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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' disaster}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=June 2011}}

{{Infobox news event
| title = Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' disaster
| image = [[File:STS-107 Flight Insignia.svg|frameless|center]]
| caption = [[STS-107]] flight insignia
| date = {{Start date and age|2003|02|01}}
| time = 08:59 [[North American Eastern Time Zone|EST]] (13:59 [[Coordinated Universal Time|UTC]])
| place = Over [[Texas]] and [[Louisiana]]
| casualties1 = {{plainlist|
*{{nowrap|[[Rick Husband|Rick D. Husband]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[William C. McCool]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[Michael P. Anderson]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[Kalpana Chawla]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[David M. Brown]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[Laurel Clark]]}}
*{{nowrap|[[Ilan Ramon]]}}}}
| inquiries = [[Columbia Accident Investigation Board|''Columbia'' Accident Investigation Board]]
| cause = Wing damage from debris
| outcome = Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for more than two years while safety measures were added, including procedures to deal with catastrophic cabin depressurization, better crew restraints, and an automated parachute system.
}}
On February 1, 2003, the [[Space Shuttle Columbia|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'']] disintegrated upon [[Atmospheric entry|reentering]] [[Earth's atmosphere]], killing all seven crew members. The disaster was the second fatal accident in the [[Space Shuttle program]] after [[Space Shuttle Challenger|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'']], which [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|broke apart]] and killed the seven-member crew 73 seconds after liftoff in 1986.

During the launch of [[STS-107]], ''Columbia'''s 28th mission, a piece of foam insulation broke off from the [[Space Shuttle external tank]] and struck the left wing of the [[Space Shuttle orbiter|orbiter]]. A few previous shuttle launches had seen damage ranging from minor to nearly catastrophic from foam shedding,<ref name="foamstrikes">{{cite web |author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=6.1 A History of Foam Anomalies (page 121) |date=August 2003 |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/akamai.netstorage/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=June 26, 2014 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20140729063239/http://s3.amazonaws.com/akamai.netstorage/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |archivedate=July 29, 2014 |df=mdy-all }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/|title=Spaceflight Now {{!}} STS-119 Shuttle Report {{!}} Legendary commander tells story of shuttle's close call|website=spaceflightnow.com|access-date=2017-03-31|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170303211110/http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts119/090327sts27/|archivedate=March 3, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref> but some engineers suspected that the damage to ''Columbia'' was more serious. [[NASA]] managers limited the investigation, reasoning that the crew could not have fixed the problem if it had been confirmed.<ref>{{cite web |title=Columbia's problems began on left wing |url=http://staugustine.com/stories/020203/new_1299125.shtml |publisher=Associated Press via staugustine.com |author=Marcia Dunn |date=February 2, 2003 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102193557/http://staugustine.com/stories/020203/new_1299125.shtml |archivedate=November 2, 2013 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> When ''Columbia'' re-entered the [[atmosphere of Earth]], the damage allowed hot atmospheric gases to penetrate the heat shield and destroy the internal wing structure, which caused the spacecraft to become unstable and break apart.<ref name="USATODAY">{{cite news|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-03-04-shuttle-investigation_x.htm|agency=Associated Press|title=Molten Aluminum found on Columbia's thermal tiles|accessdate=August 13, 2007|work=USA Today|date=March 4, 2003|deadurl=no|archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110224095355/https://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-03-04-shuttle-investigation_x.htm|archivedate=February 24, 2011|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

After the disaster, Space Shuttle flight operations were suspended for more than two years, as they had been after the [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|''Challenger'' disaster]]. Construction of the [[International Space Station]] (ISS) was put on hold; the station relied entirely on the Russian [[Roscosmos State Corporation]] for resupply for 29 months until Shuttle flights resumed with [[STS-114]] and 41 months for crew rotation until [[STS-121]].

Several technical and organizational changes were made, including adding a thorough on-orbit inspection to determine how well the shuttle's [[Space shuttle thermal protection system|thermal protection system]] had endured the ascent, and keeping a designated rescue mission ready in case irreparable damage was found. Except for [[STS-125|one final mission]] to repair the [[Hubble Space Telescope]], subsequent shuttle missions were flown only to the ISS so that the crew could use it as a haven in case damage to the orbiter prevented safe reentry.

==Crew==
[[File:Crew of STS-107, official photo.jpg|thumb|The crew of [[STS-107]] in October 2001. From left to right: [[David M. Brown|Brown]], [[Rick Husband|Husband]], [[Laurel Clark|Clark]], [[Kalpana Chawla|Chawla]], [[Michael P. Anderson|Anderson]], [[William C. McCool|McCool]], [[Ilan Ramon|Ramon]]]]

* Commander: [[Rick Husband|Rick D. Husband]], a [[United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force]] [[Colonel (United States)|colonel]] and [[mechanical engineering|mechanical engineer]], who piloted a previous shuttle during the first docking with the [[International Space Station]] ([[STS-96]])
* Pilot: [[William C. McCool]], a [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] [[Commander (United States)|commander]]
* Payload commander: [[Michael P. Anderson]], a U.S. Air Force [[Lieutenant colonel (United States)|lieutenant colonel]], [[physicist]], and [[mission specialist]] who was in charge of the science mission
* [[Payload specialist]]: [[Ilan Ramon]], a colonel in the [[Israeli Air Force]] and the first Israeli [[astronaut]]
* Mission specialist: [[Kalpana Chawla]], [[aerospace engineering|aerospace engineer]] who was on her second space mission
* Mission specialist: [[David M. Brown]], a U.S. Navy [[Captain (U.S. Navy)|captain]] trained as an aviator and [[flight surgeon]]. Brown worked on scientific experiments.
* Mission specialist: [[Laurel Blair Salton Clark]], a U.S. Navy captain and flight surgeon. Clark worked on biological experiments.

==Debris strike during launch==
[[File:Close-up STS-107 Launch - GPN-2003-00080.jpg|thumb|left|upright|''Columbia'' lifting off on its final mission. The light-colored triangle visible at the base of the strut near the nose of the orbiter is the left bipod foam ramp. [http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/sts-107/movies/sts-107-launch.rm Video]]]
[[File:Space Shuttle external tank foam block.JPG|thumbnail|Space Shuttle external tank foam block]]
[[File:Left bipod foam ramp.jpg|thumb|Close-up of the left bipod foam ramp that broke off and damaged the shuttle wing]]

The shuttle's [[Space Shuttle external tank|main fuel tank]] is covered in [[thermal insulation]] foam intended to prevent ice from forming when the tank is full of [[liquid hydrogen]] and [[liquid oxygen|oxygen]]. Such ice could damage the shuttle if shed during lift-off.

Mission [[STS-107]] was the 113th Space Shuttle launch. Planned to begin on January 11, 2001, the mission was delayed 18&nbsp;times<ref name="mission objectives">{{cite web|author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=2.1 Mission Objectives and Their Rationales (page 28) |date=August 2003 |url=http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=January 28, 2011 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060630042334/http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_volume1.pdf |archivedate=June 30, 2006 |df= }}</ref> and eventually launched on January 16, 2003, following [[STS-113]]. (The Columbia Accident Investigation Board determined that this delay had nothing to do with the catastrophic failure.)<ref name="mission objectives"/>

81.7&nbsp;seconds after launch from [[Kennedy Space Center]]'s LC-39-A, a suitcase-sized piece of foam broke off from the external tank (ET), striking ''Columbia''{{'}}s left wing [[reinforced carbon-carbon]] (RCC) panels. As demonstrated by ground experiments conducted by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, this likely created a {{convert|6|to|10|in|cm|adj=on|sp=us}} diameter hole, allowing hot gases to enter the wing when ''Columbia'' later re-entered the atmosphere. At the time of the foam strike, the orbiter was at an altitude of about {{convert|65600|ft|km mi|sp=us}}, traveling at Mach&nbsp;2.46 ({{convert|1650|mph|m/s|disp=or|sp=us}}).

The left bipod foam ramp is an approximately three-foot (one-meter) long aerodynamic component made entirely of foam. The foam, not normally considered to be a structural material, is required to bear some aerodynamic loads. Because of these special requirements, the casting-in-place and curing of the ramps may be performed only by a senior technician.<ref name="CoF">{{cite web|url=http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/space/Columbia%20accident.htm|author=Century of Flight|title=The Columbia space shuttle accident|accessdate=August 13, 2007|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926220336/http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/space/Columbia%20accident.htm|archivedate=September 26, 2007|df=mdy-all}}</ref> The bipod ramp (having left and right sides) was originally designed to reduce aerodynamic stresses around the bipod attachment points at the external tank, but it was proven unnecessary in the wake of the accident and was removed from the external tank design for tanks flown after STS-107 (another foam ramp along the liquid oxygen line was also later removed from the tank design to eliminate it as a foam debris source, after analysis and tests proved this change safe).

Bipod ramp insulation had been observed falling off, in whole or in part, on four previous flights: [[STS-7]] (1983), [[STS-32]] (1990), [[STS-50]] (1992) and most recently [[STS-112]] (just two launches before STS-107). All affected shuttle missions completed successfully. NASA management came to refer to this phenomenon as "foam shedding". As with the [[O-ring]] erosion problems that ultimately doomed the [[Space Shuttle Challenger|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'']], NASA management became accustomed to these phenomena when no serious consequences resulted from these earlier episodes. This phenomenon was termed "normalization of deviance" by sociologist [[Diane Vaughan]] in her book on the [[Space Shuttle Challenger launch decision|''Challenger'' launch decision process]].<ref>{{cite web |author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=6.1 A History of Foam Anomalies (PDF) |date=August 2003 |url=http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=February 26, 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110806231858/http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |archivedate=August 6, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

As it happened, STS-112 had been the first flight with the "ET cam", a video feed mounted on the ET for the purpose of giving greater insight to the foam shedding problem. During that launch a chunk of foam broke away from the ET bipod ramp and hit the SRB-ET attach ring near the bottom of the left [[Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster|solid rocket booster (SRB)]] causing a dent four inches wide and three inches deep in it.<ref name="STS-112 SRB Foam Damage">{{cite web|url=http://aboutfacts.net/ColumbiaDocs/Debris/STS112/STS-112.6.pdf|author1=Armando Oliu|author2=KSC Debris Team|title=STS-112 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL ASSESSMENT|date=10 October 2002|accessdate=August 6, 2011|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://www.webcitation.org/69GZgmEeq?url=http://aboutfacts.net/ColumbiaDocs/Debris/STS112/STS-112.6.pdf|archivedate=July 19, 2012|df=mdy-all}}</ref> After STS-112, NASA leaders analyzed the situation and decided to press ahead under the justification that "[t]he ET is safe to fly with no new concerns (and no added risk)" of further foam strikes.<ref name="Jerry Smelser flight rationale ppt">{{cite web |author=Jerry Smelser |title=STS-112/ET-115 Bipod Ramp Foam Loss, Page 4 |date=October 31, 2002 |url=http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/news/columbia/frr/sts-113/08_et.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=August 5, 2011 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110416051305/http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/news/columbia/frr/sts-113/08_et.pdf |archivedate=April 16, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

Video taken during lift-off of STS-107 was routinely reviewed two hours later and revealed nothing unusual. The following day, higher-resolution film that had been processed overnight revealed the foam debris striking the left wing, potentially damaging the thermal protection on the Space Shuttle.<ref>{{cite book | title=Comm Check |author1=Cabbage, Michael |author2=Harwood, William |lastauthoramp=yes | year=2004 | publisher=Free Press | isbn=0-7432-6091-0 | page=94}}</ref> At the time, the exact location where the foam struck the wing could not be determined due to the low resolution of the tracking camera footage.

