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==Publications==
==Publications==
;Game theory and mechanism design
;Game theory and mechanism design
* {{Cite journal | title = Graphs and Cooperation in Games | journal = [[Mathematics of Operations Research]] | volume = 2 | issue = 3 | pages = 225–229 | publisher = [[INFORMS]] | doi = 10.1287/moor.2.3.225 | date = August 1977 | url = https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.3.225 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Graphs and Cooperation in Games | journal = [[Mathematics of Operations Research]] | volume = 2 | issue = 3 | pages = 225–229 | doi = 10.1287/moor.2.3.225 | date = August 1977 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 45 | issue = 7 | pages = 1631–1637 | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] | doi = 10.2307/1913955 | jstor = 1913955 | date = October 1977 | url = https://doi.org/10.2307/1913955 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 45 | issue = 7 | pages = 1631–1637 | doi = 10.2307/1913955 | jstor = 1913955 | date = October 1977 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept | journal = International Journal of Game Theory | volume = 7 | issue = 2 | pages = 73–80 | publisher = [[Springer Publishing|Springer]] | doi = 10.1007/BF01753236 | date = June 1978 | url = https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753236 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept | journal = International Journal of Game Theory | volume = 7 | issue = 2 | pages = 73–80 | doi = 10.1007/BF01753236 | date = June 1978 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = R. B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 47 | issue = | pages = 61–73 | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] | doi = 10.2307/1912346 | jstor = 1912346 | date = January 1979 | url = https://doi.org/10.2307/1912346 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 47 | issue = 1| pages = 61–73 | doi = 10.2307/1912346 | jstor = 1912346 | date = January 1979 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Optimal Auction Design | journal = [[Mathematics of Operations Research]] | volume = 6 | issue = 1 | pages = 58–73 | publisher = [[INFORMS]] | doi = 10.1287/moor.6.1.58 | date = February 1981 | url = https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Optimal Auction Design | journal = [[Mathematics of Operations Research]] | volume = 6 | issue = 1 | pages = 58–73 | doi = 10.1287/moor.6.1.58 | date = February 1981 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 51 | issue = 6 | pages = 1767–1797 | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] | doi = 10.2307/1912116 | jstor = 1912116 | date = November 1983 | url = https://doi.org/10.2307/1912116 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 51 | issue = 6 | pages = 1767–1797 | doi = 10.2307/1912116 | jstor = 1912116 | date = November 1983 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* {{Cite journal | title = Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 52 | issue = | pages = 461–487 | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] | doi = 10.2307/1911499 | jstor = 1911499 | date = 1984 | url = https://doi.org/10.2307/1911499 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information | journal = [[Econometrica]] | volume = 52 | issue = 2| pages = 461–487 | doi = 10.2307/1911499 | jstor = 1911499 | date = 1984 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in {{cite book | editor-last1 = Hurwicz | editor-first1 = Leonid | editor-last2 = Schmeidler | editor-first2 = David | editor-last3 = Sonnenschein | editor-first3 = Hugo | title = Social goals and social organization : essays in memory of [[Elisha Pazner]] | pages = 229–259 | publisher = [[Cambridge University Press]] | location = Cambridge New York | year = 2005 | isbn = 9780521023955 }}
* "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in {{cite book | editor-last1 = Hurwicz | editor-first1 = Leonid | editor-last2 = Schmeidler | editor-first2 = David | editor-last3 = Sonnenschein | editor-first3 = Hugo | title = Social goals and social organization : essays in memory of Elisha Pazner | pages = 229–259 | publisher = [[Cambridge University Press]] | location = Cambridge New York | year = 2005 | isbn = 9780521023955 | title-link = Elisha Pazner }}


He wrote a general textbook on game theory in 1991, and has also written on the history of game theory, including his review of the origins and significance of noncooperative game theory.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Myerson | first=Roger B. | title=Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory | journal=[[Journal of Economic Literature]] | volume= 37 | issue= 3 | date=1999 | pages=1067–1082 | jstor= 2564872 |postscript=<!--None--> | doi=10.1257/jel.37.3.1067}}</ref> He also served on the editorial board of the ''International Journal of Game Theory'' for ten years.
He wrote a general textbook on game theory in 1991, and has also written on the history of game theory, including his review of the origins and significance of noncooperative game theory.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Myerson | first=Roger B. | title=Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory | journal=[[Journal of Economic Literature]] | volume= 37 | issue= 3 | date=1999 | pages=1067–1082 | jstor= 2564872 |postscript=<!--None--> | doi=10.1257/jel.37.3.1067| citeseerx=10.1.1.130.7955 }}</ref> He also served on the editorial board of the ''International Journal of Game Theory'' for ten years.


Myerson has worked on economic analysis of [[political institution]]s and written several major survey papers:
Myerson has worked on economic analysis of [[political institution]]s and written several major survey papers:
* {{Cite journal | title = Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance | journal = [[Journal of Economic Perspectives]] | volume = 9 | issue = 1 | pages = 77–89 | publisher = [[American Economic Association]] | date = Winter 1995 | jstor = 2138356 | ref = harv | postscript = . | doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.77}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance | journal = [[Journal of Economic Perspectives]] | volume = 9 | issue = 1 | pages = 77–89 | date = Winter 1995 | jstor = 2138356 | ref = harv | doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.77| last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}
* "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
* "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46–65.
* {{Cite journal | title = Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems | journal = [[European Economic Review]] | volume = 43 | issue = 4–6 | pages = 671–697 | publisher = [[ScienceDirect]] | doi = 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0 | date = April 1999 | url = https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0 | ref = harv | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite journal | title = Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems | journal = [[European Economic Review]] | volume = 43 | issue = 4–6 | pages = 671–697 | doi = 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0 | date = April 1999 | ref = harv | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. | citeseerx = 10.1.1.21.9735 }}


