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{{short description|Deleting data by overwriting the encryption keys}}
{{short description|Deleting data by overwriting the encryption keys}}
'''Crypto-shredding''' is the practice of 'deleting' [[Data (computing)|data]] by deliberately deleting or overwriting the [[encryption]] keys.<ref>[https://books.google.nl/books?id=nMwVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PT668&dq=isbn:1119278651+crypto-shredding&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj51IGKoqHTAhUoKsAKHZWwCaoQ6AEIJDAA#v=onepage&q=isbn%3A1119278651%20crypto-shredding&f=false Crypto-shredding in 'The Official ISC2 Guide to the SSCP CBK'] {{ISBN|1119278651}}</ref>
'''Crypto-shredding''' is the practice of 'deleting' [[Data (computing)|data]] by deliberately deleting or overwriting the [[encryption]] keys.<ref>[https://books.google.nl/books?id=nMwVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PT668&dq=isbn:1119278651+crypto-shredding&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj51IGKoqHTAhUoKsAKHZWwCaoQ6AEIJDAA#v=onepage&q=isbn%3A1119278651%20crypto-shredding&f=false Crypto-shredding in 'The Official ISC2 Guide to the SSCP CBK'] {{ISBN|1119278651}}</ref>
This requires that the data have been encrypted. Data comes in these three states: [[data at rest]], [[data in transit]] and [[data in use]]. In the [[CIA triad]] of [[confidentiality]], [[integrity]], and [[availability]] all three states must be adequately protected.
This requires that the data have been encrypted. Data may be considered to exist in three states: [[data at rest]], [[data in transit]] and [[data in use]]. General data security principles, such as in the [[CIA triad]] of [[confidentiality]], [[integrity]], and [[availability]], require that all three states must be adequately protected.


Getting rid of data at rest like old [[backup]] tapes, [[Cloud storage#Potential concerns|data stored in the cloud]], [[Computer data storage|computers]], phones, and [[Multi-function printer#Security|multi-function printer]]s can be challenging when confidentiality of information is of concern; when encryption is in place it allows for smooth disposal of data. [[Confidentiality]] and [[privacy]] are big drivers of encryption.
Deleting data at rest on storage mediums such as [[backup]] tapes, [[Cloud storage#Potential concerns|data stored in the cloud]], [[Computer data storage|computers]], phones, or [[Multi-function printer#Security|multi-function printer]]s can present challengens when confidentiality of information is of concern. When encryption is in place, data disposal is more secure.


==Motivations for use==
==Motive==
The motive for deleting data can be: defective product, older product, no further use for data, no legal right to use or retain data any more, etc. Legal obligations can also come from rules like: the [[right to be forgotten]], the [[General Data Protection Regulation]], etc.
There are various reasons for using crypto-shredding, including when the data is contained in defective or out-of date systems, there is no further use for the data, the circumstances are such that there are no [longer] legal rights to use or retain the data, and other similar motivations. Legal obligations may also come from regulations such as the [[right to be forgotten]], the [[General Data Protection Regulation]], and others. Data security is largely influenced by [[confidentiality]] and [[privacy]] concerns.


==Use==
==Use==
In some cases everything is encrypted (e.g. [[harddisk]], [[computer file]], [[database]], etc.) but in other cases only specific data (e.g. [[passport]] number, [[social security number]], [[bank account number]], [[person name]], [[database record|record in a database]], etc.) is encrypted. In addition, the same specific data in one system can be encrypted with another key in another system.
In some cases all data storage is encrypted, such as encrypting entire [[harddisk]]s, [[computer file]]s, or [[database]]s. Alternatively only specific data may be encrypted, such as [[passport]] numbers, [[social security number]]s, [[bank account number]]s, [[person name]]s, or [[database record|record in a database]]s. Additionally, data in one system may be encrypted with separate keys when that same data is contained in multiple systems.
The more [[Data-centric security|specific pieces of data are encrypted]] (with different keys) the more specific data can be shredded.<ref>[https://medium.com/@brentrobinson5/crypto-shredding-how-it-can-solve-modern-data-retention-challenges-da874b01745b Crypto shredding: How it can solve modern data retention challenges on medium.com]</ref>
When [[Data-centric security|specific pieces of data are encrypted]] (possibly with different keys) this allows for more specific data shredding.<ref>[https://medium.com/@brentrobinson5/crypto-shredding-how-it-can-solve-modern-data-retention-challenges-da874b01745b Crypto shredding: How it can solve modern data retention challenges on medium.com]</ref>