Meanwhile, NASA's judgment about the risks was revisited. [[Linda Ham]], chair of the Mission Management Team (MMT), said, "Rationale was lousy then and still is." Ham and Shuttle Program manager [[Ron Dittemore]] had both been present at the October 31, 2002, meeting where the decision to continue with launches was made.<ref>{{cite web| author=Gehman| title=Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Chapter 6, "A History of Foam Anomalies", pages 125 & 148| year=2003| url=http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf| accessdate=2011-08-05| display-authors=etal| deadurl=no| archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110806231858/http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf| archivedate=August 6, 2011| df=mdy-all}}</ref>

Post-disaster analysis revealed that two previous shuttle launches ([[STS-52]] and [[STS-62|-62]]) also had bipod ramp foam loss that went undetected. In addition, protuberance air load (PAL) ramp foam had also shed pieces, and there were also spot losses from large-area foams.

==Flight risk management==
In a risk-management scenario similar to the ''Challenger'' disaster, NASA management failed to recognize the relevance of engineering concerns for safety and suggestions for imaging to inspect possible damage, and failed to respond to engineers' requests about the status of astronaut inspection of the left wing. Engineers made three separate requests for [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] (DOD) imaging of the shuttle in orbit to determine damage more precisely. While the images were not guaranteed to show the damage, the capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to provide meaningful examination. NASA management did not honor the requests and in some cases intervened to stop the DOD from assisting.<ref>{{cite web| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=CAIB page 153 (PDF)| year=2003| url=http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/chapters/chapter6.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=December 17, 2010| deadurl=yes| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110516132723/http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/chapters/chapter6.pdf| archivedate=May 16, 2011| df=mdy-all}}</ref> The CAIB recommended subsequent shuttle flights be imaged while in orbit using ground-based or space-based DOD assets.<ref>{{cite web| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=CAIB Recommendation R6.3-2 (PDF)| year=2003| url=http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/chapters/chapter5.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=January 30, 2006| deadurl=yes| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060219044014/http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/chapters/chapter5.pdf| archivedate=February 19, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref> Details of the DOD's unfulfilled participation with ''Columbia'' remain secret; retired NASA official [[Wayne Hale]] stated in 2012 that "activity regarding other national assets and agencies remains classified and I cannot comment on that aspect of the Columbia tragedy".{{r|hale20120418}}

Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage were detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager [[Linda Ham]] for exhibiting this attitude.<ref>Columbia Accident Investigation Board, (2003) Volume 1, Chapter 6, p. 138. [http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL1/PART02.PDF CAIB Report Volume 1 Part 2] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161006052430/http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL1/PART02.PDF |date=October 6, 2016 }}(pdf). Retrieved June 8, 2006.</ref> In 2013, Hale recalled that Director of Mission Operations Jon C. Harpold shared with him before ''Columbia{{'}}''s destruction a mindset which Hale himself later agreed was widespread at the time, even among the astronauts themselves:

{{quote|You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS [Thermal Protection System]. If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?<ref name="hale20130113">{{cite web | url=http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/13/after-ten-years-working-on-the-wrong-problem/ | title=After Ten Years: Working on the Wrong Problem | work=Wayne Hale's Blog | date=2013-01-13 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170530152247/https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2013/01/13/after-ten-years-working-on-the-wrong-problem/ | archive-date=2017-05-30 | deadurl=no | accessdate=January 14, 2013 | author=Hale, Wayne}}</ref>}}

Much of the risk assessment hinged on damage predictions to the thermal protection system. These fall into two categories: damage to the silica tile on the wing lower surface, and damage to the [[reinforced carbon-carbon]] (RCC) leading-edge panels. The TPS includes a third category of components, thermal insulating blankets, but damage predictions are not typically performed on them. Damage assessments on the thermal blankets can be performed after an anomaly has been observed, and this was done at least once after the return to flight following Columbia's loss.

Before the flight NASA believed that the RCC was very durable. [[Charles F. Bolden]], who worked on tile-damage scenarios and repair methods early in his astronaut career, said in 2004 that:<ref name="bolden20040106">{{cite interview | title=Charles F. Bolden | date=2004-01-06 | accessdate=6 January 2014 | last=Bolden | first=Charles F. | subjectlink=Charles F. Bolden | interviewer1=Johnson, Sandra | interviewer2=Wright, Rebecca | interviewer3=Ross-Nazzal, Jennifer | work=NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project | location=Houston, Texas | url=http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_histories/BoldenCF/BoldenCF_1-6-04.htm | deadurl=no | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107031937/http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/oral_histories/BoldenCF/BoldenCF_1-6-04.htm | archivedate=January 7, 2014 | df=mdy-all }}</ref>

{{quote|...never did we talk about [the RCC] because we all thought that it was impenetrable ... I spent fourteen years in the space program flying, thinking that I had this huge mass that was about five or six inches thick on the leading edge of the wing. And, to find after ''Columbia'' that it was fractions of an inch thick, and that it wasn't as strong as the [[fiberglass|Fiberglas]] on your [[Chevy Corvette|Corvette]], that was an eye-opener, and I think for all of us ... the best minds that I know of, in and outside of NASA, never envisioned that as a failure mode.}}

Damage-prediction software was used to evaluate possible tile and RCC damage. The tool for predicting tile damage was known as "Crater", described by several NASA representatives in press briefings as not actually a software program but rather a statistical spreadsheet of observed past flight events and effects. The "Crater" tool predicted severe penetration of multiple tiles by the impact if it struck the TPS tile area, but NASA engineers downplayed this. It had been shown that the model overstated damage from small projectiles, and engineers believed that the model would also overstate damage from larger Spray-On Foam Insulation (SOFI) impacts. The program used to predict RCC damage was based on small ice impacts the size of cigarette butts, not larger SOFI impacts, as the ice impacts were the only recognized threats to RCC panels up to that point. Under one of 15 predicted SOFI impact paths, the software predicted an ice impact would completely penetrate the RCC panel. Engineers downplayed this, too, believing that impacts of the less dense SOFI material would result in less damage than ice impacts. In an e-mail exchange, NASA managers questioned whether the density of the SOFI could be used as justification for reducing predicted damage. Despite engineering concerns about the energy imparted by the SOFI material, NASA managers ultimately accepted the rationale to reduce predicted damage of the RCC panels from possible complete penetration to slight damage to the panel's thin coating.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_full.pdf|title=nasa-global.speedera.net|format=PDF|accessdate=July 27, 2007|deadurl=no|archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110412004504/http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_full.pdf|archivedate=April 12, 2011|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

Ultimately the NASA Mission Management Team felt there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the strike was an unsafe situation, so they declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue (not of highest importance) and denied the requests for the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] images.

On January 23, flight director Steve Stich sent an e-mail to ''Columbia'', informing commander Husband and pilot McCool of the foam strike while unequivocally dismissing any concerns about entry safety.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/01/columbia.usa |title=Email told fatal shuttle it was safe |date=July 1, 2003 |publisher=[[Associated Press|AP]]/[[Guardian.co.uk]] |accessdate=March 26, 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130827051509/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/01/columbia.usa |archivedate=August 27, 2013 |df=mdy-all }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jsc.nasa.gov/news/columbia/107_emails/foamemails.doc|title=Publicly released email exchange between Columbia and mission control|author=|date=|website=nasa.gov|accessdate=May 8, 2018|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20161223232853/http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/news/columbia/107_emails/foamemails.doc|archivedate=December 23, 2016|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

{{quote|During ascent at approximately 80 seconds, photo analysis shows that some debris from the area of the -Y ET Bipod Attach Point came loose and subsequently impacted the orbiter left wing, in the area of transition from Chine to Main Wing, creating a shower of smaller particles. The impact appears to be totally on the lower surface and no particles are seen to traverse over the upper surface of the wing. Experts have reviewed the high speed photography and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage. We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts107/030630emails/ |title=Foam strike email to shuttle commander released |author=William Harwood |date=June 30, 2003 |publisher=[[CBS News]]/spaceflightnow.com |accessdate=March 26, 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130311174005/http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts107/030630emails/ |archivedate=March 11, 2013 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>}}

Edward Tufte, an expert in information design and presentation,<ref name="wamo">{{cite news|url=http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/mayjune_2011/features/the_information_sage029137.php?page=1|title=The Information Sage|last=Yaffa|first=Joshua|newspaper=Washington Monthly|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110515083011/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/mayjune_2011/features/the_information_sage029137.php?page=1|archivedate=May 15, 2011|df=mdy-all}}</ref> remarked on poor modes of communication during the assessment made on the ground, before ''Columbia''<nowiki/>'s reentry. NASA and Boeing favored [[Microsoft PowerPoint]] for conveying information. PowerPoint uses multi-level bullet points and orients towards single-page-of-information groupings. This is not ideal for complex scientific and engineering reports and may have caused recipients to draw incorrect conclusions. In particular, the slide format may have emphasized optimistic options and glossed over the more accurate pessimistic viewpoints.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0001yB&topic_id=1|title=Edward Tufte forum: PowerPoint Does Rocket Science – and Better Techniques for Technical Reports|website=www.edwardtufte.com|access-date=2016-08-11|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160816034440/http://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0001yB&topic_id=1|archivedate=August 16, 2016|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

==Re-entry timeline==
''Columbia'' was scheduled to land at 9:16&nbsp;a.m. EST.{{refn|group=Note|A timeline beginning at 8:10.39 and ending at 09:00.53 is available as part of NASA's post-disaster investigation.<ref name="timeline">{{Cite web|url=https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/master_timeline.htm|title=NASA Columbia Master Timeline|last=|first=|date=March 10, 2003|website=NASA|access-date=February 27, 2018|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20171225231450/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/master_timeline.htm|archivedate=December 25, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>}}{{refn|group=Note|A chronology of STS-107 is available as part of NASA's post-disaster investigation.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/Columbia%20Chronology%20.htm|title=Columbia Chronology|last=Troxell|first=Jennifer|date=|website=NASA|access-date=February 27, 2018|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20171225231449/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Timelines/Columbia%20Chronology%20.htm|archivedate=December 25, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>}}
* ''2:30&nbsp;a.m. EST, February 1, 2003'': The Entry [[flight controller|Flight Control Team]] began duty in the Mission Control Center (known today as the [[Christopher C. Kraft Jr. Mission Control Center]]).
:The Flight Control Team had not been working on any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of ''Columbia''. In particular, the team had indicated no concerns about the debris that hit the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other. The team worked through the de-orbit preparation checklist and re-entry checklist procedures. Weather forecasters, with the help of pilots in the [[Shuttle Training Aircraft]], evaluated landing-site weather conditions at the Kennedy Space Center.
* ''8:00'': Mission Control Center Entry Flight Director [[LeRoy E. Cain|LeRoy Cain]] polled the Mission Control room for a GO/NO-GO decision for the de-orbit burn.
:All weather observations and forecasts were within guidelines set by the flight rules, and all systems were normal.
* ''8:10'': The Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) told the crew that they were GO for de-orbit burn.
* ''8:15:30 (EI-1719)'': Husband and McCool executed the de-orbit burn using ''Columbia'''s two Orbital Maneuvering System engines.
:The Orbiter was upside down and tail-first over the [[Indian Ocean]] at an altitude of {{convert|175|mi|km|sp=us}} and speed of {{convert|17500|mph|km/h|sp=us}} when the burn was executed. A 2-minute, 38-second de-orbit burn during the 255th orbit slowed the Orbiter to begin its re-entry into the atmosphere. The burn proceeded normally, putting the crew under about one-tenth gravity. Husband then turned ''Columbia'' right side up, facing forward with the nose pitched up.
* ''8:44:09 (EI+000)'': Entry Interface (EI), arbitrarily defined as the point at which the Orbiter entered the discernible atmosphere at {{convert|400000|ft|km mi|sp=us}}, occurred over the [[Pacific Ocean]].
:As ''Columbia'' descended, the heat of reentry caused wing leading-edge temperatures to rise steadily, reaching an estimated {{convert|2500|F|C}} during the next six minutes. (As former Space Shuttle Program Manager Wayne Hale said in a press briefing, about 90% of this heating is the result of compression of the atmospheric gas caused by the orbiter's supersonic flight, rather than the result of friction.)
[[File:STS-107 Columbia entry imaged from ground.jpg|thumb|''Columbia'' at about 8:57. Debris is visible coming from the left wing (bottom). The image was taken at [[Starfire Optical Range]] at [[Kirtland Air Force Base]].]]
* ''8:48:39 (EI+270)'': A sensor on the left wing leading edge spar showed strains higher than those seen on previous ''Columbia'' re-entries.
:This was recorded only on the Modular Auxiliary Data System, which is similar in concept to a [[flight data recorder]], and was not sent to ground controllers or shown to the crew.
* ''8:49:32 (EI+323)'': ''Columbia'' executed a planned roll to the right. Speed: [[Mach number|Mach]] 24.5.
:''Columbia'' began a banking turn to manage lift and therefore limit the Orbiter's rate of descent and heating.
* ''8:50:53 (EI+404)'': ''Columbia'' entered a 10-minute period of peak heating, during which the thermal stresses were at their maximum. Speed: Mach 24.1; altitude: {{convert|243000|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
* ''8:52:00 (EI+471)'': ''Columbia'' was about {{convert|300|mi|km|sp=us}} west of the [[California]] coastline.
:The wing leading-edge temperatures usually reached {{convert|2650|F|C}} at this point.
* ''8:53:26 (EI+557)'': ''Columbia'' crossed the California coast west of [[Sacramento, California|Sacramento]]. Speed: Mach 23; altitude: {{convert|231600|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
[[File:Columbia debris detected by radar.jpg|thumb|''Columbia'' debris (in red, orange, and yellow) detected by [[National Weather Service]] radar over Texas and [[Louisiana]]]]
:The Orbiter's wing leading edge typically reached more than {{convert|2800|F|C}} at this point.
* ''8:53:46 (EI+577)'': Various people on the ground saw signs of debris being shed. Speed: Mach 22.8; altitude: {{convert|230200|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
:The superheated air surrounding the Orbiter suddenly brightened, causing a streak in the Orbiter's luminescent trail that was quite noticeable in the pre-dawn skies over the West Coast. Observers witnessed four similar events during the following 23&nbsp;seconds. Dialogue on some of the amateur footage indicates the observers were aware of the abnormality of what they were filming.
* ''8:54:24 (EI+615)'': The Maintenance, Mechanical, and Crew Systems (MMACS) officer told the Flight Director that four hydraulic fluid temperature sensors in the left wing had stopped reporting. In Mission Control, re-entry had been proceeding normally up to this point.
* ''8:54:25 (EI+616)'': ''Columbia'' crossed from California into [[Nevada]] airspace. Speed: Mach 22.5; altitude: {{convert|227400|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
:Witnesses observed a bright flash at this point and 18 similar events in the next four minutes.
* ''8:55:00 (EI+651)'': Nearly 11 minutes after ''Columbia'' re-entered the atmosphere, wing leading-edge temperatures normally reached nearly {{convert|3000|F|C}}.
* ''8:55:32 (EI+683)'': ''Columbia'' crossed from Nevada into [[Utah]]. Speed: Mach 21.8; altitude: {{convert|223400|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
* ''8:55:52 (EI+703)'': ''Columbia'' crossed from Utah into [[Arizona]].
* ''8:56:30 (EI+741)'': ''Columbia'' began a roll reversal, turning from right to left over Arizona.
* ''8:56:45 (EI+756)'': ''Columbia'' crossed from Arizona to [[New Mexico]]. Speed: Mach 20.9; altitude: {{convert|219000|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
* ''8:57:24 (EI+795)'': ''Columbia'' passed just north of [[Albuquerque, New Mexico|Albuquerque]].
* ''8:58:00 (EI+831)'': At this point, wing leading-edge temperatures typically decreased to {{convert|2880|F|C}}.
* ''8:58:20 (EI+851)'': ''Columbia'' crossed from New Mexico into Texas. Speed: Mach 19.5; altitude: {{convert|209800|ft|km mi|sp=us}}.
:At about this time, the Orbiter shed a Thermal Protection System tile, the most westerly piece of debris that has been recovered. Searchers found the tile in a field in [[Littlefield, Texas]], just northwest of [[Lubbock, Texas|Lubbock]].
* ''8:59:15 (EI+906)'': MMACS told the Flight Director that pressure readings on both left main landing-gear tires were indicating "off-scale low".
:"Off-scale low" is a reading that falls below the minimum capability of the sensor, and it usually indicates that the sensor has stopped functioning, due to internal or external factors, not that the quantity it measures is actually below the sensor's minimum response value.
* ''8:59:32 (EI+923)'': A broken response from the mission commander was recorded: "Roger, uh, bu – [cut off in mid-word] ..." It was the last communication from the crew and the last [[telemetry]] signal received in Mission Control. The Flight Director then instructed the Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) to let the crew know that Mission Control saw the messages and was evaluating the indications, and added that the Flight Control Team did not understand the crew's last transmission.
* ''8:59:37 (EI+928)'': Hydraulic pressure, which is required to move the flight control surfaces, was lost at about 8:59:37. At that time, the Master Alarm would have sounded for the loss of hydraulics, used to move flight control surfaces. The shuttle would have started to roll and yaw uncontrollably, and the crew would have become aware of the serious problem.<ref name="Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2008">{{cite web| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report| year=2008| url=http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407002022/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf| archivedate=April 7, 2016| df=mdy-all}}</ref>
* ''9:00:18 (EI+969)'': Videos and eyewitness reports by observers on the ground in and near [[Dallas, Texas|Dallas]] indicated that the Orbiter had disintegrated overhead, continued to break up into smaller pieces, and left multiple ion trails, as it continued eastward. In Mission Control, while the loss of signal was a cause for concern, there was no sign of any serious problem. Before the orbiter broke up at 9:00:18, the ''Columbia'' cabin pressure was nominal<!--hunh?--> and the crew was capable of conscious actions.<ref name="Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2008"/> Although the crew module remained mostly intact through the breakup, it was damaged enough that it lost pressure at a rate fast enough to incapacitate the crew within seconds,<ref>{{cite web|title=Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report|url=http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf|website=NASA.gov|pages=2–90|year=2008|quote=The 51-L Challenger accident investigation showed that the Challenger CM remained intact and the crew was able to take some immediate actions after vehicle breakup, although the loads experienced were much higher as a result of the aerodynamic loads (estimated at 16 G to 21 G).5 The Challenger crew became incapacitated quickly and could not complete activation of all breathing air systems, leading to the conclusion that an incapacitating cabin depressurization occurred. By comparison, the Columbia crew experienced lower loads (~3.5 G) at the CE. The fact that none of the crew members lowered their visors strongly suggests that the crew was incapacitated after the CE by a rapid depressurization. Although no quantitative conclusion can be made regarding the cabin depressurization rate, it is probable that the cabin depressurization rate was high enough to incapacitate the crew in a matter of seconds. Conclusion L1-5. The depressurization incapacitated the crew members so rapidly that they were not able to lower their helmet visors.|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407002022/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf|archivedate=April 7, 2016|df=mdy-all}}</ref> and was completely depressurized no later than 9:00:53.
* ''9:00:57 (EI+1008)'': The crew module, intact to this point, was seen breaking into small subcomponents. It disappeared from view at 9:01:10. The crew members, if not already dead, were killed no later than this point.
* ''9:05'': Residents of north central Texas, particularly near [[Tyler, Texas|Tyler]], reported a loud boom, a small concussion wave, smoke trails and debris in the clear skies above the counties east of Dallas.
* ''9:12:39 (EI+1710)'': After hearing of reports of the shuttle being seen to break apart, Entry Flight Director LeRoy Cain declared a contingency (events leading to loss of the vehicle) and alerted search-and-rescue teams in the debris area. He called on the [[Ground Controller]] to "lock the doors", meaning no one would be permitted to enter or leave until everything needed for investigation of the accident had been secured.<ref>{{cite web| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Volume I| year=2003| url=http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html| accessdate=January 4, 2006| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://www.webcitation.org/69Xmc0fS0?url=http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/CAIB_Vol1.html| archivedate=July 30, 2012| df=mdy-all}}</ref> Two minutes later, Mission Control put contingency procedures into effect.

==Crew survivability aspects==
In 2008, NASA released a detailed report on survivability aspects of the ''Columbia'' reentry.<ref>{{cite web |title=Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report |url=https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf}}</ref> The crew would have had less than a minute between the beginning of orbiter disintegration and depressurization. The structural failure of the left wing set off alarms in the cabin, although they had no way of knowing that the wing had broken apart as the rear of the orbiter could not be seen from the cabin. All evidence indicated that the crew frantically tried to regain control of ''Columbia'' as it began to spin out of control, but the loss of the left wing caused the orbiter to yaw to the right, exposing its underside to extreme aerodynamic forces and causing total structural disintegration. The crew cabin separated from the rest of the orbiter and rapidly depressurized, which would have killed or incapacitated the astronauts within seconds. Afterwards, the cabin spun around at high RPM, which caused the seat restraints on their upper bodies to fail. They were thus whipped around violently and pummeled by flying and falling objects from the disintegrating cabin, along with their heads and necks being slammed against the helmets, which were not designed to provide any head protection. Even if the cabin had remained structurally intact and reached a lower altitude where air could refill it, the high altitude depressurization would have been fatal to the astronauts unless they received medical attention within 5 minutes, approximately the amount of time it would take between cerebral hypoxia and brain death.

