Adversarial system: Difference between revisions
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The adversarial system is the two-sided structure under which [[Criminal procedure| of [[perjury]]. As the election to maintain an accused person's [[right to silence]] prevents any examination or cross-examination of that person's position, it follows that the decision of counsel as to what evidence will be called is a crucial tactic in any case in the adversarial system and hence it might be said that it is a lawyer's manipulation of the truth. Certainly, it requires the skills of counsel on both sides to be fairly equally pitted and subjected to an impartial judge. |
The adversarial system is the two-sided structure under which [[Criminal procedure| of [[perjury]]. As the election to maintain an accused person's [[right to silence]] prevents any examination or cross-examination of that person's position, it follows that the decision of counsel as to what evidence will be called is a crucial tactic in any case in the adversarial system and hence it might be said that it is a lawyer's manipulation of the truth. Certainly, it requires the skills of counsel on both sides to be fairly equally pitted and subjected to an impartial judge. |
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By contrast, while [[defendant]]s in most civil law systems can be compelled to give a statement, this statement is not subject to cross-examination by the prosecutor and not given under oath. This allows the defendant to explain their side of the case without being subject to cross-examination by a skilled opposition. However, this is mainly because it is not the prosecutor but the judges who question the defendant. The concept of "cross"-examination is entirely due to adversarial structure of the common law. |
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Judges in an adversarial system are impartial in ensuring the fair play of [[due process]], or [[fundamental justice]]. Such judges decide, often when called upon by counsel rather than of their own motion, what [[evidence (law)|evidence]] is to be admitted when there is a dispute; though in some common law jurisdictions judges play more of a role in deciding what evidence to admit into the record or reject. At worst, abusing [[judicial discretion]] would actually pave the way to a biased decision, rendering obsolete the judicial process in question—[[rule of law]] being illicitly subordinated by [[rule of man]] under such discriminating circumstances. |
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The [[rules of evidence]] are also developed based upon the system of objections of adversaries and on what basis it may tend to prejudice the [[trier of fact]] which may be the judge or the jury. In a way the rules of evidence can function to give a judge limited inquisitorial powers as the judge may exclude evidence he/she believes is not trustworthy or irrelevant to the legal issue at hand. |
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Peter Murphy in his ''Practical Guide to Evidence'' recounts an instructive example. A frustrated judge in an English (adversarial) court finally asked a barrister after witnesses had produced conflicting accounts, 'Am I never to hear the truth?' 'No, my lord, merely the evidence', replied counsel. |
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The name "adversarial system" may be misleading in that it implies it is only within this type of system in which there are opposing prosecution and defense. This is not the case, and both modern adversarial and inquisitorial systems have the powers of the state separated between a prosecutor and the judge and allow the defendant the right to counsel. Indeed, the [[European Convention on Human Rights|European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]] in Article 6 requires these features in the legal systems of its signatory states. |
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The [[right to counsel]] in criminal trials was initially not accepted in some adversarial systems. It was believed that the facts should speak for themselves, and that lawyers would just blur the matters. As a consequence, it was only in 1836 that England gave suspects of felonies the formal right to have legal counsel (the [[Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836]]), although in practice English courts routinely allowed defendants to be represented by counsel from the mid-18th century. During the second half of the 18th century advocates like [[William Garrow|Sir William Garrow]] and [[Thomas Erskine, 1st Baron Erskine]] helped usher in the adversarial court system used in most common law countries today. In the United States, however, personally retained counsel have had a right to appear in all federal criminal cases since the adoption of the [[United States Constitution|Constitution]] and in state cases at least since the end of the [[American Civil War|Civil War]], although nearly all provided this right in their state constitutions or laws much earlier. Appointment of counsel for indigent defendants was nearly universal in federal felony cases, though it varied considerably in state cases.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/amdt6frag7_user.html#amdt6_hd36 |title=CRS/LII Annotated Constitution Sixth Amendment }}</ref> It was not until 1963 that the [[Supreme Court of the United States|U.S. Supreme Court]] declared that legal counsel must be provided at the expense of the state for indigent felony defendants, under the federal Sixth Amendment, in state courts. See ''[[Gideon v. Wainwright]]'', {{ussc|372|335|1963}}. |