===Example===
Example: [[iOS]] devices and [[Macintosh]] computers with a [[Apple T2]] or [[Apple silicon]] chip use crypto-shredding when activating the "Erase all content and settings" by discarding all the keys in '[[wikt:efface|effaceable]] storage'. This renders all user data on the device cryptographically inaccessible in a very short amount of time.<ref>[https://uit.stanford.edu/security/data-sanitization Crypto-shredding using effaceable storage in iOS on stanford.edu]</ref>


[[iOS]] devices and [[Macintosh]] computers with a [[Apple T2]] or [[Apple silicon]] chip use crypto-shredding when performing the "Erase all content and settings" action by discarding all the keys in '[[wikt:efface|effaceable]] storage'. This renders all user data on the device cryptographically inaccessible, in a very short amount of time.<ref>[https://uit.stanford.edu/security/data-sanitization Crypto-shredding using effaceable storage in iOS on stanford.edu]</ref>
==Best practices==
==Best practices==
* '''Storing encryption keys''' securely is important for shredding to be effective. There is no effect when a [[Symmetric-key_algorithm|symmetric]] or [[Asymmetric key algorithm|asymmetric]] [[encryption key]] is shredded when it has already been compromised (copied). A [[Trusted Platform Module]] addresses this issue. A [[hardware security module]] is one of the safest ways to use and store encryption keys.
* '''Storing encryption keys''' securely is important for shredding to be effective. For instance, shredding has no effect when a [[Symmetric-key_algorithm|symmetric]] or [[Asymmetric key algorithm|asymmetric]] [[encryption key]] has already been compromised. A [[Trusted Platform Module]] is meant to address this issue. A [[hardware security module]] is considered one of the most secure ways to use and store encryption keys.
* '''[[Bring your own encryption]]''' refers to a cloud computing security model to help cloud service customers to use their own encryption software and manage their own encryption keys.
* '''[[Bring your own encryption]]''' refers to a cloud computing security model to help cloud service customers to use their own encryption software and manage their own encryption keys.
* '''Salt''': [[Cryptographic hash function|Hashing]] can be inadequate for confidentiality, because the hash is always the same. For example: The hash of a specific [[social security number]] can be reverse engineered by the help of [[rainbow table]]s. [[Salt (cryptography)|Salt]] addresses this problem.
* '''Crypographic "salting"''': [[Cryptographic hash function|Hashing]] may be vulnerable to a single breach if the hash key used for all data is the same. Hash keys can be reverse engineered by methods such as [[rainbow table]]s. [[Salt (cryptography)|Salt]] is meant to address this problem by ensuring that access to the hash key will not compromise all data.


==Security considerations==
==Security considerations==
* '''[[Security level|Encryption strength]]''' can be weaker over time when computers get faster or flaws are found.
* '''[[Brute-force attack]]''': If the data is not adequately encrypted it is still possible to decrypt the information through brute force. [[Post-quantum cryptography|Quantum computing]] has the potential to speed up a brute force attack in the future.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-post-quantum-cryptography.html |title=Factsheet post quantum cryptography on ncsc.nl |access-date=2017-11-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171117174720/https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-post-quantum-cryptography.html |archive-date=2017-11-17 |url-status=dead }}</ref> However, [[quantum computing]] is less effective against [[symmetric encryption]] than [[public-key encryption]]. Assuming the use of symmetric encryption, the fastest possible attack is [[Grover's algorithm]], which can be mitigated by using larger keys.<ref>[https://application.wiley-vch.de/PQC_for_Dummies Post Quantum-Crypto for dummies on wiley-vch.de]</ref>
* '''[[Data in use]]'''. For example: the ([[plaintext]]) encryption keys temporarily used in [[Random-access memory|RAM]] can be threatened by [[cold boot attack]]s, hardware [[advanced persistent threat]]s, [[rootkits]]/bootkits, computer hardware [[supply chain attack]]s, and physical threats to computers from insiders (employees).
* '''[[Data remanence]]''': For example: When data on a harddisk is encrypted after it has been stored there is a chance that there is still unencrypted data on the harddisk. Encrypting data does not automatically mean it will overwrite exactly the same location of the unencrypted data. Also [[bad sector]]s cannot be encrypted afterwards. It is better to have encryption in place before storing data.
* '''[[Hibernation (computing)|Hibernation]]''' is a threat to the use of an encryption key. When an encryption key is loaded into RAM and the machine is hibernated at that time, all memory, including the encryption key, is stored on the harddisk (outside of the encryption key's safe storage location).


