Lazy argument: Difference between revisions
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The lazy argument seems to hold only if one neglects to consider the necessity of the occurrence of intermediate events related to a final and fated event. This is unsound, and the lazy argument must be rejected. |
The lazy argument seems to hold only if one neglects to consider the necessity of the occurrence of intermediate events related to a final and fated event. This is unsound, and the lazy argument must be rejected. |
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Consider this hypothetical argument. Say, at a time T<sub>1</sub> it is fated that I will pass my test at a time T<sub>2</sub>. The lazy argument would suggest that I would be just as justified to not study as I would be to study due to the fact that I am fated to pass the test at T<sub>2</sub> ''no matter what'' (after all, it is fated). But while my passing of the test ''is'' fated, it is also |
Consider this hypothetical argument. Say, at a time T<sub>1</sub> it is fated that I will pass my test at a time T<sub>2</sub>. The lazy argument would suggest that I would be just as justified to not study as I would be to study due to the fact that I am fated to pass the test at T<sub>2</sub> ''no matter what'' (after all, it is fated). But while my passing of the test ''is'' fated, it is also contingent on my completion of a series of events between T<sub>1</sub> and T<sub>2</sub>. If I do not complete these intermediate events, then I will not pass my test at T<sub>2</sub>. |
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While this argument does discredit the lazy argument, it leads to a discussion of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will free will]. This refutation presented here leads to such a discussion because the lazy argument hinges on a person somehow having a knowledge of their fate. After all, didn't my decision to study or not study in some time between T<sub>1</sub> and T<sub>2</sub> depend on my knowledge that I would pass the test at T<sub>2</sub>? This argument will be founded on the ability to voluntarily change a course of action after it has already been fated. Perhaps this argument and the entire lazy argument can be denied simply be demonstrating that no one has, or can have, knowledge of their fate. This would eliminate the possibility of the lazy argument (as I demonstrated before, it hinges on one's knowledge of their fate) and the subsequent problem of free will. |
While this argument does discredit the lazy argument, it subsequently leads to a discussion of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will free will]. This refutation presented here leads to such a discussion because the lazy argument hinges on a person somehow having a knowledge of their fate. After all, didn't my decision to study or not study in some time between T<sub>1</sub> and T<sub>2</sub> depend on my knowledge that I would pass the test at T<sub>2</sub>? This argument will be founded on the ability to voluntarily change a course of action after it has already been fated. Perhaps this argument and the entire lazy argument can be denied simply be demonstrating that no one has, or can have, knowledge of their fate. This would eliminate the possibility of the lazy argument (as I demonstrated before, it hinges on one's knowledge of their fate) and the subsequent problem of free will. |
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[[Category:Philosophical arguments]] |
[[Category:Philosophical arguments]] |
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Revision as of 23:22, 8 February 2007
Argument
The lazy argument (ἀργὸς λόγος) is an attempt at undermining doctrines of fate.
It runs basically that if it is one's fate to recover from a disease, then whether or not one seeks medical attention or takes medicine is inconsequential. Additionally, if it is fated that the disease will prove fatal, it would have been just as futile to have sought medical attention or to have taken medicine. Therefore, we ought not do anything. For, whether we act in one way or another will do little to undermine the force of fate.
Refutation
The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' refutation of the lazy argument is given in Cicero's On Fate ("De fato"). The argument presented by Cicero calls upon the idea that an event is co-fated with other events. As in the example above, if it is fated to recover from an illness, then the necessary steps to reach recovery are fated as well, and can be said to be co-fated along with this final event. So while recovery will occur, the steps to reach recovery must also occur (and will occur if it truly is one's fate).
The lazy argument seems to hold only if one neglects to consider the necessity of the occurrence of intermediate events related to a final and fated event. This is unsound, and the lazy argument must be rejected.
Consider this hypothetical argument. Say, at a time T1 it is fated that I will pass my test at a time T2. The lazy argument would suggest that I would be just as justified to not study as I would be to study due to the fact that I am fated to pass the test at T2 no matter what (after all, it is fated). But while my passing of the test is fated, it is also contingent on my completion of a series of events between T1 and T2. If I do not complete these intermediate events, then I will not pass my test at T2.
While this argument does discredit the lazy argument, it subsequently leads to a discussion of free will. This refutation presented here leads to such a discussion because the lazy argument hinges on a person somehow having a knowledge of their fate. After all, didn't my decision to study or not study in some time between T1 and T2 depend on my knowledge that I would pass the test at T2? This argument will be founded on the ability to voluntarily change a course of action after it has already been fated. Perhaps this argument and the entire lazy argument can be denied simply be demonstrating that no one has, or can have, knowledge of their fate. This would eliminate the possibility of the lazy argument (as I demonstrated before, it hinges on one's knowledge of their fate) and the subsequent problem of free will.