Israeli–Palestinian peace process: Difference between revisions
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There are and have been a variety of [[Palestinian]] views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding some of these views is an understanding of what some advocates of the Palestinian cause have been fighting for. Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to [[1948]] with the creation of [[Israel]] (rather than Israel’s views of [[1967]] being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations) and has been a fight to bring home [[Palestinian refugee|refugees]] to a [[Palestinian state]].<ref>Pappe, I., 2004, ''A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press </ref> Therefore this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process and for |
There are and have been a variety of [[Palestinian]] views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding some of these views is an understanding of what some advocates of the Palestinian cause have been fighting for. Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to [[1948]] with the creation of [[Israel]] (rather than Israel’s views of [[1967]] being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations) and has been a fight to bring home [[Palestinian refugee|refugees]] to a [[Palestinian state]].<ref>Pappe, I., 2004, ''A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press </ref> Therefore this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process and for groups such as [[Hamas]] still is. However Slater says that this ‘maximalist’ view of a destruction of Israel in order to regain Palestinian lands, a view held by [[Yasser Arafat|Arafat]] and the [[PLO]] initially, has steadily reduced from the late 1960s onwards to a preparedness to negotiate and instead seek a two state solution.<ref>Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, ''Political Science'', Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199, page 176 </ref> The [[Oslo Accords]] demonstrated the recognition of this acceptance by Palestinian leadership of the state of Israel’s right to exist in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the [[Gaza Strip]] and [[West Bank]].<ref> Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, ''Political Science'', Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199</ref> However there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives. <ref>Pappe, I., 2004, ''A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press </ref> <ref>Bregman, A. & El-Tahri, J., 1998, ''The Fifty Year War: Israel and the Arabs'', London, Penguin Books </ref> |
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=== Israeli views of the peace process === |
=== Israeli views of the peace process === |
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Revision as of 16:30, 28 February 2007
| Part of a series on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict |
| Israeli–Palestinian peace process |
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The Peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken shape over the years, despite the ongoing violence in the Middle East and an "all or nothing" attitude about a lasting peace, "which prevailed for most of the twentieth century" (Eran, 121). Since the 1970s there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Some countries have signed peace treaties, such as Egypt-Israel (1979), and Jordan-Israel (1994), whereas some have not yet found a mutual basis to do so.
Views of the peace process
Palestinian views of the peace process
There are and have been a variety of Palestinian views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding some of these views is an understanding of what some advocates of the Palestinian cause have been fighting for. Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to 1948 with the creation of Israel (rather than Israel’s views of 1967 being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations) and has been a fight to bring home refugees to a Palestinian state.[1] Therefore this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process and for groups such as Hamas still is. However Slater says that this ‘maximalist’ view of a destruction of Israel in order to regain Palestinian lands, a view held by Arafat and the PLO initially, has steadily reduced from the late 1960s onwards to a preparedness to negotiate and instead seek a two state solution.[2] The Oslo Accords demonstrated the recognition of this acceptance by Palestinian leadership of the state of Israel’s right to exist in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[3] However there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives. [4] [5]
Israeli views of the peace process
There are several Israeli views of the peace process. One Israeli view is that the conflict stems from the 1967 Six Day War and consequently the peace process should stem from this and thus have negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence.[6] Hardliners believe that no territorial concessions should be given to Palestinians and want to maintain an Israeli sovereign state over the whole area it currently occupies, or if it does negotiate with territory in the peace process only with the Gaza Strip.[7] Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control.[8] In fact, Pedahzur goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank.[9] The Oslo Accords and the Camp David 2000 summit negotiations revealed the possibility of a two state system being accepted as a possible peace solution by Israeli leadership. However the violence of the second intifada has strengthened the resolve that peace and negotiation is not possible and a two state system is not the answer [10] which is further enforced by the coming to power of Hamas. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians ask for too much in their peace demands.
American views of the peace process
There are many divergent views on the peace process held by U.S. officials, citizens and lobbying groups. The U.S. government has contributed significant levels of financial and military support to Israel for decades. U.S. aid to Israel exceeds the amount of foreign aid that the U.S. provides to any other country. In 2002, the US began providing limited financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority (about $100 million annually), and has encouraged European nations to contribute as well, leading to a total contribution of more than one billion dollars.
The U.S. has veto power in the U.N. Security Council and is able to block resolutions it opposes, and it has frequently vetoed resolutions critical of Israel's actions, while criticizing other nations for similar actions.
- "The United States will always stand with Israel, always remember that only a strong Israel can make peace." -- U.S. President Bill Clinton, December 13, 1998.
- "Israel is entitled to the land they have. . . it should not be a part of the peace process." -- U.S. Senator James Inhofe, February 2002.
