Talk:Sino-Indian War

Sources

A recent monograph on the 1962 war has a section on "Historiography" which lists about two dozen scholarly sources. Out of all these sources, Neville Maxwell is the only source used in this article to any great extent. However, two other sources Calvin and Guruswamy, who are not listed by scholars but toe the same line as Maxwell, have also been used extensively. Consequently, this article is too narrowly focused and displays extreme POV. I am tagging it for now, and will be working on fixing the problem in due course. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:14, 22 September 2017 (UTC)

References

There are sources galore on Sino-Tibetan relations since the 8th century as well as on Tibetan history and Chinese history. Of course practically each source has its own context and slant, and that is why it is important to read up as many books - I mean books, as distinct from newspaper or magazine articles - as time and interest in the topic permit. For instance, one finds from William Dalrymple's book "Return of a King" on Afghanistan an appreciation of the "great game" between the British and the Russians in Central Asia that considerably distracted the British from the developing situation to the immediate north of India. Or on Dr. Alastair Lamb as to how Sir John Morley, then Secretary of State for India in 1890s, influenced British policy towards China and Tibet.To rely only on one or two sources will only lead the "Talk" astray. Pidiji (talk) 03:25, 16 November 2017 (UTC)

Can you give examples of this "extreme POV"? I am curious of reader how this article is supposed to be biased Mateusz Konieczny (talk) 11:02, 31 May 2018 (UTC)

You can look at this edit that I made after studying the new sources (i.e., sources other than Maxwell, Calvin and Guruswamy), especially the paragraph starting with W. H. Johnson. The old text makes it appear as if a British civil servant, with self-gain in mind, defined an extended territory for the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then declared it as his territory. Sure enough, the civil servant then got a plum post as the Governor of Ladakh. And notice the severe demonisation as well: Johnson's work was severely criticised as inaccurate. His boundary line was described as "patently absurd", and extending further north than the Indian claim. The fact, it turns out, is that the Mahraja's dynasty claimed all that territory ever since they conquered Ladakh (even before they came under British control). Their general Zorawar Singh Kahluria was even itching to invade Chinese Turkestan. The fact is also that the Chinese Turkestan never had any interest in that territory. It was the British that made persistent efforts to give it to them (to create a buffer zone between Russia and India). The civil servant, it turns out, was basically documenting the situation as it existed. And the faults in his survey work were entirely understandable given the state of knowledge at that time, and the constraints under which he was operating. You can see the W. H. Johnson page for details. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:35, 31 May 2018 (UTC)

Neville Maxwell is a reliable source who has valid authority knowledge of the event. In addition, the Indian government has not 'solidly' denied any of his specific reports despite being very much aware of his significance. They simply refused to admit he's correct and continue to refuse to declassify the reports out of avoidance. That speaks for itself. 😒 120.17.233.32 (talk) 20:21, 4 March 2019 (UTC)

I have no idea what is meant by a "valid authority". It is fine to say that he is a "reliable source", mainly because he has been cited in plenty of scholarly articles, even if to disagree with what he says. But, at the end of day, he is just a journalist, who sees, hears and reports. He is not a scholar. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:53, 19 October 2019 (UTC)

Mohan Guruswamy

Looking at the Mohan Gurswamy article again, which has been used here for all kinds of things, I find this rather surprising passage:

This was the MacCartney-Macdonald line that excluded most of the Aksai Chin. The British tried to get the Chinese to sign an agreement to this effect. The Chinese did not respond to these moves and Lord Curzon concluded their silence could be taken as acquiescence and decided that, henceforth, this should be considered the border, and so it was. Interestingly this line, by and large, corresponds with the Chinese claim line, which in turn, by and large, coincides with the Line of Actual Control.

