Rentier state: Difference between revisions
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The emergence of the new [[petroleum|oil]] states and their increasing importance in world trade in the 1970s brought a renewed interest in thinking on rentier economies in the afore mentioned disciplines of political science and international relations.<ref name=“Beblawi”>Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> Examples of rentier states include oil preducing states in the [[Middle East]] region including [[Saudi Arabia]], [[United Arab Emirates]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] and [[Qatar]] as well as states such as [[Venezuela]] and [[Libya]] in Latin America and North Africa, all of whom are members of [[OPEC]].<ref name=“Beblawi”>Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> Rentier state theory, in the context of Middle East oil states in particular, is one of several explanations provided to explain the predominance of authoritarian regimes and the seeming lack of success of [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracy in the region]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While many states [[export]] resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of [[revenue]] from domestic [[taxation]], as their naturally-occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their citizenry. According to [[Douglas Yates]] (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), the economic behavior of a rentier state |
The emergence of the new [[petroleum|oil]] states and their increasing importance in world trade in the 1970s brought a renewed interest in thinking on rentier economies in the afore mentioned disciplines of political science and international relations.<ref name=“Beblawi”>Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> Examples of rentier states include oil preducing states in the [[Middle East]] region including [[Saudi Arabia]], [[United Arab Emirates]], [[Iraq]], [[Iran]], [[Kuwait]] and [[Qatar]] as well as states such as [[Venezuela]] and [[Libya]] in Latin America and North Africa, all of whom are members of [[OPEC]].<ref name=“Beblawi”>Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., ''The Arab State'', London, Routledge </ref> <ref>Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, ''Comparative Politics'', Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18</ref> Rentier state theory, in the context of Middle East oil states in particular, is one of several explanations provided to explain the predominance of authoritarian regimes and the seeming lack of success of [[Democracy in the Middle East|democracy in the region]].<ref>Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, ''American Journal of Political Science'', Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246 </ref> While many states [[export]] resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of [[revenue]] from domestic [[taxation]], as their naturally-occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their [[citizenship|citizenry]]. According to [[Douglas Yates]] (cited [http://www.semp.us/biots/biot_227.html here]), the economic behavior of a rentier state |
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<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote> |
<blockquote>embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.</blockquote> |
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Reflecting this, [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. Control over the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, who may use it to alternately coerce or coopt their populace. There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'', |
Reflecting this, [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Fareed Zakaria]] has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive [[social welfare]] programs, becoming an '''allocation''' or '''distributive state'''. Control over the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, who may use it to alternately coerce or coopt their populace. There is, in the words of [[Noah Feldman]] in his book ''After Jihad'', |
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Revision as of 12:39, 7 February 2007
A rentier (prounounced rän'tyā) is an individual who depends on income derived from rents. A rentier state is a term in political science and international relations theory used to classify states who derive all or a substantial portion of their national revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients. The term is most frequently applied to states rich in highly valued natural resources such as petroleum, however it could be applied to nations who trade on their strategic resources (such as permitting the development of an important military base in their territory) as well. Dependent as they are on this source of income, rentier states may externally generate rents by manipulating the global political and economic environment. Such manipulation may include monopolies, trading restrictions, and the solicitation of subsidies or aid in exchange for political influence.
The emergence of the new oil states and their increasing importance in world trade in the 1970s brought a renewed interest in thinking on rentier economies in the afore mentioned disciplines of political science and international relations.[1] Examples of rentier states include oil preducing states in the Middle East region including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Qatar as well as states such as Venezuela and Libya in Latin America and North Africa, all of whom are members of OPEC.[1] [2] Rentier state theory, in the context of Middle East oil states in particular, is one of several explanations provided to explain the predominance of authoritarian regimes and the seeming lack of success of democracy in the region.[3] While many states export resources or license their development by foreign parties, rentier states are characterized by the relative absence of revenue from domestic taxation, as their naturally-occurring wealth precludes the need to extract income from their citizenry. According to Douglas Yates (cited here), the economic behavior of a rentier state
embodies a break in the work-reward causation ... [r]ewards of income and wealth for the rentier do not come as the result of work but rather are the result of chance or situation.
Reflecting this, political scientist Fareed Zakaria has posited that such states fail to develop politically because, in the absence of taxes, citizens have less incentive to place pressure on the government to become responsive to their needs. Instead, the government essentially 'bribes' the citizenry with extensive social welfare programs, becoming an allocation or distributive state. Control over the rent-producing resources is concentrated in the hands of the authorities, who may use it to alternately coerce or coopt their populace. There is, in the words of Noah Feldman in his book After Jihad,
no fiscal connection between the government and the people. The government has only to keep its people in line so that they do not overthrow it and start collecting the oil rents themselves. (Feldman 139)[4]
Consequently in these resource-rich rentier states there is a challenge to developing civil society and democratization. Hence, theorists such as Beblawi concude that the nature of rentier states provides a particular explantion for the presence of authoritarian regimes in such resource rich states.[1]
See also
References
- ^ a b c Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., The Arab State, London, Routledge
- ^ Anderson, L., 1987, The State in the Middle East North Africa, Comparative Politics, Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 1-18
- ^ Smith, B., 2004, Oil Wealth & Regime Survival in the Developing World: 1960-1999, American Journal of Political Science, Volume 48, Issue 2, Pages 232-246
- ^ Feldman, N., 2003, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux