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==Further reading==
==Further reading==
* Jung, Heon Joo, and Timothy S. Rich. "Why invest in North Korea? Chinese foreign direct investment in North Korea and its implications." ''The Pacific Review'' 29.3 (2016): 307-330. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Timothy_Rich3/publication/277611788_Why_invest_in_North_Korea_Chinese_foreign_direct_investment_in_North_Korea_and_its_implications/links/5cfb037092851c874c5686aa/Why-invest-in-North-Korea-Chinese-foreign-direct-investment-in-North-Korea-and-its-implications.pdf online]
* Jung, Heon Joo, and Timothy S. Rich. "Why invest in North Korea? Chinese foreign direct investment in North Korea and its implications." ''The Pacific Review'' 29.3 (2016): 307-330. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Timothy_Rich3/publication/277611788_Why_invest_in_North_Korea_Chinese_foreign_direct_investment_in_North_Korea_and_its_implications/links/5cfb037092851c874c5686aa/Why-invest-in-North-Korea-Chinese-foreign-direct-investment-in-North-Korea-and-its-implications.pdf online]
* Kim, Jih-Un. "Inflated Hope, Unchanged Reality: China's Response to North Korea's Third Nuclear Test." ''Asian Perspective'' 39.1 (2015): 27-46. [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/713878/summary online]
* Kim, Min-hyung. "Why provoke? The Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 39.7 (2016): 979-998.
* Kim, Min-hyung. "Why provoke? The Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' 39.7 (2016): 979-998.
* Nanto, Dick K., and Mark E. Manyin. "China-North Korea Relations." ''North Korean Review'' (2011): 94-101. [https://www.academia.edu/download/33488577/China-North_Korea_Relations.pdf online]
* Nanto, Dick K., and Mark E. Manyin. "China-North Korea Relations." ''North Korean Review'' (2011): 94-101. [https://www.academia.edu/download/33488577/China-North_Korea_Relations.pdf online]

Revision as of 03:46, 10 February 2021

China–North Korea relations
Map indicating locations of People's Republic of China and North Korea

China
North Korea
Diplomatic mission
Chinese Embassy, PyongyangNorth Korean Embassy, Beijing
Envoy
Ambassador Li JinjunAmbassador Ji Jae Ryong
Embassy of North Korea in China

China–North Korea relations (simplified Chinese: 中朝关系; traditional Chinese: 中朝關係; pinyin: Zhōngcháo Guānxi, Template:Lang-ko) have been generally friendly, although they were sometimes strained in recent years because of North Korea's nuclear program. They have a close special relationship[1] and China is often considered to be North Korea's closest ally.[2][3][4] China and North Korea have a mutual aid and co-operation treaty, which is currently the only defense treaty either country has with any nation.[5][6]

China maintains an embassy in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and a consulate general in Chongjin.[7] The embassy of North Korea in China is located in Beijing's Chaoyang District, while a consulate general is in Shenyang.

China and North Korea have, in the past, enjoyed close diplomatic relations. However, China–North Korea relations have declined markedly over the past few years until 2018. Since 2018, ties between North Korea and China also appear to have improved and returned to normalcy, with Workers' Party of Korea chairman Kim Jong-un making multiple trips to Beijing to meet Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping.[8] In the past, decline in China–North Korea relations was primarily due to growing concern in China over issues such as North Korea's impoundment of Chinese fishing boats and more importantly its nuclear weapons program.[9][10] Relations have again been increasingly close since 2018, especially after Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang in June 2019.[11]

Favorable views of North Korea among Chinese people appear to be receding. According to a 2014 BBC World Service Poll, 20% of Chinese people view North Korea's influence positively, with 46% expressing a negative view.[12]

Country comparison

Common name China North Korea
Official name People's Republic of China Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Coat of arms
Flag China North Korea
Area 9,596,961 km2 (3,705,407 sq mi)

(including Hong Kong and Macau)

120,540 km2 (46,540 sq mi)
Population 1,418,669,490 25,368,620
Population density 145/km2 (375.5/sq mi) 212/km2 (549.1/sq mi)
Capital Beijing Pyongyang
Largest city Shanghai (26,317,104) Pyongyang (3,255,288)
Government Unitary one-party socialist republic Unitary one-party socialist republic
First leader Mao Zedong Kim Il-Sung
Current leaders Party General Secretary Xi Jinping
Premier Li Keqiang 		Party General Secretary Kim Jong-un
Premier Kim Jae-ryong
Established 21 September 1949 (People's Republic declared)

1 October 1949 (Proclamation of the People's Republic)

4 December 1982 (current constitution)

9 September 1948 (Foundation of DPRK)

27 December 1972 (current constitution)

Official languages Standard Chinese Korean
Currency Yuan North Korean Won
GDP (nominal) $14.216 trillion (2019) $32.1 billion (2018)
External debt (nominal) $1.843 trillion (2018 Q4) $20 billion (2011)
GDP (PPP) $27.438 trillion (2019) $40 billion (2014)
GDP (nominal) per capita $10,153 (2019) $1,300 (2018)
GDP (PPP) per capita $19,559 (2019) $1,800 (2014)
Human Development Index 0.752 (high) no data
Expatriates ~5,000 North Koreans living in China ~10,000 Chinese living in North Korea
Foreign exchange reserves 3,088,000 (millions of USD) unknown
Military expenditures $177.6 billion (1.9% of GDP) (2019) $1.6 billion (4.9% of GDP) (2018)
Military personnel 3,205,000 (0.23% of population)
  • 2,035,000 (active)
  • 510,000 (reserve)
  • 660,000 (paramilitary)
 7,039,000 (25% of population)
  • 950,000 (active)
  • 200,000 (reserve)
  • 5,889,000 (paramilitary)
Army size People's Liberation Army Ground Force (2019)
  • 18,910 main battle tanks
  • 49,350 armored fighting vehicles
  • 3,710 self-propelled guns
  • 6,945 towed artillery
  • 2,890 multiple-launch rocket systems
  • 0 tactical ballistic missile systems
  • 1,531 surface to air missile systems
 Korean People's Army Ground Force (2019)
  • 10,375 main battle tanks
  • 12,500 armored fighting vehicles
  • 2,500 self-propelled guns
  • 8,600 towed artillery 
  • 5,500 multiple-launch rocket systems
  • 1,380 tactical ballistic missile systems
  • 6,825 surface to air missile systems
Air force size People's Liberation Army Air Force
  • 2,378 fighters/interceptors
  • 550 attack aircraft
  • 191 transports
  • 980 helicopters
  • 446 attack helicopters
 Korean People's Army Air Force
  • 384 fighters/interceptors
  • 188 attack aircraft
  • 4 transports
  • 184 helicopters
  • 20 attack helicopters
Navy size People's Liberation Army Navy (2019)

Total naval strength: 352 ships

  • 2 aircraft carriers
  • 16 destroyers
  • 33 frigates
  • 50 corvettes
  • 41 submarines
 Korean People's Navy

Total naval strength: 967 ships

  • 3 frigates
  • 14 corvettes
  • 70 submarines
Nuclear warheads

active/total

0(?) / 280 (2019)[13] ?) / 20–30 (2019)

Paramount leaders of China and Supreme leaders of North Korea since 1950

Kim Il-SungKim Jong-ilKim Jong-unMao ZedongHua GuofengDeng XiaopingJiang ZeminHu JintaoXi JinpingNorth KoreaChina

History

Early history and Korean War

See also: History of Sino-Korean relations
Chinese volunteers crossing the Yalu River into North Korea during the Korean War
North Korea's prime minister Kim Il-sung and China's premier Zhou Enlai tour Beijing in 1958.

The People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exchanged diplomatic recognition on 6 October 1949.

In May 1950, North Korea's Prime minister Kim Il-sung secretly visited Beijing to brief Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership on his war plans.[14] Following setbacks sustained by the Korean People's Army and the crossing of the 38th parallel by the United Nations Command led by US-forces, in October 1950 Chinese forces secretly crossed into North Korea in response to security concern of a possible U.S. invasion of Chinese territory, and entered the Korean War in support of North Korea.[15] China had cautioned that they would go as far as risking an all-war with the US-forces if they advanced towards the Yalu River. However, Douglas MacArthur defied US and UN orders and pushed towards the Yalu River, which enlarged the conflict when Chinese forces fought back and caught the UN forces by surprise, resulting them to retreat back to the 38th parallel, eventually turning into a stalemate and also the current boundary between North Korea and South Korea. In addition to dispatching the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korea to fight against the United Nations Command, China also received North Korean refugees and students and provided economic aid during the war.[16] Following the signing of the Korean War Armistice in 1953, China, along with members of the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union, provided extensive economic assistance to Pyongyang to support the reconstruction and economic development of North Korea.[17]

1956 August Faction Incident

In 1956, at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 3rd Central Committee, leading pro-China Korean figures known as the Yan'an faction attempted to remove Kim il-sung from power with the support of China and the Soviet Union, but failed. This incident has become known as the August Faction Incident and forms the historical basis for North Korean fears of Chinese interference.

