Second Punic War

Second Punic War
Part of the Punic Wars
Borders of Roman and Carthaginian influence in 218, just prior to the war
Date 218 to 202 BC Location Italia, Sicily, Hispania, Cisalpine Gaul, Transalpine Gaul, Africa Result Decisive Roman victory Territorial changes Seizure of the bulk of Carthaginian territory
Belligerents
Roman Republic	Carthage
Commanders and leaders
Publius Cornelius Scipio†, Titus Sempronius Longus Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, Gaius Flaminius†, Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus†, Lucius Aemilius Paullus†, Gaius Terentius Varro, Marcus Livius Salinator, Gaius Claudius Nero, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus†, Masinissa	Hannibal Barca, Hasdrubal Barca†, Mago Barca†, Hasdrubal Gisco, Maharbal, Syphax, Hanno the Elder†

The Second Punic War (referred to as "The War Against Hannibal" by the Romans) was fought between Carthage and Rome from 218 to 202 BC. It was the second of three major wars fought between the former Phoenician colony of Carthage, and the Roman Republic, then still confined to the Italian Peninsula. They were called "Punic Wars" because Rome's name for Carthaginians was Punici (older Poenici, due to their Phoenician ancestry).

Background

After Carthage lost its holdings in Sicily to Rome in the First Punic War, Carthage moved to compensate for the loss by extending her territory in Hispania (the Roman name for the Iberian Peninsula). This policy was begun by Hamilcar Barca, and continued by his son-in-law Hasdrubal and then his son Hannibal, meaning "Beloved of Baal". In 219 BC Hannibal used a pretext for attacking the town of Saguntum, which stood under the special protection of Rome. According to Roman tradition, Hannibal had sworn hatred to Rome, and he certainly did not take a conciliatory attitude when the Romans berated him for crossing the river Iberus (Ebro), which Carthage was by treaty required to stay south of. Hannibal did not cross the Ebro River (Saguntum was near modern Valencia - well south of the river) in arms, and the Saguntines provoked his attack by attacking their neighboring tribes who were Carthaginian protectorates, and by massacring pro-Punic factions in their city. Rome had no legal protection pact with any tribe south of the Ebro River. Nonetheless, when asked to hand Hannibal over, the Carthaginian senate promptly refused and so Rome declared war on Carthage.

Hannibal's overland journey to Italy

Hannibal´s route of invasion, courtesy of The Department of History, United States Military Academy

Hannibal's army in Iberia reportedly totaled 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, although those figures probably include Hasdrubal's forces as well as Hannibal's. The expeditionary force would still number as many as 75,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen. His army also had an unknown number of war elephants. Hannibal departed New Carthage in late spring of 218 B.C. He anticipated that a consular army would move along the coast towards Hispania, so he took his army by an inland route. After marching 290 miles through hostile territory and arriving at the Ebro by late June, Hannibal selected the most trustworthy and devoted contingents of the large army of Libyan and Iberian mercenaries at his disposal to carry on with him. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. At the Pyrenees, he left a detachment of 11,000 Iberian troops, who showed reluctance to leave their homeland, to garrison the newly conquered region. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 50,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen.

By conciliating the Gaulic chiefs along his passage, Hannibal reached the Rhône River before the Romans could take any measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rhône in September, Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and thirty-seven war elephants. After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to prevent his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in Gaul. He then proceeded up the valley of one of the tributaries of the Rhône River (probably the Isere) and by autumn arrived at the foot of the Alps. Then Hannibal successfully crossed the Alps, while surmounting the difficulties of climate and terrain, the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes, and the challenge of commanding an army diverse in race and language. His passage over the mountain chain (probably in the vicinity of the Col de Mont Cenis) is one of the most celebrated achievements of any military force in ancient warfare and came as a surprise to the Romans.

After completing his overland journey, Hannibal descended from the foothills into northern Italy. He had arrived, however, accompanied by only half the forces he had started with, and only a few elephants. In total, Hannibal had lost as many as 20,000 men and all but three of his war elephants. Hannibal from the start seems to have calculated that he would have to operate without aid from Hispania. It should be noted the figures for the amount of troops he had when he left Hispania are less reliable. Nonetheless, historian Adrian Goldsworthy has written that due to the opposition of the natives and the difficulties of landslides and cold altitudes, the costs of Hannibal's march were considerable.

