Proving too much: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|Logical fallacy}}In [[philosophy]], '''proving too much''' is a [[Informal fallacy|logical fallacy]] which occurs when an argument reaches the desired conclusion in such a way as to make that conclusion only a [[special case]] or corollary consequence of a larger, obviously absurd conclusion. It is a fallacy because, if the reasoning were valid, it would hold for the absurd conclusion. |
{{Short description|Logical fallacy}}In [[philosophy]], '''proving too much''' is a [[Informal fallacy|logical fallacy]] which occurs when an argument reaches the desired conclusion in such a way as to make that conclusion only a [[special case]] or corollary consequence of a larger, obviously absurd conclusion. It is a fallacy because, if the reasoning were valid, it would hold for the absurd conclusion. |
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The judgement of fallacy is therefore largely dependent on a normative judgement of the "absurd" conclusion. A charge of "proving too much" is thus generally invoked, rightly or wrongly, against normatively-opposed conclusions, and so such charges are often controversial at the time they are made, as in the following examples pertaining from the existence of God to [[laissez-faire]] economics: |
The judgement of fallacy is therefore largely dependent on a normative judgement of the "absurd" conclusion. A charge of "proving too much" is thus generally invoked, rightly or wrongly, against normatively-opposed conclusions, and so such charges are often controversial at the time they are made, as in the following examples pertaining from the existence of God to [[laissez-faire]] economics:<blockquote>Gaunilo argued that Anselm's Ontological Argument, that God exists because he is the greatest conceivable being and to exist is greater than to not exist, proves too much, because Gaunilo believed a parallel argument could be made proving the existence of a perfect island <ref>{{cite journal|last1=Mizrahi|first1=Moti|title=On Proving Too Much|journal=Acta Analytica}}</ref></blockquote> |
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* Gaunilo argued that Anselm's Ontological Argument, that God exists because he is the greatest conceivable being and to exist is greater than to not exist, proves too much, because Gaunilo believed a parallel argument could be made proving the existence of a perfect island <ref>{{cite journal|last1=Mizrahi|first1=Moti|title=On Proving Too Much|journal=Acta Analytica}}</ref> |
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Showing that an opponent has proved too much is a form of ''[[reductio ad absurdum]].'' |
Showing that an opponent has proved too much is a form of ''[[reductio ad absurdum]].'' |
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Revision as of 04:10, 3 February 2022
 | This article relies largely or entirely on a single source. (October 2021) |
In philosophy, proving too much is a logical fallacy which occurs when an argument reaches the desired conclusion in such a way as to make that conclusion only a special case or corollary consequence of a larger, obviously absurd conclusion. It is a fallacy because, if the reasoning were valid, it would hold for the absurd conclusion. The judgement of fallacy is therefore largely dependent on a normative judgement of the "absurd" conclusion. A charge of "proving too much" is thus generally invoked, rightly or wrongly, against normatively-opposed conclusions, and so such charges are often controversial at the time they are made, as in the following examples pertaining from the existence of God to laissez-faire economics:
Gaunilo argued that Anselm's Ontological Argument, that God exists because he is the greatest conceivable being and to exist is greater than to not exist, proves too much, because Gaunilo believed a parallel argument could be made proving the existence of a perfect island [1]
Showing that an opponent has proved too much is a form of reductio ad absurdum.
References
- ^ Mizrahi, Moti. "On Proving Too Much". Acta Analytica.
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