Emic and etic

Emic/Etic Distinctions The neologisms “emic” and “etic,” which were derived from an analogy with the terms “phonemic” and “phonetic,” were coined by the linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1954). He suggests that there are two perspectives that can be employed in the study of a society’s cultural system, just as there are two perspectives that can be used in the study of a language’s sound system. In both cases, it is possible to take the point of view of either the insider or the outsider. As Pike defines it, the emic perspective focuses on the intrinsic cultural distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given society (e.g., whether the natural world is distinguished from the supernatural realm in the worldview of the culture) in the same way that phonemic analysis focuses on the intrinsic phonological distinctions that are meaningful to speakers of a given language (e.g., whether the phones /b/ and /v/ make a contrast in meaning in a minimal pair in the language). The native members of a culture are the sole judges of the validity of an emic description, just as the native speakers of a language are the sole judges of the accuracy of a phonemic identification. The etic perspective, again according to Pike, relies upon the extrinsic concepts and categories that have meaning for scientific observers (e.g., per capita energy consumption) in the same way that phonetic analysis relies upon the extrinsic concepts and categories that are meaningful to linguistic analysts (e.g., dental fricatives). Scientists are the sole judges of the validity of an etic account, just as linguists are the sole judges of the accuracy of a phonetic transcription. Besides Pike, the scholar most closely associated with the concepts of “emics” and “etics” is the cultural anthropologist Marvin Harris, who has made the distinction between the emic and etic perspectives an integral part of his paradigm of cultural materialism. Pike and Harris continue to disagree about the precise definition and application of emics and etics (Headland et al. 1990). The most significant area of their disagreement concerns the goal of the etic approach. For Pike, etics are a way of getting at emics; for Harris, etics are an end in themselves. From Pike’s point of view, the etic approach is useful for penetrating, discovering, and elucidating emic systems, but etic claims to knowledge have no necessary priority over competing emic claims. From Harris’s perspective, the etic approach is useful in making objective determinations of fact, and etic claims to knowledge are necessarily superior to competing emic claims. Pike believes that objective knowledge is an illusion, and that all claims to knowledge are ultimately subjective; Harris believes that objective knowledge is at least potentially obtainable, and that the pursuit of such knowledge is essential for a discipline that aspires to be a science. As is apparent, the debate over emics and etics raises a number of fundamental ontological and epistemological issues. It is not surprising, therefore, that controversy continues to surround even the definitions of emics and etics. Although the terms are part of the working vocabulary of most cultural anthropologists, there are no standard definitions that have won universal acceptance. A survey of introductory textbooks in anthropology reveals that the terms “emic” and “etic” are glossed in highly disparate fashion. The situation is even more obscure outside anthropology, where the concepts have been widely diffused and widely reinterpreted. The terms “emic” and “etic” are current in a growing number of fields--including education, folklore, management, medicine, philology, psychiatry, psychology, public health, semiotics, and urban studies--but they are generally used in ways that have little or nothing to do with their original anthropological context. Despite that diversity and disagreement, it is possible to suggest a precise and practical set of definitions by focusing on emics and etics as epistemological concepts. From that perspective, the terms “emic” and “etic” should be seen as adjectives modifying the implicit noun “knowledge.” Accordingly, the distinction between emics and etics has everything to do with the nature of the knowledge that is claimed and nothing to do with the source of that knowledge (i.e., the manner by which it was obtained). Emic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories that are regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the members of the culture under study. Am emic construct is correctly termed “emic” if and only if it is in accord with the perceptions and understandings deemed appropriate by the insider’s culture. The validation of emic knowledge thus be- comes a matter of consensus--namely, the consensus of native informants, who must agree that the construct matches the shared perceptions that are characteristic of their culture. Note that the particular research technique used in acquiring anthropological knowledge has nothing to do with the nature of that knowledge. Emic knowledge can be obtained either through elicitation or through observation, because it is sometimes possible that objective ob- servers can infer native perceptions.

	Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories that are regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers.  An etic construct is correctly termed “etic” if and only if it is in accord with the epistemological principles deemed appropriate by science (i.e., etic constructs must be precise, logical, comprehensive, replicable, falsifiable, and observer independent).  The validation of etic knowledge thus becomes a matter of logical and empirical analysis--in particular, the logical analysis of whether the construct meets the standards of falsifiability, comprehensiveness, and logical consistency, and then the empirical analysis of whether or not the concept has been falsified and/or replicated.  Again, the particular research technique that is used in the acquisition of anthropological knowledge has no bearing on the nature of that knowledge.  Etic knowledge may be obtained at times through elicitation as well as observation, because it is entirely possible that native informants could possess scientifically valid knowledge.

