Popper's three worlds

Not to be confused with the model of global economics and politics known as the Three-world model..

Popper's three worlds is a way of looking at reality, described by the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper in a lecture given in August 1967. The concept involves three interacting worlds, called World 1, World 2 and World 3.

Worlds 1, 2 and 3

These three "Worlds" are not proposed as isolated universes but rather are realms or levels within the known universe.

Their numbering reflects Popper's view (a) of their temporal order within the known universe, and (b) that each later realm emerged from developments within the preceding realm. A one-word description of each realm is that World 1 is the material realm, World 2 is the mental realm, and World 3 is the cultural realm - though, in the detail of Popper's theory, each "World" or realm transcends what might be typically understood by the respective terms "material", "mental" and "cultural".

While each major realm (i.e. World 1, 2 and 3) is said by Popper to arise from the emergence of new entities, Popper accepts that multiple levels of new entity may also be distinguished as having emerged within each realm e.g. physics, chemistry and biology are subjects corresponding to distinguishable levels within Popper's "World 1", and it is possible to distinguish further levels within these levels (e.g. within chemistry, between inorganic and organic chemistry; within biology, the different levels of entity or species identified by evolutionary classification). In Popper's view, many of these levels emerged so gradually that it may not be feasible to precisely demarcate their borders, and this may be the case regarding the emergence of World 2 from World 1 and of World 3 from World 2. Nevertheless, Popper's tripartite division of all emergent levels in the evolving universe, into three major distinct realms or "Worlds", reflects his view that entities within each respective "World" share crucially distinct characteristics when compared to entities in the other "Worlds", and that the points of interaction between these three "Worlds" are of special interest and importance.

Popper uses the framework provided by the interactions of the three "Worlds" to advance his account of human creativity, rationality and freedom. Popper's position is that there is continuity and similarity between many aspects of human knowledge and the knowledge attained by other animals and living entities, and he argues for an "evolutionary epistemology" which regards all such knowledge as instruments for problem-solving - instruments that evolve, using "conjecture and refutation", according to a schema of 'initial problem - trial solution - error elimination - revised problem'. Yet he argues that what most separates human from animal knowledge is that only humans develop their knowledge in World 3 terms:- he contends that much of the vastly enlarged human capacity to be creative and/or rational, in comparison with the capacities of other animals, arises from humans' unique access to "objective knowledge" in World 3 terms i.e. from the creative, rational and indeterministic interplay between human "subjective knowledge" in World 2 terms and "objective knowledge" in World 3 terms - the interplay between the human 'mind' and the many forms of human 'culture'. Within this framework, Popper defends the view that humans are moral beings with a crucial degree of rational 'autonomy', but he argues we are not born fully fledged 'selves' or with rational autonomy but that we achieve selfhood and develop rational autonomy as our minds develop in interaction with other selves and with World 3.

In Popper's theory, there is at points direct interaction between World 1 and World 2 (at the point of mind-brain liaison), and between World 2 and World 3 (at the point where mental states or processes are engaged with World 3 content), but there is no direct interaction at any point between World 1 and World 3 - World 3 does affect World 1 but only indirectly, through the workings of World 2 with World 3 content and then World 2's subsequent interaction with World 1 via mind-brain-body interaction.

Though it is part of Popper's theory of knowledge, Popper's theory of these three "Worlds" is also a cosmological theory. Consistent with the known universe as presently described by the natural sciences, Popper maintains that the known universe did not contain any World 2 or World 3 from the outset - there was initially only a "World 1", a realm where everything consisted of physical states and processes, with chemical reactions between the elements arising much later. Moreover, for an even longer time that "World 1" was devoid of any living matter, and so during that time lacked any biological level. The biological level is a level within World 1 that emerged from its physical-chemical evolution over a vast tract of time, as a lifeless universe eventually gave rise to living organisms. In a similar sense to this emergence of life within World 1 itself, Popper maintains that a "World 2" of mental life later emerged as a product of biological evolution, and that subsequently "World 3" emerged as a product of evolution within the human "World 2". Much as there was no biological realm in the universe before the emergence of biological entities, so Popper views "World 2" and "World 3" as realms that only came into existence with the first respective World 2 and World 3 entities. Likewise, when Popper speaks of the interaction between, say, "World 2" and "World 3", he means interaction between specific entities that exist within these respective realms rather than interaction of the "Worlds" as such.

This cosmological approach is directly opposed to claims that we will eventually be able to fully explain (and perhaps predict) whatever comes later in the known universe from the character of what came before - or claims that, in principle, we can always completely 'reduce' later characteristics of the universe to its earlier characteristics. Against such reductionist and deterministic views, Popper argues that we should view our universe as "creative" and indeterministic, especially in that it has given rise to genuinely new levels or realms - like biological life, "World 2" and "World 3" - that were not there from its beginning, and which are not 'reducible' to (or predictable from) what was there from its beginning.

The three "Worlds" may be understood, within this evolutionary and cosmological framework, as containing three categories of entity:-

• World 1: the realm of states and processes as typically studied by the natural sciences. These include the states and processes that we seek to explain by physics and by chemistry, and also those states and processes that subsequently emerge with life and which we seek to explain by biology.

• World 2: the realm of mental states and processes. These include sensations and thoughts, and include both conscious and unconscious mental states and processes. World 2 includes all animal, as well as human, mental experience. Mental states and processes only emerged as a product (or by-product) of biological activity by living organisms, and so only emerged subsequent to the emergence of living organisms within World 1. Mental states and processes are the products of evolutionary developments in the World 1 of animal brains and nervous systems, but constitute a new realm of World 2 that co-evolved by its interaction with the World 1 of brains and nervous systems.

• World 3: the realm of the 'products of thought' when considered as objects in their own right. These products emerge from human "World 2" activity, but when considered as World 3 objects in their own right they have rebound effects on human World 2 thought processes. Through these rebound effects, World 3 'objects' may - via World 2-motivated human action on World 1 - have an indirect but powerful effect on World 1. In Popper's view, World 3 'objects' encompass a very wide range of entities, from scientific theories to works of art, from laws to institutions.

World 3 content and its vehicles in World 1 and World 2

Popper recognises that some form of World 1 and of World 2 is accepted by most people, but that his "World 3" goes beyond what is generally accepted as a matter of common sense. While humans may be widely considered to have developed many forms of "culture", it may often be assumed that these forms can be entirely explained in terms of World 1 and/or World 2 e.g. in terms of physical artefacts, or dispositions to act or memories physically encoded in the brain; or in terms of subjective knowledge or psychological dispositions within World 2. Whereas, in Popper's theory, those physical and mental entities which embody or represent cultural forms should be understood as vehicles for the relevant World 3 content e.g. the cultural content of a painting or a musical composition or a book does not reside in their characteristics in World 1 terms (i.e. their physical, chemical or biological aspects as studied by the natural sciences), or in their World 2 affects on the human mind (as perhaps studied by psychology), but in their distinctive World 3 content. This World 3 content, Popper argues, is not identical with, or reducible to, any World 1 or World 2 states or processes.

In addition to:-

(1) World 3 content that has been embodied or encoded physically in World 1 as artefacts like books or as brain contents such as stored memories ("World 3.1" content), and

(2) World 3 content that has been the past or present subject matter of mental states and processes ("World 3.2" content),

it is an important part of Popper's theory that there is also

(3) "World 3.3" content i.e. there also exists, Popper argues, World 3 content that has as yet had no existence in the form of a World 1 or World 2 'vehicle' and which only exists within World 3 itself.