The war in Italy

Battles of Ticinus and Trebia

Main articles: Battle of Ticinus and Battle of the Trebia

Hannibal's perilous march brought him into Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new allegiance to the Romans before the latter could take steps to check the rebellion.

File:Battleofthetrebiamap.JPG

Battle of Trebbia

Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman force sent to intercept Hannibal, had not expected Hannibal to make an attempt to cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to fight the war in Spain. With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul, Scipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt decision and speedy movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea, in time to meet Hannibal. After allowing his soldiers a brief rest to recover from their exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by subduing the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern Turin). While moving down the Po Valley, the opposing forces were engaged in the Battle of Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, by virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of Lombardy. This victory, though essentially a minor engagement, did much to weaken Roman control over the Gauls. As a result, of the Rome’s defeat at Ticinus, the Gauls were encouraged to join the Carthaginian cause. Soon the entirety of northern Italy was unofficially allied, both Gallic and Ligurian troops soon bolstering his army back to 40,000 men. Hannibal’s army, significantly supplemented, now stood poised to invade Italy. Scipio, severely injured in the battle, retreated across the River Trebia with his army still intact, and encamped at the town of Placentia to await reinforcements.

The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before news of the defeat at Ticinus River had reached Rome, the senate had ordered the consul Sempronius Longus to bring his army back from Sicily to meet Scipio and face Hannibal. Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia and Ariminum, by which Sempronius would have to march in order to reinforce Scipio. He then captured Clastidium, from which he drew large amounts of rations for his men. But this gain was not without its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal watchfulness, slipped around his flank, and joined his colleague in his camp near the Trebbia River near Placentia. There, in December of the same year, Hannibal had an opportunity to show his superior military skills at the Battle of the Trebia. In the first hours of the morning, before the meal, he lured out of the camp the whole Roman army, unprepared to the unexpected fight, hungry, tired and chilled; the cavalry was immediately driven off the field and the excellent Roman infantry, caught between Hannibal's main force and a hidden detachment led by his brother Mago Barca, who attacked on the flank, suffered heavy losses. The surviving Romans were forced to retreat.

Battle of Lake Trasimene

Main article: Battle of Lake Trasimene

Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose support for him abated. So, in spring 217 BC Hannibal decided to find a more reliable base of operations farther south. On the other hand, the Romans, greatly alarmed and dismayed by Sempronius’s defeat at Trebia, immediately made plans to counter the new threat from the north. The Roman senate resolved to elect new consuls the following year in 217 B.C. The two new consuls elected were Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius. As both expected Hannibal to carry on advancing, the new consuls took their armies (one under Servilius to Ariminum on the Adriatic Sea, and the other under Flaminius to Arretium situated near the Apennine mountain passes) so commanding the eastern and western routes by which Hannibal could advance towards Rome.

Battle of Lake Trasimene, courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy

The only alternate route to central Italy laid at the mouth of the Arno. This route was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest route to Central Italy. As Polybius claims “he Hannibal ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well know to the enemy, but that one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius by surprise. This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route.” For four days and three nights, Hannibal’s men marched “through a route which was under water” suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed the Apennines and the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he lost a large part of his force, including, it would seem, his remaining elephants.

Arriving in Eturia in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius into a pitched battle, by devastating under his very own eyes the area he had been sent to protect. As Polybius tells us, “he Hannibal calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him ... and give him opportunities for attack.” . At the same time, he tried to break the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that she was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the first conscious turning movement in military history). Advancing through the uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty pursuit and, catching him in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes while killing Flaminius as well (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). He had now disposed of the only field force which could check his advance upon Rome, but despite the urgings of his generals, did not proceed to besiege Rome, as he lacked siege equipment and he had no supply base in central Italia. Instead he proceeded to the south in hopes of stirring up rebellion amongst the Greek population there. After Lake Trasimene, Hannibal stated, “I have not come to fight Italians, but on behalf of the Italians against Rome.”

Fabius Cunctactor takes command

See also: Fabian strategy and Fabius Maximus

Hannibal's three-main victories in Italy: (1) The Battle of the Trebia (2) Battle of Lake Trasimene (3) Battle of Cannae respectively, courtesy of The Department of History, United States Military Academy.

Rome, reeling from her disastrous defeat at Lake Trasimene, was put into an immense state of panic. According to Polybius “On the news of the defeat reaching Rome, the chiefs of the state were unable to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to summon a meeting of the commons and announce it. When the Praetor [the head of the Roman Senate] ... said, ‘We have been defeated in a great battle”, it produced such consternation that to those who were present on both occasions, the disaster seemed much greater now than during the actual battle.” In times of such crisis, there was but one thing to do; and that was to appoint a dictator. Dictatorial power permitted a single man to develop his own strategies, make appointments in the civil government, and prepare armies without the usual political wrangling; a post that gave him near total authority for a period of approximately six months. “Abandoning” says Polybius “the system of government by magistrates elected annually, they [the Romans] decide to deal with the present situation more radically, thinking that the state of affairs and the impending peril demand the appointment of a single general with full powers” . The man they appointed as sole commander, or “dictator”, was a man named Quintus Fabius Maximus, intelligent and prudent general coined as the "Cunctator" (akin to the English noun cunctation), or the "Delayer" in Latin

Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the Fabian strategy of refusing open battle with his opponent while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal’s vicinity to limit his movement. While seeking to avoid battle, Fabius instead, sent out small detachments against Hannibal’s foraging parties, and always maneuvered the Roman army in hilly terrain, so as to nullify Hannibal’s decisive superiority in cavalry. Residents of small northern villages were encouraged to post lookouts, so that they could gather their livestock and possessions and take refuge into fortified towns. This, Fabius knew, would wear down the invaders’ endurance and discourage Rome’s allies from going over to the enemy, without having to challenge the Carthaginians to battle.

Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle. Livy tells us that “He [Hannibal] began to provoke and try his temper, by frequently shifting his camp and laying waste the territory of the allies before his eyes; and one while he withdrew out of quick sight and halted suddenly, and concealed himself in some winding of the road, if possible, to entrap [ambush] him on his descending into the plain” . The dictator closely followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn into battle, and thus remained on the defensive. While Fabius refrained himself from being drawn into battle, his troops became increasingly irritated by his “cowardly and unenterprising spirit” . His inactive policies, while tolerable among wiser minds in the Roman Senate, were deemed unpopular, because the Romans had been long accustomed to facing their enemies in the field. Fabius’s strategy was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed, that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the terrified allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect and pledge their allegiance to the Carthaginians.

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Hannibal - Silver double shekel, c. 230 BC, The British Museum

As the year wore on, Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the already devastated lowlands of Campania but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of Campania were blocked. Fortunately, the Carthaginian general hit upon a highly imaginative deception scheme. At night, he gathered together all the cattle, and after tying burning torches to their horns, he drove them along a ridge near the pass. To the Romans guarding the pass, this gave the impression that the Carthaginians, aided by torches, were attempting to escape through the woods, and thus left the defile to attack them. After the Romans had chased off after the cattle, Hannibal promptly occupied the pass, and his army made their way through the pass unopposed. Fabius was within striking distance but in this case his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly) he stayed put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius’s prestige, and soon after this, his period of power ended. The rest of autumn continued that year with frequent skirmishes— and after six months of exercising dictatorial power, Fabius would be removed from his position, in accordance with the Roman law.

Fabius' plans were in part ruined by Minucius, magister equitum and political enemy of Fabius. Minucius was named co-commander of Roman troops and, claiming Fabius to be a coward, decided to attack Hannibal's army in Larinum. The Carthaginians avoided Minuncius frontal attack by setting a trap, but, when Roman soldiers were on the verge of being slaughtered, Fabius Maximus rushed to his co-commander's assistance and Hannibal's forces immediately retreated.

Fabius became unpopular in Rome, since his tactics did not lead to a quick end of the war. Roman people gave Fabius the nickname Cunctator (delayer), and two new consuls, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus, were elected to lead a more incisive war campaign.