Even lay readers know that the MacDonald line goes beyond the Lanak La pass whereas the "Line of Actual Control" is at the Kongka Pass. It seems that this man does not really know his head from his tail. I am tagging all citations to his article as unreliable. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:50, 19 October 2019 (UTC)

I agree, Guruswamy's writings, especially his works hosted on Rediff, have several errors and inconsistencies. The Discoverer (talk) 07:39, 20 October 2019 (UTC)

And, be aware this his book, coauthored with Daulet Singh and published by something called "Viva Books", has very much the same problems. And, another book by some one called "Anna Orton" (appears to be a fake name) has plagiarised large parts of it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:48, 20 October 2019 (UTC)

Both of those book publishers, Viva and Epitome, are vanity press and can not be considered reliable sources, per WP:RSSELF. GA-RT-22 (talk) 17:41, 2 January 2021 (UTC)

Kongka sentence

So I recently updated the section about Kongka Pass incident, without knowing there was this discussion here. In the write up, I tried to stay away from any controversial stuff (where's the border is/was, who shot first, etc), focused mostly on the facts on the ground, and mainly only used Indian sources -- the Indian published diplomatic white paper (memos between the 2 countries) & special edition of Indian Police Journal on the Police Memorial. Any objections to me just replacing Mohan cite for the sentence about Kongka camp incident? --Voidvector (talk) 00:28, 7 January 2020 (UTC)

Please do. Mohan Guruswamy cites are meant to be replaced. Even though this particular citation is actually harmless, there are plenty of others that are POV-ridden. I wouldn't him being entirely banished from this page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:47, 8 January 2020 (UTC)

James Bernard Calvin

Another heavily used source (some 52 times) is a paper/thesis by James Bernard Calvin, at the US Marine Corp Staff College. Admittedly, this is a good piece of work and covers a lot of the detail of the hostilities. However it is student research. Even if we deem it to be equivalent to a PhD thesis, as per WP:SCHOLARSHIP, it should be used cautiously. Statements like "According to James Bernard Calvin" have no place here. If the issue calls for judgement, a student's judgement cannot be taken as authentic or encyclopaedic. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:23, 22 October 2019 (UTC)

this is an article on military history and Calvin is a professional soldier, which is the expertise the other authors lack. He is writing at a major research center for military studies. Note that university history departments rarely have faculty who specialize in military history. Rjensen (talk) 08:41, 8 May 2023 (UTC)

Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India and Indian media

Used extensively for a total of 17 times to support mostly otherwise unsourced and somewhat controversial claims. I hardly think that a government source from one of the belligerents is appropriate for an article such like this. Similarly, this applies to the website of Chushi Gangdruk, which was an Indian backed Tibetian militant group.

Also quoted throughout the article are articles from various Indian newspapers, including Times of India, which is known to publish unverified news stories, paid news and right wing conspiracy theories. Given the pervasiveness in the article, India's low press freedom as well as a history of publishing unverified erroneous news, I believe that they should be replaced by alternate scholarly sources, or a review of articles conducted. Dark-World25 (talk) 00:48, 17 July 2021 (UTC)

John W. Garver

John Garver's book chapter called "China's decision for war with India" (2006) has been cited over 30 times on this page. In addition to this substantial work, he has written a book called Protracted Contest (2011), which is supposed to be about Sino-Indian rivalry, and another book called China's Quest (2015). Garver works in International Relations with special expertise in China's foreign policy [1].

His writings seem to be based mostly on Chinese sources, which are often not even cited, and the quality of these materials is questionable. Even top strategic experts in China rarely know what their government has actually claimed or done, and the government sources themselves just put out self-serving propaganda. One would expect a scholar relying on such materials to critically evaluate the sources and information which, in my view, Garver does not do. Here are some examples:

• In China's Quest, I notice the statements: The road crossed a high, remote, desolate, and cold desert region known as Aksai Chin. China believed this region had traditionally been part of Tibet. It is news to me that China ever regarded Aksai Chin as part of Tibet. It is officially marked as part of Xinjiang. (The difference matters, because we need to know which history is being used as the basis for the claim.)
• In China's decision for war, we see the statement: India's policies along the border, and especially the Forward Policy adopted in November 1961, were seen by China's leaders as constituting incremental Indian seizure of Chinese-controlled territory, and there is little basis for deeming that view inaccurate. The last clause gives the appearance that Garver evaluated the claim and found it to be accurate. No explanation can be found as to how he arrived at this conclusion.