Popper often uses the example of prime numbers and their relation to the sequence of natural numbers to illustrate his form of objectivism. Though his objectivism extends to other World 3 entities, such as works of art and scientific theories, it would appear that Popper considered mathematical examples as a good way to convey his point of view. In Popper's view, primes existed as discoverable "World 3.3" content in the above sense, as an immediate 'objective' property of the sequence of the natural numbers, as soon as the sequence of natural numbers was developed by humans - accordingly, prime numbers existed in World 3 before their existence was grasped mentally by humans or was made explicit in mathematical speech or writing. In Popper's account, humans invented rather than discovered the sequence of natural numbers (a sequence which does not exist within World 1 and which did not come into existence with the first human mental states), but humans discovered rather than invented the existence of prime numbers within that sequence; so, in terms of the three "Worlds", natural numbers came into existence with their conscious invention and use by humans ("World 3.2" content), but prime numbers entered World 3 at the same time as an unintended but discoverable "World 3" property of the sequence of natural numbers ("World 3.3" content). Popper suggests this approach may help throw light on other debates as to whether some particular item of knowledge has been discovered or invented.

Popper implicitly recognises "World 3.3" content with his "theorem" that "World 3 > World 3.2 + World 3.1" - meaning that World 3 transcends those World 3 contents that have been either encoded in World 1 or grasped by World 2. This theorem also means that, in Popper's view, World 3 contains not just contents that are the intended products of human mental activity but also contents that are unintended by-products of other World 3 contents. For example, Mendel's work, showing genetic material is 'particulate' (and combines but does not 'blend' in reproduction), existed in World 3 together with Darwin's theory of 'natural selection' before anyone understood how their theories interconnect; so while Mendel and Darwin invented their theories, important connections between these theories existed to be discovered in World 3, as "World 3.3" content, once the theories themselves existed in World 3 (e.g. Mendel's theory can be used to explain why advantageous mutations are not 'blended out' by subsequent interbreeding before they can further spread in the gene pool, thereby answering one of the most critical objections to Darwin's theory, an objection that Darwin himself struggled to answer because he was unaware of Mendel's work).

Even in the case of World 3 objects that are the intended products of human mental activity, Popper contends that such objects may have a depth of content that transcends the human understanding involved in their creation e.g. Einstein's "e = mc²", Darwin's theory of 'natural selection', Shakespeare's "King Lear", Joyce's "Ulysses", Bach's "Well-Tempered Clavier", Dylan's "Highway 61 Revisited", Miles Davis' "Kind of Blue", or Leonardo's 'Mona Lisa', may have depths that were not fully known or understood by anyone at the point of their creation. Indeed, Popper's theory is that some World 3 objects have sufficient depths that their content can be 'mined' for an indefinite time after the object was initially created, with some of that 'mining' of considerable importance in terms of advancing our understanding e.g. 'mining' the sequence of natural numbers for properties and relations such as primes, and other different sets and classes of number and number relation; R.A. Fisher's explanation for the prevalence of 1:1 male-female ratios in terms of Darwin's 'natural selection'; a particularly insightful performance of a play or musical composition; an especially penetrating commentary on a book or work of art.

As already indicated, it is crucial to Popper's theory that where World 3 content is embodied physically or grasped mentally it nevertheless retains its character as World 3 content (hence the aptness of the terminology of "World 3.1", "World 3.2" and "World 3.3" content, which marks the distinctness of World 3 content even where it has a World 1 or World 2 vehicle) e.g. in Popper's view, the World 3 content of a book remains within World 3 and does not exist within World 1 as content of the sort studied by physics, chemistry or biology (accordingly, two editions of a book may be identical in World 3 terms despite marked differences in their physical and chemical composition; and a single edition of a book may remain unchanged in World 3 terms despite changes in its physical and chemical composition as it deteriorates over time). Popper's theory is that World 1 objects can provide vehicles for World 3 content, but such World 1 vehicles do not fully embody the World 3 content because, crucially, the World 3 content retains its World 3 character rather than being converted into some form of World 1 content. This may at first seem a strange view, but Popper argues, for example, that the act of reading is an interpretative act of the conscious mind seeking to grasp World 3 content, and is clearly not an act of merely 'reading' physical or chemical characteristics in World 1 terms - with the World 1 aspects of writing important only in their role as symbolic vehicles for the relevant World 3 content, and otherwise unimportant in any specific World 1 terms (they could always, in principle, be replaced by a physically or chemically different symbolism). That World 3 content may remain invariant between translations into different languages that differ markedly in World 1 terms; and where there are difficulties of translation (i.e. in keeping the content invariant in translation) these are not World 1 difficulties but mostly World 3 difficulties e.g. they are difficulties in finding sufficiently equivalent expressions in the other language to convey relevant aspects of the World 3 meaning. The initial strangeness of this "World 3", in contrast to the more intuitively familiar concepts of World 1 and World 2, may also be counterbalanced by understanding that World 1 and World 2 are shown by science to be much stranger and more complex than they might appear to "common sense", and even to defy "common sense" e.g. quantum physics within World 1; perceptual and other cognitive illusions within World 2.

The reality of World 3 in the context of the reality of World 1 and World 2

World 1 extends beyond what is testable by science to those aspects of physics, chemistry and biology that remain a matter of philosophical or metaphysical (i.e. untestable) conjecture - so, for example, arguments as to whether there exist any 'laws of physics' pertain to World 1 even though neither the existence nor non-existence of such laws can be tested (i.e. falsified) by observation (only specified 'laws of nature' can be falsified or tested, in Popper's view, whereas there is no observational test for the existence or non-existence of such laws in general terms). Also pertaining to World 1 are untestable theories as to the origin of World 1 and the origin of life within it, and untestable theories regarding the extent to which World 1 is governed by exceptionless laws of nature, or governed by probabilistic laws, or by probabilistic 'changing propensities for change', or is a product of random or blind chance. Similarly, a proposition may pertain to World 2 or World 3 whether it is scientifically testable or not.

Deeper than this, Popper does not claim our knowledge (whether scientific-testable or not) is, or ever could be, exhaustive of the reality it seeks to comprehend. His position is that even were we to reach apparent 'rock bottom' in our understanding of, say, the laws governing the physical universe, our knowledge would always fall short of conclusive proof that we had reached the actual 'rock bottom'. Moreover, it may be that World 1 has aspects to its reality, including aspects fundamental to its physical nature, that we shall never understand - and perhaps that we are incapable of ever understanding. Equivalent points also hold true for World 2 and World 3.

To appreciate Popper's theory, especially the reality of a "World 3", it helps to appreciate that:-

(a) fundamental aspects of World 1 and World 2 defy naive forms of "common sense" and might be regarded as extravagant and fantastical were they not shown by critical arguments, including experiments;

(b) the reality of World 1 and World 2 are not themselves straightforwardly testable in the sense in which their reality is usually disputed by philosophers, and the view that they are "real" is better understood as a conjecture made as part of our realist metaphysical outlook;

(c) we have not got to the bottom of understanding either World 1 or World 2, and the deeper our understanding has penetrated into these realms the more we have unearthed aspects that are not obvious as a matter of common sense or everyday experience;

(d) we do not have any general theory of causation that explains (i) the causal interactions within each realm and/or (ii) between each realm;

(e) there are key aspects of human knowledge, including language acquisition and extending to scientific knowledge, that are difficult to fully explain in terms of subjective mental states and which are much better explained by a theory of World 3 and of "objective knowledge".

Viewed in such a wider perspective, the reality of "World 3" may seem less extravagant and fantastical, and less vulnerable to objections that it is not part of untutored common sense and is not demonstrated by a clear or testable explanation of how causally it may interact with World 2. In Popper's view, the reality of World 3 is a reasonable further metaphysical conjecture in line with the conjectured reality of World 1 and World 2:- it is made more reasonable by our increased knowledge of the evolving character of World 1 and World 2, especially that discovered aspects of their reality extend far beyond the visible or touchable material objects central to ordinary experience - so that the 'abstractness' of World 3 objects (by contrast to the experienced 'concreteness' of visible or graspable material objects) should be viewed relative to the 'abstractness' of atoms, sub-atomic particles, gravity and other forces, the spectrum of electro-magnetic waves, 'natural selection', 'relativity' and 'space-time' within World 1, and of conscious and unconscious mental states and processes within World 2. Popper argues that a main reason we may consider all these entities as "real" is because their existence is needed to explain the character or behaviour of the visible or touchable material objects which arguably form the core of ordinary experience.