- "Israel has got responsibilities. Israel must deal with the settlements. Israel must make sure there is a contiguous territory that the Palestinians can call home." -- U.S. President George W. Bush, June 3, 2003.
- "Palestinian leaders must bring an end to the violence against Israelis, and find a way, with the help of others, to rein in militant groups. Israel must be prepared to meet its obligations, as outlined in the Bush administration's road map, and in the Mitchell plan, with respect to settlements." -- 2004 U.S. Presidential candidate John Kerry, October 17, 2003.
All recent U.S. Presidents have maintained a policy that Israel must give up some of the land that it conquered in the 1967 war in order to achieve peace; that the Palestinians must actively prevent terrorism; that Israel has an unconditional right to exist; and that the Palestinians should eventually have their own democratic state.
Major current issues between the two sides
Repeated obstacles to peace seem to be as follows:
- Strong feelings on both sides
- Status of Jerusalem
- Israeli security concerns over terrorism, safe borders, incitements, violence.
- Arab concerns over Israeli settlements and land.
- Palestinian refugee issues
There are several issues which currently have a prominent effect on the progress of negotiations between the two sides.
The major concern expressed through the Israeli side is whether the major Palestinian figures and institutions are in fact trying to fight terrorism, and to promote tolerance and co-existence with Israel.
Israeli concerns are based on abundant documentary and empirical evidence of many Palestinian leaders having in fact promoted and supported terrorist groups and activities. Furthermore, there is much concrete evidence of Palestinians having supported and expressed incitement against Israel, its motives, actions, and basic rights as a state.
This is almost a moot point right now, owing to the election of Hamas, which states unequivocally that it does not recognize Israel's right to exist. However there remain some activists on the Palestinian side who claim that there are still some positive signs on the Palestinian side, and that Israel should use these to cultivate some positive interactions with the Palestinians, even in spite of Hamas's basic opposition to the existence of the Jewish State.
From the Palestinian point of view, the main concern is whether Israel will in fact allow the Palestinian community to emerge as a viable and workable political unit, hopefully culminating in a state.
Negotiators expressing this concern often point to various economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinian people, activities, and institutions. Israel has said repeatedly that these restrictions are necessary due to security concerns, and in order to counteract ongoing efforts which promote terrorism, and which incite opposition to Israel's existence and rights as a country.
Attempts to make peace
Madrid and Oslo (1991-93)
In 1991, just after the First Gulf War, a breakthrough occurred when US president George H.W. Bush (with the help of Secretary of State James Baker) called a conference in Madrid, Spain between Israel and the Arab nations "directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict ... which ... was to serve only as a preamble to direct bilateral and multilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors", dubbed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 (Eran, 137). Talks continued in Washington, DC, but with few results, and were replaced by a series of clandestine meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338" (Eran, 138). The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), was signed on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. Rabin, Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts.
After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process slowed to a grinding halt. The Palestinians living in the territories did not see their living conditions improve. Additionally the Israeli settlements, seen by the Palestinians as one of the largest obstacles to peace, were not beginning to be dismantled. Instead their population almost doubled in the West Bank. Later sporadic suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable.
1996-1999 agreements
The many suicide attacks by HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since 1993 including a wave of suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections in May 1996 led to a declared new policy by elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu delcared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity", where Israel will not engage in the process if Arafat continued with what he defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy, incitement and direct or indirect support of terrorism. Several agreements were signed during this time when Israel considered that the conditions it set where partially met.
Hebron agreement
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, also known as The Hebron Protocol or Hebron Agreement, began January 7 and was concluded from January 15 to January 17, 1997 between Israel and the PLO. This agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords. The agreement dealt with redeployments in Hebron, security issues and other concerns.
Wye River Memorandum
The Wye River Memorandum was a political agreement negotiated to implement the Oslo Accords, completed on October 23, 1998. It was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was negotiated at Wye River, MD (at the Wye River Conference Center) and signed at the White House with President Bill Clinton playing a key role as the official witness. On November 17, 1998, Israel's 120 member parliament, the Knesset, approved the Wye River Memorandum by a vote of 75-19. The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns.
Camp David 2000 Summit
In 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak reportedly offered the Palestinian leader approximately 95% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, and that 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) be ceded to Israel. He also proposed "temporary Israeli control" indefinitely over another 10% of the West Bank territory--an area including many more Jewish settlements. According to Palestinian sources, the remaining area would be under Palestinian control, yet certain areas would be broken up by Israeli bypass roads and checkpoints. Depending on how the security roads would be configured, these Israeli roads might impede free travel by Palestinians throughout their proposed nation and reduce the ability to absorb Palestinian refugees.
President Arafat rejected this offer. President Clinton reportedly requested that President Arafat make a counter-offer, but he proposed none. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U.S. pressure. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee that later published the Mitchell Report. Later at the Taba summit (at Taba) in January 2001, the Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected as Israeli prime minister in February 2001.