He is squarely contradicted by other sources. For instance, Hoffmann's India and the China Crisis states: On the basis of this information, the [Indian] MEA (..) concluded that the Chinese were attempting to move up to their 1960 claim line in some strength. The Forward Policy was designed to forestall this possibility. In fact, no mention of the "1960 claim line" or its antecedent, the "1956 claim line", can be found in any of Garver's writings. He only knows of one "claim line". His Protracted Contest has a chapter called "The Territorial Dispute" without a single map of the contested border. This is ironic, because Hoffmann's book (as well Dorothy Woodman and even Neville Maxwell) has numerous maps, practically all of which document the various claim lines. Garver seems oblivious of all such subtleties.

Garver knows that India disagreed with the claim. He writes: According to the official Indian history, before 1961 a "wide corridor of empty area" separated Chinese forward outposts from lndian outposts. But he seems disinterested in finding out what the truth is. (He cites Hoffmann off and on, but there is no evidence that he has processed his information.)

To sum up, the Chinese claimed that the Indians were capturing their territory; the Indians claimed that they were capturing empty area. Garver, without explanation, sided with the Chinese claim. He is oblivious of other scholars who actually studied the issue.

• The passage that I found the most troublesome is this one (Protracted Contest, p.83): The westerly route via Aksai Chin was an old caravan route and in many ways the best. It was the only route that was open year-round, throughout both the winter and the monsoon season. The Dzungar army that had reached Lhasa in 1717, precipitating the Qing counter-intervention mentioned in the previous chapter, had followed this route. A detachment of PLA cavalry also followed this route in 1951 to participate in the occupation of Tibet.

This makes two strong historical claims, with absolutely no evidence and no citations. (The Chinese routinely make these same claims, again with no evidence.) Strangely, Garver himself gave the accurate route of the Dzungars on pp. 25-26, though he doesn't seem to realize that it is a different route that is well to the east of (what we now call) Aksai Chin. In the early eighteenth century a Dzungar Mongol army marched from the Ili Valley [Khotan Valley] via Hetian [Yutian, also called Keriya]) in today's southern Xinjiang to atop the Tibetan plateau and thence to Lhasa. The 1951 PLA cavalry also followed a similar route. They reached a place called Zhama Mangbao (Shenchen/Xianqian), where most of them perished due to some disease.

In summary, I think Garver can at best be used to discuss China's foreign policy. He is unreliable for the Indian side of the dispute, and even more so for geographical and historical matters. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:12, 14 November 2022 (UTC)

References

Semi-protected edit request on 17 October 2022

china had only 10,000, not 80,000 read this in a book about the Sino-Indian war Ithekid (talk) 18:47, 17 October 2022 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. MadGuy7023 (talk) 19:24, 17 October 2022 (UTC)

Infobox

@Kautilya3: The casualties statistics I added were provided by T.N. Kaul.

2nd modification is changing "Status quo ante bellum in Assam Himalaya" to "Chinese withdrawal from Arunachal Pradesh". The wording used by sources for the location in question is "Arunachal Pradesh". Chinese withdrawal from this region happened after international pressure but it was still "withdrawal".

Let me know your issues with these additions. Capitals00 (talk) 21:09, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

T. N. Kaul was the General in charge of the eastern sector, seriously involved, and also quite incompetent. I also find Jayat Kumar Ray to be quite wishy-washy as a scholar. His book is extremely opinionated.

Status quo ante bellum as the accurate description given the Garver quote, which is also quite accurate. They went back to the old positions and reinstated the pre-war LAC. "Withdrawal" makes no sense becuase they didn't withdraw from anywhere with respect to the pre-war position. Liegl is unnecessary also because he is not a balanced scholar. His speciality is only Chinese politics. Notice his amusing claim that the disputed territory was "paritioned"! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:32, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

India supposedly "received 82,000 square kilometres of Arunachal Pradesh". Received it from whom? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:38, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

T.N. Kaul has been added under "Indian sources" and Jayanta Kumar Ray seems reliable enough for this information. It's just a figure provided by Indian sources.

