Ethiopian nationalism

The plain green, yellow and red flag of Ethiopian nationalism.

Ethiopian nationalism, also referred to as Ethiopianism, Ethiopianness, Pan-Ethiopian nationalism, Ethiopian national identity, and Civic Nationalism in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Community, asserts that the people of Ethiopia/Ethiopians are a nation and promotes the multi-ethnic cultural unity of the people whereas it defines ethnic groups as sub-divisions of Ethiopian identity, and asserts that all ethnic groups should have equality rights and the Ethiopian people as a whole regardless of ethnicity constitute sovereignty as one polity. Ethiopian nationalism is a type of civic nationalism in that it is multi-ethnic in nature and promotes diversity. The view espoused by Ethiopian nationalists is that Ethiopian civic nationalism is in contrast to and in opposition against ethno-nationalist supremacism fueled by ethnic federalist policies introduced by the EPRDF in which Ethiopian nationalists claim that regional subdivisions of the state were segregated according to ethnicity brought about by the partitioning and dissolution of traditionally multi-ethnic regions causing the internal displacement of people through internal population transfers. However, there has been opposition to multi-ethnic Ethiopian nationalism from ethnic nationalist and separatists groups as seen in the surge of ethnic tensions between various Ethiopian ethnic groups and political parties most notably among the most populous ethnic groups in the country such as the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, most of whom who have separatist movements among their ranks, and conflict between Ethiopia and various ethnic groups that make up Eritrean national identity with Eritrean Provincial Separatists vying for and later accomplishing the independence of Eritrea (who had already formed their own region specific Eritrean Nationalism and national identity of the people of Eritrea (Eritreans) which has keen similarities to that of Ethiopian nationalism because of its multi-ethnic nature) in the aftermath of the Shewan NeftenyaPolitical-Predominance Era that occurred<sup class="citation nobold" id="ref_ by adopting the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and other aristocratic cultural traits found in royal court culture. Both peasant Amhara culture and Ethiopian Empire royal court culture have heavily influenced each other; this Ethiopian royal court culture (that influenced and was influenced by Amhara culture) dominated throughout the eras of military and monarchic rule. Both the imperial and the Derg government relocated numerous Amharas into southern Ethiopia where they served in government administration, courts, church and even in school, where Oromo texts were eliminated and replaced by Amharic.] </ref>">[[#endnote_ by adopting the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and other aristocratic cultural traits found in royal court culture. Both peasant Amhara culture and Ethiopian Empire royal court culture have heavily influenced each other; this Ethiopian royal court culture (that influenced and was influenced by Amhara culture) dominated throughout the eras of military and monarchic rule. Both the imperial and the Derg government relocated numerous Amharas into southern Ethiopia where they served in government administration, courts, church and even in school, where Oromo texts were eliminated and replaced by Amharic.] </ref>|[{{{2}}}]]] towards the end of monarchic rule in the Ethiopian Empire. However, ethnic tensions surged between the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, each of whom had formed separatist movements dedicated to leaving Ethiopia or forming ethnicity-specific enclaves within the Ethiopian state. Oromo nationalism and Ethiopian nationalism have conflicting narrative over status of Addis Ababa

History

Painting depicting the Battle of Adwa of 1896 where Ethiopian forces were victorious over invading Italian forces. The victory is cherished as an example of Ethiopia upholding its independence against European colonial powers, and is annually celebrated in Ethiopia in Victory at Adwa Day.

The conception of an Ethiopian nation by Ethiopian nationalists is stated to have begun with the Aksumite Kingdom in the 4th century A.D. The Aksumite Kingdom was a predominantly Christian state that at the height of its power controlled northern Ethiopian Highlands, Eritrea, and the coastal regions of Southern Arabia. The Aksumite Kingdom was responsible for the development of the religious movement that became the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. However, the expansion of Islam in the 7th century caused the decline of the Aksumite Kingdom, and most of the lowland populations converted to Islam, while the highland people remained Christian. Since the Aksumite people became divided between Christian highlands and Islamic lowlands, religious and tribal tensions and rivalries between the people intensified. The Aksumite society changed into a loose confederation of city-states that maintained the language of Aksum.

The establishment of modern Ethiopia was led by particularly Amhara emperors Tewodros II of Gondar and Menelik II of Shewa. Tewodros governed from 1855 to 1868, followed by Yohannis IV, who was from Tigray and was emperor from 1869 to 1889 and managed to expand his authority into Eritrea, followed by Menelik, who governed from 1889 to 1913 and repelled the Italian invasion of 1896.

Ethiopia, unlike the rest of Africa, had never been colonized. Ethiopia was accepted as the first independent African-governed state at the League of Nations in 1922. Ethiopia was occupied by Italy after the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, but it was liberated by the Allies during World War II.

After the second world war, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea. However, ethnic tensions surged between the Amhara and the Eritrean, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, each of whom had formed separatist movements dedicated to leaving Shewan Neftenya-dominated Ethiopia. After the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy by the Derg military junta, the country became aligned with the Soviet Union and Cuba after the United States failed to support it in its military struggle with Somali separatists in the Ogaden region. After the end of military government in Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea separated from Ethiopia.

Legacy of independence

See also: Battle of Adwa

In March 1896 a definitive battle took place between the forces of colonial Italy, and those of the Ethiopian Empire in a town in northern Ethiopia called Adwa. The battle was short but extremely violent with tens of thousands of deaths. At the time Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia had mobilized the Ethiopian people regardless of class and ethnicities. The mobilization drive would see millions of Ethiopian Citizens march from their towns, villages, and cities into the Northern Highlands for the preservation of their African Empire. This battle would end in a decisive victory for Ethiopia, marking the country with a unique legacy of independence in the face of European Aggression.

