: Stabilising the Contested District of Sinjar | Crisis Group". www.crisisgroup.org. 2022-05-31. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  26. ^ streiman (2021-04-01). "The Sinjar agreement has good ideas, but is it a dead end?". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  27. ^ "النجباء تحذر من "غرفة عمليات تركية" تدير مخططًا لتخريب العراق". العربية - Rojnews.news (in Arabic). 2024-12-10. Retrieved 2024-12-11.
  28. ^ Erdoğan focuses on trade during Iran visit Al-Monitor
  29. ^ "Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Husi terörüne karşı Yemen'e destek verdi". Türkiye (in Turkish). 26 March 2013. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020. Retrieved 14 April 2017.
  30. ^ "The Iran-Haftar links in Libya". July 17, 2020.
  31. ^ "What's behind Iran's sudden realignment with Turkey?". July 1, 2020.
  32. ^ "Haftar used Iranian anti-tank missiles in war on Tripoli, UN report finds | The Libya Observer". www.libyaobserver.ly.
  33. ^ Nastaran Moosavi, "Secularism in Iran," in Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar (eds.), Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives (Hartford: ISSSC, 2007), рр. 143-45.
  34. ^ "هواداران پرحاشیه تراکتورسازی چگونه فوتبال ایران را به هم ریخته‌اند؟ /ضرر‌هایی که تراکتورسازی از هوادارنما‌های پرحاشیه دیده است/۵ حاشیه بزرگ تراکتورسازی در فصل گذشته". پایگاه خبری تحلیلی فردا | Farda News (in Persian). Archived from the original on 2019-08-30. Retrieved 2019-08-30.
  35. ^ "سوء استفاده رسانه‌های ترکیه از حواشی هواداران تراکتور + عکس". ایسنا (in Persian). 2016-12-18. Archived from the original on 24 April 2022. Retrieved 2019-08-30.
  36. ^ "Bakan Soylu: Siyasete en büyük darbe terördür". DHA | Demirören Haber Ajansı (in Turkish). 2020-06-06. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  37. ^ "Syria and Iran 'backing Kurdish terrorist group', says Turkey". The Telegraph. 3 September 2012. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2012.
  38. ^ The Turkish Counter-Terrorism Experience, Suleyman Ozeren, Organizational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism, Ed. Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism, (IOS Press, 2008), 159.
  39. ^ Turkish Hezbollah, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Ed. Harvey Kushner, (Sage Publications Inc., 1993), 368-369.
  40. ^ The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy, Kemal Kirisci, The future of Turkish foreign policy, Ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, (MIT Press, 2004), 295.
  41. ^ Turkey and the War on Terror, Andrew Mango, (Routledge, 2005), 65.
  42. ^ "Implications of Turkey's Anti-Hizbullah Operation | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Archived from the original on March 23, 2024. Retrieved 2024-02-03.
  43. ^ "Alevi temsilcilerinden iddia: Şiileştirme çabaları arttı, gençleri türbe ziyareti diye İran'a götürüp etkilemeye çalışıyorlar". Independent Türkçe (in Turkish). 2020-09-11. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  44. ^ "Alevi temsilcileri: Şiileştirme çabaları arttı, gençleri türbe ziyareti diye İran'a götürüp etkilemeye çalışıyorlar... Tehlike gerçekten büyük". turkish.aawsat.com (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  45. ^ "Iran's secret plot to co-opt Turkey's Alevis, Shiites exposed in Quds Force terror probe - Nordic Monitor". nordicmonitor.com. 2021-02-02. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  46. ^ Strategic Fail: Partnering with Turkey to Counter Iran Would Misread the Region - War on the Rocks Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  47. ^ Üstün, Kadi̇r (2010). "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions". Insight Turkey. 12 (3): 19–26. JSTOR 26334100. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020.
  48. ^ "Turkey renews opposition to US sanctions on Iran". Archived from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 2020-11-16.
  49. ^ Cengiz Çandar (8 January 2020). "Is Turkey 'big winner' after Soleimani killing?". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 2020-10-12.
  50. ^ "Saudi Arabia and the Soleimani assassination". Saudi Arabia and the Soleimani assassination. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020.
  51. ^ "Soleimani's death offers Erdoğan a precious opportunity with Trump". Ahval. Archived from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
  52. ^ James P. Nichol. Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics, Praeger/Greenwood, 1995, Template:ردمك, p. 150
  53. ^ "Country Studies/Azerbaijan/The Foreign Policy Establishment". countrystudies.us. Archived from the original on 15 November 2020. Retrieved 2008-01-18.
  54. ^ Iranian Official: We Helped Azerbaijan In Karabakh War | Eurasianet Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  55. ^ Vatantka, Alex (15 January 2013). "Tangle in the Caucasus: Iran and Israel Fight for Influence in Azerbaijan". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 14 February 2013.
