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== Background ==
== Background ==
In the [[Post–Cold War era|post-Cold War era]] the [[Chinese Communist Party]] promoted a policy of [[Chinese nationalism|Chinese Nationalism]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Bislev|first=Ane|last2=Li|first2=Xing|date=2014-04-02|title=Conceptualizing the cultural and political facets of “Chinese Nationalism” in an era of China’s global rise|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40636-014-0002-x|journal=International Communication of Chinese Culture|volume=1|issue=1-2|pages=21–33|doi=10.1007/s40636-014-0002-x|issn=2197-4233}}</ref> This form of nationalism had a long history of political utilisation in China, first appearing during the [[Qing dynasty]] when China suffered a humiliating defeat in the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] and growing over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as China faced various military conquests at the hands of various colonial powers, European and Japanese.<ref name=":3" />
The Patriotic Education Campaign was promoted by the Chinese Communist Party in the [[Post–Cold War era|post-Cold War era]]. The campaign was developed by the government as a response to the growing Chinese pro-democracy movement of the 1980s, and particularly the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, which had substantially weakened popular support for the Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Liu|first=Chuyu|last2=Ma|first2=Xiao|date=2018-07-24|title=Popular Threats and Nationalistic Propaganda: Political Logic of China’s Patriotic Campaign|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483632|journal=Security Studies|volume=27|issue=4|pages=633–664|doi=10.1080/09636412.2018.1483632|issn=0963-6412}}</ref> Particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests the Chinese political leadership realized the need of political education of the younger generation in order to create support for the Chinese Communist Party. The two factions of the Chinese Communist Party, the conservatives and the reformists, agreed that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought no longer sufficiently legitimized their rule. The conservative faction argued for strengthening the position of Maoist ideology, while the reformist faction, led by Deng Xiaoping, saw nationalism as the solution.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Zhao, Suisheng, 1954-|first=|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/54694622|title=A nation-state by construction : dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism|date=2004|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=|isbn=0-8047-4897-7|location=Stanford, Calif.|pages=213|oclc=54694622}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=Suizheng|date=1998|title=A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China|journal=Communist and post-communist studies|volume=31|pages=287-302}}</ref> After a period of political stability and Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in 1992, patriotic education eventually became a youth education campaign that was mainly focused on the youth and intellectuals.<ref name=":1" />

Following the Communist Party’s 1949 victory in the [[Chinese Civil War]], [[Mao Zedong]] employed Chinese Nationalism as a political tool used to bolster Chinese patriotism and party loyalty; seeking to closely align Chinese national identity with a sense of fidelity to the Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=Suisheng|date=1998-09-01|title=A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9|journal=Communist and Post-Communist Studies|volume=31|issue=3|pages=287–302|doi=10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9|issn=0967-067X}}</ref> During the Cold War, Chinese Nationalism was promoted as a uniting national philosophy in Chinese cultural and educational institutions and was used to justify the Party’s suppression of separatist and secessionist movements in Western provinces.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vickers|first=Edward|date=2009-09|title=Selling ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ ‘Thought and Politics’ and the legitimisation of China's developmental strategy|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2009.04.012|journal=International Journal of Educational Development|volume=29|issue=5|pages=523–531|doi=10.1016/j.ijedudev.2009.04.012|issn=0738-0593}}</ref>

In the 1980s a growing pro-democracy movement emerged in China, culminating in the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|1989 Tiananmen Square Protests]]. The Chinese Communist Party, feeling increasingly threatened by the movement and the increasingly drastic lengths to which protesters would go in order to advocate political reform, sought to institute the Patriotic Education Campaign to combat the rising wave of anti-Party sentiment associated with the movement.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Liu|first=Chuyu|last2=Ma|first2=Xiao|date=2018-07-24|title=Popular Threats and Nationalistic Propaganda: Political Logic of China’s Patriotic Campaign|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.1483632|journal=Security Studies|volume=27|issue=4|pages=633–664|doi=10.1080/09636412.2018.1483632|issn=0963-6412}}</ref> The PEC constituted a modern iteration of the Chinese Nationalist vision and was designed to foster increased party loyalty among a generation of young Chinese students born under the leadership of [[Deng Xiaoping]] and therefore too young to remember the Communist Party, and China, of Mao Zedong.<ref name=":4" />