Battle of Cannae

Main article: Battle of Cannae

In the campaign of 217 BC Hannibal had failed to obtain a following among the Italians; in the following year he had an opportunity to turn the tide in his favor. In the Spring of 216 B.C. Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. Thus, by seizing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their Consular elections in 216, they appointed Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as Consuls. Some estimates have the Roman forces as large as 100,000 men, though this figure cannot be completely validated.

Destruction of the Roman army, courtesy of The Department of History, United States Military Academy.

The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls Aemilius and Varro, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia. After a two days’ march, they found him on the left bank of the Audifus River, and encamped six miles away. Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using an envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area where combat could occur. Hannibal drew up his least reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center with the wings composed of the Gallic and Numidian horse. The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's weak center but the Libyan Mercenaries in the wings swung around by the movement, menaced their flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, and Hasdrubal, his brother, who commanded the left, pushed in the Roman right and then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's cavalry on the Roman left. Then he attacked the legions from behind. As a result, the Roman army was hemmed in with no means of escape. Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers, managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this force. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans were killed or captured at Cannae. This makes it one of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of Ancient Rome, and one of the bloodiest battles in all of human history.

As Polybius notes, “How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the behavior of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman Power.” . During that same year, the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V pledged his support to Hannibal – thus initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed King Hieronymous of Syracuse, and Tarentum also came over to him around then. Had Hannibal now received proper material reinforcements from his countrymen at Carthage he might have made a direct attack upon Rome; for the present he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses which still held out against him, and the only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal made his new base. Yet even this defection failed to satisfy him as only a few of the Italian city-states which he had expected to gain as allies consented to join him. Also, the Macedonian navy was no match for the Roman, so they were unable to help him directly.

Stalemate in Italy

The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate in the years following Cannae. The Romans, after suffering three consecutive defeats and losing countless other battles, had at this point, learned their lesson. They utilized the attritional strategies Fabius had taught them, and which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal. Fabius Maximus was reelected consul in 215 BC and again in 214 BC. They always kept Hannibal in view, they only fought when everything was in their favor; they sought to starve him rather than destroy him in battle; and cut down his power of doing harm as fast as circumstances warranted . Despite their defeats and the defections, the Romans could still field larger armies than Hannibal, and could readily replace their losses. The consuls the Roman Senate elected always had an upwards of 80,000 men to oppose Hannibal, whose army was deteriorating in quality and barely more than half of that of the Romans’. Instead of using a single large army, Rome now began to field multiple smaller armies. These armies sought to tire Hannibal through fatiguing marches, constant skirmishes, and famine. As a result, for the next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout Southern Italy. Since he was no longer able to draw his opponents into a pitched battle, his immediate objectives were reduced to minor operations which centered mainly round the cities of Campania.

As the war drew on, Hannibal repeatedly appealed to the Carthaginian oligarchy for reinforcements and aid. The War-faction and the Pro-Roman Peace Party were the two main political parties that controlled Carthage during this time. The latter, represented Peace and Conciliation with Rome, and the other, represented a war policy and a policy of resistance to Rome. Despite the apparent unanimity of the acceptance of war, Hanno the Great, the leader of the peace party, condemned Hannibal’s actions. As spokesperson for the Carthaginian noble class, he opposed the policy of foreign conquest pursued by Hannibal. As a result, Hanno undermined support in Carthage for Hannibal's military efforts in Italy. Moreover, the success of the Romans in Iberia (Carthage's main source of wealth in the Mediterranean) had convinced the Carthaginians that their most valuable colony was at stake. Thus, in the hopes of stemming the tide against the Romans there, reinforcements desperately needed by Hannibal in Italy, were otherwise rerouted to Iberia. Carthage also diverted her limited resources in Sardinia as well as Sicily. At the same time, Hannibal experienced great difficulty materializing his allies. Many of the allies defected to the Carthaginians, on the condition that they could not be forced to serve against their will. This not only rendered this defection less beneficial to Hannibal, but also ensured him that he could not rely on his allies as he hoped for. To make matters worse, his men grew increasingly weak beyond the point where he was no longer able to beat the Romans, who were daily growing stronger in numbers and experience.