Can we still change "Assam Himalaya" to "Arunachal Pradesh"? Capitals00 (talk) 21:42, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Indian Official History, written by reputed by military hisitorians based on actual evidence, is quite good and accepted by scholars. Kaul is just pulling figures out of thin air. Totally baseless claims. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:44, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Do you have any issue with changing "Assam Himalaya" to "Arunachal Pradesh"? Capitals00 (talk) 21:49, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Only a mild one because it is an anachronistic term here. I have changed it to North-East Frontier because that is being used. "Assam Himalaya" is a perfectly fine term actually because agencies were attached to provinces/states in those days.

I also mistook your T.N. Kaul for B.M. Kaul. Sorry about that. But still, those figures look quite random to me. Let me dig into it a bit. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:17, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

The Official History says the Western Command estimated 2,500 Chinese casualties, but disbelieves it. It estimaes 1,000 in the West. For the East, it didn't even bother to try. So, T.N.Kaul's 10,000 is out of whack. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:45, 25 December 2022 (UTC)

Result/territory

Its a well known fact that Aksai Chin was never even controlled by India and this war ended without any territory change. So why this should not be mentioned on infobox like all other articles? The current use of result field of this article looks too bloated and unnecessary. To mention status quo only for north-east but not Aksai Chin looks utterly misleading. Article body is for lengthy explanations, not infobox. The result field should only say "Chinese victory" while the territory field should just say "no territorial change". >>> Extorc.talk 20:51, 17 February 2023 (UTC)

I agree. War also location mentions "Assam" but no result about it is mentioned. Current version looks very ambiguous. Aman Kumar Goel ^(Talk) 21:32, 17 February 2023 (UTC)

• The entire result field contradicts the hard won consensus at Talk:Sino-Indian_War/Archive_10#Territorial_change which was about fixing the result and territory field. The false claim that China took Aksai Chin was added on 17 June 2021 [2] by an editor and then the result was expanded by Kautilya3 on the same day.[3] But I don't see any consensus for these edits. I have removed it because the last discussion was very lengthy and I had ensured addressing every contrary point. Unless new consensus is gained there is no need to make these modifications. Capitals00 (talk) 03:24, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

I don't see what was supposedly agreed in the 2017 thread. There is neither a proposal nor sources supporting it. I only see disagreements. Saying nothing about the result is not viable, as it appears to have been the case when Swtadi143 started editing. He made a resonable edit based on his/her knowledge and I fixed it. If you want to make a proposal, please go ahead. We don't want a yet another meandering discussion with no conclusion in sight. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:54, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

If there was no conclusion then why it remained as is until mid 2021 until it was unilaterally changed by you? Capitals00 (talk) 05:29, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

wHO DO rs SAY WON? Slatersteven (talk) 15:28, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

@Slatersteven: There is no doubt that China won, but there is also no doubt that no change in territory happened. Shouldnt infobox only mention these two things i.e. "Chinese victory" and "No territorial change"? Any additional details should be discussed on article, not infobox. Capitals00 (talk) 16:02, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

That is delusional. Four good sources have been cited to say that territorial change has happened. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:30, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: This claim was already debunked in the 2017 discussion. Not a single source confirms any territorial change happened with this war. India never controlled Aksai Chin. Capitals00 (talk) 05:29, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

If you have already debunked them, then it should be easy enough to copy-paste what you said. Just about these four sources. Plus there is going to be a fifth source, which I will add as soon as I can find it. You can debunk that as well. Then we can have a discussion. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:22, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

"This claim was already debunked in 2017 discussion" I said. I haven't said that these four sources were debunked, though Taylor was. Nevertheless, I can do it now.

1st source, "On 21 November Beijing announced a unilateral ceasefire to be followed by the withdrawal of Chinese troops to the north of the McMahon Line. But China would retain control up to its 1960 claimline in Ladakh—a situation that persists till today." = We all agreed in 2017 that China occupied Aksai Chin since 1959 and India never controlled it. What's new here?

2nd source, "China occupied several thousand square kilometers of land in the western sector of its dispute with India in the late 1950s. After the war in 1962, China may have gained control over an additional 1,000 square kilometers of territory. = This source was over here that the source is dubious because no other reliable sources make this claim and it does not provide any details beyond "may have" because it is necessary to know what was occupied.

3rd source, "Their aim in 1962 in the Western Sector was to remove 43 Indian posts (out of 72) which they considered were across their Claim Line. However, there was one exception and that was in the Depsang Plain (southeast of Karakoram Pass) where they seemed to have overstepped their Claim Line and straightened the eastward bulge." = Are we really using a news source for this? The author of the article is a major general (see WP:PRIMARY) and comes with a number of misleading claims. Such as "whole of Kailash Range passed into Chinese hands" (which was always under Chinese control), and "Chushul" does not exist in "no man's land". China had captured Rezang la in Chushul but had to withdraw.[4]

4th source: "According to Yun Sun, analyst at the Stimson Centre in Washington DC, the PLA were seeking to assert [in 2020] the line they had reached following their offensive in 1962. Though China maintains that they have been holding this line since even earlier, 7 November 1959" = Yes there is no evidence to contrary. Capitals00 (talk) 21:21, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

My goodness! This is all you have? You are going to shoot down esablished scholars with your own WP:OR? You have been here long enough to know you can't do that!

• 1st source is Srinath Raghavan, who has been praised with superlatives such as "one of the very best diplomatic and military historians working on modern South Asia"[5].
• 2nd source is Taylor Fravel, Sloan Professor of Political Science at MIT, and author of multiple books on Chinese military and diplomatic affairs.
• 3rd source is Maj. Gen. P.J.S. Sandhu, the lead author of the following book, a history of the 1962 war based on Chinese military sources.
  • Sandhu, P. J. S.; Shankar, Vinay; Dwivedi, G. G. (2015), 1962: A View from the Other Side of the Hill, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-84464-37-0

and numerous others listed at United Service Institution.

• 4th source is Manoj Joshi, a Senior Research Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, an author of multiple military cum security-related works on India, inclding the most recent:
  • Joshi, Manoj (2022), Understanding the India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in High Himalaya, Oxford University Press, ISBN 9781787388833

You think you can shoot all these experts down based on your own rudimentary understanding which doesn't go much beyond the two words "Aksai" and "Chin"? You are out of your mind!

You can only counter established sources with other sources of equal or better quality. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:39, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

Not OR if information is disputed on verifiable basis. Where I have denied the information from 1st source (Srinath Raghavan) and 4th source (Manoj Joshi)? Only Taylor Fravel (who was also refuted in 2017 discussion) and P.J.S. Sandhu (a WP:PRIMARY) are the disputed sources.

"Vij Books India Pvt Ltd" is an Indian military books publisher which allows military members to publish their accounts, thus publishing a book here alone does not make anyone reliable. Surely you won't accept Chinese military sources on the subject. Capitals00 (talk) 03:47, 20 February 2023 (UTC)

As for providing reliable sources to counter the information, a number of sources have been already provided earlier. Though I won't repeat them for now. Here are some more:-

• Jayanta Kumar Ray (2013). India's Foreign Relations, 1947-2007. South Asian History and Culture. Routledge. p. 222. ISBN 978-1-136-19714-7. India did not, as China desired, retreat 20 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control in the western sector.

• Larry Wortzel (1999). Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History. Greenwood Press. p. 225. ISBN 978-0-313-29337-5. The Chinese simultaneously announced a December 1, 1962, withdrawal to positions 20 kilometers behind the "line of actual control" that existed between China and India on November 7, 1959, reviving a formula that was used to defuse the crisis in that year.

• Byron N. Tzou (1990). China and International Law: The Boundary Disputes. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-275-93462-0. On November 21, China repeated her proposal of October 24, and announced unilaterally that her frontier guards would cease fire the next day and withdraw 20 kilometers behind the line controlled before November 1959. The Chinese withdrawal began on December 1 and continued roughly on schedule.