  56. ^ Alaolmolki, Nozar. Life After the Soviet Union. published in 2001 page 50.
  57. ^ Cornell, Svante (1 December 2000). Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780203988879. Archived from the original on 16 November 2020. Retrieved 28 September 2018 – via Google Books.
  58. ^ Svante Cornell. Iranian Azerbaijan: A Brewing Hotspot Archived 2007-06-09 at the Wayback Machine
  59. ^ Human Rights Watch. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994, Template:ردمك, p. 37
  60. ^ Two States, One Nation: the mixed blessings of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  61. ^ Karl Rahder. The Southern Azerbaijan problem, ISN Security Watch, 19/04/07 Archived 2008-05-20 at the Wayback Machine
  62. ^ "Azerbaijan to receive part of Iran, and Armenia – Nagorno Karabakh?" Archived September 30, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
  63. ^ Baku has unofficially agreed to take part in anti-Iranian coalition Archived October 1, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
  64. ^ http://www.cfr.org/publication/10547/conversation_with_ilham_aliyev_rush_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html "QUESTIONER: Hasan Hazar, Turkish daily Turkiye. Mr. President, you know, there are more than 20 million Azeris living in Iran. So my question is about that. What is Azerbaijan’s policy toward south Azerbaijan? ALIYEV: Azerbaijanis live in many countries. Recently we had the Second Congress of World Azerbaijanis. And according to our estimations, there are more than 50 million Azerbaijanis who live around the world, and about 30 million of them live in Iran. And of course all of them—their destiny for us is very important. When I visit other countries, I always meet representatives of the Azerbaijani community, because really Azerbaijanis live, as I mentioned, in many countries. We try to be helpful to their needs. We try to maintain good relations with the countries where Azerbaijanis live, so that their lives become better. " Archived 2011-01-11 at the Wayback Machine
  65. ^ http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/0f418e0f-3f21-4ae3-8f3e-bceeb1c4be40.html Aliyev told EU officials today that Baku is unhappy that the Azeri language is banned from schools and the media in Iran. Archived 2008-07-06 at the Wayback Machine
  66. ^ What is Iran’s position on Armenian Genocide? - Panorama | Armenian news Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  67. ^ A Look at the Vibrant Iranian Armenian Community | Financial Tribune Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  68. ^ Iran’s Azerbaijan Question in Evolution: Identity, Society, and Regional Security - Institute for Security and Development Policy Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  69. ^ Iranian trucks in Karabakh spark protest in Azerbaijan | Eurasianet Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  70. ^ Staff, Al-Monitor (October 6, 2020). "Iran criticizes Turkey's role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". Al-Monitor.
  71. ^ "Iran warns 'terrorists' near border in Karabakh fighting". Al-Monitor. March 1, 2021.
  72. ^ "Iran's state-run media avoids discussing the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict". TRT World. 20 October 2020.
  73. ^ "Turkey summons Iranian ambassador over Azeri poem tensions". ABC News. Retrieved 12 December 2020.
  74. ^ "Erdoğan'ın Azerbaycan'da okuduğu şiirden rahatsız olan İran Türk mallarını boykot ediyor". December 13, 2020.
  75. ^ "Iran Battles Turkish Influence in South Caucasus". CEPA. 2022-11-01. Retrieved 2024-12-13.
  76. ^ "İbrahimbəyli "Hüseyniyyun" dəstəsi yaradıb - Şok DETALLAR". Metbuat.az.
  77. ^ "İbrahimbəyli "Hüseyniyyun" dəstəsi yaradıb - Şok məlumat". Axar.Az. July 15, 2018.
  78. ^ "Tohid İbrahimbəyli İranda dini təhsil alan şəxslərin iştirakı ilə "Hüseyniyyun" (Hüseynçilər) adlı silahlı dəstə yaradıb". Apa.az.
  79. ^ Pakistan - The Taliban-Pakistan Alliance | Return Of The Taliban | FRONTLINE | PBS Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  80. ^ Pakistan, Taliban and the Afghan Quagmire Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  81. ^ Iran’s influence in Afghanistan | Middle East Institute Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  82. ^ Why are Pakistani Shiites ′disappearing′? | Asia| An in-depth look at news from across the continent | DW | 09.07.2019 Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
  83. ^ Shia-Sunni rift on rise in Pakistan, but Imran Khan govt’s silence may be strategic Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  84. ^ Iran lures Pakistani Shias to fight its war in Syria | Suddaf Chaudry | AW Archived 2020-11-16 at the Wayback Machine
  85. ^ Pakistan-Turkey Friendship Archived 2020-11-15 at the Wayback Machine
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/enwiki/w/index.php?title=Iran–Turkey_proxy_conflict&oldid=1264523894"