After cabin disintegration, the astronauts' bodies were released into the upper atmosphere and battered by extreme aerodynamic forces and temperatures. The remains of the crew then fell some {{convert|200,000|feet}} to Earth, where they were also subjected to burning from aerodynamic heating. The official NASA report omitted some of the more graphic details on the recovery of the remains; however, witnesses reported various gruesome finds such as a human heart and parts of femur bones.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420965/Searchers-stumble-on-human-remains.html|title=Searchers stumble on human remains|last=Harnden|first=Toby|date=|work=Telegraph.co.uk|access-date=2017-09-05|publication-date=2003-02-03|language=en|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170908005642/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420965/Searchers-stumble-on-human-remains.html|archivedate=September 8, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

All evidence indicated that crew error was in no way responsible for the disintegration of the orbiter, and they had acted correctly and according to procedure at the first indication of trouble. Although some of the crew were not wearing gloves or helmets during reentry and some were not properly restrained in their seats, doing these things would have added nothing to their survival chances other than perhaps keeping them alive and conscious another 30 or so seconds.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf |title=Archived copy |accessdate=2016-12-06 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407002022/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf |archivedate=April 7, 2016 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

==Presidential response==
[[File:George W Bush Columbia FINAL.ogg|thumb|President George W. Bush's address on the ''Columbia''{{'}}s destruction, February 1, 2003]]
At 14:04 EST (19:04 UTC), [[George W. Bush|President George W. Bush]] said, "This day has brought terrible news and great sadness to our country&nbsp;... The ''Columbia'' is lost; there are no survivors". Despite the disaster, Bush said, "The cause in which they died will continue....Our journey into space will go on".<ref>{{cite web| author=Bush, George W.| title=President Addresses Nation on Space Shuttle Columbia Tragedy| publisher=The White House| year=2003| url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030201-2.html| accessdate=January 4, 2006| deadurl=no| archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20140211125535/https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030201-2.html| archivedate=February 11, 2014| df=mdy-all}}</ref> Bush later declared East Texas a federal disaster area, allowing federal agencies to help with the recovery effort.<ref>Introduction to Emergency Management, Fourth Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, Burlington, 2010, p. 166</ref>

==Recovery of debris==
[[File:Grid with Columbia's Debris - GPN-2003-00081.jpg|thumbnail|A grid on the floor is used to organize recovered debris]]
[[File:Columbia's Main Engine Powerheads - GPN-2003-00076.jpg|thumb|alt=refer to caption|Recovered power-head of one of Columbia's main engines]]
More than 2,000 debris fields were found in sparsely populated areas from [[Nacogdoches, Texas|Nacogdoches]] in [[East Texas]], where a large amount of debris fell, to western [[Louisiana]] and the southwestern [[counties of Arkansas]]. A large amount of debris was recovered between [[Tyler, Texas]] and [[Palestine, Texas]]. One debris field has been mapped along a path stretching from south of [[Fort Worth, Texas|Fort Worth]] to [[Hemphill, Texas]], as well as into parts of Louisiana.<ref name="Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003 p. 41">Columbia Accident Investigation Board, (2003) Volume 1, Chapter 2, p. 41.</ref> Various notable places that had debris included [[Stephen F. Austin State University]] in Nacogdoches and several casinos in [[Shreveport, Louisiana]].<ref name="Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003 p. 41"/> Along with pieces of the shuttle and bits of equipment, searchers also found human body parts, including arms, feet, a torso, and a heart.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420965/Searchers-stumble-on-human-remains.html | location=London | work=The Daily Telegraph | first1=Toby | last1=Harnden | title=Searchers stumble on human remains | date=February 3, 2003 | deadurl=no | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170911233245/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420965/Searchers-stumble-on-human-remains.html | archivedate=September 11, 2017 | df=mdy-all }}</ref>

In the months after the disaster, the largest-ever organized ground search took place.<ref name="News Researcher">{{cite web |url=http://researchernews.larc.nasa.gov/archives/2003/050903/Search.html |title=In Search Of... |accessdate=February 9, 2009 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090320232815/http://researchernews.larc.nasa.gov/archives/2003/050903/Search.html |archivedate=March 20, 2009 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>
Thousands of volunteers descended upon Texas to participate in the effort to gather the Shuttle's remains. According to Mike Ciannilli, Project Manager of the Columbia Research and Preservation Office, "[these people] put their life on hold to help out the nation's space program," showing "what space means to people."<ref name="Space Safety Magazine Columbia Disaster">{{cite web |author=Ramasamy Venugopal |publisher=Space Safety Magazine |url=http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-disasters/columbia-disaster/ |title=The Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster |accessdate=January 28, 2015 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150204015337/http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-disasters/columbia-disaster/ |archivedate=February 4, 2015 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>
NASA issued warnings to the public that any debris could contain hazardous chemicals, that it should be left untouched, its location reported to local [[emergency services]] or government authorities, and that anyone in unauthorized possession of debris would be prosecuted. Because of the widespread area, volunteer [[amateur radio operator]]s accompanied the search teams to provide communications support.<ref>{{cite web | author=awextra@arrl.org | title=''Hams Aid Columbia Debris Search in Western States'' | publisher=American Radio Relay League, Inc. | year=2003 | url=http://www.arrl.org/news/stories/2003/02/26/2/?nc=1 | accessdate =February 1, 2007 |archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20051104131736/http://www.arrl.org/news/stories/2003/02/26/2/?nc=1 |archivedate = November 4, 2005}}</ref>

A group of small (1&nbsp;mm) adult ''[[Caenorhabditis elegans]]'' worms, living in [[petri dish]]es enclosed in aluminum canisters, survived reentry and impact with the ground and were recovered weeks after the disaster.<ref>{{cite web| author=Szewczyk, Nathaniel| title=''Caenorhabditis elegans'' Survives Atmospheric Breakup of STS-107, Space Shuttle Columbia| publisher=Mary Ann Liebert, Astrobiology| year=2005| url=http://www.liebertpub.com/prdetails.aspx?pr_id=428| archive-url=https://archive.is/20120529141120/http://www.liebertpub.com/prdetails.aspx?pr_id=428| dead-url=yes| archive-date=May 29, 2012| accessdate=November 2, 2006| display-authors=etal}}</ref><ref>{{cite news| title=Worms survived Columbia disaster| publisher=BBC News| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2992123.stm| date=May 1, 2003| accessdate=December 16, 2005| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20051106233827/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2992123.stm| archivedate=November 6, 2005| df=mdy-all}}</ref> The culture was found to be alive on April 28, 2003.<ref>[http://www.cmu.edu/magazine/03fall/wormsurvive.html Worms Survive Shuttle Disaster] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161011165150/http://www.cmu.edu/magazine/03fall/wormsurvive.html |date=October 11, 2016 }} Fall 2003</ref> The worms were part of a biological research in canisters experiment designed to study the effect of weightlessness on [[physiology]]; the experiment was conducted by [[Cassie Conley]], NASA's [[planetary protection]] officer.

Debris Search Pilot Jules F. Mier Jr. and Debris Search Aviation Specialist Charles Krenek died in a helicopter crash that injured three others during the search.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.check-six.com/Crash_Sites/STS107-N175PA.htm |title=The 'Columbia' Debris Recovery Helo Crash |publisher=Check-Six.com |accessdate=September 1, 2009 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090123171943/http://check-six.com/Crash_Sites/STS107-N175PA.htm |archivedate=January 23, 2009 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

Some Texas residents recovered some of the debris, ignoring the warnings, and attempted to sell it on the [[online auction business model|online auction site]] [[eBay]], starting at $10,000. The auction was quickly removed, but prices for ''Columbia'' merchandise such as programs, photographs and patches, went up dramatically following the disaster, creating a surge of ''Columbia''-related listings.<ref>{{cite news| title=Shuttle debris offered online| publisher=BBC News| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2720225.stm| date=February 3, 2003| accessdate=May 27, 2007| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060923052013/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2720225.stm| archivedate=September 23, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref> A three-day amnesty offered for "looted" shuttle debris brought in hundreds of illegally recovered pieces.<ref>{{cite news| title=Debris Amnesty Ends, 9 May Face Looting Charges | agency=Associated Press| url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454&dat=20030209&id=-2o0AAAAIBAJ&sjid=jR8EAAAAIBAJ&pg=5501,2583517| date=February 8, 2003}}</ref> About 40,000 recovered pieces of debris have never been identified. The largest pieces recovered include the front landing gear<ref>{{cite news| title=Divers Find Shuttle's Front Landing Gear| publisher=Fox News| url=http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,78993,00.html| date=February 19, 2003| accessdate=April 25, 2010| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20101203053231/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,78993,00.html| archivedate=December 3, 2010| df=mdy-all}}</ref> and a window frame.<ref>{{cite news| title=NASA begins packing up shuttle debris for storage|work=USA Today | url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-09-10-space-shuttle-storage_x.htm| date=September 10, 2003| accessdate=June 22, 2009}}</ref>

[[File:STS-107 Cockpit Video 3.jpg|thumb|The glow of reentry as seen out of the front windows]]
On May 9, 2008, it was reported that data from a [[disk drive]] on board ''Columbia'' had survived the shuttle accident, and while part of the 340&nbsp;MB drive was damaged, 99% of the data was recovered.<ref>{{cite web |last=Fonseca |first=Brian |url=http://www.computerworld.com/article/2535754/data-center/shuttle-columbia-s-hard-drive-data-recovered-from-crash-site.html |title=Shuttle Columbia's hard drive data recovered from crash site |publisher=Computerworld.com |date=May 7, 2008 |accessdate=December 9, 2016 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220091053/http://www.computerworld.com/article/2535754/data-center/shuttle-columbia-s-hard-drive-data-recovered-from-crash-site.html |archivedate=December 20, 2016 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> The drive was used to store data from an experiment on the properties of [[shear thinning]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/25apr_cvx2.htm |title=The Physics of Whipped Cream |publisher=Science.nasa.gov |accessdate=September 1, 2009 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090901032246/http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2008/25apr_cvx2.htm |archivedate=September 1, 2009 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

On July 29, 2011, Nacogdoches authorities told NASA that a {{convert|4|ft|adj=on}} diameter piece of debris had been found in a lake. NASA identified the piece as a power reactant storage and distribution tank.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/02/texas.shuttle.debris/index.html |title=Space shuttle Columbia part found in East Texas |publisher=CNN |date=August 2, 2011 |accessdate=August 2, 2011 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110802170346/http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/08/02/texas.shuttle.debris/index.html |archivedate=August 2, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

All recovered non-human ''Columbia'' debris is stored in unused office space at the [[Vehicle Assembly Building]], except for parts of the crew compartment, which are kept separate.<ref>{{cite news | url=http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/31/nation/na-remains31 | work=Los Angeles Times | title=Shuttle Columbia's Debris on View at NASA Facility | date=January 31, 2004 | deadurl=no | archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20120810001231/http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/31/nation/na-remains31 | archivedate=August 10, 2012 | df=mdy-all }}</ref>

===Crew cabin video===
[[File:STS-107, final moments in cabin (Space Shuttle Columbia disaster).webm|thumb|Video taken by the crew of part of re-entry]]
Among the recovered items was a videotape recording made by the astronauts during the start of re-entry. The 13-minute recording shows the flight crew astronauts conducting routine re-entry procedures and joking with each other. None gives any indication of a problem. In the video, the flight-deck crew puts on their gloves and passes the video camera around to record [[plasma (physics)|plasma]] and flames visible outside the windows of the orbiter (a normal occurrence). The recording, which on normal flights would have continued through landing, ends about four minutes before the shuttle began to disintegrate and 11 minutes before Mission Control lost the signal from the orbiter.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/feb/HP_news_n03023.html |title=NASA Releases Columbia Crew Cabin Video |author=Glenn Mahone/Bob Jacobs (NASA Headquarters), Eileen M. Hawley (Johnson Space Center) |date=February 28, 2003 |publisher=NASA |accessdate=March 29, 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130801023134/http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/feb/HP_news_n03023.html |archivedate=August 1, 2013 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

==Investigation==

===Initial investigation===
[[File:Impact-test.jpg|thumb|Mock-up of a [[Space Shuttle]] leading edge made with an [[Reinforced carbon-carbon|RCC]]-panel taken from [[Space Shuttle Discovery|''Discovery'']]. Simulation of known and possible conditions of the foam impact on [[Space Shuttle Columbia|''Columbia'']]'s final launch showed [[brittle fracture]] of RCC.]]

NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager [[Ron Dittemore]] reported that "The first indication was loss of temperature sensors and hydraulic systems on the left wing. They were followed seconds and minutes later by several other problems, including loss of tire pressure indications on the left main gear and then indications of excessive structural heating".<ref>{{cite news| author=Dittemore, Ron| title=NASA Briefing, Part I| publisher=CNN| year=2003| url=http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/01/bn.05.html| accessdate=January 4, 2006| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060209120502/http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/01/bn.05.html| archivedate=February 9, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref> Analysis of 31 seconds of telemetry data which had initially been filtered out because of data corruption within it showed the shuttle fighting to maintain its orientation, eventually using maximum thrust from its Reaction Control System jets.

The investigation focused on the foam strike from the very beginning. Incidents of debris strikes from ice and foam causing damage during take-off were already well known, and had damaged orbiters, most noticeably during [[STS-45]], [[STS-27]], and [[STS-87]].<ref>{{cite web| author=Woods, David| title=Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia| year=2004| url=http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/space/Create%20foresight%20Col-draft.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=February 1, 2005| deadurl=yes| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20050309101635/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/space/Create%20foresight%20Col-draft.pdf| archivedate=March 9, 2005| df=mdy-all}}</ref> After the loss of ''Columbia'', NASA concluded that mistakes during installation were the likely cause of foam loss, and retrained employees at [[Michoud Assembly Facility]] in Louisiana to apply foam without defects.{{r|hale20120418}} Tile damage had also been traced to ablating insulating material from the [[cryogenic]] fuel tank in the past.

===Columbia Accident Investigation Board===
{{Main|Columbia Accident Investigation Board}}

Following protocols established after the [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|loss]] of ''[[Space Shuttle Challenger|Challenger]]'', an independent investigating board was created immediately after the accident. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, or CAIB, was chaired by retired US Navy Admiral [[Harold W. Gehman, Jr.]],<ref>{{cite web|author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=Board Members |year=2003 |url=http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |accessdate=May 28, 2012 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120522072615/http://caib.nasa.gov/board_members/default.html |archivedate=May 22, 2012 |df= }}</ref> and consisted of expert military and civilian analysts who investigated the accident in detail.

''Columbia''{{'}}s [[flight data recorder]] was found near [[Hemphill, Texas]], on March 19, 2003.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://space.about.com/cs/spaceshuttles/a/caib032703a.htm|accessdate=1 February 2013|title=Review of Columbia's data recorder will begin this weekend|author=NASA|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130329232245/http://space.about.com/cs/spaceshuttles/a/caib032703a.htm|archivedate=March 29, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref> Unlike commercial jet aircraft, the space shuttles did not have flight data recorders intended for after-crash analysis. Instead, the vehicle data were transmitted in real time to the ground via [[telemetry]]. Since ''Columbia'' was the first shuttle, it had a special flight data OEX (Orbiter EXperiments) recorder, designed to help engineers better understand vehicle performance during the first test flights. After the initial Shuttle test-flights were completed, the recorder was never removed from ''Columbia'', and it was still functioning on the crashed flight. It recorded many hundreds of parameters, and contained very extensive logs of structural and other data, which allowed the CAIB to reconstruct many of the events during the process leading to breakup.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts107/030319recorder/|accessdate=1 February 2013|work=Spaceflight Now|title=Data recorder recovered; could hold key insights|date=19 March 2003|author=Harwood, William|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130203121644/http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts107/030319recorder/|archivedate=February 3, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref> Investigators could often use the loss of signals from sensors on the wing to track how the damage progressed.<ref name=learn/> This was correlated with forensic debris analysis conducted at [[Lehigh University]] and other tests to obtain a final conclusion about the probable course of events.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www3.lehigh.edu/News/RCEASnews_story.asp?iNewsID=1465|accessdate=1 February 2013|publisher=Lehigh University|title=Materials science students prepare to analyze debris recovered from the shuttle Columbia|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060912061306/http://www3.lehigh.edu/News/RCEASnews_story.asp?iNewsID=1465|archivedate=September 12, 2006|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

Beginning on May 30, 2003, foam impact tests were performed by [[Southwest Research Institute]]. They used a compressed air gun to fire a foam block of similar size and mass to that which struck ''Columbia'', at the same estimated speed. To represent the leading edge of ''Columbia''{{'}}s left wing, [[Reinforced carbon-carbon|RCC]] panels from NASA stock, along with the actual leading-edge panels from ''[[Space Shuttle Enterprise|Enterprise]]'', which were fiberglass, were mounted to a simulating structural metal frame. At the beginning of testing, the likely impact site was estimated to be between RCC panel 6 and 9, inclusive. Over many days, dozens of the foam blocks were shot at the wing leading edge model at various angles. These produced only cracks or surface damage to the RCC panels.

During June, further analysis of information from Columbia's flight data recorder narrowed the probable impact site to one single panel: RCC wing panel 8. On July 7, in a final round of testing, a block fired at the side of an RCC panel 8 created a hole {{convert|16|by|16.7|in|cm|sp=us}} in that protective RCC panel.<ref>{{cite web| author=Justin Kerr| title=Impact Testing of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System | year=2003| url=http://research.jsc.nasa.gov/PDF/Eng-20.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=January 30, 2006| deadurl=yes| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060219044015/http://research.jsc.nasa.gov/PDF/Eng-20.pdf| archivedate=February 19, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref> The tests demonstrated that a foam impact of the type ''Columbia'' sustained could seriously breach the thermal protection system on the wing leading edge.<ref>{{cite book| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board| chapter=Volume I, Chapter 3| page=78| year=2003| url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2003/caib-report_vol1_chapter3.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=January 4, 2006| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20051227031828/http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2003/caib-report_vol1_chapter3.pdf| archivedate=December 27, 2005| df=mdy-all}}</ref>

===Conclusions===

On August 26, 2003, the CAIB issued its report on the accident. The report confirmed the immediate cause of the accident was a breach in the leading edge of the left wing, caused by insulating foam shed during launch. The report also delved deeply into the underlying organizational and cultural issues that led to the accident. The report was highly critical of NASA's decision-making and risk-assessment processes. It concluded the organizational structure and processes were sufficiently flawed and that a compromise of safety was expected no matter who was in the key decision-making positions. An example was the position of Shuttle Program Manager, where one individual was responsible for achieving safe, timely launches and acceptable costs, which are often conflicting goals. The CAIB report found that NASA had accepted deviations from design criteria as normal when they happened on several flights and did not lead to mission-compromising consequences. One of those was the conflict between a [[design specification]] stating that the thermal protection system was not designed to withstand significant impacts and the common occurrence of impact damage to it during flight. The board made recommendations for significant changes in processes and organizational culture.

On December 30, 2008, NASA released a further report, entitled Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report, produced by a second commission, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). NASA had commissioned this group, "to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles."<ref name="Layout 1">{{cite web |url=http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf |title=Layout 1 |format=PDF |accessdate=September 1, 2009 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407002022/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf |archivedate=April 7, 2016 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> The report concluded that: "The Columbia depressurization event occurred so rapidly that the crew members were incapacitated within seconds, before they could configure the suit for full protection from loss of cabin pressure. Although circulatory systems functioned for a brief time, the effects of the depressurization were severe enough that the crew could not have regained consciousness. This event was lethal to the crew."

The report also concluded:
* The crew did not have time to prepare themselves. Some crew members were not wearing their safety gloves, and one crew member was not wearing a helmet. New policies gave the crew more time to prepare for descent.
* The crew's safety harnesses malfunctioned during the violent descent. The harnesses on the three remaining shuttles were upgraded after the accident.
The key recommendations of the report included that future spacecraft crew survival systems should not rely on manual activation to protect the crew.<ref>[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407002022/http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf |date=April 7, 2016 }}.</ref>

===Other contributing factors===

Unintended consequences of decisions contributed to the failure: the original tank white paint was removed to save {{cvt|600|lb}}, exposing the rust-orange-colored foam; the tank foam chemical composition was altered to meet [[Environmental Protection Agency]] requirements, weakening it; upgrades to the leading edge proposed in the early 1990s were not funded because NASA was working on the later-cancelled [[VentureStar]] single-stage-to-orbit shuttle replacement.<ref name=AvWeek4Dec2017>{{cite news |url= http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/opinion-jim-albaugh-s-lessons-aerospace-success |title= Opinion: Jim Albaugh's Lessons Of Aerospace Success |date= Dec 4, 2017 |author= [[James Albaugh]] |work= Aviation Week & Space Technology |deadurl= no |archiveurl= https://web.archive.org/web/20171213013351/http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/opinion-jim-albaugh-s-lessons-aerospace-success |archivedate= December 13, 2017 |df= mdy-all }}</ref>

===Possible emergency procedures===

One question of special importance was whether NASA could have saved the astronauts had they known of the danger.<ref>{{citeweb|url=https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/|title=The audacious rescue plan that might have saved space shuttle ''Columbia''|publisher=Ars Technica|date=1 February 2016|accessdate=27 September 2016|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160929012837/http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/|archivedate=September 29, 2016|df=mdy-all}}</ref> This would have to involve either rescue or repair – docking at the [[International Space Station]] for use as a haven while awaiting rescue (or to use the [[Soyuz (spacecraft)|Soyuz]] to systematically ferry the crew to safety) would have been impossible due to the different [[orbital inclination]] of the vehicles.

The CAIB determined that a rescue mission, though risky, might have been possible provided NASA management had taken action soon enough.<ref name="CAIBVolIChap6Page173">{{cite web |author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=Decision Making at NASA |work=CAIB Report, Volume I, chapter 6.4 "Possibility of Rescue or Repair" |pages=173ff |year=2003 |url=http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |format=PDF |accessdate=March 28, 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110806231858/http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB_lowres_chapter6.pdf |archivedate=August 6, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref><ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12">{{cite web |author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board |title=STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment |work=CAIB Report, Volume II, appendix D.13 |pages=391ff |format=PDF |year=2003 |url=http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF |accessdate=January 30, 2006 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060219044010/http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/caib/PDFS/VOL2/D13.PDF |archivedate=February 19, 2006 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> Normally, a rescue mission is not possible, due to the time required to prepare a shuttle for launch, and the limited consumables (power, water, air) of an orbiting shuttle. However, ''Atlantis'' was well along in processing for a planned March 1 launch on [[STS-114]], and ''Columbia'' carried an unusually large quantity of consumables due to an [[Extended Duration Orbiter]] package. The CAIB determined that this would have allowed ''Columbia'' to stay in orbit until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators determined that ''Atlantis'' processing could have been expedited with no skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch. Hence, if nothing went wrong, there was a five-day overlap for a possible rescue. As mission control could deorbit an empty shuttle, but could not control the orbiter's reentry and landing, it would likely have sent ''Columbia'' into the Pacific Ocean;<ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12" /> NASA later developed the [[Remote Control Orbiter]] system to permit mission control to land a shuttle.