The Chinese Nationalist-bent of the PEC was not immediately guaranteed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Protests however. While consensus existed within the Party regarding the need for a more targeted political education of the younger generation in order to foster increased support for the CPP, two party factions, the conservatives and the reformists, emerged with competing ideological visions of the legitimisation strategy that should be employed in youth political education. Both factions agreed that [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxism-Leninism]] and [[Maoism|Mao Zedong Thought]] no longer served to sufficiently legitimised CCP rule, yet while the conservative faction argued for a strengthening of the position of Maoist ideology in political education, the reformist faction, led by Deng Xiaoping, saw Chinese Nationalism as the solution.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Zhao, Suisheng, 1954-|first=|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/54694622|title=A nation-state by construction : dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism|date=2004|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=|isbn=0-8047-4897-7|location=Stanford, Calif.|pages=213|oclc=54694622}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Zhao|first=Suizheng|date=1998|title=A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China|journal=Communist and post-communist studies|volume=31|pages=287-302}}</ref>

The Patriotic Education Campaign was commenced following a period of relative political stability in the post-Tiananmen years and [[Deng Xiaoping's southern tour|Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour]] of 1992. It was to become an extensive youth education campaign that primarily targeted school students and intellectuals.<ref name=":1" />


== Textbook Changes ==
== Textbook Changes ==

Revision as of 10:36, 4 January 2022

The Patriotic Education Campaign (simplified Chinese: 爱国主义教育; traditional Chinese: 愛國主義教育; pinyin: Àiguó zhǔyì jiàoyù) was a political campaign in China initiated in 1991 but not carried out in full scale until 1994. In May 1995, the Chinese government issued the "Notice on Recommending Hundreds of Patriotic Education Books to Primary and Middle Schools across the Country", and made a list of a hundred patriotic films, a hundred patriotic songs, a hundred patriotic books.[1] The main goal of the campaign was to "boost the nation’s spirit, enhance cohesion, and foster national self esteem and pride".[2]

This was done through education that was designed to construct a historical memory of what the People's Republic of China was created from,[3] by emphasizing the role the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in securing national independence, and the influence of foreign countries on China. This aim was to boost the CCP's legitimacy, which during the 1980s had declined, particularly around the time of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.[4][5] The academic Suisheng Zhao has said the Campaign is part of a strategy to make the Party the “paramount patriotic force and guardian of national pride.”[6]

Ideology

Guiding ideology

According to the 1994 "Outline", patriotism education focuses on young people and takes socialism with Chinese characteristics and the party's basic line as the guide. The main content covers the history of China, the traditional culture of China, and the beliefs of the CCP. The outline also promotes Chinese nationalism. In 2019 the "Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education in the New Era" was implemented which contains expositions by Xi Jinping, and tenets of Xi Jinping Thought such as the Chinese dream.[7][8]

Background

In the post-Cold War era the Chinese Communist Party promoted a policy of Chinese Nationalism.[9] This form of nationalism had a long history of political utilisation in China, first appearing during the Qing dynasty when China suffered a humiliating defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War and growing over the course of the 20th Century as China faced various military conquests at the hands of various colonial powers, European and Japanese.[9]

Following the Communist Party’s 1949 victory in the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong employed Chinese Nationalism as a political tool used to bolster Chinese patriotism and party loyalty; seeking to closely align Chinese national identity with a sense of fidelity to the Communist Party.[10] During the Cold War, Chinese Nationalism was promoted as a uniting national philosophy in Chinese cultural and educational institutions and was used to justify the Party’s suppression of separatist and secessionist movements in Western provinces.[11]

In the 1980s a growing pro-democracy movement emerged in China, culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. The Chinese Communist Party, feeling increasingly threatened by the movement and the increasingly drastic lengths to which protesters would go in order to advocate political reform, sought to institute the Patriotic Education Campaign to combat the rising wave of anti-Party sentiment associated with the movement.[12] The PEC constituted a modern iteration of the Chinese Nationalist vision and was designed to foster increased party loyalty among a generation of young Chinese students born under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and therefore too young to remember the Communist Party, and China, of Mao Zedong.[12]

The Chinese Nationalist-bent of the PEC was not immediately guaranteed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Protests however. While consensus existed within the Party regarding the need for a more targeted political education of the younger generation in order to foster increased support for the CPP, two party factions, the conservatives and the reformists, emerged with competing ideological visions of the legitimisation strategy that should be employed in youth political education. Both factions agreed that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought no longer served to sufficiently legitimised CCP rule, yet while the conservative faction argued for a strengthening of the position of Maoist ideology in political education, the reformist faction, led by Deng Xiaoping, saw Chinese Nationalism as the solution.[13][14]

The Patriotic Education Campaign was commenced following a period of relative political stability in the post-Tiananmen years and Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour of 1992. It was to become an extensive youth education campaign that primarily targeted school students and intellectuals.[14]

Textbook Changes

The campaign was aimed at Chinese youth and had them study China’s humiliating modern history - such as China’s “century of humiliation” - and the positive changes brought by the Communist Revolution.[2] These included a replacement of the old call-struggle narrative with a new patriotic narrative, as well as a replacement of the official Maoist “victor narrative” in which China “won" national independence with a “victimization narrative” that blames the West for China’s problems and suffering.[2] Specific changes in the content of Chinese history textbooks can be seen at three different instances in time. In 1995, Chinese textbooks followed a Marxist, historical materialist, and internationalist ideology. Japan was seen mostly in a positive light with highlights on its positive impact on China through its own modernization. Negative aspects of Japan, such as the rise of fascism, are attributed to the elite and government and not the people.[15] Then, in 2004, textbooks took on a more liberal and cosmopolitan ideology. Japan was still only marginally discussed with the only real mention of its influence on China coming from Japan’s role in smuggling opium into China.[15]

The year 2007, however, saw major changes with textbook ideology becoming more nation-centric with Marxist veneer. Japan’s history and aggression against China were now covered much more explicitly. Furthermore, while Japan’s achievements are still noted, there is no longer mention of any positive impact on China. There is also no longer a distinction between the elite and the masses, meaning Japan's wartime atrocities are now being blamed on the Japanese people rather than the government or elite.[15] Overall, Chinese textbooks were portraying a much more negative view of Japan. The new content brought forth by this campaign has become embedded in political institutions and inaugurated as the CCP’s new ideological tool.[2] This represented a major shift in Beijing’s identity politics.

References

  1. ^ Ministry of Education of China. "List of "Three Hundreds" in Patriotic Education". Ministry of Education of China. Archived from the original on 4 October 2020. Retrieved 4 October 2020. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= / |archive-url= timestamp mismatch; 6 October 2020 suggested (help)
  2. ^ a b c d Wang, Zheng (December 2008). "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China". International Studies Quarterly. 52 (4): 783–806. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00526.x. JSTOR 29734264. Retrieved 24 September 2020.
  3. ^ Dor, Alexander (15 August 2015). "China's WW2 Remembrance: 'Patriotic Education' in Action". The Diplomatic. Retrieved 24 September 2020.
  4. ^ Anderlini, Jamil (23 December 2012). "Patriotic education distorts China world view". Financial Times. Retrieved 24 September 2020.
  5. ^ Wu, Sarah (2020-11-29). "China wields patriotic education to tame Hong Kong's rebellious youth". The Japan Times. Retrieved 2021-01-19.
  6. ^ "Which Side Are You On, Comrade? Potential for Convergent Protests across the People's Republic of China". THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW. Retrieved 2020-09-27.
  7. ^ "爱国主义教育实施纲要-【维普期刊官网】- 中文期刊服务平台". qikan.cqvip.com. Retrieved 2021-02-16.
  8. ^ "中共中央国务院印发《新时代爱国主义教育实施纲要》(全文)_中国政库_澎湃新闻-The Paper". www.thepaper.cn. Retrieved 2021-02-16.
  9. ^ a b Bislev, Ane; Li, Xing (2014-04-02). "Conceptualizing the cultural and political facets of "Chinese Nationalism" in an era of China's global rise". International Communication of Chinese Culture. 1 (1–2): 21–33. doi:10.1007/s40636-014-0002-x. ISSN 2197-4233.
  10. ^ Zhao, Suisheng (1998-09-01). "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 31 (3): 287–302. doi:10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9. ISSN 0967-067X.
  11. ^ Vickers, Edward (2009-09). "Selling 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' 'Thought and Politics' and the legitimisation of China's developmental strategy". International Journal of Educational Development. 29 (5): 523–531. doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2009.04.012. ISSN 0738-0593. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  12. ^ a b Liu, Chuyu; Ma, Xiao (2018-07-24). "Popular Threats and Nationalistic Propaganda: Political Logic of China's Patriotic Campaign". Security Studies. 27 (4): 633–664. doi:10.1080/09636412.2018.1483632. ISSN 0963-6412.
  13. ^ Zhao, Suisheng, 1954- (2004). A nation-state by construction : dynamics of modern Chinese nationalism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. p. 213. ISBN 0-8047-4897-7. OCLC 54694622.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  14. ^ a b Zhao, Suizheng (1998). "A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-Tiananmen China". Communist and post-communist studies. 31: 287–302.
  15. ^ a b c Vickers, Edward; Biao, Yang (2013-12-01). "Shanghai's History Curriculum Reforms and Shifting Textbook Portrayals of Japan". China Perspectives. 2013 (2013/4): 29. doi:10.4000/chinaperspectives.6317. ISSN 2070-3449.