Deterioration in 1960s

The 1960s have been characterized as a "contentious" period in Sino-North Korean relations.[18] The Korean Workers Party criticized the Cultural Revolution and described Mao Zedong as “an old fool who has gone out of his mind.”[18][19] The People's Republic of China recalled its Ambassador from Pyongyang in October 1966, and the Red Guard criticized North Korea as being "revisionist" in the Dongfanghong newspaper.[18][20]

Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty

In 1961, the two countries signed the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, whereby China pledged to immediately render military and other assistance by all means to its ally against any outside attack.[21] This treaty was prolonged twice, in 1981 and 2001, with a validity until 2021.

Post-Cold War era

On 1 January 2009, Chinese paramount leader Hu Jintao and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il exchanged greetings and declared 2009 as the "year of China–DPRK friendship," marking 60 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries.[22]

The close China-DPRK relationship is celebrated at the Mass Games in Pyongyang

In August 2012, Jang Song-thaek, uncle of Kim Jong-un, met Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing.[23] It has since been widely reported that during their meeting, Jang told Hu Jintao he wished to replace Kim Jong-un with his brother Kim Jong-nam. The meeting was allegedly taped by Zhou Yongkang, then secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, who informed Kim Jong-un of the plot. In December 2013, Jang was executed for treason while in July 2014 Zhou was publicly put under investigation for corruption and other crimes and was arrested in December 2014. These events are said to have marked the beginning of Kim Jong-un's distrust of China, since they had failed to inform him of a plot against his rule, while China took a dislike to Kim for executing their trusted intermediary.[24][25]

On 5 May 2013, North Korea "grabbed," according to Jiang Yaxian, a Chinese government official, another Chinese fishing boat in a series of impounding Chinese fishing boats.[9] "North Korea was demanding 600,000 yuan ($97,600) for its safe return, along with its 16 crew."[9] According to a December 2014 article in The New York Times, relations had reached a low point.[26]

In March 2016 the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited a missile factory, which China strongly condemned, in a report by the state newspaper the People's Daily revealed that the North Korean politics causes instability on the Korean Peninsula and is comparable to the situation in Syria.[citation needed]

The involvement of the United States in the peninsula's affairs in April–May 2017 presented a major issue for Sino-American relations in organiser Li Xiaolin's preparations for Xi's visit to the US.[27]

Nuclear weapons program

Since 2003, China has been a participant in six-party talks aimed at resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme.

The Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Yang Jiechi said that China "resolutely" opposed the 2013 North Korean nuclear test conducted by North Korea.[28][29] The North Korean ambassador to China, Ji Jae-ryong, was personally informed of this position on 12 February 2013 in a meeting with Yang Jiechi.[28]

In 2016, right after the North Korean nuclear test in January tensions between China and North Korea have further grown, the reaction of China was, "We strongly urge the DPRK side to remain committed to its denuclearization commitment, and stop taking any actions that would make the situation worse," spokesperson Hua Chunying said.[30] On 24 February 2016 the United States and China introduced new sanctions against the North Korean regime conducted within the United Nations context.[31]

The Times of India reported that British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson saying at a dinner to mark India's independence that the Chinese control 90% of North Korea's trade and it is in the Chinese government's hands to exercise economic pressure on Kim Jong-un to achieve the diplomatic resolution needed to de-escalate tensions in the region.[32]

The United States has sanctioned many Chinese companies for violating North Korean sanctions, possibly aiding their nuclear program.[33][34]

2017 decline in relations

Due to Chinese support for sanctions against North Korea, relations in 2017 took a negative turn with North Korean state media attacking China directly on at least three occasions.

In February 2017, after China halted imports of coal from North Korea, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, "this country [China], styling itself a big power, is dancing to the tune of the US while defending its mean behaviour with such excuses that it was meant not to have a negative impact on the living of the people in the DPRK but to check its nuclear program".[35]

In May 2017, KCNA made an unprecedented criticism of China, saying "a string of absurd and reckless remarks are now heard from China every day only to render the present bad situation tenser" and that "China had better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK-China relations". Accusing China of "big-power chauvinism", KCNA said Chinese support for sanctions against North Korea were "an undisguised threat to an honest-minded neighboring country which has a long history and tradition of friendship" and that "The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China".[36]

In September 2017, KCNA slammed negative editorials by the People's Daily and Global Times, saying "some media of China are seriously hurting the line and social system of the DPRK and threatening the DPRK" and calling them "the dirty excrement of the reactionaries of history" who "spouted such extremely ill-boding words".[37]

In February 2018, the KCNA again criticized Chinese media. According to KCNA, China Central Television "seriously spoiled the atmosphere of the feast by publishing presumptuous comments of individual experts" and the Global Times was condemned for "the behavior of scattering ashes on other’s happy day as they bring the denuclearization issue".[38][39]