The mentioned security issues are not specific to crypto-shredding, but apply in general to encryption. In addition to crypto-shredding, [[data erasure]], [[degaussing]] and [[Scrap metal shredder|physically shredding]] the physical device (disk) can mitigate the risk further.
There are many security issues that should be considered when securing data. Some examples are listed in this section.The security issues listed here are not specific to crypto-shredding, and in general these may apply to all types of data encryption. In addition to crypto-shredding, [[data erasure]], [[degaussing]] and [[Scrap metal shredder|physically shredding]] the physical device (disk) can mitigate the risk further.
* '''[[Security level|Encryption strength]]''' can weaken over time as computing speed becomes more efficient and more time is available to discover exploits in secure systems.
* '''[[Brute-force attack]]''': If data is not adequately encrypted it may be possible to decrypt it through brute-force methods. Newer technology such as [[Post-quantum cryptography|quantum computing]] increases the potential to allow brute-force attacks to become more efficient in the future.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-post-quantum-cryptography.html |title=Factsheet post quantum cryptography on ncsc.nl |access-date=2017-11-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171117174720/https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-post-quantum-cryptography.html |archive-date=2017-11-17 |url-status=dead }}</ref> However, [[quantum computing]] is less effective against specific encryption methods such as [[symmetric encryption]] than others that are more vulnerable to brute-force attacks such as [[public-key encryption]]. Even when data is secured via use of symmetric encryption, there are methods such as [[Grover's algorithm]] that make these kinds of attacks more effective, though this can be mitigated by other enhancements, such as using larger key values.<ref>[https://application.wiley-vch.de/PQC_for_Dummies Post Quantum-Crypto for dummies on wiley-vch.de]</ref>
* '''[[Data in use]]''': Data that is "in use" has specific vulnerabilities. For example, when ([[plaintext]]) encryption keys are temporarily stored in [[Random-access memory|RAM]], it may be vulnerable to [[cold boot attack]]s, hardware [[advanced persistent threat]]s, [[rootkits]]/bootkits, computer hardware [[supply chain attack]]s, and physical threats from users who have access.
* '''[[Data remanence]]''' is the ability of computer memory to retain previously stored information beyond its intended lifetime, which also increases its vulnerability to unintended access. For example: When data on a harddisk is encrypted after it has been stored, it is possible that unencrypted data may remain on the harddisk. Encrypting data does not necessarily ensure the data will be overwritten at the same location as the unencrypted data. In addition, any [[bad sector]]s on a harddisk cannot be encrypted after data has been written to those locations. Encrypting data at the time it is written is always more secure than encrypting it after is has been stored without encryption.
* '''[[Hibernation (computing)|Hibernation]]''' presents additional threats when an encryption key is used. Once an encryption key is loaded into RAM and the machine is placed into hibernation, all memory, including the encryption key, may be stored on the harddisk, which is outside of the encryption key's safe storage location.



==References==
==References==

Revision as of 17:20, 12 May 2022

Crypto-shredding is the practice of 'deleting' data by deliberately deleting or overwriting the encryption keys.[1] This requires that the data have been encrypted. Data may be considered to exist in three states: data at rest, data in transit and data in use. General data security principles, such as in the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, require that all three states must be adequately protected.

Deleting data at rest on storage mediums such as backup tapes, data stored in the cloud, computers, phones, or multi-function printers can present challengens when confidentiality of information is of concern. When encryption is in place, data disposal is more secure.