Key aspects of the role of World 3

Among the many points and arguments Popper makes using his three worlds' schema, the following may be regarded as key claims regarding the role of World 3 in the known universe.

First, Popper argues that, notwithstanding the many continuities and correspondences between the human and animal World 2, (1) only humans consider their mental products as objects in their own right in a World 3 sense, and (2) only humans have knowledge of World 3 objects.

Second, World 3 has no direct effect on World 1 but only affects World 1 as mediated by the human World 2:- for example, a theory of nuclear reactions will never of itself cause a nuclear reactor to be built, yet a nuclear reactor is not the result of a purely World 1 process but is the product of a complex interaction between particular "World 3" theories and human "World 2" mental activity, and then particular human actions in "World 1" made possible by this complex interaction.

Third, Popper argues that one way to bring out the reality of World 3 is to consider how its existence can drastically change the state of World 1 (on earth, where the human "World 2" provides a bridge from World 3 content to its effect on World 1). He gives the contrasting examples of a disaster that wiped out civilisation including our stored knowledge (e.g. in libraries and in computers) and a similar disaster which left our stored knowledge substantially intact. In the first example, civilisation as we now know it, including its knowledge-base, would have to be rebuilt from scratch; whereas, in the second case, even if all the relevant experts had died in the disaster, we could avail of the stored knowledge-base to begin rebuilding. Popper argues that the stored knowledge-base is World 3 content in its physically encoded form - "World 3.1" content - and its reality becomes clear when we consider how much more difficult the rebuilding of civilisation would likely be in the first example when contrasted with the second, with the 'rebuilding of civilisation' being a process that would have many World 1 effects. The "World 3.1" stored knowledge-base (e.g. in libraries and in computers) is itself an array of World 1 objects whose character and behaviour, Popper argues, need to be explained in terms of World 3 content - not just the content which these objects may record or encode but also the World 3 content needed for their creation and maintenance.

Contrast between Popper's theory of knowledge and the theory of knowledge as "justified true belief"

In contrast to the dominant Western tradition that identifies "knowledge" with special states within World 2 (e.g. with "justified true belief"), in Popper's theory of knowledge there exist forms of knowledge within World 1 as well as within World 2, and additionally there are knowable 'objects' within World 3 which constitute forms of "objective knowledge". Objects or entities within each of these "Worlds" constitute the main subject matter of human knowledge. Popper's interactionist view is that human knowledge often arises from combinations of knowledge in World 1 terms (e.g. information processes built into the brain), "subjective knowledge" in World 2 terms, and "objective knowledge" in World 3 terms.

Central to Popper's overall theory of knowledge is his contention that a form of "making and matching" or "conjecture and refutation" is the model by which knowledge develops at all these levels i.e. within World 1, and within World 2, and also as regards knowledge arising from World 2's interactions with World 1 and World 3.

Popper's theory of knowledge is very different to the view that identifies knowledge with some form of "justified true belief", and he argues, by contrast, that:-

(a) all knowledge is conjectural, because it always might be mistaken, and none is "justified" in the sense philosophers usually mean i.e. of having an infallible basis;

(b) knowledge encompasses what is false as well as what is true e.g. Newton's physics, though strictly false, is highly significant knowledge - much more significant than knowledge that is true but trivial;

(c) the traditional philosophical search for infallible foundations for knowledge is a fool's errand, because knowledge does not grow or develop by attaining, or seeking, perfect or firm foundations but through improvements to its accuracy and scope; at the human, cultural - and especially scientific - level, these improvements arise from a fallible process of "conjecture and refutation" and from rational criticism, without the knowledge having any conclusively proved infallible foundations;

(d) (i) knowledge need not be believed or involve 'belief states' (e.g. knowledge stored in libraries; discoverable knowledge in the "World 3.3" sense - that has not, as yet, been the subject matter of any human belief);

(ii) we may be more committed to our knowledge the stronger our convictions or 'belief-states', and this commitment or conviction may sometimes appear useful as a well-spring for action or because it contributes to our sense of well-being, but commitment and conviction may also underpin dogmatism and impede critical correction of our knowledge, and we should pursue knowledge wary of such commitments and convictions;

(iii) the value of knowledge stands in no strict correlation with our subjective degree of belief in it;

(iv) while we may often be more willing to rely and act on knowledge the greater our degree of belief in it, there is no simple logical connection between our degree of belief in knowledge and our actions performed in reliance on that knowledge e.g. we are capable of deciding to act on knowledge or information in which we have little belief or even which we believe false, and we are capable of refusing to act on knowledge or information which we strongly believe is true; and there are differences between individuals and contexts as regards what standard of assessed reliability is required of "knowledge" before it is relied on for action;

(v) obviously there is a sense in which the assessed "value" of knowledge may depend on the values we adopt (and some knowledge may be invaluable though we do not consciously assess it as such e.g. because it is essential to survival, such as knowing how to breathe without conscious effort); but, if we take truth as a core value and consider knowledge for its explanatory power, then the value of knowledge centres on (a) how well it stands up to critical examination in terms of its truth or 'truth-likeness' and (b) its amount of explanatory power. The truth or 'truth-likeness' of knowledge and its amount of explanatory power are issues we strive to answer in objective terms, by critical evaluation of the relevant "objective knowledge", and they cannot be properly answered by any mere appeal to subjective mental states, including our degree of belief.

According to Popper's views on knowledge:-

(1) a tree may have knowledge, such as how to spread its roots to tap water, or how to exchange information about the state of its environment with other trees; but this is biological knowledge within World 1 - a tree does not have mental states or World 2 knowledge;

(2) in addition to such biological knowledge, explicable in World 1 terms, a dog may have mental states and World 2 knowledge - such as a conscious expectation as to when its owner is likely to return home (in Popper's view, the dog's mental state will not involve knowledge of 'owner', 'return', 'home' or 'time' in their World 3 senses, but still there may be some resemblance between the dog's understanding of the relevant situation in its World 2 terms and human understanding of the same situation in World 3 terms - so that, for example, the dog attaches special significance to specific persons, actions and places in a way that resembles what humans would signify and explain in terms of 'owner', 'return', 'home' and a specified 'time');

(3) only humans have knowledge that extends beyond World 1 and World 2 states and processes to knowledge of 'objects' or entities in the World 3 sense.

More on World 3

The range of World 3 entities

World 3 contains the products of thought and other mental activity when these products form a World 3 'object'. World 3 also contains by-products of these products, such as discoverable connections between them. World 3 'objects' includes abstract objects such as scientific theories, stories, myths, and also works of art - including the musical, literary and dramatic arts.

World 3 also includes the content of much more basic uses of language than in, say, advanced science or literature or the humanities, and it includes the content of flawed or poor artistic and scientific works as well as the content of great ones e.g. the informational content in "I would like a coffee" is a form of World 3 content and not just sounds reflective of a subjective state (though the sounds may causally reflect a subjective state, they have a linguistic "World 3" meaning that is independent of that state; if a person insincerely said "I would like a coffee" it could carry the same World 3 meaning though their subjective state would not be that of a sincere person saying it). As may be apparent from this, humans begin handling basic World 3 content of different sorts from early childhood, and their ability in this correlates closely with their language-development and education, both in terms of natural language and mathematical language. A child that learns how a "dog" belongs to the category of "animal", but that "cheese" belongs to the category of "food", is handling the relevant terms as World 3 content - and may show their World 3 understanding by knowing, immediate on their first encounter, that a squirrel is an "animal" and an ice-cream is "food".