The battle of Adwa is the foundation for Ethiopian Nationalist ideology. For many Ethiopians, the threat of foreign invasion is the rallying cry for patriotic sacrifices and nationalist ideologues. By the time the battle of Adwa took place almost all of Africa was dominated by European forces. Ethiopian independence broke the mold of European superiority & provided a beacon of hope for black nations and peoples around the world. For many Ethiopians this moment represents a transitional moment, in which the nation realized its teleological doctrine. While the first war against Italy was a uniting war, the 1934 invasion by Benito Mussolini was extremely divisive. In Observation on the Ethiopian Nation Charles McClellan argues that the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1934 was in fact "as much a civil war as one against foreign aggression." McClellan argues that the political and factional differences which emerged in Ethiopia prior to the war, were not resolved by the Italian invasion but instead were amplified. This in the authors opinion led to an era of bitter factionalism which would "define the dynamics of post-war Ethiopian politics."

Era of ethnic federalism

See also: Ethnic federalism § Ethiopia

Since 1991, the TPLF has had almost complete control of the national government, leveraging its power to concentrate wealth and development into the Tigray Region. The hegemonic rule of the Tigray people in Ethiopia was in many ways a reaction to the predominance Amharas had in media and governance. The hegemonic rule of a few ethnic groups or in some cases a single ethnic group has marginalized many groups within Ethiopia and has led to a cycle of violence and retribution. In the early 1990s the TPLF believed that through an ethnic federalist state system, one in which regions were assigned and divided by ethnic population, they could

"reduc[e] the inter-ethnic conflict that has divided Ethiopian society for centuries; (2) promot[e] equitable material conditions in all areas of the country; and (3) improv[e] the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector performance at the field level. They argued they could use political and administrative devolution to promote these objectives without threatening other important objectives, such as economic growth and political stability."

While these region weren't given "extensive sub-national control over technical policies, laws, regulations, and tax" their creation lent credibility to the different independence and ethnic nationalist movements around the country. For Ethiopian Nationalists, this credibility has emboldened different groups, giving them more cohesion, whilst corroding national unity and notions of Pan-Ethiopianism. The increased autonomy of these groups contrasted with the increased repression by Tigray elites created a situation in which the ruling class was both empowering groups through greater ethnic cohesion, but transparently stifling their political will. As evidenced by the 2005 elections the TPLF use of violent repression to subdue detractors of the ruling coalition only had the effect of radicalizing ethnic parties and increasing ethnic divisions. Many Ethiopian nationalists view the system of ethnic federalism as having made governing in Ethiopia a zero sum game. To win power in Ethiopia is to deny any other ethnic group significant power. By expelling notions of Ethiopianism or multi-ethnic Ethiopian national identity from the national political dialogue the TPLF has increased the ethnic cleavages and created a system revolving around ethnic affiliation, void of political ideology. In 2015 "after 2014 Addis Ababa Master Plan was unveiled to expand the boundaries of the capital, Addis Ababa" into Oromia thousands of Oromo Youth Liberation Movement Members took up to the streets demanding increased political representation, an end to the TPLF sponsored Master Plan, and avenues of dissent. Although the ruling party tried to blunt these protests through physical force they only grew and Amharas "angered by an unfulfilled demand to retake control of some of their lands" lost in the reorganization of regional boarders launched protests of mostly Oromos and Amharas (but also other Ethiopians) demanding proportional political representation and influence. After a 10-month state of emergency imposed by the TPLF, which saw the abdication of prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Abiy Amhed was selected by the ruling EPDRF coalition as the next prime minister due to his mixed Oromo-Amhara ethnic ancestry with a preference to his Oromo identify. Since taking power he has taken up major reforms allowing back political dissidents, releasing some political prisoners, and liberalizing the economy. While his drive to reform and democratize the nation have garnered him support across the country he still has not addressed the fundamental issues of the Ethnic Federalist system, which in the Pan-Ethiopians' opinion is the root cause for ethno-nationalist politics and tensions. Ethiopian nationalists believe that Ethnic Federalism must be ended to shift Ethiopian politics from ethnic patronage to ideology, it must be ended to induce national cohesion and blunt sectarian loyalty, and through the blunting of ethnic cohesion induce an era of unity and prosperity.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia and the Prosperity Party have been seen as supporters of Ethiopian civic nationalism due to the merger of the Oromo Democratic Party with the Amhara Democratic Party, Argoba People's Democratic Organization, Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front, Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party, Gambela People's Democratic Movement, Afar National Democratic Party, Hareri National League, and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement ethnicity-based political parties into the new multi-ethnic Prosperity Party, thus moving these predecessor parties away from their ethnic nationalist and pro-ethnic federalism past into a party that promotes Ethiopian national identity, and non-ethnicity based federalism - all of which are seen by opponents as steps towards taking political powers based on group rights away from the various ethnic groups, while proponents see it as a way to move Ethiopian politics and governmental administration away from ethnicity-based identity politics, supporting the individual rights of each person, to mitigate the rise of ethnic nationalism, to foster national unity and solidarity, and to include in the democratic process political parties of several ethnic groups and regions that were once deemed too inferior by the Tigray People's Liberation Front-led Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front regime to fully join the one-party dominated coalition government or be full partakers in revolutionary democracy because of their largely pastoralist way of life.

Ethiopia's influential Lion of Judah flag.

See also

• Neftenya
• Ethiopian empire
• Ethiopianism

Further reading

• Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot; Gebresilassie, Feseha Habtetsion. 2021. "Nationalism and self-determination in contemporary Ethiopia." Nations and Nationalism.

Bibliography

• Motyl, Alexander J. (2001). Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Volume II. Academic Press. ISBN 0-12-227230-7.