Motivations for use

There are various reasons for using crypto-shredding, including when the data is contained in defective or out-of date systems, there is no further use for the data, the circumstances are such that there are no [longer] legal rights to use or retain the data, and other similar motivations. Legal obligations may also come from regulations such as the right to be forgotten, the General Data Protection Regulation, and others. Data security is largely influenced by confidentiality and privacy concerns.

Use

In some cases all data storage is encrypted, such as encrypting entire harddisks, computer files, or databases. Alternatively only specific data may be encrypted, such as passport numbers, social security numbers, bank account numbers, person names, or record in a databases. Additionally, data in one system may be encrypted with separate keys when that same data is contained in multiple systems. When specific pieces of data are encrypted (possibly with different keys) this allows for more specific data shredding.[2]

Example

iOS devices and Macintosh computers with a Apple T2 or Apple silicon chip use crypto-shredding when performing the "Erase all content and settings" action by discarding all the keys in 'effaceable storage'. This renders all user data on the device cryptographically inaccessible, in a very short amount of time.[3]

Best practices

  • Storing encryption keys securely is important for shredding to be effective. For instance, shredding has no effect when a symmetric or asymmetric encryption key has already been compromised. A Trusted Platform Module is meant to address this issue. A hardware security module is considered one of the most secure ways to use and store encryption keys.
  • Bring your own encryption refers to a cloud computing security model to help cloud service customers to use their own encryption software and manage their own encryption keys.
  • Crypographic "salting": Hashing may be vulnerable to a single breach if the hash key used for all data is the same. Hash keys can be reverse engineered by methods such as rainbow tables. Salt is meant to address this problem by ensuring that access to the hash key will not compromise all data.

Security considerations

There are many security issues that should be considered when securing data. Some examples are listed in this section.The security issues listed here are not specific to crypto-shredding, and in general these may apply to all types of data encryption. In addition to crypto-shredding, data erasure, degaussing and physically shredding the physical device (disk) can mitigate the risk further.

  • Encryption strength can weaken over time as computing speed becomes more efficient and more time is available to discover exploits in secure systems.
  • Brute-force attack: If data is not adequately encrypted it may be possible to decrypt it through brute-force methods. Newer technology such as quantum computing increases the potential to allow brute-force attacks to become more efficient in the future.[4] However, quantum computing is less effective against specific encryption methods such as symmetric encryption than others that are more vulnerable to brute-force attacks such as public-key encryption. Even when data is secured via use of symmetric encryption, there are methods such as Grover's algorithm that make these kinds of attacks more effective, though this can be mitigated by other enhancements, such as using larger key values.[5]
  • Data in use: Data that is "in use" has specific vulnerabilities. For example, when (plaintext) encryption keys are temporarily stored in RAM, it may be vulnerable to cold boot attacks, hardware advanced persistent threats, rootkits/bootkits, computer hardware supply chain attacks, and physical threats from users who have access.
  • Data remanence is the ability of computer memory to retain previously stored information beyond its intended lifetime, which also increases its vulnerability to unintended access. For example: When data on a harddisk is encrypted after it has been stored, it is possible that unencrypted data may remain on the harddisk. Encrypting data does not necessarily ensure the data will be overwritten at the same location as the unencrypted data. In addition, any bad sectors on a harddisk cannot be encrypted after data has been written to those locations. Encrypting data at the time it is written is always more secure than encrypting it after is has been stored without encryption.
  • Hibernation presents additional threats when an encryption key is used. Once an encryption key is loaded into RAM and the machine is placed into hibernation, all memory, including the encryption key, may be stored on the harddisk, which is outside of the encryption key's safe storage location.


References

  1. ^ Crypto-shredding in 'The Official ISC2 Guide to the SSCP CBK' ISBN 1119278651
  2. ^ Crypto shredding: How it can solve modern data retention challenges on medium.com
  3. ^ Crypto-shredding using effaceable storage in iOS on stanford.edu
  4. ^ "Factsheet post quantum cryptography on ncsc.nl". Archived from the original on 2017-11-17. Retrieved 2017-11-17.
  5. ^ Post Quantum-Crypto for dummies on wiley-vch.de