In Popper's theory of science, a "basic" or "test statement" is a statement denoting a state of affairs in a space-time location that be checked by observation, and may be as straightforward as "In the laboratory this morning the solution x turned red after the chemical y was added" - likewise the statement "Last night my car was parked outside my house" is a scientific "test statement" rather than a metaphysical one, because checkable by observation. In Popper's theory of World 3, such basic or testable statements contain or represent "objective knowledge" in a World 3 sense, and their content is World 3 content, irrespective of whether the content is true or false. World 3 content is also expressed by testable 'universal statements' like "e=mc²", and also by untestable metaphysical statements such as "The storm destroyed the armada because God willed it", "My feeling anxious today is because of a strange dream I had last night", or "All events in the universe are the result of the operation of universal laws" - likewise their status as "objective knowledge" does not depend on their being true but on their content existing as a criticisable 'object' outside of mere subjective experience.

Popper's conception of World 3 content is very broad, and he includes within it traditions, laws and institutions e.g. we may speak of the institution of Parliament in a World 3 sense, and distinguish this sense from the Houses of Parliament as World 1 buildings - and we may recognise that what may destroy or change "Parliament" in either of these senses may have no affect on "Parliament" in the other sense.

Though Popper's terminology is not commonplace, he argues that our ordinary and technical language implicitly draws distinctions, or has meanings, that correspond to the three Worlds' theory:-

(1) if we speak of the knowledge stored in a library, we mean "objective knowledge" in its World 3 sense ("World 3.1" content), rather than knowledge that is held by World 2 mental states or which is a set of merely World 1 states or processes;

(2) in the English law of evidence, a categorical distinction is drawn between hearsay and "real evidence" that corresponds to a World 3 and World 1 distinction - the words "Jack loves Jill" engraved into a tree are used as "real evidence", or for their World 1 characteristics, if they are adduced to identify the tree - but they are used as hearsay, or for their World 3 content, if they are adduced to prove that it is true that Jack loves Jill;

(3) we may speak of the powers and duties of a Prime Minister or a President - or powers and duties in relation to many other roles or capacities - where these roles and capacities are spoken of in their World 3 sense; the powers and duties pertain to the relevant 'World 3-designated' role or capacity rather than directly to the person who has that role or capacity; the person or persons with the relevant role or capacity may often be identified using World 3 rules or principles or criteria, and such persons cannot be identified by any set of merely World 1 and/or World 2 states or processes.

World 3 not offered as an "ontology"

It may be tempting to regard a World 3 object as something along the lines of a meta-object or a form of being - but Popper avoids such talk, and 'ontological' debate, because he does not think it typically adds much to genuine understanding. In The Self And Its Brain he made clear at the outset (p.3-4) that he was "not offering what is sometimes called an "ontology"" "(In fact, the need to avoid "what is" questions will turn out to be one of my main points.").

It is antithetical to Popper's approach to provide or seek some criterion or "essence" for what constitutes a World 3 entity (i.e. that defines their essential identity or character) - as it is equally not part of his approach to provide an equivalent "essence" for World 2 or World 1 entities. Instead, Popper views the entities within each realm, and the realms themselves, as a matter of conjecture - it being a central tenet of his theory of knowledge that all knowledge is conjectural. This approach treats further investigation into their character or identity as open-ended - as a matter for further 'conjecture and refutation'.

World 3 open-ended and raises open-ended issues

A great many other questions are left open by Popper in relation to his version of a theory of World 3 (e.g. might an outstanding "World 3.1" performance or recording - of, say, a Beethoven symphony, or a Shakespeare play - be regarded as itself a distinct kind of World 3 object, worthy of special study?; might some higher animals, like dolphins, have a World 2 and linguistic representations handling content that is analogous to some forms of human World 3 content?).

Some critics have objected to the resultant lack of detail in aspects of the Popper's theory, but, in Popper's defence, in some cases this is because some such questions raise matters on which he had no concluded view, in others because they raise matters where his own view is only one of many arguable positions, and because there are other issues - such as the causal nature of World 2 and World 3 interaction (and, more broadly, causation both within and between each of the three Worlds) - where Popper argues we lack any relevant kind of detailed theory or explanation. For such reasons, much is left open-ended about "World 3" and by the theory of the three worlds generally. Popper did make detailed contributions on various topics, including technical ones in logic and probability, but he was wary of the tendency of some philosophers to develop in detail a theory that argumentatively still remains weak, and the dangers of obfuscation - he typically writes with an eye to what he considers most important as a matter of argument, where the validity of key arguments is rarely enhanced by swathes of detail.

For example, one academic critic of Popper's "lack of detailed work" further argued that World 3 must be a flawed theory, because Popper admits contradictory theories within World 3 and yet claims World 3 can grow in content:- their criticism was that in logic any proposition may be inferred from a contradiction, and therefore if World 3 contains contradictions it must therefore contain all propositions by inference, and if it already contains all propositions by inference then it cannot grow in terms of propositional content. Popper's reply treats this as an instance of a professional philosopher using a point of detail - regarding inference from contradictions - in a way that misleads:- the criticism confuses the important distinction between material and logical implication, Popper argues, but might be answered non-technically as follows. It is true that once a system of propositions is inconsistent then no further proposition can be inconsistent with it (because it is already inconsistent), and in this sense any such further proposition is "implied" by the inconsistent system; but this does not mean any such further proposition is brought into existence e.g. if we put two contradictory propositional statements written on paper strips into a cup, no further statement can be inconsistent with what is already an inconsistent system of (two) propositions, and any further statement may in a corresponding sense be "inferred" from the system - but this does not mean that logically there now exists any more than two statements in the cup, or that the cup has become full of all the statements that might be "inferred" in this sense. For Popper "World 3" is the container for a certain kind of entity, and just like a cup that contains contradictory statements is not therefore itself a contradictory cup or a cup full of all possible statements, so the existence of contradictory propositions and theories within World 3 does not make World 3 itself contradictory and it does not mean that all propositions or theories already exist within it.

Though Popper argues for the reality of a "World 3" and its vital role in the development of human knowledge and culture, he understood not only that many related issues and debates remain open, but that it is possible to develop different specific theories as to, for example, the character of World 3, the differing character of the differing entities within it, and the forms of its interaction with World 2. Indicating his framework was not proposed in a doctrinaire fashion, he admitted we could argue for treating the field of ethics as a distinct, special "World". Some might also prefer to treat art and science as special "Worlds" that arise from a more basic conception of a "World 3". Though Popper places ethics, science and art within his "World 3", this does not mean his theory asserts or implies their character is uniform:- nevertheless their placement together in "World 3" reflects his view that in each case they may be understood as fields of "objective knowledge" and not merely "subjective knowledge", and that he regards this as fundamental to their worth and to the character of their development. His theory of "World 3" does not entail but does facilitate his further view that - in addition to having "objective knowledge" in the fields of science, art and ethics - in each field human rationality plays a key or central role:- he defends the rationality of science in terms of 'critical rationalism', regarding science at its best as the epitome of rational endeavour, and he gives human reason a larger role in human ethics and art than would many other philosophers. However, as with Bryan Magee, it is possible to go along with Popper on the reality of "World 3" but to argue that human rationality has less of a role in the development of such "objective knowledge" than Popper would claim, especially in the field of ethical and artistic decisions.