• Rong Ying (2002-12-20). "40 years after the Sino-Indian 1962 war". Rediff.com. "Chinese frontier guards would observe a ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border, and from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards would withdraw 20km from the line of actual control existing along the entire border on November 7, 1959. In the eastern sector, the counter-attack of self-defence was launched in the area of Chinese territory north of the traditional boundary, but the Chinese frontier guards were ready to withdraw from their positions to the line of actual control, that is, 20km north of the McMahon Line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese side would withdraw 20km from the line of actual control. What must be pointed out is that the positions of the Chinese frontier guards after their stated withdrawal would be much farther away from their positions before September 8, 1962."

Old sources confirming the above

• Asian Recorder. 1963. p. 4967. The Chinese Defence Ministry announced on November 30 that its troops would begin their withdrawal in N - EFA and Ladakh and pull back 20 kilometres behind the " actual line of control " on November 7 , 1959.

• Boulger, D.C.; Oriental Institute (Woking, Surrey); East India Association (London, England) (1964). Asiatic Review. East & West. p. 55. Despite India's unwillingness to comply with China's suggestion Chinese troops did fall back to the 20 kilometres area behind the line held in 1959.

There was absolutely no change in the territory with this war since China had withdrawn 20 kilometers from its 1959 line, whereas India refused to withdraw 20 kilometers. The result of the war was not entirely in favor of China. When writing the infobox, the information should concern only what happened in this war and it is uncontroversial to say that no territory change happened. Capitals00 (talk) 04:22, 20 February 2023 (UTC)

This is even more WP:OR, and a pretty silly and fallacious one. Withdrawing 20 km does not mean that the line of control shifted back by 20 km! That is just a demilitarisation measure. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:25, 20 February 2023 (UTC)

Both India and China published their idea of where the line was. The two versions were in broad agreement, and they were documented by the US Army and the Colombo powers. There are little differences, which were attempted to be exploited by China in the recent standoff. But they make no difference to the broad issue of territorial change. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:34, 20 February 2023 (UTC)

If "status quo" is not the result then the mainstream view should differ on this. The "pre-war" position was restored. Is there any doubt? And if there is any doubt is it widespread? Its been 60 years since this war so there should be no confusion. >>> Extorc.talk 14:35, 20 February 2023 (UTC)

• I have been pinged at my TP here to participate in this discussion in consequence of my participation in a similar discussion at Talk:Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1947–1948. I am presently reviewing the material relating to this. Cinderella157 (talk) 23:26, 3 March 2023 (UTC)

Comment Firstly, I observe that there is no dispute that this should be reported as a Chinese victory. Per MOS:MIL, there is clear guidance as to the use of the result parameter in the infobox: it is to report who won. It should not be used for multiple dot points as done in this article. To the matter of territorial changes, I will make these observations. In the west (and particularly Aksai Chin), the borders had only been loosely defined (multiple times) by the British and not "controlled" by either the British or Chinese. There is no clear status quo ante. In the east, there was a delineation that had been mark on the ground and established a status quo ante of sorts. However, this differed slightly from what had been marked on maps. Of course, both sides had differing views on who owned what, otherwise there would have been no dispute. A view taken at arms-length from the dispute is that the borders were fuzzy - particularly in the west. Asserting a change in territory post bellum is to assert defined territory ante bellum. One can only do this by choosing one of many options which would ipso facto be a Wiki POV and WP:OR since there does not appear to be a consensus in the independent sources. It would also assert in a Wiki voice a POV favouring the initial claim of one side or the other by asserting that one side lost territory relative to the other. Consequently, it is my view that Wiki should remain silent on this question, confining itself to describing where the borders lay at the end of the day without the appearance of being partisan.