Defined in that manner, the usefulness of the emic/etic distinction is evident. Answers to the most fundamental anthropological questions—including the origins of humanity, the characteristics of human nature, and the form and function of human social systems—are part of the worldview of every culture on the planet. Like all human beings, individual anthropologists have been enculturated to some particular cultural worldview, and they therefore need a means of distinguishing between the answers they derive as enculturated individuals and the answers they derive as anthropological observers. Defining “emics” and “etics” in epistemological terms provides a reliable means of making that distinction. Finally, most cultural anthropologists agree that the goal of anthropological research must be the acquisition of both emic and etic knowledge. Emic knowledge is essential for an intuitive and empathic understanding of a culture, and it is essential for conducting effective ethnographic fieldwork. Furthermore, emic knowledge is often a valuable source of inspiration for etic hypotheses. Etic knowledge, on the other hand, is essential for cross-cultural comparison, the sine qua non of ethnology, because such comparison necessarily demands standard units and categories.

---

Emic and etic (also known as "nemic" and "netic" when used in an inter-cultural marketing context) are terms used by some in the social sciences and the behavioral sciences to refer to two different kinds of data concerning human behavior. An "emic" account of behavior is a description of behavior in terms meaningful (consciously or unconsciously) to the actor. An "etic" account is a description of a behavior in terms familiar to the observer. Scientists interested in the local construction of meaning, and local rules for behavior, will rely on emic accounts; scientists interested in facilitating comparative research and making universal claims will rely on etic accounts.

The terms were first introduced by linguist Kenneth Pike, who argued that the tools developed for describing linguistic behaviors could be adapted to the description of any human social behavior. Emic and etic are derived from the linguistic terms phonemic and phonetic respectively.

The terms were also championed by anthropologists Ward Goodenough and Marvin Harris with slightly different definitions (Goodenough was primarily interested in understanding the culturally specific meaning of specific beliefs and practices; Harris was primarily interested in explaining human behavior).

---

The term etic to refer to the detached observer's view, and the term emic for that of the normal participant. The labels are coined by utilizing the last half of the terms phonetics and phonemics which are current in the linguistic field in the approximate sense implied here, but with the new terms generalized to cover other areas of behavior. In political theory an act viewed etically has been called an "operation," but when viewed emically, it has been called a "practice." Several characteristics of an etic view differentiate it from an emic one. It is useful to list some of them, including those implied in previous paragraphs. The etic view is an alien view--the structuring of an outsider. The emic view is domestic, leading to units which correspond to those of an insider familiar with and participating in the system. The etic view is cross-cultural in that its units are derived by comparing many systems and by abstracting from them units which are synthesized into a single scheme which is then analytically applied as a single system. The emic view is monocultural with its units derived from the internal functional relations of only one individual or culture at a time. The etic view is, therefore, classificatory or typological, since its units lead to a classifying grid through which each system can in turn be seen as comprised of units related to that grid. The emic view, however, is structural, since its units are derived from internal relations, rather than a potentially irrelevant but prior grid of relations. Hence the etic view approaches a new situation with units--or at least components of units--prepared in advance, ready to be found in that situation, whereas the emic approach leads to units which are known only after that particular situation has been analyzed. Etic criteria are absolute, or--if somewhat relative--are relative to an a priori absolute or quasi-absolute grid. Emic criteria are relative to the place the units have in the particular systems. The etic criteria are frequently, therefore, measurable as such, without reference to the system which they are embedded, while emic criteria are contrastive, and observable only in reference to differential responses which they elicit in relation to other units of the system. Etic systems are the creation of the analyst, conceptual tools ready to be applied to data so that one can begin to observe them as an alien and reach toward an appreciation of the emic structuring of that data. Emic systems are discovered by the analyst, as units reacted to or constituting the reaction of native participants in events. Participants discover these units by being "born into" a system--by suddenly finding themselves in a series of events which they at first do not comprehend. Here they gradually learn to act as normal participants, as through contrastive situations (or by receiving instruction) they gradually learn to make the kind of responses to these events which elicit appropriate reactions by other members of the community. For a more detailed development of the technical implications of this distinction, as well as of other problems discussed in these lectures, see my Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior.

References

• Goodenough, Ward (1970) “Describing a Culture” in Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp 104-119. ISBN-10 0-202-30861-8 ISBN-13 978-0-202-30861-6
• Harris, Marvin (1980) “Chapter Two: The Epistemology of Cultural Materialism,” in Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture. New York: Random House. pp. 29-45 ISBN-10 0-759-10134-5; ISBN-13: 978-0759101340
• Nattiez, Jean-Jacques (1987). Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music (Musicologie générale et sémiologue, 1987). Translated by Carolyn Abbate (1990). ISBN 0-691-02714-5.
• Pike, Kenneth Lee (1967). Language in relation to a unified theory of structure of human behavior 2nd ed. The Hague: Mouton