As indicated above, Popper's framework could be reworked in a more elaborate typology:- say with his "World 1" divided into a World 1 of physics, a World 2 of chemistry, and a World 3 of biology; and with his "World 2" likewise divided in terms of different mental experiences into a "World 4", "World 5" etc.; and with his "World 3" perhaps divided into a "World" for science, another for art, another for ethics etc. Popper's simpler division into just "three Worlds" may be defended on several grounds e.g. that its dividing lines focus on the most important and interesting points of interaction - as interactions between the physical, chemical and biological realms do not seem to pose the same level of philosophical problem as either the interactions of these realms with a mental realm or the interaction of a mental realm with a realm of intelligible 'objects'. Popper also accepts that opponents might argue, for example, that "World 3" is only an aspect of "World 1" and/or of "World 2" and not a distinct realm at all - so that his terminology does not foreclose any fundamental debate but instead highlights distinctions that might otherwise be glossed over. Consequently, Popper's theory of the three worlds - including the category of "World 3" - may be highly useful as a framework for debate no matter what position is taken in relation to the issues raised.

The focus of Popper's published writings is less the detailed development of his version of a theory of the three worlds, including "World 3", and more about arguing the merits of such a theory as against the view that there is only a World 1 (e.g. reductive materialism), or only a World 2 (e.g. Berkleyan or subjective idealism), or only a World 1 and World 2 (which, Popper argues, is the dominant tradition in most Western philosophy). "World 3" is a key part of Popper's opposition to what he calls the "subjectivist blunder" in Western philosophy, which he argues is typically trapped by a traditional view of knowledge as "justified true belief" - and thereby into viewing knowledge as merely "subjective knowledge". "World 3" is part of a theory of "objective knowledge" that, Popper argues, provides better answers to problems that struggle to be solved within any framework confined to "subjective knowledge".

The autonomy of World 3 objects

Popper argues that World 3 is distinct and autonomous from World 1 and World 2. Central to this aspect of Popper's theory is that the "World 3 object" can typically be articulated, expressed or represented as an object in itself, distinct from mere subjective experience of it - and that this makes the object 'criticisable' in the sense that it thereby becomes an object capable of critical assessment or evaluation (or an object of study, or for further investigation). The extent to which a mental product may be treated as an object capable of critical evaluation may be a question of degree in any given case, affected by, for example, the linguistic development, educational level and intelligence of an individual human. Nevertheless, Popper regards the basic step from mere subjective knowledge to some form or degree of "objective knowledge" as crucial, especially as it provides a gateway to many further developments in knowledge that would not otherwise be possible.

Some sense of why Popper regards this step as decisive may be given by contrasting the experienced pain of a creature that has no language for that pain, and that has merely "subjective knowledge" of their pain, with the pain of a human who can understand their experience of pain (e.g. toothache) in terms of some concept or theory of pain that they can formulate in language, and where the human has, Popper argues, both "subjective knowledge" and a form of "objective knowledge" of their pain. A similar contrast could be drawn between a pre-linguistic human baby with merely "subjective knowledge" of its 'teething pains' and an adult human with both "subjective knowledge" and "objective knowledge" of the pain from their 'wisdom teeth'. The human capacity to 'objectify' the experience of "pain", as a World 3 linguistic construct, may perhaps alter some aspects of the overall subjective experience of pain e.g. because it becomes part of an enlarged understanding that provides knowledge as to the pain's likely duration or the real level of danger the pain represents. Most important, for Popper, is that the capacity to view pain in World 3 terms as an 'object' opens the door to further understanding e.g. to greater understanding of the problems of pain, and to conscious development of solutions to these problems. Accordingly, we might expect some animals with toothache or other injury to adopt primitive strategies for tackling or alleviating their pain or discomfort, but we would never expect such an animal, with their mental horizon limited to merely "subjective knowledge" of their pain or discomfort, to develop anything like a World 3 institution for dealing with such issues, such as dentistry or hospitals.

It is also part of Popper's theory that development of full conscious awareness, and of our selfhood, is bound up with the capacity to have "objective knowledge" - so that, in Popper's view, full conscious self-awareness and our autonomous 'selves' develop from our minds becoming increasingly "anchored in World 3", a process that begins in childhood. Our self-development depends on discovering and learning many things in relation to our World 1 (e.g. distinguishing animate from inanimate objects), in relation to our World 2 and to the World 2 of others, and in relation to World 3:- in The Self and Its Brain (p.111), Popper writes, "not only perception and language have to be learned - actively - but even the task of being a person...this involves not merely a close contact with the World 2 of other persons, but also a close contact with the World 3 of language and of theories such as a theory of time (or something equivalent)." As much of what we learn of others' "World 2" is through understanding their World 3 linguistic expressions (and how these reflect their "World 2"), we have a form of World 3 "objective knowledge" of their World 2.

A key aspect of Popper's theory is that World 3 objects may have a depth of content that transcends their vehicles in World 1 and World 2. In the case of a Beethoven symphony, the symphony as "World 3 object" is, Popper argues, an intelligible object that transcends its vehicles in World 1 and World 2:- the symphony as World 3 object transcends, for example, (a) Beethoven's mental states in relation to its creative development - not just any segment of them, but their totality; and (b) the totality of performances of the symphony within World 1, and the somewhat arbitrary or conventional notation that may express the symphony as a musical score in World 1 terms. In each case where the symphony is represented or expressed by vehicles in World 1 or World 2, Popper views the symphonic content as retaining its specific World 3 character, so the vehicles are a kind of hybrid e.g. some of Beethoven's creative mental states may represent the symphony in "World 3.2" terms, as may the mental states of the audience at a performance; and a concert performance, or a written score of the symphony, are not mere World 1 entities but rather should be understood as "World 3.1" expressions or representations of the symphony. In both cases, Popper argues, these hybrid vehicles provide or contain only a limited and incomplete representation of the symphony as a World 3 object, and do not exhaust the content of the symphony when viewed as a World 3 object. So it is very possible that, having worked exhaustively to compose the symphony, Beethoven might obtain greater insight and understanding into the symphony through hearing its first performance or a later outstanding performance, and that he might make critical changes to the composition as a result. It is similarly possible that a person listening to the same "World 3.1" recording of the symphony over and over may gain increased insight or understanding - not just of the symphony as recorded (i.e. as a specific "World 3.1" object or performance) but of the symphony itself as a transcendent "World 3" object e.g. a keen listener may replay a great recording not merely to re-experience the performance as before but to deepen their appreciation (a) of the specific achievements of that performance (in "World 3.1" terms) and (b) of the transcendent World 3 object which is portrayed or conveyed by that performance. It may be taken as one of the marks of great performances of great works, as opposed to lesser performances or lesser works, that they continue to reward this kind of renewed encounter - in terms of renewed or deepened appreciation of both the "World 3" object and its outstanding "World 3.1" version.

However, World 3 is not to be conceived as a Platonic realm, because unlike the Platonic world of forms, which is unchanging and exists independently of human beings, Popper's World 3 is created by human beings and is not fixed. The state of World 3 roughly corresponds to the current state of our knowledge and culture. However, "World 3.3" content, as already discussed, is a case where there is no such correspondence - as "World 3.3" content only becomes part of "our" knowledge and culture, in their usual senses, when it acquires a vehicle in World 1 or World 2. Moreover, when we speak of 'current culture' we tend to mean what is dominant or prevalent in terms of contemporary human awareness - in terms of the contemporary as opposed to the historical "World 3.2". Yet World 3 may contain in its physically encoded section ("World 3.1" content) many works of art and science that exist, and which may merit our cultural attention at some point, but which are neglected or overlooked within contemporary mainstream culture. In fact, some such works may also have always been neglected or overlooked in the past. It is therefore more accurate to say that the current state of our knowledge and culture owes much to the current state of World 3 (rather than say that the state of World 3 corresponds to the current state of our knowledge and culture) - because World 3 transcends both its contemporary and its historical reflection in terms of what is (or has been) prevalent or dominant culturally within the human "World 2".

The interaction of World 1 and World 2

Popper's theory of the interaction of World 2 and World 3 may be said to provide a decisive step beyond mere mind-body dualism into a form of 'trialism', yet within that 'trialism' there is a distinctive theory of mind-body dualism - one that provides an alternative to Cartesian dualism.