NASA investigators determined that on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts was possible but overall considered "high risk", primarily due to the uncertain resiliency of the repair using available materials and the anticipated high risk of doing additional damage to the Orbiter.<ref name="CAIBVolIChap6Page173" /><ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12" /> ''Columbia'' did not carry the [[Canadarm]], or Remote Manipulator System, which would normally be used for camera inspection or transporting a spacewalking astronaut to the wing. Therefore, an unusual emergency [[extra-vehicular activity]] (EVA) would have been required. While there was no astronaut EVA training for maneuvering to the wing, astronauts are always prepared for a similarly difficult emergency EVA to close the external tank umbilical doors located on the orbiter underside, which is necessary for reentry. Similar methods could have reached the shuttle left wing for inspection or repair.<ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12" />

For the repair, the CAIB determined that the astronauts would have to use tools and small pieces of titanium, or other metal, scavenged from the crew cabin. These metals would help protect the wing structure and would be held in place during re-entry by a water-filled bag that had turned into ice in the cold of space. The ice and metal would help restore wing leading edge geometry, preventing a turbulent airflow over the wing and therefore keeping heating and burn-through levels low enough for the crew to survive re-entry and bail out before landing. The CAIB could not determine whether a patched-up left wing would have survived even a modified re-entry, and concluded that the rescue option would have had a considerably higher chance of bringing ''Columbia''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s crew back alive.<ref name="CAIBVolIChap6Page173" /><ref name="CAIBVolIIAppendixD12" />

==Memorials==
[[File:Columbia windows.jpg|thumb|upright|''Columbia'''s window frames on display as part of the "Forever Remembered" installation at Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex in 2018]]
On February 4, 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] and his wife [[Laura Bush|Laura]] led a memorial service for the astronauts' families at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center]]. Two days later, Vice President [[Dick Cheney]] and his wife [[Lynne Cheney|Lynne]] led a similar service at [[Washington National Cathedral]]. [[Patti LaBelle]] sang "Way Up There" as part of the service.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/06/se.03.html|title=Remembering the Columbia 7: Washington National Cathedral Memorial for Astronauts|date=February 6, 2003|accessdate=September 15, 2011|work=CNN.com|publisher=CNN|first=Judy|last=Woodruff|authorlink=Judy Woodruff|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113193826/http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0302/06/se.03.html|archivedate=January 13, 2012|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

[[File:Columbia makeshift memorial.jpg|thumb|A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center]] in [[Houston]], Texas]]
[[File:Columbia Memorial.JPG|thumb|upright|''Columbia'' Memorial in [[Arlington National Cemetery]]]]
[[File:MER STS-107 Memorial.JPG|thumb|''Columbia'' memorial on [[Mars Exploration Rover]] ''Spirit'']]
[[File:Space Shuttle Columbia memorial - Shelby County, Texas.jpg|thumb|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' memorial – Sabine County, Texas]]

On February 2, 2003, and throughout March, April, and May 2003, large memorial Catholic Brazilian masses and Roman Catholic memorial concerts were held in [[Rio de Janeiro]], [[Sao Paulo]], and other cities in Brazil where [[Brazilian people|Brazilian]] [[Catholic]] [[priest]] [[Marcelo Rossi]] and his concert partner Belo sang a Christian hymn "Noites Traicoeiras" (Treacherous Nights) as tribute to the seven Columbia astronauts, as well as the other seven crew members who lost their lives in the [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' disaster]] in 1986. The concerts were televised to millions throughout Brazil and the world.

On March 26, the [[United States House of Representatives]]' Science Committee approved funds for the construction of a memorial at [[Arlington National Cemetery]] for the STS-107 crew. A similar memorial was built at the cemetery for the last crew of [[Space Shuttle Challenger|''Challenger'']]. On October 28, 2003, the names of the astronauts were added to the [[Space Mirror Memorial]] at the [[Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex]].

On April 1, 2003, the [[Opening Day]] of [[baseball]] season, the [[Houston Astros]] (named in honor of the U.S. space program) honored the ''Columbia'' crew by having seven simultaneous [[ceremonial first pitch|first pitches]] thrown by family and friends of the crew. For the [[The Star-Spangled Banner|National Anthem]], 107 NASA personnel, including flight controllers and others involved in ''Columbia''{{'}}s final mission, carried a U.S. flag onto the field. In addition, the Astros wore the mission patch on their sleeves and replaced all dugout advertising with the mission patch logo for the entire season.<ref>{{cite web| title=Astros Honor Astronauts At Season Opener| url=http://www.nasa.gov/vision/space/features/HP_ELT_Feature_astros.html| publisher=NASA| accessdate=September 19, 2006| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20061003074949/http://www1.nasa.gov/vision/space/features/HP_ELT_Feature_astros.html| archivedate=October 3, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref>

On February 1, 2004, the first anniversary of the ''Columbia'' disaster, [[Super Bowl XXXVIII]] held in Houston's [[NRG Stadium|Reliant Stadium]] began with a pregame tribute to the crew of the ''Columbia'' by singer [[Josh Groban]] performing "[[You Raise Me Up]]", with the crew of [[STS-114]], the first post-''Columbia'' Space Shuttle mission, in attendance.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4292-2004Feb1.html|title=Columbia Astronauts Honored at Super Bowl|last=Babineck|first=Mark|publisher=''[[The Washington Post]]''|date=2004-02-01|accessdate=2017-05-21|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20171223043118/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4292-2004Feb1.html|archivedate=December 23, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://amarillo.com/stories/020204/nfl_nflhonors.shtml|title=NFL honors shuttle crew in ceremony|publisher=''[[Amarillo Globe-News]]''|date=2004-02-02|accessdate=2017-05-21|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20171223044222/http://amarillo.com/stories/020204/nfl_nflhonors.shtml|archivedate=December 23, 2017|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

In 2004, Bush conferred posthumous [[Congressional Space Medal of Honor|Congressional Space Medals of Honor]] to all 14 crew members lost in the ''Challenger'' and ''Columbia'' accidents.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://history.nasa.gov/spacemedal.htm |title=Congressional Space Medal of Honor |publisher=NASA History Program Office |accessdate=January 28, 2011 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110220213828/http://history.nasa.gov/spacemedal.htm |archivedate=February 20, 2011 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

NASA named several places in honor of ''Columbia'' and the crew. Seven [[asteroid]]s discovered in July 2001 at the [[Mount Palomar observatory]] were officially given the names of the seven astronauts: [[51823 Rickhusband]], [[51824 Mikeanderson]], [[51825 Davidbrown]], [[51826 Kalpanachawla]], [[51827 Laurelclark]], [[51828 Ilanramon]], [[51829 Williemccool]].<ref>{{cite press release| publisher=NASA| date=August 6, 2003| title=Asteroids Dedicated To Space Shuttle Columbia Crew| url=http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/aug/HQ_03259_astroids_dedicated.html| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://www.webcitation.org/65SUPJxoU?url=http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2003/aug/HQ_03259_astroids_dedicated.html| archivedate=February 15, 2012| df=mdy-all}}<br />{{cite web| title = Tribute to the Crew of Columbia| url = http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/releases/2003/columbia-tribute.cfm| archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20080208162807/http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/releases/2003/columbia-tribute.cfm| archivedate = February 8, 2008| accessdate = November 6, 2006}}<br /></ref> On [[Mars]], the landing site of the [[Mars Exploration Rover Mission|rover]] ''[[MER-A|Spirit]]'' was named ''Columbia'' Memorial Station, and included a memorial plaque to the ''Columbia'' crew mounted on the back of the high gain antenna. A complex of seven hills east of the ''Spirit'' landing site was dubbed the [[Columbia Hills (Mars)|Columbia Hills]]; each of the seven hills was individually named for a member of the crew, and [[Husband Hill]] in particular was ascended and explored by the rover. In 2006, the [[International Astronomical Union|IAU]] approved naming of a cluster of seven small craters in the [[Apollo (crater)|Apollo basin]] on the [[far side of the Moon]] after the astronauts.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20170830195017/https://planetarynames.wr.usgs.gov/Feature/14140 Husband crater], Gazetteer of Planetary Nomenclature, [[International Astronomical Union]] Working Group for Planetary System Nomenclature</ref> Back on Earth, NASA's [[National Scientific Balloon Facility]] was renamed the [[Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility]].

Other tributes included the decision by [[Amarillo, Texas]], to rename its airport [[Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport]] after the Amarillo native. [[State Route 904 (Washington)|Washington State Route 904]] was renamed Lt. Michael P. Anderson Memorial Highway, as it runs through [[Cheney, Washington]], the town where he graduated from high school. A newly constructed elementary school located on Fairchild Air Force Base near [[Spokane, Washington]], was named Michael Anderson Elementary School. Anderson had attended fifth grade at Blair Elementary, the base's previous elementary school, while his father was stationed there. A mountain peak near [[Kit Carson Peak]] and [[Challenger Point]] in the [[Sangre de Cristo Range]] was renamed [[Columbia Point]], and a dedication plaque was placed on the point in August, 2003. Seven dormitories were named in honor of ''Columbia'' crew members at the [[Florida Institute of Technology]], [[Creighton University]], [[The University of Texas at Arlington]], and the Columbia Elementary School in the [[Brevard County School District]]. The [[Huntsville City Schools]] in [[Huntsville, Alabama]], a city strongly associated with NASA, named their most recent high school Columbia High School as a memorial to the crew. A Department of Defense school in Guam was renamed Commander William C. McCool Elementary School.<ref>{{cite web|title=Commander William C. McCool Elementary/Middle School |url=http://www.guam.pac.dodea.edu/Guam%20Schools/GEMSweb/index.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060904095628/http://www.guam.pac.dodea.edu/Guam%20Schools/GEMSweb/index.html |dead-url=yes |archive-date=September 4, 2006 |accessdate=February 1, 2007 |df= }}</ref> The City of [[Palmdale, California]], the birthplace of the entire shuttle fleet, changed the name of the thoroughfare Avenue M to Columbia Way. In Avondale, Arizona, the Avondale Elementary School where Michael Anderson's sister worked had sent a T-shirt with him into space. It was supposed to have an assembly when he returned from space. The school was later renamed Michael Anderson Elementary.

{{anchor|downey}}
The first dedicated meteorological satellite launched by the [[Indian Space Research Organisation]] (ISRO) on 2 September 2002, named Metsat-1, was later renamed [[Kalpana-1]] by Indian Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] in memory of India-born Kalpana Chawla.

In October 2004, both houses of Congress passed a resolution authored by US Representative [[Lucille Roybal-Allard]] and co-sponsored by the entire contingent of California representatives to Congress changing the name of [[Downey, California]]'s Space Science Learning Center to the Columbia Memorial Space Science Learning Center. The facility is located at the former manufacturing site of the space shuttles, including ''Columbia'' and ''Challenger''.<ref>Barragan, James (February 14, 2014) [http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-downey-space-museum-20140214,0,6858403.story "Downey space museum is struggling to survive"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140422071833/http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-downey-space-museum-20140214%2C0%2C6858403.story |date=April 22, 2014 }} Los Angeles Times</ref>

The [[US Air Force]]'s [[Squadron Officer School]] at [[Maxwell Air Force Base]], [[Alabama]], renamed their auditorium in Husband's honor. He was a graduate of the program. The US Test Pilot School at [[Edwards Air Force Base]] in California named its pilot lounge for Husband.

