Bank of Montreal v Stuart

Bank of Montreal v Stuart
Bank of Montreal building, Montreal, Quebec
Court	Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Full case name	Bank of Montreal v Jane Jacques Stuart and Another
Decided	2 December 1910
Citation	[1911] AC 120, [1910] UKPC 53
Case history
Appealed from	Supreme Court of Canada
Court membership
Judges sitting	Lord Macnaghten, Lord Collins, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Sir Arthur Wilson
Case opinions
Decision by	Lord Macnaghten
Keywords
undue influence

Bank of Montreal v Stuart is a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. It deals with the principle of undue influence in relation to contracts, in the particular context of dealings between spouses. The case continues to be cited in the courts in Canada and in England.

Facts

John Stuart, the husband of the respondent to the action, was a shareholder in the Maritime Sulphite Company, Limited, of Chatham, New Brunswick in Canada. That company was indebted to the Bank of Montreal. The bank exerted commercial pressure on John Stuart to obtain a guarantee from his wife, Jane Jacques Stuart, in the amount of $100,000. This he duly did, and Jane Stuart executed the guarantee on 24 February 1896. At the same time she also granted mortgages over land and other investments to the bank. On 11 April 1898 she gave a further guarantee, and on 2 October 1903 and 20 July 1904 she granted further mortgages. All of the property in question was Jane Stuart's personal property, inherited from her father. In exchange for mortgages and guarantees in the neighbourhood of $240,000, she received shares in the company from her husband and the other investors, worth about $24,000.

Jane Stuart did not have any independent legal advice. The only lawyer involved in the transactions was Alexander Bruce, QC, who was simultaneously acting for the bank and for John Stuart. Bruce was also a business associate of John Stuart and a shareholder in the company in question. Bruce drew up all of the various documents which John Stuart requested, and Jane Stuart signed.

The company did not prosper and the bank sought to enforce the guarantees. Bruce, the bank's solicitor, acknowledged that Mrs Stuart was "absolutely cleaned out."

In the judgment Jane Stuart as described as simply accepting the demands made upon her: "The evidence is clear that in all these transactions Mrs. Stuart, who was a confirmed invalid, acted in passive obedience to her husband's directions. She had no will of her own. Nor had she any means of forming an independent judgment even if she had desired to do so."

Decisions of the Canadian courts

Trial

Jane Stuart brought an action in the Ontario High Court of Justice to rescind the various mortgages and security interests which she had granted. The trial judge dismissed the action with costs, noting that "Mrs. Stuart is a lady of intelligence and refinement", who had been the sole executrix of her father's estate, totalling around $250,000. He noted that John Stuart denied that he had exerted any undue influence over his wife, and noted that she had received the shares in the company from her husband and the other shareholders, worth about $23,500, in exchange for the guarantees. The trial judge held that John Stuart had acted with "utmost good faith" towards both the bank and Jane Stuart. The trial judge rejected the argument that a married women must always receive independent legal advice.

Ontario Court of Appeal

Jane Stuart appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. A panel of four judges heard the appeal and divided evenly. Two judges, Osler and MacLaren JJ.A., concluded that the trial judge was correct and would dismiss the appeal.

The other two judges, Moss CJO and Garrow JA, concluded that she was entitled to relief and would direct that the matter be remitted for trial. They concluded that although a married woman has full legal authority in relation to her own property, in transactions between husband and wife which benefit the husband, the wife must always receive independent legal advice. Moss CJO relied on a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Cox v Adams, in support of that conclusion.

Judgment of the Privy Council

The sole judgment was delivered by Lord Macnaghten. A surprisingly large amount of the judgment is simply the judge recounting correspondence between the bank and the company's directors, and providing background as to the sources of Mrs Stuart's wealth and the general financial difficulties of the company. Strangely, having recounted all the correspondence, Lord Macnaghten then notes that much of the correspondence was not in evidence at trial. Lord Macnaghten was clearly not impressed by the fact Mrs Stuart asserted that she had acted of her own free will in her evidence at trial, noting: "Her declarations in the course of her cross-examination that she acted of her own free will and not under her husband's influence merely shew how deeprooted and how lasting the influence of her husband was."

He then added:

It may well be argued that when there is evidence of overpowering influence and the transaction brought about is immoderate and irrational, as it was in the present case, proof of undue influence is complete. However that may be, it seems to their Lordships that in this case there is enough, according to the recognized doctrine of Courts of Equity, to entitle Mrs. Stuart to relief.

Chitty on Contracts cites the case as authority for the proposition that the person exercising undue influence over a person need not engage in any overt act at all. Mrs Stuart succeeded in establishing undue influence "even though her husband had put no pressure on her because none was needed, as 'she had no will of her own ... she was ready to sign and do anything he told her to do.'"

The case is also cited as authority for key propositions:

1. The court used the phrase "immoderate and irrational" to describe the character of a transaction which might of its nature suggest undue influence such as to put a third party on notice.
2. A solicitor who is advising a client about a transaction and has reason to suspect that the client is the victim of undue influence is placed under a duty to the client to try and protect her.
3. The relationship of husband and wife was not one which, as a matter of law, would raise a presumption of undue influence.

Commentary

The decision was an important one in the early development of the law of undue influence but is rarely cited or relied upon today.

The proposition of the case has modern value in business venture loans where final court of appeal decisions such as Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) are followed, which developed the proposition further, leading to the widespread independent provision of "Etridge advice" to a spouse or other joint owner not set to benefit from a transaction.

See also

• Undue influence in English law