Beirut summit
The Beirut summit took place in March 2002, and held to present plans to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jordan's foreign minister said, "The Arab initiative put forth at the Beirut Summit in March offers comprehensive peace in the region based on the internationally recognized formulation of 'land for peace' -- a return to June 4, 1967, borders in exchange for normal relations and a collective peace treaty."[citation needed]
In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, "... the details of every peace plan must be discussed directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya", [1] referring to Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on previous evening which the Beirut Summit has failed to address. The main aspects of the Arab Peace Initiative that Israel was unready to implement were the "full withdrawal to 1967 borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees" (Eran, 147).
The "Road Map" for peace
In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (AKA Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat.
The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Israel was then required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.[2]
Neither party has yet fulfilled its obligations under this peace plan. Israel has dismantled only minor post-March 2001 settlements and has actually expanded some settlements. Israel also evacuated the whole Gaza-strip in August 2005, dismantling all Jewish settlements there. The Israeli army also withdrew completely from the Gaza-strip. The Israeli army still regularly patrols and redeploys into Palestinian controlled areas in what it describes as actions to combat terrorism. Palestinians have not made much progress in reducing violent actions of Palestinian against Israel and Israels. They state that this is because of disputes between resistance factions (e.g: then-prime-minister Abbas had stated that he could not act against Hamas without causing a civil war) and continued Israeli attacks. Initially, Hamas and Islamic Jihad unilaterally declared a 45 day temporary ceasefire ("hudna"), conditional on Israel ceasing its assassinations of Palestinian leaders and a mass release of thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli prisons without trial or charges. Israel rejected the proposal.
This violence which continues to this day, coupled with the lukewarm political support, has led many to conclude that this peace plan has failed. Then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon has all but declared it dead. The U.S., which gave lip-service to the plan, has failed to provide any meaningful support for the plan and has blocked efforts by the Europeans, Russians and the U.N. to revive it.
Alternative peace proposals
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With the road map in difficulties, pressure has grown to find an alternative way forward. On December 7, 2003, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a unilateral withdrawal from large parts of the West Bank and Gaza strip, abandoning some Jewish settlements while annexing some territory. This was interpreted by many as a trial balloon on behalf of Ariel Sharon, who followed it up with a speech on December 18 giving the Palestinian Authority "a few months" to comply with the road map before Israel took "unilateral steps". The speech was strongly criticised by the United States government, which warned against pre-empting the road map's outcome, and by many on the Israeli right, who cite security concerns and the need for achieving reciprocal concessions in return for the withdrawal.
Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, one and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On December 1, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord). In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration including Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by Edward Said and New York University professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Somewhat surprisingly, some Israeli settler groups supported it, seeing it as a way by which Israel could permanently legitimise its hold on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems a improbable solution to the problem.
The Elon Peace Plan is a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict proposed in 2002 by former minister Binyamin Elon. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will be become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. This solution is tied to the Demographics of Jordan where it's claimed that Jordan is essentially already the Palestinian state.[3]
Other peace projects
Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Arabs, there are many people working on peaceful solutions that respect the rights of peoples on both sides.
Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties
- Paris Peace Conference, 1919
- Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (1919)
- Peel Commission
- 1949 Armistice Agreements
- Allon Plan
- Rogers plan
- Geneva Conference (1973)
- Camp David Accords (1978)
- Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979)
- Madrid Conference of 1991
- Oslo Accords (1993)
- Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace (1994)
- Camp David 2000 Summit
- Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
- List of Middle East peace proposals
- International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict
See also
- Peace Now
- Jewish refugees
- Israeli settlements
- Israeli West Bank barrier
- Violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict timeline
- History of the Arab-Israeli conflict
- Arab League and the Arab-Israeli conflict
- Category:Israeli songs about Peace
- Palestinian refugees
- Americans for Peace Now
- Seeds of Peace
References
- ^ Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199, page 176
- ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199
- ^ Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- ^ Bregman, A. & El-Tahri, J., 1998, The Fifty Year War: Israel and the Arabs, London, Penguin Books
- ^ Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199
- ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199
- ^ Pedahzur, A., 2005, Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge, Polity Press, page 65
- ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, Pages 171-199
- Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.
External links
- Resources > Modern Period > 20th Cent. > History of Israel > State of Israel > Peace Processes The Jewish History Resource Center, Project of the Dinur Center for Research in Jewish History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- The Novel Catalyst for the Jerusalem Solution A website explaining why one school for the children of the Israeli and Palestinian governments might be the missing piece needed to achieve a lasting solution
- A presentation of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's views on the Jewish people's connection with the Holy Land, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the so-called "Land for Peace" issue
- Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding the Middle East Peace talks