NASA named a [[supercomputer]] "[[Columbia (supercomputer)|Columbia]]" in the crew's honor in 2004. It was located at the [[NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division]] at [[Ames Research Center]] on [[Moffett Federal Airfield]] near [[Mountain View, California]]. The first part of the system, built in 2003, known as "[[Kalpana (supercomputer)|Kalpana]]" was dedicated to Chawla, who worked at Ames prior to joining the Space Shuttle program.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nas.nasa.gov/publications/news/2004/05-10-04.html|title=NASA to Name Supercomputer After Columbia Astronaut|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130317094512/http://www.nas.nasa.gov/publications/news/2004/05-10-04.html|archivedate=March 17, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

A US Navy compound at a major coalition military base in [[Afghanistan]] is named Camp McCool. In addition, the athletic field at McCool's alma mater, [[Coronado High School (Lubbock, Texas)|Coronado High School]] in [[Lubbock, Texas]], was renamed the Willie McCool Track and Field.

A proposed reservoir in [[Cherokee County, Texas|Cherokee County]] in Eastern Texas is to be named Lake Columbia.<ref>{{cite web | title=The Lake Eastex Water Supply Project | url=http://www.lakeeastex.org/index.asp | accessdate=January 2, 2009 |archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20080512232529/http://www.lakeeastex.org/index.asp |archivedate = May 12, 2008}}</ref>

Ilan Ramon High School was established in 2006 in [[Hod HaSharon|Hod HaSharon, Israel]], in tribute to the first Israeli astronaut.<ref>{{cite web | title=Ramon High School-Overview | url=http://c3.ort.org.il/Apps/WW/Page.aspx?ws=3971922f-5911-4607-b3c4-1316667ed79f&page=47f54905-442f-4107-b241-3939657662bc&fol=71e5d817-5b2d-4c8e-94e0-5061efb9450e | accessdate=August 31, 2010 | deadurl=no | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813005222/http://c3.ort.org.il/Apps/WW/Page.aspx?ws=3971922f-5911-4607-b3c4-1316667ed79f&page=47f54905-442f-4107-b241-3939657662bc&fol=71e5d817-5b2d-4c8e-94e0-5061efb9450e | archivedate=August 13, 2011 | df=mdy-all }}</ref> The school's symbol shows the planet Earth with an aircraft orbiting around it.<ref>{{cite web | title=יום הבריאות 4.02.09 | url=http://c3.ort.org.il/Apps/WW/Page.aspx?ws=3971922f-5911-4607-b3c4-1316667ed79f&page=b482dc26-31c6-4a98-95b6-fd5713ee1f25&fol=80a631e5-5ea3-4572-bbd4-0d240620c4b3&box=7a0f94a9-be23-4b95-8a86-6b35488f46ff&_fol=80a631e5-5ea3-4572-bbd4-0d240620c4b3&_pstate=item&_item=c3e5ceea-d373-4f96-9703-b8d2d681bc76 | accessdate=August 31, 2010 | deadurl=no | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20111007201800/http://c3.ort.org.il/Apps/WW/Page.aspx?ws=3971922f-5911-4607-b3c4-1316667ed79f&page=b482dc26-31c6-4a98-95b6-fd5713ee1f25&fol=80a631e5-5ea3-4572-bbd4-0d240620c4b3&box=7a0f94a9-be23-4b95-8a86-6b35488f46ff&_fol=80a631e5-5ea3-4572-bbd4-0d240620c4b3&_pstate=item&_item=c3e5ceea-d373-4f96-9703-b8d2d681bc76 | archivedate=October 7, 2011 | df=mdy-all }}</ref>

The [[National Naval Medical Center]] dedicated Laurel Clark Memorial Auditorium on July 11, 2003.<ref>{{cite web| title=Laurel B Clark Auditorium| url=http://www.bethesda.med.navy.mil/visitor/pride_of_place/POP_Committee/clark/index.htm| accessdate=June 22, 2011| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927135106/http://www.bethesda.med.navy.mil/visitor/pride_of_place/POP_Committee/clark/index.htm| archivedate=September 27, 2011| df=mdy-all}}</ref> [[Gamma Phi Beta]] [[sorority]], of which Clark was a member, created the Laurel Clark Foundation in her honor.<ref>{{cite web | title=MSU Gammas – Laurel Clark Foundation | url=http://www.gammasmsu.com/page.php?page_id=16210 | accessdate=March 11, 2012 | deadurl=yes | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20121029033934/http://www.gammasmsu.com/page.php?page_id=16210 | archivedate=October 29, 2012 | df=mdy-all }}</ref> A fountain in downtown [[Racine, Wisconsin]], which Clark considered her hometown, was named for her.<ref>Fiori, Lindsay. [http://journaltimes.com/news/local/laurel-clark-memorial-fountain-features-new-additions/article_2a34525e-cfb0-5048-a232-6a0c379245cd.html "Laurel Clark Memorial Fountain features new additions"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170824180406/http://journaltimes.com/news/local/laurel-clark-memorial-fountain-features-new-additions/article_2a34525e-cfb0-5048-a232-6a0c379245cd.html |date=August 24, 2017 }}, ''[[Racine Journal Times]]'', May 27, 2008.</ref>

PS 58 in Staten Island, New York, was named Space Shuttle Columbia School in honor of the failed mission.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/31/R058/default.htm|title=Welcome to PS 58|date=July 29, 2015|publisher=|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150423073039/http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/31/R058/default.htm|archivedate=April 23, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

The [[Challenger Columbia Stadium]] in [[League City, Texas]] is named in honor of the victims of both the ''Columbia'' disaster as well as the [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|''Challenger'' disaster]] in 1986.

Columbia Colles, a range of hills on [[Pluto]] discovered by the ''[[New Horizons]]'' spacecraft in July 2015, was named in honor of the victims of the disaster.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Sutherland|first1=Paul|title=Pluto team name features after Dr Who and Star Trek|url=http://www.skymania.com/wp/2015/07/pluto-team-name-features-after-dr-who-and-star-trek.html/8820/|website=Skymania|accessdate=31 August 2015|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924102525/http://www.skymania.com/wp/2015/07/pluto-team-name-features-after-dr-who-and-star-trek.html/8820/|archivedate=September 24, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

A starship on ''[[Star Trek: Enterprise]]'' was named ''NX-02 Columbia'' in honor of the ''Columbia''.

==Effect on space programs==
Following the loss of ''Columbia'', the [[space shuttle program]] was suspended.<ref name=learn>{{cite web |work=Space |url=http://www.space.com/19436-columbia-disaster.html |title=Columbia Disaster: What Happened, What NASA Learned |author=Howell, Elizabeth |accessdate=1 February 2013 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160925054548/http://www.space.com/19436-columbia-disaster.html |archivedate=September 25, 2016 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> The further construction of the [[International Space Station]] (ISS) was also delayed, as the space shuttles were the only available delivery vehicle for station modules. The station was supplied using Russian unmanned ''[[Progress spacecraft|Progress]]'' ships, and crews were exchanged using Russian-manned [[Soyuz spacecraft|''Soyuz'' spacecraft]], and forced to operate on a skeleton crew of two.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/soyuz/index.html|accessdate=1 February 2013|title=Russian Soyuz TMA Spacecraft|publisher=NASA|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130202031654/http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/soyuz/index.html|archivedate=February 2, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.airspacemag.com/space-exploration/cit-reichhardt.html|accessdate=1 February 2013|title=Backgrounder: State of the Station|work=Air & Space Magazine|author=Reichhardt, Tony|date=November 2003}}</ref>

Less than a year after the accident, President Bush announced the [[Vision for Space Exploration]], calling for the space shuttle fleet to complete the ISS, with retirement by the year 2010 following the completion of the ISS, to be replaced by a newly developed [[Crew Exploration Vehicle]] for travel to the Moon and Mars.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nasa.gov/missions/solarsystem/bush_vision.html|accessdate=1 February 2013|publisher=NASA|title=President Bush offers new vision for NASA|date=14 January 2004|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070510062228/http://www.nasa.gov/missions/solarsystem/bush_vision.html|archivedate=May 10, 2007|df=mdy-all}}</ref> NASA planned to return the space shuttle to service around September 2004; that date was pushed back to July 2005.

On July 26, 2005, at 10:39&nbsp;am EST, Space Shuttle ''Discovery'' cleared the tower on the "Return to Flight" mission [[STS-114]], marking the shuttle's return to space. Overall the STS-114 flight was highly successful, but a similar piece of foam from a different portion of the tank was shed, although the debris did not strike the Orbiter. Due to this, NASA once again grounded the shuttles until the remaining problem was understood and a solution implemented.<ref name=learn/> After delaying their re-entry by two days due to adverse weather conditions, Commander [[Eileen Collins]] and Pilot [[James M. Kelly (astronaut)|James M. Kelly]] returned ''Discovery'' safely to Earth on August 9, 2005. Later that same month, the [[Space Shuttle external tank|external tank]] construction site at Michoud was damaged by [[Hurricane Katrina]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-30/tech/katrina.tank.facility_1_external-tanks-nasa-s-michoud-assembly-facility-nasa-michoud-assembly-facility?_s=PM:TECH|archive-url=https://archive.is/20130215180934/http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-30/tech/katrina.tank.facility_1_external-tanks-nasa-s-michoud-assembly-facility-nasa-michoud-assembly-facility?_s=PM:TECH|dead-url=yes|archive-date=15 February 2013|accessdate=1 February 2013|title=Katrina batters NASA facility|work=Space.com|author=David, Leonard|date=30 August 2005}}</ref> At the time, there was concern that this would set back further shuttle flights by at least two months and possibly more.

The actual cause of the foam loss on both ''Columbia'' and ''Discovery'' was not determined until December 2005, when [[radiography|x-ray photographs]] of another tank showed that [[thermal expansion]] and contraction during filling, not human error, caused cracks that led to foam loss. NASA's Hale formally apologized to the Michoud workers who had been blamed for the loss of ''Columbia'' for almost three years.<ref name="hale20120418">{{cite web | url=http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/ | title=How We Nearly Lost Discovery | work=waynehale.wordpress.com | date=2012-04-18 | accessdate=April 18, 2012 | author=Hale, Wayne | deadurl=no | archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120420210848/http://waynehale.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/how-we-nearly-lost-discovery/ | archivedate=April 20, 2012 | df=mdy-all }}</ref>

The second "Return to Flight" mission, [[STS-121]], launched on July 4, 2006, at 2:37:55&nbsp;pm (EDT), after two previous launch attempts were scrubbed because of lingering thunderstorms and high winds around the launch pad. The launch took place despite objections from its chief engineer and safety head. This mission increased the ISS crew to three. A {{convert|5|in|mm|adj=on|sp=us}} crack in the foam insulation of the external tank gave cause for concern; however, the Mission Management Team gave the go for launch.<ref>Chien, Philip (June 27, 2006) [http://www.washtimes.com/news/2006/jun/26/20060626-110227-5543r/ "NASA wants shuttle to fly despite safety misgivings."] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090111035050/http://www.washtimes.com/news/2006/jun/26/20060626-110227-5543r/ |date=January 11, 2009 }} ''The Washington Times''</ref> Space Shuttle ''Discovery'' touched down successfully on July 17, 2006 at 9:14:43&nbsp;am (EDT) on Runway 15 at the [[Kennedy Space Center]].