As the forces detached under his lieutenants were generally unable to hold their own, and neither his home government nor his new ally Philip V of Macedon helped to make good his losses, his position in southern Italy became increasingly difficult and his chance of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever more remote. In 211 BC after a long siege Rome re-captured Capua, the second Italian city after Rome, and Syracuse, who fell after a two-year siege, made famous by the defence engines made by Archimedes, who was killed in the sack of the city. In 209 BC Romans took back Tarentum. Hannibal still won a number of notable victories, completely destroying two Roman armies in 212 BC, and at one point, killing two Consuls (which included the famed Marcus Claudius Marcellus) in a battle in 208 BC. Nevertheless, without the resources his allies could contribute, or reinforcements from Carthage, Hannibal could not make further significant gains. Thus, inadequately supported by his Italian allies, abandoned by his government, and unable to match Rome’s resources, Hannibal slowly began losing ground. Hannibal continued defeating the Romans whenever he could bring them into battle, yet he was never able to complete another decisive victory that produced a lasting strategic effect. Leonard Cottrell encapsulated Hannibal's situation with an interesting analogy: “So the rest of the war becomes rather like a group of lesser animals [The Romans] following a wounded lion [Hannibal]. Every now and then the beast turns, and they scatter. Sometimes it conceals itself and then, leaping out, tears its tormentors to pieces. Afterwards, it moves on alone and unmolested for a while, but before very long it hears once again the stealthy pad-pad of footsteps following some way behind.”

The war in Hispania

While the main campaign was taking place in Italy, the Romans had carried the war into Hispania. Over the years Rome had gradually expanded along the coast until in 211 BC it captured Saguntum. This prevented Hasdrubal Barca from sending his brother Hannibal any aid and also diverted Carthaginian reinforcements away from Italia. However, Hasdrubal was able to defeat the Romans in the Battle of the Upper Baetis, and the two Roman commanders, brothers named Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were killed. Even so Hasdrubal did not feel confident enough to expel the Roman army after his other losses.

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Scipio Africanus

The following year the Romans sent out Publius Scipio's son and namesake, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who later became known as Scipio Africanus Major, with the authority of a consul even though he had not held any offices. Vowing to avenge his father and uncle, he proceeded directly to what was effectively the capital of Punic Hispania, Carthago Nova, that fell in 209 BC after the Battle of Baecula. Hasdrubal, deprived of his main port, decided to focus his efforts on the Italian peninsula, and, abandoning Hispania to some relatively weak garrisons, set out to repeat his brother's crossing of the Alps. His move was a failure. This time, the Romans anticipated the Carthaginian army's arrival, and had two legions waiting for it to come down from the Alps. Hasdrubal was defeated and killed at the Battle of the Metaurus River (207). The first news Hannibal received that his brother had left Hispania came when Hasdrubal's head was flung into his encampment by a Roman horseman.

The Carthaginian forces that remained in Hispania were defeated a few years later, in 206 BC, at the Battle of Ilipa, and Hispania became a Roman province.

End of war in Italy

In 212 BC the Romans had so alienated Tarentum that conspirators admitted Hannibal to the city. The conspirators then blew the alarm on some Roman trumpets allowing Hannibal's troops to pick off the Romans as they stumbled out into the streets. Hannibal was able to keep control of his troops to the extent that there was no general looting. Instead Hannibal having committed himself to respect Tarentine freedom told the Tarentines to mark every house where Tarentines lived. Only those houses not so marked and thus belonging to Romans were looted. The citadel, however, held out so denying Hannibal the use of harbor. His brother Hanno, however, was defeated at Beneventum further depleting the overall Carthaginian force. Despite resisting a siege by Roman forces at Herdonea, the tide was slowly beginning to turn in Rome's favor. Further, in the same year, he lost his hold upon Campania, where he failed to prevent the concentration of three Roman armies around Capua.