His recent work on [[democratization]] has raised critical questions about American policy in occupied Iraq:
His recent work on [[democratization]] has raised critical questions about American policy in occupied Iraq:
* {{Cite journal| title = Fundamentals of social choice theory | journal = [[Quarterly Journal of Political Science]] | volume = 8 | issue = 3 | pages = 305–337 | publisher = Now Publishing Inc. | doi = 10.1561/100.00013006 | date = June 2013 | url = https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00013006 | ref = harv | postscript = .| citeseerx = 10.1.1.297.6781 }}
* {{Cite journal| title = Fundamentals of social choice theory | journal = [[Quarterly Journal of Political Science]] | volume = 8 | issue = 3 | pages = 305–337 | doi = 10.1561/100.00013006 | date = June 2013 | ref = harv | citeseerx = 10.1.1.297.6781 | last1 = Myerson | first1 = Roger B. }}


;Books
;Books

Revision as of 17:44, 12 February 2019

Roger Myerson
Born (1951-03-29) March 29, 1951 (age 73)
Boston, Massachusetts
NationalityUnited States
Academic career
FieldGame theory
InstitutionUniversity of Chicago
Northwestern University
Alma materHarvard University (AB, SM, PhD)
Doctoral
advisor		Kenneth Arrow
Doctoral
students		Scott E. Page
ContributionsMechanism design
AwardsNobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (2007)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Roger Bruce Myerson (born 1951) is an American economist and professor at the University of Chicago. He holds the title of The Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor in Economics and the College and Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies.[1] In 2007, he was the winner of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin for "having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory."[2]

Biography

Roger Myerson was born in 1951 in Boston. He attended Harvard University, where he received his A.B., summa cum laude, and S.M. in applied mathematics in 1973. He completed his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Harvard University in 1976.[3] His doctorate thesis was A Theory of Cooperative Games.[4]

From 1976 to 2001, Myerson was a professor of economics at Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management, where he conducted much of his Nobel-winning research.[5] From 1978 to 1979, he was Visiting Researcher at Bielefeld University. He was Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago from 1985–86 and from 2000–01. He became Professor of Economics at Chicago in 2001. Currently, he is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago.[4]

Bank of Sweden Nobel Memorial Prize

Myerson was one of the three winners of the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the other two being Leonid Hurwicz of the University of Minnesota, and Eric Maskin of the Institute for Advanced Study. He was awarded the prize for his contributions to mechanism design theory.[6]

Myerson made a path-breaking contribution to mechanism design theory when he discovered a fundamental connection between the allocation to be implemented and the monetary transfers needed to induce informed agents to reveal their information truthfully. Mechanism design theory allows for people to distinguish situations in which markets work well from those in which they do not. The theory has helped economists identify efficient trading mechanisms, regulation schemes, and voting procedures. Today, the theory plays a central role in many areas of economics and parts of political science.[6]

Personal life

In 1980, Myerson married Regina (Weber) and the couple had two children, Daniel and Rebecca.[7]

Publications

Game theory and mechanism design
  • Myerson, Roger B. (August 1977). "Graphs and Cooperation in Games". Mathematics of Operations Research. 2 (3): 225–229. doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (October 1977). "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility". Econometrica. 45 (7): 1631–1637. doi:10.2307/1913955. JSTOR 1913955. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, R. B. (June 1978). "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept". International Journal of Game Theory. 7 (2): 73–80. doi:10.1007/BF01753236. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (January 1979). "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem". Econometrica. 47 (1): 61–73. doi:10.2307/1912346. JSTOR 1912346. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (February 1981). "Optimal Auction Design". Mathematics of Operations Research. 6 (1): 58–73. doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (November 1983). "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal". Econometrica. 51 (6): 1767–1797. doi:10.2307/1912116. JSTOR 1912116. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Myerson, Roger B. (1984). "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information". Econometrica. 52 (2): 461–487. doi:10.2307/1911499. JSTOR 1911499. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in Hurwicz, Leonid; Schmeidler, David; Sonnenschein, Hugo, eds. (2005). Social goals and social organization : essays in memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 229–259. ISBN 9780521023955.

He wrote a general textbook on game theory in 1991, and has also written on the history of game theory, including his review of the origins and significance of noncooperative game theory.[8] He also served on the editorial board of the International Journal of Game Theory for ten years.

Myerson has worked on economic analysis of political institutions and written several major survey papers:

His recent work on democratization has raised critical questions about American policy in occupied Iraq:

Books
  • Game theory: analysis of conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1991. ISBN 9780674728615.
  • Probability models for economic decisions. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Brooke/Cole. 2005. ISBN 9780534423810.

Concepts named after him

See also

References

  1. ^ "Prof. Myerson's University of Chicago Department of Economics Profile".
  2. ^ "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007" (Press release). Nobel Foundation. October 15, 2007. Retrieved 2008-08-15.
  3. ^ http://www.pritzkermilitary.org/whats_on/pritzker-military-presents/front-center-john-callaway-global-economic-crisis/
  4. ^ a b "Curriculum Vitae of Roger Myerson" (PDF). Retrieved 2008-08-15.
  5. ^ JUF News: Nobel Prize winners have Jewish, Chicago connections
  6. ^ a b "Roger Myerson wins 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics". University of Chicago. 2007-10-17. Retrieved 2008-08-16.
  7. ^ "Roger B. Myerson – Autobiography". Nobelprize.org.
  8. ^ Myerson, Roger B. (1999). "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory". Journal of Economic Literature. 37 (3): 1067–1082. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.130.7955. doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1067. JSTOR 2564872.
Awards
Preceded by Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics
2007
Served alongside: Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin 		Succeeded by
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