On August 13, 2006, NASA announced that STS-121 had shed more foam than they had expected. While this did not delay the launch for the next mission – [[STS-115]], originally set to lift off on August 27 <ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9733-foam-still-a-key-concern-for-shuttle-launch.html | title = Foam still a key concern for shuttle launch | publisher = New Scientist SPACE | accessdate = August 13, 2006 | deadurl = no | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20060813153250/http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9733-foam-still-a-key-concern-for-shuttle-launch.html | archivedate = August 13, 2006 | df = mdy-all }}</ref> – the weather and other technical glitches did, with a lightning strike, [[Hurricane Ernesto (2006)|Hurricane Ernesto]] and a faulty fuel tank sensor combining to delay the launch until September 9. On September 19, landing was delayed an extra day to examine ''Atlantis'' after objects were found floating near the shuttle in the same orbit. When no damage was detected, ''Atlantis'' landed successfully on September 21.

The ''Columbia'' Crew Survival Investigation Report released by NASA on December 30, 2008, made further recommendations to improve a crew's survival chances on future space vehicles, such as the then planned [[Orion spacecraft]]. These included improvements in crew restraints, finding ways to deal more effectively with catastrophic cabin depressurization, more "graceful degradation" of vehicles during a disaster so that crews will have a better chance at survival, and automated parachute systems.<ref name="Layout 1"/>

==Sociocultural aftermath==

===Fears of terrorism===
After the shuttle's breakup, there were some initial fears that terrorists might have been involved, but no evidence of that has ever surfaced.<ref>{{cite book | last = Barnett | first = Brooke |author2=Reynolds, Amy | title = Terrorism and the Press: An Uneasy Relationship | publisher=Lang, Peter Publishing, Incorporated | year = 2008 | page = 39 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jFGf5quO1EUC&pg=PA39 | isbn = 0-8204-9516-6 }}</ref> Security surrounding the launch and landing of the space shuttle had been increased because the crew included the first Israeli astronaut.<ref>{{cite news| title=Israel mourns first astronaut's death| publisher=CNN| url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/01/shuttle.israel.reax/| date=February 1, 2003| accessdate=February 24, 2004| deadurl=no| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20040420203552/http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/01/shuttle.israel.reax/| archivedate=April 20, 2004| df=mdy-all}}</ref> The [[Merritt Island]] launch facility, like all sensitive government areas, had increased security after the [[September 11 attacks]].

===Purple streak image===
The ''[[San Francisco Chronicle]]'' reported that an amateur astronomer had taken a five-second exposure that appeared to show "a purplish line near the shuttle", resembling lightning, during re-entry.<ref>{{cite news | last = Russell | first = Sabin | url = http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2003/02/05/MN192153.DTL | title = Mysterious purple streak is shown hitting Columbia 7 minutes before it disintegrated | work = San Francisco Chronicle | date = May 2, 2003 | accessdate = May 26, 2009 | deadurl = no | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20081210082337/http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=%2Fc%2Fa%2F2003%2F02%2F05%2FMN192153.DTL | archivedate = December 10, 2008 | df = mdy-all }}</ref> The CAIB report concluded that the image was the result of "camera vibrations during a long-exposure".<ref>{{cite book| author=Columbia Accident Investigation Board| title=Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board|chapter= Volume III, Part 2| page= 88 | year=2003| url=http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol3/part02.pdf| format=PDF| accessdate=August 18, 2006| deadurl=yes| archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20060825154518/http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol3/part02.pdf| archivedate=August 25, 2006| df=mdy-all}}</ref>

===2003 ''Armageddon'' film hoax===
In response to the disaster, [[FX (TV channel)|FX]] canceled its scheduled airing two nights later of the 1998 film ''[[Armageddon (1998 film)|Armageddon]]'', in which the Space Shuttle ''[[Space Shuttle Atlantis|Atlantis]]'' is depicted as being destroyed by asteroid fragments.<ref>{{cite news |author=Sue Chan |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/03/entertainment/main539194.shtml |title=TV Pulls Shuttle Sensitive Material |publisher=CBS News |date=February 3, 2003 |accessdate=September 1, 2009 |deadurl=no |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090813134955/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/03/entertainment/main539194.shtml |archivedate=August 13, 2009 |df=mdy-all }}</ref> In a hoax inspired by the destruction of ''Columbia'', some images that were purported to be satellite photographs of the Shuttle's "explosion" turned out to be screen captures from the Space Shuttle destruction scene of ''Armageddon''.<ref>https://snopes.com/fact-check/shuttle-explosion</ref>

===Music===
The 2003 album ''[[Bananas (album)|Bananas]]'' by [[Deep Purple]] includes "Contact Lost", an [[instrumental]] piece written by guitarist [[Steve Morse]] in remembrance of the loss. Morse is donating his songwriting royalties to the families of the astronauts.<ref name="GuitarSite">{{cite web | url = http://www.guitarsite.com/newsletters/031110/7.shtml | title = Deep Purple's Shuttle Connection | accessdate = 2007-02-15 | publisher = guitarsite.com | archiveurl = https://www.webcitation.org/5MfMKfRYt?url=http://www.guitarsite.com/newsletters/031110/7.shtml | archivedate = February 15, 2007 | deadurl = yes | df = mdy-all }}</ref>

Catherine Faber and Callie Hills (the [[Folk music|folk]] group known as Echo's Children) included a memorial song titled "Columbia" on their 2004 album ''From the Hazel Tree.'' <ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.echoschildren.org/Echos_Children_CD.html#hazeltree|title=Echo's Children CD Page|publisher=|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150211073012/http://echoschildren.org/Echos_Children_CD.html#hazeltree|archivedate=February 11, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

The 2005 album ''[[Ultimatum (EP)|Ultimatum – EP]]'' by [[The Long Winters]] contains the song "[[The Commander Thinks Aloud]]", which was songwriter/singer [[John Roderick (musician)|John Roderick]]'s musing on the crew's perspective of the unexpected catastrophe.<ref name="The Long Winters">{{cite web|last=Roderick|first=John|title=The Long Winters|url=http://www.thelongwinters.com/albums/ultimatum|accessdate=5 February 2015|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150206080004/http://www.thelongwinters.com/albums/ultimatum|archivedate=February 6, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref> In addition, the January 30, 2015 episode of [[Hrishikesh Hirway]]'s [[Song Exploder|''Song Exploder'' podcast]] presented an interview with John Roderick about the songwriting and recording process for "The Commander Thinks Aloud".<ref name="Song Exploder, Episode 28">{{cite web|last=Hirway|first=Hrishikesh|title=Song Exploder, Episode 28: The Long Winters|url=http://songexploder.net/episode-28-the-long-winters|accessdate=5 February 2015|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150203225039/http://songexploder.net/episode-28-the-long-winters/|archivedate=February 3, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

Swiss post-rock band [[The Evpatoria Report]] used the records of radio communication between ''Columbia'' and CAPCOM as a sample for their instrumental song "Taijin Kyofusho" on their 2005 album [[Golevka (album)|''Golevka'']].

The Hungarian composer [[Peter Eötvös]] wrote a piece named ''Seven'' for solo violin and orchestra in 2006 in memory of the crew of ''Columbia''. ''Seven'' was premiered in 2007 by violinist [[Akiko Suwanai]], conducted by [[Pierre Boulez]], and it was recorded in 2012 with violinist [[Patricia Kopatchinskaja]] and the composer conducting.<ref name="Seven by Peter Eötvös">{{cite web|last=Eötvös|first=Peter|title=Seven|url=http://eotvospeter.com/index.php?node=compositions&id=25&targetpage=main&current_menu=compositions_commissions|publisher=Peter Eötvös|accessdate=16 Nov 2013|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20131230234155/http://eotvospeter.com/index.php?node=compositions&id=25&targetpage=main&current_menu=compositions_commissions|archivedate=December 30, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

The 2008 album ''Columbia: We Dare to Dream'' by Anne Cabrera was written as a tribute to Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' [[STS-107]], the crew, support teams, recovery teams, and the crew's families.<ref name="Columbia page of CCR">{{cite web|url=http://chubbycrowrecords.com/annesblog/|title=Columbia: We Dare to Dream|last=Cabrera|first=Anne|date=|website=Chubby Crow Records: Anne Cabrera|publisher=Chubby Crow Records Inc.|accessdate=6 May 2012|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20131214053425/http://chubbycrowrecords.com/annesblog/|archivedate=December 14, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref> A copy of the album on [[compact disc]] was flown aboard [[Space Shuttle Discovery|Space Shuttle ''Discovery'']] mission [[STS-131]] to the [[International Space Station]] by astronaut [[Clayton Anderson]] in April 2010.<ref name="twitpic Columbia photo">{{cite web|last=Anderson|first=Clayton|title=Clay Anderson with Columbia CD aboard ISS|url=http://twitpic.com/1jglah|publisher=Anderson|accessdate=6 May 2012|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102123313/http://twitpic.com/1jglah|archivedate=November 2, 2013|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

The Scottish Folk-Rock band [[Runrig]] included a song titled "Somewhere" on their album ''[[The Story (Runrig album)|The Story]]'' (2016); the song was dedicated to Laurel Clark (who had become a fan of the band during her Navy service in Scotland), and includes a piece of her wake up song, followed by some radio chatter, at the end.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/culture/music/skye-rockers-runrig-prepare-for-their-final-album-1-4016107|title=Skye rockers Runrig prepare for their final album|publisher=|deadurl=no|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20161017024722/http://www.scotsman.com/lifestyle/culture/music/skye-rockers-runrig-prepare-for-their-final-album-1-4016107|archivedate=October 17, 2016|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal bar|United States|Spaceflight|Texas|2000s}}
* [[Apollo 1]]
* [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' disaster]]
* [[Criticism of the Space Shuttle program]]
* [[Engineering disasters]]
* [[Expedition 6]]
* [[Columbia Point]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist|group=Note}}

==References==
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}
{{Include-NASA}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|Space Shuttle Columbia disaster}}
{{wikisource|Columbia Settlement}}
* [http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/upgrades/wle.html Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Protection] (upgrade proposed for 1999, but cancelled)
* [http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/index.html NASA's Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' and her crew]
* [http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts-107/memorial/index.html NASA STS-107 Crew Memorial web page]
* [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf ''Columbia'' Crew Survival Investigation Report] PDF
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrAZK8mxAGk Doppler radar animation of the debris after break up]
* [https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030204-1.html President Bush's remarks at memorial service] – February 4, 2003
* [http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/SRH_Disasters.htm The CBS News Space Reporter's Handbook STS-51L/107 Supplement]
* [http://space.webtvselector.com/wiki_colombia_cockpit.htm The 13-min. Crew cabin video (subtitled). Ends 4-min. before the shuttle began to disintegrate.]
* [http://www.collectspace.com/news/news-020104a.html photos of recovered debris stored on the 16th floor of the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC]
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