Two Roman armies besieged Capua so persistently that Hannibal himself was forced to attack the besieging armies with his full force in 211 BC. It was only a temporary relief, for two years later the Romans were again before Capua with three armies. By a sudden march through Samnium that brought him within three kilometers of Rome, Hannibal attempted to draw them away by a feint against their capitol. He was hoping that his feint on Rome would force the siege of Capua to be lifted, and draw the Roman army out into the open where Hannibal could destroy them in a pitched battle. Yet his strategy caused more alarm than real danger to the city. The siege of Capua continued, and the city fell in the same year. Likewise, in summer of 211 BC, the Romans completed their conquest of Syracuse and destruction of a Carthaginian army in Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the Romans pacified Sicily and entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to counter Phillip V. Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's preoccupation in Italy to conquer Illyria, now found himself under attack from several sides at once and was quickly subdued by Rome and her Greek allies. Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at Herdonea in Apulia, but lost Tarentum in the following year.

In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by a severe defeat inflicted at Herdoniac in Apulia upon a proconsular army, and in 208 BC destroyed a Roman force engaged in the siege of Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum in 209 BC and the gradual reconquest by the Romans of Samnium and Lucania, his hold on south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded in making his way again into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome with his brother Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing, however, of his brother's defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. The combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal's success in Italy. With the failure of his brother Mago Barca in Liguria (205 BC-203 BC) and of his own negotiations with Philip of Macedon, the last hope of recovering his ascendancy in Italy was lost.

The war moves to Africa

After his victories in Hispania, Scipio returned to Rome a great hero, and, although he was technically ineligible, was elected consul in 205 BC. He resolved to end the war by attacking Carthage itself, and appealed directly to the Centuriate Assembly when he found the Senate opposed this. Thus he was given command of the two legions in Sicily, plus 7,000 volunteers he had recruited, and the next year brought the war to North Africa when he landed at Utica, about twenty miles away from Carthage. Here he was counting on support from the Numidians, who resented Carthaginian control and so agreed to provide him with cavalry.

In 203 BC, when Scipio was carrying all before him in Africa and the Carthaginian peace party were arranging an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon brazen tablets in the temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. His arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, who placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy. In 202 BC, Hannibal met Scipio in a fruitless peace conference. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, as well as perceived breach in contemporary military etiquette (Hannibal's numerous ambuscades).

The Battle of Zama

Main article: Battle of Zama

Painting of the Battle of Zama by Cornelis Cort, 1567

This decisive battle soon followed. Unlike most battles of the Second Punic War, the Romans had superiority in cavalry and the Carthaginians had superiority in infantry. The Roman army was generally of better calibre than the Carthaginian. It is possible that by now the aging Hannibal was suffering from mental exhaustion, a result of nearly 20 years of constant warfare in Italy, during which time he witnessed the undoing of all his efforts against Rome.

The Roman cavalry won an early victory, and Scipio had devised tactics for defeating Carthaginian war elephants. However, the battle remained closely fought, and at one point it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge of victory. However, Scipio was able to rally his men, and his cavalry attacked Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. With their leading general defeated, the Carthaginians had no choice but to accept defeat and surrender to Rome.

Results

Hispania was lost to Carthage forever, and was reduced to a client state. A war indemnity of 10,000 talents was imposed, her navy was limited to 10 ships to ward off pirates, and she was forbidden from raising an army without Rome's permission. Numidia took the opportunity to capture and plunder Carthaginian territory. Half a century later, when Carthage raised an army to defend itself from these incursions, it was destroyed by Rome in the Third Punic War. Rome on the other hand, by her victory, had taken a key step towards domination of West Eurasia.

The end of the war was not universally welcomed in Rome, for reasons of both politics and morale. When the Senate decreed upon a peace treaty with Carthage, Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a former consul, said he did not look upon the termination of the war as a blessing to Rome, since he feared that the Roman people would now sink back again into its former slumbers, from which it had been roused by the presence of Hannibal. (Valerius Maximus vii. 2. §3.). Others, most notably Cato the Elder, feared that if Carthage was not completely destroyed it would soon reacquire its power and pose new threats to Rome, and pressed for harsh peace conditions.

Hannibal survived the battle of Zama and continued to enjoy a leadership role in Carthage even after the end of the war. However, the Romans forced him into exile, where he continued to fight them, and he eventually committed suicide.

See also

• Hannibal
• Barcid
• List of battles of the Second Punic War
• Silius Italicus, who dramatised the war in his poem Punica

References

1. Bagnall, Nigel, The Punic Wars, 1990, ISBN 0312342144
2. Lazenby, John Francis, Hannibal's War, 1978