Differences between Popper's dualism and Cartesian dualism

Notwithstanding his World 3 'trialism', it is clear that Popper accepts that there was a time, before World 3 emerged, when there were only World 1 and World 2 entities - and therefore there was at that time only a mind-body dualism. This dualism is in the tradition of Descartes to the extent that it regards the mind (or 'the mental') as being something crucially distinct from the body (or 'the physical'), with a corresponding categorical distinction drawn between World 1 and World 2. But in many other respects Popper's views differ from Descartes', for example on what Popper considers two fundamental Cartesian errors:- first, in taking these distinct entities of mind and body to be constituted as distinct "substances"; and, second, in applying a restrictive theory of causation only by 'push' - both to the physical world and to the interaction of that physical world with 'mind'. In further contrast to Descartes, Popper allows that animals other that humans may have mental states and processes (e.g. dogs can be shown experimentally to have dream sleep); and he also allows for the existence of unconscious mental states and processes, and for differing degrees of conscious awareness in relation to mental states (e.g. an individual human may experience different degrees of conscious awareness in relation to their mental states in the course of the day, depending on factors like tiredness or whether they are in an emergency or are sleeping). Consequently, Popper's position is distinguishable from Cartesian dualism, providing a form of dualist interactionism that is not vulnerable to all the same criticisms - a position which accepts that mental states and processes are highly dependent on physical states and processes in the brain but which emphasises the evolutionary advantages conferred by autonomous World 2 activity in terms of furthering World 1 adaptiveness.

Popper describes himself as a dualist in terms of mind and body, and he rejects any form of 'identity theory' whereby mental states are taken to be the same as physical brain states. Nevertheless his approach allows (1) for mental states (and processes) to be in some sense dependent for their existence on a physical substrata in the brain; (2) for there to be close interconnectivity between mental states/processes and physical brain states/processes; (3) for many, if not most, mental states/processes to be products of World 1 brain states/processes without in turn having any affect on any brain states/processes. Given this interconnectivity and interdependence between World 2 and the World 1 of brain activity, and especially that the 'causal arrow' between World 1 and World 2 events may often be one-way, it is clear that when Popper speaks of the "autonomy" of World 2 from World 1 he does not mean complete autonomy in every respect - he primarily means "autonomy" in certain specific instances of mental processing, so that the World 2 of the human mind may be regarded overall as having partial autonomy from its World 1 brain.

In Popper's theory, this partial autonomy is then amplified by World 3:- because World 2 thought processes, when they are autonomous from World 1, can create autonomous World 3 objects - and World 2's further interaction with those World 3 objects gives World 2 greater scope for the further pursuit of knowledge unbridled by the limitations of World 1 processes.

Dualism, like 'indeterminism', "is not enough"

Dualism by itself, Popper argues, is not enough to grant the human mind any creative freedom or autonomy from its World 1 brain:- for example, a mind-brain parallelism could be dualistic even if we lacked genuine mental freedom or rationality because our mental states were always mere epiphenomena to World 1 brain activity and so had no causal effect on World 1. It is in defence of human creativity, rationality and freedom that Popper stresses the 'causal openness' of World 1 to World 2 (and of World 2 to World 3) - that is, his position is 'interactionist', not merely 'dualist'. Accordingly, it is a crucial part of Popper's view of World 1 and World 2 interaction that mental states can sometimes causally affect physical brain states i.e. mental states (or processes) can produce changes in World 1 brain states (or processes). For example, a human's deliberate conscious and rational action involves all of the following:- (a) a mental state (or process) that has some form of autonomy from World 1 brain states and processes, including those that may have helped produce it; (b) that mental state (or process) effecting changes to World 1 brain states/processes; (c) the changed World 1 brain states/processes producing World 1 action by the body. In Popper's view, despite the many difficulties and imponderables raised by mind-brain liaison, critical discussion favours the common sense conclusion that there occurs such "downward causation" (i.e. of mental states/processes changing underlying physical brain states/processes), even though we do not know how it occurs.

Problems with Cartesian dualism and mind-brain causation led to mistaken rejection of dualism

Challenging the view that dualism is a Cartesian bogey, Popper argues that some form of mind-body dualist interaction has been the predominant position throughout human history, both philosophically and as a matter of common sense, and as reflected in the law. This dualism was considered as relatively unproblematic until the time of Descartes when it became a pressing concern to explain how something as possibly ethereal and scientifically untestable as 'mind' could fit within the materialistic and mechanistic conceptions of the Scientific Revolution. Popper proposes that mind-body dualism subsequently suffered because it became identified with "Cartesian dualism", which turns out to be an untenable form of dualist interactionism. In Descartes' approach, mind and body must interact by one 'pushing' on the other, as 'push' is the only form of causal connection accepted by Descartes. Yet in Descartes' view both mind and body are "substances", the difference between them being that bodies are material substances and the mind consists of an immaterial substance. This proves untenable as a scheme of explanation because it is impossible to see how an immaterial substance (here 'mind') could 'push' on material bodies (say, the brain) when 'push' is conceived as a purely material form of contact.

In opposition to this scheme of explanation, Popper rejects both the view that minds and bodies should be regarded as "substances" and Descartes' view that all causation is some form of 'push'. Popper also rejects those post-Cartesian theories that might appear to circumvent the causal issues, thrown up by interactionism, by denying there is any mind-body interaction - whether the denial takes the form of 'identity theories' that assert mental events are just physical brain events, or takes the form of a mind-body parallelism, such as epiphenomenalism, which denies mental activity has any effect on the physical world. While materialistic identity theories might seem very different to dualistic theories like epiphenomenalism, Popper argues that both are in the same boat in terms of denying that mental states have any causal effect on World 1, and that this brings both into conflict with a Darwinian explanation for the evolution of mental states which must be based on their causal effects in terms of World 1 adaptiveness, reproduction and survival. More broadly, Popper also rejects a narrowly materialistic view of the universe, arguing that, since the Scientific Revolution, the programme of explaining everything in terms of matter has been transcended within science itself e.g. by the need to explain matter in terms of non-material forces. His position is readily allied with the view that many intuitions and arguments (a) against the reality of an autonomous, causally affective World 2, and (b) for regarding World 1 as causally closed (i.e. as 'cut off' from World 2 influence), are based on an outdated and overly simplistic view of the character of World 1. In particular, Popper argues that mistakenly restrictive views regarding issues of causality prompted many thinkers to wrongly abandon dualist interactionism e.g. many thinkers subscribed to the view that there were two distinct "simple theories of causation, one for World 1 and one for World 2" - material push within World 1, association of ideas and sensory 'data' within World 2 - and the seeming incompatibility of these causal theories made mind-brain interaction appear incomprehensible.

Issues of causality are often regarded as central to the problems with dualist interactionism, but Popper views these unsolved and perhaps unsolvable problems as far from decisive. For example, he admits that we do not know how such different entities as mind and bodily brain could causally interact but argues this should not be regarded as an insuperable difficulty for dualist interactionism - for we do not know how it is possible for an invisible disembodied force like gravity to causally affect huge amounts of embodied matter like stars, but rightly do not regard this as an insuperable objection to a theory of gravitation. In short, Popper argues, we may often correctly know or conjecture that certain different entities interact - even though in some fundamental sense we neither know how such interaction is possible nor know precisely how it may happen.