As the result parameter is not for dot points, I have removed these. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:49, 5 March 2023 (UTC)

I have reinstated the points. They are necessary to describe the true end of the conflict, as the current description of "Chinese victory" is under contention. MOS:MIL is a recommendation, not a policy; It cannot be enforced while discussions regarding NPOV concerns are ongoing over the same material. Captain Jack Sparrow (talk) 08:24, 9 March 2023 (UTC)

CapnJackSp, thank you for your subsequent self-revert. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:42, 9 March 2023 (UTC)

Doubt

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

---

Well there is a doubt, its being expressed here, so unless you can find RS saying China won we can't. Slatersteven (talk) 16:54, 18 February 2023 (UTC)

@Slatersteven: Doubt over what? Victory was Chinese but no territorial change happened with this war because it ended in status quo ante bellum. Capitals00 (talk) 05:29, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

If nothing changed, it was a draw, not a victory. This is my wp:or your wp:or does not trump it, this is why we need wp:rs saying it. Slatersteven (talk) 10:39, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

The result itself does not appear to be at issue, and why should the apodictic be contested in such offhand a fashion? The war was fought at multiple fronts, and Ladakh was but one theatre thereof. The crux of the discourse is whether the Chinese manoeuvres in Aksai Chin in the course of the war spawned material changes to the then prevailing Line of Actual Control or simply enforced it intransiently and an editorial consensus should establish either of the propositions. Offhand, laconic comments foregrounding red-herrings (the war being claimed to be a draw, for instance) are unhelpful and do a disservice to the developing discourse. MBlaze Lightning (talk) 12:03, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

Dupey and Dupey the collins Encyclopedia of military history, page 1405 "Nehru rejected the Chinese terms for settling the dispute, but since the defeated Indians had no desire to renew the war, informal truce prevailed...". Enough for me to say China won, as I said we go by what RS says. Slatersteven (talk) 15:42, 19 February 2023 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Sino-Indian war: An Indian strategic failure

User @Kautilya3, History isn't written on the narrative of Indian republic specially Pro-BJP narrative.

The war was ultimately a strategic failure for India for several reasons:

1. Lack of preparation: India was caught off guard by the Chinese invasion and had not adequately prepared for the conflict. The Indian military was ill-equipped, poorly trained, and lacked the necessary logistical support to effectively defend the border.
2. Poor intelligence: India's intelligence agencies failed to provide accurate information about the Chinese troop build-up and movements, leaving India unaware of the impending attack.
3. Strategic miscalculation: India believed that its diplomatic and military efforts would deter China from launching an attack, but China's determination to secure its border region and assert its dominance in the region proved stronger.
4. Political leadership: India's political leadership was divided and lacked clear direction, which further hindered the country's response to the conflict.
5. Chinese superiority: China's military was better equipped and better trained, and they had the advantage of surprise, making it difficult for India to mount an effective defense.

India sources:

• TheFederal | Sino-India war of 1962, what exactly caused Delhi's intelligence failure
  
• IndiaTimes | Why India lost 1962 war to China
  
• IndiaToday | Leadership failed India in 1962
  

Foreign sources:

• GlobalAsia | Nehru's role in Sino-India war
• Taylor-Franis Online | The Failure of Indian intelligence in the Sino-Indian Conflict

Now @Kautilya3 it is better if you accept the defeat instead of Coping further, thank you. ⭐️ Starkex ⭐️ 📧 ✍️ 08:30, 8 May 2023 (UTC)

Your edit has been reverted in accordance with MOS:MIL. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:13, 8 May 2023 (UTC)

Kindly can you refer me please which section of MOS:MIL have been violated by my edits? ⭐️ Starkex ⭐️ 📧 ✍️ 09:17, 8 May 2023 (UTC)

WP:MILMOS#INFOBOX. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:32, 8 May 2023 (UTC)

Indo-Sino War 1962

What I do not understand is why there is no mention of the USAF squadron of C-130s with support personnel that was sent to New Delhi in November 1962 and stayed in India for several months is not mentioned. I was there, operating out of a hangar on the Military side of Palam Airdrome seven days a week from sometime in November until the early part of January '63. We made flights into Jammu and Kashmir and Leh in the Ladakh region and occasionally out to Assam.

I read things in the Wiki discussion saying that President Kennedy was to involved with the Cuban missile crisis to get involved with India on this matter but I strongly doubt that our division commander took it upon himself to rotate squadrons on aircraft to India for several months. Alas, trying to sort this out myself on Wikipedia is too complicated, especially as it seems there are people in India that don't want to include U.S. help in flying troops and supplies into the mountains and evacuating wounded. Sgt Toot (talk) 23:51, 12 June 2023 (UTC)