2018 improvement in relations

Main article: Kim–Xi meetings

In March 2018, Korean Workers' Party Chairman Kim Jong-un met with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping for the first time in Beijing.[40] Xinhua News Agency reported that the North Korean leader's trip lasted four days. Kim and his wife Ri Sol-ju were met with honour guards and a lavish banquet hosted by Xi Jinping.[41]

Xi was likewise received in the same-fashion when he visited Pyongyang in June 2019 on two-day state visit, the first of such since Hu Jintao's 2006 visit. In a North Korean mass games that Xi attended, he was depicted inside a gold-framed circle surrounded by red — the same style previously used to depict Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-il, and grandfather, Kim Il-sung.[42][43] It is also the first time a visit by a Chinese leader to North Korea has been called a "state visit" by the Chinese government.

In July 2019, North Korea was one of the 50 countries which signed a letter defending Xinjiang re-education camps and praising "China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights in Xinjiang."[44][45] North Korea has also defended China's position in the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests, with North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho saying that "North Korea fully supports the stand and measures of China to defend the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the country and safeguard the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and concerns about foreign forces interference in Hong Kong issue."[46] During an official visit to North Korea in September 2019, State Councilor Wang Yi said that "China will always stand on the road as comrades and friends" of North Korea.[47]

In October 2019, the two countries celebrated 70 years of an "invincible friendship".[48]

Human rights

In June 2020, North Korea was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong national security law at the United Nations.[49]

Border

Main article: China–North Korea border

China and North Korea share a 1,416 km long land border that corresponds almost entirely to the course of the Yalu and Tumen rivers.

The two countries signed a border treaty in 1962 to resolve their un-demarcated land border. China received 40% of the disputed crater lake on Paektu Mountain (known as Changbai Mountain in China), while North Korea held the remaining land.[50]

In the 1950s and 1960s, many ethnic Koreans in Northeast China crossed the border into North Korea to escape economic hardship and famine in China. In recent years, the flow of refugees has reversed, with a considerable number of North Koreans fleeing to China.[51] Much of China's trade with North Korea goes through the port of Dandong on the Yalu River.[52]

In February 1997, tourist access to the bridge over the Tumen at Wonjong-Quanhe was allowed.[53]

In May 2012, China and North Korea signed an agreement on the construction and management of the cross-border bridge between Manpo in the Jagang Province of North Korea and Jian in China.[54]

In 2015, a single rogue North Korean soldier killed four ethnic Korean citizens of China who lived along the border of China with North Korea.[55]

In April 2019, both countries opened the bridge connecting the cities of Ji'an, Jilin and Manpo after three years of construction.[56]

Economic relations

Trucks queued waiting for the border crossing between Quanhe and Wonjong to open.

China's economic assistance to North Korea accounts for about half of all Chinese foreign aid. Beijing provides the aid directly to Pyongyang, thereby enabling it to bypass the United Nations.

During the period of severe food shortage between 1996 and 1998, Beijing provided unconditional food aid to North Korea.[57]

Trade

China is North Korea's largest trade partner, while North Korea itself ranks relatively low as a source of imports to China. North Korea is dependent on trade and aid from China, although international sanctions against North Korea have decreased overall official volume of trade.[58] Between 2000 and 2015, trade between the two countries grew over ten-fold, reaching a peak of $6.86 billion in 2014.[58]

DPRK Imports and Exports with China, 2008-2019 (mil. USD)[59]
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Imports 2033.2 1887.7 2277.8 3165.2 3527.8 3632.9 4022.5 3226.5 3422.0 3608.0 2528.2 2883.6
Exports 754.0 793.0 1187.9 2464.2 2484.7 2913.6 2841.5 2483.9 2634.4 1650.7 194.6 215.2

In February 2017, China restricted all coal imports from North Korea until 2018. In 2016, coal briquettes had been the single largest good exported by North Korea, accounting for 46% of its trade with China.[60] China has said this was in line with the UN sanctions against North Korea, but it is speculated that this occurred because of a mix of events, including recent nuclear tests, the suspected assassination of Kim Jong-nam, brother of ruler Kim Jong-un, and pressure on China from the rest of the world and especially the United States.[61][62][63] However, despite this, North Korea has been reported to evade sanctions and continue to sell coal to China through a loophole.[64][65] On 28 September 2017, in response to new UN Security Council sanctions over a nuclear test earlier in the month, China ordered all North Korean companies operating in China to cease operations within 120 days.[66]