Popper's rejection of 'physicalism' and 'reductive materialism'

Not only are World 2 and World 3 proposed as non-physical realms, but Popper rejects purely 'physicalist' thinking in the area of understanding mind-body liaison e.g. we should avoid prescribing that only a physical model of causality can apply when understanding mind-brain interaction - for we may know that a stock market crash will likely cause a rise in unemployment, or that a conductor dropping a baton may cause the orchestra to falter, while knowing that the model of this causality cannot be a matter of pure physics. Popper also argues that we may rationally place more weight on how we actually experience mental events 'from the inside', as evidence that we actually have distinctly 'non-physical' mental experiences, than on the 'physicalist' argument that distinctly non-physical mental events do not exist because their existence is not physically detectible in the same way as physical events. In Popper's view, we may even regard subjective experience as scientifically testable, and as passing certain tests, provided we allow our mental experience to provide evidence for the test e.g. we can test for the existence of non-physical mental experience by gently pressing on our eyelid and then experiencing both the fracturing of the visual image and conscious awareness that this is due to pressure on the eyelid and not to the fracturing of the external physical world - obviously this test is not conclusive to disprove certain philosophical doubts, but it is not merely question-begging as it uses the specific character of the experience to argue for its non-physical existence, and that specific character is also inter-subjectively testable as any human with adequate sight may undertake the test for themselves.

The philosophy of 'physicalism' derives most of its attraction, Popper argues, from the explanatory success of physics and from a programme of 'reductionism' within science that holds out the promise that future developments will eventually see all problems and issues as resolvable in terms of physics (or perhaps physics and chemistry). Despite his highest regard for the explanatory successes of physics as a science, Popper regards 'physicalism' as a mistaken attempt to elevate this success into a monistic philosophy of everything - by contrast, he argues, our increased understanding of the evolution of the universe (itself indebted to physics) shows that there has emerged a plurality of many distinct kinds of entity, from the platypus to the experience of grief to a Beethoven symphony, and that many of these entities have a character that cannot readily be accounted for in terms of physics or chemistry. He emphasises three main points that undermine 'reductionism' as a general philosophy:- (1) attempts at reductions within science have only been partial, if striking, successes - so that, for example, at present science is not even close to reducing the explanations needed for chemistry to those of pure physics; (2) a complete 'reductionism' of everything to physics would have to include reducing scientific explanation itself to a product of physics, and there are many reasons this is not feasible - including that scientific explanation arises from World 2 activity and World 3 theories that cannot be reduced to pure physics; (3) reductionism as a programme within science is rightly pursued because a successful reduction increases testability/falsifiability by having a more general unifying theory supplant two or more disparate theories, but reductionism as a philosophical diktat has the opposite tendency - as it involves denying without test the existence of a class of entities (e.g. World 2 mental events) which, if admitted to exist, would be a class of potential falsifiers.

Mind-body interaction results from complexes of many states, processes and systems

In Popper's version of dualist interactionism, human mental states and processes arise from extremely complex and intensely active World 1 processes in the brain. Such is the level of complexity and activity that it may be somewhat misleading to speak of a mental state or process in singular terms, as the actual workings of mind and brain may arise from interacting complexes of multiple physical and mental states and processes. In this regard, referring to a mental or brain state or process as if they are a singular entity may be understood as just a useful simplification - and not a reflection of the more intricate reality where the state or process is a complex composite. Accordingly, we may understand a human's eventual decision to travel across the world to meet a long-lost relative as being the product of many distinct states, processes and systems over an extended period of time - including unconscious states and processes, such as in dreams, and including World 3-based knowledge, for example regarding available modes of transport and necessary documentation and immunisation.

The World 1 activities of the brain may be analysed in terms of physics and chemistry but also biology, as the human brain is a living and highly active organ - the most complex and most intensely active entity within World 1 - with this giving rise to consideration of the biological purposes of brain activity. Popper allows that in many cases mental events may be mere causal upshots of World 1 brain processes, running parallel to the brain processes without affecting those processes in turn (e.g. many aspects of visual processing may result from a body-mind parallelism, which may explain why knowledge of an optical illusion still leaves us helpless to visualise any differently). But, considered in terms of biological purposes, Popper argues that it does not fit with an evolutionary view of the mind to consider the entire plethora of mental events as never producing any effect on the bodily brain:- for the evolution of greater mental capacity (that we may trace in the 'higher' animals compared to the 'lower') would have no rationale in terms of 'natural selection' if that greater mental capacity had no causal impact on the animal's actions and behaviour. (Such evolution is very hard to rationally explain without recourse to 'natural selection' and it is very hard to apply 'natural selection' to the evolution of entities that play no causal role in survival and adaptive behaviour.) Therefore there must exist instances of "downward causation", Popper argues, where some mental states or processes somehow sometimes act 'downwards' to alter brain states and thereby action and behaviour, if the evolution of human consciousness is to be understood as conferring any adaptive advantage in terms of 'natural selection'.

World 3 brings an additional 'system' into understanding interaction of the human mind and body

Popper's theory of World 3 takes the last argument a step further, by regarding the human mind's development of World 3 as also conferring adaptive advantages, and with World 3's continued evolution being at least partly explained by the advantages conferred. In Popper's theory, the human mind's ability, to create and interact with autonomous World 3 'objects', massively amplifies its ability to develop knowledge that is autonomous from World 1 brain states and processes.

Though the World 2 evaluation of World 3 objects is cultural rather than 'natural selection', there are, in Popper's view, many analogies to be drawn between cultural and natural evolution - especially that both work along the lines of non-inductive/Darwinian 'selection between variants' and not by inductive/Lamarckist 'instruction from environment'. The central adaptive advantage of human cultural evolution is that we can let our theories die in our stead, and grow our knowledge beyond what is otherwise 'built-into' brain and mental states/processes, by having our knowledge advanced through non-violent, non-lethal intellectual competition and co-operation - centred on the creation and evaluation of different kinds of World 3 object and "objective knowledge". Human knowledge has advanced in depth and breadth beyond the knowledge attained by other animals, and this, in Popper's view, is bound up with the development of World 3 and the expansion of humans' World 2 interaction with World 3 contents. According to Popper's theory, the depth of our cognition and the scope of our error elimination exceeds that of other animals because we are able to articulate our knowledge as World 3 objects (e.g. theories) that have greater range and depth than what is otherwise presented by sensory or subjective experience in World 2, because we are able to investigate these World 3 constructs as "objective knowledge", and because we are able to subject them to much more rigorous and systematic testing and assessment than is otherwise possible with knowledge that merely exists in the form of subjective mental states.

Mental activity as the bridge between World 1 and World 3 and as an agent in their evolution

So Popper's theory posits two cases of interaction - World 3 with World 2 and World 2 with World 1 - and Popper maintains that both cases of interaction may be rationally defended even though in both cases we lack a theory of causation that adequately explains how this interaction occurs. Popper argues that, in truth, we lack such a theory of causation in general terms - even for the different kinds of interaction within World 1 (e.g. the different physical forces with different sets of particles; the effect of structures on their components and vice versa); and also for how a 'train of thought', or any other mental process, is causally constituted within World 2. Scientific advances have shown our primitive views of World 1 causation (e.g. as materialistic 'push') to be highly inadequate (what we might mistake as simple push between two objects, like the hammer on the nail, is in fact a complex interactive process mediated by force fields). Yet the myriad complexity of interactions within World 1, as revealed by science, is not underpinned by any general theory of causation or explanation of how those interactions are causally possible:- many fundamental interactions, such as forces with matter, are asserted as part of scientific theories without science further explaining how these interactions are fundamentally possible. That is, scientific theories generally present no testable explanation, in the sense under discussion, of how their theorised 'interactions' are causally possible:- e.g. a theory of the interaction of gravity and mass may posit a two-way relationship where gravity affects the behaviour of material mass and material mass affects the operation of gravity, yet without any testable explanation of how this two-way relationship is causally possible. In this light, Popper argues, we should not regard the shortcomings in our understanding of how a form of interaction is causally possible as anything like a decisive argument against the existence of such interaction.