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One of the most significant differences between the adversarial system and the inquisitorial system occurs when a criminal defendant admits to the crime. In an adversarial system, there is no more controversy and the case proceeds to sentencing; though in many jurisdictions the defendant must have [[allocution]] of her or his crime; an obviously [[false confession]] will not be accepted even in common law courts. By contrast, in an inquisitorial system, the fact that the defendant has confessed is merely one more fact that is entered into evidence, and a confession by the defendant does not remove the requirement that the prosecution present a full case. This allows for [[plea bargain]]ing in adversarial systems in a way that is difficult or impossible in inquisitional system, and many felony cases in the United States are handled without trial through such plea bargains. |
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In some adversarial legislative systems, the court is permitted to make [[inference]]s on an accused's failure to face [[cross-examination]] or to answer a particular question. This obviously limits the usefulness of silence as a tactic by the defense. In the United States, the [[Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution|Fifth Amendment]] has been interpreted to prohibit a jury from drawing a negative inference based on the defendant's invocation of his right not to testify, and the jury must be so instructed if the defendant requests. |
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Lord Devlin in ''The Judge'' said: "It can also be argued that two prejudiced searchers starting from opposite ends of the field will between them be less likely to miss anything than the impartial searcher starting at the middle."<ref>P Devlin, ''The Judge'' (Oxford University Press, 197idence and testimony before it is presented to judge or jury. The lawyers involved have a very good idea of the scope of agreement and disagreement of the issues to present at trial which develops much in the same way as the role of investigative judges. |
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Proponents of inquisitorial justice dispute these points. They point out that many cases in adversarial systems, and most cases in the United States, are actually resolved by [[plea bargain]] or [[Settlement (litigation)|settlement]]. Plea bargain as a system does not exist in an inquisitorial system. Many legal cases in adversarial systems, and most in the United States, do not go to trial, which may lead to injustice when the defendant has an unskilled or overworked attorney, which is likely to be the case when the defendant is poor. In addition, proponents of inquisitorial systems argue that the plea bargain system causes the participants in the system to act in perverse ways, in that it encourages prosecutors to bring charges far in excess of what is warranted and defendants to plead guilty even when they believe that they are not. |
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==See also== |
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{{Portal|Law}} |
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* [[Adversary evaluation]] |
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* [[Exclusionary rule]] |
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* [[Parallel thinking]]{{snd}}described as a systemic alternative |
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==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
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==Further reading== |
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*{{cite book|author=Kagan, Robert A. |title=Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law| isbn=9780674012417|date=September 2003|url=http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674012417|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, MA}} |
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{{Criminal procedure}} |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Adversarial System}} |
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[[Category:Judiciaries]] |
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[[Category:Legal systems]] |
Revision as of 09:18, 16 May 2022
This article needs additional citations for verification. (February 2021) |
The adversarial system or adversary system is a legal system used in the common law countries where two advocates represent their parties' case or position before an impartial person or group of people, usually a judge or jury, who attempt to determine the truth and pass judgment accordingly.[1][2][3] It is in contrast to the inquisitorial system used in some civil law systems (i.e. those deriving from Roman law or the Napoleonic code) where a judge investigates the case.
The adversarial system is the two-sided structure under which [[Criminal procedure| of perjury. As the election to maintain an accused person's right to silence prevents any examination or cross-examination of that person's position, it follows that the decision of counsel as to what evidence will be called is a crucial tactic in any case in the adversarial system and hence it might be said that it is a lawyer's manipulation of the truth. Certainly, it requires the skills of counsel on both sides to be fairly equally pitted and subjected to an impartial judge.
- ^ Hale, Sandra Beatriz (July 2004). The Discourse of Court Interpreting: Discourse Practices of the Law, the Witness and the Interpreter. John Benjamins. p. 31. ISBN 978-1-58811-517-1.
- ^ Richards, Edward P.; Katharine C. Rathbun (1999-08-15). Medical Care Law. Jones & Bartlett. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-8342-1603-7.
- ^ Care, Jennifer Corrin (2004-01-12). Civil Procedure and Courts in the South Pacific. Routledge Cavendish. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-85941-719-5.