By January 2018 customs statistics showed that trade between the two countries had fallen to a historic low,[67] although volume again increased by 15.4% to $1.25 billion in the first half of 2019.[68] China closed its border in late January 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and trade between the two countries nearly halted, with North Korean imports from and exports to China both down by over 90% year-over-year in March.[69]

Banking

On 7 May 2013, Bank of China, China's biggest foreign exchange bank, joined other international banks in closing the accounts of North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank, its main foreign exchange bank. Although neither entity stated reasons for the closure, it is widely assumed that it was in response to sanctions placed against Bank of China by the United States for its alleged assistance in financing the North Korean nuclear weapons program.[70]

Investments

In 2012, a $45 million investment by China's Haicheng Xiyang Group into an iron-ore powder processing plant failed under what the Chinese called "a nightmare".[71] On 21 February 2016 China quietly ended financial support of North Korea without any media publicity. It is reported to be due to the fallout of relations between the two governments.[72]

In July 2019, Washington Post reported that Huawei "secretly helped" North Korea to build and maintain its commercial wireless network in conjunction with Chinese state-owned enterprise Panda International Information Technology Co.[73][74]

Military relations

Chinese soldiers at the Battle of Triangle Hill in 1952, during the Korean War.

China assisted North Korea during the Korean War (1950–53) against South Korean and UN forces on the Korean peninsula. Although China itself remained neutral, three million Chinese soldiers participated in the conflict as part of the People's Volunteer Army fighting alongside North Korean forces. As many as 180,000 were killed.[75]

Since the end of the Korean War, the two states have closely cooperated in security and defense issues. In 1975, Kim Il-sung visited Beijing in a failed attempt to solicit support from China for a military invasion of South Korea.[76] On 23 November 2009, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Pyongyang, the first defense chief to visit since 2006.[77]

In August 2019, director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA Kim Su Gil visited Beijing to meet with Zhang Youxia. Zhang told Kim that the delegation's visit as was of “crucial significance in bilateral exchange.“[78]

Inter-visits by leaders

From North Korea to China
Year Name
1953 Premier Kim Il-sung
1954 Premier Kim Il-sung
1958 Premier Kim Il-sung
1959 Premier Kim Il-sung
1961 Premier Kim Il-sung
1975 General Secretary Kim Il-sung
1982 President Kim Il-sung
1984 President Kim Il-sung
1987 President Kim Il-sung
1989 General Secretary Kim Il-sung
1991 General Secretary Kim Il-sung
2000 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2001 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2004 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2006 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2010 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2010 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2011 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2011 General Secretary Kim Jong-il
2018 Chairman Kim Jong-un
2018 Chairman Kim Jong-un
2018 Chairman Kim Jong-un
2019 Chairman Kim Jong-un


From China to North Korea
Year Name
1958 Premier Zhou Enlai
1963 Chairman Liu Shaoqi
1970 Premier Zhou Enlai
1978 Chairman Hua Guofeng
1982 Chairman Hu Yaobang
1984 General Secretary Hu Yaobang
1985 General Secretary Hu Yaobang
1986 President Li Xiannian
1988 President Yang Shangkun
1989 General Secretary Zhao Ziyang
1990 General Secretary Jiang Zemin
1991 Premier Li Peng
1992 President Yang Shangkun
2001 General Secretary Jiang Zemin
2004 General Secretary Hu Jintao
2008 Vice President Xi Jinping
2009 Premier Wen Jiabao
2013 Vice President Li Yuanchao
2019 General Secretary Xi Jinping

In 1978, the DPRK celebrated the 30th anniversary of the republic, in which Deng Xiaoping attended in his official capacities as the First Vice Premier of the State Council and the Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.[79][80]

See also

References

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Further reading

  • Jung, Heon Joo, and Timothy S. Rich. "Why invest in North Korea? Chinese foreign direct investment in North Korea and its implications." The Pacific Review 29.3 (2016): 307-330. online
  • Kim, Jih-Un. "Inflated Hope, Unchanged Reality: China's Response to North Korea's Third Nuclear Test." Asian Perspective 39.1 (2015): 27-46. online
  • Kim, Min-hyung. "Why provoke? The Sino-US competition in East Asia and North Korea’s strategic choice." Journal of Strategic Studies 39.7 (2016): 979-998.
  • Nanto, Dick K., and Mark E. Manyin. "China-North Korea Relations." North Korean Review (2011): 94-101. online
  • Rozman, Gilbert. " North Korea’s place in Sino-Russian relations and identities." in International Relations and Asia’s Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) pp. 301-314.
  • Shin, Jong-Ho. "Evaluation of North Korea-China Summit and Its Implications on the Korean Peninsula." (2018). online
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