Popper's account of mind-brain interaction therefore eschews what he regards as either sterile or irresolvable causal issues (e.g. as to how the causation involved is possible or actually occurs) to emphasise that we nevertheless have sufficient reason to conjecture that such interaction does occur. He argues that the mind-body interface is one where the relevant World 1 and World 2 states/processes are highly active - intensely alive - and that mind-body interaction should be understood as resulting from intense live activity rather than lifeless causal mechanisms; and he suggests the ways the mind 'reads off' from brain activity follows the active model of "making and matching" that is central to how knowledge develops within the tiny fraction of World 1 that is alive.

In Popper's later work he proposed a 'spearhead' model for Darwinian explanation in line with his "three worlds" theory:- supplementing the view that 'natural selection' works on passive genetic material with the view that the activity of organisms (e.g. in pursuing new ecological niches) may crucially change the character of their selection pressures. Where such changed selection pressures emerge from changed behaviour due to an organism's World 2 preferences (and/or mental states/processes), we may see both the immense evolutionary value of World 2 and its immense role in affecting evolutionary change in World 1 terms:- (a) how World 2 activity can act as a 'spearhead' for behavioural change and consequent gene-pool change within World 1; and (b) how the increased variation in behaviour facilitated by World 2 greatly increases the variety for 'natural selection' to cull, and so provides a much richer field for a theory of evolution by 'natural selection' than the field of genetic mutations alone. In a similar way to how World 2 may enrich World 1, for example by enlarging the repertoire of behavioural responses within World 1, so Popper argues that World 3 also enriches the human World 2 and the possibilities for human action in World 1. In both cases of interaction - World 1 with World 2, and World 2 with World 3 - Popper emphasises the active role of World 2 in producing evolutionary change within World 1 and within World 3.

The interaction of World 2 and World 3

The interaction of World 2 and World 3 - more precisely, of entities within these respective realms - is based on the theory that World 3 objects have a form of autonomous existence from any mental processes within World 2, and that these World 3 objects can play the role of autonomous objects when made subject to World 2 activity. It is the interplay between these autonomous objects and World 2 activity that constitutes the interaction of World 3 and World 2.

As discussed above, this autonomy of World 3 objects is, Popper argues, bound up with how such 'objects' can be formulated or grasped in language, or in some other medium outside of World 2 states and processes i.e. by how such entities can be expressed as "objective knowledge". "Objective knowledge", in Popper's sense, need not be correct or true - its "objective" character is not because it reflects anything like a God-like objectivity but because it exists as a criticisable object. Its autonomous existence as a criticisable object makes possible its critical assessment and evaluation, and opens the door to the further development and improvement of such objects.

The interaction of World 3 and World 1

A World 3 object may be embodied in World 1. For example, Hamlet as a World 3 object may be embodied many times in World 1 as a printed edition of the play, and it may be embodied many times in World 1 through a performance of the play.

As discussed above, a book or other writing which expresses or represents World 3 content is regarded by Popper as a World 1 vehicle for the World 3 content. The World 3 content retains its World 3 character, in Popper's view, and is not converted into some form of World 1 content. Accordingly, books, and other forms of writing, are "World 3.1" or "World 1.3" objects - they are objects within World 1 that provide vehicles for relevant World 3 content. This representation of World 3 content by a World 1 vehicle is not considered, by Popper, to constitute any direct interaction between World 1 and World 3. Instead, for Popper, World 3 - as a "World" of intelligible abstractions - only indirectly interacts with World 1, through the activity of World 2. In the case of the production of books, human mental activity is the bridge between the relevant World 3 content and its expression in a World 1 form. In the case of a performance of Hamlet human mental activity is the bridge between the World 3 object and its expression in World 1 - and, as with books, the performance on stage is not a mere World 1 object but rather a hybrid "World 3.1" entity.

The deterioration or alteration of World 1 objects by World 1 processes, so they no longer represent World 3 content as they had previously, is also not considered by Popper to be any form of direct interaction between World 1 and World 3. For example, where a manuscript loses vital words through ink fading over time - and thereby suffers vital changes to how it represents the World 3 content - the manuscript as a physical object is changing in terms of how it represents the relevant World 3 content but it is not thereby interacting with World 3. Likewise, a road sign blown by the wind to point in the wrong direction may change the direction it signals - and so its World 3 meaning may be changed because the World 1 object is affected by a World 1 process - but this is not World 1 interacting with World 3, Popper argues, instead it is another case where a World 1 process affects how a World 1 object continues to represent World 3 content. (Another case may be how the Venus de Milo lost her arms.)

This is also Popper's approach to World 3 content that is processed by computers. In his view, computers are World 1 entities and systems that may process and modify all kinds of World 3 content, but they do so only through the operation of World 1 processes (e.g. as instructed by physically constituted computer programmes) and not by any interaction with World 3 itself.

On Popper's approach, when a computer like a pocket calculator processes a sum like "5 x 5 = 25" it is not interacting with any World 3 content in the way the human mind may do when performing the same calculation. In the case of the computer, the relevant World 3 content has been made part of its physical programme in World 1, and the computer merely performs a World 1 operation on that content according to instructions physically encoded in its World 1 programme. A computer may develop a fault in its physical programme so that it no longer performs a calculation correctly, but the computer has no World 2 and so can have no mental awareness of this. As the computer is not mentally engaged with any relevant World 3 content, it will be unable to consciously identify and correct the error as a human might. 'Error correction' within computers is never a matter of critical assessment by its World 2 of World 3 content - say, in terms of whether that content conforms to certain World 3 standards or principles - but can only arise from some further aspect of the computer's World 1 programmes being able to check and correct for errors in some other part of its World 1 programmes. So a computer, that through physical malfunction or programming error produces the figure "26" onscreen in response to "5" "x" "5" being keyed in, will never mentally realise - as a human might - that this cannot be correct because it violates the World 3 principle or rule that multiples of "5" always end in either "5" or "0".

See also

• Eccles' philosophy
• Emergence - In terms of Popper's three worlds' theory, "emergence" is a term used in an evolutionary sense - it refers to how new or novel entities arise or emerge in the course of evolution. While the term "evolution" may have originally denoted the gradual unrolling of what is already there (to be unrolled), Popper's theory of evolution and emergence is indeterministic and asserts that actual evolution within the universe is a creative process where new entities arise or emerge. The newness of these entities reflects the fact that they did not exist within the preceding circumstances e.g. an element like cobalt did not exist in the initial stages of the universe, and an animal like a platypus did not exist in the initial stages of life on earth. In each case the existence of the new entity may be viewed as arising in some way from the preceding circumstances but without its emergence being completely predictable from (or preformed within, or reducible to) the entities that constituted those preceding circumstances. This sense of emergence should not be confused with "when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own":- the issue of an entity forming a distinct 'whole', that has properties as a whole that are not properties of the individual constituents of the whole, is discussed by Popper using the separate term 'holism'.
• Platonic realm
• Third Realm (Frege)
• Trichotomy (philosophy)
• Group mind
• Logical Investigations

References

• Eccles, J. C. (1970). Facing Reality: Philosophical Adventures by a Brain Scientist. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 978-1-4757-3997-8.
• Heller, Michael (2011). Philosophy in Science: An Historical Introduction. Springer.
• Niiniluoto, Ilkka (2006). "World 3: A Critical Defence". In Jarvie, Ian; Milford, Karl; Miller, David (eds.). Karl Popper: Metaphysics and epistemology. Ashgate.
• Popper, Karl (1968) [reprinted in Popper 1972, chap. 3.]. Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject. Third International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 25 August 1967. Amsterdam.
• Popper, Karl (1972). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.

Further reading

• Popper, Karl; Eccles, John C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.
• Popper, Karl (7 April 1978). Three Worlds by Karl Popper (PDF). The Tanner Lecture on Human Values. Talk delivered at The University of Michigan.
• Popper, Karl (1982). The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism.
• Popper, Karl (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem.
• Popper, Karl (1994) [First edition 1945]. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Routledge 2012, Princeton University Press 2013.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)